Essays on Macroeconomics and Labor Economics

Abstract

My dissertation consists of two chapters. In Chapter 1, I study efficient allocations when parents have both non-altruistic and altruistic motives for having children and when markets are complete. I find that when parents are not restricted in their bequest decisions, the only type of inefficiency that may arise in the competitive equilibrium is dynamic inefficiency, either in the form of under- and over-accumulation. Introducing childcare subsidies or estate tax creates short-run distortions, whereas a pay-as-you-go social security system can eliminate dynamic inefficiency, even when not explicitly linked to an individual's fertility decision. In Chapter 2, I use a heterogeneous-agent lifecycle overlapping-generation model with credit constraints, endogenous fertility, and human capital investment to evaluate the long-run effects of federal student loans. I estimate the model to match features of micro-level U.S. household survey data in the 2000s. I find that federal student loans reduce fertility rates but increase college attendance rates and income and have no discernible effects on social mobility. An exogenous fertility model overstates the effects on aggregate output and social mobility.