

**American Muslim Organizations:
Response to Counterterrorism Initiatives**

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In service to my communities -- all of them

Democracy for Americans thereby becomes...not something that has been/is being "eroded" or "lost" by passage of legislation like the Patriot Act and the concomitant functioning of agencies like the FBI. Instead, it must be viewed as something that, as a society—or, more accurately, as a multiplicity of societies—we've to all intents and purposes never experienced, but to which we might yet aspire.

--Ward Churchill

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1 -- Website of Free Muslims Coalition Demonstrates Accommodationist Codifier 1	xxxvi
Figure 2 -- Letters of Endorsment from the FBI and a Muslim Organization - Codifier 3	xxxviii
Figure 3 -- MPAC Website Demonstrates Accommodationist Codifier 3	xxxix
Figure 4 -- American Islamic Congress Website Demonstrates Accommodationist Codifiers 2 and 3.....	xl
Figure 5 -- Fred Hampton, Chairman of the Chicago chapter of the Black Panther Party, 1969.....	liii
Figure 6 -- Chicago Police Carry Fred Hampton's Body, 1969.....	liii
Figure 7 -- CVE Illustration Created for the White House Summit to Counter Violent Extremism, 2015 ..	lxi

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Adrian. Credit..... You know what you did.
.....So much credit it needed another line.
I love you.

ABBREVIATIONS

ACLU	American Civil Liberties Union
AIC	American Islamic Congress
AMO	American Muslim Organization
CAIR	Council on American Islamic Relations
CHRGJ	Center for Human Rights and Global Justice
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
COINTELPRO	Counter Intelligence Program
DOJ	Department of Justice
MAS	Muslim American Society
MPAC	Muslim Public Affairs Council
RMT	Resource Mobilization Theory

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The surveillance of Muslim-Americans as a key component of American counterterrorism efforts has been the subject of both legal and academic analysis. Reports of spying, infiltration, and harassment have become commonplace in recent years. Consider these headlines: “The NSA’s Spying on Muslim Americans,” from the New Yorker; “Meet the Muslim American Leaders the NSA and FBI have been Spying On,” from The Intercept; “Muslim Students Stunted by Police Spying,” from the Huffington Post; and “Informant: NYPD Paid Me to ‘Bait’ Muslims,” from the Associated Press. While these reports are often accompanied by challenges to the legality of the programs used to collect information, very little if any scholarship exists on how American Muslim organizations (AMOs) *respond* to the policing practices of counterterrorism initiatives.

Although it is considerably more difficult to measure the impact of counterterrorism initiatives on *organizations* than to simply isolate individual experiences, the value to academic and political discourse is far greater. The study of the ways in which American Muslim organizations are impacted by government and law enforcement counterterrorism initiatives, measured by how they respond to such initiatives, will provide insight into the effects of intense policing on civil organizing. Through this investigation, we may be able to see areas of organizations which are particularly vulnerable to government intervention. The study of these responses may provide insight into how this level of government impact can be limited, while preserving organizational values and cohesion.

Theory and Methodology

Theories of policing society and police practices, including historical analysis of social movements impacted by intense policing (G. Marx, Della Porta, Churchill, Ellison, Bonino) are foundational in the conceptualization and development of my research process. Certain aspects of social movement theory, particularly a blend of resource mobilization theory (McCarthy and Zald) and the social psychological approach that addresses group narrative as strategy -- for example: broadcasting accommodation or opposition (Gamson, Morris, Braine, Bedingfield, McAdam, Rascoff) -- have provided useful insight and perspective into the world of organizations working toward social change. I employ participant observation, discourse analysis and interview methods of data collection for this project. To examine the impact of counterterrorism initiatives at the micro level, I have conducted primary research in the Somali and Muslim communities of the Twin Cities metro area. This process explores the ways in which local community-based Muslim organizations respond and react to counterterrorism programs, specifically the recently announced pilot program, Countering Violent Extremism (CVE).

Definitions and Word Choice

Collective behavior, group, organization, social movement, social change organization:

Throughout this literature review, there are references to social movements – theory behind them, the identity of social movements, history of social movements, etc. As explained above, although I am studying the behavior of a subset of *organizations*, I will refer to their behavior as that of a *social movement* to help remind the reader of the theoretical framework utilized for exploring the public narrative of American Muslim organizations. Although there is a large field of scholarship dedicated to the study of organizations, in this case it is more appropriate to

view this research through the lens of social movement theory. Organizations are all around us: schools, clubs, businesses, institutions and more. But the subject of this study is a subset of organizations with a social change goal in common. As representatives of a religious minority, currently highly unpopular in the US, they are often targeted as subversive, a threat to national security, or the American way of life. The point at which these organizations and their constituency intersect with policing practices is profoundly different from what, for example, a chapter of the Parent Teacher Association might experience. Because of the nature of these organizations and the current political climate in which their constituency lives and works, social movement theory is the most appropriate lens through which to examine the behaviors and strategies of American Muslim organizations.

American Muslim organization (AMO): The subject of my study is limited to organizations within the United States with a stated Muslim identity. From this point forward, I will refer to them as AMO or AMOs. To avoid confusion regarding the “Islamic” nature of any organization, I chose the more inclusive “Muslim” to refer to organizations which predominantly serve the Muslim community.

Counterterrorism: I chose this as an umbrella term to encompass all initiatives, policies, and practices of government and law enforcement agencies engaged in preventing or prosecuting activities they define as “terroristic” in nature. This includes the use of paid informants, surveillance, infiltration, detainment, covert data collection, etc.

Policing: In this context, policing refers to the scope of *practice* of law enforcement and government agencies as they interact with the public whether overtly or covertly.

Accommodationist narrative: I use this phrase to describe an observed emerging pattern in my research. I chose the term “accommodationist” for its specificity and relationship to issues of institutional control versus collective action. Its origins are in the efforts to secure equal civil rights for African Americans in the early to mid-20th century. Leaders who advocated an approach of cooperation with the white establishment were labeled “accommodationist” by leaders who argued that an unyielding, confrontational method was necessary for sustainable systemic change.¹

¹ W.E.B. DuBois labeled Booker T. Washington an accommodationist, arguing his methods of action for civil rights were too closely tied to the second-class citizenship white institutions assigned to blacks in America (DuBois, 1903).

Chapter 2

CVE COMES TO MINNESOTA

Counterterrorism initiatives which target Muslims in America have existed for many years (examples are discussed throughout this paper) before this past fall when Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) came to Minnesota. Although the depth and breadth of these initiatives is vast, I chose to dedicate a chapter to this particular program because it is the current incarnation of counterterrorism initiatives that most directly impacts the Muslim community in Minnesota – the setting of the case study featured in this paper.

In September 2014, United States Attorney General Eric Holder announced that a new counterterrorism initiative, Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), would be tested in three pilot cities across the US. This program is the latest in an ongoing roll-out of efforts to address what the American government has described as the “threat of homegrown terrorism.” Minneapolis, Minnesota, is one of the three pilot cities for the new CVE initiative and is home to the largest Somali immigrant population in the world as well as a large and diverse multi-ethnic Muslim community. Since 2008, when several young Somali-American Muslims left the US to participate in armed operations in Somalia, the community has been the subject of speculation, study, investigation and media attention.

CVE is a counterterrorism strategy launched by the Obama administration in 2011. The CVE strategy is outlined in a document (available for free online) titled, “Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United

States.”² Three main objectives of the strategy are: (1) “Enhance federal engagement with and support to local communities that may be targeted by violent extremists;” (2) Increase “government and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism;” and (3) Address “violent extremist propaganda while promoting our [American] ideals.” From the same document, specific strategies include “foster community-led partnerships, improve development and use of standardized training [for law enforcement], and increase the capacity of communities to directly challenge violent extremist ideologies and narratives.” The recent announcement of a CVE pilot city program is based on these objectives.

Islamophobia in CVE conceptualization, Creation and Implementation

During a community meeting in Minneapolis, Minnesota United States Attorney, Andrew Luger, provided the list of what he reports are the identified root causes of violent extremism.³ This list includes: disaffected youth with no connection to religious leaders, difficulties at school, identity crisis, poor ties to the broader Minnesota community, generational divide, and poor opportunities for economic and educational growth and development (Luger, public meeting, 2015). This concept of the origins of radicalization or participation in terrorism is solidly refuted by a remarkably in-depth study carried out by the behavioral science unit of MI5 (the British intelligence agency). The study was exhaustive and included, “several hundred individuals known to be involved in, or closely associated with, violent extremist activity” (Travis, 2008). The findings of the study revealed no identifiable

² “Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States” <https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/sip-final.pdf>

³ As a community member actively engaged in this issue, I am frequently invited to attend briefings, discussions and public announcements dealing with CVE. This particular set of root causes of violent extremism was presented several times publicly from October, 2014 to my last observation in March, 2015.

pattern of radicalization or reliable predictors for who might engage in terrorism. The report describes the study subjects as “demographically unremarkable.” In other words, one could not differentiate them based on age, race, religious or ethnic identity, religiosity, or any other factor, from that of the general British population. Despite research that indicates there is no identifiable or predictable pattern of “radicalization,” Luger maintains his concept of the origins of successful terror recruitment which closely resemble our understanding of what causes American youth to engage in the sale of illegal drugs. Consider the familiar narrative of a kid on the corner, bored, broke and disillusioned who everyday sees a few neighborhood drug dealers with money, expensive cars and clothes. The kid looks at his own life - no stability at home, no connection to community institutions, no hope for a decent financial or academic future – and suddenly getting into the illegal drug trade is a very appealing option. Unfortunately, this framework does not explain or address the issue of violent extremism. Michael German, former FBI agent and fellow at the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU Law School explains the danger of relying on a debunked theory of terrorism in a blog post for the ACLU:

The recent spate of terrorist incidents and arrests involving Americans has policy-makers and security professionals scrambling to find a future-seeing Precog to help them identify so-called "homegrown terrorists" before they act, like in the movie *Minority Report*...This is nonsense of course, as virtually all empirical studies of actual terrorists, like this one,⁴ find no discernable pattern or profile... Yet this "path" or "funnel" theory remains popular among some security experts and government officials

because it is exactly what the government wants to believe — that terrorists (who are hard to find) progress from a discernable pool of ideological radicals and activists (who are easy to find and therefore much easier to target). Why should the government look for hard-to-find terrorists when they can more easily target political or religious groups for surveillance, screening, or pretext arrest? A simplistic theory justifies a simplistic approach and allows government to avoid doing the harder work of developing a more complex approach that might actually work.

This mentality drives the increase in law enforcement spying on political and religious groups. The Maryland State Police surveillance and infiltration of nonviolent peace groups and anti-death penalty activists is only one example of many across the country. Likewise, the FBI's use of an ex-convict to infiltrate a number of southern California mosques failed to identify or arrest any terrorists, but managed to increase the community's resentment toward the government (German, 2014).

German provides a clear picture of how seriously lacking in evidence-based practice the CVE initiative is and further demonstrates not only its ineffectiveness but its potential to cause harm. To further illuminate this point, we should consider the 2010 FBI report detailing the demographic origins of terrorist attacks on US soil between 1980 and 2005. This report highlights the very small number of US terrorist attacks perpetrated by Muslims. The FBI found that of all domestic attacks between 1980 and 2005, the demographics represented by perpetrators are distributed as follows: 42 percent Latino, 24 percent extreme left wing groups,

16 percent others, 7 percent Jewish extremists, and 6 percent Islamic extremists (FBI, 2010).⁵ It could be argued that the 25-year span of data dates too far back to be an appropriate source of information to consider in this discussion. For example, the geopolitical landscape from 1980-1990 is significantly different than that of the period from 1995-2005. I reviewed the detailed report created by the FBI and individually counted each act of domestic terrorism committed between January 1, 2001 and November 20, 2005 (when the report data ends). A total of 38 incidents are reported; two of them committed by Muslims – approximately 5.3%. We should also note how the FBI determines what and what is not “terrorism.” Critics charge that when the actor is a white male, terrorism is rarely used to describe the action (Karlin, 2015). It is certainly possible that incidents of terrorism have been committed by white American males, but never included in reports such as this one from the FBI.

A community leader echoes this finding, “The threat is over exaggerated! Entrapment projects are highly engaged. It’s almost surprising that we haven’t seen more. It’s almost more PR nightmare than *actual* threat. When it [an attack] happens, what story will play?” This sentiment speaks directly to the frustration respondents report about the general public’s perception of the terror threat from the Muslim community, “The recycling of these stories has created an environment that challenges our normal living experiences.” Many local Muslims fear that CVE’s focus on the Muslim and Somali community will only serve to further exacerbate this false perception. This narrative is discussed at length in Chapter 7: Local Findings.

⁵ It should be noted that I was not able to locate more current data. I searched extensively for similar reports for years past 2005, but was not successful. More recent data would be stronger support for my argument.

The core of the Minneapolis CVE initiative is a focus on youth - youth mentors, job fairs, and scholarship opportunities. Particularly worrying is Luger's announcement that Minneapolis and St. Paul public schools will participate in a program to monitor students for signs of potential terrorist threat. US Attorney Luger explained, "There will be intervention teams in Minneapolis and St. Paul public schools. The schools are very willing. Professionals will be available who can help with difficult conversations to address kids who are exhibiting behaviors of concern" (Luger, public meeting 2015). Minneapolis Public Schools Executive Director of External Partnerships and Institutional Advancement, Courtney Kiernat accompanied Luger and the Minnesota delegation to the White House Summit on CVE in February, 2015 and expressed the support of the school district to participate in CVE (Sherry, "Trust, action key in Minnesota's fight against extremism, 2015). Opponents of this measure are concerned about monitoring students in an already very unequal public school system. The achievement gap in Minnesota is one of the worst in the US (Post, Minnesota Public Radio, 2015). Critics worry that monitors in public schools looking for suspicious behavior will only serve to further isolate and alienate students who are already struggling. Somali and Muslim students become suspects in their own learning environment.

An article in the *Intercept* demonstrates how pervasive CVE programming can be in an educational environment. The *Intercept*, an independent investigative news outlet, obtained a document labeled "for official use only" and in February of 2015, laid bare the guidelines of a policy designed to identify possible terrorists in groups of school children. Authors Murtaza Hussain, Cora Currier, and Jana Winter write:

The rating system, part of a 36-page document dated May 2014 and titled “Countering Violent Extremism: A Guide for Practitioners and Analysts,” suggests that police, social workers and educators rate individuals on a scale of one to five in categories such as: “Expressions of Hopelessness, Futility,” “Talk of Harming Self or Others,” and “Connection to Group Identity (Race, Nationality, Religion, Ethnicity).” The ranking system is supposed to alert government officials to individuals at risk of turning to radical violence, and to families or communities at risk of incubating extremist ideologies. Families are judged on factors such as “Aware[ness] of Each Other’s Activities,” as well as levels of “Parent-Child Bonding,” and communities are rated by access to health care and social services, in addition to “presence of ideologues or recruiters” as potential risk factors. A low score in any of these categories would indicate a high risk of “susceptibility to engage in violent extremism,” according to the document. It encourages users of the guide to plot the scores on a graph to determine what “interventions” could halt the process of radicalization before it happens (Hussain, Currier, and Winter, 2014).

