Damer, Steven2019-08-202019-08-202019-05https://hdl.handle.net/11299/206300University of Minnesota Ph.D. dissertation. 2019. Major: Computer Science. Advisor: Maria Gini. 1 computer file (PDF); 159 pages.This dissertation explores several problems related to social behavior, which is a complex and difficult problem. In this dissertation we describe ways to solve problems for agents interacting with opponents, specifically (1) identifying cooperative strategies,(2) acting on fallible predictions, and (3) determining how much to compromise with the opponent. In a multi-agent environment an agent’s interactions with its opponent can significantly affect its performance. However, it is not always possible for the agent to fully model the behavior of the opponent and compute a best response. We present three algorithms for agents to use when interacting with an opponent too complex to be modelled. An agent which wishes to cooperate with its opponent must first identify what strategy constitutes a cooperative action. We address the problem of identifying cooperative strategies in repeated randomly generated games by modelling an agent’s intentions with a real number, its attitude, which is used to produce a modified game; the Nash equilibria of the modified game implement the strategies described by the intentions used to generate the modified game. We demonstrate how these values can be learned, and show how they can be used to achieve cooperation through reciprocation in repeated randomly generated normal form games. Next, an agent which has formed a prediction of opponent behavior which maybe incorrect needs to be able to take advantage of that prediction without adopting a strategy which is overly vulnerable to exploitation. We have developed Restricted Stackelberg Response with Safety (RSRS), an algorithm which can produce a strategy to respond to a prediction while balancing the priorities of performance against the prediction, worst-case performance, and performance against a best-responding opponent. By balancing those concerns appropriately the agent can perform well against an opponent which it cannot reliably predict. Finally we look at how an agent can manipulate an opponent to choose actions which benefit the agent. This problem is often complicated by the difficulty of analyzing the game the agent is playing. To address this issue, we begin by developing a new game, the Gift Exchange game, which is trivial to analyze; the only question is how the opponent will react. We develop a variety of strategies the agent can use when playing the game, and explore how the best strategy is affected by the agent’s discount factor and prior over opponents.enCooperationGame TheorySimulationThesis or Dissertation