The Living Mind

Abstract

This thesis revisits the question of what kind of thing a mind is, and seeks to show that this question contains an important assumption about the nature of the mental domain, namely, that it is its own domain, or more simply, its own thing. What if, instead of asking what the mind is, and doggedly pursuing an answer that will satisfy us, we inquire into the nature of the mind without a commitment to there being a distinct and discrete explanandum, a delineable entity that awaits our delineation? This thesis follows up on this thought, by exploring an alternative conception of mind that treats it as no thing, but not as nothing. Starting with the idea that minds aren’t clearly bounded realms that contain thoughts and feelings and so forth, but the embodied performances of subjects-persons-organisms (SPOs), this thesis goes on to explore how this reorientation in our understanding of the mental yields a radical, powerful, and explanatorily fruitful approach to solving, or dissolving, thorny philosophical problems, and specifically, problems in epistemology.