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Browsing by Author "Rob, Rafael"

Now showing 1 - 3 of 3
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    The Coase Theorem, an Informational Perspective
    (1984) Rob, Rafael
    It is common knowledge these days that environmental policy plays a crucial role in a society characterized by a rapidly developing technology. While a world of highly mechanized productions methods offers its inhabitants a larger supply of goods and services, it raises at the same time serious questions about the ecological price that has to be paid for this increased abundance. The public concern expressed through the media, and governmental responses to this concern via budgetary provisions testify to the importance of the issue.
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    Equilibrium Price Distributions
    (1984) Rob, Rafael
    Equilibrium price distributions (for a homogeneous product) consistent with individual incentives are investigated. They arise in informationally imperfect markets in which the only primitive datum is the distribution of search costs. It is shown that single, multi- and continuous price distributions are all viable long-run phenomena depending on the nature of search costs. A method for computing equilibrium price distributions is also provided.
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    A Note on Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information
    (1984) Rob, Rafael
    An interesting case of competitive bidding with an asymmetrical knowledge about the true value of the auctioned object is examined by R. Wilson [4]. The primary motivation for his study is the insight it provides about the value of information, or, more specifically, about the relative gains of the informed bidder vs. the uninformed bidder. As a by-product one can learn something about the ability of the seller to appropriate or realize the value of the item he offers for sale and about the identiy of the buyer. His analysis tells us, in short, about allocations and imputation under conditions of uncertainty and symmetric market positions - a fundamental question in economic theory. The purpose of this paper is expositional. By means of two alternative approaches, I will derive the equilibrium strategies and outcomes of the bidding game formulated by Wilson. A few flaws in his analysis will be corrected thererby. Additional examples illustrating the results will be offered. To be self-sufficient, let me start out by presenting the real-life situtation we wish to investigate and the model corresponding to it.