Browsing by Subject "ethics for spies"

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Biological Weapons
(Combating Terrorism, 2020) Andregg, Michael M.
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS Since 1945, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) have included chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. All have been used in wars, with casualties greatest for chemical, then nuclear, and least from biological weapons, at least in the modern era. However, modern genetic engineering technologies like “CRISPR” could change that dramatically. Historical biological weapons typically involved infectious organisms from nature like smallpox, plague and anthrax. They were used at least as early as Hannibal tossing plague infested corpses into Roman cities. Some white Americans gave smallpox-infected blankets to Indians, and a Japanese Unit #731 did similar and worse things to Chinese people during World War II. During the “Cold War” both the Soviet Union and the United States developed extensive biological warfare programs. However, near universal horror at the concept of breeding and “weaponizing” ancient plagues for use against human populations resulted in a UN mediated treaty called the “Biological Weapons Convention” that banned all such activity by civilized nations in 1975. As of January 2018, this convention has been signed and ratified by 180 of the UN’s 193 nations. Moral and legal constraints on biological weapons are challenged, however, by the relative ease and low cost of creating biological weapons compared with nuclear and even chemical weapons. Modern genetic engineering techniques (which go far beyond CRISPR) raise fears that terrorists in basements using chemicals bought online could recreate ancient scourges like smallpox, or even create new “designer diseases.” These could be “Chimera” organisms that combine lethal genes from multiple organisms, and even include genes for resistance to all known antibiotics. One of the novel properties of biological weapons compared to other WMD is that they can reproduce themselves and spread far beyond any initial target. This helped military institutions to recognize that biologicals could turn on one’s own troops, and were not very useful against military targets. Instead, they would afflict mainly vulnerable civilian populations, and could spread worldwide. Biological weapons could also be used against food crops and animals, spreading famine as well as novel plagues. For all these reasons, even the most fierce warrior generals have generally agreed that biological weapons should not be created much less used. Some terrorist groups have expressed considerable interest in WMD, however, including biological weapons. One Japanese death cult called Aum Shinrikyo made chemical weapons, killing 12 people on a subway system in 1995, and tried to make biological weapons to attack Japan’s civilian population, but it was thwarted by Japanese police and counterterrorism forces. Another cult in Oregon organized by Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh put salmonella bacteria on salad bars in ten restaurants in an attempt to swing county elections their way. In November, 1984, 751 people were sickened, but no one died. Assassinations are another area where biological weapons have been used. Biological toxins like ricin have been used to kill selected individuals like Bulgarian dissident writer Georgi Markov in London, in September of 1978. Several packages of weaponized anthrax were also sent to about a dozen targets shortly after 9/11, killing five people and infecting 17 others. According to the FBI, the alleged culprit was not a ‘typical’ terrorist, however, but a veteran of America’s biological weapons program named Bruce Ivins. There remains controversy over that conclusion, but whoever sent the US weapons-grade anthrax packages to several news media offices and two Democratic US Senators included notes with Islamic terminology hoping to arouse mass anger against Muslims. Therefore, better control of biological weapons before terrorists (or false flag operators posing as terrorists) can build or buy any is a top priority for counter-terrorism around the world today. Michael Andregg [Word count excluding “Further Reading” is 600] Further Reading Osterholm, Michael T. and Mark Olshaker, 2017. Deadliest Enemy: Our War Against Killer Germs. New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company. Wright, Susan, 2002. Biological Warfare and Disarmament: New Problems/New Perspectives. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Cirincione, Joseph, John B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, 2005. Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Threats. 2nd Edition. Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The Nuclear Threat Initiative is a well-financed, long-term, non-profit educational organization that maintains extensive files on all weapons of mass destruction, including one on biosecurity http://www.nti.org/about/biosecurity/. It also sponsors conferences like one in 2018 that can be seen whole at http://www.nti.org/about/projects/global-biosecurity-dialogue/event/nti-seminar-biosecurity-design-getting-ahead-risk-world-designer-organisms/ The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs has a link to the full text of the Biological Weapons Convention that includes many supporting documents, history and data. It is at https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/bio/ .
The Birth of Professional Ethics: Some Comparisons among Medicine, Law and Intelligence Communities
(2008-02-22) Andregg, Michael M.
Doctors in antiquity used leeches, herbs and shamanistic rituals to try to help their patients heal from the wounds and illnesses of life. Yet even in this long pre-scientific period, some felt a need to develop an ethos and codes of ethics specific to their craft. One goal was prestige, a social good of intangible but real value (especially when practitioners are ridiculed by many, common when medicine was young). Close behind was another goal, a privileged and eventually exclusive right to practice their craft commercially. As science and technology advanced, a third goal emerged. This was continuing professional education to meet a growing need for both technical competence and some systematic way to evaluate novel dilemmas that emerged as medicine became truly effective. The best examples of those dilemmas come from “test-tube babies,” but there are many other dilemmas like end of life issues when machines can sustain a brain-dead body, or access to intrinsically scarce resources like transplantable organs. The concept of a professional medical ethos was built upon more general ethics of the Greeks (and independently within the Chinese and Indian civilizations at least). Its earliest generally recognized form was the oath of Hippocrates. This served to identify special responsibilities to be assumed by those who would call themselves ‘professionals’ of the healing arts. Sometimes rights were included, but the responsibilities were primary to Hippocrates, like his famous injunction to first, “do no harm.” In addition to that he urged doctors to take care of mentors who trained them and to not dishonor the emerging profession by sexual acts with patients or their families, or by inducing abortion. American Law developed a variety of professional ethos over about 100 years, which is another long story. Intelligence professionals (a.k.a. 'spies') who desired to improve the reputation of 'the world's second oldest profession' began thinking about ethics for spies in the early 2000's, and created an International Intelligence Ethics Association in 2005 as part of a broader effort to "professionalize" what was, in practice, a craft. This paper attempts to integrate these three paths to thinking about codified "professional ethics" and records some of the early efforts in that direction among intelligence professionals and those who study them.
