Beyond Military Power: The Symbolic Politics of Conventional Weapons Transfers

Abstract

Why do states transfer arms to one another, and what are the effects of these weapons transfers? Conventional weapons are the weapons most commonly used in war, and states devote significant resources to acquiring them, spending an estimated $401 billion in 2014. Despite this link to conflict and economic resources, we know very little about why states seek certain weapons and not others, or the outcomes of these transfers. In contrast to arguments that conflict or economic profit guide weapons transfers, I argue that states use weapons transfers to send political signals. These signals, based on the symbolic value of the weapon, clarify—to friend and foe alike—the extent and depth of the states’ political relationship. My dissertation offers a typology of weapons and their expected effect on the receiving state’s foreign policy behavior; theorizes the circumstances under which these outcomes should be observed; and assesses this theory using case studies of US arms transfers to India and Pakistan (1954-1967), Egypt and Israel (1962-1968), and China and Taiwan (1972-1979), as well as large-n statistical and network analyses, in turn offering a novel explanation of key foreign policy dynamics.