Browsing by Subject "polarization"
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Item Conflict Framing of the News and Group Polarization(2016-05) Han, JiyoungPartisan polarization has been at the center of scholarly attention. Many studies on this topic have underscored elite polarization as a primary cause of mass polarization in American politics. Relatively little attention has been paid to the role of mass media in promoting polarization. This is partly because of the notion that news media largely reflect political reality. However, when it comes to news making, the role of journalists should not be underestimated: Journalists choose what to report among thousands events happening all over the world and how to report the event. This active role of journalists in the news reporting process is conceptualized as framing. Conflict is known as the most prevalent way American journalists frame their stories (de Vreese, 2012; Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992). In this present dissertation, I argue that conflict framing—especially news media emphasis on partisan conflict in their coverage of political events—contributes to partisan polarization. Drawing on self-categorization theory of group polarization (Turner et al., 1987), I hypothesize that as a vicarious experience of partisan conflict, conflict-framed news will lead people to respond to the disputed issue as members of the Democratic or Republican Party instead of as unique individuals; this increased partisan self-categorization is a mechanism behind the news effect. This group polarization hypothesis is tested with three experimental studies. Specifically, with a use of diverse samples of students and non-students, Studies 1 and 2 find supporting evidence that Democrats and Republicans exposed to partisan conflict-framed news adopt more polarized positions along party lines when news exposure elicits their partisan identity. To rule out a potential confounding effect of the so-called party cue effects (Goren, Federico, & Kittilson, 2009), Study 3 retests the group polarization hypothesis in the context of gender polarization. The findings of Study 3 are robust. Exposure to gender conflict-framed news promotes attitude polarization between women and men; increased gender self-categorization accounts for the news effect. The findings inform us that media reflection of elite polarization (Cohen, 2003; Druckman, Peterson, & Slothuus, 2013) and the growing popularity of partisan cable news channels (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008; Stroud, 2010) fail to paint a whole picture when it comes to the link between news media and polarization in American mass public. Many scholars have criticized the news media for transforming politics into a “strategic game” (Patterson, 1993) or “spectator sport” (Price, 2009) and are concerned about the potentially-negative influence of this style of coverage on deliberative democracy. By examining the polarizing effect of news coverage that oversells the competitive aspect of party politics, the present dissertation study provides some of the only evidence that speaks to these claims. The second part of this dissertation examines whether self-categorization theory sheds new light on polarization research beyond and above current literature. To that end, I explore three possible mechanisms through which conflict framing may elicit group polarization of attitudes: (1) by increasing group self-categorization, (2) by increasing motivated reasoning, and (3) by increasing intergroup animus. Data from Studies 1, 2, and 3 provide promising but conflicting results: For partisan polarization, motivated reasoning is the most powerful explanatory mechanism behind the polarizing effect of the news. Yet, for gender polarization, self-categorization theory was the most powerful mechanism. Understanding of how conflict framing promotes partisan polarization is critical because it paves the ways to combat the negative effects of the news. Implications and directions for future studies are discussed.Item Grain Alignment in Turbulent Cores(2018-12) Sandalski, StouThe Interstellar Medium (ISM) is strongly magnetized therefore magnetic fields are important to its evolution. The morphology of the interstellar field can be mapped using polarized emission from large asymmetric silicate grains that are aligned with their long axis perpendicular to the magnetic field as well as through polarized extinction of background sources by the same grains. The grains are spun-up and subsequently aligned via Radiative Alignment Torques (RAT) due to anisotropic radiation from the Interstellar Radiation Field (ISRF) or a localized source such as a protostar. Deep inside starless cores the ISRF is highly reddened and therefore grains can not be aligned by it. We examine if the growth of large grains $a_{max} > 10 \mu m$ or a warm central source $T <90K$ can enhance alignment to detectable levels. We found that while both large grains $a_{max} = 10 \mu m, 100 \mu m $ and an embedded protostar with $T_{\star} = 30K-90K$ enhance the fraction of aligned grains deep in the core this enhancement did not translate to a significant enhancement of the polarized fraction in emission and extinction. This is because the enhancement at most brings the normalized fraction of aligned grains from $0.01$ to $0.10$ which is likely undetectable considering that the polarization limit for maximally aligned grains is only $7\%$ in extinction and $15\%$ in emission.Item The Rise of Partisan Rigidity: The Nature and Origins of Partisan Extremism in American Politics(2016-01) Luttig, MatthewAs political elites have polarized, the American public has become more strongly partisan. Why has the American public become more extremely partisan, and what does this transformation of the electorate imply for the health of American democracy? In this thesis, I argue that elite polarization has strengthened the relationship between a basic psychological motivation for group membership—the need for certainty—and partisan strength, in-party favoritism, out-party derogation, and conformity to group leaders. Because the need for certainty is a form of motivated closed-mindedness, I argue that the American electorate today is increasingly composed of rigid partisans: partisans who are uncritically extremist, biased, and intolerant. Across a number of distinct empirical studies, this thesis demonstrates that, (1) partisan strength, in-group favoritism, out-group derogation and partisan sorting have a strong basis in the psychological need for certainty, (2) in many cases this pre-political psychological variable has larger effects on partisan strength than explicitly political variables such as policy preferences, (3) that this effect occurs among both Democrats and Republicans, (4) that this has caused politically engaged respondents in particular to be rigid in their partisan identity, and (5) that this relationship has grown stronger over time as political elites have polarized and become more internally cohesive and distinct. In conclusion, I argue that the transformation of the public into rigid partisans weakens the competence of the American electorate and threatens the foundations of American democracy.