Breaking Laws of God and Men: When is this OK for Intelligence Professionals?
(2019-11-20) Andregg, Michael M.
Attorneys and philosophers have presented detailed answers to the question of when it is permissible to break laws, some of which begin and end with the word “never.” Others answer “always” if reasons of state are compelling. To compound confusion, governments often write special laws for their “spies”* and other “intelligence professionals”* [1]. Some of these laws are publicly known, but others are classified, like a significant fraction of US NSDD’s (National Security Decision Directives) and NSPD’s (National Security Presidential Directives). So what is forbidden for ordinary citizens may be legally “OK” for intelligence professionals, but citizens cannot tell because some of the laws are secret laws administered by secret courts like the FISA court in the USA [2]. This situation can easily degenerate into simple codes: like “Do anything you need to accomplish your mission, but do not get caught” which has been noted by several CIA veterans [3]. That noted here, the CIA may be among the more restrained intelligence agencies in the world, because it is besieged by lawyers who have some actual laws to work with, unlike the secret services of some other countries. Many cases can be studied as dilemmas that challenge these simple, black-and-white views of the world and of moral codes of conduct. A modern classic is the ‘nuclear terrorist with a ticking time bomb’ scenario. Many people conclude that there are no limits at all on what one might properly do to stop him (or her!). A dilemma of longer duration is that of the small unit infantry commander whose surrounded troops will all die if he does not do something to a prisoner that is forbidden by the Geneva Conventions and the American Laws of War. Such cases often involve torture or murder. There is also a long, Catholic tradition called “Just War Theory” that attempts to bring systematic thought to both jus ad bellum issues (is the war just?) and jus in bello (is the war being conducted justly?). Even in a theoretically unified church (regarding fundamental moral issues) one can find substantively different opinions about this among highly competent commentators [4]. This paper will consider both of these hard cases in the context of many years of moral and legal thought with a final focus on two moral principles and one practical observation addressing the question of whether evil means can be morally pursued to achieve good end goals. They are: 1) the Do No Harm principle; 2) the Lesser of Evils principle; and 3) the lesson from human history that the Means Used Determine the Actual Ends Achieved.
Creating a Reader on Intelligence Ethics, 2008 for INS
(Intelligence and National Security (a journal), 2008) Andregg, Michael M.
The information age is burying everyone in noise. Globalization increases stress. Then the poorly named Global War on Terror drove some leaders to suspend, or at least radically rethink, ethical constraints that had been settled two generations past, like the unequivocal ban on torture in the Geneva Conventions and many subsequent laws and treaties. This was the context in which we set out to create a reader on intelligence ethics that would, a) actually be read by busy professionals buried in urgent texts, and b) make a real difference in a profession better known for breaking rules. All involved recognized the “oxymoron problem.” All know that while most of our colleagues are moral people trying to do legitimate work to protect their peoples and governments, there are some who certainly think that ethics for spies is the dumbest idea ever. To them we say that intelligence ethics is actually a force multiplier, and dramatic deviations like officially sanctioned torture are force degraders. So 26 intelligence professionals from seven countries collaborated to create a reader designed to be 50 pages maximum, an hour’s read for busy people who recognize why ethics matter, even for spies and the many other intelligence professionals of the modern age. They gathered knowing only half would make the quality cut, and struggled to compress lifetimes of experience into extremely short forms. Each had specific reasons, but the overarching recognition was that national power declines when “all gloves off” immorality prevails. We are engaged in a very “Long War” that is basically between barbarism and civilized ways of life and conflict. There are always tactical voices who seek a quick victory by any means necessary. And real terrorism frightens all thoughtful people, so the danger of becoming that which you oppose has never been greater. This is a story about how that reader was created, with summaries of the 13 essays selected for publication. First, a professor at the National Military Intelligence College (then JMIC) Dr. Jan Goldman, collaborated with a philosopher of ethics with national security background Dr. Jean Maria Arrigo and about six others to create a new “International Intelligence Ethics Association” branching off of the long-running JSCOPE conferences (Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics). They held their first meetings on January 27 and 28 of 2006, which made the front page of the New York Times precisely because the novelty of ethics for spies was, well, news. Their association can be found at: http://www.intelligence-ethics.org/ and their fourth conference will be at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, MD, February 20-21 of 2009. Inspired by them, I went to the intelligence studies section of the International Studies Association seeking permission to do this project. They concurred, and let me fill one-fourth of their next year’s panels with papers on intelligence ethics of various kinds. Those engaged 18 participants, but some solicited could not come and others were advisors to international leaders who could not participate publicly. From those, 8 other papers were procured. A panel of judges was created. Two were editors of major intelligence publications, one was a former Chancellor of America’s National Intelligence University system, and one was an operator near the end of his career. Their task was to review all submissions and to pick the best half. The authors’ task was to compress what they thought essential into 4 double-spaced manuscript pages. All judges were invited to submit forwards to the final piece, recognizing that most could not. The one who did was INS senior editor Loch Johnson, whose forward will be reprinted here next.
A Critical Lesson not yet Learned in America: Intelligence Ethics Matter
(2012-10-16) Andregg, Michael M.
