

How Aspects of Social Class Influence Partisan Choice

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
BY

Ashley Sorensen

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Dr. Paul Goren, Adviser

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I want to thank my grandparents. Albeit not political scientists or even ‘politically interested’ the experiences and ideas you shared with me are at the basis of my dissertation. As a child I did not realize the sacrifices you both made to set me on this path. Getting up daily at 5 a.m. to finish feeding the cows to take me to school in time was probably not something you planned. Your persistence, hard work, and down to earth natures instilled with me values I relied upon as I moved throughout this program. On that note, I also want to thank my stepdad James, and my mother. Your pictures on the farm and day to day updates not only bring a smile to my face, but they are grounding. In a similar way, I want to give a shoutout to the friendships that I have built in this program, especially Selçuk. Our trivia nights at Blue Door, visits to Sisyphus, coffee meet-ups, and other adventures have become some of my most treasured memories.

Next, I want to thank my advisor and my committee members, Paul Goren, Kathryn Pearson, Jane Sumner, Chris Federico, and Phil Chen. I have learned so much from each one of you these past five years. Paul, it has been an honor to be your advisee and the iterations of feedback you have provided on my work have strengthened in ways I could not imagined. I also want to give a specific acknowledgement to my outside committee member, Phil Chen. The ongoing mentorship you have provided me from undergrad to grad school has made the world of difference. I can only hope to be half the mentor you have been to me.

Finally, thank you to my husband Andy. I’m sure you know much more about class and politics than you have ever wanted. You’ve been beyond patient, supportive, understanding, and a soft place for me to land. With your willingness to compromise, we have built a life live I am extremely grateful for.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES.....	iii
LIST OF FIGURES	iv
Chapter 1: Social Class in American Politics.....	1
Chapter 2: Rethinking the Conceptualization and Measurement of Social Class.....	14
Chapter 3: Theories of Social Class in Politics.....	47
Chapter 4: Operationalizing Wealth and Cultural Capital.....	68
Chapter 5: Faces of Social Class and Partisanship in Application	103
Chapter 6: Effect of Social Class on Affective Partisanship and Partisan Choice	123
Chapter 7: Conclusion	141
Bibliography	150
Appendices	167

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1 Summary of Hypotheses	66
Table 4.1 Behavioral Norms and Presentation Style Items	72
Table 4.2: Demographic Characteristics of Each Sample	78
Table 4.3 Wealth Scale	82
Table 4.4 Tastes Items	84
Table 4.5 Behavioral Norm Items	87
Table 4.6 Correlation Matrix of Indicators of Social Class (Prolific Data)	95
Table 4.7 Correlation Matrix of Indicators of Social Class (NORC Data)	96
Table 4.8 Correlation Matrix of Indicators of Social Class (Bovitz Data).....	96
Table 5.1 Summary of Hypotheses.....	105
Table 5.2 Effects of Aspects of Social Class on Strength of Partisanship	118
Table 6.1 Aspects of Social Class on Support for Partisan Leaders and Groups.....	135
Table 6.2 Summary of Results	140

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1 Economic Indicators of Social Class and Republican Partisanship	28
Figure 2.2 Faces of Social Class and their Components	33
Figure 4.1 Distribution of Wealth Scale in 2022 Surveys	83
Figure 4.2 Distribution of Tastes Scale.....	86
Figure 4.3 Distribution of Behavioral Norm Scale.....	88
Figure 4.4 Scree Plots of Original Scales (Prolific Data)	90
Figure 4.5 Scree Plots of Original Scales (Bovitz Data).....	90
Figure 4.6 Scree Plots of Original Scales (NORC Data).....	91
Figure 4.7 Factor Loadings of Tastes Items	93
Figure 5.1 Probability of Categorical PID by Level of Income.....	109
Figure 5.2 Probability of Categorical PID by Level of Wealth.....	110
Figure 5.3 Probability of Categorical PID by Level of Education	111
Figure 5.4 Probability of Categorical PID by Level of Taste.....	113
Figure 5.5 Probability of Categorical PID by Level of Behavioral Norm	114
Figure 6.1 Predicted Feelings Towards Democrats and Republicans.....	124
w/Identity Controls	124
Figure 6.2 Predicted Feelings Towards Democrats and Republicans.....	128
w/Demographic Controls	128
Figure 6.3 Predicting Expressive Partisan Identity w/Identity Controls	130
Figure 6.4 Predicting Expressive Partisan Identity w/Demographic Controls.....	132

Chapter 1: Social Class in American Politics

The election of Donald Trump as President of the US demonstrated that political scientists were not well equipped to predict and understand the current political era and the political behavior of certain groups (including women and/or members of the working-class). Recent work, however, has placed group identities at the center of theories of public opinion and electoral behavior (Achen & Bartels, 2016; Sides et al., 2018). The premise behind these theories is that (1) social identities impact cognition, behavior, and affect and (2) voters' judgments of parties and candidates are based on a sense of belongingness with social group(s). But despite the field advancing its understanding of partisan choice by studying aspects of identity measurement, identity centrality, linked fate, and group consciousness in relation to race, ethnicity, religion, gender, and geography—we still have not fully addressed social class. Instead we have continuously invoked the notion of social class in political discourse without a real understanding of what it means.

At the broadest level social class has generally been conceptualized as a black box of factors which determine life chances, status, outcomes, opportunities, and power. In fact, when the Russell Sage Foundation hosted a conference at NYU overviewing the conceptualization of social class, social class was discussed in terms of inequality, resources, stratification, and family background (Lareau 2008). Wealth, the neighborhood one lives in, occupation, and income were often interchangeably used as proxies for class and sometimes even definitions of this concept (Lareau 2008). Sociologists have defined class by occupation (Erikson et al. 1979; Chan and Goldthorpe 2007), economists understand class through income/wealth (Piketty 2017), and political scientists have equated educational attainment with class status (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018). The only

consensus there has been is that there is no consensus across the social sciences on an agreed upon conception and quantification of class (Lareau, 2008).

Due to the insufficient thinking about its conceptualization, social class has been operationalized in an ad hoc manner, leading to conflicting assessments on whether and how class matters in politics. Public opinion models generally rely on whatever economic indicators happen to be available in a given survey to operationalize class. These variables are then interchangeably used as proxies for different conceptualizations of class. For example, Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck (2018) find that higher class predicts Democratic identification. Researchers Carnes and Lupu (2020) discover the opposite: higher class predicts Republican ID. How can this be? The different results ties back to differences in conceptualization and measurement. Carnes and Lupu (2020) define and measure class in terms of educational attainment, whereas Sides, Tesler, Michael, and Vavreck (2018) define and measure class in terms of household income.¹ These are not isolated conflicts and carry over in studies focusing on explaining the role of social class in vote choice, political participation, and economic policy attitudes.

I broadly define social class as an indicator of one's access to material resources and as a reflection of relative status on the social hierarchy. The motivation of my dissertation is to show how broadening and systemizing our conceptualization of social class as the combination of a series of non-material and economic characteristics will enrich our understanding of public opinion; politics, groups, and identities; and American politics. More specifically, I detail how previous work

¹ The correlation between education and annual household income in GSS data was .39 in 2018, .39 in 2010, and .35 in 2000. The correlation between education and occupational prestige in GSS data was .51 in 2018, .51 in 2010, and .50 in 2000. The correlation between occupational prestige and household income was .33 in 2018, .35 in 2010, and .29 in 2000.

has reduced social class to income and education, thereby ignoring the role that wealth and cultural capital play in shaping social class, as well as their influence on partisan choice. Four key questions motivate this research. First, what is social class? Second, how do we measure social class and its components? Third, does each form of capital explain partisan choice? Fourth, what are the consequences of reducing social class to whatever measure of human capital or household income is available in a survey, thereby ignoring the cultural components of class?

Reconceptualizing Social Class

Despite the lack of agreement on what ‘social class is’, scholars studying social class are not working completely in the dark. Similar to how the tenets behind our new ‘social identity model’ originate from *The American Voter* (Campbell et al. 1960, p. 143) and “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics” (*Converse 1964*, p. 240), discussions about social class go all the way back to 1848. The first major modern-day contribution to the study of class was the *Communist Manifesto*. In this 1848 seminal book, Karl Marx defined classes based on their relationship to the means of production. Followers of Marx have since operationalized his ideas by sorting individuals into classes based on their “job features” such as the hiring requirements, characteristics, or the prestige associated with one’s job. Marx’s influence has surpassed time, especially in the field sociology. In fact, sociologist Erik Wright’s famous typology of class in 1980 categorized individuals into classes (capitalists, petty bourgeoisie, managers, and workers) based on whether they have control over resources or autonomy at work.

The ideas of German sociologist Max Weber, however, rose to prominence in the early part of the twentieth century. His ideas caught attention after periods of industrialization because job

characteristics were no longer the only meaningful signifier of access to material resources (Gest, 2018). For example, wearing a uniform, working with ones hands, completing repeated tasks, and getting paired hourly were once clear markers of low status or blue collar job (Gest, 2018). However, a surgeon, sales consultant, and pilot would all be considered to have a low status occupation under this framework, while an Uber driver may not. Weber saw the limitations of defining class only in relation to the means of production and began to see it through a more multi-dimensional framework. Weber argued that class membership is based on more than occupational status alone and instead it is the combined result of education, income, and occupation.

Yet, Weber's understanding of class as SES also suffers from some important limitations, influencing French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu to bring forth a parsimonious definition of social class in *The Forms of Capital* in 1986. Bourdieu argued that class reflects more than access to material resources; it reveals one's position on the social ladder. He argues that people at the top of the social ladder think, feel, and act differently than those at middle and the bottom. Their positions are anchored both by material resources and symbolic/social/cultural resources in what Bourdieu calls ("social-capital"). Bourdieu defined social capital as "The sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition." (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 248). He believed that social capital is like financial capital in that both shape career success, educational outcomes, opportunities, and access to material resources. But rather than seeing social capital as being inherent to an individual, Bourdieu viewed social capital as something that is cultivated in one's youth and then sustained over time. His concern with social capital was thus that while social

capital is distributed unevenly, results from inequality, and reinforces inequality over time, it is essentially one of the few faces of capital that is completely untaxed.

In this way, Bourdieu combined standard definitions of class (as access to material resources) with definitions of social status (position on the social hierarchy). Under his framework, access to material resources and social rank are intertwined because both result from a similar set of characteristics. Differently worded, Bourdieu argued that social class results from multiple types of capital and factors (economic, social, cultural, and symbolic) rather than one alone.

More recently, a few scholars in social psychology, business, and sociology have come to conceptualize social class in a similar manner to Bourdieu. They see social class as the product of a series of symbolic and economic characteristics. These characteristics work in combination to determine social class or what can be understood as access to resources, social status, and opportunities, (Fiske & Rose Markus, 2012; Kraus et al., 2017; Lareau, 2015; Nicols 2023; Rivera, 2012; Stephens et al., 2007; Thomas, 2022). Based on this literature, I broadly define social class as one's access to opportunities and resources, as well as their relative position on the social ladder.

Comparison with Previous Definitions

My conception of social class as indicating one's relative social status and access to material resources is unique to political science for a few reasons. First, I consider how social class comprises material and social/symbolic characteristics. The transmission of financial capital explains inequality, but it also happens through cultural capital. Cultural capital is the combination of social networks, behavioral norms, and tastes which are 'cashed' in for jobs, deference, security, resources, safety, and opportunities. This is because behavioral norms (ways of being and self-presentation) and tastes

signal unrelated traits like competence, polish, and “organizational fit” (Currid-Halkett, 2017; Nicols, 2023). For instance, children who are allowed to negotiate at home tend to receive higher grades and are more likely to be viewed favorably by teachers than children who are taught that negotiating with authority is inappropriate (Fiske & Rose Markus, 2012). The types of extracurricular activities a high school student participates in impacts whether alumni from elite educational institutions view the applicant as being qualified for admittance (Nicols; 2023). Finally, tastes and behavioral norms impact salaries, raises, promotions, and an individual’s likelihood of getting hired for a professional job in the first place (Rivera, 2012, Rivera & Tilcsik, 2016). In general, the cultural capital kids gain during pre-adulthood helps them prepare to face more institutions which ultimately determine their financial capital or human capital in adulthood.

Even political scientist and supporter of using occupation as a proxy for social class, Nicholas Carnes (2013), states, “Of course, occupational differences are by no means the only dividing lines between social classes. A person’s class is reflected in how she speaks and dresses, the kind of home she lives, the kinds of recreations activities, she pursues, and wide range of other characteristics. These attitudes and behaviors are an important part of the way class distinction manifests in everyday life (p.4).” Inequalities are perpetuated over generations through the transmission/attainment of different tastes, social networks, and behavioral norms, but these symbolic, social, and cultural aspects of life, have been largely neglected in traditional conceptions of class in political science.

Second, my study deviates from other empirical work on social class and politics because I consider social class to be an outcome of three forms of capital rather than one. Social class is the result of a series of economic attributes and non-material characteristics which can be organized into

three forms of capital: human capital (education and occupation), financial capital (assets in the ordinary sense), and cultural capital. While each form of capital is independently important for maintaining or maximizing one's social class, people can experience status inconsistently. This means someone can be considered working-class or non-elite in terms of their human capital, but not in terms of their cultural and financial capital. The distinction between the multiple forms of capital is thus important because reducing one's social class to one form of capital alone will inaccurately depict their overall access to material resources and social status. Constituently, we risk misunderstanding the role that social class plays in politics if we fail to acknowledge its three faces.

Third, my understanding of social class differs from that of earlier work on social class and politics because I consider each form of capital to be multi-faceted. The three forms of capital which determine social class are each made up of multiple characteristics and attributes themselves. Although these attributes and characteristics can be grouped together because they have a similar function and/or effect in shaping social class, leaving one out would alter the construct. For example, while others have examined the role that income plays in public opinion, they have failed to incorporate wealth as an aspect of financial capital and therefore social class. Albeit being correlated, wealth is more unequally distributed than income and follows an exponential growth pattern. Individuals who start with less cannot easily access the same opportunities and resources compared to those who start with more. This remains the case even as we move higher up the income ladder and consider educational attainment.

Finally, I see class as being gradational. I don't assume these forms of capitals depend solely upon one another or that one is more important than the other in determining social class. While model 'working-class' or non-elite people are low on all forms of capital and the "elite" high on all

forms of capital, most Americans fall somewhere between these two polls with differing scores on each form of capital. This means someone's social class can be portrayed in numerical terms rather than just categorical terms. Thus, while individuals can be sorted into 'class groups' (upper, upper middle class, middle class, lower-middle-class, and lower-class based on their latent variable component scores) we can understand the role that different faces of social class have in determining policy preferences, partisanship, and vote choice without knowing whether someone is "middle vs. working-class".

Overall, while a broader and deeper understanding of social class is good in isolation, the theoretical payoff for understanding the role social class has in predicting public opinion and behavior in the US context is potentially better explaining support for critical yet understudied issues like free trade as well emerging divisions amongst the electorate (i.e., the diploma divide and types of polarization).

Why Social Class?

While social class has not been given the same level of attention that race, ethnicity, gender, and geography have received in studies of public opinion and political behavior, this is not because social class is irrelevant to political decision making. There are two major explanations for when and why social class is related to politics (Lindh & McCall, 2020; Manza & Brooks, 2008). These are not mutually exclusive, and their relevance varies depending upon the form of capital we're interested in studying.

First, social psychology research shows that humans are inherently self-interested. We seek to support parties which will maximize our relative utility (access to resources and status) and status.

Second, social homophily, our like-minded nature, suggests that peoples' attraction to parties and candidates is based on commonality (a sense of belonging). Voters will want to support parties and candidates with levels of human, financial, and cultural capital that mirror their own. Overall, social homophily theory and self-interested theories of politics suggest social class plays some part in shaping partisan choices because both tell us that 1) social class is political and 2) voters behave in ways that would enhance their individual and group-based statuses.

Social Class and Politics

Due to the lack of agreement on how to conceptualize social class, the field is still wrestling 1) how to measure it 2) if it matters and 3) the importance of social class beyond other identities. I expect that the conclusion to the longstanding debate on whether social class matters in politics is a yes, but that the strength and direction of the relationship between social class and public opinion and political behavior has been unclear due to ad hoc conceptualization and measurement. I also argue that the conditions and degree to which 'social class' matters depend upon what form of capital or measure we're using as a proxy for social class.

I test my theory through studying the impact of each form of capital on partisan choice. I define partisan choice as categorical partisan identification (D/I/R), direction and strength of partisan identification, feelings towards Republicans and Democrats, support for partisan leaders and interest groups, and expressive partisan identification. Partisan choice, and in hand these outcome variables, were chosen for a few reasons. First and foremost, we gain a better understanding of the role that social class has in politics by examining its impact on the most important predisposition in politics. Partisan identification is a type of attachment that biases political perception, judgment, and behavior. It is a key determinant of political behavior/attitudes

and even non-political political behavior/attitudes, influencing everything from voting patterns to who we find attractive. By studying social class in relation to partisan choice, we gain a better understanding of what drives public opinion and political behavior. Second, because partisan choices are more ‘difficult’ in their ability to be influenced or changed, it also allows for a more conservative test of my theory. Third, because partisan choice has been studied in relation to other aspects of identity and demographic characteristics, it is easier to parse out the role that social class has on politics compared to that of gender, personality traits, race, and racial attitudes. In other words, I am better able to draw inferences about the consequence of using an abbreviated measure of social class in political science. Overall understanding how social class explains variation in partisan choice is key to both understanding our current polarized climate and the functioning of government.

Broader Impact & Significance

This dissertation makes four contributions. First, it rethinks the conceptualization and measurement of social class in theoretically and empirically rigorous ways. My conceptualization of social class as a composite variable which is the outcome of three types of capital: human capital (education and occupation), financial capital (assets in the ordinary sense), and cultural capital (norms and tastes) is grounded in theoretical and empirical literature from sociology, political science, economics, business, and psychology. Through using a wide range of statistical estimation and scaling techniques, I develop short-scale measures of faces of social class with original survey data. Researchers in cognate disciplines can use these measures in their own discoveries of how to mitigate inequality or how forms of capital relate to other outcomes in the social/political environment.

Second, I show why we must carefully consider the conceptualization and measurement of identities and concepts like social class before plugging them into our regression models. Chapter

three details the mechanisms and reasoning behind each form of capital and its relation to partisan choice. But to briefly summarize, I predict that each form of capital is related to partisan choice, but that the strength of the association and direction of the relationship differs amongst each one. While I predict financial capital will be associated with Republican partisan choice, I expect human capital to be a significant predictor of Democratic partisan choice. This is why reducing social class to one facet of capital leads to conflicting results in the literature.

Next, although scholars within and across political science have acknowledged that their favored measure of social class is a proxy, and that social class is more than a sum of its economic parts, the cultural aspects of class, along with wealth, have rarely been included in models predicting public opinion and political behavior. Because I argue that each form of capital functions differently, reducing social class to education, income, or occupation runs the risk of us misunderstanding the role social class plays in politics.

The fourth contribution my dissertation makes is in resolving the prolonged debate on whether social class matters in public opinion above and beyond other identities. The importance of social class in politics has often been explained through racial resentment, SDO, and authoritarianism, and it has also been questioned due to the salience of other social identities in politics (gender, religion, white identity, etc.) (Sides et al., 2018; Zingher, 2022). This line of thought has been popular in the mainstream media which has asserted that the white-working-class led to Trump's election due to their concerns about immigration, racial diversity, and fixed cultural values. Rather than ignore the role that racial attitudes play in elections and in determining partisan choices, I run multivariate regressions which include predictors like racial resentment, white identity, and authoritarianism, alongside each measure of capital. This lets me build upon and engage with other

recent work on social identity and political psychology to parse out whether a relationship between social class and partisan choice exists, even when controlling for personality traits, racial attitudes, gender, and strength of racial identity.

Where We're Going

The rest of this dissertation is organized into seven chapters. Chapter two details what previous quantitative studies have found in their assessments of the impact of social class on determining partisan choice. It also explains what previous scholars have missed in their conceptualizations and quantifications of social class. Chapter two brings attention to (1) the distinction between education/income and financial capital (2) how wealth has generally been ignored as a form of financial capital and (3) how cultural capital is missing from conceptualizations and operationalizations of social class.

Chapter Three describes the conditions in which we can expect aspects of social class to matter in politics. It theorizes what each form of capital tells us about public opinion and political behavior by building upon group theories of politics and psychological theories relating to self-interest. More specifically, Chapter Three provides potential answers to central questions the field is still wrestling with like whether social class still matters in determining partisan choice, given the rise of racial identity-based voting. Chapter Four proposes how to conceptualize and operationalize the subcomponents of each form of capital. It offers new scales for measuring tastes, behavioral norms, and wealth.

Chapter Five and Chapter Six test my theory regarding the conditions in which social class matters in politics. In the fifth Chapter, I test whether the three faces of social class explain variation

in categorical partisanship and strength of partisanship in isolation from and in conjunction with racial resentment, white identity, and authoritarianism. Next, Chapter Six looks at whether each face of class makes an independent contribution in explaining affective measures of partisan choice like expressive partisanship, feelings towards Republicans/Democrats, and support for major party leaders/interest groups. Finally, Chapter seven summarizes my main findings, outlines limitations, and suggests avenues for future research on social class and inequality in the United States. It ends with a discussion of the broader implications my work has for understanding elections and American politics.

Chapter 2: Rethinking the Conceptualization and Measurement of Social Class

At the broadest level, there are few clear definitions of social class. Similar to how race has been described as a bundle of sticks (Sen & Wasow, 2016), social class has been conceptualized as a black box of factors. In fact, most modern definitions of class in quantitative work are simply definitions inferred from widely used economic indicators like income and education. Sociologists have defined class by occupation (Erikson et al. 1979; Chan and Goldthorpe 2007), economists understand class through income (Piketty 2017), and political scientists have equated educational attainment with class status (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018). Just a few scholars in social psychology and business have more recently come to discuss class in both economic, social, cultural, and symbolic terms (Fiske & Rose Markus, 2012; Kraus et al., 2017; Lareau, 2015; Rivera, 2012; Stephens et al., 2007; Thomas, 2022).

The problem we thus have is that social class is a richer concept and requires more nuanced engagement for us to grapple with how it informs political perspectives. In this chapter, I first outline how class has traditionally been conceptualized and measured. I then describe what previous literature has found on the association between commonly used proxies of social class and partisan choice. Second, I discuss the limitations of previous conceptualizations and measures of social class. Third, I offer my theoretical contribution to field by bringing wealth and cultural capital into our conceptualization of social class. Finally, I outline how my conceptualization of social class may aid us in understanding how people form partisan allegiances.

Traditional Conceptualizations of Class

What is social class? Class has mainly been understood as possession of human and financial capital, while social status has been viewed as a reflection of relative status on the social hierarchy. Not until the twentieth century did social scientists like Max Weber begin to accept that social status and class go ‘hand in hand’. In fact, it was Max Weber himself who equated social class to SES (socio-economic status). Unlike the class scholars before him, such as Karl Marx, Weber argued that class membership is based on more than occupational status alone and instead is the combined result of education, income, and occupation.

Yet, Weber’s understanding of class as SES has not been without limitations, which prompted French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu to bring forth a parsimonious definition of social class in *The Forms of Capital* in 1986. Bourdieu famously argues in his theory of cultural capital that social class is anchored both by resources in the more traditional sense and culture (Bourdieu, 1984, 1986). He had set out to explain why education had heterogenous effects on projected income and social status between classes and amongst people within specific classes in France. His conclusion was cultural capital differentiates individuals above and beyond their levels of human and financial capital. In other words, Bourdieu believed that tastes, ways of being (habitus), styles of speech, and hobbies are profitable. They are something we can invest in early in our lives and see a return on. People can use their cultural capital to compensate for a lack of financial or human capital, and to gain access and respect when interacting with gateway institutions. For example, a businessperson good at golf has an upper hand to a businessperson who doesn’t know how to golf and isn’t a member of a country club. A college student with high status behavioral norms, who has been socialized to believe they are special regardless of what they achieve and who feels entitled to ask for

accommodations like extensions, absences, and extra test time has more opportunities to succeed academically (and will likely get a higher GPA) than a college student with low status behavioral norms who has been socialized to respect authority, fit in, and base their potential on their accomplishments alone (Stephens, Townsend, and Dittmann 2019).

In addition to having an economic value, Bourdieu's conception of cultural capital also has the power to explain why a barista making minimum wage who majored in cultural studies, reads poetry in their spare time, and is a member of a vegan co-op considers themselves superior to an electrician who makes \$60,000 a year, enjoys musky fishing, demolition derbies, mudding, and likes to eat at Applebee's. Bourdieu even goes as far as to say that the transmission of cultural capital is so important in shaping social class that it often plays a larger role at ensuring access to resources and status than other forms of capital because it remains "hidden" and unregulated by governments.

Since the publication of *The Forms of Capital* and *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, scholars have discovered that the lessons Bourdieu draws about French society generalize to the Western world (Dittman, 2016; Field, 2008; Flemmen et al., 2018; Lareau & McCrory Calarco, 2012; Le Roux et al., 2008; Prieur et al., 2008; Sherman, 2018; Veenstra, 2007). Flemmen et al., (2018) replicated Bourdieu's qualitative and quantitative survey work on what speech, activities, mannerisms and/or tastes are associated with low and high status in Norway, Le Roux et al. (2008) in the UK, Prieur et al., (2008) in Denmark, and Veenstra (2007) in Canada. Others such as Lareau and McCrory Calarco (2012), Dittman (2015), Thomas (2018), and Nicols (2023) have tested and applied Bourdieu's cultural capital theory in the US. The general conclusion across these studies is that cultural capital theory is often present and explains intergenerational inequality in Western countries when (1) income, occupation, and education are imperfectly correlated, and (2)

intergenerational mobility cannot be explained by income, occupational status, or education alone (Field, 2008). But despite Bourdieu and others influenced by his work further advancing our understanding of social class beyond Weber, Bourdieu's ideas surrounding social class have largely been neglected in public opinion and political behavior.

More recently, French economist, Piketty and co-authors, Zucman and Saez², have brought attention to the role of wealth and how wealth can also help us understand social class beyond income, occupation, and education (Piketty, 2017; Piketty et al., 2018; Saez & Zucman, 2020). Piketty points out in his (2017) canonical book, *Capital in the Twenty First Century*, that in our globalized economy, wages and salaries from employers have become overshadowed by rentier incomes and the accumulation of different assets which yield varying rates of return. While economic growth and real wages³ have declined due to low birth rates and advances in technological innovation, returns on capital have increased (Piketty, 2017). This is partially because individuals who can accumulate wealth often do it through mechanisms like stock options and bonuses, which do not contribute to an economy's overall economic growth. One of the major conclusions Piketty makes in *Capital in the Twenty First Century* is that while income and wealth are correlated, we cannot understand financial capital or global political economy without giving adequate attention to the accumulation of wealth. This in turn has implications for understanding public opinion and political behavior. Financial capital is more than labor income. To better understand partisan choices, we need to consider the effects of wealth in addition to those of labor income.

² Gabriel Zucman and Emmanuel Saez are economic professors at the University of California, Berkeley.

³ Wages once adjusted for inflation.

Re-Conceptualizing Social Class

My conception of social class is most similar that of Bourdieu and Piketty. I understand social class to be the result of a series of economic attributes and non-material characteristics which can be organized into three forms of capital: human capital (education and occupation), financial capital (labor income and wealth), and cultural capital (behavioral norms and tastes). Under my framework, social class reflects status and access to material resources which work together to influence partisanship. In this way, social class can be understood as gradational or continuous. We can expect that most individuals will fall somewhere between "high/elite" to "low/common" on a social class continuum, and that political differences will exist amongst individuals depending upon their placement on that social class continuum.

Moreover, because forms of capital are not interchangeable, being considered elite on one form of capital does not preclude being 'common' on another. In fact, my frequent usage of the terms 'high status/elite/class' and 'low status/common' is in reference to individuals at the low vs. high end on a specific form of capital rather than their position on the greater social class continuum. I focus on differentiating between the high/elite and low/common for ease of understanding of the effects of a specific faces of social class on partisan choice.

My conceptualization and analysis of social class is also limited to non-Hispanic white people for four reasons. First, my understanding of social class builds on Bourdieu's cultural capital theory and Piketty's analysis of social class as wealth. Both Bourdieu and Piketty avoid directly discussing race in their work on social class, suggesting that social class is independent of race or is race neutral. And while I have a different understanding of the role that social class and race have in determining

life outcomes and political behavior than Bourdieu, our differences in understanding the relationship that race and social class have are not important for developing a comprehensive measure of social class--as long as I acknowledge that my measure is limited in its ability to capture social class and political behavior beyond white people.

Another reason my dissertation is focused on rethinking the conceptualization and measurement of social class for just white people is because I see class and race as being mutually constructing phenomena. In contrast to Bourdieu and Piketty, I understand class and race to be intersecting or interacting. Differently worded, race influences one's social class, and both impact status, access to resources, opportunities, and power. Because race and class depend upon one another, it is difficult to isolate social class from race. In fact, one major hurdle in building a measure of cultural capital is that perceptions of hobbies, interest, foods, and norms hold a different meaning for whites than BIPOC in gateway institutions (Becker et al., 2017a, 2017b; Curl et al., 2018; Jack, 2016; Nichols, 2023; Rivera, 2015; Thomas, 2018).

