Browsing by Subject "international law"

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Biological Weapons
(Combating Terrorism, 2020) Andregg, Michael M.
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS Since 1945, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) have included chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. All have been used in wars, with casualties greatest for chemical, then nuclear, and least from biological weapons, at least in the modern era. However, modern genetic engineering technologies like “CRISPR” could change that dramatically. Historical biological weapons typically involved infectious organisms from nature like smallpox, plague and anthrax. They were used at least as early as Hannibal tossing plague infested corpses into Roman cities. Some white Americans gave smallpox-infected blankets to Indians, and a Japanese Unit #731 did similar and worse things to Chinese people during World War II. During the “Cold War” both the Soviet Union and the United States developed extensive biological warfare programs. However, near universal horror at the concept of breeding and “weaponizing” ancient plagues for use against human populations resulted in a UN mediated treaty called the “Biological Weapons Convention” that banned all such activity by civilized nations in 1975. As of January 2018, this convention has been signed and ratified by 180 of the UN’s 193 nations. Moral and legal constraints on biological weapons are challenged, however, by the relative ease and low cost of creating biological weapons compared with nuclear and even chemical weapons. Modern genetic engineering techniques (which go far beyond CRISPR) raise fears that terrorists in basements using chemicals bought online could recreate ancient scourges like smallpox, or even create new “designer diseases.” These could be “Chimera” organisms that combine lethal genes from multiple organisms, and even include genes for resistance to all known antibiotics. One of the novel properties of biological weapons compared to other WMD is that they can reproduce themselves and spread far beyond any initial target. This helped military institutions to recognize that biologicals could turn on one’s own troops, and were not very useful against military targets. Instead, they would afflict mainly vulnerable civilian populations, and could spread worldwide. Biological weapons could also be used against food crops and animals, spreading famine as well as novel plagues. For all these reasons, even the most fierce warrior generals have generally agreed that biological weapons should not be created much less used. Some terrorist groups have expressed considerable interest in WMD, however, including biological weapons. One Japanese death cult called Aum Shinrikyo made chemical weapons, killing 12 people on a subway system in 1995, and tried to make biological weapons to attack Japan’s civilian population, but it was thwarted by Japanese police and counterterrorism forces. Another cult in Oregon organized by Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh put salmonella bacteria on salad bars in ten restaurants in an attempt to swing county elections their way. In November, 1984, 751 people were sickened, but no one died. Assassinations are another area where biological weapons have been used. Biological toxins like ricin have been used to kill selected individuals like Bulgarian dissident writer Georgi Markov in London, in September of 1978. Several packages of weaponized anthrax were also sent to about a dozen targets shortly after 9/11, killing five people and infecting 17 others. According to the FBI, the alleged culprit was not a ‘typical’ terrorist, however, but a veteran of America’s biological weapons program named Bruce Ivins. There remains controversy over that conclusion, but whoever sent the US weapons-grade anthrax packages to several news media offices and two Democratic US Senators included notes with Islamic terminology hoping to arouse mass anger against Muslims. Therefore, better control of biological weapons before terrorists (or false flag operators posing as terrorists) can build or buy any is a top priority for counter-terrorism around the world today. Michael Andregg [Word count excluding “Further Reading” is 600] Further Reading Osterholm, Michael T. and Mark Olshaker, 2017. Deadliest Enemy: Our War Against Killer Germs. New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company. Wright, Susan, 2002. Biological Warfare and Disarmament: New Problems/New Perspectives. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Cirincione, Joseph, John B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, 2005. Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Threats. 2nd Edition. Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The Nuclear Threat Initiative is a well-financed, long-term, non-profit educational organization that maintains extensive files on all weapons of mass destruction, including one on biosecurity http://www.nti.org/about/biosecurity/. It also sponsors conferences like one in 2018 that can be seen whole at http://www.nti.org/about/projects/global-biosecurity-dialogue/event/nti-seminar-biosecurity-design-getting-ahead-risk-world-designer-organisms/ The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs has a link to the full text of the Biological Weapons Convention that includes many supporting documents, history and data. It is at https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/bio/ .
The Birth of Professional Ethics: Some Comparisons among Medicine, Law and Intelligence Communities
(2008-02-22) Andregg, Michael M.
