Non-Ideal Autonomy in Relationships of Care
2017-08
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Non-Ideal Autonomy in Relationships of Care
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2017-08
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In moral and political philosophy, autonomy is generally theorized as a right exercised by independent, self-reflective, rational, adult persons. Feminist philosophers have challenged this picture by emphasizing that critical reflection as well as relationships and dependencies are integral to what it means to exercise autonomy. This work addresses the implications of necessitating cognitive processes such as critical reflection for autonomy in legal guardianships. In a guardianship, a court determines that a person (i.e., the ward) is ‘incapable’ of legal decision-making and appoints someone else (i.e., the guardian) to make decisions on her behalf. This is problematic because a state bill of rights statute may simultaneously require that a ward’s autonomy be respected by the guardian. Here, there is a gap between our philosophical conceptions of autonomy and how real cognitively diverse people experience it. In response to this gap, a non-ideal approach treats autonomy as a fundamental need rather than a right, suspends cognitive ideals and instead attends to diverse experiences of it. Approaching autonomy in this way has the potential to more meaningfully inform expectations of care within legal guardianships.
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University of Minnesota Ph.D. dissertation. August 2017. Major: Philosophy. Advisors: Joan Tronto, Sarah Holtman. 1 computer file (PDF); iii, 174 pages.
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Swanson, Kathryn. (2017). Non-Ideal Autonomy in Relationships of Care. Retrieved from the University Digital Conservancy, https://hdl.handle.net/11299/191434.
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