Browsing by Subject "Equilibrium"
Now showing 1 - 5 of 5
Results Per Page
Sort Options
Item Double E-Points in rational games(University of Minnesota. Institute for Mathematics and Its Applications, 2011-12) Marchi, EzioItem E-points for diagonal games II(University of Minnesota. Institute for Mathematics and Its Applications, 2008-04) Marchi, EzioItem Excess Demand Functions, Equilibrium Prices, and Existence of Equilibrium(Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, 1995-10) Wong, Kam-ChauFor continuous excess demand functions, the existing literature (e.g. Sonnenschein [1972, 1973], Mantel [1974], Debreu [1974], Mas-Colell [1977], etc.) achieves a complete characterization only when the functions are defined on special subsets of positive prices. In this paper, we allow the functions to be defined on a larger class of price sets, (allowing, for example the closed unit simplex, including its boundary). Besides characterizing excess demands for a larger class of economies, it is also a useful tool for proving other results. It allows us to characterize the equilibrium price set for a larger class of economies. It also permits extending Uzawa's observation [1962] by showing that Brouwer's Fixed-Point Theorem is implied by the Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium Existence Theorem ([1954], Thm. I.).Item Moral intuitions in reflective equilibrium: applying scientific methodology to ethics.(2009-10) Brophy, Matthew E.In this dissertation, I examine the credibility of moral intuitions and their relation to moral principles and background theories, as represented in the method of reflective equilibrium (MRE) originally set out by Rawls in A Theory of Justice. As part of elucidation and justification of this method, I make frequent comparisons to scientific methodology, which shares close similarities to the method of reflective equilibrium. I argue that MRE provides a non-foundationalist moral methodology which appears to be a promising approach to moral justification and moral adjudication. Moral intuitions are a crucial feature of MRE: they serve as the starting points of moral theory construction and testing in a similar way as empirical data serve as the starting points of scientific hypothesis construction and testing. Moral intuitions - just as any data - can sometimes be mistaken, however. Upon what basis can the credibility of a moral intuition be determined? I examine how the credibility of an intuition can be determined by examining its "etiology." The etiology of a moral intuition is its causal origin, which includes sociological, psychological, evolutionary and biological factors, some of which might impugn its credibility. Since intuition credibility determination is essential to the methodology of reflective equilibrium, I endeavor to show that moral intuitions can be vetted in nontrivial and noncircular ways. This filtration process discredits those initial moral judgments that are determined to be error-disposed. These resulting noncredible intuitions are then excluded from the set of considered judgments, which serve as the provisional starting points for ethical theory construction and testing. Ultimately, I will show that the moral methodology of reflective equilibrium, when theoretically developed and empirically substantiated, provides a significant contribution to moral philosophy. In particular, this fortified methodology provides further traction in ethical debate and adjudication. I exemplify this point in the final chapter, demonstrating how intuition credibility determination lends defense to a certain form of utilitarianism against certain traditional intuition-based attacks, and I show how the triple adjustment between intuitions, moral principles and background theories, understood in the context of wide reflective equilibrium, can assuage such objections.Item Valuation and Asset Pricing in Infinite Horizon Sequential Markets with Portfolio Constraints(Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, 1998-10) Huang, Kevin XiaodongThere are three ways of measuring the value of a payoff stream in sequential markets with portfolio constraints: the market price, the replication price, and the fundamental value. In this paper we characterize constraints for which these measures coincide in the absence of arbitrage, and in equilibrium. We show that the replication price functional is linear in finite horizon markets, but only sub-linear in general in infinite horizon unless markets are complete. We provide constraints for which the linearity holds regardless whether markets are complete or incomplete. Applying a duality technique, we determine an optimal replicating strategy through solving a sequence of independent linear programs. These results do not depend on investors' preferences (other than monotonicity), probability beliefs, endowments of goods, or supply of assets.