Doctors in antiquity used leeches, herbs and shamanistic rituals to try to help their patients heal from the wounds and illnesses of life. Yet even in this long pre-scientific period, some felt a need to develop an ethos and codes of ethics specific to their craft. One goal was prestige, a social good of intangible but real value (especially when practitioners are ridiculed by many, common when medicine was young). Close behind was another goal, a privileged and eventually exclusive right to practice their craft commercially. As science and technology advanced, a third goal emerged. This was continuing professional education to meet a growing need for both technical competence and some systematic way to evaluate novel dilemmas that emerged as medicine became truly effective. The best examples of those dilemmas come from “test-tube babies,” but there are many other dilemmas like end of life issues when machines can sustain a brain-dead body, or access to intrinsically scarce resources like transplantable organs. The concept of a professional medical ethos was built upon more general ethics of the Greeks (and independently within the Chinese and Indian civilizations at least). Its earliest generally recognized form was the oath of Hippocrates. This served to identify special responsibilities to be assumed by those who would call themselves ‘professionals’ of the healing arts. Sometimes rights were included, but the responsibilities were primary to Hippocrates, like his famous injunction to first, “do no harm.” In addition to that he urged doctors to take care of mentors who trained them and to not dishonor the emerging profession by sexual acts with patients or their families, or by inducing abortion. American Law developed a variety of professional ethos over about 100 years, which is another long story. Intelligence professionals (a.k.a. 'spies') who desired to improve the reputation of 'the world's second oldest profession' began thinking about ethics for spies in the early 2000's, and created an International Intelligence Ethics Association in 2005 as part of a broader effort to "professionalize" what was, in practice, a craft. This paper attempts to integrate these three paths to thinking about codified "professional ethics" and records some of the early efforts in that direction among intelligence professionals and those who study them.
Breaking Laws of God and Men: When is this OK for Intelligence Professionals?
(2019-11-20) Andregg, Michael M.
Attorneys and philosophers have presented detailed answers to the question of when it is permissible to break laws, some of which begin and end with the word “never.” Others answer “always” if reasons of state are compelling. To compound confusion, governments often write special laws for their “spies”* and other “intelligence professionals”* [1]. Some of these laws are publicly known, but others are classified, like a significant fraction of US NSDD’s (National Security Decision Directives) and NSPD’s (National Security Presidential Directives). So what is forbidden for ordinary citizens may be legally “OK” for intelligence professionals, but citizens cannot tell because some of the laws are secret laws administered by secret courts like the FISA court in the USA [2]. This situation can easily degenerate into simple codes: like “Do anything you need to accomplish your mission, but do not get caught” which has been noted by several CIA veterans [3]. That noted here, the CIA may be among the more restrained intelligence agencies in the world, because it is besieged by lawyers who have some actual laws to work with, unlike the secret services of some other countries. Many cases can be studied as dilemmas that challenge these simple, black-and-white views of the world and of moral codes of conduct. A modern classic is the ‘nuclear terrorist with a ticking time bomb’ scenario. Many people conclude that there are no limits at all on what one might properly do to stop him (or her!). A dilemma of longer duration is that of the small unit infantry commander whose surrounded troops will all die if he does not do something to a prisoner that is forbidden by the Geneva Conventions and the American Laws of War. Such cases often involve torture or murder. There is also a long, Catholic tradition called “Just War Theory” that attempts to bring systematic thought to both jus ad bellum issues (is the war just?) and jus in bello (is the war being conducted justly?). Even in a theoretically unified church (regarding fundamental moral issues) one can find substantively different opinions about this among highly competent commentators [4]. This paper will consider both of these hard cases in the context of many years of moral and legal thought with a final focus on two moral principles and one practical observation addressing the question of whether evil means can be morally pursued to achieve good end goals. They are: 1) the Do No Harm principle; 2) the Lesser of Evils principle; and 3) the lesson from human history that the Means Used Determine the Actual Ends Achieved.
Creating a Reader on Intelligence Ethics, 2008 for INS
(Intelligence and National Security (a journal), 2008) Andregg, Michael M.