But despite the intertwinement between race and social class, we can begin disentangling race from social class by looking at class differences amongst members of the same racial group. The items I validated for my cultural capital scale are based on the conclusions of sociological and psychological analyses (field experiments, lab experiments, interviews, and ethnographical work) which either focused on testing the effects of hobbies, interests, foods, and behavioral norms on perceived competence for white applicants in the hiring process or randomized/controlled for applicants' race (Nicols 2023; Thomas 2018). By focusing solely on white people in my dissertation, I can therefore better isolate race from class and explore the role that aspects of social class play in the formation of partisan choices.

The third reason my dissertation focuses on white people is because I am not only interested in developing a new measure of social class, but also in explaining how the different faces of social class impact partisan choice. BIPOC are not a politically homogenous group (Hero, Rodney & Preuhs, , 2013; Lien, Conway, and Wong, 2004; McClain et al., 2006; McKenzie & Rouse, 2013; Watts-Smith, 2014). Existing work that has sought to deeply explore the political behavior or partisan choices of specific demographic groups has generally restricted its analysis to one racial or ethnic group (Jardina, 2019; White & Laird, 2021). This is because models of political decision making differ across racial groups (Jardina, 2019; White & Laird, 2021). In other words, the factors which influence Black political decision making differ from the IVs which influence white people's political attitudes (Jardina, 2019; White & Laird, 2021). Finally, making a measure of cultural capital for BIPOC would require an extensive amount of additional survey research, likely resulting in multiple dissertation projects.

Overall, because my goal is to build a more comprehensive measure of social class (and not ethno-race) in order to gain better insight into how people form partisan allegiances, I hold ethno-race constant in my dissertation by limiting my conceptualization and quantification of social class to non-Hispanic white people. While excluding BIPOC from my dissertation means I can only speak to the validity of my measure of social class in relation to non-Hispanic white people, future research can look to build measures of social class which are specific to non-white ethno-racial groups.

Finally, while this chapter emphasizes my broader understanding of social class, the following theoretical and empirical chapters in my dissertation center on how each form of capital affects partisanship. This means I give more attention to conceptualizing, measuring, and theorizing

about the role that each form of capital has on partisanship rather than the individual or combined effects of forms of capital on social class.

In contrast to my broad understanding of social class, most definitions of social class have been loosely based on Weber's ideas of social class as SES. The main differences being that current day definitions of social class have generally been reduced to one or two common economic indicator(s) which are available in national surveys datasets (GSS, ANES, CCES). This means that in multivariate regressions, political scientists generally use just income or education to proxy class. The problem with this approach, however, is that it reduces our understanding of social class to one of two aspects of social class—thereby ignoring the possibility that cultural capital and wealth matter too. By bringing cultural capital and wealth into the study of social class and politics, I argue that we will gain a deeper understanding of the relationship between social class and partisan choice.

Who is in the White Working-Class?

The predominant approach in the social sciences is to treat educational attainment, household income, and occupational status as the only manifestations of social class. For instance, political sociologists such as Manza and Brooks (2008) and political scientist Carnes (2013; 2018) conceptualize class as how people earn a living. Manza and Brooks (2008), Carnes (2013; 2018), and other social scientists' measurement and quantification of occupation is partially derived from Erikson Goldthorpe's (1992) sociological scheme: professionals and managers, other white-collar employees, self-employed entrepreneurs, farmers, skilled blue-collar workers, unskilled blue-collar workers, and low skilled service workers.

Manza and Brooks (2008) amended Goldthorpe's (1992) scheme to categorize occupations into six categories: (1) professionals (both salaried and self-employed, including lawyers, physicians, engineers, teachers, scientists, writers, editors, and social workers), managers and administrators (all non-retail sales managers); (2) the self-employed (owners, proprietors, and other non-professional self-employed persons including farm owners); (3) routine white-collar workers (retail, sales, clerical, and white collar service workers); (4) skilled manual workers & supervisors (skilled workers and foreman in all industries); (5) non-skilled manual workers (nonskilled workers in all industries including farming and services); (6) and non-full-time labor force participants (homemakers, retirees, students, and the disabled working less than 20 hours a week). They then collapsed these categories in their analyses of occupational status and political beliefs by deeming professionals and managers to be the elite (Manza and Brooks 2008). Similarly, when Lindh and McCall (2020) used data from the 2016 Role of Government module of the International Social Survey Program to analyze the relationship between support for economic redistribution based on occupational type in 18 countries, they categorized occupations into four main categories: manual workers, service workers, sociocultural professionals, and managers/business professionals. Based on Manza and Brooks' (2008) coding of occupational groups using ANES and GSS data, the number of professionals has grown, whereas the number of skilled and nonskilled workers has been decreasing since the 1990s (Manza and Brooks 2008).

Political Scientist Carnes (2013) and law professor Williams (2017), on the other hand, don't adjudicate between skilled and non-skilled workers. Carnes (2013) insists on the continued existence of two social class groups: the working-class (employment in manual labor, the service industry, clerical work, or a union job) and the professional class (everyone not in the working-class). Williams

(2017) differentiates social classes based on skill type and work attire. Individuals with “social skills” are considered high in social class and those with technical skills “low in social class”.

As we can see, globalization and technological advances have blurred boundaries between occupational types and occupational statuses. Roughly 16% of all American workers were considered independent contractors or free-lance workers in 2015, with the percentage of independent contractors/free-lance workers in the US nearly doubling from 2005 to 2015 (Katz & Krueger, 2019). But the prestige, income, and stability that independent contractors and free-lance workers have greatly varies even for individuals working the same type of job (i.e., programmers, models, artists, writers, management consultants, influencers, building contractors) (Katz & Krueger, 2019). Understandings of social class thus differ even amongst scholars using the same definition.

Next, income and education have also been utilized as definitions and measures of social class in political science research. Gilens (2012) and Gilens and Page (2014) analyzed the role of social class in determining government responsiveness by looking at the preferences of income percentiles (i.e., 90th and 10th percentiles) and Ellis (2017) terciles. Alternatively, income and education have been treated as binary level variables which categorize an individuals’ class status on the basis on whether their household income is below or above \$60,000 and/or if they have obtained a 4-year college degree (Bartels, 2008; Carnes & Lupu, 2020).

But what’s the problem with using different measures or coding schemes of the same concept (social class)? We can see the issue of using various definitions and coding schemes to define social class in the differing estimates these measures produce. Carnes & Lupu (2020), recently argued that people with household incomes below the US median of \$60,000 and who don’t have a

college degree can be considered working-class. Under their definition less than 30% of white Americans were ‘working-class’ in 2016 (ANES/U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey Data). On the other hand, if we deem people to be members of the working-class based on educational attainment alone, as most political scientists do, then 60% of white people are part of the working-class in 2021 (Abramowitz, 2018; Schaeffer, 2022; Sides et al., 2018). If scholars cannot agree on how to conceptualize and measure class, not surprisingly, their descriptive inferences about the size of different social classes widely varies. If we cannot agree on how to measure class, and thus, who is part of a given class, it becomes exceedingly difficult to generate a cumulative body of knowledge about the effects of class on partisan choice.

Aspects of Social Class & Partisan Choice

In addition to there being widely varying estimates of the proportion of white people in the working-class, there’s also a lack of consensus on the causal role social class plays in shaping public opinion and political behavior.⁴ For instance, when Carnes & Lupu (2020) categorized people who

⁴ While the focus of my dissertation is on explaining how forms of capital impact partisan choice, prior work has examined the relationship between various indicators of social class and economic policy preferences. A summary of that literature is provided here. Income-based measures of class show that high income earners have slightly more affinity towards conservative tax and social welfare policies than low-income earners (Ellis, 2017; Gilens, 2012). On issues of universal welfare programs and trade, however, low-income earners are much more supportive of tariffs/protectionist policies and universal welfare programs (i.e., social security/Medicare) than high-income respondents (Ellis, 2017; Gilens, 2012). When occupational status is used as proxy or a definition of social class, manual and service workers hold more liberal views on taxation, business regulation, social spending, and labor laws than their elite counterparts (Carnes, 2013; Hout, 2008; Lupu & Pontusson, 2011). Much less work has looked at whether educational attainment is associated with economic preferences. Nonetheless, Mutz (2021) has found that a college education is predictive of support for free trade agreements. The consequence of using different measures or coding schemes of the same concept (social class) can thus be seen in the contrasting conclusions about how social class relates to partisanship, as well as how social class maps onto various economic policy preferences.

have both a household income below \$60,000 and don't have a college degree, they found that 62% of white-working-class voters supported Republicans. Under their framework, Republicans have had a white working-class advantage in all presidential election years from 1980-2016-with the exception of 1992, 1996, and 2008 (Carnes & Lupu 2020).

When we define class in terms of income alone, however, low-income voters have been a long-term Democratic constituency. From 1972-2012 multiple studies have found that higher income is associated with Republican vote choice and Republican PID (Hout & Laurison, 2018; Manza & Brooks, 2008; McCarty et al., 2006, 2016). More recently, Peterson (2016) found through studying over 68,000 Pennsylvania residents that even an absolute positive change in income is associated with an increased likelihood that an individual will register to vote as a Republican. Furthermore, when white individuals were grouped into terciles, income was associated with voting for Trump in 2016 (Haney López 2019). Higher income is generally understood to be predictive of stronger Republican PID and vote choice.

Education, on the other hand, has been shown in recent years to have a strong association with Democratic PID and Democratic presidential vote choice (Manza and Brooks 2008). Prysby (2020) found from averaging the Democratic advantage in party identification among people with a high school degree and the Republican advantage in party identification among people with a college degree, that Democrats did not have an advantage with white non-Hispanic college graduates from 1952-2000. It was not until 2004 that the relationship reversed. Since 2004, however, a college education has become a strong predictor of Democratic identification. Evidence of this relationship can be seen in Trump's vote share of white non-college graduates. Trump won non-college educated

voters 64% to 28% in 2016 and 65% to 33% in 2020 (Igielnik et al., 2021). In sum, higher education is linked to Democratic partisan choice after 2004.


Yet Manza and Brooks (2008) critique the notion that the Republican party has pulled the white working-class to the right. Instead, they found professionals moved from the right to left, self-employed individuals moved from Independents to Democrats, non-skilled workers continued to lean towards Democrats, and all other occupational groups moved towards the center. Using NES data from 1972-1992, Manza and Brooks (2008) found that professionals were significantly more likely to vote for Democrats than non-labor force participants. Managers were also more likely to support Democrats than non-labor force participants, but not at a level that was statistically significant. No other occupational groups differed in their vote choice in comparison to non-labor force participants.

Since then, Hout & Laurison (2018) used Manza and Brooks's (2008) occupational coding scheme to look at the association between self-reported presidential vote choice when controlling for class self-identification, family income, education, gender, race, age, and religion using GSS data from 1972-2012. They found that from 1972-2012: professionals moved from being very likely to vote for Republicans to being very likely to vote for Democrats, managers and the self-employed remained slightly more likely to vote for Republicans than Democrats, white collar workers didn't exhibit partisan voting behavior, and skilled and unskilled laborers moved from being very likely to vote for Democrats to being very likely to vote for Republicans (Hout & Laurison 2018). Taken in combination, higher occupational status appears to be linked to Democratic partisan choice post 2000.

One of the major difficulties in showing how our ad hoc usage of economic indicators to proxy social class changes our understanding of politics is that studies on social class use multiple different datasets. They vary in terms of who is included in the survey population, their sampling methods, how they define and code aspects of class, what they control for, and how they measure political outcomes like partisanship. Moreover, the strength of the correlation between each of these economic indicators varies over time, as well their individual relationships to political phenomena like partisanship and vote choice. With these methodological issues in mind, Prysby (2020) conducted a more comprehensive analysis of aspects of social class and their relation to partisan choice using ANES panel data from 1952-2016. Individuals were dichotomized as either being working-class or middle class based on whether their household income was above or below the median household income, they held a blue collar job, had a college degree, or self-identified as lower or working-class. Prysby (2020) then calculated the percent of white non-Hispanic working-class voters who identified as Democrats compared to the percent of non-working-class voters who identified as Democrats. The results show that Democrats had a small constant advantage with low-income voters from 1952-2012 (the exception being 2016). Democrats had a larger advantage with blue-collar workers than low-income voters from 1952-2012, but the advantage reversed and ended in 2004.⁵ The largest class advantage Democrats had was with high school graduates, but that advantage has been slowly decreasing since the 1960s and the trend officially reversed in 2004. The bottom-line takeaway from Prysby's (2020) analysis of class and its relationship to PID is that proxies of class differ in their direction and strength of association with partisan choices, especially over time.

⁵ The ANES did not include occupational measures on waves from 2008-2016.

Figure 2.1 Economic Indicators of Social Class and Republican Partisanship



Note: Entries are OLS coefficients. Results from the five models can be found in the Chapter 2 Appendix. Analyses includes non-Hispanic white respondents only. Partisanship is measured on 1-7 scale, where negative coefficients denote stronger identification with Democrats and positive coefficients denote stronger identification with Republicans.

Figure 2.1 also shows a running example of how different proxies of social class lead to contradictory—or at least unclear—findings on the role that social class plays in public opinion.

Figure 2.1 plots the results from OLS regressions of household income⁶, education⁷, occupation prestige⁸, and a set of demographic controls on strength in PID (with 95% confidence intervals)⁹

⁶ The following question was asked to gather respondents’ income: “In which of these groups did your total family income, from all sources, fall last year before taxes, that is? Just tell me the letter.”

⁷ (1) High school (2) Associate/junior college (3) Bachelor’s (4) Graduate

⁸ Occupational Prestige is variable that is available in GSS data based on the 2010 Census occupation classification. This standard prestige score is a simple mean value of ratings for each occupation category, converted to a scale of 0 (bottom) to 100 (top)

⁹ The following question was asked to capture PID “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what?” (1) Strong Democrat (2) Not very strong

using cross-sectional GSS data from all white non-Hispanic respondents for the past thirty years.¹⁰

The GSS is a full-probability sample of American households, so we can use this data to make broader generalizations about partisanship and its relationship to economic indicators in the American public based on our findings. Occupational prestige, education, and household income were all rescaled to be from 0-1. I controlled for gender (dummy), age (18-100), and marital status (dummy).¹¹ The analysis is broken down into five periods based on when the measurement of 'household income' changed.

What we see in Figure 2.1 is that education and occupational prestige were not associated with PID from 1991-1997 or 1998-2004. Income, on the other hand, was a significant predictor of stronger Republican PID during these same time periods and the coefficient was in the positive direction we would predict¹². But while occupational prestige continued to be unrelated to PID, an increase in educational attainment was associated with a .33 decrease in Republican PID from 2005-

Democrat (3) Independent, close to Democrat (4) Independent (neither, no response) (5) Independent, close to Republican (6) Not very strong Republican (7) Strong Republican

¹⁰ GSS Sample sizes for all white non-Hispanic participants range from 1,264 to 3,284.

¹¹ I controlled for gender, age because they have also been shown to be predictors of PID and were consistently available from 1991-2021.

¹² The following response options were provided to respondents to indicate their household income from 1998-2004: (1) under 1,000 (2) \$1,000 to \$2,999 (3) \$3,000 to \$3,999 (4) \$4,000 to \$4,999 (5) \$5,000 to \$5,999 (6) \$6,000 to \$6,999 (7) \$7,000 to \$7,999 (8) \$8,000 to \$8,999 (9) \$10,000 to \$12,499 (10) \$12,500 to \$14,999 (11) \$15,000 to \$17,499 (12) \$17,500 to \$19,999 (13) \$20,000 to \$22,499 (14) \$22,500 to \$24,999 (15) \$25,000 to \$29,999 (16) \$30,000 to \$34,999 (17) \$35,000 to \$39,999 (18) \$40,000 to \$49,999 (19) \$450,000 to \$59,999 (20) \$60,000 to \$74,999 to (21) \$75,000 to \$89,000 (22) \$90,000-\$109,000 (23) \$110,000 or over; The following response options were provided to respondents to indicate their household income from 1991-1997: (1) under 1,000 (2) \$1,000 to \$2,999 (3) \$3,000 to \$3,999 (4) \$4,000 to \$4,999 (5) \$5,000 to \$5,999 (6) \$6,000 to \$6,999 (7) \$7,000 to \$7,999 (8) \$8,000 to \$8,999 (9) \$10,000 to \$12,499 (10) \$12,500 to \$14,999 (11) \$15,000 to \$17,499 (12) \$17,500 to \$19,999 (13) \$20,000 to \$22,499 (14) \$22,500 to \$24,999 (15) \$25,000 to \$29,999 (16) \$30,000 to \$34,999 (17) \$35,000 to \$39,999 (18) \$40,000 to \$49,999 (19) \$50,000 to \$59,999 (20) \$60,000 to \$74,999 to (21) \$75,000 or more

2011 at the $p < 0.05$. More specifically, moving from a score on the 10th percentile of education to the 90th would decrease someone's predicted PID from 3.26 to 2.92. During this same time period, income, on the other hand, was positively and significantly associated with Republican PID ($b = .95$).¹³ Moving from the 10th to 90th percentile on the income scale would increase predicted PID from 2.77 to 3.41.

Interestingly and in line with prior research, educational attainment and income continued to be statistically significant predictors of PID from 2012-2021.¹⁴ For example, an individual scoring at the 10th percentile on the income scale has a predicted PID of 2.84, whereas someone at the 90th percentile has an estimated PID score of 3.29 from 2012-2015. The effects of education on PID are also significant in magnitude during this same time period. Predicted PID drops from 3.38 to 2.71

¹³ The following response options were provided to respondents to indicate their household income from 2005-2015: (1) under 1,000 (2) \$1,000 to \$2,999 (3) \$3,000 to \$3,999 (4) \$4,000 to \$4,999 (5) \$5,000 to \$5,999 (6) \$6,000 to \$6,999 (7) \$7,000 to \$7,999 (8) \$8,000 to \$8,999 (9) \$10,000 to \$12,499 (10) \$12,500 to \$14,999 (11) \$15,000 to \$17,499 (12) \$17,500 to \$19,999 (13) \$20,000 to \$22,499 (14) \$22,500 to \$24,999 (15) \$25,000 to \$29,999 (16) \$30,000 to \$34,999 (17) \$35,000 to \$39,999 (18) \$40,000 to \$49,999 (19) \$450,000 to \$59,999 (20) \$60,000 to \$74,999 to (21) \$75,000 to \$89,000 (22) \$90,000-\$109,000 (23) \$110,000 to \$129,999; (24) \$130,000 to \$149,999 (25) \$150,000 or over

¹⁴ The following response options were provided to respondents to indicate their household income from 2016-2021: (1) under 1,000 (2) \$1,000 to \$2,999 (3) \$3,000 to \$3,999 (4) \$4,000 to \$4,999 (5) \$5,000 to \$5,999 (6) \$6,000 to \$6,999 (7) \$7,000 to \$7,999 (8) \$8,000 to \$8,999 (9) \$10,000 to \$12,499 (10) \$12,500 to \$14,999 (11) \$15,000 to \$17,499 (12) \$17,500 to \$19,999 (13) \$20,000 to \$22,499 (14) \$22,500 to \$24,999 (15) \$25,000 to \$29,999 (16) \$30,000 to \$34,999 (17) \$35,000 to \$39,999 (18) \$40,000 to \$49,999 (19) \$450,000 to \$59,999 (20) \$60,000 to \$74,999 to (21) \$75,000 to \$89,000 (22) \$90,000-\$109,000 (23) \$110,000 to \$129,999; (24) \$130,000 to \$149,999 (25) \$150,000 to \$16,999 ¹⁴ The following response options were provided to respondents to indicate their household income from 2005-2015: (1) under 1,000 (2) \$1,000 to \$2,999 (3) \$3,000 to \$3,999 (4) \$4,000 to \$4,999 (5) \$5,000 to \$5,999 (6) \$6,000 to \$6,999 (7) \$7,000 to \$7,999 (8) \$8,000 to \$8,999 (9) \$10,000 to \$12,499 (10) \$12,500 to \$14,999 (11) \$15,000 to \$17,499 (12) \$17,500 to \$19,999 (13) \$20,000 to \$22,499 (14) \$22,500 to \$24,999 (15) \$25,000 to \$29,999 (16) \$30,000 to \$34,999 (17) \$35,000 to \$39,999 (18) \$40,000 to \$49,999 (19) \$450,000 to \$59,999 (20) \$60,000 to \$74,999 to (21) \$75,000 to \$89,000 (22) \$90,000-\$109,000 (23) \$110,000 to \$129,999; (24) \$130,000 to \$149,999 (25) \$150,000 to \$169,999 (26) \$170,000 or over

when moving from a score on the 10th percentile of the education scale to a score on the 90th percentile of the education scale.¹⁵

From 2016-2021, both education and income continued to be statistically significant predictors of PID, but they were so in contrasting ways. Moving from the 10th to 90th percentile on education decreases predicted PID from 3.30 to 2.76, while moving from the 10th to 90th percentile on income increases predicted PID from 2.98 to 3.31.¹⁶ Occupational prestige, on the other hand, was not significantly related to PID from 2012-2021. In sum, Figure 2.1 displays how income has consistently been a positive predictor of Republican PID, while the relevance of education has grown over time, and it is now inversely related to Republican PID.

Taken together, prior work and my own analysis show that if we use occupational type, education, and income as interchangeable definitions and/or proxies of class, we draw conflicting conclusions on its relationship (both in terms of direction, significance, and magnitude) to partisan choice. When social class is defined in terms of occupational prestige, ‘class-based’ voting appears to be dead. Meanwhile although income is generally associated with voting for Republicans, employment in a non-working-class position and a college education has increasingly been linked to holding a Democratic partisan affiliation. Given that professional jobs and education are associated with higher income, it seems odd that these workers and people would identify with a party that wants to tax them more and is perceived to be a party for the ‘poor’. Likewise, what is attracting

¹⁵ An increase in household income was associated with a .67 increase in Republican PID and education a .67 decrease in Republican PID from 2012-2015 ($p < 0.05$).

¹⁶ An increase in higher education is associated .71 decrease in Republican PID. An increase in income is associated with a .54 increase in Republican PID ($p < 0.05$).

non-college graduates to identify with Republicans? These puzzles persist as the field lacks consensus over how to define and measure social class.


What's Missing?

What are previous definitions of class failing to address? Obtaining a college degree or employment in a non-manual labor job is no longer a direct ticket into the upper-middle or even-middle class. Instead, wealth (assets-debts) and cultural capital split the working, middle, upper-middle, and upper-classes. In fact, panel data from that Baccalaureate & Beyond Longitudinal Study of 1993 and 2008 illustrates that substantial differences in human and financial capital exist amongst college graduates based on their upbringings (Witteveen and Attewell 2017). Students whose parents were employed in semi-routine or routine labor positions were more than two times less likely to get a professional job than students with parents who worked in professional or managerial positions. Likewise, professionals with a parent who worked in a low-status occupation earn roughly 16% less than professionals with a parent who was employed in a professional or managerial position (Friedman & Laurison, 2020). Even after controlling for college selectivity, major, and academic performance, individuals from elite families were at an advantage compared to their counterparts with non-elite roots---with differences in income between elite and non-elite graduates persisting 4-10 years after graduation (Rivera, 2015; Witteveen & Attewell, 2017). These statistics indicate once again that social class depends upon more than just occupation status or education.

But while other fields like social psychology have started to understand social class as being more than income, education, or occupation these ideas are new to public opinion and political behavior. My theoretical contribution to the field is thus bringing forth a conceptualization of social class based on Bourdieu's cultural capital theory (1984) and Piketty (2017) that is new to political

science. I argue that the imperfect correlation of economic indicators like education, income, and occupation ignores important variation that exists within these units, and consequently limits our understanding of public opinion. In the following sections, I describe how social class can be best understood as a combination of three types of capital: human capital (occupational status and education), financial capital (income and wealth), and cultural capital (behavioral norms and tastes) (see Figure 2.2). I note the ways in which this conceptualization of social class differs both from traditional political science conceptualizations of social class and the major differences/similarities between each form of capital and their components. Finally, I describe how the origins of cultural capital and wealth shed new theoretical light on partisan choice.

Figure 2.2 Faces of Social Class and their Components



Bringing Wealth into the Equation

The second major limitation with traditional conceptualizations of social class in political science is that they have generally reduced social class to human capital (educational attainment or occupational status) and/or ignored the potentially distinctive role that wealth, rather than income, plays in shaping partisan choices. Although education has been considered to be the solidification for upward financial mobility in the United States, wealth has begun to overtake its role (Goldthorpe & Jackson, 2008). Unlike other aspects of social class, wealth is resistant to downward mobility (Sakamoto et al., 2022). For instance, the University of Michigan's Panel Study of Income Dynamics shows that a one-decile increase in parental wealth position is associated with a four percentile increase in their child's wealth position once their child enters adulthood (Pfeffer & Killewald, 2018). Intergenerational elasticity in terms of educational achievement and occupational prestige, on the other hand, is much lower than it is for wealth.¹⁷ Political science thus needs to include wealth as an aspect of social class because it has become a better predictor of access to material resources than income or education (Goldthorpe & Jackson, 2008). It also seems likely to have independent effects on partisan choice beyond the effects of education, income, and other facets of class.

Today, elites and upper-middle-class individuals steadily accumulate financial capital (assets) through buying properties which they rent, purchasing second homes, investments, good debt, and inheritance. And while the middle class¹⁸ is still advantaged in the sense that homeownership rates are higher than that of the working poor, the return rate on real estate is less than that of the stock market (Lin & Neely, 2020). Middle class and low-income households, also carry a greater debt

¹⁷ The correlation between parental/child occupational prestige and parental/child educational attainment is roughly .3-.4 (Beller & Hout, 2006) compared to 0.5 for income/wealth (Mitnik et al., 2019).

¹⁸ When defined by household income

burden than the upper classes, which makes it hard for them to pay off debt and save in the long term (Lin & Neely, 2020). Low income and middle class families are often denied credit with low interest rates and resort to high fee money orders, payday loans, rent-to-own services, auto title loans, and tax refund anticipation loans when experiencing financial crises (Lin & Neely, 2020). The value of a paycheck and a college education is relative to one's overall net worth.

In contrast to the middle and lower classes, the assets of individuals in the 60th-100th wealth percentile are primarily in the form of stock ownership, trusts, and businesses (Lin & Neely, 2020). Debt also plays a differing role to upper classes than it does for lower classes. Upper-middle class and upper-classes' access to "good" credit (i.e., mortgages/home equity lines of credit) allow them to figuratively and literally generate revenue (Lin & Neely, 2020). They can meet their short term needs without drawing from their savings/investment accounts and instead invest those funds in the stock market, where it will have a return greater than the interest rate on their payments today (Lin & Neely, 2020).

Because income and education do not reflect all aspects of social class, reducing class to these components is likely to provide a limited understanding of how social class maps onto partisan choices (Lin & Neely, 2020). In fact, studies which have oversampled the financially successful have shown that individuals high in financial capital are systematically different from people high in human capital. When Page, Bartels, and Seawright (2013) analyzed the political beliefs of the top 1% of wealth holders in Chicago, they discovered that higher levels of wealth were associated with less support for expanding aid to foreign countries, government regulations, defense spending/security aid, food stamps, healthcare, job programs, farm subsidies, and social security. And even though there were more Republicans in the 1% than Democrats, wealthy Democrats were more conservative than Democrats in the public. Reducing social class to income, education, and/or

occupation thus not only alters our understanding of what social class is and our operationalization of it, but it can also lead us to misunderstand the role that social class has in predicting public opinion and political behavior.

Cultural Capital

Cultural capital has been vaguely described six times over the past 100 years beginning in the early 1900s. The most prominent conceptualization of cultural capital, however, arose from French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu in the 1980's. Bourdieu (1984) defines social capital or cultural capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition” (248). The central idea behind Bourdieu's cultural capital theory is that cultural capital is a prerequisite for advancing one's interests, goals, and security. Differences in speech, networks, and tastes between groups are often used to disadvantage some individuals over others. Bourdieu and other scholars influenced by the theory of cultural capital thus view cultural capital in a similar manner to other forms of capital because of its functionality and importance. Cultural capital like financial capital is understood to be a means to an end, operating as an asset and resource throughout adulthood. For instance, aspects of cultural capital like hobbies and food preferences (tastes) have been shown to signal unrelated traits like competence, polish, and organizational fit in hiring (Thomas, 2018), as well as help individuals gain critical access to higher educational institutions (Cook, 2014; Nicols, 2023). But despite the prominence of cultural capital to other social science fields, cultural capital has been discarded by political scientists studying politics and social class. Based on Bourdieu's cultural capital theory along with recent findings from sociology, business, and social psychology, I argue that cultural capital can be conceptualized and operationalized as the combination of social

networks, behavioral norms, and tastes. Just as these forms of capital have different effects than financial and human capital on economic outcomes, their effects on partisan choices may also differ.

