Shame, Respect and Well-Being: What Can We Learn from Early Chinese Philosophy?

Abstract

My dissertation aims to bring insights from early Chinese Philosophy into constructive dialogue with Western thought to enrich our philosophical understanding of two significant philosophical questions. First, what is the moral value of the feelings of respect and shame? Second, what are the necessary constituents of a well-lived life? I compare the predominant accounts of respect, shame, and well-being in the Western tradition with the Confucian and Daoist traditions on these topics. I show that a mutual understanding of both perspectives yields a more comprehensive picture of moral emotions and well-being. First, I propose an account of well-being inspired by an early Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi and compare it with the predominant accounts of well-being in Western philosophy. The comparison aims to demonstrate the prudential value of a good process of cultivating well-being, which tends to be ignored in Western theories that focus on achievements. On the moral value of shame, I provide a Confucian analysis of shame and compare it with the Aristotelian account. This comparison aims to challenge the view that shame feelings reflect a person’s damaged self-esteem. Instead, by borrowing insights from the early Confucians, we can see that the disposition to feel shame has moral value in itself and is constitutive of our need to value ourselves in order to feel worthwhile. On the moral value of respect, I compare the Confucian account of respect with the Kantian account. For early Confucians, the notion of respect not only refers to intentional feelings (feelings directed at specific objects) but more frequently refers to a respectful frame of mind. I argue that a Confucian notion of respectfulness helps to extend Kantian respect beyond Kant’s own target of rational agency to respect the elderly and people with mental illness whose rational capacities have been impaired.