The information age is burying everyone in noise. Globalization increases stress. Then the poorly named Global War on Terror drove some leaders to suspend, or at least radically rethink, ethical constraints that had been settled two generations past, like the unequivocal ban on torture in the Geneva Conventions and many subsequent laws and treaties. This was the context in which we set out to create a reader on intelligence ethics that would, a) actually be read by busy professionals buried in urgent texts, and b) make a real difference in a profession better known for breaking rules. All involved recognized the “oxymoron problem.” All know that while most of our colleagues are moral people trying to do legitimate work to protect their peoples and governments, there are some who certainly think that ethics for spies is the dumbest idea ever. To them we say that intelligence ethics is actually a force multiplier, and dramatic deviations like officially sanctioned torture are force degraders. So 26 intelligence professionals from seven countries collaborated to create a reader designed to be 50 pages maximum, an hour’s read for busy people who recognize why ethics matter, even for spies and the many other intelligence professionals of the modern age. They gathered knowing only half would make the quality cut, and struggled to compress lifetimes of experience into extremely short forms. Each had specific reasons, but the overarching recognition was that national power declines when “all gloves off” immorality prevails. We are engaged in a very “Long War” that is basically between barbarism and civilized ways of life and conflict. There are always tactical voices who seek a quick victory by any means necessary. And real terrorism frightens all thoughtful people, so the danger of becoming that which you oppose has never been greater. This is a story about how that reader was created, with summaries of the 13 essays selected for publication. First, a professor at the National Military Intelligence College (then JMIC) Dr. Jan Goldman, collaborated with a philosopher of ethics with national security background Dr. Jean Maria Arrigo and about six others to create a new “International Intelligence Ethics Association” branching off of the long-running JSCOPE conferences (Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics). They held their first meetings on January 27 and 28 of 2006, which made the front page of the New York Times precisely because the novelty of ethics for spies was, well, news. Their association can be found at: http://www.intelligence-ethics.org/ and their fourth conference will be at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, MD, February 20-21 of 2009. Inspired by them, I went to the intelligence studies section of the International Studies Association seeking permission to do this project. They concurred, and let me fill one-fourth of their next year’s panels with papers on intelligence ethics of various kinds. Those engaged 18 participants, but some solicited could not come and others were advisors to international leaders who could not participate publicly. From those, 8 other papers were procured. A panel of judges was created. Two were editors of major intelligence publications, one was a former Chancellor of America’s National Intelligence University system, and one was an operator near the end of his career. Their task was to review all submissions and to pick the best half. The authors’ task was to compress what they thought essential into 4 double-spaced manuscript pages. All judges were invited to submit forwards to the final piece, recognizing that most could not. The one who did was INS senior editor Loch Johnson, whose forward will be reprinted here next.
Deference and Divergence in Regional Human Rights Courts
(2022-04) Sanchez, Maria
While charged with similar mandates to enforce international human rights law, the world’s three regional human rights courts have developed divergent approaches to interpreting the extent of their authority over member state governments. This understudied variation has widespread implications for domestic human rights protections. I analyze the origins of regional courts’ interpretations of the boundaries of their jurisdictions and the conditions under which these interpretations shift over time. This research is particularly vital given growing national backlash against international human rights institutions and recent efforts to increase coordination across the regional human rights courts.
Ethical Implications of the Snowden Revelations
(International Journal of Intelligence, Security and Public Affairs, 2016-03-19) Andregg, Michael M.
abstract This paper addresses a number of ethical dilemmas and practical consequences of the revelations of Edward Snowden about massive electronic surveillance of telephone calls, emails, social media posts and other “Signals Intelligence” (or SIGINT) across the entire world, but especially including domestic American communications formerly thought immune to such surveillance unless authorized by judicial warrant. Practical consequences matter for all “utilitarian” ethical judgments. The author concludes that by far the largest issue is whether US intelligence professionals regard the US Constitution as supreme law in America, or non-disclosure contracts with individual agencies or the US government. Reactions to Snowden follow this pattern, with security cleared insiders generally considering him a traitor, and ordinary people generally considering him a hero for telling the public about illegal activity within the National Security agency directed against fundamental, and constitutionally protected civil liberties like freedom of speech.
Ethics and Intelligence in Old and New Democracies
(U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 2017-07) Andregg, Michael M.
