The Choice of "Take it or Leave It" Positions
1985-04
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The Choice of "Take it or Leave It" Positions
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1985-04
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Bureau of Business and Economic Research
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Working Paper
Abstract
This paper reports the results of an experiment which was designed to test the proposition that negotiators choose their take-it-or-leave-it positions with respect to their own preferences for their best alternative in the absence of an agreement. The results do not support the proposition and suggest that negotiators choose their bargaining positions to be certain of including at least one outcome that they believe ought to be acceptable to the opponent. The choice of a take-it-or-leave-it position appears to be bounded by the negotiator's security level or maximin value on the lower side and the negotiator's minimum LOA on the upper side. The value of the past agreement is a strong predictor of a negotiator's take-it-or-leave-it value if the contract which represents this value is believed to be at least as acceptable to the opponent as it was in the previous situation.
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Mitchell, Ted J; Dion, Paul A. (1985). The Choice of "Take it or Leave It" Positions. Retrieved from the University Digital Conservancy, https://hdl.handle.net/11299/264862.
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