In the article, Mike German states, “The idea that the federal government would encourage local police, teachers, medical and social service employees to rate the communities, individuals and families they serve for their potential to become terrorists is abhorrent on its face.” The fact that a child’s “Connection to Group Identity (Race, Nationality, Religion, Ethnicity)” is a scored indicator of potential for terrorism is troubling not only in that it ignores peer-reviewed studies (such as the MI5 study mentioned earlier) that refute the existence of any identifiable pattern of radicalization or participation in terrorism, but that it penalizes

children for the display of crucial pillars of their very identity. It should also be noted that under this rubric, it is unlikely that patriotic white American Christian children, who display strong connection to their nationality, ethnicity, or religion would be identified as a potential terrorist, particularly given that CVE solely targets the Muslim and Somali communities in the Twin Cities Metro. It becomes easy to see how Somali and Muslim students adhering to religious or cultural dress and praying five times daily in Minneapolis and St. Paul public schools could be identified as potential terrorists under the gaze of Luger's CVE school intervention policy.

CVE has come to Minnesota in 2015 and while the community debates the potential value or harm of what is described by government and law enforcement officials as a *new and different* approach to preventing terrorism, it is necessary that we conduct academic analysis through an informed historical lens. Today's counterterrorism operations do not operate without precedent in America. The analysis of contemporary counterterrorism initiatives, must be positioned within a larger discussion of America's longstanding practice of government and law enforcement intervention in civil society organizing efforts (particularly those deemed a threat to national security). This will be discussed at length in my analysis of findings later in this writing.

Chapter 3

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

To obtain accurate documentation and subsequent analysis of group behavior in this study, it is necessary to employ aspects of sociological theory and research strategy unique to observing group behavior. For this study, various aspects of social movement theory have proven particularly useful and become the guiding conceptual framework of my research. In considering the appropriateness of selecting social movement theory to address the phenomenon of the American Islamic organization narrative response, one could argue that each of the organizations selected for my study are not in and of themselves, social movements. I assert that each organization does indeed represent a social movement, characterized by widespread efforts to normalize the presence of Muslims in America, ensure the protection of their civil rights and work toward greater social acceptance.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the theories that have been especially formative in the conceptualization of my own research. I then describe gaps in existing research and finally offer a proposal for how my current study could contribute to providing valuable insight into how we approach the study of social movements – still a rapidly evolving field.

Vigorous debate continues about how to best measure, observe, and analyze social movements. The nature of a group of people collectively working toward social change (or any goal) is, to put it simply, messy. Groups are comprised of individuals and each brings their own agenda, knowledge, strategy and motivations to the organization. It can be difficult to document an accurate representation of any movement or group. At every point of

observation, a researcher must ask themselves if what they are seeing is the action of an individual or the collective whole. Does it represent the group’s mission? Whose identity is on display? As I explored various areas of social movement theory in search of specific themes that could support my research, I found aspects of resource mobilization theory (McCarthy, Zald, Edwards), narrative analysis (Gamson), and theories of policing and social control (Marx, Cunningham) to be especially insightful. Resource mobilization theory (RMT) is foundational, not because it explains the phenomenon of organizational response to counterterrorism initiatives, but because it provides a clear understanding of the structure of the movements I observe. RMT provides a clear and easily understood framework for conceptualizing how social movements function, move, grow, mobilize, etc... RMT also helps to maintain perspective of the areas of organizations that may exhibit signs of vulnerability to government or law enforcement intervention.

Material	Social Organizational	Human	Cultural	Moral
Money	Networking	Members	Collective Knowledge	Support
Supplies	Recruitment	Leadership	Past Experience	Solidarity
Meeting Space	Group Narrative		Skill Set	

Table 1 - Five Key Pillars of Social Movements as Defined by Resource Mobilization Theory

When I ask the question, “How are organizations impacted by counterterrorism initiatives?” RMT helps to refine that question to, “Which areas of social movements will you

observe to answer that question?” That point leads me to the role of narrative analysis in my research.

When I began to structure this research project, I considered several observable aspects of social movement/social change organization behavior. Gamson’s research on how narrative can reveal what he refers to as “micromobilization” (the inner workings, motivations, strategies, etc. of a movement) was illuminating in that it provided support for the use of narrative analysis in the observation of American Islamic organizations. His arguments provided the methodological framework of narrative analysis as a means to analyze response narrative presented for public consumption. Analysis of the narrative created by American Islamic organizations in response to counterterrorism initiatives is the how I will measure organizational efforts to deal with intense policing.

Counterterrorism initiatives as a form of social control is unlikely to be disputed. However, counterterrorism initiatives as a strategy of movement repression might be challenged, particularly by scholars who study terrorism and other threats to national security. I would argue that in light of this nation’s historical policy of actively subverting social change organizations, most who posed no identifiable threat to national security, as well as modern revelations of unconstitutional and discriminatory programs of surveillance and intelligence gathering, it is logical to consider the possible use of policing practices as a method of organization subversion. Historical perspective and the scholarship of well-respected scholars including David Cunningham and Gary T. Marx further supports this argument. Theories of policing practices and social control and the ways in which these forces intersect with social movements is the lens through which my observations are analyzed.

Both Gary T. Marx (1979, 1998) and David Cunningham (2003) lament the near total lack of social movement scholarship that explores the role of policing practices and social control in the analysis of social movements. We tend to focus only on the “protestor” side of social movements. We learn a great deal about what drives someone to join a movement, how movements are structured, how identity and collective behavior shape movements, what causes a movement to be successful, etc. But at the point of intervention by policing mechanisms and other forms of social control, social scientists seem to suspend study. This is partially due to the extreme difficulty in obtaining information on covert policing operations. David Cunningham used a FOIA release of COINTELPRO documents for his exhaustive study of the ways in which organizations of “the New Left” were targeted and how they responded. Cunningham’s examination of the ways in which these entities (police and civilian agitators) navigate the strange relationship they find themselves in, is a good example of the kind of insight and understanding we can achieve by directing academic attention to the omnipresent aspect (repressive forces) of social organizing. There is much we do not adequately understand about this phenomenon. Important questions remain largely unanswered. For example: how do police practices impact movements, how are these policing practices structured and who do they target, how do organizations/movements respond? I hope to further our understanding of these this phenomenon through my current study of the ways in which American Islamic organizations respond to the intense policing practices of counterterrorism initiatives.

Gary Marx on the Intersection of Social Control and Social Movements

Another, perhaps more controversial argument, is made by Gary T. Marx. He argues that policing exists not only in response to social deviance, but actually precipitates socially deviant

behaviors. From his article, "Ironies of Social Control: Authorities as Contributors to Deviance through Escalation, Nonenforcement, and Covert Facilitation" Marx (1981, p. 222) categorizes three roles of social control in creating deviant behavior: escalation (by taking enforcement action, authorities unintentionally encourage rule breaking), nonenforcement (by strategically taking no enforcement action, authorities intentionally permit rule breaking), covert facilitation (by taking hidden or deceptive enforcement action, authorities intentionally encourage rule breaking). For my research of how American Muslim organizations respond to counterterrorism initiatives, this perspective helps to identify the potential for policing to create socially deviant behavior; the question of entrapment of local young Somali males in recent months should be studied but is outside the scope of my current research. I hope to continue to measure the impact of counterterrorism initiatives on the local Muslim population with an examination of the role of paid informants and allegations of entrapment. Marx's assertion that social control methods are often powerful instigators of social deviance will inform the theoretical framework of that research.

Marx's work on the ways in which policing methods (repressive measures) specifically work to destabilize social change organizations is more valuable to conceptualizing my current study. In a chapter from *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* (McAdam, McCarthy, Zald), Marx lists the specific police/intelligence methods of destabilizing a movement/organization: "...according to their specific aims: the creation of an unfavorable public image, disinformation, restricting a movement's resources and limiting its facilities, de-recruitment of activists, destroying leaders, fueling internal conflicts, encouraging conflicts between groups and sabotaging particular actions" (1969, p. 65). This argument presents the

capacity of law enforcement and government intelligence agencies to strategically damage and destabilize specific areas of movements and social change organizations. Again here, I point to the value of resource mobilization theory to help observers conceptualize the structural aspects of a social movement/organization that when destabilized, can result in catastrophic disruption, even reaching the point of complete eradication. From his piece, *Agents Provocateurs as a Type of Faux Activist*, from the *Wiley Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*, Marx identifies specific police/intelligence practices that function as strategic mechanisms of destabilization:

This can involve manipulating activists (particularly leaders) into illegal actions so they can be arrested, requiring that resources go to defensive needs and away from the pursuit of the broader goals; disrupting the flow of resources such as money and spaces to organize; creating paranoia and suspiciousness and harming morale and solidarity by creating the myth of surveillance which implies that watching is omnipresent (With respect to the student movement, a 1970 FBI memo for example encouraged creating the impression that there is an FBI agent behind every mailbox.); spreading disinformation; encouraging internal schisms and external conflicts with other organizations; and inhibiting or sabotaging planned actions and communication (in Snow, et al., 2012, online).

At first glance, one might be taken aback by Marx's portrayal of law enforcement in the US, but need only look closer to realize that the basis for this unfavorable representation of law enforcement is pulled directly from the FBI's own internal memo. Gary T. Marx observes similar patterns of repression in recent years as he addresses the issue of policing practices post-2001:

Yet specious activists have not disappeared. Following 9/11, national enforcement priorities gave greater attention to terrorism than to traditional crime. Emphasis was placed on anticipatory control in which the goal is preventive rather than reactive after the fact. This requires information and budgets for more informants, and the number increased significantly. With this came a concomitant increase in opportunities and incentives for specious activism (Snow, et al., 2012, online).

David Cunningham reminds us that mass covert police/intelligence practices that target social movements/organizations are thriving in America today. In the past ten years, dozens of reports and investigative pieces on discriminatory policing and intelligence operations have come to light. Just a few of these include: “FBI FOIA Docs Show Use of ‘Mosque Outreach’ for Illegal Intel Gathering,” Center for Human Rights and Global Justice at the NYU School of Law: “Targeted and Entrapped: Manufacturing the “Homegrown Threat in the United States,” and the City University New York report: “Mapping Muslims: NYPD Spying and its Impact on American Muslims.” Concern over the legality and existence of these programs is evident, but as Marx explains in *Agents Provocateurs as a Type of Faux Activist*, we are not yet examining the response of social movements/organizations to such programs. Marx explains:

The reciprocal efforts of social movements to control those who wish to control them have rarely been studied. Rather than passive recipients, movements are better viewed as actors in a dynamic process. The playing fields are not level but new means of surveillance and communication such as the computer, cell phone and video camera

may help activists in defensive and offensive responses to social control efforts (Marx, 2012, accessed online).

Questions to Consider and Gaps in Existing Research

When narrative is a unit of analysis, does it simply reflect an organic presentation of group values and mission? Or is it a deliberate and crafted presentation of image for strategic purpose? How can that be determined? Does group narrative provide insight into the ideological identity of the organization? Or is it merely a strategic presentation that belies the true ideology of the organization? Does group narrative accurately reflect the ideological identity of the individuals who participate in the organization? Does it matter? How is the narrative received? Is its intended goal achieved?

These questions were not answered by scholars in the course of this literature review. I believe this reinforces the assertion by myself and others that there exists a tremendous gap in the field of social movement research; the point at which policing intersects social movements is still relatively unknown and grossly understudied. Charles Blumer may have been referring to a different kind of “social problem” but his argument is relevant here.

I scarcely know of any facet of the general area of social problems that is more important, less understood, and less studied than that of the unforeseen and unintended restructuring of the area of a social problem that arises from the implementation of an official plan of treatment. I am unable to understand why students of social problems, in both their studies and their formulation of theory, can afford to ignore this crucial step in the life-being of social problems (Blumer, 1976, p. 304).

Since Blumer wrote this in 1976, few scholars have explored the phenomenon of what unfolds at the point policing and social movements intersect; fewer still have undertaken the level of analysis necessary to understand the ways in which organizations are impacted, how they respond to forces of social control, or what methods are employed to survive periods of intense policing. Using the lenses of historical perspective, narrative analysis and theories of policing and social control – I will attempt to provide insight into the often unseen aspects of social movements. My research is a step toward a more nuanced understanding of that which occupies so much time and space of the closed-door meetings of organizations – the omnipresence of forces that seek to repress and subvert social change movements.

Chapter 4

METHODOLOGY

I begin this section on methodology by touching again on the discussion from my earlier chapter on the role of American government agencies in the disruption of civil society organizations such as the Black Panthers. While the focus of this thesis is a measurement of the impact of counterterrorism initiatives on Muslim organizations in America, I want to remind the reader that this particular research project is merely a case study, *one* measurement of how policing practices impact civil society organizations in the US. The final product (arguments, discussion, knowledge) of this research is intended to inform how we analyze the intersection at which policing practices and civil society organizations meet, across all sectors of society (including of course, the impact of counterterrorism initiatives on American Muslim organizations.)

As I began to research the experience of Muslim organizations in America, I most often encountered anecdotal evidence -- personal narratives which detailed mistaken identity, false imprisonment, airport harassment, frozen assets, and deportation. It was nearly impossible to find scholarly work that provided some quantifiable measurement of the impact to *organizations* rather than individuals. One of the very few examples I encountered was created by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) entitled, "Blocking Faith, Freezing Charity." This study the decrease in funds donated to Muslim charitable organizations. The threat of being accused of providing material support to terrorists, in the "see something, say something" era of the US, had an especially damaging impact on American Muslim organizations. The ACLU

report describes hardships endured by organizations that have come under investigation, “Although these six charities have not been designated as terrorist organizations or had their assets frozen pursuant to a Treasury Department blocking order, they have suffered as a result of publicly announced investigations, law enforcement raids, and intrusive surveillance; two of these charities of have closed. In total, and as a result of these federal government actions, nine Muslim charities have been shut down in Texas, Michigan, Missouri, Illinois, Oregon, Ohio, Massachusetts, and New York” (2009).

While a valuable measurement, I believe there is far more value to the larger academic and political discussion in examining the *behavior* of these organizations.