Introduction Intelligence ethics matter because mistakes here can result in loss of thousands of innocent lives, and in worst cases to destruction of whole governments and their peoples. The Cold War swung as much on moral factors as political, economic or military, but bureaucracies learn slowly. Deep history shows that political hubris can bring any empire down. When mistakes have such large potential consequences, accuracy is critical. The modern world must deal with diffuse terrorist and “failed state” threats, and complex, non-military threats to civilization like global warming, international crime and rogue financial entities that can ruin entire economies. Accuracy in complex problems requires close cooperation among intelligence systems, both national security and law enforcement focused. Close cooperation requires trust. When one intelligence entity in a cooperative system becomes immoral, corrupt or unreliable in protecting methods and sources, cooperation declines, accuracy declines, and somewhere down the line innocent people may suffer or even die. Many examples could be considered, but a particularly relevant case is what happened before the United States of America attacked Iraq on 19 March, 2003. The causus belli alleged were aggressive weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in Iraq, with a secondary concern that Saddam Hussein was helping Al Qaeda. After many over 100,000 Iraqis were killed, the country laid waste, occupied and thoroughly searched, no WMDs were found. And Hussein had been hostile to Al Qaeda, not a friend. In the short space available, we will consider this case in detail. Some have called this an “intelligence failure,” but most call it a policy failure blamed on intelligence agencies. Either way, the cost to the USA has been huge. Thousands of billions of dollars were wasted attacking Iraq, and thousands of US and allied troops were killed or gravely wounded. The costs to Iraq were relatively much larger. I will focus on how these costs reflect failures of ethics at the level of intelligence professionals who knew that bad things were being done for false reasons, but remained silent. That was the biggest ethical lapse for many of them. But do not forget the policy people who actually ordered this unjustified carnage, or the citizens like me who let them do it. In America we sacrificed a modest reputation of respect for rule of law, for due process, for human rights and for many other things like honest cooperation with allies as we rationalized these mortal sins that killed so many innocent others. Cold War contests helped set the stage for this illegal and immoral war so we will comment on that also. But we begin with some specific lies that led to the deaths of perhaps a million people if all casualties were properly counted.
Do Intelligence Bureaucracies Fear Ethics, and if so, Why?
(International Journal of Intelligence Ethics, 2012-10) Andregg, Michael M.
Do Intelligence Bureaucracies Fear Ethics, and if so Why? By Michael Andregg, University of St. Thomas in St. Paul MN USA mmandregg@stthomas.edu For the International Journal of Intelligence Ethics, Fall of 2012 Yes. Why will take longer since the bureaucracies are very defensive about this topic. Introduction: Special Challenges Every intelligence professional knows that the domain they enter presents unusual challenges. Stakes can be extremely high (like life or death for nations, or for your personal infantry squad). Information is always incomplete and all too often incorrect. Moral ambiguities abound, and tradeoffs between alternative outcomes can be excruciatingly painful. Least evil options are sometimes the only options available better than watching catastrophe unfold. To be considered a professional by polite society one must belong to a group mature enough to have developed codes of ethics, among many other issues of standards, training, expected skills, duties and such. It took doctors and attorneys centuries to develop their codes, and issues still remain or emerge anew with new technologies. So this is not an easy process even for normal organizations (1, 2) which intelligence bureaucracies are not. We do not have centuries to linger on nuances now, because nuclear, biological and other ‘special’ weapons could destroy our civilization. So a sense of urgency is appropriate. Intelligence failures sometimes precede catastrophic wars. Politicians and their policy people often blame intelligence staff for their own policy failures (see “Elephants in the Room” to follow). But after the carnage is done, finding who to blame is a sad exercise among tragic people most of whom were sworn to protect the innocents of their countries. Bureaucracies are not people. They are composed of people, like a human body is made of cells. But bureaucracies have emergent properties, system dynamics, capabilities and behaviors that go far beyond what any individual human or cell could accomplish. Bureaucracies have no souls or conscience in the human sense, but they fear ethics and oversight. This is why they often crucify whistleblowers. Fear is seldom the stated reason, but it is often the real reason. Some secrets should be exposed, lest they lead to waste, fraud, abuse or the murder of thousands of innocents. But the mantra of protecting sources and methods generally prevails, even when the real reason for secrecy is bureaucratic incompetence, sloth or mortal sin. Finally, be assured that you can put good people into a dysfunctional system, and that bad system can then put the good people to work on very evil ends. Totalitarian governments provide numerous examples from history. Most of them are gone now; a warning to those who think the status quo is stable. So bringing ethics to intelligence bureaucracies is not easy, but is important. I am not a moralist, rather a practical person trying to preserve civilizations faced with profound challenges in the third millennium of the Common Era. So I beg you to attend, and to do better than I have as you move forward. The order of presentation will be: 1) a brief history of the quest for ethics for spies, 2) a quick survey of a dozen U.S. intelligence agencies, 3) discussion of ‘Elephants in the Room’ that are seldom mentioned where everyone has been scrubbed by security clearances, and 4) conclusions about why systemic, bureaucratic fear of ethics is a primary cause of other problems that bedevil those guardians who would like to be called professionals of intelligence.
Ethics and Intelligence in Old and New Democracies
(U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 2017-07) Andregg, Michael M.
