Essays on Well-Being

Abstract

In this dissertation, I defend Objective List Theories of well-being from a number of powerful objections, and in the process, put pressure on subjectivists to offer better support for their theories. I begin by providing an overview of the philosophical literature on well-being, before turning in Chapter I to the objection that Objective List Theories are founded on unwarranted appeals to intuitions. I respond to this objection by arguing that subjective theories of well-being appeal to intuitions in the same way, and that, ultimately, such appeals are justified when constructing a theory of well-being. In Chapter II, I examine the intuitive basis of subjective theories more closely, and argue that their foundational intuition—i.e., the claim that something can be good for us only if we hold the relevant pro-attitude(s) towards it—must be argued for; it cannot simply be accepted as an axiomatic intuition. No such argument is offered by subjectivists; therefore, subjective theories are faulty. Finally, in Chapter III, I consider the objection that Objective List Theories are not well-equipped to account for ill-being. I show, first, that Objective List Theories do have the tools to account for ill-being, and second, that simple subjective theories of well-being (despite their advocates offering several compelling responses to the same objection) do not. This means that we ought to prefer either an Objective List Theory, or a more sophisticated subjective theory (e.g., a Value-Fulfillment Theory). That said, sophisticated subjective theories must still contend with the problem raised in Chapter II, and so, ultimately, we ought to prefer Objective List Theories.