Macro/National Research

As discussed in the previous chapter on theory, the narrative analysis work of William Gamson in his study of social movements has been foundational in constructing my own research. Gamson demonstrated the value of analyzing the language, statements, publications and other pieces of narrative of those who belong to a particular social movement or organization as a way to gain insight into what he calls the “micromobilizations” (inner workings, motivations, mechanics, intentions, etc.) of the group. I employed narrative analysis to examine the ways in which national-scope American Muslim organizations (AMOs) *respond to* counterterrorism initiatives and the government and law enforcement bodies that administer them. I examined the official websites of eight national-scope AMOs, gathering phrases and observing narrative themes that appeared in press releases, mission statements, programming, brochures, and interview responses. Criteria for inclusion in the study:

organization's scope must be national, simultaneous presentation of both American and Muslim identities, and a functional website used to present organization to general public.

Micro/Twin Cities Research

Conducting research related to issues of national security in a largely immigrant community, during roll-out of the Department of Justice's Countering Violent Extremism pilot program is challenging. Four weeks of attempts to facilitate focus groups included: email promotion from local reputable organizations, fliers (which promised confidentiality and anonymity of participants), scheduling focus groups over three days at different times to accommodate schedules, positioning focus groups in East African neighborhoods and providing halal (butchered and prepared by Islamic standards) food free of charge. After failing to generate even a single interested participant from the "average Muslim" demographic, it became immediately apparent that local research would need to focus on human subjects already in the public eye. Despite my work within the Muslim and Somali communities in the Twin Cities, average Muslims (private citizens) seem frightened of "going on record" with their thoughts and feelings about counterterrorism initiatives. Understandable. A white woman, albeit in hijab, asking for "your thoughts and feelings about counterterrorism programs that target your community" raises suspicions. Given the incidents of paid informants and mosque infiltration here in Minnesota, I cannot blame them. To accommodate this challenge, I chose to interview⁶ eight prominent and public members of the Muslim community. This includes faith leaders, official representatives of local organizations, elected officials, activists, organizers, and others

⁶ See Appendix 1 for email script used to contact potential study subjects and Appendix 2 for interview questions.

who regularly present their positions on counterterrorism programs in a variety of media formats. I also transcribed five televised interviews conducted with these community leaders, to supplement my research.

Limitations of this study

It is important to note the limitations of scope and sample in this research. My role as a program manager with a local Muslim civil rights organization provided the opportunity for extensive participant observation research, but also influences the sample of respondents. Due to my association with this organization, I am naturally more likely to engage with people who are concerned with issues of civil rights and tend to be more skeptical of government and law enforcement initiatives of any kind. In an effort to correct this imbalance, I have been diligent in my efforts to engage with individuals and organizations that are vocal supporters of the CVE initiative in Minneapolis/St. Paul. My sample size is also relatively small. As discussed above, the nature of this topic relating to issues of national security make people reluctant to discuss their opinions. As a result, I have primarily been able to engage with community leaders and organizational administrators, those who are accustomed to discussing CVE in the public eye. I recognize this shapes the perspective of the information I collect and look forward to conducting further research that allows me to survey the much larger general Muslim community.

Chapter 5

FINDINGS: NATIONAL

A pattern quickly emerged in the narrative presented by national-scope American Muslim organizations. I label this phenomenon the accommodationist narrative. This term appeared during my study of intellectual and political movements of the African diaspora. Two dominant voices of public discourse on the issue of achieving equality for blacks in America, W.E.B. DuBois and Booker T. Washington, frequently debated the value of their divergent approaches to African American self-determination. DuBois' characterization of Washington's approach to African American self-determination as "accommodationist" provides valuable context for identifying and analyzing the observed narrative pattern of contemporary American Muslim organizations. It is important to note two things: (1) the discovery of a repeated pattern of this kind, appearing throughout history, is significant to advancing social movement theory and will be discussed extensively later in this writing, and (2) although Dubois used "accommodationist" as a derogatory term, I do not assign such value to it here. In fact, one could argue that to accommodate the dominant culture of the time, allows for faster progress through compromise. It is merely a descriptor which acknowledges the historical context of this phenomenon.

Accommodationist Narrative

In an effort to measure the impact of counterterrorism initiatives on Islamic organizations in the United States, I initially employed discourse analysis to examine the narrative of American Muslim organizations (AMOs). I examined the official websites of several

national-scope AMOs, gathering phrases and observing themes that appeared in press releases, mission statements, programming, brochures, and interview responses. I identified four themes that appeared repeatedly in language addressing the role of Islam and Muslims in the United States. These themes (codifiers) are as follows: (1) Establishing official Islam – borrowed from the Daniel Rascoff article by the same name, this theme is indicative of efforts to promote a specific version of Islam that is compatible with modern Western life, while eschewing the parts of Islam that are currently rejected by 21st century mainstream culture. (2) Emphatic and repeated condemnation of terrorism – this refers to language that exceeds what has become the obligatory denunciation of random acts of terror. This theme indicates a demonstrated commitment to centrally position the condemnation of terror at the core of an organization’s public narrative, in other words “branding” itself an “anti-terror” organization. (3) De-radicalization programming – this language refers to efforts by an organization to develop programming (usually youth programming) aimed at preventing or correcting “radicalization” in the community. Accompanying this theme is the acknowledgement by the organization that radicalization is a chief concern of both the organization and the community they represent and serve. (4) Statements of allegiance to America – like anti-terrorism language, this theme refers to emphatic and repeated professions of a belief in American ideals, commitment to American security and other similar language not typically observed in the official communication of community organizations.

In Table 1, I have listed the national organizations alphabetically and indicated each of the codifiers as they appeared in organizational narratives. First, a brief reminder of the

themes: (1) Establishing official Islam; (2) Emphatic and repeated condemnation of terrorism;
 (3) De-radicalization programming; (4) Statements of allegiance to America.

National Organization	Positive Codifiers
American Islamic Congress	2, 3, 4
Council on American Islamic Relations	2
Free Muslims Coalition	1, 2, 3, 4
Islamic Circle of North America	-
Islamic Society of North America	-
Muslim Advocates	-
Muslim American Society	1, 2, 3
Muslim Public Affairs Council	2, 3, 4

Table 2 National Data

The following are excerpts of statements from official organizational websites. Each section of text represents one or more accommodationist themes. Certain phrases are underlined to highlight words that are especially strong indications of the respective codifier.




Figure 1 Website of Free Muslims Coalition Demonstrates Accommodationist Codifier 1

(1) Establishing official Islam: “...the concept of jihad should be reinterpreted for a modern day context in which holy war is obsolete. No holy war needs to be waged; there is no clear and present threat to Islam; the only war that needs to be waged in the modern world is one against terrorists and extremists. As militant Islamic fundamentalism increases, the Coalition will wage a battle of minds as we bring Islam into the 21st century and introduce a doctrine which is compatible with democracy and modern living.”

(3) De-radicalization programming: [MAS] implemented “The Straight Path Initiative,” a long-term campaign aimed at engaging all components of the Muslim American community, with a special focus on youth ages 15-30. The initiative seeks to pinpoint the roots of extremism, the ways in which individuals are radicalized, and the tools needed to address these challenges.”

The program strives to “engage the Muslim American community in monitoring and detecting extremist trends and their impact on vulnerable members of the community.”

(4) Allegiance to the US: “America has been a haven for Muslims and we must educate the world about the remarkable freedoms and coexistence we enjoy here. Virulent anti-American

rhetoric and action by radicalized Muslims threaten our country, our freedom and our democracy.”

In consideration of the climate of anti-Muslim and anti-Arab sentiment of the past 12 years, it is not surprising to find that the issue of national security is featured as a primary point of information on nearly every website surveyed. While some organizations focus on how individuals can best protect their constitutional rights if questioned or detained by officials⁷, many strive to present a clear narrative of unquestionable allegiance to the United States as well as a commitment to defending national security. One could argue that there is nothing inherently anti-establishment or anti-government about American Muslim organizations and therefore a stated commitment to the security of the nation is nothing of significance. To challenge this point, one can simply conduct an internet search of five or six organizations of *any* other kind – youth organizations, environmental groups, educational advocacy groups – and try to find similar statements that declare a commitment to the security of the United States. Virtually no other category of public organizations make these kind of statements. I argue that these very public claims of American allegiance indicate an effort to create a specific and accommodationist narrative. Consider the following examples from the website of Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC): a visitor to the MPAC website will see featured topics across the top of the page, one of which is *Issues*. Hover the cursor over that tab and the first choice is *National Security*. Selecting this option brings the visitor to MPAC’s assurance that its priority is protecting American national security.

⁷ See Appendix 4 for PDF of CAIR Pocket Guide to Civil Rights




Figure 2 Letters of Endorsment from the FBI and a Muslim Organization - Codifier 3

The site goes on to demonstrate cooperation with government efforts to fight terrorism, “MPAC has created campaigns to assist local Muslim communities in engaging with law enforcement and ensuring financial and ideological transparency at their mosques. One such program is our National Grassroots Campaign to Fight Terrorism, which was launched in 2004 and endorsed by the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) and the Department of Justice.”

The program was also endorsed by the FBI. Also from the MPAC website, one featured objective of the campaign is to “acquire skills to detect any potential criminal activity to be able to thwart them.” This is a strong statement which encourages Muslims in America to constantly be on the look-out for potential terrorists within their community. It is difficult to imagine similar language used to encourage Christians or Jews in America to be watchful of their fellow congregants.

A flash player across the top of the page emphasizes the importance of MPAC to the American government’s counterterrorism efforts with the scrolling message: “MPAC is one of the key players in the counterradicalization debate – not only according to the FBI but also to

author and former analyst with Steven Emerson's Investigative Project on Terrorism." To help illustrate the point, a photograph of a stack of books by the mentioned analyst/author - Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalization Challenge, edited by Rik Coolset, is piled beside the quote. Publicizing FBI endorsement is perhaps the epitome of an accommodationist narrative.



Figure 3 MPAC Website Demonstrates Accommodationist Codifier 3

Upon the announcement of the execution of Osama bin Laden, MPAC released the following praise, "The Muslim Public Affairs Council tonight greeted the news of the death of Osama bin Laden with an immense sense of relief. This is a time when our country must stand together, and turn the page on a decade of terror led by bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. MPAC also commends the service of President Obama and his national security team, who have made bringing Osama bin Laden to justice a top priority." While relief may have been an emotion experienced by other Muslim Americans, MPAC's special note of thanks to Obama's national security team is striking in that it specifically commends the very apparatus that discriminatorily targets innocent Muslim Americans in the sweep of counterterrorism efforts. One more item from this organization, a headline of significance: "MPAC to Release Declaration against Extremism." Here, MPAC demonstrates their commitment to the adoption of the American government's anti-extremism mantra.

Another organization examined, the American Islamic Congress (AIC) takes extraordinary steps to prove their allegiance to America.




Figure 4 American Islamic Congress Website Demonstrates Accommodationist Codifiers 2 and 3

A statement from their website: “American Muslims must be ambassadors to the Muslim world. America has been a haven for Muslims, and we must educate the world about the remarkable freedoms and coexistence we enjoy here. Virulent anti-American rhetoric and action by radicalized Muslims threaten our country, our freedom, and our democracy.” Notice that the AIC does not enumerate specific freedoms, but rather promotes the vague *idea* of freedom. Maintaining that vague ideological style, the statement does not define “anti-American rhetoric,” “radicalized,” or substantiate how those things “threaten our country.” The themes and patterns that appear in the narrative of national-scope American Muslim organizations demonstrate a significant presence of the accommodationist narrative.

Chapter 6

FINDINGS: TWIN CITIES

“Like all other communities, we cannot guarantee that any person or organization will not usurp our faith and ethnic identities, or manipulate legitimate foreign policy grievances, to justify horrendous acts of violence. We fully recognize that we live in times rife with conflict and grotesque acts of cruelty. In such times it is even more important that our government not descend into marginalizing and stigmatizing communities, whose active participation in our democratic landscape we should be prepared to value and defend.”

Twin Cities Muslim Community Statement against CVE, May, 2015

While the accommodationist narrative appears in more than half of *national* American Muslim organizations reviewed, I observed it much less frequently at the level of local community organizations in Minnesota. Although the Twin Cities area is home to more than 40 mosques, as of this writing, the leadership of only one mosque has signed on in support of the CVE initiative here in the Minneapolis/St. Paul metro.

One local faith leader explained his participation at the White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism in the following way:

Then the White House announced the summit in Washington, and so there was this pilot project of the Twin Cities, Boston and Los Angeles, to come there and learn about what the federal government intends. It was quite a high level. The president himself signed off on it. Vice President Joe Biden was there. Our congressional delegation, Congressman Ellison, two senators – they were all there. And there was a general sense of yes there are problems, and we want the Muslim community and the community that has concerns should be part of it. So kind of this environment of inclusion. You know, all

of them clearly stating that it will not be used for intelligence gathering or for spying but rather to work together.”

His language appears to indicate that he is impressed that the most powerful leaders in the country expressed an interest in solving a problem with the collaboration of his community and seems to trust assurances that no part of the CVE initiative will be used for intelligence gathering purposes. This level of trust in the government is somewhat surprising when one considers numerous instances (in recent years) of paid informants in mosques and illegal and discriminatory surveillance programs which targeted people based on their religious identity. But again, he asserts his faith in the CVE initiative, “And then when we came back, the direction of the project is stated to have its own plans and structure. So it’s not one size fits all. In Minneapolis, the program is called “Building Community Resilience.” So we’re not looking specifically at extremism or terrorism. I mean building the community... The government assures us that they will not use this program for surveillance or intelligence.”

Another example of the accommodationist narrative is observed in the leadership of a local youth organization. The executive director attended the White House Summit on CVE, and spoke of the value of his organization’s work in countering violent extremism. In his address at the White House, he also explained the ways in which arts programming can prevent radicalization of youth. This organization has also recently made an appeal for 4.35 million in state funds to go toward the prevention of Al-Shabaab and ISIS recruitment arguing, “It’s an issue that we must come together to combat. It’s an ideology issue, and we must fight ideology with an ideology” (CBS Minnesota, 2015). A proponent of CVE in the Somali and Muslim

community, the leadership of this organization is one of the most vocal supporters of the pilot program.

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the accommodationist narrative is observed much less frequently at the local level. After identifying the few community leaders who have supported government counterterrorism initiatives that target their communities, I examined the official websites of the organizations they lead. As a follow-up to the national research, I wanted to see if these local organizations were presenting accommodationist themes in the narrative contained within their official websites, similar to those seen in the narrative of national organizations. Surprisingly, there were no observed indicators of the accommodationist narrative. Not one of the codifiers from the national study appeared in any portion of the information presented to the public on their official websites.

