Kim, Minjae2023-09-192023-09-192023-05https://hdl.handle.net/11299/257119University of Minnesota Ph.D. dissertation. May 2023. Major: Business Administration. Advisors: CYRUS AGHAMOLLA, HELEN ZHANG. 1 computer file (PDF); vi, 88 pages.Bank regulators define bank peer groups through the Uniform Bank Performance Report (UBPR). Regulators use the UBPR peer information in their evaluation of banks and publicly disclose the peer information. This study examines whether regulatory use and disclosure of peer information induce bank herding behaviors in their regulatory capital ratio decisions. To examine this question, I consider a reform in 2004 in peer group structure -- the introduction of a ``class-of" peer group for newly chartered banks. After the reform, new banks are grouped with their cohorts while existing banks are still grouped with other similar-sized banks. I find that bank regulatory capital ratios become more sensitive to their peer group averages in the post-period. Moreover, I find that banks change their loan loss provisions or loan portfolios to manage their regulatory capital ratios. I also provide evidence that bank lending decisions become more sensitive to the rankings of their regulatory capital ratios within the peer group, and the recognition of expected losses is delayed in the post-period.enThesis or Dissertation