Browsing by Subject "behavioral ecology"
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Item Data for: Inconsistent sexual signaling degrades optimal mating decisions in animals(2020-03-09) Tanner, Jessie C; Bee, Mark A; jessie.c.tanner@gmail.com; Tanner, Jessie C; University of Minnesota Animal Communication LabData from a series of phonotaxis tests used to investigate the effects of within-individual variation (inconsistency) in male signals and ambient chorus noise on female mating decisions in Cope's gray treefrog. This dataset is among only a few generated to examine the effects of within-individual variation in signal production on animal communication. The data are now being released in support of a publication describing our findings.Item Data for: Species recognition is constrained by chorus noise, but not inconsistency in signal production, in Cope's gray treefrog (Hyla chrysoscelis)(2020-06-18) Tanner, Jessie C; Bee, Mark A; jessie.c.tanner@gmail.com; Tanner, Jessie C; University of Minnesota Animal Communication LabOptimal mate choice based on the assessment of communication signals can be constrained by multiple sources of noise. This dataset was created to examine the effects of two possible noise sources: ambient noise caused by the treefrog chorus and the inconsistency in signal production inherent to many animal communication systems. Our data were generated using two-choice phonotaxis tests of female Cope's gray treefrogs.Item The ecological context of individual specialization(2018-12) Steck, MeredithEcologists often consider conspecific individuals to be ecologically equivalent. However, there can be considerable variation in resource use among individuals from the same local population. Such intraspecific variation can have important ecological consequences for both communities and individuals. Although this pattern of individual specialization has been documented across multiple taxa, less is known about the ecological contexts that promote the development of individual resource specializations. My dissertation addresses this gap by experimentally testing how environmental complexity, resource abundance, resource discriminability, and resource quality affect the development of individual specialization in the cabbage white butterfly (Pieris rapae). Broadly, my results show that ecological context can shape the challenges animals face while searching for resources and that these challenges influence specialization at the individual level.Item The economics of animal communication: theory and experiments integrating receiver choice and strategic signal reliability(2015-12) Polnaszek, TimothyThis research centers on two themes fundamental to communication, signal reliability and receiver tolerance of imperfect reliability (abbreviated as receiver tolerance). Focus on signal reliability tends to dominate research on signaler-receiver interactions, but represents only half of the signaling dyad. Understanding why signals are reliable and why receivers follow imperfect reliability are equally important; I argue the combination of reliability and receiver tolerance to ultimately determines the form and stability of signaler-receiver interactions. To explore these themes, I first developed a model of signaling interactions that combines aspects of models of receiver choice and signal reliability. The results highlight the co-importance of receiver tolerance and reliability enforcement mechanisms (such as signal cost). To experimentally test the model predictions, I developed a novel laboratory signaling game that allows control over theoretically important variables (such as the level of conflict between the signaler and receiver). The game placed blue jay subjects (Cyanocitta cristata) in a signal-response game played for food rewards. A series of these signaling-game experiments demonstrate the effects of signal cost on signal reliability (or honesty) and show the extent to which uncertainty in the environment generates receiver tolerance. Signal cost is an important topic in signaling theory, but lacks direct empirical support. I show that high signal cost does increase honesty under conditions of conflict, but also that cost is unnecessary in mutualistic conditions. I also show that receiver tolerance increases when environments are uncertain (to the point that receivers are gullible), and that signalers are sensitive to the level of receiver tolerance – exploiting tolerance when signaler and receiver interests conflict. Taken together, these models and experiments establish the value of considering both signal reliability and receiver tolerance.