Oppositional Narrative

In May of 2015, more than 50 local mosques and Muslim organizations signed on to a statement denouncing the CVE pilot program and calling for immediate changes including: (1) a demand that community outreach and social service funds for the Muslim community come directly from foundations or social service organizations, *not* law enforcement and intelligence agencies; (2) DOJ adoption of so-called “good Samaritan” laws to protect individuals who make a good-faith effort to intervene to prevent someone from participating in terrorist activity; and (3) the establishment of a congressional committee to review the federal government’s overreaching intelligence-gathering operations that discriminately target Muslims and mosques.⁸ Representatives of the organizations that signed the statement, formed a

⁸ See entire statement and list of signatories in Appendix 3

community task force to advocate for civil rights concerns as CVE launches in the Twin Cities Muslim community, serve as a resource for law enforcement agencies, and develop grassroots community-based solutions for the issues that threaten the health and well-being of Muslims in Minnesota.

A particularly striking excerpt from the statement highlights a recent incident of community “outreach” used for intelligence-gathering purposes. Documents uncovered in a FOIA request made by the Brennan Center for Justice exposed a plan in the St. Paul police department that involved the FBI, (Department of Justice) DOJ and local law enforcement. The program included plans to use Somali-speaking liaisons to encourage individuals to join programs at the YWCA and the Police Athletic Club. Lines from the grant proposal read, “...the team will also identify radicalized individuals, gang members, and violent offenders who refuse to cooperate with our efforts” (Price, 2015). Including this in their statement is almost certainly an effort to remind Twin Cities Muslims of the presence of targeted surveillance and intelligence gathering *already* occurring in the community.

A significant majority of Muslim community leaders and organization representatives in Minnesota have consistently and publicly expressed concern about the potential negative community impact of CVE initiatives. While detailing a public education event on CVE, an administrator of a local Muslim organization explains, “Constitutional rights are the cornerstone of our society and must not be suspended or limited for any Americans.” He argued, “Allowing the federal criminal prosecutor and law enforcement agencies to engage in social services and organize mentorship and after-school programs only in the Muslim community is unprecedented. It blurs the line between community outreach and intelligence gathering.” His

criticism highlights the concern that CVE initiatives in local communities, amount to the disguise of intelligence gathering operations.

Consequences of Opposing CVE

It is interesting to note there is little media coverage of community opposition to CVE initiatives in Minnesota. This is possibly due to a combination of factors including the high profile and public position of US Attorney Luger combined with the fear and risk that accompanies speaking out against a national security government initiative. One local organization shared with me their experience of receiving a bouquet of flowers and an anonymous card that read, "Thank you for protecting my community. Turning down FBI-infested money to protect our civil rights takes courage. We appreciate all that you do and cannot thank you enough." This example speaks to the difficult position an opponent of the CVE initiative finds themselves in.

Several local leaders have been visited multiple times at their homes by FBI agents and are routinely detained and questioned in airports. One local leader explained how after several visits from the FBI, she finally installed a camera on the front of her home so she would know when not to answer the door. Speaking out publicly against a Department of Justice program appears to place one in a cloud of suspicion. The Minneapolis Muslim community has reported multiple incidents of unexpected visits from the FBI followed a week later by subpoenas to appear before a grand jury. A local imam who has been especially vocal and public in his opposition to CVE reports that when he attempted to visit six young Somali men who are currently in solitary confinement in a local jail, personnel refused him entry. The families of these young men have reported to a local organization that the only faith leader that has been

allowed to visit their sons is the sole imam who has publicly supported the CVE initiative. When Luger and other proponents of CVE claim that average law-abiding Minnesotans have nothing to fear from FBI home visits, not many are convinced.

CVE in Public Schools

An issue that seems to be of special concern to the community is the presence of CVE in public schools. One local leader explained, “We don’t want to see programs like CVE go to other public places like public schools. We don’t want our kids worried that they’re being targeted as Muslim kids, or because of their name, or because of the veil, or because of their activities like MSA [Muslim Student Association]. The MSAs, when they heard this information, that the government might have a partnership with the public schools, they began worrying about their Muslim activities, that they could be targeted. Those activities are a very helpful part of the public school system to help minority students in a variety of capacities.” Another organization described an incident in which two public university students in Minneapolis were approached by federal agents on campus and offered full tuition, new laptops and other electronics in exchange for becoming informants in the Somali community. Frightened by the encounter, the students refused and reported the incident to a local advocacy organization.

One local youth leader’s comments on CVE seem to be especially representative of the oppositional narrative. He asserts:

The American Muslim community has an excellent track record of reporting criminal behaviors. Former FBI director, Robert Mueller, once told the US House Judiciary committee that many of our cases are results of cooperation from the Muslim community in the United States. The Minnesota pilot program focuses ONLY on

countering violent extremism in Minnesota Somali communities. We believe it will further stigmatize and marginalize the Somali and Muslim community by targeting all of its members as suspects and holding an entire community responsible for the actions of others. We believe it is morally and democratically repugnant to single out the community based solely on its religious affiliation and ethnic makeup.

Personal experience with law enforcement and government intelligence agencies seems to inform the predominantly oppositional narrative observed at the local level. This cannot account however for the disparity between national and local narratives, as many examples of discrimination against the Muslim community (several noted earlier in this study) have occurred on the national stage. This phenomenon will be further explored in the chapter that includes analysis of findings.

Chapter 7

WE'VE BEEN HERE BEFORE

“Too many people have been spied upon by too many Government agencies and too much information has been illegally collected.”

–Church Committee report, 1976

My purpose for including this discussion here is to provide proper historical context for the reader *before* analysis of findings begins. As I stated in Chapter 2: CVE Comes to Minnesota, contemporary counterterrorism initiatives have not been introduced without precedent. This history is foundational in the conceptualization and construction of my research and must be considered in analysis of CVE and other counterterrorism initiatives. Throughout this interdisciplinary research, I studied both contemporary and historical instances of policing civil society organizing efforts. In this writing, I strive to keep the exploration of how American Muslim organizations are impacted by counterterrorism initiatives positioned squarely at the intersection of historical analysis and the study of social movements. Here, I anchor the discussion in the examination of COINTELPRO and a look further back at the origins of one of my research terms: the accommodationist narrative as debated by Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. DuBois.

COINTELPRO

The Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO), secret FBI operations from 1956 to 1971, to destabilize, contain and neutralize various political and social movements in the United States, operated with the explicit mission of infiltrating organizations, launching psychological

warfare, spying on leaders, discrediting and defaming them in the public eye, and instigating internal strife whenever possible. COINTELPRO was kept secret until a burglary by the Citizen's Commission to Investigate the FBI uncovered documents exposing the program (Mazzetti, 2015). But during the years COINTELPRO carried out operations across the country, several social movement organizations found themselves targeted by the FBI, but none more so than the Black Panther Party. Of the 290 total COINTELPRO operations, 245 were carried out against the Panthers (Black Panthers: Vanguard of the Revolution, 2015).

Director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover, ordered bureaus across the US to "...expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit and otherwise neutralize" organizations he deemed a threat to national security. Hoover, who built his early intelligence career identifying "subversives," collected and recorded the names of more than 450,000 Americans between 1917 and 1924. Records released through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, featured in the 1996 documentary, "All Power to the People," show internal FBI memos that detail precisely what should be said in letters, who it should be sent to, and when. Black Panther member and Peabody award winning journalist, Mumia Abu Jamal explains, "Many of those confrontations both on the West Coast and between the East Coast and the West Coast happened because of the COINTELPRO program - what they called 'program brown mail.' They would write to one person and sign the letter and write to another person and sign each other's person's signatures." The Bureau also sent similar letters to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in which they claimed to possess information that would incriminate and publicly humiliate him. The text of these letters encouraged him to commit suicide (Gage, 2014). During this time, the FBI also engaged in numerous raids and mass arrests. One such mass arrest resulted in the arrest of 21

members of the Black Panther Party in New York, charged with plotting to plant bombs. They faced more than 360 years in prison. The charges were widely seen as baseless and after only three hours of deliberation, the jury returned with 156 not guilty verdicts. Each of the "Panther 21" were released. Throughout the trial, a young charismatic Black Panther, Fred Hampton worked across cultures to collaborate with the Young Lords (anti-racist Puerto Rican youth movement based in New York) and the Young Patriots (predominantly white anti-racist movement, fighting for better job opportunities – based in Chicago) to lead numerous rallies in support of the "Panther 21." This kind of cross-cultural cooperation between minority movements, which led to the Rainbow Coalition, was groundbreaking for the time. This display of unity across minority movements was greatly feared by J. Edgar Hoover as evidenced in the following excerpt from a classified COINTELPRO memo:

