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Browsing by Subject "Department of Philosophy"

Now showing 1 - 8 of 8
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    An Analysis of Model Organism Criteria in Developmental Biology: From Metazoans to Microbes
    (2012-04-18) Spates, Matt
    Model organisms are central to contemporary biology and the studies of embryogenesis in particular. Biologists utilize only a small number of organisms to experimentally elucidate various properties of ontogeny. These experimental models allow researchers to investigate the phenomena and mechanisms of development in great depth. Critics have questioned whether these models are good representatives of their targets because of the inherent biases involved in selecting these organisms (e.g., rapid development and short generation time). This line of criticism raises two questions: (a) is the criterion of representation for model organisms more complex than earlier discussions have emphasized? (b) is representation the only relevant criteria in deciding if a model organism is a good model? Here we provide an analysis of the criteria involved in choosing model organisms that answers these questions. We show that the criterion of representation is highly structured and a key additional criterion—manipulability— has been largely neglected. In combination, these criteria explain how developmental biologists respond to the criticism about biases in existing models and also accounts for why microbes have not been considered "good" models for ontogeny. This analysis has both scientific and philosophical consequences. Scientifically, it suggests new avenues of research by making criteria of model organism selection explicit. Philosophically, it shows how the practical aspects of experimental biology—exemplified in the criterion of manipulability—must be scrutinized in order to understand scientific reasoning.
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    The Dialogue (2015 Spring)
    (University of Minnesota Duluth, 2015) University of Minnesota Duluth. Department of Philosophy
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    The Dialogue (2016 Spring)
    (University of Minnesota Duluth, 2016) University of Minnesota Duluth. Department of Philosophy
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    The Dialogue (2017 Spring)
    (University of Minnesota Duluth, 2017) University of Minnesota Duluth. Department of Philosophy
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    Embracing Revenge by Embracing Gaps
    (2011-04-13) Tourville, Nicholas
    The Liar statement, “This statement is false”, is one of the oldest unresolved paradoxes. To see why it is paradoxical, consider whether it is true or false. On the one hand, if it is true, then since it says it is false, it must be false. But surely it cannot be both true and false! So, on the other hand, maybe it is false. But then, since it simply asserts its own falsity, it must be true. It seems that we are forced into a contradiction. On first glance, this may seem like a cute puzzle or a mere oddity, but the Liar paradox indicates that there is a deep flaw in our ordinary conception of truth. I’m interested in “gappy” solutions to the paradox– solutions that hold that some statements (like the Liar) are neither true nor false. The statements falling in this gap between truth and falsity might be called pathological. Introducing this new category of statements lets us deal with the Liar statement above, but the Liar gets its revenge in a strengthened form: “This statement is false or pathological”. This strengthened Liar statement cannot consistently be considered true, false, or pathological, so it seems that we need to introduce yet another category of statements. Introducing the new category leads to another paradoxical statement, which leads to another category, which leads to another paradoxical statement, and so on. The result is a theory of truth with infinitely many categories of statements. I’m working on developing the philosophical motivations for such a theory.
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    Interview with John Wallace
    (University of Minnesota, 1994-09-08) Wallace, John; Chambers, Clarke A.
    Clarke A. Chambers interviews John Wallace, professor and chairman for the Department of Philosophy; former staff member for the Graduate School and vice-president for Academic Affairs.
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    Interview with Marcia Eaton
    (University of Minnesota, 1995-04-20) Eaton, Marcia Muelder; Chambers, Clarke A.
    Clarke A. Chambers interviews Marcia Eaton, professor in the Department of Philosophy.
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    The Portrait of Propositions in Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations: The Question of Husserl as Historical Predecessor to Act-Based Conceptions of Propositional Content
    (2020) Ulven, Farrow
    This research investigates the conception of propositional content present in the work of German philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). Husserl's influence spans diverse areas of 20th century philosophical thought through his founding of the practice of phenomenology, developed in notable works such as Logical Investigations (1900/01) and Ideas (1913). His influence on subsequent generations of thinkers also comes indirectly through his guidance of renowned students including Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger. The primary question taken up by this research is whether it is appropriate to identify Husserl’s portrait of propositional content in his Logical Investigations as a historical predecessor to act-based conceptions of propositional content developed in recent decades. This research proposes that in the Logical Investigations, Husserl gives a portrait of propositions greatly resembling the Fregean portrait. In this regard, it would be inappropriate to name Husserl’s portrait of propositions as a historical predecessor to present-day act-based conceptions of propositional content.