“Ethics and Intelligence in Old and New Democracies” 1. Functions of Security Intelligence in “Democracies” versus “Totalitarian States.” a. Common missions: i. Protecting the people from external and internal threats. ii. Protecting the state from external & internal threats, and corruptions. iii. Gathering intelligence for early warning of both current and potential threats. Sometimes this includes warning of opportunities also. iv. Informing law enforcement or military units for action against threats. v. Managing Information Operations, both offensive and defensive. vi. Protecting the legitimacy of the state from corruptions and organized attacks by external forces. b. Contrasting missions: i. Democracies value their citizens over their governments, in theory. ii. Totalitarian States value the regime of the day over rights of citizens. iii. This fundamental distinction has profound consequences at every level of human existance, for professional conduct among police and soldiers of any kind, and even affects the probability of survival of human civilization entire. Therefore it deserves significant attention.* iv. It also has profound effects on the welfare of military, police and all “guardian” professionals tasked with protecting people, state or both. 2. Why “Ethics” matters at all for Spies and other “Intelligence Professionals.” a. Personal Survival b. Family Survival c. Mission Success d. Minimizing Blowback, and other “Unintended Consequences.” e. Do you think that people have Souls? If so, ethics might matter even more. 3. Does “Old” versus “New” Democracies matter as a distinction? a. The eternal problem of Corruptions of Governance. Old democracies are often more corrupt than brand new ones, as can be very old politicians. b. Why Guardian Professionals must take this problem more seriously than many do. (This has profound importance for your soul, if you have one). c. How to Balance tensions between loyalty to team versus loyalty to ideals. Supplimental References: Intelligence Ethics: the Definitive Work of 2007* Breaking Laws of God and Man: When is this OK for Intelligence Professionals? * Das Leben Der Anderen, (The Lives of Others) is a great movie on this topic, about how the East German “Stasi” surveilled everyone, ruining their country until it fell.
Ethics for Intelligence Analysts
(Foreknowledge [published in South Africa], 2012-10) Andregg, Michael M.
Ethics for Spies in an Age of Assassinations, Rationalized Torture, Black, High-tech Propaganda, and Civilizational Breakdown
(International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations, 2018-06) Andregg, Michael M.
Ethics for Spies in an Age of Assassinations, Rationalized Torture, Black, High-tech Propaganda, and Civilizational Breakdown Michael Andregg, University of St. Thomas, and Vice President of the ISCSC for Young Scholar Development Op-Ed for the 2018 ISCSC Newsletter In my academic life, I do war forecasting and study spies (you cannot be very accurate on causes of wars if you do not pay attention to what the spies are up to). This makes ISCSC conferences a welcome relief to me, because they gather mainly nice, safe, elderly professors and students who are concerned about the great, classical issues. Spy conferences have quite a different ambiance. Anyone who has read Sun Tzu or Thucydides knows that spies have been with us for as long as civilizations, perhaps longer. But spies usually keep a low profile, and you do not have to worry about the assassins unless you are involved in high politics or commerce. Once in a great while, big issues for civilizations and for secret intelligence entities overlap. This is one. So my task today is to convey why creating an ethos for spies is important to civilizational survival. You all have read something about the attempted assassination on March 4 of the Russian double agent Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia in Great Britain by exotic nerve agent. This is part of a larger “Warm War” between current Russia and “the West,” which could become much hotter. Since nuclear weapons hover in the background, most of this is done “asymmetrically” through “hybrid warfare” and “active measures” which include extensive “information operations” and cyberattacks. Oops, the Brits chose Brexit (partly therefore) and we got Putin’s Poodle for a president. NATO, the EU, the United States and the world will never be the same. Propaganda always was more powerful than many know, but the techniques available in World War II were trivial compared with the techniques and technologies of information warfare and psychological operations today. Disinformation and black propaganda always were Russian specialties (well, the Brits and Israelis are pretty adept at these also). The problem is that spies learn from each other like any other professionals do, and sophisticated technique is spreading. Kim Jong-un also used an exotic nerve agent to kill his half-brother Kim Jong-nam in Malaysia, to prevent China from cultivating an alternative for the throne. North Korea got their VX from Russia. Meanwhile China has shown the world new heights of industrial espionage, and learned excellent brainwashing techniques from the North Koreans. These contribute to trade tensions with the US and the West, while China also develops the world’s best facial recognition software and social control technologies, like continuous video surveillance guided by novel AI software of people suspected of impure thoughts. Since China and North Korea have near total control of their media, this can have large consequences for concepts like freedom and human dignity. The West is far from pure in this domain. We invented Facebook, in the news a lot recently, the NSA and CIA, while the Brits built GCHQ and Cambridge Analytica. We also invented the term “psychological operations” during our war with North Korea (and China) in the early 1950’s. So when we of the ISCSC visit China for the 48th annual meeting of our gentle, professorial society, I will be pushing for a “Great Harmony” between the “Middle Kingdom” (China) and the “Beautiful Country” (USA). I will be remembering wise words from ancient Chinese masters, especially from Sun Tzu whose incomparable work will be cited extensively. This “clash” of civilizations must be managed as constructively as possible, lest everything under heaven be threatened with general thermonuclear war (among other bad options). Therefore, the dark arts and dark artists must be tended to, at least watched very carefully, so they do not throw monkey wrenches into everyone else’s peace plans. North and South Korea must be encouraged to pursue the sunshine policies of constructive reunification instead of war hawk dreams of containable wars with merely millions dead. And China must rise without feeling a need to wage war against western values, which will not surrender as easily as national armies may. Therefore, I have been agitating spies around the world to create a professional “ethos” for spies, complete with codes of conduct and such. You may laugh – its oxymoronic aspects are obvious. But consider, do you really want everyone’s spies to be as bad as the worst among us? That is a short path to global war, so I say step aside Sisyphus, we have work to do!
