The Nature of Human Truths: The Pragmatism of FCS Schiller and Cognitive Science

Abstract

Over the past several decades, Cognitive Science has been experiencing a “pragmatic turn” as a result of philosophers within the field examining the literature of classical Pragmatism. One outgrowth of the current “turn” has been the development of various enactivist models of cognition and perception. In his 1990 book, The Fragmentation of Reason, philosopher and cognitive scientist Stephen Stich promotes the adoption of what he calls an “epistemic pragmatism” and arrives at the startling conclusion that truth and true beliefs have no value whatsoever, either intrinsic or instrumental. I understand Stich’s conclusion about truth to be motivated by what I refer to as a “predicament” (i.e. that traditional analytic approaches to evaluating beliefs are limited and idiosyncratic, their deployment ultimately resting on subjective intuitions) and an apparent “dilemma” (i.e. the perception that there is an essential and unavoidable bifurcation between truth and practical success). While I agree with the majority of Stich’s assessment of traditional analytic methods of cognitive evaluation, I take exception with his conclusion that truth and true beliefs have no value. Furthermore, I consider his “dilemma” to be false, or at least only applicable in a case where one accepts certain analytic notions of truth. Refuting Stich’s conclusion regarding the value of truth serves as the first aim of this project. The second aim (though it is perhaps more prominent throughout) regards the presentation of a pragmatic theory of truth from a prolific classical pragmatist philosopher, F.C.S. Schiller (b. 1864), a close friend and colleague of William James, whose work has gone largely unconsidered since his death in 1937. Schiller’s comprehensive and detailed account of truth dissolves the apparent horns of Stich’s “dilemma” and provides a strong basis for examining truth within the conceptual framework of enactivism. In presenting Schiller’s account of truth, I hope to further elucidate and strengthen the relationship between classical Pragmatism and Cognitive Science, while also contributing to the ongoing “turn” by presenting an approach to truth that fits within the broader enactivist paradigm. The three main chapters of this dissertation (2-4), present an overview of Schiller’s pragmatic understanding of metaphysics (2) and truth (3), offer various criticisms of at least one version of the correspondence theory of truth (3), and provide some answers to common objections raised against the pragmatic theory of truth (4), particularly its dimensions of relativity and subjectivity.