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE

3/4/68

GOALS

~~~~~

For maximum effectiveness of the Counterintelligence Program, and to prevent wasted effort, long-range goals are being set.

1. Prevent the COALITION of militant black nationalist groups. In unity there is strength; a truism that is no less valid for all its triteness. An effective coalition of black nationalist groups might be the first step toward a real "Mau Mau" [Black revolutionary army] in America, the beginning of a true black revolution.

2. Prevent the RISE OF A "MESSIAH" who could unify, and electrify, the militant black nationalist movement. Malcolm X might have been such a "messiah;" he is the martyr of the movement today. Martin Luther King, Stokely Carmichael and Elijah Muhammed all aspire to this position. Elijah Muhammed is less of a threat because of his age. King could be a very real contender for this position should he abandon his supposed "obedience" to "white, liberal doctrines" (nonviolence) and embrace black nationalism. Carmichael has the necessary charisma to be a real threat in this way.

4. Prevent militant black nationalist groups and leaders from gaining RESPECTABILITY, by discrediting them to three separate segments of the community. The goal of discrediting black nationalists must be handled

tactically in three ways. You must discredit those groups and individuals to, first, the responsible Negro community. Second, they must be discredited to the white community, both the responsible community and to "liberals" who have vestiges of sympathy for militant black nationalist [sic] simply because they are Negroes. Third, these groups must be discredited in the eyes of Negro radicals, the followers of the movement. This last area requires entirely different tactics from the first two. Publicity about violent tendencies and radical statements merely enhances black nationalists to the last group; it adds "respectability" in a different way.

5. A final goal should be to prevent the long-range GROWTH of militant black organizations, especially among youth. Specific tactics to prevent these groups from converting young people must be developed.

COINTELPRO operations placed paid informants at all levels of targeted organizations.

Fred Hampton's bodyguard, William O'Neal, was a paid informant who received a \$300 bonus after he provided detailed floor plans of Hampton's apartment to the FBI (Black Panthers: Vanguard of the Revolution, 2015). In the early morning hours of December 4, 1969, Fred Hampton was killed as he slept in his bed next to his wife (eight months pregnant) by a team of Chicago police reportedly there to serve a warrant, and armed with machine guns. The Chicago police department defended their heavily criticized December 4<sup>th</sup> actions, explaining that upon arriving at Hampton's residence, shots were fired from inside the apartment and their only option was to respond with deadly force.



*Figure 5 Fred Hampton, Chairman of the Chicago chapter of the Black Panther Party, 1969*



*Figure 6 Chicago Police Carry Fred Hampton's Body, 1969*

The Chicago Tribune ran a story which seemed to confirm this report featured a photograph of what they labeled bullet holes on the inside of Hampton's door. These "holes" were later determined to be nail heads (Gregory, 2015). A federal investigation of the deadly raid found that of nearly 100 shots fired, only one was *not* fired by Chicago police. Fred Hampton's death was a pivotal moment for the Black Panthers, followed by deep divisions in

leadership and differences in vision for where the organization should direct focus and action.<sup>9</sup>

The intervention of the FBI into organizing efforts of the Black Panthers resulted in a significant weakening of the organization. It would seem that many if not all of Hoover's objectives for COINTELPRO were accomplished. It is outside the scope of this paper, but worth considering what the state of racial equity might be in 2015, had the FBI not carried out the operations of COINTELPRO, or if the existence of the covert program had been discovered years earlier.

### **Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. DuBois**

At the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century and beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup>, two figures dominated public discourse on how to best create positive sustainable change in the lives of black Americans. Booker T. Washington and W.E.B DuBois each developed comprehensive (and drastically different) approaches to lifting black Americans up from poverty and out from under the grip of white supremacy. Washington advocated an accommodationist approach; he urged African Americans to improve themselves through economic and practical vocational development in an effort to win the acceptance of white society. He believed that it was a mistake to demand civil rights on the basis of racial equality, before whites were able to see that equality demonstrated in the growth and development of the black community. Washington recognized the value of higher learning, but saw the abject poverty of black life as an urgent need that

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<sup>9</sup> It should be noted that the inclusion of this period in history is not meant to be an exhaustive analysis of the role of government and law enforcement intervention in the Black Panther Party's organizing efforts. Several outstanding texts including: *Liberation, imagination, and the Black Panther Party: a new look at the Panthers and their legacy* by Kathleen Cleaver and George Katsiaficas and *Agents of repression: the FBI's secret wars against the Black Panther Party and the American Indian Movement* by Ward Churchill offer historical account and analysis far superior to the brief overview I have written here.

could not be immediately or adequately ameliorated by academic study. In 1896, Washington wrote an article for the Atlantic entitled, "The Awakening of the Negro." He writes,

Some one [sic] may be tempted to ask, Has not the negro boy or girl as good a right to study a French grammar and instrumental music as the white youth? I answer, Yes, but in the present condition of the negro race in this country there is need of something more. Perhaps I may be forgiven for the seeming egotism if I mention the expansion of my own life partly as an example of what I mean. My earliest recollection is of a small one-room log hut on a large slave plantation in Virginia. After the close of the war, while working in the coal-mines of West Virginia for the support of my mother, I heard in some accidental way of the Hampton Institute. When I learned that it was an institution where a black boy could study, could have a chance to work for his board, and at the same time be taught how to work and to realize the dignity of labor, I resolved to go there. (Washington, 1896, newspaper archive online)

Washington did make his way to the Hampton Institute and as a result of his experience there, later established the Tuskegee Institute (a boarding school devoted to training blacks in industrial and practical vocational skills) in Tuskegee, Alabama. Washington's beliefs about the way to black liberation are perhaps best expressed in his article, "Up From Slavery."

Washington plainly states, "Friction between the races will pass away in proportion as the black man . . . can produce something that the white man wants or respects in the commercial world" (Washington, 1901). DuBois rejected this approach entirely.

DuBois, an intellectual and philosophical giant of his time, argued that the intellectual and academic development of the black community was the only way to establish true equality in America. He criticized the growing movement of industrial education institutions in his writing, "Of the Training of Black Men" (1902). DuBois explains,

Is not life more than meat, and the body more than raiment? And men ask this to-day all the more eagerly because of the sinister signs in recent educational movements. The tendency is here, born of slavery and quickened to renewed life by the crazy imperialism of the day, to regard human beings as among the material resources of a land to be trained with an eye single to future dividends. Race prejudices, which keep brown and black men in their "places," we are coming to regard as useful allies with such a theory, no matter how much they may dull the ambition and sicken the hearts of struggling human beings. And above all, we daily hear that an education that encourages aspiration, that sets the loftiest of ideals and seeks as an end culture and character rather than bread-winning, is the privilege of white men and the danger and delusion of black.

DuBois warned that widespread implementation of industrial education for the black community would only serve to perpetuate the already inferior station in society prescribed to blacks by whites. In other words, intellectual pursuits were reserved for intellectually superior whites, remanding blacks to less desirable physical labor – not unlike the labor hierarchy maintained during slavery. From DuBois' perspective, the Washingtonian school of thought could never adequately challenge the system of racial subjugation in America.



Undoubtedly, both Washington and DuBois had tremendous love and respect for the black community in America and believed in its ability to liberate itself from the oppression of white supremacy; they just approached the challenge with deeply divergent philosophies. Washington saw accommodation not as a weakness or as a failure to appropriately represent the needs of his community, but as a carefully calculated strategy which best positioned blacks to achieve economic stability and ultimately, equality. For DuBois, accommodation was a trap, an agreement to accept the second-class citizen status designated for blacks by whites that would accomplish little more than to begin a fruitless journey toward a moving target of success and worth that would be always out of reach.<sup>10</sup> DuBois ultimately argued that even if economic power was generated by blacks through Washington's approach, it could not be defended without civil rights. This debate continues now in the African American community and is observed in my study of the Muslim community in the US, particularly in the examination of American Muslim organizational response to counterterrorism initiatives and the government bodies that administer them.

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<sup>10</sup> DuBois continued to write extensively on the necessity of demanding full civil equality *before* meeting an arbitrary standard of economic achievement and later penned his seminal work, *The Souls of Black Folk*, which became instrumental in spurring the civil rights movement in America.

## **Chapter 8**

### **ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION**

In my examination of AMOs and the phenomenon of their response narrative, it is necessary to place these groups in the proper context - the environment in which American Muslim organizations operate and the non-Muslim narratives that shape that space. I begin with a discussion of research that documents incidents of discrimination in existing counterterrorism initiatives, particularly intelligence gathering measures. I then discuss the government and law enforcement perspective on these initiatives as well as their response to allegations that these programs target people based on their religious and ethnic identity. Finally, I provide analysis of both the accommodationist and oppositional narratives observed during this research.

#### **Documenting Discrimination**

Military and academic studies demonstrate that current methods of surveillance discriminatorily target of Muslims in America. One study conducted in 2013 by West Point Military Academy's Combatting Terrorism Center, which according to their website strives to "conduct rigorous and policy relevant research that contributes to the academic body of knowledge and informs counterterrorism policy," reveals tremendous disconnect between the focus of counterterrorism efforts and the identity of people who actually commit acts of terror (Perliger, 2013). Matthew Harwood, freelance writer for TomDispatch.com, explains, "The numbers couldn't be clearer: right-wing extremists have committed far more acts of political violence since 1990 than American Muslims. That law enforcement across the country hasn't felt similarly compelled to infiltrate and watch over conservative Christian communities in the

hopes of disrupting violent right-wing extremism confirms what American Muslims know in their bones: to be different is to be suspect” (2013).

The Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security (TCTHS), which describes itself as “...a collaborative effort between Duke University, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and RTI International to enhance the understanding of terrorism and the means to combat it...” In this 2012 report, by the TCTHS, Charles Kurzman, professor of sociology at Chapel Hill notes, “The number of American Muslims turning to terrorism is vanishingly small.” However, government programs of surveillance have not shifted focus in response to this fact. Kurzman goes on to explain, “Until public opinion starts to recognize the scale of the problem has been lower than we feared, my sense is that public officials are not going to change their policies” (2013).<sup>11</sup>

In addition, a number of impact studies document various effects of counterterrorism efforts on American Muslim organizations (AMOs). The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice (CHRGJ) at the New York University School of Law conducted studies to measure the impact of surveillance and intelligence-gathering on AMOs. The findings demonstrate the various ways organizations suffer financially and structurally as a result. The ACLU study mentioned earlier in this writing, “Blocking Faith, Freezing Charity: Chilling Muslim Charitable Giving in the ‘War on Terrorism Financing,’ explains how organizations have been destabilized and even shut down as a consequence of enduring

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<sup>11</sup> At the time of this writing, and in the wake of coordinated terrorist attacks in Paris, several American governors have announced plans to block the entry of Syrian refugees. Republican presidential candidate, Jeb Bush stated of the Syrian refugee crisis that only the Christian refugees should be allowed into the United States. A change in American attitudes toward the threat posed by Muslims does not seem to be on the horizon.

public criminal investigation, government raids, frozen assets and other financial difficulties.

The study discovered that most targets of investigation have been found to have no connection whatsoever to terrorism. According to the report released in May, 2011, the CHRJGJ urges, “The U.S. government must stop its discriminatory targeting of Muslim communities in counterterrorism investigations.” Again from the report, the CHRJGJ explains in more detail, “The Report considers key trends in counterterrorism law enforcement policies that have facilitated these practices, including the government’s promulgation of so-called radicalization theories that justify the abusive targeting of entire communities based on the unsubstantiated notion that Muslims in the U.S. are ‘radicalizing’.”

The perspective offered by these research institutions highlights the ways in which Muslim Americans are discriminatorily targeted as potential terrorist suspects. The disproportionate targeting of these organizations and their community members, the threat of criminal charges, of detention, deportation, isolation, stigmatization, of frozen assets, all contribute to an environment of fear. Consideration of these factors creates the appropriate context for analysis of the narrative of American Muslim organizations in response to counterterrorism initiatives. I would be remiss, however, to analyze AMO narratives without considering the government perspective on CVE and other counterterrorism initiatives.

### **Government Perspective**

In contrast to the studies described above, the United States government maintains that Countering Violent Extremism and other counterterrorism initiatives are carefully designed to help prevent terrorist attacks by identifying individuals and behaviors of concern *before* tragedy strikes, but do not indiscriminately target Muslims in America. The Obama administration

describes CVE in particular as a collaborative effort to empower local communities to educate and support youth and families, which leads to a decrease in radicalization and extremism. A statement on CVE from the White House Press Secretary explains, “The pilot framework developed by these three cities [Los Angeles, Boston and Minneapolis/St. Paul] emphasizes the strength of local communities with the premise that well-informed and well-equipped families, communities, and local institutions represent the best defense against violent extremist ideologies and offers three overarching components” (Office of the White House Press Secretary, 2015). To clarify the secretary’s phrase, “framework developed by these three cities,” one should note that despite the implication that the programs *originated* in the pilot cities, CVE was conceived and designed at the federal level and administered in three pilot cities by their respective US attorneys.



Figure 7 CVE Illustration Created for the White House Summit to Counter Violent Extremism, 2015

In the closing remarks of the 2015 White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, President Obama addressed concerns of discrimination and stigmatization surrounding CVE:

I know some Muslim Americans have concerns about working with government, particularly law enforcement. And their reluctance is rooted in the objection to certain practices where Muslim Americans feel they've been unfairly targeted. So, in our work, we have to make sure that abuses stop, are not repeated, that we do not stigmatize entire communities. Nobody should be profiled or put under a cloud of suspicion simply because of their faith. Engagement with communities can't be a cover for surveillance. We can't "securitize" our relationship with Muslim Americans, dealing with them solely through the prism of law enforcement. Because when we do, that only reinforces suspicions, makes it harder for us to build the trust that we need to work together (Obama, 2015).

Back at home in the Twin Cities, US Attorney in Minnesota, Andrew Luger, echoes Obama's rebuttal of allegations that CVE discriminates or unjustly targets the Muslim or Somali community, "I have two children and if somebody was recruiting my children to go overseas and die, I would want the people who were doing that to be caught and put in jail," Luger said. "My children are no more valuable than your children." He added, "This is something we do together. It's not that the government is attacking this wonderful people, thriving, large community. You deserve to have this wonderful community grow and live and prosper in peace, and I want to help you do that" (Luger as quoted in "U.S. Attorney tells Somali community: investigations into ISIS recruitment 'not an attack,'" Hirsi, 2015). We should consider the fact that Luger does not address whether he would also want his children to go to jail. This is important to note in light of the six young Somali men who are in jail in Minnesota, currently awaiting trial for allegedly trying to travel to Syria in 2015. They are not charged with

trying to recruit, but rather are the victims of a recruitment campaign (not unlike Luger's hypothetical example of his own children).

One could take comfort in these words of reassurance, of commitment to preserving peace, of praise for a community beleaguered by outside suspicion. In and of themselves, there is nothing particularly troubling about the comments made by President Obama or US Attorney Luger. Devoid of context, these statements are reasonable, reassuring -- even comforting. Careful analysis is required. Let us walk through Obama's statement one piece at a time: "I know some Muslim Americans have concerns about working with government, particularly law enforcement." Obama delicately acknowledges this fact but inadequately provides explanation when he follows it with, "And their reluctance is rooted in the objection to certain practices where Muslim Americans feel they've been unfairly targeted." This statement is akin to the responsibility-absolving non-apology, "I'm sorry *you* feel that way."

His use of the words "certain practices" implies that Muslims are only frustrated by isolated incidents. He does not address the broad systemic Islamophobia the FBI, CIA, Department of Homeland Security and other agencies are frequently accused of as demonstrated in numerous articles and reports presented in this writing. Consider the dismissive tone of "...feel they've been unfairly targeted." His refusal to grant any legitimacy to those "feelings," places them solidly outside the realm of fact. Interestingly though, he seems to admit some level of wrong doing, "So, in our work, we have to make sure that abuses stop, are not repeated..." This begs the question, What abuses must stop? Is President Obama here acknowledging the abuse of Muslims at the hands of American law enforcement and intelligence agencies? Curiously, he goes on to remind us of the importance, "...that we

