Browsing by Subject "Political Psychology"

Now showing 1 - 3 of 3
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    The Informative Power Of Campaign Advertising
    (2018-06) Motta, Matthew
    Americans' abilities to vote for candidates who represent their policy views has important implications for their representation in government. However, while policy voting theoretically requires knowing where candidates stand on major policy issues (i.e., "campaign knowledge"), it is most typically studied in relation of what people know about civics (i.e., "civic knowledge"). I advance prior research by considering how Americans acquire campaign knowledge, and whether or not this information helps voters select candidates who share their policy preferences. I theorize that policy-focused political ad exposure provides most people with campaign knowledge – especially those who are the least politically engaged. Americans in turn use this information, more so than civic knowledge, to vote for candidates whose issue stances match their own. Merging campaign advertising data from the Wesleyan Media Project into nationally representative cross-sectional and longitudinal opinion data, I find consistent support for both sets of expectations. I conclude by discussing the informational benefits of policy-focused advertising, and considering the impact of changing media and campaign dynamics on Americans' knowledge about politics.
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    When worldviews collide: the role of emotion in reactions to symbolic threats.
    (2011-08) Hunt, Corrie Valentine
    Until recently, intergroup relations research has undervalued the role of emotion. This dissertation examines how people's emotional reactions to challenges to their cherished values--symbolic threats--shape social attitudes. I argue that people respond with distinct emotions depending on whether the symbolic threat comes from within their ingroup or from outsiders, and that these emotions explain why those who feel that their cultural values are threatened are less accepting and tolerant of outsiders. Using a survey, Study 1 showed that when participants believed that Muslims rejected core American values, they felt angry at and less sympathy toward Muslim immigrants, and in turn, opposed granting civil rights to Muslim immigrants. Participants who believed that Americans, in general, disagreed on the importance of different values felt less proud to be American and held more negative attitudes toward Americans. Study 2 showed a similar pattern of results with a different outgroup. Participants--particularly those high in authoritarianism--felt disgusted and angry with, as well as less proud of, gays and lesbians. Negative emotions explained why high authoritarians who perceived gays as a symbolic threat expressed intolerant attitudes toward gays and lesbians. Using an experimental manipulation of symbolic threat, Study 3 partially replicated the findings from Study 1. High threat from Muslim immigrants led to anger at Muslim immigrants, which in turn, predicted more negative attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. High threat from within the American ingroup made people--especially authoritarians--less proud of Americans, which predicted more negative attitudes toward the ingroup.
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    Why Disagreement Obstructs Constructive Dialogue: The Role of Biased Attribution of Moral Motives
    (2014-09) Reifen Tagar, Michal
    Diversity of opinions is often celebrated as an opportunity to learn from one another and to improve decision-making by widening the scope of considerations informing decisions, and, on the societal level, is lauded as the foundation of liberal democracy. Yet, constructive dialogue across lines of disagreement is often lacking, especially around the more charged and contentious issues of disagreement. The goal of the current research project was to examine the proposition that biased attribution of moral motives plays an adverse role in the relation between disagreement and tolerance of ideational opponents. In particular, it was expected that people impugn the moral motives of those with dissimilar opinions, especially when the issue of contention is held as a moral conviction, and that this biased perception in turn leads to greater intolerance of such opponents. The pattern of results accrued across four studies supports this expectation. Across diverse issues of disagreement, to the extent that participants held their positions with high moral conviction, they were more likely to see their ideational opponents as less morally motivated than themselves, and this biased attribution, in turn, led to more negative attitudes and emotions toward the other, to greater distrust and desire for social distance, and less willingness to work together; all this occurring above and beyond the simultaneous mediating role of biased attribution of ability. These negative outcomes effectively obstruct the likelihood of engagement and constructive dialogue that could advance shared understanding, and ultimately individual and societal progress and well-being. As such, the pattern of results that emerged from the current research suggests that biased attribution of moral motives in the context of moral disagreement deserves greater attention in future studies of interpersonal, organizational, and intergroup relations, as well as democratic processes.