A Theory of Signalling Auctions
Authors
Published Date
Publisher
Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota
Type
Abstract
The essential structural characteristic of an auction is that
a bidder will either win or lose, and there is a different payoff
function for each of these two outcomes. In this paper, a symmetric
auction model is formulated and analyzed as a game with incomplete
information. Special cases of this model include many price auction
arrangements, but the specification allows for "bidding" competition
on the basis of non-price signals such as design proposals, educational
credentials, etc. Common properties and economic applications
of such signalling auction models are discussed.
Keywords
Description
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Series/Report Number
Discussion Paper
110
110
Funding Information
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DOI identifier
Previously Published Citation
Holt, C.A. Jr., (1979), "A Theory of Signalling Auctions", Discussion Paper No. 110, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota.
Other identifiers
Suggested Citation
Holt, Charles A. Jr.. (1979). A Theory of Signalling Auctions. Retrieved from the University Digital Conservancy, https://hdl.handle.net/11299/54994.
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