Biological Weapons

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Biological Weapons

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2020

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Combating Terrorism

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BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS Since 1945, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) have included chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. All have been used in wars, with casualties greatest for chemical, then nuclear, and least from biological weapons, at least in the modern era. However, modern genetic engineering technologies like “CRISPR” could change that dramatically. Historical biological weapons typically involved infectious organisms from nature like smallpox, plague and anthrax. They were used at least as early as Hannibal tossing plague infested corpses into Roman cities. Some white Americans gave smallpox-infected blankets to Indians, and a Japanese Unit #731 did similar and worse things to Chinese people during World War II. During the “Cold War” both the Soviet Union and the United States developed extensive biological warfare programs. However, near universal horror at the concept of breeding and “weaponizing” ancient plagues for use against human populations resulted in a UN mediated treaty called the “Biological Weapons Convention” that banned all such activity by civilized nations in 1975. As of January 2018, this convention has been signed and ratified by 180 of the UN’s 193 nations. Moral and legal constraints on biological weapons are challenged, however, by the relative ease and low cost of creating biological weapons compared with nuclear and even chemical weapons. Modern genetic engineering techniques (which go far beyond CRISPR) raise fears that terrorists in basements using chemicals bought online could recreate ancient scourges like smallpox, or even create new “designer diseases.” These could be “Chimera” organisms that combine lethal genes from multiple organisms, and even include genes for resistance to all known antibiotics. One of the novel properties of biological weapons compared to other WMD is that they can reproduce themselves and spread far beyond any initial target. This helped military institutions to recognize that biologicals could turn on one’s own troops, and were not very useful against military targets. Instead, they would afflict mainly vulnerable civilian populations, and could spread worldwide. Biological weapons could also be used against food crops and animals, spreading famine as well as novel plagues. For all these reasons, even the most fierce warrior generals have generally agreed that biological weapons should not be created much less used. Some terrorist groups have expressed considerable interest in WMD, however, including biological weapons. One Japanese death cult called Aum Shinrikyo made chemical weapons, killing 12 people on a subway system in 1995, and tried to make biological weapons to attack Japan’s civilian population, but it was thwarted by Japanese police and counterterrorism forces. Another cult in Oregon organized by Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh put salmonella bacteria on salad bars in ten restaurants in an attempt to swing county elections their way. In November, 1984, 751 people were sickened, but no one died. Assassinations are another area where biological weapons have been used. Biological toxins like ricin have been used to kill selected individuals like Bulgarian dissident writer Georgi Markov in London, in September of 1978. Several packages of weaponized anthrax were also sent to about a dozen targets shortly after 9/11, killing five people and infecting 17 others. According to the FBI, the alleged culprit was not a ‘typical’ terrorist, however, but a veteran of America’s biological weapons program named Bruce Ivins. There remains controversy over that conclusion, but whoever sent the US weapons-grade anthrax packages to several news media offices and two Democratic US Senators included notes with Islamic terminology hoping to arouse mass anger against Muslims. Therefore, better control of biological weapons before terrorists (or false flag operators posing as terrorists) can build or buy any is a top priority for counter-terrorism around the world today. Michael Andregg [Word count excluding “Further Reading” is 600] Further Reading Osterholm, Michael T. and Mark Olshaker, 2017. Deadliest Enemy: Our War Against Killer Germs. New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company. Wright, Susan, 2002. Biological Warfare and Disarmament: New Problems/New Perspectives. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Cirincione, Joseph, John B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, 2005. Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Threats. 2nd Edition. Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The Nuclear Threat Initiative is a well-financed, long-term, non-profit educational organization that maintains extensive files on all weapons of mass destruction, including one on biosecurity http://www.nti.org/about/biosecurity/. It also sponsors conferences like one in 2018 that can be seen whole at http://www.nti.org/about/projects/global-biosecurity-dialogue/event/nti-seminar-biosecurity-design-getting-ahead-risk-world-designer-organisms/ The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs has a link to the full text of the Biological Weapons Convention that includes many supporting documents, history and data. It is at https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/bio/ .

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This is an encyclopedia entry. Therefore, it is quite short at less than 600 carefully edited words, but it also includes suggested readings on the topic of biological weapons. They have assumed new urgency, or currency, recently due to the coronavirus pandemic.

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Andregg, Michael M.. (2020). Biological Weapons. Retrieved from the University Digital Conservancy, https://hdl.handle.net/11299/212264.

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