Existence and Fairness of Value Allocation without Convex Preferences

Yannelis, Nicholas C.
1983-08
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Existence and Fairness of Value Allocation without Convex Preferences

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1983-08

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Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota

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Shafer [8] proved that in a finite exchange economy value allocations exist, provided that each agent has convex, complete, transitive, compact and monotone preferences. However, if preferences are not convex, then value allocations may not exist. To remedy this difficulty we enlarge the set of value allocations introducing the concept of approximate value allocations, and show that in a finite exchange economy approximate value allocations exist, even if preferences are not convex, or compact, or monotone. This value existence result can be used to provide a very general value existence theorem for a sequence of finite economies. Further, we show that value allocations do discriminate in favor of or against any coalition of agents.

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Center for Economic Research Discussion Papers

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Discussion Paper
 184

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Yannelis, N.C., (1983), "Existence and Fairness of Value Allocation without Convex Preferences", Discussion Paper No. 184, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota.

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Yannelis, Nicholas C.. (1983). Existence and Fairness of Value Allocation without Convex Preferences. Retrieved from the University Digital Conservancy, https://hdl.handle.net/11299/55276.

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