Behavioral Norms

The first component of social-cultural capital is behavior norms. Behavior norms are akin to what Bourdieu (1986) calls ‘embodied capital’ and describes as “long lasting dispositions of the body of mind” (98). These ‘unwritten rules of conduct’ which exist in long-term memory guide the way we express (verbally and non-verbally) ourselves in social interactions. (Stephens, Markus, and Phillips 2014). For example, behavioral norms tell us what salutations to use when meeting someone new, when its appropriate to shake someone’s hand, how to ask for an extension on a deadline, or how to pronounce words (Schwalbe & Shay, 2014). And although there isn’t one correct way of expressing oneself, behavioral norms are not treated as ‘equal’ or ‘neutral’ (Mendelberg, McCabe, and Thal 2017). Institutions (health institutions, schools, and workplaces) which influence life outcomes and facilitate inequality/the distribution of resources/opportunities often assume white upper-middle class ways of being (Ridgeway, 2012). Here, I describe what normatively good conduct or appropriate speech looks like to elites, the origins of behavioral norms, and how individuals with low status norms are at a disadvantage in schools, doctors’ offices, and workplaces.

The children of parents with low cultural capital are taught that the world is not their own, life isn’t fair, to play by the rules, and to make the best out of their situation (Lareau and McCrory Calarco 2012; Stephens, Townsend, and Dittmann 2019). Non-elite parents are in-between a rock and a hard place, so they emphasize to their children that there is little room for breaking the rules. This is evident in their prioritization of obedience over reasoning and physical safety over verbal skills (Putnam, 2015). For instance, they generally use direct language and concise grammar rather

than counterfactuals and conditional statements (Lareau and McCrory Calarco 2012; Stephens, Townsend, and Dittmann 2019) Non-elite parents are also more likely to spank their children than elite parents, who use more ‘promotive parenting strategies’ than ‘preventative parenting strategies’. (Putnam, 2015). For instance, elite parents use twice as many verbal encouragements (and overall, fewer discouragements) than non-elite parents (Putnam, 2015). Kids who grow up in families with low cultural capital consequently adopt a different understanding of ‘what good behavior’ and ‘appropriate speech looks like’ in adulthood than kids who grew up with elite parents (parents with high cultural capital).

Furthermore, because non-elite kids and parents often lack the economic safety net that their peers have, non-elite individuals learn to be self-reliant and are more adept at working with others to survive (Stephens, Townsend, and Dittmann 2019). In other words, they learn to fend for themselves (Putnam, 2015). For instance, non-elites share more money with anonymous partners during money games in lab experiments and are more perceptive to others’ emotions (Muscatell et al., 2012). (Kraus and Keltner 2009). Due to the adverse situations and experiences they face, non-elites learn to be pro-social and resilient.

In contrast to the individuals with low cultural capital, elites and their children tend to be self-focused and behave in more-status seeking ways. Even though elites are less skilled at understanding the emotions of others, they are more likely to express their own thoughts, feelings, wants, and needs (Lareau and McCrory Calarco 2012; Stephens, Townsend, and Dittmann 2019). Elites see making a fuss as worth their time and would prefer to stand out vs. fit in (Stephens, Townsend, and Dittmann 2019). They will negotiate or take risks to maximize their goal(s) (Stephens, Townsend, and Dittmann 2019). Finally compared to non-elite individuals, who prioritize interdependence over independence, elites seek personal achievement and advancement even at the

cost of others (Piff et al., 2018; Stephens, Townsend, and Dittmann 2019). In sum, while elites undervalue humility, show less empathy, and are more self-focused, the opposite is true for non-elites (Kennedy et al., 2013; Stephens et al., 2019).

So how do the behavioral norms we adopt during childhood reproduce inequality in the long-term? Non-elite kids are at disadvantage in educational institutions because they have been socialized to be self-reliant and to avoid drawing attention to themselves. Because kids with high cultural capital feel entitled to challenging group norms and preferences, they speak up, interrupt, negotiate, argue, and ask for help more often from teachers, coaches, and mentors (Calarco, 2011; Streib, 2011). Likewise, in higher educational institutions, elite students are more likely than first-generation college students to ask for accommodations, a test retake, or for an assignment to be regraded (Phillips et al., 2020; Stephens et al., 2019). The needs of non-elite kids go unmet for longer periods of time in educational institutions due to differences in what is viewed as appropriate expression.

Like their children, parents with low status behavioral norms also face setbacks when interacting with gateway institutions. Parents with high status behavioral norms are more likely than parents with low status behavioral norms to intervene with teachers and other school officials when they believe their child's interests aren't being served (Lareau and McCrory Calarco 2012). People with low status behavioral norms also ask fewer questions to doctors, are less likely to seek a formal diagnosis for a child struggling with school, seek a lower number of treatment options, and receive less information from doctors on how to best take care of themselves (Lareau & McCrory Calarco, 2012). Similarly, Chua (2022) and colleagues found in interviews with hiring managers at tech companies that applicants from non-elite backgrounds are at a disadvantage in the hiring process for white-collar jobs because of their low cultural capital. Unlike their peers who were raised in elite

families and learned high status behavioral norms, applicants with low status behavior norms felt uncomfortable using their social networks for self-gain (referrals) and were less likely to negotiate (Chua et al., 2021; Chua & Mazmanian, 2020).

Because white-collar workplaces, educational institutions, and the health system in the US function on the basis that individuals are independent actors who feel comfortable seeking attention/information and who know the ‘right language’ to negotiate, they produce cultures and norms which best serve people with high status behavioral norms. Due to the discrimination they face, and the adverse experiences they have with gateway institutions, it is not surprising people with low status behavioral norms often become resentful of individuals and groups who are associated with high cultural capital (aka: professionals, career politicians, etc.). Individuals with low cultural capital recognize how ways of being have allowed ‘people not like them’ to get an unfair ‘leg up’ in life. Their resentment is also easily mapped onto politics as most Americans evaluate candidates and parties by asking ‘who is one of them’ (Cramer, 2016; Fenno, 1978). Developing a measure of behavioral norms is not only important for being able to build a more comprehensive measure of social class, but it can also help us better understand how people make partisan choices.

Tastes

The second component of cultural capital is what I call tastes: preferences for foods, tv shows, music genres, and activities that signify status. Individuals can capitalize on having tastes deemed as being more “refined” than others. As social psychologists Piff, Kraus, and Keltner (2018) summarize, “Because inferior signalers do not possess the resources to produce them humans signal social class through the communications of tastes and aesthetic preferences, and by patterns of social behavior. These signs of social class are not only costly (or expensive) in and of themselves; if

revealed to be faked, they incur additional reputational costs for the signaler akin to having poor taste in art, food, music, or other cultural pursuits. It is through the communication of taste, preferences, and interpersonal style that individuals rapidly, accurately, and effortlessly communicate their social class to strangers” (p.73). In other words, elites use tastes as a way maintain boundaries between themselves and others by delimiting certain tastes as trashy, sophisticated, or classy (Veenstra, 2007).

Although there is nothing inherently wrong with having ‘low status tastes’, society ascribes normative judgements to tastes. Survey work conducted by sociologist Kyla Thomas (2022) shows that Americans generally agree about what is considered high vs. low status music, sports, and food (Thomas 2022). Thomas (2022) manipulated musical, sport, and food preferences which she found to indicate social class in a vignette experiment. The results of the vignette experiment confirmed that not only do individuals make assumptions about others based on their tastes, but also tastes influence judgement (Thomas, 2022). Americans with high-status tastes rated profiles with low status tastes as less competent than profiles with highbrow tastes for people with identical levels of human capital (Thomas, 2022). In contrast to people with high-status tastes, perceptions of competence were unrelated to tastes amongst people with low status tastes (Thomas, 2022). Despite the impracticality and the lofty price tag associated with some high status-tastes, individuals with high-status tastes believe their choices indicate how ‘cultured’, ‘environmentally conscious’, ‘competent’, ‘ethical’ and “morally superior” they are in comparison to people with low-status tastes (Currid-Halkett, 2017).

Field experiments with employers and alumni from elite educational institutions also show that tastes hold more significance than what their current price tag indicates. (Nicols 2023; Rivera

and Tilcsik 2016; Thomas 2018). Rivera and Tilcsik (2016) sent fake summer internship applications to 147 top law firms in 14 cities. They manipulated class on the fake resumes through undergraduate awards, service, extra-curricular activities (sailing team versus track and field relay team), and personal interests (polo and classical music vs. pick-up soccer, and country music) (Rivera and Tilcsik 2016). Although the field experiment applicants were in the top 1% of their law school class and attended a second-tier law school, the high social class applicants were four times more likely than the low social status applicants to get an interview (Rivera and Tilcsik 2016). Likewise, when Thomas (2018) manipulated social class through cultural tastes on resumes for over 1,000 entry level jobs, people with high-brow tastes received more interviews than those with low brow tastes. Nicols (2023) even found that whether a prospective college student has high status hobbies (cello, sailing, foreign film club) or low status hobbies (video games, country music, pick-up soccer) has a statistically significant impact on whether alumni from an elite educational institution will recommend that applicant for admittance. This effect persisted above and beyond the applicant's level of financial need.

After conducting follow-up interviews with hiring managers, Thomas (2018) and Rivera (2015) concluded that applicants with high-brow tastes received a greater number of interviews because they were perceived as more polished and competent than their counterparts. Hiring managers' preferences for applicants with the same leisure and consumption habits as their own thus makes it harder for people with low status tastes and behavioral/ norms to get hired or gain entry into elite educational institutions (Currid-Halkett, 2017).

Due to differences in tastes and behavioral norms, people with low cultural capital are less likely to apply, get admitted, and succeed in schools/workplaces where their material circumstances

could improve. In fact, hiring committees report “cultural fit” (Chua & Mazmanian, 2020) and “activities/interests” as being more important than communication skills, GPA, analytical thinking, and productiveness (Rivera 2015). And although individuals with low cultural capital may be exposed to high status tastes or even learn high status ‘unwritten rules of conduct’ over time, tastes and behavior norms are generally quite stable after they form during childhood (Stephens, Markus, and Phillips 2014). The match between elite tastes and behavioral norms and the culture of gateway institutions thus causes long term disadvantages for people with low cultural capital, as well as potential advantages for political parties who can effectively capitalize on having a certain ‘taste’ brand.

Politicians, like voters have a hard time turning their level of ‘cultural capital’ off. In other words, it is readily available for voters to use a clue as to determine whether a candidate is ‘one of them’ and it is apparent to voters when a candidate tries to mask their high-status tastes and behavioral norms. For instance, John Kerry was unable to turn his image from ‘elite-wind surfing snob’ to ‘redneck joe’, even after he changed his linguistic style, hunted, wore camouflage, and drank beer (Wilgoren 2004). Likewise, Dukakis’ efforts to ‘be one with the farmers’ backfired when he was framed as ‘out of touch’ for trying to get farmers to plant an exotic plant, Belgian endive, rather than corn/soybeans during the 1980’s farm crisis. Candidates who genuinely vibe with people with low cultural capital or who Sarah Palin refers to as “real Americans’ can, however, benefit from the resentment people with low-cultural capital harbor towards elites. Bill Clinton, Mike Huckabee, and Sarah Palin were all framed as ‘down to earth’ for respectively eating Big Macs, fried squirrels, and self-hunted turkeys. Democrats in Montana such as former governor Brian Schweitzer and Senator Jon Tester have also had recent electoral successes which have been attributed to their low-status

tastes (use of a branding iron to veto bills and interest in hunting/fishing). In sum, by incorporating cultural capital into our understanding of social class and discussions of partisan choice, we can potentially solve long term puzzles in the field like why college degree holders would identify with a ‘party for the poor’ or why former presidents like George W. Bush and Jimmy Carter were praised for being ‘regular guys’ despite being millionaires and having attended elite educational institutions.

On the Origins of Cultural Capital

What insight do we gain about partisan choice by brining cultural capital and wealth into our conceptualization of social class? Wealth, cultural capital, income, education, and occupation are not only distinctive components of social class due their relative importance and functionalities, but also their origins. Wealth and cultural capital are much ‘stickier’ than other components of social class. This means wealth and cultural capital, unlike other aspects of social class, reproduce over one’s lifecycle. Cultural capital is also distinct from economic proxies of class because it’s ‘non-material’. And although cultural capital cannot be liquidated, it is prevalent in everyday life. The innateness, significance, and stickiness of behavioral norms, tastes, and wealth are what make cultural capital and wealth politically salient and relevant to voters when they form partisan allegiances.

Differently worded, the origins of cultural capital and wealth can help us better understand partisanship because they make it clear ‘what causes what’. We rarely think about partisan choices causing people to change genders, sexualities, and races. Demographic characteristics, although recently been shown to be endogenous to PID (Egan, 2019), are still largely seen by the field as being exogenous to politics. This is because demographic characteristics are often thought of as being ‘pre-political’ and ‘stable’. They theoretically form and crystallize in childhood before an individual forms a strong psychological attachment to a political party. In this way, cultural capital

could also be considered pre-political and independent to PID because it emerges and forms in young adulthood.

Second, cultural capital is also capable of being a predictor rather than a consequence of partisan choice because of its durability. As previously mentioned, behavioral norms, and tastes form during young adulthood and remain stable throughout adulthood. For instance, despite exposure to the educational system's norm of independence, first-generation college students continued to value interdependence over independence and were also less likely to take up 'highbrow interests' after graduation (Dumais, 2019; Phillips et al., 2020). The formation of cultural capital can thus be compared to learning a language. While individuals can learn new languages in adulthood, the ease and fluency which comes with using one's native language is hard to reproduce late in life. In fact, non-elite individuals who attempted to mimic the behavioral norms of elites during the EPS hiring process were perceived as inauthentic (Rivera 2015).

And while we can't be absolutely sure that cultural capital is pre-political, because my dissertation represents the first systematic attempt in political science to link cultural capital to partisan choice, there is still much to be gained from such an analysis even if questions about causality cannot be settled definitively at this time.

In conclusion, given that cultural capital and wealth have become fundamental building blocks for educational achievement and white-collar employment, there is likely some overlap between those who have a college degree/are employed in a non-working-class job and those with high cultural capital and high financial capital. Yet just because forms of capital are correlated does not mean these concepts are interchangeable. This chapter outlined how class has traditionally been reduced to proxies like education and income in political science. It described how the inferences we draw about the relationship between social class and partisan choice is a function of the

conceptualization and measurement of social class. Second, this chapter discussed how I understand social class to be the result of a series of economic attributes and non-material characteristics which can be organized into three forms of capital: human capital (education and occupation), financial capital (assets in the ordinary sense), and cultural capital. Third, it introduced wealth and cultural capital into our understanding of social class. While I concluded this chapter by briefly touching on how the origins of wealth and social class have the power to help characterize voters beyond human capital and income, Chapter Three outlines how reducing social class to education and/or income alone comes at the cost of misunderstanding the role that social class has on influencing partisan choice.

Chapter 3: Theories of Social Class in Politics

The conflicting conceptualization, measurement, and understanding of the role that social class plays in politics has left the field with a series of longstanding puzzles and questions. This chapter outlines when, why, and how aspects of social class will relate to partisan choice. I first describe how self-interestedness leads us to believe that individuals will make partisan choices which will enhance their financial and human capital. Next, I discuss how social homophily, our innate tendency to be attracted to people like us (Currarini & Mengel, 2016; Kossinets & Watts, 2009), causes us to evaluate parties and candidates by asking whether they are ‘one of us’ based on shared levels of human, financial, and cultural capital. Overall, I build upon both these mutually reinforcing theories to outline my main argument: forms or faces of capital are not only conceptually distinct, but they also relate to politics in contrasting ways. If we want to understand how social class affects partisan choice, we cannot reduce class to human capital and one aspect of financial capital.

Self-Interest & Political Attitudes

Where do political preferences come from? Some aspects of human cognition are universal. Humans’ are inherently self-interested social animals (Neuberg & Schaller, 2015; Weeden & Kurzban, 2014). Our primary goals in life are to: survive, acquire resources, attract mates, reproduce, establish social ties, better our social status and the status of our tribe(s), and maintain our self-esteem (Neuberg & Schaller, 2015; Weeden & Kurzban, 2014). It is thus human nature to want ‘have more’ and to try to ‘get more’ through political action (Neuberg & Schaller, 2015; Weeden & Kurzban, 2014). In fact, political thinkers like Thomas Hobbes and James Madison believed that without government, humans would spend their day usurping resources from each other in a

constant state of war. Hobbes famously described life as: “Solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” in the *Leviathan* and Madison viewed government as the result of men “being no angels” in *Federalist No. 51*.

Our self-interested nature still shapes how we think about politics and make partisan choices. A wide range of studies at both the elite and mass level have shown that people support policies which help them attain their utmost desires: resource acquisition and social status enhancement. Homeowners are more supportive of cutting property taxes than non-homeowners (Sears & Citrin, 1985); congressmembers who send their children to public schools have more favorable attitudes towards school vouchers (Burden, 2007); smokers are more likely to oppose cigarette taxes than non-smokers (Green & Gerken, 1989); Black people are more likely to support affirmative action than white people (Kluegel & Smith, 1983); people with a religious affiliation are less supportive of the Supreme Court’s decision to ban school prayer (Weeden & Kurzban, 2014); individuals who pursue low-commitment and low-fertility romantic pursuits are more supportive of abortion than those who do not (Weeden & Kurzban, 2014); unemployed people are more likely to support a social safety net (Owens & Pedulla, 2014); and people concerned about their health status are more supportive of government run healthcare (Henderson & Hillygus, 2011). Association does not mean causation, but there appears to be at least some relationship between self-interest and political attitudes.

Whether or not people want to admit that their self-interestedness shapes their partisan choices or political attitudes, however, is a different issue. Sherman’s (2018) interviews with 50 ‘elite egalitarians’, liberals whose household incomes ranged from \$250,000/year to \$10 million/year and assets from \$800,000 to over 50 million, exemplifies how individuals are inherently, but also *discreetly* self-interested. Most of the individuals Sherman (2018) interviewed identified as

Democrats (some even left of the Democratic party). These affluent interviewees knew their privilege and emphasized the importance of valuing hard work and ‘not spoiling their children’ (Sherman 2018). In fact, they saw themselves as morally superior to other affluent individuals because of their ‘modest’ spending habits and ‘awareness of inequality’. But despite their awareness of inequality, elite egalitarians reported voting for Obama in 2008, but not again in 2012. ‘Elite egalitarians’ were concerned that Obama was creating divisiveness amongst Americans when he brought inequality to the forefront of his agenda (Sherman 2018). Tolbert, Witko, and Wolbers (2019) analysis of support towards tax related propositions in California also shows that self-interest can override symbolic ideology. While partisanship was a strong predictor of support towards tax propositions, support varied amongst Republicans depending upon the tax increase. Low-income Republicans were much more supportive of higher tax increases on the wealthy than high-income Republicans. In other words, low-income Republicans were open to tax increases if the tax increases would not affect them. When it comes down to it, even ‘elite egalitarians’ and ‘low-income fiscal conservatives’ vote out of self-interest; they just do not want to admit it to themselves or others.

The total effect Sears & Citrin (1985) found self-interest to have on support for the tax revolt, however, was comparable to party ID and symbolic ideology. While self-interest directly affected support towards property tax propositions, self-interest played a small role in explaining support for other tax based policies (Sears & Citrin 1985). How can this be? Sears & Citrin (1985) concluded that while individuals are self-interested, self-interest is narrowly defined. Individuals are only self-interested actors in politics when a direct (cash) tangible benefit is in their sight (Sears & Citrin 1985). People also behave in self-interested ways out of greed more than fear. Potential tangible benefits are more notable to individuals than potential tangible losses (Sears & Citrin 1985).

The findings from Doherty et al. (2006) and Bergan's (2009) natural experiments, however, push back on Sears & Citrin's (1985) thesis of 'narrowly defined self-interest'. In Doherty et al. (2006) and Bergan's (2009) experiments, independent lotteries randomized whether respondents received the treatment (i.e., winning money from a lottery in Doherty et al. (2006) and getting a low draft number in Bergan (2009)). When Doherty et al (2006) surveyed the general public alongside lottery winners, they found lottery winners were more opposed to estate taxes and redistribution efforts than non-lottery winners. Doherty et al (2006) also noted that opposition to estate taxes was positively related to the amount of money won. Because the only difference between lottery winners and losers is newfound wealth, we have reason to believe self-interest has a causal role in shaping attitudes towards the estate tax. Similarly Bergan (2009) found using panel data that having a low draft number decreased support for the Vietnam war. Both experiments offer unique insight into the motivations behind political decision making. They confirm that politics can be characterized as a natural consequence to our innermost drives to acquire resources and to maintain our social status.

Overall, while political science literature in the 1990s-early 2000s has been critical about the role self-interest has in shaping political preferences, the current state of the field is that self-interest matters for making partisan choices, but it depends upon how self-interest it being defined and operationalized. Two social psychologists, Weeden and Kurzban (2014) reviewed literature on self-interestedness and found that individuals are often self-interested, they just do not want to come out and say so. They argue that self-interest is present when people seek "...various kinds of material and nonmaterial gains, over shorter-term and longer-term horizons, received by themselves, their family members and their friends, allies, and social networks" (p. 40). Weeden & Kurzban (2014) note a series of experimental studies which discovered that although people believe their morality

overrides their self-interest, when push comes to shove, people behave in a self-interested manner. For instance, in one study participants were given two tasks, one which would last 30 minutes and the other 10 minutes (Weeden & Kurzban 2014). Survey participants could assign one of these tasks to a 10-year-old girl. Participants were four times more likely to give the long task to a ten year old (Weeden & Kurzban 2014). Furthermore, while other critics in the field have argued that social identities override 'self-interest', Weeden & Kurzban (2014) cogently explain that social identities matter in politics because people are discreetly self-interested. Most people opposing social policies are the ones who would benefit the least from them.

Financial Capital & Partisan Choice

So which party provides people with financial capital or human capital with direct (cash) tangible benefits (Sears & Citrin 1985)? Our federal tax system in the US is set up so richer people pay more in quantity and receive less in benefits. In so far as individuals are narrowly self-interested then, the Republican party offers tangible benefits to those with high financial capital and individuals with low human capital. The Republican party's economic platform can be nicely summed up in the following quote from George H.W. Bush in 1988, "Read my lips: no new taxes". Republicans have earned a reputation as being the party for the rich and the party of business. They have advocated the importance of economic growth through implementing tax cuts on middle and high earners, investment income, and corporate taxes, as well as reining in government spending on social services. Democrats, on the other hand, are seen as the party for the poor. The Democratic party is known for its long-term dedication to funding social programs for those with less income and material resources.

But despite the differences in Republican and Democratic party platforms and legacies, most political science research indicates that Americans do not think about political parties and candidates in terms of policy issues. In fact, prior research has found that roughly 80% of Americans lack political sophistication, people don't have consistently liberal or conservative opinions, public opinion doesn't translate into vote behavior in the aggregate, and that individual opinions are largely a reflection of party leaders/elite framing (Achen & Bartels, 2016; Converse, 1964; Kalmoe & Kinder, 2018). So how do Americans conceive of parties and how does their conception relate to their narrowly defined self-interested nature?

To determine which party best represents one's "narrowly defined self-interests" individuals often rely on mental short-cuts like party stereotypes rather than the specifics of a party's platform. Despite what one may think about short-cuts, however, party stereotypes are not necessarily bad proxies for party platforms. When both Democrats and Republicans were asked to think about what a pro-typical Democratic candidate looks like both groups reported that they would support greater efforts to: help the poor, protect the environment, maintain social security, and invest in healthcare/education (Goggin et al., 2020; Goggin & Theodoridis, 2017). When asked to think about Republicans, Americans thought about candidates who support lowering taxes, cautious spending, businesses, the rich, and the upper-class (Baumer & Gold, 2007; Goggin et al., 2020; Goggin & Theodoridis, 2017). These perceptions were consistent for people with high and low political knowledge (Goggin et al., 2020; Goggin & Theodoridis, 2017). Another way scholars have determined what images come to mind when people think about parties is by examining survey respondents' open-ended likes and dislikes about each party (Baumer & Gold, 2007). This ANES data from 1952-2004 shows that that Republicans and Democrats overwhelmingly perceive the Republican party to be the party for the "rich", and the Democratic party to be the party for the

‘poor’ (Baumer and Gold, 2007; Brewer 2009). Individuals thus do not need comprehensive knowledge about politics to know which party will enhance their financial or human capital. Given both the parties’ reputations/stereotypes, along with their actual platforms, on taxes and social welfare spending, we can expect that financial capital-higher income (H1) and wealth (H2) are associated with Republican partisan choice.

Social Homophily & Self-Interest

While individuals are inherently self-interested, seeking to maintain their social status and acquire resources, it is time-consuming and difficult to be knowledgeable about a wide range of policies and candidates just like it is demanding to closely read through 300 hundred job applications. There’s thus a point of diminishing returns. Once opportunity costs are considered into the equation, it can be in voters’ best interest to think about politics in an efficient us vs. them manner. The second theory explaining why aspects of social class relate to partisan choices, social homophily, addresses opportunity cost and the constraints of the human mind.

Social homophily describes “why birds of a feather flock together”; our general tendency of being attracted to people like us (Carrarini & Mengel, 2016; Kossinets & Watts, 2009). It causes us to view people with common traits in a more favorable light than individuals without common traits (Carrarini & Mengel, 2016; Himelboim et al., 2016). It leads us to feel more warmly towards similar individuals than dissimilar individuals (Carrarini & Mengel, 2016; Himelboim et al., 2016).

Homophily even explains our tendency to trust, befriend, marry, hire, and spend more time with individuals with the same attitudes, aspirations, age, gender, race, partisanship, education, class background, experiences, interests, and presentation/linguistic style as our own (Himelboim et al.,

2016; Huber & Malhotra, 2017; Kovacs & Kleinbaum, 2020; Nicols 2023; Putnam, 2015; Rivera, 2015; Streib, 2015).

Part of the reason homophily is so prevalent in our day-to-day life and is endemic to humankind is because it originates from our evolutionary roots. It occurs with little thought. In fact, infants as young as 6-14 months have shown their ability to put “two and two together”; understand that individuals with the same tastes have an increased likelihood of liking each other (Lieberman et al., 2021). By the time children reach age five, they even have in-group biases (bias for sameness) that is akin to the in-group bias of adults (Dunham et al., 2013). Homophily, our unconscious endemic proclivity for matching, ultimately has both positive and negative affective, cognitive, and behavioral consequences.

Social Homophily & Political Decision Making

So, what does social homophily, our like-minded nature, tell us about how forms of capital may relate to the formation of partisan identification and how we make partisan choices? Social homophily acknowledges that Americans are generally ‘ideologically innocent’, and non-reflective thinkers. It suggests that peoples’ attraction to parties and candidates is based on commonality (a sense of belonging). Voters rely on readily available cues which they believe indicate a candidate’s ‘trustworthiness’ and ‘competence’. Political and partisan decision making is thus a function of in-group bias more than it results from sophisticated ideological reasoning and utility maximization. In other words, social homophily explains how voters will want to make partisan choices (support parties and candidates) with levels of human, financial, and cultural capital which mirror their own.

Let’s take the example of Jim, a standard white middle-aged voter in U.S. US. Jim doesn’t have strong beliefs on specific social welfare policies or most issues, but he gets annoyed when he

sees politicians using big words, ‘beating around the bush’, and drinking \$7 lattes. This is not something he or his friends/family would ever do. Jim also thinks it’s wrong to ‘take handouts’ from the government; he believes that part of life is working for what you earn and ‘sucking it up’. He admires the rich for their ‘hard work’ and ‘success’ but has a lot of disdain for people who got rich by not playing by the rules. Jim follows the rules because he ‘knows that’s how you stay out of trouble’ and finds it distasteful when individuals question or break them. He sees on the TV that Democrats like Obama eat Kale, shop at Whole Foods, hate Chick-Fila-A, and think eating red meat is bad for the environment. He remembers that Jon Kerry likes to water surf and Hilary Clinton got rich off being a politician/networking. And while Jim doesn’t distrust and dislikes all politicians, Republicans like George W. Bush at least eat meat and potatoes, watch sports like baseball, drink beer, don’t complain about how things in life should be free, and will enforce the rules. Furthermore, Jim gets annoyed when he sees politicians argue that college should be free or suggest that everyone should go. He didn’t go to college and his children went to trade school. He feels angry when the liberals he knows assume that he’s racist just because he didn’t spend money on a four-year degree and likes that Trump doesn’t talk down to him. These tastes choices/expressions are enough for Jim to know he won’t be voting for any Democrats.

While this may seem like an extreme example, Jim isn’t alone. Hetherington & Weiler (2018) found that individuals feel more positively towards others who drive the same car, buy coffee at the same coffee-shops, and eat at the same fast-food restaurants as themselves. Van Noord et al., (2022) discovered that college educated voters are more attracted to candidates with college degrees, regardless of the candidates's perceived level of competence. Moreover, Settle (2018) found through experiments and panel data with Facebook users that social media has made it easier for non-politically savvy individuals to engage in by-product learning about what tastes go with what party.

