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A Theory of Moral Obligation

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A Theory of Moral Obligation

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2016-05

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I begin by arguing against “ought” implies “can.” Without obligations limited by ability, I develop an account of the obligation to refrain from harm that shows most of our daily actions contribute to the harm of others worldwide, necessitating that we take possible alternatives to those harmful actions. While we can act on each individual obligation, together they create massive moral dilemmas, i.e. most of us cannot act on all of our obligations. In light of the impossible obligations, I argue that each person should develop a moral disposition to act on her obligations in order to achieve moral success.

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University of Minnesota Ph.D. dissertation. May 2016. Major: Philosophy. Advisors: Sarah Holtman, Roy Cook. 1 computer file (PDF); iii, 201 pages.

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Wilson, Brian. (2016). A Theory of Moral Obligation. Retrieved from the University Digital Conservancy, https://hdl.handle.net/11299/181686.

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