Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents

McLennan, Andrew
1996-10
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Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents

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1996-10

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Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota

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Working Paper

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The Condorcet Jury Theorem pertains to elections in which the agents have common preferences but diverse information. We show that, whenever "sincere" voting leads to the conclusions of the Theorem-decisions superior to those that would be made by any individual based on private information, and asymptotically correct decisions as the population becomes large--there are also Nash equilibria with these properties, and in symmetric environments the equilibria may be taken to be symmetric. These conclusions follow from a simple property of common interest games: a mixed strategy profile of a (symmetric) common interest game that is optimal in the set of (symmetric) mixed strategy profiles is a Nash equilibrium.

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Center for Economic Research Discussion Papers

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Discussion Paper
 289

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McLennan, A., (1996), "Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents", Discussion Paper No. 289, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota.

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McLennan, Andrew. (1996). Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents. Retrieved from the University Digital Conservancy, https://hdl.handle.net/11299/55753.

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