“Ethics and Intelligence in Old and New Democracies” 1. Functions of Security Intelligence in “Democracies” versus “Totalitarian States.” a. Common missions: i. Protecting the people from external and internal threats. ii. Protecting the state from external & internal threats, and corruptions. iii. Gathering intelligence for early warning of both current and potential threats. Sometimes this includes warning of opportunities also. iv. Informing law enforcement or military units for action against threats. v. Managing Information Operations, both offensive and defensive. vi. Protecting the legitimacy of the state from corruptions and organized attacks by external forces. b. Contrasting missions: i. Democracies value their citizens over their governments, in theory. ii. Totalitarian States value the regime of the day over rights of citizens. iii. This fundamental distinction has profound consequences at every level of human existance, for professional conduct among police and soldiers of any kind, and even affects the probability of survival of human civilization entire. Therefore it deserves significant attention.* iv. It also has profound effects on the welfare of military, police and all “guardian” professionals tasked with protecting people, state or both. 2. Why “Ethics” matters at all for Spies and other “Intelligence Professionals.” a. Personal Survival b. Family Survival c. Mission Success d. Minimizing Blowback, and other “Unintended Consequences.” e. Do you think that people have Souls? If so, ethics might matter even more. 3. Does “Old” versus “New” Democracies matter as a distinction? a. The eternal problem of Corruptions of Governance. Old democracies are often more corrupt than brand new ones, as can be very old politicians. b. Why Guardian Professionals must take this problem more seriously than many do. (This has profound importance for your soul, if you have one). c. How to Balance tensions between loyalty to team versus loyalty to ideals. Supplimental References: Intelligence Ethics: the Definitive Work of 2007* Breaking Laws of God and Man: When is this OK for Intelligence Professionals? * Das Leben Der Anderen, (The Lives of Others) is a great movie on this topic, about how the East German “Stasi” surveilled everyone, ruining their country until it fell.
Ethics of Nuclear Weapons and National Security Intelligence
(2013-04-06) Andregg, Michael M.
Ethics of Nuclear Weapons and National Security Intelligence Michael Andregg, University of St. Thomas in St. Paul, MN, USA, mmandregg@stthomas.edu for Presentation to the International Ethics Section of the ISA, San Francisco, April 6, 2013 Introduction From the beginning of the nuclear age there have been fears that we may have invented a weapon that will destroy us all. J. Robert Oppenheimer, who helped build the first fission bombs, commented often on this (1). Albert Einstein, whose letter to then President Franklin Roosevelt helped convince him to fund them, talked about the imperative to seek peace and new ways of thinking about everything as he neared death (2). Bertrand Russell coauthored a Manifesto with Einstein (and nine others) to warn the world that everything had changed (3). Yet thousands of thoughtful people still felt compelled by the urgencies of World War II to make nuclear weapons and to use two of them against other human beings. To end the war, they said to each other, and perhaps to show the Soviets who would be the big dog following. But then what? Another arms race had begun, and bigger, badder WMDs would be developed soon. As soon as more than one nation had nuclear weapons, some strategy had to be conceived for their use. Mutual Assured Destruction was the main result, and millions learned the irony of a “MAD” strategy, where safety was to be assured by capabilities and declared will to destroy human civilization if we were frightened enough by any enemy. Those we terrified produced similar weapons and strategies. Herman Kahn and colleagues wrote books like “Thinking the Unthinkable” (4) to explain this theory to lay publics unanointed by the priesthood of nuclear physicists. Many nominally good people were hired to build thousands of nuclear warheads and delivery systems. Thousands more were trained to use them to blow up half of the world if so ordered. Their reliability was tested relentlessly, to pull the trigger or push the button if so ordered, and our bureaucracies learned how to exclude anyone who might hesitate if their duty called. Our adversaries did the same. We shared the lethal technologies with some allies, as did they. And retired nuclear physicists started a magazine, called the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, to warn people basically not to do what they had done. Later we invented modern biological weapons, ever so secretly, and a new community of biologists and doctors learned to sin like physicists . And chemical weapons were ‘improved’ by development of modern, binary nerve agents, much more effective than old mustard gas, Zyklon B and such, despite strict prohibitions that were rationalized around. Scientists and intelligentsia pondered how we had wandered into this thicket of moral conundrums. Meanwhile we stumbled on, driven by something. One purpose of this paper is explaining that.
How "Wisdom" Differs from Intelligence and Knowledge in the Context of National Intelligence Agencies
(2003-02-28) Andregg, Michael M.