do not stigmatize entire communities.” This of course is precisely the argument opponents of CVE make to challenge the targeting of the Muslim community and in the case of Minnesota, predominantly the Somali community, in efforts to prevent terrorism. He further emphasizes this point as he explains, “Nobody should be profiled or put under a cloud of suspicion simply because of their faith.”

“Engagement with communities can’t be a cover for surveillance,” Obama warns. And yet it is. As mentioned earlier in this writing, a FOIA request revealed “community outreach” efforts (Police athletic league, spotting potential radicalized youth if they didn’t want to participate) were proposed by the St. Paul police department in Minnesota. Obama goes on to explain, “We can’t “securitize” our relationship with Muslim Americans, dealing with them solely through the prism of law enforcement. Because when we do, that only reinforces suspicions, makes it harder for us to build the trust that we need to work together.” This is precisely the argument made by one local respondent, “While Obama administration officials have tried to distance US programs from the British CVE programs called Prevent, the similarities between the two are obvious. Prevent has been widely criticized for alienating the very community it was seeking to influence for lacking any means of measuring effectiveness. Moreover, the trajectory of the UK efforts shows how these programs can morph into outright censorship. Yet US CVE programs have repeated Prevent mistakes, focusing exclusively on Muslims.” No matter how the President describes it, CVE is a tough sell in Minnesota.

And yet, US Attorney Luger continues to try, “It’s time for the community to work with government to address the root causes of radicalism,” Luger said in remarks before the briefing. “This is not about gathering intelligence, or expanding surveillance. We want to ‘prevent’ — so that



we're not back in this same room five or ten years from now addressing the same issues."

Unfortunately, we do not actually know what the so-called "root causes" are. As a reminder, in Chapter 2 I discussed a remarkably exhaustive study conducted by the British national intelligence agency, MI5, which found no identifiable pattern of radicalization or factors which indicate propensity to commit acts of terror (The Guardian, 2015). Even Luger himself said in a public forum in February, 2015, "This is only a pilot program. We don't know if it will work." This is a stunning statement of uncertainty when compared to the confidence with which Luger presents this initiative to the media, public, and potential benefactors of CVE programs.

In later meetings for which I was present, community members challenged Luger to provide a rubric or criteria for how the objectives of CVE in Minnesota will be measured as well. He refused and has not produced such a rubric to date. Concerned community leaders also asked Luger to present what measures will be implemented to ensure the CVE program has appropriate oversight, including recourse for those negatively impacted by the initiative. No such outline of policy and procedure has been provided by the US Attorney's office. As a researcher, I recognize the importance of transparency as well as outlining specific and measurable goals. Without them, degree of success simply cannot be determined. As a researcher, I argue that the opacity in this case, is strategic. Without clearly stated objectives and publicly available policy and procedure for this program, how can anyone (organization or individual) effectively challenge the legality of CVE? CVE, vague by design.

### **Accommodationist Narrative**

The accommodationist narrative explored in previous chapters and observed most frequently amongst national-scope AMOs, requires careful analysis that considers the

following: When the accommodationist narrative is present, what does it mean? Does it indicate a shift in organizational values? Does it reflect the feelings of the organization's constituency? Does it serve as cover, deflecting unwanted government attention, allowing "genuine" work to continue unhampered? These questions are difficult to answer. The nature of this study, exploring the inner workings, strategies and motivations of organizations, seeks to uncover that which is not meant to be exposed for public consumption or even shared in private conversation with a researcher. The opacity of this subject requires me to carefully synthesize the theories and study of scholars of social movements and social control, the long-standing history and current context of this phenomenon, and patterns of behavior and narrative. In the analysis that follows, I use the lenses of resource mobilization theory (conceptualizing the pieces of social organization necessary for successful operation), social psychology (examining the role of narrative in social movements), and policing and social control (keeping in mind the longstanding history of government intervention in civil society organizing efforts).

### **Narrative Response as Protection Against Structural Vulnerabilities**

My analysis follows the structural aspects of organizational success as outlined by resource mobilization theory (RMT). For clarity and ease, I detail each aspect as it is demonstrated by the AMOs examined in this study. The first structural aspect is material, which includes all material resources of an organization but refers especially to the funding and finances. As mentioned earlier in this writing, AMOs have experienced hardship in this vital area. Cases such as the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, outlined by the ACLU in their study, "Blocking Faith, Freezing Charity: Chilling Muslim Charitable Giving in the

War on Terrorism Financing,” demonstrate the power of government and law enforcement to completely destabilize and even shut down an organization with even just an investigation of possible financial support for terrorism. It could be argued that the accommodationist narrative is strictly an attempt to craft a non-threatening public image, but is not actually representative of how these organizations operate or the ideology that informs their work. Although just one example, this kind of experience is echoed in several examples across the nation. The case of Asad Dandia exemplifies extraordinary organizational efforts to avoid being perceived as connected to anything deemed suspicious by the American Government. In, “My Life under Surveillance,” Mr. Dandia describes how his charitable giving organization was infiltrated and threatened by the FBI, along with the mosque which allowed his small group to meet and serve as a source of financial support. From his article,

About 10 days later, a religious leader at my mosque, Masjid Omar, asked me to stop holding Muslims Giving Back meetings at the mosque—which, until then, had been our primary meeting place and a substantial source of our fundraising—and to avoid bringing new people. The Masjid Omar religious leader also said that Muslims Giving Back would no longer be permitted to solicit donations from congregants after Friday services. This has been a major blow to our organization, which had relied on these weekly calls to raise money for our work. As a result, Muslims Giving Back has struggled to raise the funds we need to buy food and serve our community's needs” (2013).

Although Dandia’s organization simply distributed food to community members in need, the very possibility of being designated a threat to American security, left Dandia’s mosque unwilling to allow his work to continue with their support. Certainly this is a prime example of

an organization that represents a Muslim American community, accommodating the investigative whims of a government which disproportionately targets its members.

The human and culture aspect of organizational stability refers to the presence of knowledgeable experienced members. Resource mobilization theory suggests that organizations with a strong presence of members or leadership who have extensive experience building communities around ideas and action as well as expertise in the issues around which they are organizing, fare better than those without such human capital. As with any venture, people with “know-how” and leadership ability will always be a tremendous benefit. In the case of AIO vulnerability in this area, educated capable leaders are likely to be targeted. For example, in Nusrat Choudry’s article, “FBI FOIA Docs Show Use of ‘Mosque Outreach’ for Illegal Intel Gathering,” he points out a variety of ways in which government agencies were able to infiltrate communities of faith and gather constitutionally protected personal information about various members. (2012) When the reach and power of government is so dramatically demonstrated in its ability to monitor innocent individuals, those who make up the core of a group must make decisions based on an assessment of the risk to their own lives, their freedom and security. Surinder Guru, lays bare the excruciating family consequences that occur as a result of an aggressive counterterrorism campaign in her article, “Under Siege: Families of Counter-Terrorism.” From the article:

In the wake of terrorist attacks in New York and in London, Muslim communities in Britain have been blighted by increased racist activity and vilification alongside a systematic strengthening of surveillance and national security. As many Muslim men are incarcerated, the families of detainees and prisoners are often left to fend for

themselves amidst economic and social insecurity, giving rise to isolation and ostracisation from within and outside of their own communities (2012).

It could be argued that if an individual has committed no crime, there is no threat to their freedom or security. This argument is predicated on the assumption that the American judicial system is fair. However, even a remedial reading of American history provides more than sufficient evidence to the contrary - lynching in the Jim Crow era, individuals held for years without charge in Guantanamo Bay, and people executed who were later exonerated by DNA evidence. To return to the focus of this study, if the perceived risk is too great, an organization will have great difficulty recruiting or maintaining strong leadership. Solidarity, another aspect of organization stability, like human and culture assets, is impacted by government action in much the same way as the most valuable group members. As operations such as infiltration or surveillance are implemented, the level of risk to all (leaders, members and even associates) increases. Groups suspected of providing material support to terrorists, can quickly become perceived as terrorists themselves. Any association with such an organization immediately calls into question the legality of an individual's contact with or participation in said organization. At this point, building a sense of solidarity for a given cause, becomes extremely difficult for any organization that finds itself in this situation. Consider for a moment, the case mentioned earlier, Mr. Dandia, the young man who operated a food drive out of his local mosque. Out of fear and amongst allegations, his mosque leadership refused to let him continue charitable work on their premises. Once the community becomes aware of such allegations, the damage to his efforts is difficult to measure, but I argue that it is reasonable to speculate that others in the community might become fearful or suspicious of Mr. Dandia's work and decide it is not

worth any level of risk to support his efforts. Whatever one's opinion on resource mobilization theory, I think it can be agreed upon that without some measure of solidarity, a civil society organization will struggle to survive.

The final aspect of resource mobilization theory applied to this analysis is organizational, referring to the ability of a group to network with other causes/organizations and to recruit new members. Consistent with examples throughout this writing, risk to personal security and stability is considered in relation to associating with or joining a group. If government or law enforcement targets an organization or groups associated with certain causes, it becomes immediately apparent that prospective members should be cautious in their choice to associate. This is perhaps the farthest reaching of the ways in which collective action efforts are impacted by government intervention. It is at this point that the base of *future* members and support begins to erode. In fact, I argue that organizations *not* targeted by counterterrorism initiatives, but which are similar in constituency to organizations which are targeted, suffer the same negative consequence.

### **Narrative Response an Attempt to Preserve Stability and Cohesion**

It is evident that the pressure of surveillance, the criminalization of social organizing, or the threat of financial ruin destabilizes an organization's ability to sustain collective action. Keeping resource mobilization theory in mind, patterns of defense against such destabilization emerge in analysis of AIO case studies. I categorize these defensive efforts into two categories. The first is allegiance, particularly public expression of unquestionable American allegiance. Consistently presented at or near the front of nearly every site I studied, was some kind of assurance to all who visit, that this organization loves America, enjoys the freedoms afforded to

their members and in no way poses any threat to national security. An excerpt of one such statement comes from the American Islamic Congress. From the section of their website titled “AIC’s Statement of Principles,” consider the tone of the following:

Muslims have been profoundly influenced by our encounter with the United States. American Muslims are a minority group, largely comprised of African-Americans, converts, immigrants, and the children of immigrants who have prospered in America’s climate of religious tolerance and civil rights. Our community must carefully consider the lessons of our unprecedented experience of acceptance and success as members of American society.

I assert that this kind of public declaration is used strategically to deflect government suspicion as a means to preserve both the material and solidarity resources of their organizations. The threat to financial stability is great as is outlined at various points in this study (ie, “Blocking Faith, Freezing Charity”). As for the resource of solidarity, one can not underestimate the importance of public support for a cause. If people are fearful of being associated with an organization suspected of ties to terrorism, they will not feel comfortable providing financial or tactical support.

I define the second category of defense against AMO destabilization as adopting official Islam. This notion was mentioned in the first section of analysis of this study with a call for further investigation into the topic as it deserves research far beyond this writing. I want to mention it here as it appeared in several of the case studies of this research process. As is true for all of the defensive efforts, adopting an official (acceptable by Western standards) version of Islam serves to deflect unwanted government attention including surveillance and other forms

of harassment. But a particular function of this effort is to assure institutions of power not only that the AIO poses no threat of any kind, but goes so far as to promote sanctioned messages throughout their teachings and actions. One of the most precise examples of this is found in the writings of the Free Muslims Coalition. From the “About Us” section of their website:

The Coalition believes that fundamentalist Islamic terror represents one of the most lethal threats to the stability of the civilized world. The existence of Islamic terrorists is the existence of threats to democracy. There is no room for terrorism in the modern world and the United States should take a no-tolerance stance on terrorism in order to avoid another tragedy, along the lines of 9-11...All calls for jihad to create an Islamic state should be rejected as heretic and a threat to modern society... As militant Islamic fundamentalism increases, the Coalition will wage a battle of minds as we bring Islam into the 21st century and introduce a doctrine which is compatible with democracy and modern living.

This kind of rhetoric perfectly aligns with the anti-terrorism, anti-extremism messages espoused by the American government over the past 12 years. The language, particularly reminiscent of Department of Homeland Security rhetoric, with phrases such as “threat to modern society, introduce a doctrine...compatible with democracy, wage a battle of minds,” boldly demonstrates what Daniel Rascoff describes as establishing official Islam. Statements such as these, rife with the anti-terrorism language of government officials, beg the questions, to whom is this message directed and for whose benefit? Further examination of primary sources reveals counterradicalization efforts undertaken by the AMOs themselves. For example, as mentioned on page 31 in the chapter on national findings, I discuss the Muslim American



Society's "The Straight Path Initiative." The language used to describe the objectives of the initiative is strikingly similar to that observed in statements from law enforcement and government intelligence agencies on matters of preventing terrorism. Consider the following: "pinpoint the roots of extremism, the ways in which individuals are radicalized, and the tools needed to address these challenges." The program strives to "engage the Muslim American community in monitoring and detecting extremist trends and their impact on vulnerable members of the community." Without context, one would be surprised to learn that the origin of such statements were *not* from the White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism. Considering the rise of anti-Islam and anti-Muslim sentiment in America, challenges to the legality of various counterterrorism initiatives, and countless other incidents of spying, harassment, discrimination and infiltration discussed throughout this writing – that an organization which claims to represent the Muslims of America would adopt such language is startling. This further affirms my argument that AMOs largely present such narrative to deflect unwanted government attention, preserve positive relationships to systems of power, and prevent the interruption of flow of resources of any kind.

### **Oppositional Narrative**

Analysis of the oppositional narrative is considerably less complex. The organizations which demonstrated opposition to counterterrorism initiatives, particularly public opposition, presented a relatively simple and straightforward message. Concerns of the constituency were echoed in the statements of local organizations. This trend is perhaps unremarkable because it is predictable in the current context. Reports of illegal surveillance and discriminatory targeting of Muslims through counterterrorism initiatives result in fear and distrust from the community

toward law enforcement and government officials. Organizations that represent those communities, particularly advocacy and civil rights organizations, use the resources available to them to amplify the concerns of their constituency. Raising concerns about the stigmatizing effects of CVE and other counterterrorism initiatives is also consistent with the mission statements of many organizations I examined. Challenging Islamophobia, facilitating dialogue about Islam, helping Muslim immigrants to successfully integrate into the US, providing Muslim families with educational and social activities, and conducting interfaith discussions to teach others about Islam, are some of the aims of local AMOs. Speaking out against a program your constituency believes is deeply harmful, is a natural fit with the numerous ways in which you already support and advocate for your community.

Every terrorist attack anywhere in the world demands an apology and emphatic condemnation from Muslim leaders in every community. The leadership of local AMOs are accustomed to repeatedly addressing questions about what many assume to be the unique propensity of Islam to produce terrorists. To work on behalf of the Muslim community (as shown repeatedly throughout this writing) in any city is to be suspect. Challenging the dominant narrative of the power structure is difficult but an accepted and expected aspect of the work local AMOs do in their communities. This approach is not without consequences, but local AMOs seem willing to accept the risk.

Questions that remain at the conclusion of this study center on the effectiveness of the accommodationist narrative. Does it provide adequate protection from the destabilization of external forces? Does it create new areas of destabilization within the group? These questions should be considered in further research of this phenomenon. Certainly anyone participating in

