Equilibrium Points of Non-Cooperative Random and Bayesian Games
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Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota
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Abstract
We provide random equilibrium existence theorems for noncooperative
random games with a countable number of players. Our results
give as corollaries generalized random versions of the ordinary equilibrium
existence result of Nash [18]. Moreover, they can be used to
obtain equilibrium existence results for games with incomplete information,
and in particular Bayesian games. In view of recent work on applications
of Bayesian games and Bayesian equilibria, the latter results seem to be
quite useful since they delineate conditions under which such equilibria
exist.
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Discussion Paper
241
241
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DOI identifier
Previously Published Citation
Yannelis, N.C., (1987), "Equilibrium Points of Non-Cooperative Random and Bayesian Games", Discussion Paper No. 241, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota.
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Suggested Citation
Yannelis, Nicholas C.. (1987). Equilibrium Points of Non-Cooperative Random and Bayesian Games. Retrieved from the University Digital Conservancy, https://hdl.handle.net/11299/55516.
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