It is customary at this point to spend considerable time defining key terms like wisdom, intelligence and knowledge. I will come back to that after cutting to the bone of the topic at hand. Wisdom has a longer time horizon than either intelligence or knowledge. It spans a greater scope of concern, and reflects a set of values infused into knowledge that include compassion as a core component. It requires a deep understanding of human nature, because it is only called upon during crises of human affairs. All the rest is details, which can distract from these cardinal truths. With respect to issues of international security, this difference is exemplified by cases like Afghanistan (1979-89), Guatemala (1954) and Iran (1953-79). In each case focus on short-term, narrowly defined and mainly American national interests resulted in significant tactical victories. The long-term cost has been generating intense hatred of America among hundreds of millions of people worldwide. That hatred has diffuse military and economic consequences that are difficult to measure, but by any measure are profound. Of course there are excuses for this sacrifice of long-term, general welfare for short-term, narrow goals. But such excuses should not obscure the great price to thoughtful intelligence professionals, who undoubtedly do care about the future of their countries and their children.
Introduction to a special edition of the International Journal of Intelligence Ethics
(International Journal of Intelligence Ethics, 2012-09) Andregg, Michael M.
IIEA Journal fall 2012, Draft 1, Entry 2: Published as: Vol. 3, No. 2 / Fall/Winter, 2012. Introduction This journal edition began with an essay that Jan Goldman wrote in 2007 titled: “Ethicsphobia and the U.S. National Intelligence Community: Just say ‘No’” (1). In this he claimed there was an actual fear of ethics among some parts of the bureaucracy that he knew well as a professor at what is now called the National Intelligence University (NIU) and as a former practitioner for the Defense Intelligence Agency. So I arranged a panel to look at this question specifically in 2012, “Do Intelligence Bureaucracies Fear Ethics, and if so, Why?” All but one of the papers to follow are products of that panel, and the outlier was created by teams working on ethics issues under guidance from Dr. Goldman’s successor at NIU, JD and retired Army Col. Christopher Bailey. It begins with a view from Britain by Mark Phythian of Lancaster who has been a real pioneer of intelligence studies in the UK, followed by a focus on Africa and “Authoritarian State Security Apparatus” by a former Ambassador to the African Union, Cindy Lou Courville, now another professor at America’s NIU. Then comes Bailey’s exposition on U.S. intelligence community ethos, and defense of oversight in what he claims is “a closely regulated profession.” We will debate that a bit here, but this is certainly the common view among people inside the security clearance cocoon. No doubt they see all the inefficiencies, like we dwell on the victims of error. That is followed by what was the most interesting paper to me, a brief look at “Codes of Ethics” across America’s IC including 6 quite different and interesting proposals generated by teams of students at NIU. Those are typically mid-career intelligence professionals from the uniformed services, Majors and Captains mostly, with a few civilian employees of our Pentagon related intelligence agencies. They took their task seriously and the range of ideas they came up with is especially instructive and engaging. Then comes my paper, the dullest no doubt, but also the most pointed critique of assumptions and blind spots that come with the classified Kool-Aid. Book reviews round out this edition of the International Journal of Intelligence Ethics, by Stephen Kershnar of Alhoff’s “Terrorism, Time Bombs and Torture: a Philosophical Analysis,” by Professor Bailey of Christopher Perry’s edited “In the Balance: The Administration of Justice and National Security in Democracies,” and by Ian Fishback of Fried and Fried’s “Because it is Wrong: Torture, Privacy and Presidential Power in the Age of Terror.” Now, a bit more detail on the substantive papers.
The Moral Crisis in U.S. National Security Today
(2011-06-18) Andregg, Michael M.
Neither Madmen nor Messiahs: What NSA Leaks Reveal about Ethics in America's Intelligence Community
(e-IR, 2014-01-11) Andregg, Michael M.
Neither Madmen Nor Messiahs: What NSA Leaks Reveal About Ethics in America’s Intelligence Community The NSA (National Security Agency) has been savaging the US Constitution lately by secretly collecting data on almost every US citizen. But most of that evil work has been done by citizens obeying orders from true believers in the security state. In their hearts, they are heroes. It (the security state), however, has no heart. The key to understanding this dilemma is to recognize that the Intelligence Community (‘IC’) bureaucracies have mastered the art of getting “good people” to do “bad things” in the name of “national security.” There are just enough real maniacs on earth to frighten the hyper-vigilant at all times, even though actual deaths to real terrorists in North America are objectively far less each year today than deaths to bee stings, lightning strikes or televisions. So while I mention serious damage to American civil liberties and even to national security due to the recent growth of NSA activities, I need to be clear that this damage was done mainly by people with good intentions. In their minds, they are protecting the innocent from dangers posed by murky and sometimes stateless actors called “terrorists.” The IC clan is largely sincere, partly because they are told constantly that they are patriots by the bureaucracies that hire them, and which enforce the secrecy rules that enable such dysfunction. 9/11 provided an excuse. But bureaucracies run on money, not consciences, ‘free will,’ ethics or love, so counting on them to enforce any restraint is a fool’s conclusion. Bureaucracies are in it for the money, period.
