Browsing by Subject "Road Pricing"

Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
  • Thumbnail Image
    Item
    HOT or Not: driver elasticity to price and alternative pricing strategies on the MnPASS HOT Lanes
    (2013-12) Janson, Michael Risch
    The Minnesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT) has added MnPASS High Occupancy Toll (HOT) lanes on two freeway corridors in the Twin Cities. While not the first HOT lanes in the country, the MnPASS lanes are the first implementation of road pricing in Minnesota and possess a dynamic pricing schedule. Tolls charged to single occupancy vehicles (SOVs) are adjusted every three minutes according to HOT lane vehicle density. Given the infancy of systems like MnPASS, questions remain about drivers' responses to toll prices. Three field experiments were conducted on the corridors during which prices were changed. Data from the field experiments as well as two years of toll and traffic data were analyzed to measure driver responses to pricing changes. Driver elasticity to price was positive with magnitudes less than 1.0. This positive relationship between price and demand is in contrast with the previously held belief that raising the price would discourage demand. In addition, drivers consistently paid between approximately \$60-120 per hour of travel time savings, much higher than the average value of time. Four alternative pricing strategies are then proposed and calibrated. These pricing strategies are tested using a HOT lane choice model based on previous research. Adjusting parameters of the pricing strategies altered the resulting HOT lane share. Measuring the changes in HOT demand against the changes in price led to similar positive elasticity results.
  • Thumbnail Image
    Item
    Revenue Choice on a Serial Network
    (University of Bath, 2000) Levinson, David M
    A model to examine the choice by jurisdiction whether to finance roads with taxes or tolls is developed. The idea of decentralized, local control and multiple jurisdictions distinguishes this analysis from one where a central authority maximizes global welfare. Key factors posited to explain the choice include the length of trips using the roads, the size of the governing jurisdiction, the elasticity of demand to revenue instruments, and the transaction costs of collection - which dictate the size and scope of the free rider problem associated with financing. Spatial complexity in this problem results from the fact that jurisdiction residents use both local and non-local networks, and each jurisdiction's network is used by both local and non-local residents. The central thesis argues that, since jurisdictions try to do well by their residents who are both voters and travelers, the effects of a revenue instrument on local residents is a key consideration in the choice of that revenue instrument. Decentralization of control and lower toll collection costs are identified as conditions under which tolls would more likely become the preferred revenue instrument for highways.