Social homophily – similarities in educational attainment, income, tastes, and speech/behavioral norms thus seem like good reasons for cognitively taxed voters or non-politically savvy individuals to back candidates for office. In fact, Fenno (1978) famously concluded in *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts* that politicians don't win elections by give compelling speeches about current events. Fenno (1978) found that candidates won campaigns by giving off “impressions” that say to potential voters, “I'm one of you”, “You can trust me because we are like one another” “I understand your situation and I care about it”; “I can put myself in your shoes”; and “I can see the world the way you do” (p. 59). A popular example of this phenomena can be seen in a 2004 Club for Growth TV advertisement where an individual explains that his dislike for Howard Dean, a presential candidate, is rooted in Dean's tastes. The individual in the commercial states, “What do I think? Well, I think Howard Dean should take his tax-hiking, government-expanding, latte-drinking, sushi eating, Volvo-driving, New York Times–reading, body-piercing, Hollywood-loving left wing freak show back to Vermont where it belongs.” Another more positive example of an elected official giving off a ‘vibe’ to gain support can be seen in the 2022 campaign of Senator John Fetterman (D-PA). Fetterman demonstrated his understanding of ‘low status tastes’ and ‘everyday people’ through campaigning in basketball shorts and Carhartt hoodies. The first thing you read on his website even draws attention to his style, as it states, “John Fetterman doesn't look like a typical politician, and more importantly, he doesn't act like one.” For better or worse, candidate tastes, non-verbal behavior, and habits of speech are used as a credentials to signal competence and gain the trust of voters.

More recently, the ‘politicization’ of cultural and human capital and the implications of not having that sort of homophilic representation is apparent in the prominent qualitative work of Cramer (2016) and Hochschild (2016). Hochschild (2016) found that Tea Party activists with high and low financial capital had a common grievance: they felt their lifestyles were being disrespected.

Cramer (2016) came to a similar conclusion in her fieldwork with rural residents in WI. She found that rural identity was more than an attachment to place or out group resentment—it was about how rural people felt ignored in decisions, believed that they weren't getting their fair share of resources, and perceived that they differ from elites/urban dwellers in terms of lifestyles, values, and work ethics. In both studies, voters' feelings of differences from political elites went beyond policy preferences, ideology, and partisanship.

In many ways then, voters can be thought of as being similar to hiring managers. They are self-interested and want to acquire more resources, but their thought process is also heavily clouded by their homophilic tendencies. Voters' perceptions of whether a candidate can govern effectively or whether they can trust a candidate is a function of the number of important characteristics they share with their candidate. In other words, 'vibes' are just as (if not more) important to voters than a representative's prior legislative record just like 'fit' is more important to hiring managers than a GPA.

Social Homophily, Human/Financial Capital, & Partisan Choice

If voters evaluate political parties and make partisan choices by looking to see whether they share important characteristics and attributes like gender, race, financial capital, cultural capital, and financial capital with the party's voting base and candidates, which party is the party for people with high financial, human, and or/cultural capital? There are few differences between Republican and Democratic candidates and officeholders in terms of their wealth, educational attainment, and occupational backgrounds. A majority of members of Congress are millionaires (Evers-Hillstrom, 2020) and more than 90% of members of Congress have college degrees (Schaeffer, 2023). House

Democrats are wealthier than House Republicans, but Senate Republicans have a net worth that is greater than Senate Democrats (Hawkings, 2018).

The few class-based differences that emerge between Republicans and Democrats in Congress, however, follow a similar pattern to the electorate. Republicans make up most of the MCs without a college degree and are more likely than Democrats to hire non-Ivy league graduates on their staff (Kreiss, 2019). 19.6% of Democrats versus 13.0% of Republicans in general congressional elections from 2008 to 2014 were attorneys (Goggin & Theodoridis, 2020). Meanwhile 27.8% of Republicans and 14.9% of Democrats running for Congress in this time period were business owners (Goggin & Theodoridis, 2020). Given the few occupational, educational, and financial differences between Republicans and Democrats in Congress, neither party appears to stand out as a home for people with high financial or human capital.

But what about the base of each party? The Democratic party is composed of a series of social groups such as white college educated women, millennial women (25-39), Hispanic Catholics, the religiously unaffiliated, urban Northeasterners, and Black women (Grossman & Hopkins, 2016). Democratic voters are split in terms of educational attainment and race. People of color constitute about 40% of the Democratic party and the proportion of non-college-educated voters to college-educated voters in the Democratic party is roughly equal (Grossman & Hopkins, 2016). The Republican party base, on the other hand, is homogenous in terms of education and race. It comprises white evangelical Protestants, white non-college educated men, rural Southerners, regular church attenders, and GenX men (40-55) (Grossman & Hopkins, 2016). White people make up about 85% of the Republican party and white non-college educated voters are the majority faction (Grossman & Hopkins, 2016). Considering the demographics of the parties' bases alone, the Democratic party seems to be the party of the educated (H3).

Still, people's conceptions of the parties can differ greatly from their actual demographic makeup. Brewer (2009) and Ahler & Sood (2018) have both investigated what comes to mind when people think about Republicans and Democrats. Ahler & Sood (2018) found that while just 2.2% of Republicans earn over \$250,00 a year, Democrats think its 44.1% and Republicans 33.3%. Rothschild et al., (2019) built on Ahler & Sood's (2018) work on party stereotypes by asking survey respondents open ended questions about what images come to mind they think about each party's base. They then analyzed the responses using machine learning. They found that Democrats were most frequently seen as liberal, progressive, young, urban, minorities, open minded, caring, young, smart, poor, equality minded, educated, and ignorant. Republicans were most commonly viewed as conservative, rich, white, prejudiced, senior citizens, ignorant, self-interested, religious, trade focused, and close minded. The images that come to respondents' mind clearly differ depending upon political knowledge and partisan affiliation (hence why both Democrats and Republicans were viewed as ignorant), but overall stereotypes of the parties are more consistent than not with actual partisan traits and demographics. Because people characterize parties based on group identities, issue preferences, and individual traits, we would expect income (H1) and wealth (H2) to be positively associated with Republican partisan choice and human capital to be negatively associated with Democratic partisan choice (H3).

The demographic profiles of members of Congress and party supporters, however, are less important than how the party presents itself to the public. As Fenno (1978) outlines in *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts* politicians can signal that they – and by extension, members of their party -- are the party of the college-educated, low status, or the working-class, regardless of their individual achievements and biographic details. Parties and their members can compensate for their

unmatched high levels of human or financial capital by making positive (or negative) references to people without a college education, the poor, the rich etc. (Robison et al., 2021)

Democratic politicians signal they are a party for the educated through making appeals to science, praising the importance of a college education (everyone should go), and arguing the need for college debt forgiveness. They rely heavily on ‘facts’ or research from universities to make their policy based claims (Grossman and Hopkins, 2016). Republicans, on the other hand, appear to be more “representative” of the non-college educated, the wealthy, and blue-collar workers. Trump publicly criticized “professionals” (climate scientists, professors, health officials, and political elites) and praised non-college educated votes. He even stated, “I love the poorly educated” after winning a Nevada Republican primary caucus. Meanwhile, Fox News has been both praised and castigated for its anti-intellectual format. Conservative media figures like Rush Limbaugh downplay their elite educational backgrounds or take pride in not having a college education (Peck, 2019). In doing so, Republicans promote the idea that you don’t need a college degree to understand politics (or be a ‘good’ Republican) (Peck, 2019). Taken in combination, if voters solely rely on information about the actual or perceived demographic makeup of the parties and/or party signaling to determine which party better represents them, we can expect people with low income (H1) and low wealth (H2) and high human capital to make Democratic partisan choices (H3).

Cultural Capital, Social Homophily & Partisanship Identification

Attraction to parties and candidates based on ‘sameness’ not only occurs in relation to human and financial capital, but also cultural capital. Our theory of social homophily suggests that voters identify with parties which have the same tastes and behavioral/presentation norms as their own.

Which party is associated with low vs. highbrow tastes? When individuals in a survey were asked an open-ended question about what foods, activities, and products were associated with Democrats and Republicans, a few patterns emerged. Guns, trucks, hunting, steak, football, country music, SUVs, BBQ, potatoes, pickups, confederate flags, foxes, hats, beer, and NASCAR were all associated with the Republican party (Hiaeshutter-Rice et al., 2021) Democrats were associated with vegans, electric music, yoga, basketball, hiking, vegetarians, Starbucks, I-phones, recycling, Toyotas, coffee, Hondas, tofu, health, signs, hybrids, art, and books. Hiaeshutter-Rice et al. (2021) found similar results when they asked survey respondents to rate a list of 26 pre-selected objects as being more Republican or Democratic. Hunting, NASCAR, church, country music, football, BBQ, burgers, beer, camping, and liquor were all perceived as ‘Republican’, whereas pant suits, wine, charity, soccer, microbeers, lattes, organic food, vegan food, and tattoos were all perceived as ‘Democratic’. The associations voters make between tastes and partisanship is so strong that it even translates into candidate evaluations. When candidates were seen engaging in these tastes in a campaign photo, perceptions of the candidate’s partisanship changed. As we can see, respondents’ contrasting perceptions of the parties mirror the taste divide between individuals high and low in cultural capital.

The Republican party has also recently and successfully doubled down on being the party for individuals with low status tastes. Because individuals can have high financial and human capital, despite having low levels of human capital, political elites have a unique opportunity to signal to their constituents that they are ‘one of them’ based on their cultural capital. Former party leaders like George W. Bush provide great examples as to how politically powerful privately educated millionaires can signal to their voters that they are actually ‘non-elite’ or ‘one of the left behind’. For instance when describing what President George W. Bush does in his free time, the Washington

Post Stated, “On most of the 365 days he has enjoyed at his secluded ranch here, President Bush’s idea of paradise is to hop in his white Ford pickup truck in jeans and work boots, drive to a stand of cedars, and whack the trees to the ground” (Rein, 2005).

Republican politicians and media pundits have also signaled that they are ‘common people’ through their alignment with the country music industry in the 1960s and 1970s and their food preferences (Peck, 2019). Despite the popularity of country music in the U.S., President Nixon was the first president to visit the Grand Ole Opry (Preece et al., 2016). He even invited Merle Haggard to the White House to sing “Okie from Muskogee”. Today, Fox News and others conservative media outlets regularly bring on guests who would be considered to have low cultural capital. These guests then sympathize with voters who feel looked down upon for their low levels of cultural capital, strengthening the connection between the Republican party and people with low cultural capital.

And while both Democrats and Republicans shine light on low status tastes, Democrats generally do so ironically (Preece et al., 2016). For example, the background in the *Colbert Report* is “Merica” themed. This is ironic because patriotism is perceived to be tacky to individuals high in cultural capital. Low status Republican media pundits like Sean Hannity, however, display patriotism sincerely. Moreover, while high profile liberals and Democratic figures might reveal that they too enjoy “Baconnaise” and a “pancake wrapped sausage on a stick” during the “Pantry of Shame” section the *Daily Show*, these foods had no ‘shame’ attached to them for Bill O’Reilly. Unlike Democrats, Republican elites’ engagement with low-status food, music, and hobbies is more genuine.

Low status behavioral norms are also better reflected in Republican elite behavior than Democratic elite behavior. Individuals with low cultural capital have been taught that the world is

not their own, life isn't fair, to play by the rules, and to make the best out of their situation (Lareau and McCrory 2012; Stephens, Townsend, and Dittmann 2019). In contrast to people with low cultural capital, individuals with high cultural capital feel entitled to challenging group norms and preferences. Democrats and individuals with high cultural capital consequently appear to have a similar mental map of what 'good behavior' looks like. Entitlement is central to their platform as they advocate those who 'have less' deserve more. Democratic candidates and voters also pride themselves on challenging social and cultural norms and their thoughtful choice of words. In fact, Freeman, (1986) described the Democratic Party culture as being open, loud, confrontational, and factitious. It is best suited for individuals with high levels of cultural capital who are willing to debate, artfully rearrange power hierarchies, and make their opinions heard.

The Republican party on the other hand, castigates 'entitlement'. Republicans argue that those with less need perseverance and a sense of personal responsibility rather than government attention or help. For instance, Romney told his donors, "There are 47 percent of the people who will vote for the president no matter what. All right, there are 47 percent who are with him, who are dependent upon government, who believe that they are victims, who believe the government has a responsibility to care for them, who believe that they are entitled to health care, to food, to housing, to you-name-it. That's an entitlement." In this way, Republican expectations tap into low status behavioral norms like self-reliance. They both emphasize, 'fitting in', 'rules', 'order', and "pulling oneself up from their bootstraps". In fact, when survey respondents were asked to think about what traits are associated with candidates from both parties, Republicans demonstrated trait ownership over being 'hard-working' (Goggin & Theodoridis, 2017). Furthermore, because power in the Republican party flows downwards rather than upwards, Republican party culture has been described as homogenous, closed, and consciousness (Freeman, 1986). The Republican party is a

better fit than the Democratic party for individuals with low status behavioral norms, who are more focused on fitting in and self-reliance rather than standing out.

Finally, Republicans model low status behavioral norms through their speech. Unlike individuals with low-cultural capital, Democrats and individuals with high cultural capital use complex prose and conditional statements rather than direct and simple language (Lareau and McCrory Calarco 2012; Stephens, Townsend, and Dittmann 2019). In fact, when Tucker et al., (2019) analyzed all congressional one minute speeches from 1873 to 2010 in term of their readability, word diversity, and word homogeneity, he found that since the 21st century, Republican speeches had a higher readability score and less word diversity than Democratic speeches at the $p < 0.05$. The differences in speech styles of Republicans and Democrats have grown over time and were the largest since the beginning of the 20th century.

Outside of Congress, Trump's presentation also exemplifies the connection between 'low status' behavioral norms and Republican PID. Trump's speeches ranked 25/26 in word size, 26/26 on word variety, 3/26 on self-references, and 2/26 on words used in relation to other people (i.e., brother, people, aunt, friends) compared to all other major party presidential candidates from 1948-2016 (Hart, 2020). Trump also notably paused less often than other candidates and mainly used single-syllable words (Hart, 2020). Because we think about candidates and parties by asking ourselves "are these people like me?" and we are naturally more likely to trust individuals with the same behavioral norms and tastes as our own, we can expect higher status tastes and behavioral norms to be associated with stronger Democratic PID and/or Democratic partisan choice.

A Note on Occupation

Although Trump publicly criticized "professionals" (climate scientists, professors, health officials, and political elites), most Republican and Democratic appeals based on human capital have

been focused on educational status rather the occupation status. In fact, there are not clear occupational divides or differences between Republicans and Democrats at the elite or mass level (Senior, 2020). And while Democrats have been more supportive of unions and collective bargaining rights, when union membership is associated with Democratic vote choice, participation in a union is not specific to higher or lower occupational status (Newport et al., 2011). For example, the first and second largest employment sectors with the highest union membership are protective services and education (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2022), when teachers/librarians and would be considered professionals on Manza and Brooks (2008) and Goldthorpe's (1992) canonical occupational coding schemes.¹⁹ We have also recently seen a rise in labor organization amongst professionals after major tech layoffs (Rosenberg, 2021). Furthermore, multi-variable logistic regression analysis indicates that the link between union membership and Democratic partisan choice is mainly driven by differences in the racial make-up of union employees vs. non-union employees (Silver 2011).

Finally, there is not a strong theoretical reason to believe that occupation is tied to party ID because occupational differences were missing from individuals' images of parties (Ahler & Sood, 2018; Brewer, 2009). Given this and the fact that occupational status was not associated with PID in GSS data from 1991-2011 and 2016-2021, I do not expect occupational status to be a significant predictor of PID. It is for this reason that I do not include a hypothesis about occupational status (nor do I focus on its relationship with partisan choice in future chapters) in the Table 3.1 Summary of Hypotheses, even though I consider occupational status to be a factor composing social class.

¹⁹ Protective service occupations would be mostly likely to be classified as mid-tier depending upon the position

Form of Capital	Table 3.1 Summary of Hypotheses
Financial	H1: Increasing income is associated with Republican partisan choice H2: Greater wealth is associated with Republican partisan choice
Human	H3: Having a college education is associated with Democratic partisan choice
Cultural	H4: Higher status tastes are associated with Democratic partisan choice H5: Higher status behavioral norms are associated with Democratic partisan choice.

Putting it Together

People are both inherently self-interested and homophilic. The readily availableness of candidates' cultural cues and party stereotypes, alongside the stickiness and salience of cultural capital and wealth make it worthwhile and (frankly easy) for voters to determine which party is for 'people like me' or will at least enhance their resources and social standing. So, what does my conceptualization and measurement of social class bring to the table above and beyond common indicators of social class? While I predict that education and income will continue to have a relationship with partisan choice in isolation, as prior studies have shown, I also anticipate that cultural capital and wealth will make independent contributions to explaining partisanship and partisan choice above and beyond education, occupation, and income.

I also acknowledge that that not all aspects of social class are the same and are politicized to differing extents. In other words, I expect that when we reduce social class to just income or education, we will find that social class is often 'largely insignificant' once controlling for demographic characteristics and other identity based traits/attitudinal variables. However, this is not likely to be the case when we define social class in a more compressive manner.

Furthermore, while cultural and human capital should map positively onto Democratic PID and partisan choice, I expect to the find the opposite for financial capital. If we only define social class in terms of income or education (or equate the two as social class) we consequently misunderstand

both the significance of social class as well as the direction in which social class maps onto PID and partisan choice.

Overall, I argue that we as a field do not fully understand social class nor how it consequently affects partisan choice because we have forgotten to consider key components of social class like cultural capital and wealth . While two sets of individuals without a college degree may seem ‘working-class’ or ‘non-elite’ based on a few indicators on an ANES survey, their net worth and cultural capital potentially tells us a different story about their social class, and how it maps onto partisan choice. By providing a richer conceptualization and measure of social class, we are better able to understand the strength and the direction of the relationship between partisan choice and social class. We may thus find that white ‘working-class’, ‘non-elite’, and ‘elite’ individuals aren’t voting against their own interests after all.

Chapter 4: Operationalizing Wealth and Cultural Capital

We can understand social class to be the result of a series of economic attributes and non-material characteristics which can be organized into three forms of capital: human capital (education and occupation), financial capital (labor income and wealth), and cultural capital (behavioral norms and tastes). Human capital can be captured through traditional measures of educational attainment and occupation status through Manza and Brooks' (2008) popular occupation coding scheme²⁰. Financial capital has been quantified through measures of household income; the amount of revenue all members of a family have made during the past 12 months before taxes. The other aspect of financial capital-wealth, and cultural capital, however, have not been measured in political science.

Cultural capital originates back to Bourdieu's cultural capital theory in the 1980's. The central idea is that tastes, preferences, and ways of being operate like assets. Tastes and behavioral norms are something individuals can accrue over time and later 'cash in'. Since the 1980's sociologists and social psychologists have built upon Bourdieu's cultural capital theory to examine how individuals' specific hobbies, food preferences, and behaviors influence their likelihood of being hired, educational outcomes, and their perceived competence (Thomas, 2018). Yet despite these advancements in other fields, cultural capital has not been conceptualized as a face of social class in public opinion and political behavior literature.

²⁰ (1) professionals (both salaried and self-employed, including lawyers, physicians, engineers, teachers, scientists, writers, editors, and social workers), managers and administrators (all non-retail sales managers); (2) the self-employed (owners, proprietors, and other non-professional self-employed persons including farm owners); (3) routine white-collar workers (retail, sales, clerical, and white collar service workers); (4) skilled manual workers & supervisors (skilled workers and foreman in all industries); (5) non-skilled manual workers (nonskilled working in all industries including farming and services); (6) and non-full-time labor force participants (homemakers, retirees, students, and the disabled working less than 20 hours a week).

While Chapter Two focused on defining human, financial, and cultural capital in greater depth, this chapter focuses on another important part of scale construction: operationalization and measurement validation. As Adcock and Collier (2001) stated when establishing a standard of measurement validity for qualitative and quantitative research, “Researchers routinely make complex choices about linking concepts to observations, that is, about connecting ideas with facts. These choices raise the basic question of measurement validity: Do the observations meaningfully capture the ideas contained in the concepts” (529). Here, I outline the methods and data I used to come up with three original scales (wealth, tastes, and behavioral norms) for capturing different faces of social class and note the metrics of each.

Content Validity:

Although scholars within and across political science and sociology acknowledge that their favored measure of social class is a proxy, and that social class is more than a sum of its economic parts, the cultural aspects of class have not been included in models predicting public opinion. Moreover, social class has generally been reduced to education, income, or occupation, thereby ignoring how wealth is also an aspect of social class. But while conceptualization²¹ is the first step in being able to potentially better explain how aspects of social class relate to partisan identification, content validation (a part of the measurement process), is another process we must undergo to better understand the role that social class has in public opinion and political behavior. Adcock and Collier (2001) define content validity as the “assessment of the degree to which an indicator

²¹ Adcock and Collier (2001) break down the process of measurement validation into four levels (or steps). The first and second pertain to conceptualization. They state, “At the broadest level is the background concept, which encompasses the constellation of potentially diverse meanings associated with a given concept. Next is the systematized concept, the specific formulation of a concept adopted by a particular researcher or group of researchers. It is usually formulated in terms of an explicit definition” (530). Conceptualization of social class was covered in Chapter Two.

represents the universe of content entailed in the systemized concept being measured” (537). They then pose a series of questions which researchers can ask themselves in order determine whether “a given indicator adequately captures the full content of the systematized concept” (538). Adcock and Collier (2001) ask, “First, are key elements omitted from the indicator? Second, are inappropriate elements included in the indicator?” (538). In this section, I briefly review how I conceptualize wealth, tastes, and behavioral norms before I explain how I operationalize²² each of these three concepts.

First, wealth can be understood as a person’s overall net worth. Thus, to quantify an individual’s wealth, I need to come up with a series of questions which are exhaustive in capturing an individual’s assets and debts. Luckily, the University of Michigan’s Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) has been doing this since 1968. They unfortunately capture individual wealth, however, through asking respondents hundreds of open-ended questions. The response format of the PSID questions is not ideal for studying how wealth relates to partisan choice because open ended questions are 1) time consuming for respondents, 2) expensive to administer, and 3) lead to social desirability bias in reporting. Moreover, because so few Americans currently have pension plans or the rights to a trust or estate, the PSID also asks many questions which are irrelevant to most Americans. With these issues in mind, I selected 8 PSID questions which I saw as most important for being able to capture the wealth of the average American. I then altered these questions for brevity and to be in a multiple-choice format. Finally, I piloted these 8 questions on a Prolific Survey with 1,654 self-identified white respondents in August of 2022.

²² Adcock and Collier (2001) define the task of operationalization as “Developing, on the basis of a systematized concept, one or more indicators for scoring/classifying” (531).

Second, cultural capital can be understood as tastes (preferences for foods, hobbies, music genres, and activities that signify cultural status) and behavioral norms ('unwritten rules of conduct' which exist in long-term memory and guide the way we express ourselves in social interactions). (Stephens, Markus, and Phillips 2014). But how did I determine what behavioral norms were worth asking respondents about or how to ask about them in a way that is not cognitively taxing to answer? As previously mentioned, the idea of cultural capital originates from Bourdieu's cultural capital theory in the 1980's. Behavioral norms are akin to what Bourdieu saw as 'embodied capital'. Sociologists and social psychologists influenced by Bourdieu's work have since focused on delineating a more specified list of behavioral norms which disadvantage (or advantage) individuals in schools, doctors' offices, and workplaces over time. I thus relied on the findings of prior literature to come up with a comprehensive list of behavioral norms.

What has prior work found? Qualitative and quantitative work which has sought to apply Bourdieu's cultural capital theory in the United States has largely focused on how the children of non-elite parents learn that the world is not their own, life isn't fair, to play by the rules, and to make the best out of their situation (Lareau and McCrory Calarco 2012; Stephens, Townsend, and Dittmann 2019). This is evident in their prioritization of obedience over reasoning and physical safety over verbal skills (Putnam, 2015). For instance, individuals with low status behavioral norms are more likely to use spanking rather than 'verbally reasoning' if their children are not behaving, and are also more likely to use more verbal discouragements than verbal encouragements with their children (Lareau, 2003; Putnam, 2015). As a function of being told to 'play by the rules' and for paying their consequences when they are not followed, non-elite children and their parents unsurprisingly have been shown to challenge authority figures less often than their elite counterparts (Lareau and McCrory Calarco 2012; Stephens, Townsend, and Dittmann 2019). Children of elite

parents, on the other hand, are applauded for status-seeking behavior and are taught to value verbal sophistication and negotiation (Phillips et al., 2020; N. M. Stephens et al., 2019). Adults and children with high status behavioral norms thus feel comfortable challenging group norms and preferences in the workplace, at home, and during school (Calarco, 2011; Streib, 2011) They tend to be more self-focused and behave in more-status seeking ways like asking for referrals (Chua et al., 2021; Chua & Mazmanian, 2020) than individuals with low status behavioral norms. Based on the examples, themes, and major findings of studies which have examined Bourdieu's 'embodied capital' in practice in the United States, I came up with 16 original items to operationalize behavioral norms. For each of the items respondents were asked to read about some factitious people. They were then instructed to choose a response which indicated how much the person in the description is like them on a 1-5 scale (not at all like me to very much like me). These are listed below in Table 4.1

Table 4.1 Behavioral Norms and Presentation Style Items
[She/he/they] thinks a child should be punished for talking back to an adult (Low status item)
[She/he/they] tells herself and others to 'suck it up' when something bad happens to them (Low status item)
[She/he/they] is willing to spank a kid for behaving poorly (Low status item)
[She/he/they] thinks people are too sensitive these days (Low status item)
[She/he/they] thinks it's okay to challenge authority figures (High status item)
[She/he/they] avoids using big words (Low status item)
[She/he/they] would be disappointed if she had a child who did not graduate with a 4-year college degree (High status item)
[She/he/they] generally follows the rules, even when she knows she won't get caught for breaking them (Low status item)
[She/he/they] would rather do something by herself and fail then accept help from others and succeed (Low status item)
[She/he/they] thinks parents get too involved with their children's lives today (Low status item)
[She/he/they] is reluctant to brag about her accomplishments (Low status item)
[She/he/they] makes her feelings and needs known to those around her (High status item)
[She/he/they] thinks it's okay for a student to ask for an exam to be regraded if the student did not agree with the grade (High status item)
Even if [she/he/they] struggling financially, she would not accept help from the government (Low status item)

[She/he/they] tries to avoid standing out in a crowd (Low status item)
[She/he/they] thinks "networking" is wrong (Low status item)

It is imperative to note that many of the behavioral norms items are similar to the four child rearing questions used to capture the conventionalism/conformity and obedience dimensions of authoritarianism. This is to be expected as there is some conceptual overlap between authoritarianism and behavioral norms. Behavior norms, however, encompasses more than just the conventionalism/conformity and obedience aspects of authoritarianism; similar to how authoritarianism has multiple subcomponents (conventionalism, moral absolutism, obedience to authority, and cynicism) (Duckitt & Bizumic, 2013; Feldman, 2003). Thus while there is some conceptual overlap between authoritarianism and behavioral norms, they are still not the exact same conceptually, and should be similar (but not exactly the same) empirically.

Similar to my process for capturing and quantifying behavioral norms, I relied on the findings of prior experimental work to come up with a list of hobbies, interests, and food preferences which are ascribed differing levels of status and respect (Nicols 2023; Rivera & Tilcsik, 2016; Thomas, 2018). This list is not exhaustive, however. To come up with a more comprehensive list of tastes items, I conducted a quick validation study with 401 white Prolific participants in October of 2022²³, where respondents were asked to rate a list of taste items as unsophisticated/sophisticated or trashy/classy on a 1-10 scale.²⁴ Respondents were provided with

²³ Prolific allows researchers to use stored demographic characteristics as screeners for their studies. This survey was shown to individuals who identified as white to Prolific. I also included a question about race/ethnicity where respondents were asked to click which racial or ethnic group best described them (White, Black or African America, Hispanic or Latino, Asian or Asian-American, Middle Eastern, Mixed Race, Other (Open Text Box), Native American). Respondents were included in the study if they identified as White, regardless of whether they checked additional boxes.

²⁴ The demographic characteristics of the participants are as follows: 49.4% of respondents identified as men and 42.3% of respondents had at least a 4-year college degree. The breakdown of respondents'

the followings prompts: (1) “Here we briefly note some activities, hobbies, and interests. Please rate the extent to which you think these activities, hobbies, and interests are likely to be perceived by others as “sophisticated/unsophisticated” on a scale of 0 to 10. Ratings between 5 and 10 mean that you think these activities, hobbies, and interests are likely to be perceived by others as “sophisticated”. Ratings between 0 and 5 mean that you think these activities, hobbies, and interests are perceived by others as “unsophisticated” and (2) Here we list some foods and beverages. Please rate the extent to which you think these foods and beverages are likely to be perceived by others as classy/trashy on a scale of 0 to 10. Ratings between 5 and 10 mean that you think these foods and beverages are likely to be perceived by others as “classy”. Ratings between 0 and 5 mean that you think these food and beverages are perceived to be “trashy” by others.” Half of respondents were presented with the prompt which used the language of classy/trashy and the other half with the language in the prompt using sophisticated/unsophisticated. In total, respondents were asked to rate 40 activities, hobbies, and interests and 46 foods and beverages. The ratings of each of the 86 items are provided in the Chapter Four Appendix. The range of perceived ‘sophistication’ ratings for hobbies and interests was 2.3 (wrestling) to 8.3 (orchestra) and it was 1.3 (mayonnaise sandwich) to 8.1 (artisanal wine) for foods and beverages.

partisan identifications is as follows: strong Democrats (31.34%), weak Democrats (17.41%), Democratic leaners (13.43%), true Independents (14.68%), Republican leaners (5.22%), weak Republicans (11.44%) and strong Republicans (6.22%). The pilot survey is clearly a convenient sample, as the partisan leanings and the educational attainment of the respondent pool is not representative of the American public. This is because all users of the Prolific platform were invited to take a survey estimated to take 7-9 minutes when the registered Prolific users are not fully representative of the American public. Survey participants were paid for their time and efforts. The actual average time was 11 minutes, so the original quote of \$1.33 for completion of the survey was increased to account for the additional time respondents spent.