How "Wisdom" Differs from Intelligence and Knowledge in the Context of National Intelligence Agencies
(2003-02-28) Andregg, Michael M.
It is customary at this point to spend considerable time defining key terms like wisdom, intelligence and knowledge. I will come back to that after cutting to the bone of the topic at hand. Wisdom has a longer time horizon than either intelligence or knowledge. It spans a greater scope of concern, and reflects a set of values infused into knowledge that include compassion as a core component. It requires a deep understanding of human nature, because it is only called upon during crises of human affairs. All the rest is details, which can distract from these cardinal truths. With respect to issues of international security, this difference is exemplified by cases like Afghanistan (1979-89), Guatemala (1954) and Iran (1953-79). In each case focus on short-term, narrowly defined and mainly American national interests resulted in significant tactical victories. The long-term cost has been generating intense hatred of America among hundreds of millions of people worldwide. That hatred has diffuse military and economic consequences that are difficult to measure, but by any measure are profound. Of course there are excuses for this sacrifice of long-term, general welfare for short-term, narrow goals. But such excuses should not obscure the great price to thoughtful intelligence professionals, who undoubtedly do care about the future of their countries and their children.
Intelligence Ethics: An Uncompleted Project
(2018-04-05) Andregg, Michael M.
Intelligence Ethics: An Uncompleted Project Michael Andregg, University of St. Thomas in St. Paul, MN, USA, mmandregg@stthomas.edu for the 2018 ISA Conference in San Francisco, TB-57, April 5, 2018, 10:30 am – 12:15 pm [submitted to INASIS in Brazil but no news back] abstract d-7 The International Studies Association (ISA) helped to develop a very slowly emerging sub-field called intelligence ethics. ISA’s Intelligence Studies Section has been a venue for many efforts to develop literature on ethics for spies. For one example, we hosted three panels with 18 papers on that topic in 2007, contributing to a reader on intelligence ethics that was used by the CIA and DIA for a while. Dr. Jan Goldman of the NIU, FBI and other positions, also presented papers at ISA, and edited the “Scarecrow Professional Intelligence Education Series” that published 13 books, three focused on ethics for intelligence professionals. He started an international ethics association, and a peer-reviewed journal. However, this worthy effort to professionalize intelligence education with an ethical dimension was and remains greatly slowed by something Dr. Goldman labeled “ethics phobia” among the bureaucracies. The association is now dormant and the journal’s last print edition was in 2013. Senior executive Brian Snow also tried at NSA, where a team of colleagues created a model code of ethics for collectors that did not gain traction for similar reasons. Individual and institutional concerns result in a “fear” of ethics among many three-letter US-IC agencies. What agencies fear, practitioners avoid because children need feeding and pensions have meaning. Many definitions of a “profession” require a professional code of ethics to guide their craft, as doctors developed their “Hippocratic Oath,” and attorneys developed their “Model Code of Professional Conduct” for lawyers. It is time ‘professional’ spies did so also. Some comparisons with non-Western countries will conclude that this is a problem only for societies that already embrace concepts like ‘rule of law’ and ‘individual liberties.’ No one expects the spies of brutal, police state dictators to eschew deception, betrayal, propaganda, torture or even killing of critics in service to the power of their immoral leaders.
Intelligence Ethics: Oxymoron or Hope for the Future?
(2007-02-15) Andregg, Michael M.
Intelligence Ethics: Oxymoron or Hope for the Future? There is much to-do about intelligence failures prior to the war, prior to 9/11, or in other disasters related to ethical failures among intelligence professionals. A cottage industry has arisen searching for whom to blame how. This is why people gathered at the second “International Intelligence Ethics” conference in Springfield Virginia in January 2007. It attracted a couple of hundred analysts, internationals, professors, military inteI vets, active duty and even a few operators, who stayed murky on the fringes like they do. Almost every one of the participants has heard a hundred “oxymoron” jokes, because that’s just the natural reaction to putting those two words together. If you speak or write about intelligence ethics, you will become well versed in oxymoron jokes. But, the moral zealots protest, “Ethics is good for you!” Right. Like lots of fiber, heavy exercise and prostate exams. But I pester colleagues; the case for ethics even in this strange domain is stronger than it may appear at first. The cases that ethics in intelligence serve the national interest, and that attention to intelligence ethics can be healthy even for operators in the field, are very strong when carefully reviewed. First, alliances are critical to power on our vast planet, whether that power is democratically guided or imperial in style. Alliances fray when the center becomes untrustworthy or corrupt. Second, cohesion within the state is essential to maximum power at war. And nothing corrodes internal cohesion faster than a rotten core or visibly incompetent and immoral leadership.
Introduction to a special edition of the International Journal of Intelligence Ethics
(International Journal of Intelligence Ethics, 2012-09) Andregg, Michael M.
