Title
Governance Choice on a Serial Network
Abstract
This paper analyzes governance choice in a two-level federation in providing road infrastructure across jurisdictions. Two models are proposed to predict the choice of centralized or decentralized spending structure on a serial road network shared by two districts. While the first model considers simple Pigouvian behavior of governments, the second explicitly models political forces at both a local and central level. Both models led to the conclusions that the spending structure is chosen based on a satisfactory comprise between benefits and costs associated with alternative decision-making processes, and that governance choice may spontaneously shift as the infrastructure improves temporally.
Identifiers
doi: http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9448-5
Previously Published Citation
Xie, Feng, and David Levinson (2009) Governance Choice on a Serial Network. Public Choice 141: 189–212 .
Suggested Citation
Xie, Feng; Levinson, David M.
(2009).
Governance Choice on a Serial Network.
Retrieved from the University of Minnesota Digital Conservancy,
https://hdl.handle.net/11299/179984.