Generic 4 x 4 Two Person Games Have At Most 15 Nash Equilibria
Authors
Published Date
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Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota
Type
Abstract
The maximal generic number of Nash equilibria for two person games in which the
two agents each have four pure strategies is shown to be 15. In contrast to Keiding
(1995), who arrives at this result by computer enumeration, our argument is based on a
collection of lemmas that constrain the set of equilibria. Several of these pertain to any
common number d of pure strategies for the two agents.
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Discussion Paper
300
300
Funding Information
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DOI identifier
Previously Published Citation
McLennan, A. and Park, I., (1997), "Generic 4 x 4 Two Person Games Have At Most 15 Nash Equilibria", Discussion Paper No. 300, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota.
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Suggested Citation
McLennan, Andrew; Park, In-Uck. (1997). Generic 4 x 4 Two Person Games Have At Most 15 Nash Equilibria. Retrieved from the University Digital Conservancy, https://hdl.handle.net/11299/55850.
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