IIEA Journal fall 2012, Draft 1, Entry 2: Published as: Vol. 3, No. 2 / Fall/Winter, 2012. Introduction This journal edition began with an essay that Jan Goldman wrote in 2007 titled: “Ethicsphobia and the U.S. National Intelligence Community: Just say ‘No’” (1). In this he claimed there was an actual fear of ethics among some parts of the bureaucracy that he knew well as a professor at what is now called the National Intelligence University (NIU) and as a former practitioner for the Defense Intelligence Agency. So I arranged a panel to look at this question specifically in 2012, “Do Intelligence Bureaucracies Fear Ethics, and if so, Why?” All but one of the papers to follow are products of that panel, and the outlier was created by teams working on ethics issues under guidance from Dr. Goldman’s successor at NIU, JD and retired Army Col. Christopher Bailey. It begins with a view from Britain by Mark Phythian of Lancaster who has been a real pioneer of intelligence studies in the UK, followed by a focus on Africa and “Authoritarian State Security Apparatus” by a former Ambassador to the African Union, Cindy Lou Courville, now another professor at America’s NIU. Then comes Bailey’s exposition on U.S. intelligence community ethos, and defense of oversight in what he claims is “a closely regulated profession.” We will debate that a bit here, but this is certainly the common view among people inside the security clearance cocoon. No doubt they see all the inefficiencies, like we dwell on the victims of error. That is followed by what was the most interesting paper to me, a brief look at “Codes of Ethics” across America’s IC including 6 quite different and interesting proposals generated by teams of students at NIU. Those are typically mid-career intelligence professionals from the uniformed services, Majors and Captains mostly, with a few civilian employees of our Pentagon related intelligence agencies. They took their task seriously and the range of ideas they came up with is especially instructive and engaging. Then comes my paper, the dullest no doubt, but also the most pointed critique of assumptions and blind spots that come with the classified Kool-Aid. Book reviews round out this edition of the International Journal of Intelligence Ethics, by Stephen Kershnar of Alhoff’s “Terrorism, Time Bombs and Torture: a Philosophical Analysis,” by Professor Bailey of Christopher Perry’s edited “In the Balance: The Administration of Justice and National Security in Democracies,” and by Ian Fishback of Fried and Fried’s “Because it is Wrong: Torture, Privacy and Presidential Power in the Age of Terror.” Now, a bit more detail on the substantive papers.
The Moral Crisis in U.S. National Security Today
(2011-06-18) Andregg, Michael M.
Neither Madmen nor Messiahs: What NSA Leaks Reveal about Ethics in America's Intelligence Community
(e-IR, 2014-01-11) Andregg, Michael M.
Neither Madmen Nor Messiahs: What NSA Leaks Reveal About Ethics in America’s Intelligence Community The NSA (National Security Agency) has been savaging the US Constitution lately by secretly collecting data on almost every US citizen. But most of that evil work has been done by citizens obeying orders from true believers in the security state. In their hearts, they are heroes. It (the security state), however, has no heart. The key to understanding this dilemma is to recognize that the Intelligence Community (‘IC’) bureaucracies have mastered the art of getting “good people” to do “bad things” in the name of “national security.” There are just enough real maniacs on earth to frighten the hyper-vigilant at all times, even though actual deaths to real terrorists in North America are objectively far less each year today than deaths to bee stings, lightning strikes or televisions. So while I mention serious damage to American civil liberties and even to national security due to the recent growth of NSA activities, I need to be clear that this damage was done mainly by people with good intentions. In their minds, they are protecting the innocent from dangers posed by murky and sometimes stateless actors called “terrorists.” The IC clan is largely sincere, partly because they are told constantly that they are patriots by the bureaucracies that hire them, and which enforce the secrecy rules that enable such dysfunction. 9/11 provided an excuse. But bureaucracies run on money, not consciences, ‘free will,’ ethics or love, so counting on them to enforce any restraint is a fool’s conclusion. Bureaucracies are in it for the money, period.
The Primary Value of Restoring a Healthy Relationship Between Intelligence Agencies and the Academic World is a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs
(2002-03-25) Andregg, Michael M.
The Primary Value of Restoring a Healthy Relationship Between Intelligence Agencies and the Academic World is a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs Michael Andregg, University of St. Thomas in St. Paul, MN, USA. mmandregg@stthomas.edu for presentation to the intelligence studies section of the ISA, March 25, 2002. This long-winded title derives from two fundamental goals. On the positive side, I’d like to have better access to information resources of my national government, because my opinion on why wars start matters in various places and I’d like that to be better informed. I’ve studied the causes of war for 23 years, and written one, national award-winning book on the subject. But I am still like a child just beginning to understand. Watching about 30 conflict zones all the time leaves the single observer thin everywhere, and it would be great to have easier access to detailed information compiled by my government with it’s vastly greater resources. On the negative side, there have been many intelligence failures the last few decades, some very serious with grave consequences for thousands or even millions of people, depending on how you count them. And it is very obvious from outside that distortions of perspective and data is the root reason why, brought on by the same system that keeps certain secrets so well. Examples include the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan with consequences obvious to all by now, the unpredicted fall of Iran, and later of the Soviet Union, and the ongoing failure really to comprehend why so many people around the world hate America despite many good things we have done. It is not all just envy, important though that factor certainly is. So, there are the issues of accuracy of analysis, and of timely warning of dangerous events. Another, related question has occupied my time recently, prompted by discussion at these ISA meetings last year. How can we get more wisdom into the official products of national intelligence agencies? To answer this question requires some awareness of how wisdom gets screened out of such assessments and recommendations. It is not a conscious process, that’s for sure – all involved are doing the best they can to serve their country within systems that often prevent success. Remembering that I have no security clearances and have declined to sign the nondisclosure agreements necessary for such clearances (to preserve my own clarity of thought, and credibility in polite society), I have reached the following conclusions among others. All involve, paradoxically, restrictions on information available to the professional intelligence analysts and executives who think that because they have special access to “secrets” that they must then have access to more data than the open world. As Gregory Treverton has noted more eloquently, the obsession with keeping secrets tends to crowd out the goal of figuring out what is really going on and what to do about that.
The Quest for Ethics for Spies
(2011-08) Andregg, Michael M.
