Hancher, Michael2016-08-032016-08-031992“The Law of Signatures.” Law and Aesthetics. Ed. Roberta Kevelson. New Studies in Aesthetics 11. New York: Peter Lang, 1992. 227–43.https://hdl.handle.net/11299/181554Based on a paper presented at the Fourth International Colloquium on Law and Semiotics, Pennsylvania State University–Berks, Reading, PA, 1988. Posted by permission of Peter Lang Publishing, Inc.In criticizing J. L. Austin's theory of speech acts, Jacques Derrida and Jonathan Culler have argued, in part, that Austin misunderstands how signatures function. They claim that he ignores the essentially formal and "iterable" structure of a signature -- a structure that betrays the absence of any subjective consciousness on the part of the signer. I argue that their concept of iterability does not fully apply to this case. Rather, legal practice in England and the United States countenances a wide range of variation for signatures, variation that is consistent with and legitimized by Austinian assumptions about personal agency. The fact that the legal situation is somewhat different in France may explain the structure of Derrida's argument.enJ. L. Austinspeech actsJacques Derridasignatureslawintention, iterabilityBook chapter