The Living Mind

Loading...
Thumbnail Image

Persistent link to this item

Statistics
View Statistics

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Title

The Living Mind

Published Date

2017-01

Publisher

Type

Thesis or Dissertation

Abstract

This thesis revisits the question of what kind of thing a mind is, and seeks to show that this question contains an important assumption about the nature of the mental domain, namely, that it is its own domain, or more simply, its own thing. What if, instead of asking what the mind is, and doggedly pursuing an answer that will satisfy us, we inquire into the nature of the mind without a commitment to there being a distinct and discrete explanandum, a delineable entity that awaits our delineation? This thesis follows up on this thought, by exploring an alternative conception of mind that treats it as no thing, but not as nothing. Starting with the idea that minds aren’t clearly bounded realms that contain thoughts and feelings and so forth, but the embodied performances of subjects-persons-organisms (SPOs), this thesis goes on to explore how this reorientation in our understanding of the mental yields a radical, powerful, and explanatorily fruitful approach to solving, or dissolving, thorny philosophical problems, and specifically, problems in epistemology.

Description

University of Minnesota Ph.D. dissertation. January 2017. Major: Philosophy. Advisors: Peter Hanks, Naomi Scheman. 1 computer file (PDF); iv, 252 pages.

Related to

Replaces

License

Collections

Series/Report Number

Funding information

Isbn identifier

Doi identifier

Previously Published Citation

Suggested citation

Laine, Patrick. (2017). The Living Mind. Retrieved from the University Digital Conservancy, https://hdl.handle.net/11299/185600.

Content distributed via the University Digital Conservancy may be subject to additional license and use restrictions applied by the depositor. By using these files, users agree to the Terms of Use. Materials in the UDC may contain content that is disturbing and/or harmful. For more information, please see our statement on harmful content in digital repositories.