Ethics for spies is a true oxymoron, since breaking laws is part of their daily work. But it is an important oxymoron, because the lives of millions swing on what spies tell leaders who employ them. When weapons of mass destruction enter the mix, the fate of the entire planet can depend on whether spies are wise at moments of exceptional stress. Wisdom is not possible without ethics. So even though spies break laws every day, often lie for a living, and live in a strange world of bizarre customs, semi-random danger, rampant paranoia, and extremely twisted thinking, the quest for ethics among spies is important. I study spies and call their strange world “spooky-luky land” in honor of Al McCoy, a career officer for the U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Division. In retirement, he became a private investigator devoted to defending whistleblowers from within this secret world, people who risked everything to defend the Constitution by getting forbidden truths out to a public that is theoretically in charge of the Republic (emphasis on “theoretically”). Spooky-luky land does not like employees who reveal secrets, and it punishes most who do relentlessly. Intelligence bureaucracies are systems that depend on secrecy for their power and life’s blood, which is money. Good personnel help too, but money is essential. Secrecy protects identities and empowers methods used by “intelligence professionals” (the preferred label for most who make their living spying for governments). In human intelligence, as opposed to electronic, image and other forms, those methods are largely blackmail, extortion, assassination and threats of assassination (if you cannot just pay someone to betray their government). That begs a few other ethical questions.
Targeted Assassinations
(Combating Terrorism, 2020) Andregg, Michael M.
TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS Assassination has been a tool of terrorists and governments for millennia. It has been an act of terrorists and nation states in warfare since the formal “state” was invented. The term “assassin” probably comes from a group of Islamic enthusiasts formed in 1090 CE (the Nizari Ismalilis) that specialized in targeted killings of opponents. Assassinations differ from ordinary murders or killings on battlefields by the implication that the target has some special political importance. One famous assassination was when a 19 year-old Serbian named Gavrilo Pincip killed Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914, leading to World War I which killed almost a tenth of all males in Central Europe. In theory, the USA is prohibited from assassinations by an Executive Order (#12333, “United States Intelligence Activities”) signed by Ronald Reagan in 1981. This did not prevent hundreds of attempts to kill political people like Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen in October 14, 2011, or Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq on June 7, 2006, using Hellfire missiles. The US also tried to assassinate Cuba’s President Fidel Castro at least 8 times (CIA records) to as many as 28 times (Cuba’s estimate) during the Cold War. The assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963 raised questions about the wisdom of targeting national leaders. Some suspected the Cubans. The Russian government refined assassination to high art. It was connected to the murders of Georgi Markov in London September 11, 1978, using the biological poison ricin, and of Alexander Litvinenko using polonium 210 on November 23, 2006. Russia is also alleged to have poisoned Sergie Skripal and his daughter Yulia with a very sophisticated “novichok” nerve agent on March 4, 2018. But no state has a more diversified record of assassinations than Israel. Its MOSSAD intelligence agency decided to use this as a common tool in their long-running covert war against Palestinian organizations, a host of Islamic terrorist groups, and other declared enemies like Iran. MOSSAD killed many Iranian nuclear scientists, for example, using ordinary pistols and limpet mines attached to cars to slow down nuclear weapons development in Iran. Years before, MOSSAD set out to avenge the murders of 11 Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics by killing most of the Palestinians who had been involved in those assassinations. This history is described in riveting detail by our first “suggested reading,” Ronan Bergman’s “Rise and Kill First” (2018). That book is noteworthy because it was informed and endorsed by many of MOSSAD’s former Directors. A comprehensive view of targeted assassinations requires recognition that thousands of “targeted killings” have also been committed by various Arab mukhabarat (secret police and intelligence groups) in their countries and against enemies abroad. This business of spies killing spies (or generals or presidents of enemy entities) has a long and very complex history, obscured by the secrecy that attends such events. Therefore, this section ends with downsides of such tactics revealed by this history. Sometimes innocent people are killed because they are near the bomb, or are incorrectly identified as targets like Chico Bouchikhi, killed by MOSSAD in Lillehammer, Norway on July 21, 1973. Killing innocents has terrible public relations consequences. Second, if you kill able leaders of enemy groups, they may be replaced by less intelligent but more brutal others who push hatred harder and make peace negotiations impossible. Third, if one country adopts assassination as a tool of statecraft, its enemies may reply in kind, and your own political leaders may be killed. So prudent leaders are warned about the perils of assassination, and all need special protection today from terrorists and many other rivals. Michael Andregg [Word count excluding “Further Readings” is 604] Further Reading Bergman, Ronan, 2018. Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations. New York: Random House. Perliger, Arie, 2015. The Causes and Impact of Political Assassinations. In Vol. 8, Issue 1 of the CTC Sentinel (Counter Terrorism Center) at the US Military Academy at West Point, New York. Accessible at: https://ctc.usma.edu/the-causes-and-impact-of-political-assassinations/ Assassinations in History – Chronologically, 2018. At Emerson Kent.com, accessible at: http://www.emersonkent.com/assassinations_in_history_chronologically.htm Kahana, Ephraim, 2006. Historical Dictionary of Israeli Intelligence. Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press. Cockburn, Alexander, July 24, 2009. The CIA and a Long History of Assassinations. In The Week, London, UK, accessible at: http://www.theweek.co.uk/politics/21051/cia-and-long-history-assassinations .
Weapons of Mass Destruction
(Combating Terrorism, 2020) Andregg, Michael M.
