Browsing by Subject "deception"
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Item Deception and Distraction in the 2012 Presidential Campaign(2012-09-28) Jamieson, Kathleen H.; Annenberg, Walter; Annenberg, Leonore; Jacobs, LawrenceItem The economics of animal communication: theory and experiments integrating receiver choice and strategic signal reliability(2015-12) Polnaszek, TimothyThis research centers on two themes fundamental to communication, signal reliability and receiver tolerance of imperfect reliability (abbreviated as receiver tolerance). Focus on signal reliability tends to dominate research on signaler-receiver interactions, but represents only half of the signaling dyad. Understanding why signals are reliable and why receivers follow imperfect reliability are equally important; I argue the combination of reliability and receiver tolerance to ultimately determines the form and stability of signaler-receiver interactions. To explore these themes, I first developed a model of signaling interactions that combines aspects of models of receiver choice and signal reliability. The results highlight the co-importance of receiver tolerance and reliability enforcement mechanisms (such as signal cost). To experimentally test the model predictions, I developed a novel laboratory signaling game that allows control over theoretically important variables (such as the level of conflict between the signaler and receiver). The game placed blue jay subjects (Cyanocitta cristata) in a signal-response game played for food rewards. A series of these signaling-game experiments demonstrate the effects of signal cost on signal reliability (or honesty) and show the extent to which uncertainty in the environment generates receiver tolerance. Signal cost is an important topic in signaling theory, but lacks direct empirical support. I show that high signal cost does increase honesty under conditions of conflict, but also that cost is unnecessary in mutualistic conditions. I also show that receiver tolerance increases when environments are uncertain (to the point that receivers are gullible), and that signalers are sensitive to the level of receiver tolerance – exploiting tolerance when signaler and receiver interests conflict. Taken together, these models and experiments establish the value of considering both signal reliability and receiver tolerance.Item Perceptions of Applicants Who Deceive: Does Physical Attractiveness Matter?(2022-05) Burditt, JayImpression management is a broad term that describes multiple tactics used by job applicants to influence how they are perceived by employers. These evaluations may also be affected by factors such as the applicant's physical attractiveness or hiring managers' personality characteristics. While past research has shown that engaging in impression management and possessing attractive facial features garner more positive evaluations, the two variables have not been explored together. To address this gap in the literature, our study utilized a betweensubjects design in which 129 participants evaluated three job applicants, using LinkedIn profiles, on their recommendation to be interviewed, along with their perceived competence and integrity. Results show that detected deceptions negatively impacted the deceptive individual in terms how they are perceived and whether they would be recommended for an interview; however, physical attractiveness of the applicant had no effect on decision-maker judgements. Furthermore, when deception occurred, decision-maker agreeableness negatively impacted interview decisions, competence, and integrity ratings of the deceptive job applicant.