After looking at the list of 86 items and their ratings, I selected 12 high status and 12 low-status tastes items which varied in terms of their perceived sophistication/class rating and scaled well together. The chosen low-status tastes items and the 12 chosen high-status can be found in the Chapter Four Appendix. It's important to note, however, that because respondents were asked whether these items are likely to be perceived by others as sophisticated/unsophisticated or classy/trashy, the Cronbach's alpha for the 12 low-status items and the Cronbach's alpha for the 12 high-status items indicate the extent to which respondents who for example, rate 'country music' as 'low-status' also rate 'rodeo' as 'low-status'. The Cronbach's alpha for the 12 high status items is 0.92 and the Cronbach's alpha for the 12 low status items is 0.88.

Prolific Data

I relied on original survey data from three survey platforms for this dissertation. I then built original scales of wealth, behavioral norms, and tastes with the survey data from the three platforms to assess the relationship between aspects of social class and partisan choice. I outline the specific details of each dataset below.

The first set of data I used was original survey data via Prolific. The survey was made available to participants on the Prolific platform who identify as white, are at least 18 years old, are a US citizen, and speak English. This survey was funded by a Claggett Research Fellowship from the University of Minnesota Political Science Department and a research grant from the University of Minnesota Center for the Study of Political Psychology. The expected survey time was 15 minutes and respondents were paid \$2.07 for their time and effort. The actual average survey duration was 13 minutes. Questions relating to respondents' annual household income, gender, age, region, place of residence, educational attainment, occupational status, and PID were included on the survey. Annual

household income, educational attainment, and occupational status were all rescaled to be from 0-1. Respondents were also asked about their assets/debts, preferences for 24 foods/drinks/activities, and the extent to which behaviors of a fictitious person with the same gender identification seemed like them. The Chapter Three Appendix includes the specific question wording for all survey measures. Following Prolific policy, respondents were excluded from the study if they failed the two attention checks at the beginning of the survey. 1,210 respondents completed the survey in November of 2022.

The second set of data I used was original survey panel data via Bovitz. This data is from a multi-investigator study conducted and funded by the University of Minnesota Study Center for the Study of Political Psychology. The expected survey time for each of the three waves was 20 minutes. Respondents who completed wave 1 were paid \$2.50 plus one Bovitz loyalty credit and respondents who completed wave 2 were paid an additional \$2.50 + 1 Bovitz loyalty credit. The actual average survey duration for wave 1 was 20 minutes and 23 minutes for wave 2.²⁵ Questions relating to respondents' annual household income, place of residence, educational attainment, occupational status, and PID were included on the first wave of the survey. Participants were also provided with a multiple-choice question pertaining to their estimated net worth before they were provided with the eight wealth scale items. Wave one also included measures of authoritarianism, and racial resentment.

Respondents were asked to complete the tastes and the behavioral norm scales in wave 2, along with a question pertaining to the strength of their racial identity. The Chapter Three Appendix

²⁵ The calculated average survey time for wave 2 does not include the survey times of outliers or those who spent more than two hours on the survey. The items I am using in my analysis from Wave 2 of the Bovitz survey were listed towards the beginning of the survey.

includes the specific question wording and response options for all survey measures. Bovitz provided us with demographic information for all respondents (gender, racial identification, sexual orientation, age, marital status, and region of residence). Annual household income, educational attainment, and occupational status were all rescaled to be from 0-1. After dropping individuals who failed the first attention check and respondents who did not identify as white non-Hispanic, a total of 1,213 people completed wave 1 in December of 2022. 872 of the 1,213 white respondents who completed wave 1 completed wave 2 in March of 2023. For the sake of simplicity, I included the demographic characteristics of the 872 individuals who completed both wave 1 and wave 2 in Table 4.2.²⁶

The third set of data comes from AmeriSpeak NORC Omnibus. AmeriSpeak NORC is funded and operated by NORC at the University of Chicago. AmeriSpeak® is a probability-based panel designed to be representative of the US household population. Randomly selected US households are sampled using area probability and address-based sampling, with a known, non-zero probability of selection from the NORC National Sample Frame. These sampled households are then contacted by US mail, telephone, and field interviewers (face to face). The panel provides sample coverage of approximately 97% of the U.S. household population. There are roughly 50,000 households involved in the panel and 60,000 people. Those excluded from the sample include people with P.O. Box only addresses, some addresses not listed in the USPS Delivery Sequence File, and some newly constructed dwellings. This multi-stage clustering method is also used by the General Social Survey. While most AmeriSpeak households participate in surveys by web, non-

²⁶ Population data from the most recent Census is not included in Table 4.2 because the US Census does not provide the same categorical information for all the studied demographic characteristics in Prolific, Bovitz, and NORC samples. When U.S. Census data is available for making comparisons for white-non-Hispanic individuals, it is described in the text.

internet households can participate in AmeriSpeak surveys by telephone. Households without conventional internet access, but who have web access via smartphones are allowed to participate in AmeriSpeak surveys online. 1,000 participants of the AmeriSpeak panel were then randomly selected to complete my close ended survey questions, which were combined with other clients' survey questions, in March of 2023. Data from all 716 participants who reported identifying as white non-Hispanic were included in the analyses of this paper. The expected survey time for the entire study was 15 minutes. 2.79% of the 716 participants completed the survey by phone and all other participants completed the survey online. The actual average survey duration for participants interviewed by phone was 18 minutes. The average survey time was 14 minutes for online participants. The funding for this survey was generously provided by Rapoport Family Foundation. The questions in the NORC survey pertained to wealth, tastes, behavioral norms, strength of racial identity, authoritarianism, racial resentment, and partisan choice (PID and support for party leaders and partisan interest groups). The Chapter Three Appendix includes the specific question wording and response options for all measures. AmeriSpeak NORC provided profile information regarding participants' gender, age, education, race/ethnicity, partisanship, household income, marital status, region, and current employment status.

		Prolific	NORC	Bovitz	GSS
Gender	Woman	48.76%	75.98%	52.29%	55.16%
	Man	49.34%	24.20%	47.13%	44.84%
	Non-Binary	1.90%	0%	0.57%	---
Education	Less than high school degree	0.66%	3.63%	1.61%	5.07%
	High school degree	15.87%	16.34%	20.99%	39.99%
	Some college, but no degree/associates degree	32.48%	43.99%	40.71%	9.20%
	Bachelor's degree	34.55%	21.09%	23.51%	26.50%
	Postgraduate Degree	16.28%	14.94%	13.19%	19.24%
PID	Strong Democrats	22.23%	16.06%	22.36%	19.18%
	Weak Democrats	10.58%	10.61%	12.84%	12.70%
	Democratic Leaners	9.09%	11.73%	9.17%	11.80%
	True Independents	8.93%	14.39%	13.19%	18.75%

	Republican Leanners	6.03%	13.55%	9.17%	9.53%
	Weak Republicans	24.13%	14.11%	11.70%	11.86%
	Strong Republicans	19.01%	19.41%	21.56%	16.18%
Household Income	Less than \$15,000	8.18%	4.05%	11.37%	9.89%
	\$15,000 to \$24,999	9.75%	7.12%	12.51%	7.29%
	\$25,000 to \$34,999	10.00%	8.52%	12.63%	7.68%
	\$35,000 to \$49,999,	13.14%	11.31%	13.66%	11.03%
	50,000 to \$74,999,	16.36%	19.97%	17.45%	17.71%
	\$75,000 to \$99,000	12.15%	16.48%	10.10%	19.35%
	\$100,000 to \$149,000,	14.21%	19.13%	11.48%	10.04%
	\$150,000-174,999	9.17%	5.17%	6.20%	---
	\$175,000 to \$249,000	4.38%	---	2.64%	---
	\$250,000 or more	2.64%	---	1.95%	---
	\$150,000 or more	---	2.79%	---	17.00%
	\$175,000 to \$199,999	---	5.45%	---	---
	\$200,000 or more	---	---	---	---
Occupation	Non-full-time participants	21.65%	---	37.38%	---
	Non-skilled manual workers	4.79%	---	4.86%	---
	Skilled manual workers & supervisors	6.45%	---	7.64%	---
	Routine white-collar workers	17.11%	---	11.46%	---
	Self-employed	13.72%	---	12.15%	---
	Managers and Administrators	9.83%	---	7.99%	---
	Professionals	26.45%	---	18.52%	---
Employment Status	Working - as a paid employee	---	52.37%	---	---
	Working - self-employed	---	9.08%	---	---
	Not working - on temporary layoff from a job	---	1.40%	---	---
	Not working - looking for work	---	24.72%	---	---
	Not working - retired	---	6.70%	---	---
	Not working - disabled	---	6.70%	---	---
	Not working - other	---	4.19%	---	---
Geographic Region	Northeast	17.77%	15.92%	18.03%	---
	South	39.26%	31.56%	41.33%	---
	Midwest	24.71%	30.31%	25.83%	---
	West	18.26%	22.21%	14.81%	---
Population Density	Rural Town	18.93%			---
	Small Town	18.18%			---
	Suburb	41.74%			---
	City	21.26%			---
	Urban			22.09%	---
	Suburban			47.66%	---

	Rural			29.41%	---
	Don't Know			0.84%	---
	Metro		83.66%		---
	Non-Metro		16.34%		---
Age					
	18-24	6.12%	4.19%	5.16%	3.51%
	25-34	25.70%	16.48%	13.19%	12.61%
	35-44	26.12%	18.44%	15.60%	15.46%
	45-54	17.44%	12.71%	19.50%	13.89%
	55-64	16.12%	20.95%	20.99%	18.38%
	65-74	7.52%	17.32%	19.84%	18.42%
	75+	0.74%	9.92%	5.73%	17.73%

So how unrepresentative are the Prolific and Bovitz samples? According to US Census Data from 2020 and GSS data from 2021, Prolific and NORC respondents have similar household incomes and educational attainments to the average American. US Census data from 2020 shows 7.6% of white-non-Hispanic American households make less than \$15,000, (8.0%) \$15,000 to \$24,999, (7.5%) \$25,000 to \$34,999, (10.9%) \$35,000 to \$49,999, (16.1%) 50,000 to \$74,999, (12.7%) \$75,000 to \$99,000, (16.6%) \$100,000 to \$149,000, (9%) \$150,000 to \$199,999, (11.7%) \$200,000 and over a year²⁷. According to the U.S. Census Bureau approximately 41.9% of white-non-Hispanic people 25 years of age or older in the United States had a bachelor's degree or higher²⁸ in 2021, whereas this percentage was 52.64% in the Prolific sample, 35.98% in the NORC sample, and 37.24% in the Bovitz sample. Prolific respondents are thus more highly educated than the average American, but their household incomes are quite similar. A greater percentage of individuals in the NORC and Bovitz samples, however, do not have a bachelor's degree or higher.

²⁷ <https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2021/demo/p60-273.html>

²⁸ <https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2022/educational-attainment.html>

The NORC sample also has a much greater percentage of women than the Bovitz, Prolific, and GSS data. This may be because I was able to set quotas with no additional costs on the Prolific platform to keep a gender balance within the sample. In comparison, NORC does not set quotas on certain parameters when it distributes its survey to the 60,000 people involved in their representative panel. While a sample cannot truly be representative unless participants are selected randomly and all-American adults have a definite, non-zero chance of being selected, the Prolific, Bovitz, and NORC samples are still a good sample for inferring how aspects of social class map onto partisan choice based upon recent demographic data from the GSS and U.S. Census. This is because these are large samples which reflect the population in terms of the characteristics we care most about.

Measuring Wealth

Even though wealth has been well conceptualized as assets-debts, it has not been measured in public opinion and political behavior. I developed 8 questions to capture wealth based on questions about assets and debt in the University of Michigan's Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The original question wording for each item was largely kept, but I amended the response options for each item.

The item analysis (see Chapter Four Appendix) shows the six wealth items which were chosen to be made into an unweighted scale. The average interitem correlation for the scale is 0.4 in the Prolific, Bovitz, and NORC datasets. The sign was positive for all items, indicating that all wealth items are entered in the same direction. The item-test correlations are similar for each of the six wealth items, ranging from 0.66 to 0.82 in the Prolific sample, 0.69 to 0.83 in the Bovitz sample, and 0.62 to 0.81 in the NORC sample.

‘Other assets’ does have a lower rest score than the other wealth items in all the samples. More importantly though, the item analysis showed that the alpha for the scale would decrease if any of the items were dropped from the scale in the Bovitz sample. The alpha would remain the same if the ‘other assets’ item was dropped in the Prolific sample. Given this, we can conclude all the items seem to fit well in the scale. Overall, the wealth scale is reliable in all three samples. It has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.83 in the Prolific sample, 0.85 in the Bovitz sample, and 0.82 in the NORC sample. The exact question wording and response options for each of the six wealth items can be found below in Table 4.3.²⁹

Table 4.3 Wealth Scale
“The next set of questions are designed to give estimates of the wealth of families in the United States. In these questions, “family” means your family living there with you. Your responses are completely anonymous, and answering all questions is strongly encouraged.”
Vehicles: What about the value of vehicles, including any cars, trucks, motor homes, trailers, or boats – what are they worth all together, minus anything you [or anyone in your family living there] still owe on them? (0) No one in my household owns a vehicle (1) less than \$2,000 (2) \$2,000 to less than \$10,000 (3) \$10,000 to less than \$25,000 (4) \$25,000 to less than \$35,000 (5) \$35,000 to less than \$50,000 (6) \$50,000 or more
Stock Value: If you and your family sold all of your shares of stock in publicly held corporations, stock mutual funds, or investment trusts, (not including stock in retirement accounts) and paid off anything you owed on it, how much would you have? (0) No one in my household owns any stock
Real Estate: If you sold your home(s) and other real estate and other real estate that you own today, how much would you expect to get for these properties (minus how much you owe on them)? (0) No one in my household owns any real estate (1) Less than \$50,000 (2) \$50,000 to less than \$100,000 (2) \$100,000 to less than \$200,000 (3) \$200,000 to less than \$300,000 (4) \$300,000 to less than \$500,000 (5) \$500,000 to less than \$700,00 (6) \$700,000 to less than \$900,000 (7) More than \$900,000
Retirement Value: What is the approximate total dollar value of your family's retirement account(s)? (i.e., private annuities, pension plans, IRAs, 401(k), 403(b)) (0) No one in my household has a retirement account (1) Less than \$5,000 (2) \$5,000 to less than \$25,000 (3)

²⁹ All 1,210 respondents in the Prolific sample answered all six items in the wealth scale. 0.9% of respondents in the Bovitz sample **did not** answer all six wealth items. 6.14% respondents did not answer all the wealth questions in the NORC sample. The difference in response rates between the samples is likely explained by differences in survey duration, payment, survey platform policies, and the interviewers offering participants a ‘don’t know’ options in the NORC sample.


\$25,000 to less than \$75,000 (4) \$75,000 to less than \$200,000 (5) \$200,000 to less than \$400,000 (6) \$400,000 to less than \$600,000 (7) \$600,000 to less than \$800,000 (8) More than \$800,000

Savings: What's the total amount of money in your [all your family living there] checking(s) or saving(s) accounts combined? (0) Less than \$500 (1) \$500 to less than \$1,000 (2) \$1,000 to less than \$4,000 (3) \$4,000 to less than \$15,000 (4) \$15,000 to less than \$60,000 (7) \$60,000 or more

Other assets: What is the total cash value you and your family have in a life insurance policy, a valuable collection for investment purposes, or rights in a trust or estate? (0) Less than \$15,000 (1) \$15,000 to less than \$30,000 (2) \$30,000 to less than \$50,000 (3) \$50,000 to less than \$80,000 (4) \$80,000 to less than \$100,000 (5) \$100,000 to less than \$150,000 (6) \$150,000 to less than \$300,000 (7) \$300,000 to less than \$500,000 (8) \$500,000 to less than \$750,000 (9) \$750,000 or more (10) No one in my household has a life insurance policy, a valuable collection, or rights in an estate/trust

Other Assets: What is the total cash value you and your family have in a life insurance policy, a valuable collection for investment purposes, or rights in a trust or estate?(1)Less than \$15,000 (2)\$15,000 to less than \$30,000 (3)\$30,000 to less than \$50,000 (4)\$50,000 to less than \$80,000 (5)\$80,000 to less than \$100,000 (6)\$100,000 to less than \$150,000 (7) \$150,000 to less than \$300,000 (8) \$300,000 to less than \$500,000 (9) \$500,000 to less than \$750,000 (10)\$750,000 or more (11) No one in my household has a life insurance policy, a valuable collection, or rights in an estate/trust

Figure 4.1 Distribution of Wealth Scale in 2022 Surveys



The distribution of the ‘wealth’ scale when rescaled from 0-1 in the Prolific, Bovitz, and NORC samples is shown in Figure 4.1. The mean in the Prolific sample was .33, the range 0 to .96, and the standard deviation .21. The mean in the Bovitz sample was .30, the range of 0 to .96, and the standard deviation .22. Finally, the mean in the NORC sample was .43, the range 0 to 1, and the standard deviation .22. The distribution of wealth was heavily skewed towards the left in all three samples. This trend is unsurprising given the prevalence of intergenerational wealth inequality in the United States (Piketty et al., 2018)

Measuring Tastes


The list of the 12 high status and 12 low status tastes items from the validation study were included on the Prolific survey and in wave two of the Bovitz survey. Respondents were asked the extent to which they liked or participated in each of the taste items on a 1-5 Likert scale. To address survey automaticity, I reversed the direction of the prompt multiple times. Table 4.4 displays the exact question wording and response options for each of the items in the tastes scale. Preferences for low status items were reverse coded, so that ‘high interest’ on a low status item would represent a low value on the tastes scale.

Table 4.4 Tastes Items
How likely would you be to attend a lecture series that was offered online or in-person through a university? (1) extremely unlikely (2) somewhat unlikely, (3) neither likely no unlikely (4) somewhat likely (5) extremely likely
Would you be interested in visiting an art gallery? (5) yes (4) probably yes (3) might or might not (2) probably not (1) definitely not
How likely are you to visit a museum in the next year? (1) extremely unlikely (2) somewhat unlikely, (3) neither likely no unlikely (4) somewhat likely (5) extremely likely
How likely are you to listen to classical music? (1) extremely unlikely (2) somewhat unlikely, (3) neither likely no unlikely (4) somewhat likely (5) extremely likely
How do you feel about tennis? (5) like a great deal (4) like somewhat (3) neither like nor dislike (2) dislike somewhat (1) dislike a great deal

How do you feel about jazz music? (5) like a great deal (4) like somewhat (3) neither like nor dislike (2) dislike somewhat (1) dislike a great deal
If you had to pick an alcoholic beverage to drink, how likely would you be to pick artisanal wine? (1) extremely unlikely (2) somewhat unlikely, (3) neither likely no unlikely (4) somewhat likely (5) extremely likely
How do you feel about sushi? (5) like a great deal (4) like somewhat (3) neither like nor dislike (2) dislike somewhat (1) dislike a great deal
How likely are you to eat kale? (1) extremely unlikely (2) somewhat unlikely, (3) neither likely no unlikely (4) somewhat likely (5) extremely likely
If you had to order a dessert, how likely would you be to choose Crème Brûlée? (1) extremely unlikely (2) somewhat unlikely, (3) neither likely no unlikely (4) somewhat likely (5) extremely likely
Would you consider eating canned spaghetti? (1) yes (2) probably yes (3) might or might not (4) probably not (5) definitely not
How likely are you to eat Little Debbies? (5) extremely unlikely (4) somewhat unlikely, (3) neither likely no unlikely (2) somewhat likely (1) extremely likely
How likely are you to eat Hamburger Helper for dinner or lunch? (5) extremely unlikely (4) somewhat unlikely, (3) neither likely no unlikely (2) somewhat likely (1) extremely likely
How likely are you to eat a hotdog with white bread? for lunch or dinner? (5) extremely unlikely (4) somewhat unlikely, (3) neither likely no unlikely (2) somewhat likely (1) extremely likely

14 of the 24 items, which scaled the best, were then made into an index ranging from 0-1 (tastes).³⁰ All of the items have rest correlations above .26 in the Prolific sample, .23 in the Bovitz sample, and .21 in the NORC sample. Removing any of the 14 items would decrease the overall reliability of the scale in the Prolific and Bovitz samples.

Figure 4.2 Distribution of Tastes Scale



Overall, the scale is reliable with a Cronbach’s alpha of .73 in the Prolific sample, .73 in the Bovitz sample and .71 in the NORC sample.³¹ This means that 71-73% of the variability in the observed tastes scale is not due to random error. The resulting distribution, as shown in Figure 4.2 is normal. For the Prolific sample, the mean score on the tastes scale is .52, the range is 0 to 1, and the standard deviation is .19. The mean of the tastes scale is .50, the range 0 to 1, and the standard deviation is .18 in the NORC sample. Finally, the mean of the tastes scale is .44, the range 0 to 1, and the standard deviation .18 in the Bovitz sample.

³¹ An item analysis for the tastes scale is provided in the Chapter Four Appendix.

Behavioral Norms

To capture respondents' behavioral norms, respondents were asked to read about some factitious people. They were then instructed to choose a response which indicated how much the person in the description is like them on a 1-5 scale (not at all like me to very much like me). The pronouns of the factitious people were manipulated to match the gender identification of the respondent. Respondents were asked to evaluate 16 behavioral norms in total.


Table 4.5 Behavioral Norm Items
[She/he/they] thinks a child should be punished for talking back to an adult
[She/he/they] tells herself and others to 'suck it up' when something bad happens to them
[She/he/they] is willing to spank a kid for behaving poorly
[She/he/they] thinks people are too sensitive these days
[She/he/they] thinks it's okay to challenge authority figures

Five behavioral norm items which scaled the best were then combined into an unweighted scale. The five-item scale was reliable with the Cronbach's alpha being .68 in the NORC data, .61 in the Bovitz data, and .70 in the Prolific data. The wording for the five item scale and the final two item scale is provided in Table 4.5.³² The behavioral norm scale was rescaled to be from 0-1 and the distribution of the scale is shown in Figure 4.3.³³

³² All respondents in the Prolific sample answered all 14 items in the tastes scale. 0.11% of respondents in the Bovitz sample **did not** answer all 14 tastes items. 3% of Respondents did not answer all the tastes questions in the NORC sample. The difference in response rates between the samples is likely explained by differences in survey duration, payment, platform policies, and the interviewers offering participants a 'don't know' option in the NORC sample.

³³ All respondents in the Prolific sample answered the two behavioral norm items. 0.34% of respondents in the Bovitz sample **did not** answer the two behavioral norm items. 2.23% of respondents did not answer all the behavioral norm items questions in the NORC sample. The difference in response rates between the samples is likely explained by differences in survey duration,

Figure 4.3 Distribution of Behavioral Norm Scale



The distribution of the behavioral norm scale is normal. The mean in the Prolific sample is .57, the range is 0 to 1, and the standard deviation is .21. Similarly, in the NORC sample the mean of the behavioral norm scale is .53, the range is 0 to 1, and the standard deviation is .18. Finally, the mean of the behavioral norm scale is .54, the range is 0 to 1, and the standard deviation is .19 in the Bovitz sample.

Parsimony

In addition to demonstrating reliability, we also strive for our scales to be parsimonious. We want to minimize sources of variability in our scales (without sacrificing accuracy or utility). This

payment, platform policies, and the interviewers offering participants a ‘don’t know’ option in the NORC sample.

means that the variability in each scale is due to the construct we are interested in, and the scale is internally consistent. A summated rating scale can be built, however, without its dimensionality or internal consistency being examined. Discovering whether our scales are internally consistent and uncovering the dimensionality of our scales is thus another step beyond determining their reliability.

We can discover the number of dimensions that the tastes, behavioral norm, and wealth scales have by performing an exploratory factor analysis³⁴ using the iterated principal-factor method.³⁵ In an exploratory factor analysis, all variables will have relationships with factors. Some of these relationships will be strong and some weak. When looking at the scree plot in Figure 4.4 for each scale, there appears to be one factor for the wealth scale and behavioral norm scale, and two factors for the tastes scale in the Prolific, Bovitz, and NORC samples.³⁶

³⁴ Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is born out of structural equation modeling (SEM) and requires you to choose which variables are related to which factors. It is therefore more of a test than an exploration. However, whenever we use a model, we often have expectations, so overall the distinction between the two really is not that important.

³⁵ I chose to use iterated principal factor method as an estimation procedure rather than MLE because MLE has convergence issues, and the results should be very similar.

³⁶ I did not perform a parallel analysis because my sample size is more than 1,000.

Figure 4.4 Scree Plots of Original Scales (Prolific Data)




Figure 4.5 Scree Plots of Original Scales (Bovitz Data)





Figure 4.6 Scree Plots of Original Scales (NORC Data)



We can further examine the dimensionality of each scale by applying the Kaiser test. The Kaiser test is used to determine which factors are meaningful. Because an eigenvalue of 1.0 or greater is meaningful (Spector, 1992), only factor 1 of the wealth scale (eigenvalue of 2.9) and factor 1 of the behavioral norm style scale (eigenvalue of 1.8) should be retained in the Prolific sample. Likewise, one factor of the wealth scale (eigenvalue of 3.1 in the Bovitz sample and 2.8 in the NORC sample) and one factor of the behavioral norm (eigenvalue of 1.7 in the Bovitz sample and 2.0 in the NORC sample) scale should be kept in the Bovitz and NORC samples. Factors 1 and 2 should, however, be retained for the tastes scale. The first two factors of the tastes scale have, respectively, eigenvalues of 2.7 and 1.3 in the Prolific sample, 2.9 and 1.7 in the NORC sample, and 2.7 and 1.00 in the Bovitz sample.

By a common rule of thumb, loadings of 0.30 or less should be treated with caution (not necessarily negligible, probably quite small relative to other loadings)(Spector, 1992). The results of the EFA show that the wealth items load overwhelmingly onto one factor. The loadings for each of

the six items are $> .5$ in the Prolific and NORC samples and $> .7$ in the Bovitz sample (see Chapter Four Appendix). The largest loading on factor 2 was just $.31$ for vehicles, which had a loading of $.67$ on factor 1 in the Prolific sample. Vehicles also had the largest loading on factor two ($.28$) in the Bovitz sample and ($.25$) in the NORC sample, but this loading does not meet the 0.3 criteria.


All five of the behavioral norms items also load overwhelmingly onto factor 1 (See Chapter Four Appendix). In the Prolific sample all items have loadings on factor 1 which are equal to or are greater than 0.4 . The largest loading on factor two is ‘resilience’, which has a larger loading on factor one than factor two in the Prolific sample. In the NORC sample, similar patterns are present. Four of the five behavioral norms items have loadings on factor 1 which are greater than $.6$. While one item, relating to challenging authority (a reverse coded high-status item), has a loading of 0.3 on factor 1 in the NORC sample this is not of great concern. This is because the ‘challenging authority item’ in the NORC still meets the 0.3 cutoff point off and loads well onto factor 1 in the Prolific sample. Finally, four of the five tastes items have loadings on factor 1 which are greater than $.5$ in the Bovitz sample. Even though ‘challenging authority’ has a loading of $.2$ on factor 1 in the Bovitz data, it is appropriate to retain this item as it loads well onto factor 1 in the other two datasets. The choice to retain this item also does not change the inferences we draw about the relationship between behavioral norms and other aspects of social class, attitudinal variables, and partisan choice.

In general, all the 14 of the taste items load well onto factor 1, but items pertaining to low-status foods also loaded well onto factor 2 in all three samples.³⁷ Figure 4.5 graphically shows each of the item loadings when just two factors are retained in the Prolific, Bovitz, and NORC samples.

³⁷ None of the loadings were greater than $.25$ on factors 6-13.

We can see from the graphical depiction of the loadings when just two factors are retained that the first factor is highly related to high-status food, beverage, and interest items.

Figure 4.7 Factor Loadings of Tastes Items



However, the items pertaining to low status food consumption and taste do not have loadings that are significantly less than that of high-status tastes items on the first factor in any of the samples. In fact, whether tastes should be treated as a unidimensional scale or multi-dimensional scale is not a straightforward question nor answer. We can, nonetheless, perform rotations and note the proportion of total variance explained by each factor.³⁸ Rotations allow us to look at the structure of our data from a different viewpoint. We can start by looking at the data through performing an oblique rotation. After performing an oblique rotation, the proportion of total variance in the wealth scale explained by factor 1 is .76. in the Prolific sample, .79 in the Bovitz

sample, and .80 in the NORC sample. Factor 1 also explains most of the total variance in the behavioral norm scale in the Prolific (96%), NORC (74%), and Bovitz (60%) data. Finally, Factor 1 explains 31% and factor 2 explains 28% of the total variance in the tastes scale in the Prolific sample. Likewise, Factor 1 explains 32% (29% in the Bovitz sample) and factor 2 explains 27% (27% in the Bovitz sample) of the total variance in the tastes scale in the NORC data. The correlation between factor 1 and two is .79 in the Prolific and NORC samples.