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) have three major types: nuclear, biological, and chemical. Some people think that this range should be expanded to include Electromagnetic Pulse weapons (EMP), radioactive “dirty bombs” or recent developments like cyber-warfare, or sophisticated information operations. By any definition, all WMD are characterized by the potential to cause large numbers of casualties without distinction between combatants and civilians. The prospect of terrorists acquiring such weapons has renewed interest in them, and in defenses against WMD deployed by either states or terrorists. Nuclear weapons cause the most general destruction because they can destroy structures as well as people. They were used twice in war, over Hiroshima, Japan on August 6, 1945 and over Nagasaki, Japan on August 9, 1945. These were relatively primitive, small “atom bombs” compared to modern “hydrogen” or thermonuclear bombs that can be 1000 times more powerful. Those two weapons destroyed both cities and about 200,000 citizens each when long-term radiation effects are included. Global warhead inventories peaked in 1986 at over 70,000 nuclear warheads, but they have since declined to about 15,000 held by nine countries, Russia, the USA, China, France, Great Britain, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea. Biological weapons have a longer history since medieval warriors sometimes threw plague infected corpses into besieged cities, and some American colonists shared smallpox infected blankets with local Indians with the goal of reducing their populations. The Soviet Union (and to a lesser degree the USA) developed “cocktails” of mixed smallpox and anthrax agents complete with delivery systems. The USA also used some biological weapons to attack Cuban agriculture during “Operation Mongoose” in the Cold War. This superpower rivalry frightened the world so much that comprehensive arms control legislation (both international and national) prohibited further development, production or stockpiling of biological weapons by nations in 1975. Modern genetic engineering techniques raise even more fearsome possibilities of designer germs enabled to resist medicines and infect all people. Perhaps the worst nightmare of biological weapons is that they can reproduce themselves. Therefore, a disease organism that might infect everyone could, in theory, grow from the point of attack to damage the entire world. Despite such nightmare scenarios, biological weapons have actually killed less people in the last century than either nuclear or chemical weapons. Chemical weapons became infamous during World War I, when mustard gas and other relatively primitive but deadly weapons were used by both sides during trench warfare in Europe. These gases were very efficient at killing or maiming large numbers of troops, but if the wind suddenly changed direction, clouds of deadly gas could turn back to kill the troops who deployed them. Indiscriminate deaths of civilians were also unintended but common effects. Germans in World War II also used chemical agents to kill some millions of Jews, Gypsies and other victims in concentration/extermination camps. This unpredictability, persistent lethality, and inability to stop the spread of effects on battlefields contributed to attempts to ban both chemical and biological weapons after World War II. Despite the essentially total ban on chemical weapons in international law (Chemical Weapons Convention of April 29, 1997) and the presence of very sophisticated control institutions like the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) some modern “nerve agents” have been used in recent years to assassinate Kim Jong-nam in Malaysia (half-brother of North Korea’s leader, 2017) and in attempts to assassinate others by Russia. Terrorist groups have expressed considerable interest in WMD. Therefore, better control of WMD before terrorists can build or buy any is a top priority for counter-terrorism today. Michael Andregg [Word count excluding “Further Readings” is 598] Further Reading Cirincione, Joseph, John B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, 2005. Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Threats. 2nd Edition. Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Wright, Susan, 2002. Biological Warfare and Disarmament: New Problems/New Perspectives. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Osterholm, Michael T. and John Schwartz, 2000. Living Terrors: What America Needs to Know to Survive the Coming Bioterrorist Catastrophe. New York: Dell Publishing, Random House. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) at https://www.opcw.org/ maintains the most comprehensive collection of open source education resources in the world on chemical weapons. It is based in The Hague, The Netherlands. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, is a periodical founded by scientists who actually built the first nuclear weapons, and whose board includes many Nobel Laureates. Its website has great detail on global nuclear weapons inventories and issues, at http://thebulletin.org . Of special value is their “Nuclear Notebook” at http://thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook-multimedia .
Why Real Ethics and True Wisdom are Keys to Keeping Intelligence Agencies Guardians of the People, for IKS in Romania
(National Intelligence Academy of Romania (Mihai Viteazul), 2012-10-19) Andregg, Michael M.
The quintessential missions of a Special Agent are to protect the people, and innocence as a concept. Protecting the state is also important, of course. If you do not, you won’t be employed as an intelligence professional. But it is vital to remember which comes first, and that governments can change from protectors of the people to persecutors of them quickly. Eastern Europe had such vivid experiences with this problem during the last century that its current guardians should be models to the world. Protecting innocents is our eternal mission, and when governments go bad they often lose sight of this distinction. To be a truly Special Agent one must always remember that the people come first and be loyal to them first, while also serving the state that employs and empowers you. States are your paycheck and pension so serve them well, but … keep priorities as indicated. That could be the end of philosophic discussion, but this issue comes up practically in careers because decay is eternal. Graft grows. Corruption appears spontaneously. There is a little dictator in every politician’s heart, and truly Special Agents never forget these problems. Thus an important question for the career professional is, “What missions would I refuse to do, and why?” Then, how does one refuse effectively? We will ask other hard questions here. Intelligence professionals serve missions assigned by states in daily work, whether collectors, analysts, operators or support staff. They are expected not to ask big questions unless they really ‘need to know.’ But today we face civilization level crises, so the world needs Special Agents with global vision. How can “global vision” coexist with the secrecy so essential to many intelligence operations? An important check on state hubris is a strong professional ethos rooted in the security services, but known more broadly. This should be supremely idealistic, deeply courageous, and grounded in WHY the people must always come first. You are their guardians – do not let any state oppress them! The rest of this paper will try to show how “real” ethics and “true” wisdom, or aspirations to such ideals, can help with cultivating an intelligence community ethos for the Third Millennium of the Common Era.

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