or studying collective action would benefit from the analysis of factors that damage or preserve structures of social organization.

## Chapter 9

### CONCLUSION

In no respect can the difference in perspectives thus described be considered of merely academic interest. To the contrary, it stands in very tangible ways not only to shape all that we might reasonably set out to achieve, socially and politically, but, perhaps more importantly, how it is we must ultimately go about achieving it.

--Ward Churchill

As I studied the history of political and intellectual movements of the African diaspora (a key piece of the interdisciplinary nature of this project), I began to have questions about the role of secret FBI and other intelligence and law enforcement operations in *contemporary* society. What if COINTELPRO was not an exception, a long ago resolved blemish on the history of American intelligence operations? What if we have always lived and continue to live under a system of government that routinely seeks to disrupt, silence or otherwise neutralize the expression of ideas it deems “subversive”? Three arguments could (and probably will) be made here. The first: We have not seen the level of civil unrest and illegal government operations of the 1960s and ‘70s since that time. To suggest that we are somehow currently living in a modern COINTELPRO era is, at best, hyperbole. At worst, that kind of claim borders on the paranoid ramblings of conspiracy theory nuts. This does not require academic study.

In response, I argue that it is a costly mistake to believe the social upheaval of the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century was somehow a unique and isolated era of change that had not been seen before and will never come again. We tend to hold that time up as the pinnacle of racial tensions, social activism, and widespread police brutality. The paranoid operations of the House Un-American Activities Committee and COINTELPRO feel far away. People reminisce and remark,

“You wouldn’t get away with that nowadays.” In some ways and on some matters, that may be true, but revelations from the documents obtained by Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden are a stark reminder that things in America have changed very little. Investigative independent news outlet, The Intercept, recently discovered that the email accounts of five prominent Muslim Americans were all monitored by the FBI. Those targeted represent activists, attorneys and academics and not one of them have ever been charged with a crime. One of the targets, Executive Director for CAIR (Council on American Islamic Relations) Nihad Awad, expressed his feelings on learning that his email had been monitored, “I was not aware that I was under surveillance, except recently. And I’m outraged that as an American citizen, my government, after decades of civil rights struggle, still the government spies on political activists and civil rights activists and leaders. It is outrageous, and I’m really angry that despite all the work that we have been doing in our communities to serve the nation, to serve our communities, we are treated with suspicion” (Awad in Greenwald and Hussain, 2014).

I argue that the incredible developments in technology will only increase the ways and extent to which the communications and data of Americans is monitored and collected. Coupled with a surge in the fear of an omnipresent threat to national security, particularly the perceived threat from radical Muslim terrorists, we will undoubtedly continue to see more cases like Nihad Awad and others. Intense policing practices which target people based on their religious and ethnic identity is not only our past, but our future.

Second argument: Of course we live under constant surveillance. Life is different after the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks and the Patriot Act which soon followed. Academic study is not required to make this claim. To some extent, I agree. However, we must devote academic study

to exploring and documenting the ways in which this level of surveillance and related police practices impact civil society organizations. Further study might also help scholars to explain how this level of government impact can be limited, while preserving organizational values and group cohesion.

Third argument: There is no relationship between radical Islamic terrorists (target of contemporary counterterrorism initiatives), American Muslim organizations, and policing of the Black Panthers. Conflating them confuses the issue and detracts from analysis of policing practices and social movements. My response to this argument is the basis of my thesis. The same national system of government intelligence and law enforcement that once identified the Black Panther Party as the greatest threat to national security is the same system that developed a counterterrorism strategy that focuses on Muslims in America – the demographic which commits less than 6% of all acts of terrorism on US soil (cite). This same system targeted (and continues to target) innocent Americans based on their ethnic identity and carried out (and continues to carry out) covert operations to eliminate the perceived threat of these Americans. Ward Churchill provides powerful observations of this longitudinal phenomenon:

Given that one of the better means of apprehending the implications inherent to a current phenomenon is to view it through the lens presented by analogous historical contexts, it is entirely appropriate that significant time and energy has been devoted to exploring the evolution of the Patriot Act out of what has come to be known as the "COINTELPRO Era" of FBI political repression during the period 1956-1971. By the same token, of course, it is appropriate to peel the onion further, examining the antecedents of COINTELPRO, demonstrating its foundation in the post-World War II "Second Red

Scare" period, for instance, and, earlier still, the post-World War I Red Scare, which gave rise to such little-remembered horrors as the Palmer Raids, the IWW trials, and the then-nascent Federal Bureau of Investigation's campaign to destroy Marcus Garvey and his United Negro Improvement Association (UNIA; still the largest African American organization in U.S. history) (Churchill, 200-).

Churchill presents only a small sample of some of the more egregious and prominent incidents in recent history, but provides compelling evidence that we have always lived under a complex system of repressive policing.

And finally I offer an unintended product of this research; I advance a theory which asserts that the proximity of a civil society organization to the national stage, determines language and tone of the narrative produced. Repeatedly throughout my research, I observed a direct correlative relationship between scope (national or local) of an organization and the probability of that organization to create an accommodationist narrative. The closer to the national political scene an organization operates, the stronger the accommodationist narrative. Organizations operating far from the national political stage were more likely to present an oppositional narrative. This theory explains and predicts the phenomena of the civil society organization's accommodationist narrative. Further, I hypothesize that this theory of proximity and accommodation applies not only in this case study, but to similar cases throughout history.

The most significant offering of this paper is the assertion that in the interest of furthering the study of social movements, we must devote scholarly research to the examination of the intersection of policing practices and civil society organizing. Although the

case study featured in this study focuses on the Muslim community in America, the threat posed by intense policing practices equally threatens all civil society organizing efforts. During this project, I have observed FBI and law enforcement intervention into the local Black Lives Matter movement. I have spoken with local anti-war organizers whose homes were raided by the FBI in recent years. As academics and social scientists we have a responsibility not only to observe and analyze but to work to improve the world in which we live, particularly when we identify patterns of systemic injustice.



## APPENDIX 1

### EMAIL TEXT SOLICITING POTENTIAL STUDY PARTICIPANTS

Assalaamu alaikum,

I am working on my master's thesis at the University of Minnesota and am currently conducting interviews as the foundation of my research.

My work centers on Islamic organizations in the US and how they cope with intense government and law enforcement scrutiny of the Muslim community.

The goal of my research is to

1. Document the impact of counterterrorism initiatives (surveillance, subpoenas, paid informants, etc...) on Islamic organizations
2. Gather strategies and opinions from Muslim leaders on how they believe the community can best deal with or respond to counterterrorism initiatives
3. Develop a list of recommendations for how organizations can best survive times like this and maintain group cohesion and stability

I would like to invite you to participate in this study, which consists of meeting with me for one 45 minute interview. At the completion of the study, I will provide you with my findings, allowing for you to provide feedback before it is published.

It is important to know that you have the right to refuse to participate in the study, and that if you should choose to participate, you have the right to stop at any time or refuse to answer any or all questions. I am a member of the Muslim community myself and am aware of the many requests for media interviews that you as a community leader receive.

I am attaching a copy of the Informed Consent to give you an overview of the interview and research process, and allow time for you to consider participating. Should you choose to participate, I will review this consent with you at the time of the interview. If at that time, you are not comfortable signing the Informed Consent, but want to participate, you may still participate in the study.

Please note that I will keep no identifying information in my records and will diligently protect your privacy in the research process.

### **APPENDIX 1 continued**

I encourage you to contact me with questions, concerns or to clarify any portion of the informed consent or the study in general. I can be reached via email at [miche374@umn.edu](mailto:miche374@umn.edu) or by phone at (651) 724.7352. If you would like to speak with someone other than myself, you may contact either or both of the following:

*Dr. Cawo Abdi, Professor of Sociology at the University of Minnesota.*

*Phone: 612-624-3714*

*Email: [cabdi@umn.edu](mailto:cabdi@umn.edu)*

*Research Subjects' Advocate Line*

*D528 Mayo, 420 Delaware St.*

*Southeast, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455*

*(612) 625-1650.*

Thank you for your time.

Most Sincerely and Salam,

Amber Michel

Master of Liberal Studies (expected 2015)

University of Minnesota – Twin Cities Campus

## APPENDIX 2

### OUTLINE OF INTERVIEW PROCESS AND QUESTIONS: COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS

#### Welcome and introduction

1. Introduction, thank you and welcome
  - a. Researcher – describe myself, my interest in the topic, and my studies at the University of Minnesota
  - b. Research - describe the research, what I hope to learn, and how I will use the information I collect
2. Review informed consent
  - a. Remind participant of rights
  - b. Encourage participants to ask questions about concerns or for clarification

#### Interview questions, including follow-up and exploratory points:

1. How did you get involved with this organization?
2. What is your background/education/training?
3. Tell me about this organization
  - a. Mission
  - b. Goals
  - c. Funding sources, budget
  - d. Methodology
  - e. Programming
  - f. Population served
  - g. Events
  - h. Challenges
  - i. Successes
4. Tell me about your professional connection to the Somali community
  - a. Have you completed any special training/education in this area?
  - b. What challenges exist in your professional relationship with this community
  - c. What challenges exist between law enforcement and this community
  - d. What are some ways your department has reached out to this community
    - i. Can you describe that effort
    - ii. What was most successful, what needs to be improved upon

## APPENDIX 2 continued

5. Tell me about your professional connection to the Muslim community
  - a. Have you completed any special training/education in this area?
  - b. Tell me about that training
6. To what extent do you or your organization have concerns about a risk of terrorism in your community?
7. To what extent do you or your organization have concerns about Muslims with regard to the risk of terrorism?
8. To what extent do you or your organization have concerns about “radicalized” Muslim youth?
9. Describe the relationship between your organization and law enforcement
10. What are your greatest concerns in your community?
11. What are your feelings about the use of the term “radicalization” or “radical Muslim” and what does it mean to you?
  - a. To what extent do you think it is a problem in your community?
12. In what way do you think programs to “prevent radicalization” are helpful?
  - a. In what way do you think programs to “prevent radicalization” are harmful?
13. Some members of your community have been questioned by police, FBI or other members of law enforcement. What can you tell me about experiences you have had with any of those agencies?
  - a. Follow-up as indicated by response
  - b. Did you feel safe in this situation?
  - c. What were your concerns?
  - d. What was the outcome of this situation?
14. How would you describe your thoughts or concerns about the risk of terrorism in your community?
  - a. How can individuals best support your organization?
  - b. How can law enforcement best support your organization?

## APPENDIX 2 continued

15. To what extent are you fearful about being accused of supporting terrorists, being a radical Muslim, or any other charge or accusation that might lead to a criminal investigation or other hardship?
  
16. If you or someone you know was accused of being a radical Muslim, or engaging in or supporting terrorism, how would you want to be supported or defended?
  - a. How could a community organization such as a masjid or other group, help you?
  - b. To what extent do you feel the masjids in your community support or defend people against accusations of being radical or supporting terrorism?
  - c. To what extent do you feel community organizations support or defend people against accusations of being radical or supporting terrorism?

## APPENDIX 3

### MAY, 2015 OFFICIAL STATEMENT: MUSLIM COMMUNITY TASKFORCE STATEMENT ON CVE

#### Minnesota Muslims Concerned About New 'Stigmatizing, Divisive, and Ineffective' CVE Pilot Program

We, the undersigned, urge the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Center on Counterterrorism, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), White House, St. Paul Police Department (SPPD), Minneapolis Police Department (MPD), Hennepin County Sheriff's Office, Ramsey County Sheriff's Office, Minneapolis Public Schools, elected officials, and Minnesota foundations, to consider our grave concerns about the government's proposed Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) pilot program in Minnesota and discontinue this stigmatizing, divisive, and ineffective initiative.

We represent communities that comprise engaged citizens and contributing members of society; our beliefs and faith inspire us daily to perform acts of kindness and generosity; our civic mindedness motivates us to protect fundamental freedoms of association, religion, and speech. Like all Americans, we condemn terrorism and terrorist organizations. Any action that harms innocent civilians is reprehensible and deserves condemnation. We condemn terrorism whenever it happens, wherever it happens and whoever commits it.

Past injustices have taught us to be wary when the government redefines its moral and legal authority in response to overbroad national security concerns. While we support the right of all Americans to live in democratic communities free of violence, we cannot in good conscience condone or help refine programs that are fundamentally discriminatory and are likely to further subject our community members to additional civil rights abuses.

While we are united with the government in our desire to protect our nation's security and liberties, we are not convinced that the current law enforcement Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program is the most effective way work with the Minnesota Muslim/Somali community.

The CVE pilot program in Minneapolis raises serious civil rights concerns, which have not been addressed or remedied by the DOJ. CVE is based on the premise that religion or nationality (Somali) determines an individual's propensity towards violence. The program focuses only on countering violent extremism in Minnesota's Somali community. It will further stigmatize and marginalize the Somali/Muslim community by treating all of its members as suspects and by holding an entire community responsible for the actions of others. We believe it is morally and democratically repugnant to single out a community based solely upon its religious affiliation and ethnic make-up.

### APPENDIX 3 continued

Counter-terrorism work of the last several years has wrongfully stigmatized our communities, through the use of surveillance, informants, and other targeting of Muslim communities not connected to any suspected wrongdoing. These activities have focused upon people's natural religious expression, labeling them "extremist" or "radical." Based on these false premises, the DHS, FBI, and other agencies have intimidated our communities through unwarranted FBI visits, airport and border detention, immigration delays, and selective criminal prosecution. We therefore believe that it is not the place of government to determine what ideologies or religious opinions are problematic, or to fund or encourage groups that believe they can, to make that determination.

There is a recent history of law enforcement using community outreach in the Muslim community to gather intelligence. One example of this is described in a St. Paul Police Department in a program that involved the DOJ, FBI and other law enforcement. It included "a plan in which Somali-speaking advocates would hold outreach meetings with community groups and direct people toward the Police Athletic League and programs at the YWCA. The proposal says that 'the team will also identify radicalized individuals, gang members, and violent offenders who refuse to cooperate with our efforts.'" (*Spies Among Us: How Community Outreach Programs to Muslims Blur Lines Between Outreach and Intelligence* by Cora Currier in *The Intercept*.)

According to U.S. Attorney Andrew Luger, the Minnesota CVE pilot program offers no guarantees that it will help reduce recruitment efforts by extremist organizations. The program also offers no safeguards or oversight against abuse. These CVE programs seek to do something unprecedented: combine policing and counter-terrorism efforts with social services and outreach targeting only one religious and ethnic community. This runs roughshod over the line between community outreach and intelligence gathering, a tactic which President Obama expressly criticized at the White House CVE Summit ("Remarks by the President in Closing of the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism," Feb. 18, 2015). Similar to other previously adopted CVE programs in the UK, the Minnesota Somali and Muslim community will also perceive all partners, funders and supporters of the CVE pilot programs to be agents of law enforcement. Therefore, the CVE program will be ineffective, divisive and erode longstanding positive relationships between communities and law enforcement agencies.

Minnesota Somali and Muslim communities join the United States Council of Muslim Organizations (USCMO), and Muslim leaders in Boston and Los Angeles, the two other pilot cities, in opposing the DOJ CVE program. We join civil rights groups, including the Council on American-Islamic Relations, Muslim Advocates, American Civil Liberties Union, Brennan Center for Justice, National Lawyers Guild and others in raising civil rights concerns inherent in the DOJ CVE.

### APPENDIX 3 continued

It is our recommendation that the government stop investing in programs that will only stigmatize, divide and marginalize our communities further. Instead, we ask the government to assist our communities to become more fully engaged participants in our democratic system, including by doing the following:

- The government should support our Minnesota Muslim community-based taskforce. This taskforce is a committee that is being developed to serve as a united outreach effort to law enforcement agencies. It will include all segments of the community.