Problems in the Intelligence Community (IC) and how they Affect the Causes of Peace and Peace Studies
(2005-03-04) Andregg, Michael M.
abstract This has been a year of major distress for the American Intelligence Community (IC). Questionable intelligence about weapons of mass destruction led to questionable decisions about going to war in Iraq, which alienated large sectors of civil society and governments around the world. Of course, there are also big fans of this decision, both in the IC and elsewhere. But that is only one of the major problems that spies and intelligence analysts face. For example, there is a purge going on in the CIA as we meet today, as the fans of global intervention drive off critics there. A major “reform” bill was passed, and neutered by the Pentagon among others. This paper will focus on a largely taboo topic, the many ways by which intelligence tradecraft induces mental illness among many (not all) intelligence professionals. This leads in turn to errors of every kind. It leads to difficulty learning from past mistakes, and coping with novel problems. It also leads to very high rates of divorce, alcoholism and pain among our spies and analysts. And finally, it leads to confusing friends with enemies. Of particular importance to the field of Peace Studies is a common confusion between peace activists and “terrorists” (or in an earlier era, with communists). When fear is great and security institutions are stressed to find some bad guys, some of them literally cannot distinguish between “peace activists” and whoever the source of fear for the day is. Dissent is confused with treason. Thus did J. Edgar Hoover target civil rights activists, anti-war activists, labor activists and many others during the infamous COINTELPRO days. Some of the less stable people in our current FBI and DHS (Department of Homeland Security) are compiling lists of “potential terrorists” today that include peace activists, labor, human rights enthusiasts, environmentalists, feminists, “liberals,” etc. This problem is particularly acute in the Joint Terrorism Taskforces that have been ordered to identify “potential terrorists” in every county in America. Since actual terrorists are rare and very hard to find, but peace activists and other liberal groups are relatively abundant, public and easy to find, many peace people are on such lists today. The paper that follows looks at a range of clinical mental problems that are induced or exacerbated by the practices of IC agencies (called “tradecraft” in their jargon) and how such problems make working for peace more difficult during times of war. Paradoxically and tragically, they also make solving traditional and legitimate security problems of intelligence more difficult too. In both ways protecting our people and preserving freedom become harder. Stressed out spies and CI guys (counter intelligence) make many errors, of which confusing peace people with terrorists is just one especially irritating example. [A paper follows that was prepared for the CIA and a variety of spies about ten months ago. At the end is a postscript for our peace community on why psychopathology among spies is especially important for us.]
Targeted Assassinations
(Combating Terrorism, 2020) Andregg, Michael M.
TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS Assassination has been a tool of terrorists and governments for millennia. It has been an act of terrorists and nation states in warfare since the formal “state” was invented. The term “assassin” probably comes from a group of Islamic enthusiasts formed in 1090 CE (the Nizari Ismalilis) that specialized in targeted killings of opponents. Assassinations differ from ordinary murders or killings on battlefields by the implication that the target has some special political importance. One famous assassination was when a 19 year-old Serbian named Gavrilo Pincip killed Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914, leading to World War I which killed almost a tenth of all males in Central Europe. In theory, the USA is prohibited from assassinations by an Executive Order (#12333, “United States Intelligence Activities”) signed by Ronald Reagan in 1981. This did not prevent hundreds of attempts to kill political people like Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen in October 14, 2011, or Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq on June 7, 2006, using Hellfire missiles. The US also tried to assassinate Cuba’s President Fidel Castro at least 8 times (CIA records) to as many as 28 times (Cuba’s estimate) during the Cold War. The assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963 raised questions about the wisdom of targeting national leaders. Some suspected the Cubans. The Russian government refined assassination to high art. It was connected to the murders of Georgi Markov in London September 11, 1978, using the biological poison ricin, and of Alexander Litvinenko using polonium 210 on November 23, 2006. Russia is also alleged to have poisoned Sergie Skripal and his daughter Yulia with a very sophisticated “novichok” nerve agent on March 4, 2018. But no state has a more diversified record of assassinations than Israel. Its MOSSAD intelligence agency decided to use this as a common tool in their long-running covert war against Palestinian organizations, a host of Islamic terrorist groups, and other declared enemies like Iran. MOSSAD killed many Iranian nuclear scientists, for example, using ordinary pistols and limpet mines attached to cars to slow down nuclear weapons development in Iran. Years before, MOSSAD set out to avenge the murders of 11 Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics by killing most of the Palestinians who had been involved in those assassinations. This history is described in riveting detail by our first “suggested reading,” Ronan Bergman’s “Rise and Kill First” (2018). That book is noteworthy because it was informed and endorsed by many of MOSSAD’s former Directors. A comprehensive view of targeted assassinations requires recognition that thousands of “targeted killings” have also been committed by various Arab mukhabarat (secret police and intelligence groups) in their countries and against enemies abroad. This business of spies killing spies (or generals or presidents of enemy entities) has a long and very complex history, obscured by the secrecy that attends such events. Therefore, this section ends with downsides of such tactics revealed by this history. Sometimes innocent people are killed because they are near the bomb, or are incorrectly identified as targets like Chico Bouchikhi, killed by MOSSAD in Lillehammer, Norway on July 21, 1973. Killing innocents has terrible public relations consequences. Second, if you kill able leaders of enemy groups, they may be replaced by less intelligent but more brutal others who push hatred harder and make peace negotiations impossible. Third, if one country adopts assassination as a tool of statecraft, its enemies may reply in kind, and your own political leaders may be killed. So prudent leaders are warned about the perils of assassination, and all need special protection today from terrorists and many other rivals. Michael Andregg [Word count excluding “Further Readings” is 604] Further Reading Bergman, Ronan, 2018. Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations. New York: Random House. Perliger, Arie, 2015. The Causes and Impact of Political Assassinations. In Vol. 8, Issue 1 of the CTC Sentinel (Counter Terrorism Center) at the US Military Academy at West Point, New York. Accessible at: https://ctc.usma.edu/the-causes-and-impact-of-political-assassinations/ Assassinations in History – Chronologically, 2018. At Emerson Kent.com, accessible at: http://www.emersonkent.com/assassinations_in_history_chronologically.htm Kahana, Ephraim, 2006. Historical Dictionary of Israeli Intelligence. Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press. Cockburn, Alexander, July 24, 2009. The CIA and a Long History of Assassinations. In The Week, London, UK, accessible at: http://www.theweek.co.uk/politics/21051/cia-and-long-history-assassinations .
Why Asia Should Lead a Global Push to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons
(2019-11-23) Andregg, Michael M.
The purpose of this chapter is to explicate reasons why Asia is especially well positioned to lead a global push to eliminate, or greatly reduce, nuclear weapons inventories worldwide, and why Mongolia might be catalytic to that effort. The threat of any general, thermonuclear war is existential to civilization itself. No one understands that better than Japan. North and South Korea want to unify, but they cannot while they are clients of opposing major powers, China and the USA. Nuclear weapons complicate that tragically, at great expense and risk to everyone. Meanwhile, Pakistan is destabilizing, which scares everyone in South Asia and many worldwide, because of its long feud with nuclear-armed India, including four conventional wars. The risk that Pakistani nuclear explosives could find their way to Islamic terrorist groups terrifies others. Many analysts therefore consider South Asia the most likely place for a nuclear war to start today. Russia is a declining power, and is frightened by both NATO and a fast-rising China, while China has considerable capital it could devote to a noble, global cause like nuclear arms control. Israel is a wild card, which motivates Iran to be one too. The former has a complete nuclear triad, and Iran could build nuclear weapons over several years if allowed to. Meanwhile, the USA is paralyzed on this topic by our weapons industry (among other factors), and everyone who now possesses nuclear weapons is modernizing. Europe in general is quite alarmed by US abandonment of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Arms Treaty (INF) and by Russian threats to use “small” nuclear weapons in tactical situations. Therefore, the EU would probably support any Asian effort to bring sanity to this situation before any more large wars get fought over their territories. No European nation wants to become a battleground for major powers fighting with nuclear weapons. At the end, we will discuss some solutions well aware that the countries that already possess nuclear weapons are extremely reluctant to eliminate, or even to limit them.
