McLennan, Andrew2009-12-152009-12-151996-10McLennan, A., (1996), "Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents", Discussion Paper No. 289, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota.https://hdl.handle.net/11299/55753The Condorcet Jury Theorem pertains to elections in which the agents have common preferences but diverse information. We show that, whenever "sincere" voting leads to the conclusions of the Theorem-decisions superior to those that would be made by any individual based on private information, and asymptotically correct decisions as the population becomes large--there are also Nash equilibria with these properties, and in symmetric environments the equilibria may be taken to be symmetric. These conclusions follow from a simple property of common interest games: a mixed strategy profile of a (symmetric) common interest game that is optimal in the set of (symmetric) mixed strategy profiles is a Nash equilibrium.en-USWorking Paper