- All funds/resources used for social and education services should come from the appropriate resources such as foundations, corporations, and state and local government, etc. and should be separated from counter-terrorism and law enforcement.

- The DOJ should issue guidelines, similar to Good Samaritan laws, to protect those who act in good faith to prevent violent extremism by engaging with those considering it in order to dissuade them. DOJ policies should make clear that those who intervene to help others should not be penalized for it by being subjected to prosecution, watchlisting, or surveillance because of their association with a potential violent extremist.

- The U.S. Congress should hold hearings, similar to the Church Committee, to investigate the federal government's overbroad surveillance of mosques and American Muslims, absent evidence of criminal activity. Like all other communities, we cannot guarantee that any person or organization will not usurp our faith and ethnic identities, or manipulate legitimate foreign policy grievances, to justify horrendous acts of violence. We fully recognize that we live in times rife with conflict and grotesque acts of cruelty. In such times it is even more important that our government not descend into marginalizing and stigmatizing communities, whose active participation in our democratic landscape we should be prepared to value and defend.

|               |
|---------------|
| Organizations |
|---------------|

Council on American Islamic Relations CAIR MN  
Global Somali Diaspora  
Muslim Youth and Family Services Islamic Relief & Social Services  
African Family and Education Center  
Abubakar As-Sidique Islamic Center  
Tawfiq Islamic Center Islamic Center of Twin Ports "ICTP"  
mYouth  
Brooklyn Park Islamic Center  
Building Blocks of Islam  
al-Mahmood Foundation  
ICM-Muslim Youth of Minnesota



### APPENDIX 3 continued

Dar Al-Farooq Al Farooq Youth & Family Center  
ICCMN/Al-Iman Center  
Masjid Al-Ihsan  
Islamic Center of Owatonna (Masjid Al Rahma)  
Burnsville Mosque (Al Salaam)  
Roshester Islamic Center  
Irshad Islamic Center Eden Prairie  
Masjid Al-Huda (ICCC)  
Masjid Al Tawba/Eden Prairie Islamic Center (ICCC)  
Ummatul Islam Center  
Masjid Ash-Shafi  
Masjid As-Sunnah (St Paul)  
Minnesota Dawah Institute  
Al Farooq Youth & Family Center  
Dar-Alqalam Islamic Center  
Abubakar As-Sidique Islamic Center-Faribault MN  
Masjid Rowdah  
Masjid Ni'mat ul-Islaam  
Muslim student association SCSU  
Mankato Islamic Center  
Islamic Center of Minnesota  
Abukhadra Mosque  
Al-Madinah Cultural Center University of Minnesota  
Muslim Student Association University of St Thomas  
Muslim Student Association MCTC-  
Muslim Student Association MNIA  
MCC  
Engage Minnesota Muslims  
Global Deaf Muslim the Minnesota chapter

Other Supporters include: National Lawyers Guild

## APPENDIX 4

### CAIR-MINNESOTA: KNOW YOUR RIGHTS POCKET GUIDE

#### KNOW YOUR RIGHTS IF LAW ENFORCEMENT CONTACTS YOU

American Muslims strongly support law enforcement and the protection of our national security. As Americans, we also value civil rights. All Americans have the constitutional right to due process and to be politically active.

If you know of any criminal activity taking place in your community, it is both your religious and civic duty to immediately report such activity to local and federal law enforcement agencies.

If you are visited by federal law enforcement agencies, remember:

■ **You have the legal right to have a lawyer present when speaking with federal law enforcement agencies.** This is true even if you are not a citizen or have been arrested or detained. This is your legal right. Refusing to answer questions cannot be held against you and does not imply that you have something to hide. Answering a question incorrectly can hurt you more than not answering at all. An attorney is best able to protect your rights.

■ **You do not have to permit any law enforcement officer to enter your home or office if they do not have a warrant.** Law enforcement agents must have a search warrant, except in emergency situations, in order to enter your house. If they say they have a warrant, politely ask to see it before allowing them to enter. If they have a warrant, be courteous and polite, but remember that you are under no obligation to answer questions without a lawyer present. You should tell the agents that you do not consent to the search so that they cannot go beyond what the warrant authorizes.

■ **You should never lie or provide false information to any law enforcement agency.** Lying to law enforcement agents under any circumstance is a federal crime.

■ **Remember to ask any investigator who visits you for a business card so you can give it to your lawyer.** At least get the name, contact information and agency of the officer.

#### KNOW YOUR RIGHTS IF STOPPED BY POLICE

■ **On the streets:** The police must have a specific reason to approach and question you. If you are approached and questioned, the police can pat you down over the outside of your clothing if they have reason to suspect that you are armed and dangerous. You do not have to answer any questions besides identifying who you are and showing a government-issued ID. After the interaction, you will be either free to leave or under arrest. Ask the officer clearly if you are free to leave or if you are under arrest. If you are free to leave, consider just walking away.

■ **In your car:** Keep your hands where they can be seen. If you are driving a vehicle, you must show your license, registration and proof of insurance. You do not have to consent to a search, but police may have legal grounds to search your car anyway. Clearly say that you do not consent to the search. Officers may separate passengers and drivers from each other to question them, but no one has to answer any questions.

■ **If arrested or taken to a police station:** Remember you do not have to talk to any police officer even if you have been arrested or detained. Clearly ask for a lawyer and one phone call until they are provided. If you cannot afford a lawyer, the government has to provide one.

■ **If mistreated:** Do not resist arrest or fight with any police officers. Write down the officer's name, badge number and any other identifying information. Try to find witnesses and write down their contact information. File a complaint with CAIR as soon after the event as possible.

#### KNOW YOUR RIGHTS IF CONTACTED BY DHS

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) includes the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

If you are not a U.S. citizen and are contacted by a DHS official, remember:

■ **You have the right to an attorney.** It is a good idea to carry the contact information of an immigration attorney who can help you.

■ **Never sign anything without reading understanding and knowing the consequences of signing it.** You have the right to have an attorney visit you if you are in detention and represent you at any immigration hearings.

■ **Federally law requires you to carry your registration documents with you at all times.** Once your immigration status has been shown to an officer, you do not have to answer any other questions without having a lawyer present.

■ **You should not be asked improper questions.** No DHS officer may ask you anything about your religious or political beliefs, groups that you belong to or contribute to, things that you have done or said in the past, or where you have traveled.

#### NO-FLY LIST

Individuals experiencing difficulties during travel at airports, train stations or U.S. borders may be on either the no-fly or selectee list.

■ **It is very difficult to determine** if you are on one of these lists.

■ **You may be on the selectee list** if you are unable to use the internet or the airport kiosks for automated check-in and instead have to check in at the ticketing counter. You should eventually be permitted to fly.

■ **The no-fly list,** on the other hand, prohibits individuals from flying at all. If you are able to board an airplane, regardless of the amount of questioning or screening, then you are not on the no-fly list.

■ **If you are constantly subjected** to advanced screening or are prevented from boarding your flight, you should file a complaint with DHS TRIP at [www.dhs.gov/trip](http://www.dhs.gov/trip). Most people who file with DHS TRIP are not actually on a watchlist and that service can resolve most problems.

Contact CAIR to file a report at 202-488-8787 or [www.cair.com](http://www.cair.com) if you are experiencing difficulties traveling.

#### KNOW YOUR RIGHTS AS AN AIRLINE PASSENGER

As an airline passenger, you are entitled to courteous, respectful and non-stigmatizing treatment by airline and security personnel. It is illegal for law enforcement officials to perform any stops, searches, detentions, or removals based solely on your race, religion, national origin, sex, or ethnicity. If you believe you have been treated in a discriminatory manner, you should:

■ Ask for the names and ID number of all persons involved in the incident. Be sure to write down this information.

■ Ask to speak to a supervisor.

■ Politely ask if you have been singled out because of your name, looks, dress, race, ethnicity, faith, or national origin.

■ Politely ask witnesses to give you their names and contact information.

■ Write a statement of facts immediately after the incident. Be sure to include the flight number, the flight date and the name of the airline.

■ Contact CAIR to file a report. If you are leaving the country, leave a detailed message with the information above at 202-488-8787 or at [www.cair.com](http://www.cair.com).

■ It is also important to note the following:

• A customs agent has the right to stop, detain and search every person and item.

• Screeners have the authority to conduct a further search of you or your bags.

• A pilot has the right to refuse to fly a passenger if he or she believes the passenger is a threat to the safety of the flight. The pilot's decision must be reasonable and based on observations, not stereotypes. (Special thanks to the American Civil Liberties Union)

#### WHAT IS CAIR?

The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) is a nonprofit, grassroots civil rights and advocacy organization.

CAIR's mission is to enhance understanding of Islam, encourage dialogue, protect civil liberties, empower American Muslims, and build coalitions that promote justice and mutual understanding.


#### HOW CAN I HELP CAIR?

■ **Subscribe:** Become part of CAIR's network. Join our email list to receive updates on issues impacting Muslims in America at [www.cair.com](http://www.cair.com).

■ **Support:** Become a member or renew your membership. Membership is only \$30/year and is open to individuals and organizations.


■ **Donate:** Donate generously so we can continue to be your voice. Monthly automatic deductions, even in small amounts, are best. Call 202-488-8787 for an authorization form or go to [www.cair.com/support](http://www.cair.com/support). Remember, your donations are eligible for zakat and are tax deductible.

■ **Act:** Your activism strengthens our community. Respond to a CAIR action alert, volunteer at your local CAIR office or help establish a local chapter of CAIR.



**Know Your Rights and Responsibilities as an American Muslim**

Council on American-Islamic Relations  
453 New Jersey Avenue, SE  
Washington, DC 20003  
202.488.8787 • fax 202.486.0833  
[info@cair.com](mailto:info@cair.com)  
[www.cair.com](http://www.cair.com)  
[facebook.com/CAIRNational](https://www.facebook.com/CAIRNational)  
[Twitter: @CAIRNational](https://twitter.com/CAIRNational)  
[youtube.com/CAIRtv](https://www.youtube.com/CAIRtv)



**CAIR**

## APPENDIX 4 continued

### REACT TO ANTI-MUSLIM HATE CRIMES

If you believe you have been the victim of a hate crime, you should:

- **Report the crime to local and federal law enforcement immediately.** Ask that the incident be treated as a hate crime.
- **Report the crime to CAIR.** You can do this by emailing [civilrights@cair.com](mailto:civilrights@cair.com) or by calling 202-488-8787.
- **Document the incident.** Write down exactly what was said and/or done by the offender (including dates, times and places). Save all evidence and try to take photographs.
- **Decide on the appropriate action to be taken.** Consider issuing a statement from community leaders, holding a news conference, organizing a peaceful protest, meeting with local officials, or starting a letter-writing campaign.
- **Act quickly.** Incidents must be dealt with right away, not when it is convenient.
- **Mobilize community support.** Make sure the local mosque is aware of your situation.
- **Stay on top of the situation.** Make sure you follow up with police, local media and community leaders.
- **Announce results.** When the incident is resolved, make an announcement to the same people and organizations originally contacted.

### GET INVOLVED LOCALLY

- Introduce yourself to your neighbors of all faiths, races and ethnicities.
- Join your children's school's Parent Teacher Association (PTA) and similar organizations.
- Donate objective, well-written books and multimedia materials about Islam to local public and school libraries.
- Register to vote. Make sure to vote in all local, state and national elections.
- Join or start a local CAIR chapter.
- Attend school board meetings and city council meetings.
- Ask about putting together a Ramadan or Hajj display at a local library or school. Invite your neighbors to an iftar.
- Submit a letter to the editor or a commentary to your newspaper about an issue of local importance.
- Invite local community leaders and the public to a mosque open house.
- Host civic events such as blood drives and health fairs for the public at your local mosque.
- Get yourself and your mosque involved in issues impacting all Americans.
- Invite local and national officials to speak about community issues at your local mosques.
- Contact the closest CAIR office and ask them to speak at an event or host a "know your rights" presentation.

### COMMUNICATING WITH CONGRESS

A letter is the most effective choice of communication with a congressional office. To improve the effectiveness of your letter:

- **Think locally.** Send letters to your local and state representatives. As one of their constituents, your voice matters and your vote counts.
- **State your purpose for writing in the first paragraph.** If the letter pertains to a specific piece of legislation, identify it accordingly, e.g., House bill: H.R. \_\_\_\_\_, Senate bill: \_\_\_\_\_.
- **Be courteous,** to the point, and use examples to support your position.
- **Address only one issue** in the letter. Try to keep the letter shorter than one page.
- **Close by requesting action** that you want taken: a vote for or against a bill, or change in general policy.

#### Addressing Correspondence

**To a Senator:** The Honorable (full name), United States Senate, Washington, D.C. 20510. Dear Senator (last name):

**To a Representative:** The Honorable (full name), House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. 20515. Dear Representative (last name):

### MAKE YOUR VOICE HEARD

#### Government

The White House 202-456-1414  
House and Senate Switchboard 202-224-3121

#### TV & Radio

ABC News 212-456-7583 Fox News 212-301-3300  
CBS News 212-975-3691 MSNBC 212-664-4444  
NBC News 212-664-4444 PBS 703-739-5000  
CNN 404-827-1511 NPR 202-513-3232

#### Print Media

New York Times 212-556-1234 USA Today 800-USA-00  
Associated Press 212-621-1600 Newsweek 212-445-4000  
Wall Street Journal 212-416-2000 Time 212-522-1212  
Washington Post 202-334-6000

### WRITING A LETTER TO THE EDITOR

- To increase your chances of publication:
- Check with the paper for their word count guidelines.
- React quickly to news of the day, negative coverage or views you support.
- Be authoritative. If appropriate, speak on behalf of a local organization in which you are involved.
- Pick one main topic and focus only on that one issue.
- Address the letter to "The Letters Editor."
- Be passionate or even controversial, but avoid rhetoric and defamation.
- Give background information on the issue from impartial sources.
- Offer a reasonable and fair solution to the problem you are addressing.

### CAIR CHAPTERS

|                                   |              |
|-----------------------------------|--------------|
| CAIR national headquarters        | 202.488.8787 |
| CAIR-Arizona                      | 602.262.2247 |
| CAIR-CA, Greater Los Angeles Area | 714.776.1847 |
| CAIR-CA, Sacramento Valley        | 916.441.6269 |
| CAIR-CA, San Diego                | 858.278.4547 |
| CAIR-CA, San Francisco Bay Area   | 408.986.9874 |
| CAIR-Connecticut                  | 860.442.2247 |
| CAIR-FL, Miami                    | 954.272.0490 |
| CAIR-FL, Tampa                    | 813.514.1414 |
| CAIR-Georgia                      | 404.542.1209 |
| CAIR-Illinois                     | 312.212.1520 |
| CAIR-Iowa                         | 319.573.6617 |
| CAIR-Kentucky                     | 859.494.3743 |
| CAIR-Michigan                     | 248.559.2247 |
| CAIR-Minnesota                    | 612.206.3360 |
| CAIR-Missouri                     | 636.207.8882 |
| CAIR-New Jersey                   | 908.668.5900 |
| CAIR-New York                     | 212.870.2002 |
| CAIR-OH, Cincinnati               | 513.281.8200 |
| CAIR-OH, Cleveland                | 216.830.2247 |
| CAIR-OH, Columbus                 | 614.451.3232 |
| CAIR-Oklahoma                     | 405.415.6851 |
| CAIR-PA, Philadelphia             | 215.592.0509 |
| CAIR-PA, Pittsburgh               | 412.606.3601 |
| CAIR-South Carolina               | 803.658.8786 |
| CAIR-TX, Houston                  | 713.838.2247 |
| CAIR-TX, San Antonio              | 210.378.9528 |
| CAIR-TX, Dallas/Ft. Worth         | 469-774-5215 |
| CAIR-Washington                   | 206.367.4081 |

### KNOW YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS AS AN EMPLOYEE

Federal law makes it illegal for an employer to discriminate against an employee on the basis of religion, race or national origin. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act guarantees your right to:

- **Reasonable religious accommodation.** The failure of an employer to reasonably accommodate your religious practices may constitute employment discrimination. "Religious practices" include wearing a hijab or beard, prayer breaks, going to Jummah (Friday) prayers, going on Hajj, etc.
- **Fairness in hiring, firing and promotions.** Your employer is prohibited from considering race, national origin or religion when making decisions affecting you at work.
- **A non-hostile work environment.** Your employer must ensure that you are not subjected to anti-Muslim insults, harassment or unwelcome and excessive proselytizing.
- **Complain about discrimination without fear of retaliation.** Federal law guarantees your right to report an act of alleged employment discrimination. It is illegal for your employer to retaliate against you for your complaint.

### WHEN FACED WITH JOB DISCRIMINATION

- Remain calm and polite.
- Inform the offending party that you believe his/her actions are discriminatory.
- Report the discriminatory action in writing to company management.
- Document the discrimination by saving memos, keeping a detailed journal, noting the presence of witnesses and making written complaints. Make sure to keep copies of all materials. It is important to keep a "paper trail" of evidence.
- Ask to be transferred to another department or job site.
- Ask for mediation.
- **DO NOT** sign any documents or resign from your position without first consulting an attorney.
- Contact CAIR at 202-488-8787, [civilrights@cair.com](mailto:civilrights@cair.com), or [www.cair.com](http://www.cair.com).
- Contact the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) at 800-669-4000 or [www.eeoc.gov](http://www.eeoc.gov).

### KNOW YOUR RIGHTS AS A STUDENT

- **You have the right to wear religious clothing.** You also have the right to wear clothing with a religious message, as long as other clothes with similar messages are allowed.
- **You have the right to inform others about your religion.** You have the right to pass out literature or to speak to others about Islam, as long as it is not done in a disruptive manner.
- **You have the right to organize student-led prayers on campus,** as long as the service is not disruptive to the function of the school.
- **You may have the right to attend Friday prayer.** The Supreme Court has upheld the right of states to allow students "release time" to attend religious classes or services.
- **You have the right to be excused from school for religious holidays.** You should be sure to inform the school in advance that you will be absent.
- **You have the right to be excused from class discussions or activities that you find religiously objectionable.**
- **You have the right to form an extracurricular Muslim student group.**
- **You have the right to express political views** by passing out leaflets, holding meetings, etc., as long as you do not cause disruption.

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