Non-Ideal Autonomy in Relationships of Care

Abstract

In​​ ​​moral​​ ​​and​​ ​​political​​ ​​philosophy,​​ ​​autonomy​​ ​​is​​ ​​generally​​ ​​theorized​​ ​​as​​ ​​a​​ ​​right​​ ​​exercised​​ ​​by independent,​​ ​​self-reflective,​​ ​​rational,​​ ​​adult​​ ​​persons.​​ ​​Feminist​​ ​​philosophers​​ ​​have challenged​​ ​​this​​ ​​picture​​ ​​by​​ ​​emphasizing​​ ​that​ ​​critical​​ ​​reflection​​ ​​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​​relationships​​ ​​and​ ​dependencies​ ​​are​​ ​​integral​​ ​​to​​ ​​what​​ ​​it​​ ​​means​​ ​​to​​ ​​exercise​ ​autonomy.​​ ​​This​​ ​​work​​ ​​addresses​​ ​​the​ ​implications​​ ​​of​​ ​necessitating​ ​cognitive​ ​processes​ ​such​ ​as​ ​critical​ ​reflection​ ​for​ ​autonomy in​ ​legal​ ​guardianships.​ In​​ ​​a​​ ​​guardianship,​​ ​​a​​ ​​court​​ ​​determines​​ ​​that​​ ​​a​​ ​​person​ ​(i.e.,​​ ​​the​​ ​​ward)​​ ​​is​​ ​​‘incapable’​​ ​​of​​ ​​legal​ ​decision-making​​ ​​and​​ ​​appoints​​ ​​someone​​ ​​else​​ ​​(i.e.,​ ​the​​ ​​guardian)​​ ​​to​​ ​​make​​ ​​decisions​​ ​​on​​ ​​her​ ​behalf.​​ ​​This​​ ​​is​​ ​​problematic​​ ​​because​​ ​​a​ ​state​ ​bill​ ​of​ ​rights​ ​statute​ ​may​ ​simultaneously require​ ​​that​ ​​a​ ​​ward’s​​ ​​autonomy​ ​​be​​ ​​respected​ ​by​ ​the​ ​guardian.​​ ​​Here,​​ ​​there​​ ​​is​​ ​​a​​ ​​gap ​between​​ ​​our​​ ​​philosophical​​ ​​conceptions​​ ​​of​ ​autonomy​​ ​​and​​ ​​how​​ ​​real​​ ​​cognitively​​ ​​diverse​ ​people​​ ​​experience​​ ​​it.​​ ​​In​​ ​​response​ ​to​ ​this​ ​gap,​ ​a​​ ​​non-ideal​​ ​​approach​​ ​​treats​​ ​​autonomy​​ ​​as​​ ​​a​ ​fundamental​​ ​​need​​ ​​rather​​ ​​than​​ ​​a​​ ​​right,​ ​suspends​​ ​​cognitive​​ ​​ideals​​ ​​and​​ ​​instead​​ ​​attends​​ ​​to​ ​diverse​​ ​experiences​ ​of​​ ​​it.​​ ​Approaching​ ​autonomy​ ​in​ ​this​ ​way​ ​has​​ ​​the​​ ​​potential​​ ​​to​​ ​​more​ ​meaningfully​​ ​​inform​​ ​​expectations​​ ​​of​​ ​​care​​ ​​within​ ​legal​​ ​​guardianships.