When we perform an orthogonal rotation, factor 1 explains the majority of variance in the wealth scale for each sample (57% in Prolific; 60% in NORC; 56% Bovitz). Factor 1 also explains 54-59% of variance in the behavioral norm scale in the three samples. Finally factor 1 accounts for 0.26 of variance in the tastes scale in the Prolific sample, 0.27 in the NORC sample, and 0.27 in the Bovitz sample. While factor 1 in the tastes scale explains less total variance than factor 1 in the wealth and behavioral norm scales, factor 1 and factor 2 of the tastes scale are highly correlated. The correlation between factor 1 and factor two is 0.88 in the Prolific and Bovitz samples and it is .90 in the Bovitz data. Given the reliability estimates of the tastes scale, the strong interfactor intercorrelations between factor 1 and factor 2, and my motivation to see how tastes as a whole relate to partisan choice, it makes sense to keep tastes as one scale rather than two distinct scales. However, it is important to note that the tastes scale appears to be multi-dimensional.

Construct Validity

It is one thing to have a reliable measure, but how can we be sure the scale that we developed is valid in the sense that the questions we are asking adequately capture the concept we are trying to measure? Cultural capital and wealth might not be a direct function of traditional

indicators of social class, but they should still be related to them. In other words, we can validate the ‘construction’ of each of these scales by checking whether they are correlated with similarly related variables such as education, income, and occupation in what is called establishing ‘criterion validity’ or ‘construct validity’ (Spector, 1992).

Because we understand social class to be the result of three forms of capital, each which contain multiple characteristics within themselves, we would expect tastes and behavioral norms to be positively correlated, occupational status and education to be positively correlated, and wealth and income to be positively correlated with each other. Nonetheless because the attributes making up each form capital are theoretically distinct; they should be empirically different. The correlations between two aspects of one type of capital should not be greater than .75.

Aspects of human capital may also be correlated with financial capital or cultural capital. But because we understand each form of capital to be independent, this is not a requirement for these scales to be validated. Scoring high on one form of capital does not preclude one’s ability to score low on another form of capital. In fact, we would expect that aspects of different forms of capitals are not strongly correlated ($r < 0.5$) with each other because they should not be capturing the same concept. The wealth scale and a measure of estimated self-worth, however, should show criterion validity. They should be positively and strongly correlated because they are intended to capture the same concept.

Table 4.6 Correlation Matrix of Indicators of Social Class (Prolific Data)

Variables	Income	Wealth	Behavioral	Tastes	Education	Occupation
(1) Income	1.00					
(2) Wealth	0.70	1.00				
(3) Behavioral	-0.07	-0.09	1.00			
(4) Tastes	0.18	0.22	0.28	1.00		
(5) Education	0.39	0.36	0.05	0.30	1.00	
(6) Occupation	0.35	0.25	-0.03	0.20	0.39	1.00

Table 4.7 Correlation Matrix of Indicators of Social Class (NORC Data)

Variables	Income	Wealth	Behavioral	Tastes	Education	Occupation
(1) Income	1.00					
(2) Wealth	0.62	1.00				
(3) Behavioral	-0.02	-0.09	1.00			
(4) Tastes	0.19	0.16	0.25	1.00		
(5) Education	0.38	0.29	0.15	0.36	1.00	
(6) Occupation	0.32	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.20	1.00

Table 4.8 Correlation Matrix of Indicators of Social Class (Bovitz Data)

Variables	Income	Wealth	Behavioral	Tastes	Education	Occupation
(1) Income	1.00					
(2) Wealth	0.71	1.00				
(3) Behavioral	0.03	0.00	1.00			
(4) Tastes	0.27	0.27	0.28	1.00		
(5) Education	0.45	0.40	0.12	0.38	1.00	
(6) Occupation	0.38	0.25	0.10	0.19	0.35	1.00

Do the wealth, tastes, and behavioral norm scales show construct validity and more specifically discriminant validity? The series of bivariate correlations between all the different indicators of class in Table 4.5, Table 4.6, and Table 4.8 demonstrate that the wealth, tastes, and behavioral norms scales have construct validity. Tastes was positively and slightly to moderately correlated with behavioral norms, education, household income, occupation, and wealth in all three samples. Behavioral norms were very weakly correlated with education, income, occupation, and wealth in the NORC, Prolific, and Bovitz samples.

Wealth was moderately and positively correlated with education, household income, and occupation in all three samples. It was also strongly correlated with estimated self-worth ($r=.75$) in the Bovitz sample.³⁹ Finally, education was moderately and positively correlated to occupational status and income. As we can see, aspects of social class are imperfectly correlated to one another. The series of pairwise correlations with weak to moderate strength in all three samples suggest that

³⁹ A question which asked respondents to estimate their total net worth was only included on the Bovitz survey.

not only do the wealth, tastes, and behavioral norm scales capture aspects of class, but they are also distinct.

Discriminant Validity

Aside from construct validity, I also need check whether these scales have discriminant validity. Considering behavioral norms are ‘unwritten rules of conduct’ which exist in long-term memory and guide the way we express (verbally and non-verbally) ourselves in social interactions, there is some conceptual overlap between authoritarianism and behavioral norms. Authoritarianism is often thought of as being a multi-dimensional predisposition, value, or personality encompassing conventionalism, obedience, aggression, moral absolutism, and cynicism (Altemeyer, 1981; de Regt et al., 2012; Duckitt & Bizumic, 2013; Napier & Jost, 2008). Its origins are often traced back to Adorno et al.'s definition of authoritarianism and his F-scale measure of it in 1950, as well as Altemeyer's measure of (RWA) Right Wing Authoritarianism in 1981.

Since the concept and measure’s widespread use in political science, sociology, and psychology, aspects of authoritarianism have been consistently linked to social class in more than 20 democratic countries (de Regt et al., 2012; Napier & Jost, 2008). In fact, some scholars like Napier and Jost, (2008) have gone so far as to assert that social class causes authoritarianism. But while authoritarianism tends to be strongly correlated with aspects of social class like occupation, education, and income in high income countries, little work has provided an explanation for why this is the case (Napier and Jost, 2008).

More popular understandings of authoritarianism in political science, however, focus on the obedience and conventional/conformity aspect of authoritarianism (Feldman, 2003). They also primarily use the 4-item child rearing scale to capture authoritarianism rather than the F-scale and

the full RWA scale. This is partially because the other aspects of authoritarianism are too close to what researchers are focused on explaining. For example, Feldman and Stenner explain the drawback of using the F-scale in their working predicting attitudes towards politics and minority groups stating, “One of the major problems with F-scale-type measures is that they include items that are often uncomfortably close to the consequences of authoritarianism that we are interested in explaining.” (Feldman and Stenner, 1997, p. 747). Feldman and Stenner then propose using child rearing measures as an alternative to the F-scale stating, “Although this is not a traditional measure of authoritarianism; it has long been noted that this dimension of child-rearing values is strongly related to other authoritarianism measures and to presumed consequences of authoritarianism.” (Feldman and Stenner, 1997, p. 747).

This is all to say that while I expect there to be a strong relationship between authoritarianism and behavioral norms (especially when it is defined in terms of submission to authority and conventionalism), authoritarianism and behavioral norms should not be thought of as the same concept. The conventional/conformity and obedience aspects dimensions of authoritarianism can be best thought of as being a dimension of behavioral norms. In other words, when the four child rearing items are analyzed in conjunction with the five behavioral norm items, we should find that the behavioral norm items should load well onto the same factor as the authoritarianism items. Nonetheless because authoritarianism and behavioral norm items are conceptually similar but not the same—they should also be empirically distinct. Aspects of behavioral norms should therefore load well onto other factor(s) too.⁴⁰

As expected, the five-item behavioral norms scale and authoritarianism are moderately to

⁴⁰ Only the Bovitz and NORC samples included the 4-item child rearing scale (authoritarianism), and a measure of racial resentment.

strongly correlated in the NORC ($r=-.49$) and ($r=-.48$) Bovtiz samples. The results of an exploratory factor analyses using the iterated principal-factor method also supports the idea that parts of authoritarianism can be thought of as a dimension of behavioral norms (see Chapter Four Appendix for full results). In both the NORC and Bovtiz samples, three of the five behavioral norm items loaded well onto the same factor (factor 1) that the four child rearing items also loaded onto. Nonetheless, the factor analysis also showed that two behavioral norms items had loadings of more than .40 and three more than .39 on Factor 2. Given the Eigen value of factor 2 was .97 and .95 in the Bovtiz and NORC samples respectively, there is strong evidence to support the idea that authoritarianism is an aspect of behavioral norms rather than behavioral norms being a reproduction of authoritarianism.⁴¹

Furthermore, when the two items which are unique to behavioral norms are retained and made into their own scale, behavioral norms and authoritarianism are weakly correlated in the NORC ($r=-.28$) and ($r=-.20$) in the Bovtiz samples.⁴² The two item behavioral norm scale is relatively reliable scale for being two items. 55% percent of the variance in the Prolific scale, 57% in the Bovtiz scale, and 65% in the NORC scale is being explained by the latent variable we are interested in studying rather than random error.⁴³ To provide further evidence to the idea that it is

⁴¹ The reliability for the 4-item child rearing scale of authoritarianism is generally .66 (Feldman & Stenner, 1997), so its reliability is very similar to that of behavioral norms.

⁴² The item analysis for the two item behavioral norm scale can be found in the Chapter Four Appendix.

⁴³ The general rule of the thumb is that Cronbach's alpha $> .70$ is good. Cronbach's alpha is also a lower-bound estimate of the true reliability of scale. This is because we typically do not have perfectly parallel measures and our IRF's only require monotonicity (the single assumption behind psychometric classical test theory). Considering alpha increases as K increases, regardless of average correlation and that it is a lower-bound estimate of reliability of a scale, we have sufficient evidence to conclude that the wealth, tastes, and behavioral/norms scales are reliable.

behavioral norms rather than just authoritarianism driving the relationship between cultural capital and partisan choice, I re-ran all the same models with the same specifications in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 with the two behavioral norm items which were not strongly correlated with authoritarianism (see Chapter Five and Chapter 6 Appendix). I find that even the two-item behavioral norm scale predicts partisan choice at the $p < 0.05$ level when controlling for standard demographic candidates and attitudinal characteristics like authoritarianism. The results of these additional analyses provide further evidence that the behavioral norms scale has discriminant validity and that it aids in understanding of partisan choice above and beyond authoritarianism.

In addition to authoritarianism, the behavioral norm scale is also negatively correlated with racial resentment in both the NORC ($r = -.48$) and (Bovitz, $r = -.48$) samples, and is not strongly correlated with white identity (NORC, $r = -.07$ and Bovitz, $r = -.28$). The correlation between behavioral norms and racial resentment is interesting given that none of the behavioral norm items mention race. However, this finding (albeit largely left unexplained) aligns with prior descriptive work which has found an association between white identity and the human/financial faces of social class (Jardina 2019), as well as racial resentment and social class (Kam & Burge, 2018).

So why is there a correlation between racial resentment and behavioral norms? Although I do not test these expectations in the dissertation itself, I speculate that behavioral norms may be the unidentified factor which can explain why racial resentment works differently for liberals and conservatives. Feldman and Huddy (2005) found in an experiment where respondents were asked whether they wanted to donate to a scholarship fund for students to attend college that the white conservatives who were high in racial resentment were opposed to giving scholarship money in general. White liberals high in racial resentment, on the other hand, lowered their support of giving

money to Black students (not white students). Racial resentment and behavioral norms can, however, be distinguished from each other as the correlations are not $>$ than 0.50.

Similarly, one might be concerned that tastes is a proxy for income, region, or place of residence. One major differentiator between common and elite tastes is that high-brow hobbies often require an intense or prolonged investment of material resources. Sports viewed as ‘classy’ or ‘sophisticated’ such as polo, crew, equestrian, golf, water skiing, squash, golf, tennis, and sailing require specific equipment or facilities that low-income individuals, people from non-elite backgrounds, and rural residents generally do not have access to. In contrast, ‘trashy’ or ‘unsophisticated’ sports like wrestling, boxing, and football have lower start-up costs associated with participation. To justify the inclusion of tastes as a measure influencing partisan choice beyond income, region, and place of residence, we can look at the strength of the correlation between tastes and income, region, and place of residence. As previously mentioned, there is a weak correlation between tastes and income and wealth in all three samples. Tastes was not correlated with living in the South (versus the Northeast, Midwest, or West); nor was it strongly correlated with living in a rural/non-metro area, as opposed to a small town, suburb, or city (metro area) in all three samples. The weak-moderate pairwise correlations between tastes and income, region, and place of residence show that we can differentiate tastes from other demographic based characteristics.

Concluding Thoughts:

This chapter focused on operationalizing and validating the measurement of wealth, tastes, and behavioral norms. Although more items could theoretically be included in the tastes and behavioral norms scales, the three original scales presented in this chapter serve as solid starting

point for future scholars to fine tune a measure of cultural capital. In fact, to my knowledge this is the first study which has sought to develop a scale of tastes and behavioral norms in the United States based on Bourdieu's cultural capital theory. In fact, while political scientists like Putnam have famously attempted to quantify somewhat similarly related cultural concepts like social networks, they have been widely criticized in terms of their methodological purism as they retrofit national survey questions to concepts (Field, 2008). Retrofitting questions to concepts is, however, problematic for scale construction as Adcock & Collier (2001) argue that "Valid measurement is achieved when scores (including the results of qualitative classification) meaningfully capture the ideas contained in the corresponding concept." (530). Taken in combination the results of the exploratory factor analysis, pairwise correlations, and reliability estimates in this chapter indicate that the wealth scale, the behavioral norm scale, and the tastes scale (1) are internally consistent (2) are reliable, (3) show discriminant/construct validity, and (4) serve as excellent starting points for allowing us to begin to examine how aspects of social class relate to partisan choice.

Chapter 5: Faces of Social Class and Partisanship in Application

While Chapter Four revealed how the forms of capital, and thereby their components, are distinctive from one another, these next few chapters are dedicated to formally testing whether each form of capital has a relationship with partisan choice through relying on three original sources of data. Chapter Five and Chapter Six discover if the three faces of class relate to politics in contrasting ways and what we can learn about partisanship and partisan choices by broadening our conceptualization of social class. More specifically, Chapter Five uses multinomial logistic regression to analyze the relationship between cultural capital (tastes and behavioral norms), financial capital (income and wealth), and human capital (occupational status and education) on categorical partisanship. It determines which faces of class tell us whether someone is more likely to identify as a Republican than an Independent or a Democrat than an Independent. Next, this chapter relies on OLS to establish that wealth and sociocultural capital make independent and important contributions to understanding variation in the direction and strength of partisan identification. I find that the effects of wealth and cultural capital on strength in partisan identification are substantively and statistically significant when analyzed in isolation from other demographic characteristics and when controlling for demographic and attitudinal/identity based characteristics. Overall, I conclude contrary to recent literature in the field of public opinion and political behavior that not all aspects of class are the same and that social class does matter beyond other social identities. When we reduce social class to human capital and one aspect of financial capital (income), it changes our understanding of how and when social class relates to partisanship.

Expectations and Methods

Why are college degree holders and poor people more likely to be Democrats than Republicans? The answer partially lies in self-interest. Self-interest refers to the idea that individuals act in ways that promote their survival and reproduction, and that these actions are part of human nature. In the context of politics, we would thus believe individuals would make partisan choices out of self-interest (the desire to attain or maintain one's resources and status) rather than out of regard to values or sophisticated ideological beliefs. Voters will thus rely on partisan stereotypes and the party brands to determine who will be more likely to enhance their financial and human capital and in hand decide who they should support. For instance, given the public's strong perception of the Republican party as being for the 'rich' and the party of 'lower taxes on the wealthy', we would expect that the greater one's household income (H1) and wealth (H2) are, the more likely it is that this person identifies as a Republican rather than Independent or Democrat. Likewise, because Americans largely perceive the Democratic party as being a party for the 'poor' and for wanting to increase the social welfare safety net, income and wealth should be negative predictors of categorical Democratic PID.

Yet while individuals are inherently self-interested, we also know that they take mental shortcuts by relying on cues to determine whether a party or candidate best represents their interests. In other words, while humans are inherently self-interested, they are also homophilic and resource constrained. We are unconsciously (even consciously) attracted to people like us and in the case of politics, we base our evaluations of parties and candidates by asking whether they are 'one of us'. This means we can expect voters to have a stronger affiliation with a party if the party's voting base and candidates have levels of financial, cultural, and human capital that mirror their own. For example, a college educated person would be more likely to be a Democrat than a Republican or

Independent (H3) because individuals as a whole are more likely to associate degree holders with the Democratic party than the Republican party (Orr & Huber, 2021). Similarly, because people associate the Republican party with primarily low-status tastes (country music, hamburgers, pickups, beer, and NASCAR) and Democrats with high-status tastes (yoga, hiking, vegetarians, Starbucks, recycling, health, hybrids, art, and books), we would expect higher tastes to be associated with Democratic partisan choice (Hiaeshutter-Rice et al., 2021) (H4). Finally, an increase in behavioral norms should be positively associated with Republican partisan choice (H5). ‘Order’, ‘tradition’, ‘toughness’, and ‘self-reliance’, are all central to the Republican party platform. Democratic elites conversely advocate that those who ‘have less’ deserve more (entitlement and the challenging of norms/hierarchies) and are more likely to model high status behavioral norms. Considering the actual and perceived makeup of the parties, in addition to each party’s signaling, we can expect that human and cultural capital will be associated with Democratic PID (partisan choice), while financial capital will be predictive of Republican PID (partisan choice).⁴⁴

Form of Capital	Table 5.1 Summary of Hypotheses
Financial	H1: Increasing income is associated with Republican partisan choice H2: Greater wealth is associated with Republican partisan choice
Human	H3: Having a college education is associated with Democratic partisan choice
Cultural	H4: Higher status tastes is associated with Democratic partisan choice H5: Higher behavioral norms are associated with Democratic partisan choice

⁴⁴ As previously mentioned in Chapter 3, because there are few occupational differences between the parties at the elite and mass level, occupational differences are largely absent from individuals’ perceptions of parties. Occupational status was also not associated with PID in GSS data from 1991-2011 or 2016-2021. It is for these reasons that I do not include a hypothesis about occupational choice (nor do I focus on its relationship with partisan choice in future chapters), even though I consider occupational status to be a factor composing social class.

I rely on original survey data from self-identified non-Hispanic white people from three survey platforms to analyze the relationship between aspects of social class and partisanship/partisan choice. While I do not think only white people have ‘cultural capital’ or that social class is only relevant to how whites make partisan choices, the eligibility of these studies was limited to white-non-Hispanic people for a few reasons. First, models of political decision making differ across racial groups (Jardina, 2019; White & Laird, 2021). Second, prior work has found race and class to be mutually reinforcing, so that perceptions of hobbies, interest, foods, and phrases hold a different meaning for whites than BIPOC (Becker et al., 2017a, 2017b; Curl et al., 2018; Jack, 2016; Rivera, 2015; Thomas, 2018). By limiting the samples to only whites, I am thus able to hold race constant across individuals within these three studies.

Categorical partisanship was based on respondents’ answers to the root question of the ANES 7-point PID branching scale in all three samples.⁴⁵ The response options for this question were Democrat, Republican, Independent, or Other Party.⁴⁶ Strength of partisanship was measured using the standard ANES 7-point branching scale on each survey.

All three surveys included the 6-item wealth scale, the tastes scale, and behavioral norms scale. I use the five-item behavioral norm scale for the analysis in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. I chose to use the five-item scale because it is more reliable than the two-item scale and it is a more

⁴⁵ “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, or as an independent? [Democrat, Republican, Independent, Other party (please specify)]”. As a robustness check, I ran the models predicting categorical PID with AND without leaners being counted as partisans. Full estimates from all models predicting categorical PID can be found in the Chapter Five Appendix.

⁴⁶ Individuals who reported being affiliated with Democratic Socialists, the SWP, the Green Party, leftists, communists, and progressives were coded as Democrats. Individuals who said none, anarchist, unaffiliated, not political, or libertarian were coded as Independents. Individuals who reported being a constitutionalist were coded as being Republican. A total of 0.03% of participants marked ‘other party’ in the Prolific sample.

exhaustive measure of behavioral norms. To address potential concerns about the overlap between authoritarianism and behavioral norms and the possibility that it is authoritarianism not behavioral norms explaining variation in PID, I control for authoritarianism in models predicting PID and partisan choice. I also re-run the models predicting categorical PID, strength of PID, and partisan choice using the two-item behavioral norm scale. The result of the models with the two-item behavioral norm scale can be found in the Appendix. It should be noted, however, that I find the same effects across the two-item and five item scale of behavioral norms.

Questions and measures relating to household income, education, and occupational status were the same across the Bovitz and Prolific surveys. Question and response options for household income and education slightly differed in the NORC survey from the Bovitz/Prolific surveys. These differences are minimal and are unlikely to impact survey responses or data quality. Due to resource constraints and because occupational status has not been shown to influence PID in GSS data from 1991-2011 or 2016-2021 (nor was it a significant predictor of partisan choice in the Prolific data), I relied on a different measure of occupational status (employment status) in the NORC sample than in the Bovitz and Prolific samples. This measure, which was provided by Bovitz, simply indicated whether an individual was not working (0=not working on temporary layoff from a job, looking for work, retired, disabled, other) or working (1=working as a paid employee or self-employed).

In addition to measures capturing aspects of social class, I included standard demographic and attitudinal control measures that could account for other factors potentially explaining partisanship. These include measures of age (continuous variable), gender (binary measure), region “south” (binary measure), marital status (binary measure), and population density of residence “rural” (binary measure). Prior research suggests that age, marital status, and region (residence in the South), will be positive predictors of Republican partisan choice, while population density of

residence and gender (identifying as a woman as opposed to a man) will be predictors of Democratic partisan choice (Abramowitz, 2018; Cravens, 2021; Jardina, 2019; Montagno et al., 2021; Sides et al., 2018; Whitehead et al., 2018). By including these variables as controls and in hand, potential predictors of partisan choice, I am better able to isolate how aspects of social class like behavioral norms map onto partisan identification. The variables in all models lie on a 0-1 scale or are dummies.⁴⁷ The Chapter Four Appendix provides the exact question wording, distribution of responses, and number of missing responses for every variable in each of the three datasets.


Figures 5.1-5.5 graphically display the outcome of a series of multinomial logits predicting categorical PID. More specifically they show the probability of identifying as a Democrat or Republican rather than an Independent for each given aspect of social class when all other aspects of social class and identity-based characteristics are held at their respective means/medians⁴⁸. The x axis of Figures 5.1-5.5 indicates the level of class on a 0-1 scale, and the y axis represents the probability a respondent identifies as a Democrat or Republican rather an Independent.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Population density of residence or “Rural” reflects whether an individual lives in a city, suburb, small town, or rural area. Population density of residence is captured through a binary variable (non-metro) in the Bovitz sample which indicates whether a respondent lives in a metropolitan area or a non-metropolitan area. A score of 1 represents living in a rural area and a 0 represents living in a non-rural area. Gender is captured through a binary variable in the Bovitz and NORC data; a 0 signifies that a respondent identifies as a man and 1 signifies that a respondent identifies as a woman. Gender is also captured through a binary variable in the Prolific data, but a 0 signifies that a respondent identifies as a man and 1 signifies that a respondent does not identify as a man. Region or “South” represents whether a respondent identifies as living in the South (0=does not live in South, 1=South).

⁴⁸ In the Prolific sample, gender, rural, and south were held at their medians, while occupation status and age were held at their means. In the Bovitz sample, gender, rural, marital status, and south were held at their medians, while occupation status and age were held at their means. In the NORC sample, gender, non-metro, work status, marital status, and south were held at their medians, while age was held at its mean.

⁴⁹ In Figures 5.1-5.5 leaners are counted as Independents. The full outcomes of the multinomial logits can be found in the Chapter Five Appendix. The Chapter Five Appendix also includes the outcomes of multinomial logit models predicting categorical PID when leaners are counted as partisans. The relative odds of being a Democrat or Republican rather an Independent are generally greater in

Figure 5.1 Probability of Categorical PID by Level of Income




Note: Full model results can be found in the Chapter 5 appendix. Income was not a significant predictor of categorical PID in any of the samples.

Beginning with Figure 5.1, we see that the relationship between income and categorical PID is complicated at best. While greater income is associated with a lower likelihood of identifying as a Democrat than an Independent, as well as greater odds of being a Republican than an Independent in the Prolific and Bovitz data, this was not the case in the NORC sample. Moving from the 10th percentile of income to the 90th increases the probability of identifying as a Democrat from .19 to .32 and decreases the probability of being a Republican by 10 percentage points in the NORC sample. And while the relationship between income and categorical PID was in the direction I had

magnitude when leaners are counted as partisans rather than independents. However, the significance of the estimates for each aspect of social class does not change regardless of how leaners are categorized.

expected in the Prolific and Bovitz samples, moving from the 10th to the 90th percentile on the income scale produced a change in probability of Democratic categorical PID that was less than 6 percentage points in the Prolific sample and 5 percentage points in the Bovitz sample. Moreover, income was not a significant predictor of categorical PID in any of the datasets. Given the small impact income has on categorical PID, and the fact that it is not a significant predictor of categorical PID in any of the models, H1 cannot be confirmed.

Figure 5.2 Probability of Categorical PID by Level of Wealth




Note: Full model results can be found in the Chapter 5 appendix. Wealth a statistically significant predictor of Republican categorical PID in the NORC and Bovitz samples, and Democratic categorical PID in the Bovitz sample. Wealth was not significant in the Prolific sample.

But income is not the only factor composing financial capital. Financial capital can still shape categorical PID through wealth, even if income has little to no influence on categorical PID. Figure 5.3 shows that moving from the 10th percentile on wealth to the 90th produces a 14 percentage point

decrease in the probability of identifying as a Democrat in the NORC sample, and a 12-percentage point decrease in the Prolific sample. Yet, wealth was only a statistically significant predictor of Democratic categorical PID in the Bovitz sample, where the sign was in the wrong direction. Based on these initial findings, H2 does not have support.

On the other hand, the probability of identifying as a Republican rather than an Independent increases from .21 to .31 in the NORC sample, .33 to .59 in the Prolific sample, and .26 to .36 in the Bovitz sample when moving from 10th to 90th percentile on the wealth scale. Wealth is a statistically significant predictor of Republican categorical PID in the NORC and Bovitz sample. Taken in combination, H2 has some support.


Figure 5.3 Probability of Categorical PID by Level of Education



Note: Full model results can be found in the Chapter 5 appendix. Education was not significant at the $p < 0.05$ level in the NORC or Bovitz models. Education was significant in predicting Democratic partisan choice in the Prolific sample, but it was not significant in predicting Republican partisan choice in the Prolific sample.

Moving on to human capital, we see that education appears to alter the relative odds of whether one identifies as a Democrat or Republican. Moving from a score on the 10th percentile of the education scale to a score on the 90th percentile produces a 22-percentage point increase in the probability of identifying as a Democrat in the Prolific data and 11 percentage point increase in probability in the NORC data. Likewise, going from the 10th percentile of education to the 90th decreases the probability of being a Republican from .46 to .35 in the Prolific data and from .35 to .24 in the NORC data. Yet while education is positively associated with Democratic partisan choice in both the NORC and Prolific datasets, the probability of identifying as a Democrat or Republican does not change more than 1 percentage point as we move from the 10th to 90th percentile on the education scale in the Bovitz data. Furthermore, changes in education only influence the relative odds of identifying as a Democrat vs. an Independent at the $p < 0.05$ level in the Prolific sample. In fact, education is not even a statistically significant predictor of Republican categorical PID in the Prolific sample. H1 thus has very limited support. While education is positively associated with Democratic PID and negatively related to Republican PID, the estimates largely fail to reach statistical significance in the models across the three samples.

Figure 5.4 Probability of Categorical PID by Level of Taste




Note: Full model results can be found in the Chapter 5 appendix. Lifestyle was not a significant predictor of categorical PID in the NORC or Bovitz data. Lifestyle was a statistically significant predictor of categorical Republican PID, but not categorical Democratic PID in the Prolific data.

In comparison to the other faces of social class, the relationship between cultural capital and categorical PID is quite clear. Moving from the 10th percentile on the tastes scale to the 90th produces a 11-percentage point increase in the probability of identifying as a Democrat vs. an Independent in the NORC sample, and a 7 and 12 percentage point increase in the Prolific and Bovitz sample respectively. The probability of identifying as a Republican rather than an Independent decreases from .38 to .23 in the NORC sample, .47 to .35 in the Prolific sample, and .38 to .24 in the Bovitz sample when we move from the 10th to 90th percentile on the tastes scale. Yet, tastes are only significant in

the Prolific model predicting Republican categorical PID. The results of the multinomial logits show limited support for H4.

Figure 5.5 Probability of Categorical PID by Level of Behavioral Norm



Note: Full model results can be found in the Chapter 5 Appendix. Behavioral norms were a significant predictor of categorical PID in all models and datasets.

