A Critique of Reductive Accounts of the Source of Necessity

Abstract

The original objective of this research project was to provide a reductive account of the source of the necessity that makes necessary truths necessarily true. After a close examination of existent reductive accounts of the source of necessity, my goal has changed. In this dissertation I argue the prospects for a reductive account of the source of necessity are not at all promising. I begin by examining and critiquing accounts of the source of necessity that claim we, humans, are in some way or other responsible for making necessary truths necessarily true (what I am calling “Dependent Accounts of the source of necessity”). I raise two critical problems with Dependent Accounts of the source of necessity, which effectively rule out all Dependent Accounts of the source of necessity. I then consider two Nondependent Accounts of the source of necessity (Modal Realism and Essentialism). I argue that both of these accounts of the source of necessity are problematic. Importantly, the major problem with Essentialism is that it does not provide us with a way to account for the necessary features of alien possible beings, so it is at best an incomplete account of the source of necessity. This problem with Essentialism effectively rules out any Nondependent Account of the source of necessity that tries to locate the source in our world. Lastly, I examine the implications of it being a brute fact that certain truths are necessary and propose some future research projects based on my findings.