The Moral Psychology of Implicit Bias: Interpretations, Obligations, and Responsibilities

Abstract

In recent years, psychologists have developed indirect measures to observe unconscious prejudices that diverge from the egalitarian views directly reported by test subjects. This unconscious prejudice is termed implicit bias. It has been used to scientifically explain a variety of broad social phenomena (e.g. persisting inequality between various demographic groups). My dissertation is focused on the relationships between scientific characterizations of implicit bias, our moral responsibility for it, and how these accounts translate into applications in real-world settings. At the center of my work is the view that philosophical theorizing regarding implicit bias should be informed by careful attention to the nuances of relevant contemporary conceptual models of implicit bias. There are multiple models of implicit bias, each of which provides a unique conceptual characterization of the same phenomena. My research is focused mainly (although not exclusively) on the most recent conceptualization of implicit bias in the relevant science: situationist models. Situationist models have the potential to fundamentally change how we think about moral responsibility for actions related to implicit bias, and what we must do to mitigate its effects in the future. There has been little attention given to developing the implications of this model in philosophical work on implicit bias and my dissertation addresses this lacuna. I argue for a pluralistic approach to moral responsibility for implicit bias. Just as there are different models of implicit bias, there are also corresponding different senses of moral responsibility associated with implicit bias. This represents a novel contribution to the philosophical literature on implicit bias.