The second aspects of cultural capital, behavioral norms are strongly associated with categorical PID across all three datasets. Moving from the 10th percentile on the behavioral norms scale to the 90th decreases the probability of being a Democrat by 39 percentage points in the NORC data, 56 percentage points in the Prolific data, and 47 percentage points in the Bovitz data. Likewise, the probability of being a Republican drop from .59 to .09 in the NORC sample, .78 to .10 in the Prolific sample, and .57 to .11 in the Bovitz sample. Behavioral norms were also positively associated with the odds of identifying as Republican vs. an Independent and a Democrat vs. an

Independents at the $p < 0.05$ level in all three samples. The results of the multinomial logits predicting categorical PID therefore unequivocally confirm H5.

Overall, my hypotheses are partially confirmed. Social class does predict categorical partisan identification beyond demographic characteristics like gender, marital status, age, and region depending upon how we define and measure social class. Yet, some faces of social class and the components that make them matter more than others. While income is positively associated with Republican PID and negatively related to Democratic PID, the relationship between income and categorical PID is largely insignificant. Similarly, I found that although tastes and education map onto categorical PID, their association with categorical PID was only significant in the Prolific data. In contrast, an aspect of cultural capital (behavior norms) and an aspect of financial capital (wealth) were statistically significant predictors of categorical Republican PID in multiple datasets. In this way, the multinomial logit models predicting categorical PID empirically show that (1) we should not conflate forms of capital or their subcomponents with one another and (2) that some aspects of social class are more politicized than others.

Model Specification

Still, social class can influence more than just categorical partisan identification, social can also influence strength of partisanship. Furthermore, others have argued that the impact of social class on partisan choice is generally (1) overridden by or (2) actually due to underlying racial attitudes/values like white identity, racial resentment, and/or SDO/authoritarianism which have been posited to be more 'prevalent' amongst individuals with lower levels of human and financial capital (Abramowitz, 2018; Gilens, 1999; Hetherington & Weiler, 2018; Jardina, 2019; Mutz, 2021; Sides et al., 2018). It is thus important to run models which control for confounding variables like racial resentment,

authoritarianism, and white identity to gain a more accurate estimate of the true relationship between social class and PID. In fact, by using a more comprehensive measure of social class and controlling for racial resentment, authoritarianism, and white identity in models predicting partisan choice, I aim to help settle the longstanding debate on whether social class matters above and beyond racial attitudes and other identity based characteristics.

But while it is important to control for racial attitudes/values like white identity, racial resentment, and/or authoritarianism to avoid overestimating the potential relationship between social class and partisan choice, including these additional set of controls into our model does bring about another set of challenges and issues. First, recent panel work seeking to address causality and identification issues in political science has found that racial resentment and partisan choice (Engelhardt, 2021), white identity and partisan choice (Agadjanian & Lacy, 2021), and authoritarianism and partisan choice (Luttig, 2021) are endogenous. In other words, authoritarianism, white identity, and racial resentment are at best mutually reinforcing phenomena rather sole causes of PID/partisan choice. Consequently, by including racial resentment, authoritarianism, and white identity in our models predicting partisan strength and partisan choice, we increase the odds of having a type II error and/or underestimating the true effect of social class on PID.

Second, even if these three attitudinal variables can justifiably be included as predictors of party ID and partisan choice, the correlational analysis presented in Chapter 4 along with the findings of prior work on the relationship between social class and racial identity/values, suggest that the effects of social class and all its facets likely shape authoritarianism (Napier and Jost 2008), racial resentment (Kam & Burge, 2018), and white identity (Jardina 2019). Without including mediated relationships, we again increase the odds of underestimating the total effect social class has on party ID by including

these variables in our models because I am unable to capture the indirect effects that aspects of social class may have on PID and partisan choice.

To address the real potential of both Type I and Type II errors, I run a series of models predicting strength of partisanship which each vary in their level of specification (see Table 5). Model 1 is the least restrictive in its specification, as it only includes measures of social class in the model. Model 2 then builds on Model 1 by including both aspects of social class in the model, as well as a standard set of demographic controls. Finally Model 3 includes aspects of social class, a standard set of demographic controls, racial resentment, white identity, and authoritarianism. By running each of these three models, I generate a plausible range of estimates for each aspect of social class on PID. For the sake of simplicity, the analysis in the main text is based on Model 2 and Model 3 results. I focus on analyzing the results from Model 3 because it provides the most conservative estimates for the effect that each aspect of social class has on PID, and consequently provides the strictest test of my hypotheses. Nonetheless, I also note the results of Model 2 in the main text.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Model 3 is not available for Prolific data, as the Prolific survey did not include measure of racial resentment, white identity, and authoritarianism.

Strength of Partisanship

Table 5.2 Effects of Aspects of Social Class on Strength of Partisanship

	Prolific Sample		AmeriSpeaks NORC			Bovitz		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Wealth	.91* (.37)	.88* (.37)	1.15* (.42)	1.23* (.46)	.88* (.38)	.25 (.45)	.18 (.46)	.19 (.44)
Income	.42 (.26)	.46 (.26)	-.51 (.45)	-.67 (.47)	-.49 (.40)	.21 (.36)	.07 (.36)	-.23 (.34)
Occupation	-.11 (.16)	-.14 (.16)	--- ---	--- ---	--- ---	.02 (.19)	.05 (.20)	.08 (.18)
Education	-.91* (.23)	-.85* (.23)	-.86* (.32)	-.88* (.33)	-.12 (.29)	-.18 (.35)	-.06 (.36)	.08 (.32)
Tastes	-.76* (.31)	-.66* (.31)	-1.34* (.47)	-1.34* (.48)	-.30 (.40)	-1.24* (.44)	-1.12* (.45)	-.21 (.42)
Behavioral	-5.95* (.25)	-5.9* (.26)	-5.03* (.37)	-5.06* (.39)	-1.44* (.43)	-5.37* (.35)	-5.10* (.37)	-2.05* (.46)
Working	---	---	.13 (.16)	.06 (.19)	.23 (.16)	---	---	---
Gender	---	.06 (.11)	---	.10 (.19)	.16 (.16)	---	-.08 (.14)	-.07 (.13)
Age	---	-.15 (.28)	---	-.25 (.37)	-.70* (.30)	---	-.02 (.34)	-1.02* (.32)
South	---	.18 (.11)	---	.04 (.16)	-.06 (.14)	---	.36* (.14)	.32* (.13)
Rural	---	.25 (.14)	---	---	---	---	.45* (.17)	.37* (.16)
Married	---	---	---	.19 (.17)	.13 (.14)	---	.29 (.16)	.38* (.15)
Non-Metro	---	---	---	-.05 (.19)	-.11 (.16)	---	---	---
Auth	---	---	---	---	.29 (.24)	---	---	.08 (.23)
White	---	---	---	---	-.20 (.20)	---	---	.19 (.21)
Identity	---	---	---	---	4.26* (.28)	---	---	3.53* (.28)
Resentment	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Constant	8.06* (.20)	7.90* (.24)	7.75* (.30)	7.87* (.44)	3.00* (.52)	7.31* (.24)	6.80* (.32)	3.31* (.44)
R ²	.36	0.36	0.28	0.28	.50	0.23	0.25	0.39
N	1,208	1,205	648	648	633	855	855	847

Note: Entries are OLS coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05 (two-tailed test)⁵¹.

⁵¹ Population density of residence or “Rural” reflects whether an individual lives in a city, suburb, small town, or rural area. Population density of residence is captured through a binary variable (non-metro)

Beginning with Model 2 results and the Prolific sample, where each aspect of social class and demographic factors were regressed onto PID. PID is on a 1-7 scale, where higher PID indicates stronger Republican PID. Here, we see support for some hypotheses. Wealth and income are positively associated with stronger Republican PID, when education is negatively associated with stronger Republican PID. But while wealth and education are statistically significant predictors of strength in PID, this is not the case for income.

Next, moving from the 10th percentile to the 90th in tastes decreases predicted PID from 4.30 to 3.98. The second component of cultural capital, behavior-norms, is an even stronger predictor of strength in Democratic PID. The predicted PID of an individual scoring on the 10th percentile of behavioral norms is 5.73, where it is estimated to be 2.50 for someone scoring on the 90th percentile.

The relationship between aspects of social class and partisanship are somewhat similar in the NORC and Bovitz models. Wealth is associated with stronger Republican PID at the $p < 0.05$ level ($\beta = 1.23$), while education is associated with stronger Democratic PID ($\beta = -.88$; $p < 0.05$) in NORC Model 2. More specifically, moving from the 10th to 90th percentile on the wealth scale increases predicted PID from 3.79 to 4.53. Tastes and behavioral norms are likewise significant predictors of strength in PID at the $p < 0.05$ level in NORC Model 2. But while tastes and behavior norms remain to be significant at the $p < 0.05$ in Bovitz Model 2, education and wealth fail to reach statistical

in the Bovitz sample which indicates whether a respondent lives in a metropolitan area or a non-metropolitan area. A score of 1 represents living in a rural area and a 0 represents living in a non-rural area. Gender is captured through a binary variable in the Bovitz and NORC data; a 0 signifies that a respondent identifies as a man and 1 signifies that a respondent identifies as a woman. Gender is also captured through a binary variable in the Prolific data, but a 0 signifies that a respondent identifies as a man and 1 signifies that a respondent does not identify as a man. Region or “South” represents whether a respondent identifies as living in the South (0=does not live in South, 1=South).

significance (albeit the coefficients being in the direction as expected). In both models, however, income was not significant.

But what about when racial resentment, authoritarianism, and white identity are included in the same model as aspects of social class predicting PID? While wealth ($\beta=.88$) and behavioral norms ($\beta=-1.44$) continue to be statistically significant predictors of strength in PID with the additional set of controls in NORC Model 3, education ($\beta=-.12$) and tastes ($\beta=-.30$) lose their statistical significance. Likewise, in Bovitz Model 3, behavioral norms continue to be the only aspect of social class that is statistically significant when controlling for demographic characteristics, racial resentment, authoritarianism, and white identity.

Model 3 does however provide the strictest test of my hypotheses. This is because aspects of social class like behavioral norms, education, wealth, and income, are correlated with racial resentment, white identity, and authoritarianism, when racial resentment, white identity, and authoritarianism are likely to be endogenous to PID. In fact, other recent work has similarly found that authoritarianism and white identity are no longer significant predictors of PID and partisan choice (Fording & Schram, 2023; Luttig 2021). The current lack of the statistical significance of these two measures post 2016 has been explained by authoritarianism and white identity only having indirect effects on PID/partisan through other measures or a change in party cue-taking/expressive identity based responding (Fording & Schram, 2023; Luttig 2021). Considering this, as well as the Model 2 and Model 3 results from the Prolific, NORC, and Bovitz samples, it appears that at least wealth and behavioral norms (if not also tastes and education) are predictors of strength in PID.

Conclusion:

What do the results of Models 2 and 3 mean for our understanding of social class and its relation to partisan identification? First, the results from all the three studies demonstrate that not all faces of social class are the same. While education, lifestyle, and behavioral norms are associated with stronger Democratic PID, wealth, and sometimes income are associated with stronger Republican PID. In this way, being high in financial capital leads to a completely different partisan outcome than being high in human or cultural capital. The direction of the relationship between social class and PID is dependent upon how we are conceptualizing and measuring social class.

Second, the results show that some aspects of social class are more politicized than others. While income failed to reach statistical significance in any of the models predicting strength in PID, behavioral norms were significant in every model. Wealth, education, and tastes also impacted strength in PID at the $p < 0.05$ when controlling for demographic characteristics. Conflating faces of class with each other thus changes our understanding of the relationship between PID and social class. The coefficient for behavioral norms was generally 5 times greater than the coefficients for wealth, tastes, and education. Thus, while multiple aspects of social class independently contribute to PID, they do so to different extents and in contrasting ways.

Third, the results show that previous models which have relied on measures of education, income, or occupation to proxy social class have both underestimated the role that social class plays in politics and limited our understanding of PID as a whole. I found that aspects of social class were often greater and reached statistical significance more often than other demographic characteristics more frequently studied in public opinion and political behavior literature. For instance, the difference in the adjusted R^2 when education, income, and occupational status (and a set of standard demographic controls) were regressed onto strength of PID and when all aspects of class (and the

same standard set of controls) were regressed onto strength of PID is noteworthy. When the OLS model only included ‘standard indicators’ (education, income, and occupational status) of social class and a set of demographic controls, the adjusted R^2 was .06 in the Prolific, NORC, and Bovitz samples; whereas the adjusted R^2 was respectively .35, .27, and .24 when all aspects of class and the same set of controls were included as IVs. In other words, 18-29% of variance in strength in PID can be attributed to tastes, wealth, and behavioral norms alone. Moreover, even after racial resentment, white identity, and authoritarianism were added to the model predicting strength in PID, an aspect of social class, behavioral norms, still consistently predicted PID at the $p < 0.05$ level. By reducing social class to one or two facets, we have previously come to false conclusions about its (lack of) importance in shaping PID.

Taken together, these three studies provide sufficient evidence for my general expectation that standard models predicting strength in PID and categorical PID have been underspecified in ways that change our understanding of the direction and significance of social class in public opinion and political behavior work. By incorporating wealth and cultural capital into our conceptualization and measurement of social class we are not only able to explain more variance in PID than we can with just our standard economic indicators, but we also gain a completely different understanding of the importance of social class and how/when it maps onto PID.

Chapter 6: Effect of Social Class on Affective Partisanship and Partisan Choice


Chapter Six furthers our understanding on how broadening our conceptualization and measurement of social class improves our understanding of public opinion by using additional measures of partisanship and partisan choice. Rather than solely rely on a single measure of partisan strength and categorical PID to assess the relationship between social class and partisan choice, this chapter brings in five additional measures of partisanship/partisan choice (party feeling thermometers, the Huddy et al. partisan identity scale, and attitudes towards partisan leaders/groups (MAGA, Biden, Trump, the NRA)). These measures capture the affective aspects of and partisan choice. Here, I find that wealth and sociocultural capital make independent and important contributions to our understanding of partisanship and partisan choice above and beyond racial attitudes, and other social identities.

Feeling Thermometers

The first set of additional measures capturing partisan choice include feelings thermometers. Feeling thermometers measure one's level of warmth or coolness towards Republicans and Democrats. The party/partisan feeling thermometers differ from the ANES strength in partisanship scale because they are affective measures, capturing the emotional attachment one has towards a party, its policies, leaders, and constituents.

With that being said, I still expect cultural capital and human capital to be associated with Democratic partisan choice (warmer feelings towards Democrats, and cooler feelings towards Republicans), and for financial capital to be positively associated with Republican partisan choice (cooler feelings towards Democrats and warmer feeling towards the Republicans).

Figure 6.1 Predicted Feelings Towards Democrats and Republicans
w/Identity Controls



Note: Feeling thermometers are on a 0-100 scale. Full model results with varying degrees of specification can be found in the Chapter 6 Appendix. Wealth, behavioral norms, racial resentment, authoritarianism, age, marital status, and gender were significant in the Democratic feeling model. Behavioral norms, racial resentment, authoritarianism, white identity, marital status, south, and gender were significant in the Republican feeling model.

Feelings towards Republicans and Democrats were each measured separately on a 0-100 scale, with a zero indicating cooler feelings and a 100 indicating warmer feelings.⁵² In general, individuals' feelings towards an in-party/partisans are warmer than feelings towards an out-

⁵² Scholars often analyze party feeling thermometers by looking at the difference in feelings towards one's in-party from the out-party. This measure tells us the extent to which individuals are affectively polarized, but not the direction. For this reason, I treat the partisan feeling thermometers as two separate DVs.

party/partisans, and this trend is exemplified in the average feeling thermometer ratings. Average feelings towards Republicans were 74.5 degrees amongst Republicans (leaners included) and 26.4 degrees amongst (Democrats). Average feelings towards Democrats were 23.6 degrees amongst Republicans (leaners included) and 76.1 degrees amongst Democrats.

But what factors explain individual level variation in feelings towards Democrats and Republicans? Figure 6.1 graphically shows the OLS coefficients for a series of variables predicting feelings towards Republicans and Democrats. The OLS model results are solely from the Bovitz dataset because the Prolific and NORC surveys did not include partisan feeling thermometers on them.

Here we see that the affective aspects of partisanship and partisan choice are slightly different than the factors which predict strength of partisanship and categorical PID. As I expected, education and tastes are associated with warmer feelings towards Democrats and cooler feelings towards Republicans. Yet, the coefficients are small in magnitude, and they fail to reach statistical significance in either model.⁵³ For instance, moving from the 10th-90th percentile on education is associated with a 2.2 degree increase in warmth towards Democrats and a 2.9 degree decrease in warmth towards Republicans. Meanwhile moving from the 10-90th percentile on tastes is associated with a 3.7 degree increase in warm feelings towards Democrats and a 2.0 degree decrease in warmth towards Republicans. The results of the models with the strictest specification indicate that education and tastes have little to no bearing on feelings towards Republicans and Democrats.

Aspects of financial capital, on the other hand, mapped onto partisan feelings in ways I did not expect. Income was not significant in either model, and the sign was positive in the Democratic

⁵³ The full model results can be found in the Chapter Six Appendix.

model and negative in the Republican model. Moreover, wealth was associated with warmer feelings towards both Republicans ($\beta=2.8$) and Democrats ($\beta=12.81$). And while moving from the 10th to 90th percentile did not produce more than a 7.4 degree change in warmth towards Democrats, wealth was statistically significant in the model predicting feelings towards Democrats. In this way, there is not support for H1-H4.

Behavioral norms, on the other hand, mapped onto Republican and Democratic partisan feelings in the ways I had predicted⁵⁴. For example, an individual scoring on the 10th percentile of behavioral norms has a predicted 53.6 degrees of warmth towards Republicans and 42.6 degrees of warmth towards Democrats, while an individual scoring on the 90th percentile of the behavioral norms scale has a predicted 41.1 degrees of warmth towards Republicans and 53.3 degrees of warmth Democrats. Unlike other aspects of social class, behavioral norms have the capacity to influence whether one generally feels warm or cool towards Republican or Democrats.

Outside of social class, racial resentment, authoritarianism, and white identity influenced feelings towards the parties/partisans. Moving from the 10th to 90th percentile on the white identity scale is associated with a 4.2 degree decrease in warmth towards Democrats ($p<.18$) and a 11.5 degree increase in warmth towards Republicans ($p<0.05$)⁵⁵. Increases in authoritarianism have a similarly sized effect on partisan feelings, but the coefficient was positive for both Democrats and Republicans. For example, moving from the 10th-90th percentile on authoritarianism is associated with a 7.5 degree increase in warmth towards Democrats ($p<0.05$), and an 8.3 degree increase in


⁵⁴ A one unit increase in behavioral norms is associated with feeling 15 degrees warmer towards Democrats and 13 degrees colder towards Republicans. The difference in feelings was significant in both models at the $p<0.05$ level.

⁵⁵ A one unit increase in white identity is associated with an 8 degree increase in warmth towards Republicans.

warmth towards Republicans ($p < 0.05$). Finally, racial resentment was a consistently strong and statistically significant predictor of feelings towards Democrats and Republicans, shifting feelings in the expected direction by 36-39 degrees at the $p < 0.05$ level when moving from the 10th to 90th percentile on the racial resentment scale.

As outlined in Chapter 5, however, models which control for racial resentment, white identity, and authoritarianism when predicting partisan choice can cause us to underestimate the effect of social class on partisan choice. This is because these measures have been shown to be endogenous with PID, as well as associated with social class. Figure 6.2 thus graphically displays the OLS coefficients for each aspect of social class and a series of demographic characteristics when they are regressed onto the partisan feeling thermometers.

Figure 6.2 Predicted Feelings Towards Democrats and Republicans
w/Demographic Controls



Note: Feeling thermometers are on a 0-100 scale. Full model results with varying degrees of specification can be found in the Chapter 6 appendix. Behavioral norms and gender were significant in the Democratic feeling model. Tastes, behavioral norms, South, and married were significant in the Republican feeling model.


Here, we see that when racial resentment, authoritarianism, and white identity are excluded from the model, tastes become a statistically significant predictor of Republican feelings, wealth is no longer a statistically significant predictor of Democratic warmth, and the coefficient for behavioral norms grows substantively in both models. An individual at the 10th percentile of tastes has an estimated 51.6 degrees of warmth towards Republicans whereas an individual at the 90th percentile of tastes has 43.3 estimated degrees of warmth towards Republicans. Alternatively, an increase in tastes is associated with an 18 degree decrease in warmth towards Republicans ($p < 0.01$). When holding demographic variables at their mean and median levels, moving from the 10th to 90th

percentile on behavioral norms also provides a statistically significant change in feelings towards Democrats and Republicans, a 27.8 degree increase in warmth towards Democrats and a 35.4 degree decrease in warmth toward Republicans. Taking the results of all four models into consideration, feelings towards parties/partisans appear to be best explained by cultural capital, racial identity, and racial resentment.

Expressive Partisan Identity

The second set of additional measures capturing partisan choice include the Huddy et al. expressive identity scale measures. This is a social, affective, and psychological measure of partisanship or partisan choice. Similar to the partisan feeling thermometers, the expressive partisan identity scale looks beyond the instrumental aspect of PID. It also tends to be a better predictor of past electoral activity and current campaign activity than the standard 7-point ANES strength in party identification scale. But because it's focused on capturing partisan teamsmanship, it was only provided to individuals who identified with or leaned towards a certain party. Pure independents are thus excluded from the analysis.

Figure 6.3 Predicting Expressive Partisan Identity w/Identity Controls



Note: Full model results with varying degrees of specification can be found in the Chapter 6 appendix. Wealth, education, occupation, racial resentment, white identity, age, and married were significant in the Democratic model. Behavioral norms, authoritarianism, white identity and gender were significant in the Republican model.

The scale is recoded to range from 0-1, where a 1 indicates greater partisan expressive identity. The Huddy et al. expressive identity scales were only included on the Bovitz survey. Figure 6.3 graphically shows the OLS coefficients for a series of demographic characteristics, aspects of social class, racial resentment, white identity, and authoritarianism predicting Democratic expressive identity and Republican expressive identity. Here we see that the factors predicting respondents' expressive partisan identities are somewhat like the characteristics influencing feelings towards the parties.

Beginning with financial capital, H1 and H2 were not confirmed. Higher income was negatively associated Democratic expressive identity ($\beta=-.03, p<0.69$) and Republican expressive identity ($\beta=-.06, p<0.38$). And while wealth was associated with Democratic expressive party ID at

the $p < .05$ level, the sign was in the opposite direction that I had expected ($\beta = 0.17, p < 0.02$). Wealth was also not a statistically significant predictor of expressive Republican identity, even though the association between wealth and Republican expressive PID was positive ($\beta = .06, p < 0.48$).

H3 was not confirmed either. An increase in education is negatively associated with expressive Democratic identity ($\beta = -.13, p < 0.05$). Moving from the 10th to 90th percentile on education drops ones predicted Democratic expressive identity score from .63 to .55. Meanwhile, even though the coefficient is the direction I expected in the Republican model, education does not reach statistical significance in that model ($\beta = -.07, p < .17$). There is thus no support for the idea that education is positively tied to Democratic and Republican expressive identity.


In terms of cultural capital, tastes were associated greater expressive partisanship for Republicans ($\beta = .03, p < .73$) and Democrats ($\beta = .11, p < .16$), while an increase in behavioral norms is associated with weaker expressive partisanship for Republicans ($\beta = -.19, p < .04$). and stronger expressive partisanship for Democrats ($\beta = .13, p < .15$). The only time an aspect of cultural capital was statistically significant, however, was in the model predicting expressive Republican identity. Going from the 10th to 90th percentile on behavioral norms drops someone's predicted expressive Republican identity from .61 to .52.

Interestingly, racial resentment appeared to matter less in predicting expressive partisan identity than it did in predicting strength of partisanship and partisan feelings too. Racial resentment was negatively associated with Republican ($\beta = -.01, p < .82$), and Democratic ($\beta = -.21, p < .00$) expressive identity, but it was nonetheless significant in just the Democratic model.

Instead, white identity played the biggest role in explaining change in Democratic ($\beta = .10, p < .02$), and Republican expressive partisanship ($\beta = .25, p < .00$). It just did so in a somewhat

unexpected manner. Although prior research would suggest that white identity would be negatively associated with Democratic partisan choice (Jardina 2019), I found that moving from the 10th the 90th percentile on white identity is associated with a 10.5 degree increase in Democratic expressive identity.

Figure 6.4 Predicting Expressive Partisan Identity w/Demographic Controls



Note: Full model results with varying degrees of specification can be found in the Chapter 6 Appendix. Wealth, occupation, lifestyle, behavioral norms, and age were significant in the Democratic model. Education, behavioral norms, age, and gender were significant in the Republican model.

One alternative reason as to why aspects of social class were largely insignificant or at least not mapping onto expressive partisan identity in the direction that I expected is because racial resentment, authoritarianism, and white identity were included in the models. When we exclude these three variables from our models predicting expressive partisan identity, our results slightly

change. Figure 6.4 shows the OLS coefficients for a series of demographic characteristics and aspects of social class predicting Republican expressive identity and Democratic expressive identity.

Beginning with financial capital, wealth continues to predict greater Democratic ($\beta=0.18$, $p<0.02$) and Republican partisan identity ($\beta=0.06$, $p<0.48$), while income remains negatively associated with Democratic ($\beta=-0.04$, $p<0.49$) and Republican expressive identity ($\beta=-0.06$, $p<0.38$). Unlike the previous model though, education does map onto Democratic partisan expressive identity in the way that I had expected. However, education is not a statistically significant predictor of Democratic ($\beta=-0.12$, $p<0.07$) or Republican ($\beta=-0.07$, $p<0.05$) expressive identity when controlling for other aspects of social class and demographic characteristics.

Finally, even though behavioral norms were the only statistically significant aspect of cultural capital in the prior models (specifically the Republican model), cultural capital plays a much larger role in explaining Democratic and Republican expressive identity when racial resentment, authoritarianism, and white identity are omitted from the models. Tastes has a positive association with Democratic expressive identity ($\beta=0.15$), and it reaches statistical significance in the Democratic expressive identity model. Meanwhile behavioral norms are a statistically significant predictor of both Republican ($\beta=-0.19$, $p<0.04$) and Democratic ($\beta=.20$, $p<0.01$) expressive identity.

Overall given the mixed findings from all four models predicting partisan expressive identity (those both including and omitting racial resentment, authoritarianism, and white identity), it appears that the factors influencing expressive partisan identity are different than those shaping categorical PID and strength in partisanship. Education, tastes, and wealth sometimes play a significant role in explaining expressive partisan identity. But they do so in an unexpected manner and to a much lesser

extent than behavioral norms or other identity based characteristics. At the same time, racial resentment mattered much less in predicting partisan expressive identity than it did in predicting strength of partisanship, while white identity mattered much more. In this way, expressive partisan identity seems to be more of a function of one's likeliness to ascribe to an 'us versus them' framework than it is a direct effect of individual social class or attitudes towards other groups.

Partisan Leaders and Groups

But what about partisan leaders and groups? The president and the most recent general presidential nominee tend to be the face of parties. Outside of that, major interest groups like the National Rifle Association (NRA) and Greenpeace have been strongly tied to parties in Americans' minds (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015). In this way, we should expect similar relationships between aspects of capital and perceptions of MAGA, the NRA, Trump and Biden, as we did with strength in partisan identification.

For this final set of analyses, respondents were asked to rate their feelings of the Make America Great Again Movement (MAGA), Trump, Biden, and the National Rifle Association (NRA) from very favorable to very unfavorable. Questions about partisan leaders and groups were included on Bovitz and NORC surveys, but only the Bovitz survey included a question about Trump. The favorability scales for each of these individuals and groups were rescaled to be from 0-1, where a one indicates greater favorability.

Table 6.1 reports the coefficients from the OLS models predicting favorability towards MAGA, Trump, Biden, and the NRA. To address issues around model specification and to gain a better understanding of the potential effects aspects of social class might have on partisan choice, I ran two models for each respective group/leader. The first OLS model (M1) regresses aspects of

social class and demographic characteristics on favorability towards a specific group or leader. The ‘second’ set of OLS models (M2) are identical to the first except that they also include measures of racial resentment, white identity, and authoritarianism.

