On Cores of Weakly Balanced Games Without Ordered Preferences
1985-10
Loading...
View/Download File
Persistent link to this item
Statistics
View StatisticsJournal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Title
On Cores of Weakly Balanced Games Without Ordered Preferences
Authors
Published Date
1985-10
Publisher
Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota
Type
Working Paper
Abstract
A new concept of balancedness for games in normal form is introduced,
called weak balanacedness. It is shown that the a-core of a weakly balanced
game with an infinite dimensional strategy space and without ordered preferences
is nonempty. Using this result we prove core existence theorems for economies
(either exchange economies of coalitional production economies) with infinitely
many commodities and without ordered preferences, by converting the economy to a
game and showing that the derived game is weakly balanced. Surprisingly, no
convexity assumption on preferences is needed to demonstrate that the game
derived from the economy is weakly balanced.
Keywords
Description
Related to
Replaces
License
Series/Report Number
Funding information
Isbn identifier
Doi identifier
Previously Published Citation
Yannelis, N.C., (1985), "On Cores of Weakly Balanced Games without Ordered Preferences", Discussion Paper No. 224, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota.
Suggested citation
Yannelis, Nicholas C.. (1985). On Cores of Weakly Balanced Games Without Ordered Preferences. Retrieved from the University Digital Conservancy, https://hdl.handle.net/11299/55494.
Content distributed via the University Digital Conservancy may be subject to additional license and use restrictions applied by the depositor. By using these files, users agree to the Terms of Use. Materials in the UDC may contain content that is disturbing and/or harmful. For more information, please see our statement on harmful content in digital repositories.