Why Fight? An Essay on the Morality of Wars: When to Start them, How to Fight them, and When not to
(U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 2016-04) Andregg, Michael M.
Why Fight? An Essay on the Morality of Wars: When to Start them, How to Fight them, and When Not to By Michael Andregg Original for the Army Command and General Staff College’s Ethics Symposium of April 2016 Introduction The United Nations and the body of international law that preceded and empowers it concluded that starting aggressive war is the ultimate crime because embedded in that act are derivative crimes like murder, torture, abuse of captured combatants or civilians, and in the worst cases slavery and genocide. The history of humankind has seen many worst cases, so thousands of groups of peoples that once existed do not anymore. Just war theory (JWT) is the most recognized and discussed root of such thinking, though it varies in versions and interpretation. The universally recognized legitimate reason for war is defense of the people or the state against attack by others. Since nation-states have written most of the modern rules, many are slanted toward the state and against rebellion. But war has been with us far longer than nation-states and corruption of governance is among the most important causes of the civil wars that predominate today in the Third Millennium of the Common Era. We will also pay some attention to the neglected area of when to rebel, or at least when to disobey orders, because blind obedience can empower fascism, police-states, and the universal crimes of genocide, etc. I remind American military audiences that our country was born in rebellion against unjust rule. Our “founding fathers” were all considered traitors by corrupt elites in Britain. Britain gave up being “great” when it decided to sacrifice ordinary people’s freedom in pursuit of wealth, power, and enslavement of non-British people. I remind non-Americans that this problem is universal. The sins of imperialism go back thousands of years before nation-states, and still exist today.
Why the Intelligence Community (IC) System Drives you Crazy, and How to Come in from the Cold
(2004-04-14) Andregg, Michael M.
“The CIA has the highest divorce rate of any government agency” a source of mine said. Since he was a career intelligence veteran in his 70’s, I figured he was probably correct. Thus began a search to answer some questions with larger boundaries, like why the extreme resistance to change, and why the dramatic intelligence failures that no one studies more than the IC itself? Why study dysfunction in national intelligence agencies? Because polite society is deeply dependent on a good, functional, healthy and wise intelligence community, all the more so in an age of terrorism and spreading WMDs. If you are sick, we are in danger. Actually, we are in plenty of danger already, so we pray most sincerely for your quick and complete recovery. The Intelligence Community is also besieged by critics, some of whom don’t have a clue what they are talking about, so a high degree of skepticism is appropriate to dramatic claims like I will make here. Even high ranking, career insiders with large staffs and mandates (like ex-NSA director, General William Odom) have a difficult time grasping the totality of the IC system and struggle to get a hearing for their sincere reform proposals (1). Such thoughtful reviews typically deal with policy, budgets and organizational structure, but few can deal with the taboos I will discuss today. The best, and last such daring effort I am aware of was “The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence” (2) by a former exec. to a DDCI* and a five year veteran of State. Thirty years later, after many large reviews (3, 4, 5, 6, 7) the parallels with cult dysfunction remain profound. Part of my answer is disturbing. Intelligence “Tradecraft” induces mental illness. To some this is heresy, to others, much less than a shocking discovery. Still it bothers me. Combine that induction with the exceptional stresses that go with operations and even with some analytic work, and you have a formula for tattered relationships. The security clearance system frustrates getting effective help, since the circle of ‘OK’ counselors is tiny and their loyalty to the company is usually greater than their loyalty to you. Trust is a precious thing in all human affairs, none more so than in marriages and counseling. But trust is also a fragile asset in the corrosive environment of spies, lies and endless rules regarding whom you can talk to, how and when. Since security clearances required for one’s career frustrate getting effective help, and since exceptional stresses undoubtedly exist that are inexorable parts of the difficult work that spies, analysts and CI* people do, almost everyone inside is affected. When everyone is affected few can see the damage clearly. Those who do often leave their agencies with the stain of ‘not being a team player’ or ‘disgruntled’ or ‘not that good anyway.’ Other psychological defenses are profound, really, impressively armor-plated. So strong measures and words are necessary. * The rest of this essay will address this problem bluntly, but aims at solutions for practitioners.

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