Table 6.1 Aspects of Social Class on Support for Partisan Leaders and Groups

	NORC						Bovitz							
	MAGA M1	MAGA M2	NRA M1	NRA M2	Biden M1	Biden M2	MAGA M1	MAGA M2	NRA M1	NRA M2	Biden M1	Biden M2	Trump M1	Trump M2
Wealth	.08 (.09)	.02 (.08)	.04 (.08)	-.00 (.07)	-.11 (.08)	-.05 (.07)	-.03 (.07)	-.06 (.07)	-.03 (.07)	-.05 (.06)	.04 (.08)	.04 (.07)	.04 (.08)	.02 (.08)
Income	-.11 (.09)	-.06 (.08)	-.04 (.08)	-.01 (.07)	.14 (.08)	.11 (.07)	-.00 (.06)	-.02 (.06)	.03 (.06)	.01 (.05)	-.08 (.06)	-.01 (.06)	-.06 (.06)	-.08 (.06)
Occupation	---	---	---	---	---	---	.06 (.03)	.06 (.03)	.06 (.03)	.06* (.03)	-.00 (.04)	-.01 (.03)	.07* (.03)	.08* (.03)
Education	-.25* (.06)	-.10 (.06)	-.28* (.06)	-.15* (.05)	.17* (.06)	.05 (.05)	-.13* (.06)	-.09 (.05)	-.13* (.05)	-.10* (.05)	.13* (.06)	.11* (.06)	-.18* (.06)	-.15* (.06)
Tastes	-.28* (.08)	-.13 (.08)	-.27* (.08)	-.12 (.08)	.24* (.08)	.12 (.07)	-.21* (.08)	-.03 (.07)	-.25* (.07)	-.10 (.06)	.17* (.07)	.03 (.07)	-.21* (.08)	-.04 (.07)
Behavioral	-.92* (.07)	-.31* (.09)	-.85* (.07)	-.26* (.09)	.78* (.08)	.22* (.09)	-.97* (.06)	-.34* (.08)	-.92* (.06)	-.39* (.07)	.75* (.07)	.26* (.08)	-.87* (.07)	-.31* (.08)
Gender	.05 (.04)	.07* (.03)	.01 (.03)	.01 (.03)	-.04 (.03)	-.04 (.03)	.00 (.02)	-.00 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	.03 (.02)	.02 (.02)	.02 (.03)	.02 (.02)
Age	.14* (.07)	.07 (.06)	.08 (.07)	.02 (.06)	.10 (.06)	.16* (.06)	.21* (.06)	.03 (.05)	.11* (.05)	-.05 (.05)	.09 (.06)	.23* (.06)	.07 (.06)	-.11* (.05)
South	.05 (.03)	.04 (.03)	.02 (.03)	.01 (.03)	-.01 (.03)	.01 (.03)	.06* (.02)	.06* (.02)	.07* (.02)	.07* (.02)	-.02* (.02)	-.01 (.02)	.07* (.03)	.07* (.02)
Rural	---	---	---	---	---	---	.06 (.03)	.04 (.03)	.07* (.03)	.06* (.02)	-.07* (.03)	-.05* (.03)	.05 (.03)	.04 (.03)
Married	.00 (.03)	-.01 (.03)	.00 (.03)	-.01 (.03)	-.03 (.03)	-.02 (.03)	.03 (.03)	.04 (.02)	.02 (.02)	.03 (.02)	-.02 (.03)	-.04 (.02)	.04 (.03)	.04 (.03)
Working	.02 (.04)	.04 (.03)	.01 (.04)	.03 (.03)	-.07 (.03)	-.01* (.03)	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Non-Metro	.01 (.04)	.01 (.04)	.07 (.04)	.07* (.03)	.03 (.04)	.04 (.03)	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Auth	---	.08 (.05)	---	.03 (.05)	---	.01 (.04)	---	.10* (.04)	---	.06 (.04)	---	.08* (.04)	---	.05 (.04)
RR	---	.68* (.06)	---	.69* (.05)	---	-.67* (.05)	---	.60* (.05)	---	.54* (.04)	---	-.68* (.05)	---	.57* (.05)
White Identity	---	-.04 (.04)	---	-.07 (.04)	---	.06 (.04)	---	.09* (.04)	---	.06 (.03)	---	.06 (.03)	---	.09* (.04)
Constant	1.07 (.09)	.25 (.12)	1.11 (.08)	.33 (.11)	-.30 (.08)	.39 (.10)	.94 (.05)	.22 (.07)	.99 (.05)	.39 (.07)	-.17 (.05)	.39 (.07)	.91 (.06)	.26 (.08)
R ²	.34	.50	.34	.51	.24	.41	.30	.45	.33	.46	.20	.36	.25	.38
N	601	589	599	587	628	614	855	847	855	847	855	847	855	847

Note: Entries reflect OLS coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05 (two-tailed test). All DVs standardized from 0-1, higher scores indicate greater favorability.

So what do I find? Beginning financial capital, we see that H1 and H2 are not confirmed. The relationship between financial capital and views towards partisan groups and leaders is not significant in Model 1 or Model 2 across the NORC and Bovitz data sets. Moreover, the sign of the coefficients for wealth and income change between datasets or across measures of partisan choice. For example, while an increase in wealth is associated with a decrease in favorability towards the NRA and MAGA in the Bovitz data set, it is also positively associated with support for Trump in the Bovitz dataset. Wealth may have been a predictor of strength in PID, but wealth and income do not appear to have a relationship with this measure of partisan choice in particular.

An aspect of human capital, education, on the other hand is a strong predictor of attitudes towards MAGA, Trump, Biden, and the NRA in both models. Education was associated with lower support for MAGA, the NRA, and Trump and greater favorability for Biden at the $p < 0.05$ level in Model 1 for both samples. When racial resentment, authoritarianism, and white identity are included in models, education continues to be a statistically significant predictor of lower support for the NRA and Trump and greater support for Biden in both samples. The size of the coefficients for education are smaller in Model 2 than in Model 1, but they are still notable. Moving from the 10th to the 90th percentile on education produces a .10 decrease in favorability for Trump, a 0.06 decrease in favorability for the NRA, and an 0.07 increase in favorability for Biden in the Bovitz sample. H3 is confirmed.

Cultural capital is likewise a significant predictor of partisan choice in Model 1 and Model 2. Tastes is associated with lower support for MAGA, the NRA, and Trump and greater support for Biden in Model 1 for both samples. The effects are weaker in Model 2, but tastes do remain to be a statistically significant predictor of support for the NRA in both samples and support for Biden in the Bovitz sample. For example, moving from the 10th to the 90th percentile on taste produces an 0.05

decrease in favorability for the NRA and an 0.02 increase in favorability for Biden in the Bovitz sample. Taking both Model 1 and Model 2 results into consideration, H4 is confirmed.

Finally, behavioral norms are a strong predictor of support for partisan leaders and groups. Behavioral norms are a statistically significant predictor of support for MAGA, the NRA, Trump, and Biden in both Model 1 and Model 2 in the Bovitz and NORC samples. The coefficient size is similar between the Bovitz and NORC datasets. And while the size of the coefficients are smaller in Model 2 than they are in Model 1, it is still clear that an increase in behavioral norms explains change in favorability towards partisan leaders and groups above and beyond authoritarianism, white identity, and racial resentment. Moving from the 10-90th percentile on behavioral norms is associated with a 0.16 decrease in favorability towards Trump, 0.19 decrease in favorability towards the NRA, a 0.18 decrease in favorability towards MAGA, and an 0.13 increase in favorability towards Biden in the Bovitz sample. H5 is unequivocally confirmed; behavioral norms is a strong predictor of Democratic partisan choice when it is defined in terms of support for leaders and groups.

Discussion and Conclusion

So, what does this mean for how we understand social class and its relation to public opinion and political behavior? Do voters avoid considering their social class when they make political evaluations? I expected that social class would predict PID and partisan choice because individuals are both self-interested and homophilic in a resource constrained world. More specifically I expected that aspects of financial capital would be associated with Republican partisan choice because of the public's strong perception of the Republican party as being the party for the 'rich'. I also anticipated that higher status tastes, behavioral norms, and education, would be associated with Democratic partisan choice because of the party's image as being a party for 'snowflakes', 'the poor', 'educated', and 'cultural elite'.

Table 6.2 notes whether my hypotheses were provisionally confirmed in Model 1 and Model 2 (as well as Model 3 for strength in PID) for each dependent variable studied. A hypothesis was categorized as provisionally confirmed ('confirmed') when the data supports a prediction in 1 of the datasets when tested in 1 sample, when the data supports a prediction in 1 of the data sets when tested in 2 samples, and when data supports a prediction in 2 of 3 data sets when the prediction is tested in all 3 samples. The combination of the analyses predicting categorical PID (both Republican and Democratic), strength of partisanship, and partisan choice show that forms of capital are not only conceptually and empirically distinct, but they also map onto to partisan choice in contrasting ways. Aspects of cultural capital and human capital map positively onto Democratic partisan choice, while greater wealth is associated with Republican partisan choice.

Some faces of social class are also more politicized than others. While behavioral norms was a statistically significant predictor of PID and partisan choice in every model, that is not the same case for other aspects of social class. In fact, wealth was positively related to Republican categorical PID and strength of Republican PID at the $p < 0.05$, but not Republican partisan choice. Wealth, however, was significant more often than income and it was significant beyond racial resentment, white identity, and authoritarianism-which is not the case for education or tastes. Even though education and tastes were associated with strength in Democratic PID and partisan choice at the $p < 0.05$, they often lost their significance once racial resentment, white identity, and authoritarianism were included in the model. In sum, the results from Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 show that conflating aspects of financial capital with cultural or human capital not only can cause us to underestimate the significance of social class in models predicting partisan identification and partisan choice, but it also leads us to draw incorrect inferences about the direction of that relationship.

Overall rethinking our conceptualization of social class has both normative and empirical implications for our understanding of public opinion and political behavior. Contrary to prior work which has argued that social class does not matter beyond racial attitudes or that it is the human face of social class plus income that play a central role in partisan identification formation and change, I find that cultural capital and sometimes wealth explain partisan divisions in the public above and beyond racial attitudes. When we leave wealth and cultural capital out of our conceptualization of social class, we consequently have a very limited understanding of the role social class plays in politics.

Table 6.2 Summary of Results

DV	Model	Income (H1)	Wealth (H2)	Education (H3)	Tastes (H4)	Behavioral Norms (H5)
Democratic Categorical PID	Model 1	Not Confirmed	Not Confirmed	Not Confirmed	Not Confirmed	Confirmed
Republican Categorical PID	Model 1	Not Confirmed	Confirmed	Not confirmed	Not Confirmed	Confirmed
Strength in PID	Model 1 Model 2 Model 3	Not Confirmed Not Confirmed Not Confirmed	Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed	Confirmed Confirmed Not Confirmed	Confirmed Confirmed Not Confirmed	Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed
Democratic FT	Model 1 Model 2	Not Confirmed Not Confirmed	Not Confirmed Confirmed	Not Confirmed Not Confirmed	Not Confirmed Not Confirmed	Confirmed Confirmed
Republican FT	Model 1 Model 2	Not Confirmed Not Confirmed	Not Confirmed Not Confirmed	Not Confirmed Not Confirmed	Confirmed Not Confirmed	Confirmed Confirmed
Democratic Expressive Identity	Model 1 Model 2	Not Confirmed Not Confirmed	Not Confirmed Not Confirmed	Not Confirmed Not Confirmed	Confirmed Not Confirmed	Confirmed Not Confirmed
Republican Expressive Identity	Model 1 Model 2	Not Confirmed Not Confirmed	Not Confirmed Not Confirmed	Confirmed Confirmed	Not Confirmed Not Confirmed	Confirmed Confirmed
Support for the NRA	Model 1 Model 2	Not Confirmed Not Confirmed	Not Confirmed Not Confirmed	Confirmed Confirmed	Confirmed Not Confirmed	Confirmed Confirmed
Support for MAGA	Model 1 Model 2	Not Confirmed Not Confirmed	Not Confirmed Not Confirmed	Confirmed Not Confirmed	Confirmed Not Confirmed	Confirmed Confirmed
Support for Biden	Model 1 Model 2	Not Confirmed Not Confirmed	Not Confirmed Not Confirmed	Confirmed Confirmed	Confirmed Not Confirmed	Confirmed Confirmed
Support for Trump	Model 1 Model 2	Not Confirmed Not Confirmed	Not Confirmed Not Confirmed	Confirmed Confirmed	Confirmed Not Confirmed	Confirmed Confirmed

Chapter 7: Conclusion

The standard research process in the field of public opinion and political behavioral involves processing data to form statistical models in order to make inferences about politics. The problem with this standard approach, however, is that it ignores how our theory testing can be corrupted by poor conceptualization and measurement of variables. In fact, the problems with short shifting attention to conceptualization and measurement are exemplified in studies of how social class maps onto partisanship. For the past few decades, there have been multiple assertions like Franks' in *What's the Matter with Kansas?* and Roediger's in *Wages of Whiteness* that social class voting is 'dead' or at least that white people's racial attitudes override notions of self-interest and class solidarity (Gilens, 1999; Sides et al., 2018). Others have, conversely, come to different conclusions about the role that social class plays in determining partisan choice. The most popular argument we have seen in the field of public opinion and political behavior today is that social class matters in the sense that the U.S. electorate is now divided in terms of educational attainment. I argue, on the other hand, that both stances miss the nuance or mischaracterize the relationship between social class and politics.

While scholars in both camps are studying 'class', they are not referring to the same conceptualization of social class. Consequently, social class has been measured in differing ways that have implications for the inferences we draw about social class and its relation to partisan choice. For instance, Gilens defines class based on income and Sides et al. consider class in terms of educational attainment. Yet, while higher class in terms of income is associated Republican partisan choice; the opposite is true for educational attainment. This is just one of the many examples where

differing conceptualizations and in hand measures of social class in the field have led to conflicting generalizations about its role in politics.

But the problem with previous work is not in whether we should be using educational attainment rather than income or occupation as a proxy for class. In fact, I argue that all of these previous practices are insufficient in so far as they neglect to consider how wealth and cultural capital also contribute to social class.

By drawing upon Bourdieu's cultural capital theory and more recent research from social psychology, business, and sociology, we begin to understand that social class is multifaceted. It is the product of a series of economic and non-economic (cultural, symbolic, and social) characteristics. The motivation behind this dissertation was thus to rethink how we are conceptualizing social class in order to build a more comprehensive measure of it to see whether it tells us something new about partisan choice.

Significance

My dissertation makes three contributions to the field of public opinion, political behavior, and class and inequality. First, it rethinks the conceptualization and the measurement of social class in theoretically and empirically rigorous ways. I conceptualize social class as being the product of a series of economic and non-economic factors and characteristics which can be organized into three forms of capital: human (education + occupation), financial (wealth + income), and cultural (tastes + behavioral norms). My conceptualization consequently differs from common understandings and quantification of social class in political science as it considers social class to be multi-faceted and gradational. Individuals can be considered working-class in terms of their human capital while still being high in financial capital. Most people fall somewhere the poles of elite and common/non-elite.

More specifically my conceptualization of social class differs from previous definitions of social class as educational attainment or income because it recognizes (1) the distinction between education/income and financial capital (2) how wealth has been ignored as a form of financial capital and (3) how cultural capital is missing from conceptualizations and operationalizations of social class. Through giving more attention to how we conceptualize social class and its faces, I was able to come up with survey questions to better operationalize social class. I then used a series of scaling and measurement methods to analyze the reliability and validity of tastes, wealth, and behavioral norms. The outcome of this process was the development of three original and reliable short scales which capture aspects of social class that have been ignored in quantitative political science research.

The second contribution my dissertation makes is in providing us with a more nuanced understanding of how people make political evaluations and partisan choices, as well as how social class relates to public opinion and political behavior. I outline two ways people come to evaluate parties and their affiliated candidates. While self-interest motivates individuals to make partisan choices which will enhance their financial and human capital, people are also homophilic. We tend to trust, befriend, and like people who we perceive to be like us. This means that because voters have limited time and resources to conduct a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis for a wide range of policies, they often figure out what and who they like based upon perceptions of who is one of them. In other words, individuals often rely on ‘vibes’, party stereotypes, and party heuristics to determine which party (and its affiliated candidates/base) will better meet their needs of being self-interested and homophilic. Because Democrats are stereotyped and have a reputation for being a party for the poor and the college educated, I expected and found that human capital is associated with Democratic partisan choice and financial capital is predictive of Republican party choice.

Likewise, I hypothesized that individuals with higher cultural capital (tastes and behavioral norms) would be more likely to make Democratic partisan choices than Republican choices because of the real and perceived differences in tastes and behavioral norms associated with the parties and their members. The results in Chapter Five and Chapter Six support this idea as both types of cultural capital and wealth were strong and statistically significant predictors of partisanship and a series of measures of partisan choice when controlling for other aspects of social class and demographic characteristics.

Finally, my dissertation helps resolve the prolonged debate on whether social class matters in public opinion above and beyond other identities and attitudes. Since W.E.B. DuBois published the *Souls of Black Folk* in 1904, the importance of social class has been both questioned and explained through racial resentment, SDO, and authoritarianism (Mutz, 2021). Scholars and journalists alike have generally posited that (1) racial attitudes have undercut any notion of class consciousness in elections (Sides et al., 2018) and/or that (2) social class only holds meaning in public opinion and political behavior because individuals with a lower social class score higher on personality scales which tend to be associated with holding negative attitudes about people of color (Mutz, 2021). These arguments have then been used in effort to explain recent partisan realignments and divides.

Rather than ignore the role that racial attitudes play in the formation of partisan choices, I ran multivariate regressions which include IVs like racial resentment, strength of white identity, and authoritarianism, alongside each measure of capital. Contrary to prior work, I find that some aspects of social class still have a strong influence on white people's partisan choices. Even after we control for a wide range of identities and personality traits which have been argued to contribute to PID and

partisan choice, the results in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 demonstrate that cultural capital, wealth, and education are often still significant predictors of partisanship and partisan choice.

Limitations with Measuring Cultural Capital

All research is not without its limitations. While others in the field of psychology, sociology, and business have sought to broaden our understanding of social class beyond income and education based on Bourdieu's cultural capital theory, this work is the first to try to build a measure of cultural capital. Albeit reliable, the tastes and behavioral norm scales I presented should be understood as a starting point for capturing the non-material components of cultural capital.

In other words, there are likely to be more foods, activities, and norms which contribute to one's level of cultural capital than what I asked about in the tastes and behavioral norm scales. Future work can thus expand upon the validation study I conducted and the field experiments of Rivera and Tilcsik (2016) and Thomas (2018) to come up with a greater list of hobbies, tastes, and norms to be included in the tastes and behavioral norm scales.

Similarly, while I defined cultural capital in relation to behavioral norms and tastes, I think there is a third component of cultural capital: social networks. A common saying is "it's not what you know, but who you know". Although friends, coworkers, family, and neighbors cannot be liquidated, social networks are an asset (Putnam, 2015). Contacts are often relied upon as resources for informal knowledge and access to job and educational opportunities (Cook, 2014). In fact, one of the best predictors of whether an individual will attend college is whether their parent(s) went to college (Savage 2015). The causal mechanism behind a child attending college is not their parent's literal degree. It's the instrumental logic (kids go to college to get "a good job") parents gain from

attending and then pass onto their children. Non-elite parents, however, don't know "the rules of the game" for getting into college and/or getting a white collar job (importance of internships etc.) (Hamilton et al., 2018). And while working class kids could rely on other social connections (mentors, family friends, and extended family), outside of their parent(s) to learn about common pathways for reaching opportunity and success, the social status of one's parents is strongly tied to the social status of their network. Elite parents tend to have broader social networks, when their kids are already 2-3 more likely to have a mentor (beyond family) than non-elite kids. As Piff, Kraus, and Keltner (2018) conclude, "The advantages of upper-class standing are compounded through preferential access to valued social networks. Resource and opportunity-rich social networks, as found in neighborhood spaces, schools, clubs, social gatherings, internships, and gateway career opportunities, are concentrated among people from upper-class backgrounds" (p.69).

The importance of social networks for having accesses to human and financial capital also reinforces the gulf between those with and without capital in adulthood. After conducting over 120 interviews with hiring partners and managing directors, attending recruitment events, interviewing elite professional service (EPS) firm applicants, and sitting on an EPS firms' hiring committee deliberations, Rivera (2015) uncovered what information employers use in making hiring decisions for entry level positions at investment banks, management consulting firms, and law firms. Rivera (2015) found that a connection to an employee often led to an interview. One's social network was used by employers to differentiate between two similarly situated candidates after the second interview and qualified applicants without an advocate were often denied the job. And although most Americans aren't seeking employment in (EPS) firms, the importance of social networks carries over into the hiring process for a wide range of jobs. In fact, 51-71% of people report relying

on their social network to obtain a job (Williams 2017), individuals with a job referral received greater benefits on average than new employees without a referral at a call center (Fernandez et al., 2000), and applicants to MBA programs are much more likely to be admitted with an endorsement (despite not being ‘better’ performers academically) (Castilla & Rissing, 2019). The exclusivity and homogeneity of social networks thus poses challenges for individuals from non-elite backgrounds who seek employment in the professional sector and/or are applying to professional programs. Due to survey space limitations, and because I did not expect social networks to be predictive of partisan choice in particular, I decided to focus on operationalizing tastes and behavioral norms in this dissertation. Nonetheless, future work can and should come up with a valid measure of social networks to assess both its relation to other aspects of social class and its influence on perceptions of inequality.

Another limitation of my dissertation is that it is focused on white people and how individual aspects of social explain partisan choice rather than how social class as a whole influences political attitudes. I have not tested whether measures of tastes and behavioral norms hold the same meaning or work the same way for Latinx, Asian, or Black Americans as they do for Whites. Nevertheless, future work can build upon the idea that social class is composed of three forms of capital and my studies to develop measures of cultural capital for specific ethno-racial groups. It can also utilize formal modeling to make a composite variable of social class. This would allow us to understand whether differences in behaviors and attitudes exist between and within various social class/ethno-racial groups in the United States.

Further Hypothesis Testing

While this dissertation focused solely on the relationship between social class and partisan choice and PID, I expect that aspects of social class influence other political phenomena commonly studied in public opinion and political behavior such as trust, political efficacy, participation, and policy preferences. Future work could also use these various measures of social class to formally test whether homophily is the mechanism behind social class mapping onto candidate and partisan evaluations. In fact, a future study might involve fielding a conjoint experiment which would randomize the tastes and behavioral norms of candidates, alongside a series of other candidate attributes and characteristics. This experimental set-up would allow us to potentially solve puzzles like why working-class candidates are less likely to be elected than non-working candidates (Arceneaux & Vander Wielen, 2023; van Noord et al., 2022), and determine if some aspects of social class are more important for getting elected to Congress than others. A conjoint experiment which uses my proposed measure of social class could also look at the interaction between candidate and voter characteristics to effectively parse out the conditions in which voters support candidates with levels of human, financial, and cultural capital that mirror their own.

Next, it has become standard in political science to recognize problems around endogeneity. Partisan identification has been shown to be predictive of identities previously thought to be relatively fixed or stable like race or sexuality (Egan, 2019). One may thus be concerned that cultural capital reflects PID and partisan choice more than the reverse. While causal order is a legitimate concern, the definition of cultural capital suggests that it is the other way around. This is because cultural capital is formed in young adulthood, and it is very sticky. Our behavioral norms and tastes remain stable into adulthood despite changes in human and financial capital (Dumais, 2019; Phillips

et al., 2020; Stephens et al., 2014; Stephens & Townsend, 2017). Nonetheless, future work can pilot these measures in a panel study to test their stability and evaluate whether PID changes as a function of behavioral norms using a random-intercept cross-lagged panel model. All in all, while this work has advanced our understanding of social class and how to measure it, as well as its relationship with partisan choice, there is still progress to be made in understanding how, why, and when social class matters in public opinion and political behavior.

Conclusion

This dissertation elucidates why we must carefully consider the conceptualization and measurement of concepts or identities like social class before plugging them into our regression models. I find that both the financial and cultural aspects of social class contribute to our understanding of partisan choice. However, the way aspects of social class map onto to partisan choice differ and conflict. Faces of social class and their characteristics should therefore not be conflated with one another. As the results of three studies show, reducing social class to just one face or a few factors like income or education not only provides a distorted view of what social class is, but it also causes us to misunderstand the role that social class has in politics. By focusing our sole attention on just education and its relation to partisan choice, we ignore the broader picture of how multiple aspects of social class are working in conjunction (or in conflict) with education and income to shape partisan choice. The aspects of social class that matter the most have been figuratively and literally left out of the equation in the public opinion and political behavior literature

Bibliography

- Abramowitz, Alan. (2018). *The Great Alignment: Race, Party Transformation, and the Rise of Donald Trump*. Yale University Press.
- Achen, C., & Bartels, L. (2016). *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government*. Princeton University Press.
- Adcock, R., & Collier, D. (2001). Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research. *American Political Science Review*, 95(3), 529–546.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055401003100>
- Adorno, T., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). *The Authoritarian Personality*. Harper.
- Agadjanian, A., & Lacy, D. (2021). Changing Votes, Changing Identities?: Racial Fluidity and Vote Switching in the 2012–2016 US Presidential Elections. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 85(3), 737–752. <https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfab045>
- Altemeyer, B. (1981). *Right-Wing Authoritarianism*. University of Manitoba Press.
- Arceneaux, K., & Vander Wielen, R. J. (2023). Do voters prefer educated candidates? How candidate education influences vote choice in congressional elections. *Electoral Studies*, 82, 102596. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2023.102596>
- Bartels, L. M. (2008). *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age* (STU-Student edition). Princeton University Press. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7t9ks>
- Baumer, D. C., & Gold, H. J. (2007). Party Images and Partisan Resurgence. *The Social Science Journal*, 44(3), 465–479. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sosci.2007.07.003>

- Becker, J. C., Kraus, M. W., & Rheinschmidt-Same, M. (2017a). Cultural Expressions of Social Class and Their Implications for Group-Related Beliefs and Behaviors: Cultural Expressions of Social Class. *Journal of Social Issues*, 73(1), 158–174. <https://doi.org/10.1111/josi.12209>
- Becker, J. C., Kraus, M. W., & Rheinschmidt-Same, M. (2017b). Cultural Expressions of Social Class and Their Implications for Group-Related Beliefs and Behaviors: Cultural Expressions of Social Class. *Journal of Social Issues*, 73(1), 158–174. <https://doi.org/10.1111/josi.12209>
- Bergan, D. E. (2009). The Draft Lottery and Attitudes Towards the Vietnam War. *Public Opinion Quarterly*.
- Bourdieu, P. (1984). *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*. Harvard University Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1986). *Forms of Capital*. Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education.
- Burden, B. (2007). *Personal Roots of Representation*. Princeton University Press.
- Calarco, J. M. (2011). “I Need Help!” Social Class and Children’s Help-Seeking in Elementary School. *American Sociological Review*, 76(6), 862–882.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122411427177>
- Campbell, A., Converse, P., Miller, W., & Stokes, D. (1960). *The American Voter*. The University of Chicago Press.
- Carnes, N. (2013). *White Collar Government: The Hidden Role of Class in Economic Policy Making*. The University of Chicago Press.
- Carnes, N. (2018). *The Cash Ceiling: Why Only the Rich Run for Office and What We Can Do About It*. Princeton University Press.
- Carnes, N., & Lupu, N. (2020). The White Working Class and the 2016 Election. *Perspectives on Politics*, 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592720001267>

- Castilla, E. J., & Rissing, B. A. (2019). Best in Class: The Returns on Application Endorsements in Higher Education. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, *64*(1), 230–270.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0001839218759965>
- Chua, P. K., Abraham, H., & Mazmanian, M. (2021). Playing the Hiring Game: Class-Based Emotional Experiences and Tactics in Elite Hiring. *Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction*, *5*(CSCW2), 1–27. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3479536>
- Chua, P. K., & Mazmanian, M. (2020). Are You One of Us?: Current Hiring Practices Suggest the Potential for Class Biases in Large Tech Companies. *Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction*, *4*(CSCW2), 1–20. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3415214>
- Converse, P. (1964). *The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics*. The Free Press.
- Cook, K. (2014). Social Capital and Inequality: The Significance of Social Connections. In *Handbook of the Social Psychology of Inequality*. Springer.
- Cramer, K. (2016). *The Political of Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker*. University of Chicago Press.
- Cravens, R. G. (2021). The view from the top: Social acceptance and ideological conservatism among sexual minorities. *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, *9*(5), 975–996.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2019.1674674>
- Curl, H., Lareau, A., & Wu, T. (2018). Cultural Conflict: The Implications of Changing Dispositions Among the Upwardly Mobile. *Sociological Forum*, *33*(4), 877–899.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/socf.12461>
- Currarini, S., & Mengel, F. (2016). Identity, homophily and in-group bias. *European Economic Review*, *90*, 40–55. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.02.015>

- Currid-Halkett, E. (2017). *The Sum of Small Things: A Theory of the Aspirational Class*. Princeton University Press.
- de Regt, S., Smits, T., & Mortelmans, D. (2012). The relevance of class in shaping authoritarian attitudes: A cross-national perspective. *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility*, 30(3), 280–295. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rssm.2012.03.001>
- Dittman, A. (2016, August 12). Understanding Social Class as Culture. *Behavioral Scientist*. <https://behavioralscientist.org/understanding-social-class-as-culture/>
- Doherty, D., Gerber, A. S., & Green, D. P. (2006). Personal Income and Attitudes toward Redistribution: A Study of Lottery Winners. *Political Psychology*, 27(3), 441–458. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2006.00509.x>
- Duckitt, J., & Bizumic, B. (2013). Multidimensionality of Right-Wing Authoritarian Attitudes: Authoritarianism-Conservatism-Traditionalism. *Political Psychology*, 34(6), 841–862. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12022>
- Dumais, S. A. (2019). The cultural practices of first-generation college graduates: The role of childhood cultural exposure. *Poetics*, 77, 14.
- Dunham, Y., Chen, E. E., & Banaji, M. R. (2013). Two Signatures of Implicit Intergroup Attitudes: Developmental Invariance and Early Enculturation. *Psychological Science*, 10.
- Egan, P. J. (2019). Identity as Dependent Variable: How Americans Shift Their Identities to Align with Their Politics. *American Journal of Political Science*, ajps.12496. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12496>
- Engelhardt, A. M. (2021). Racial Attitudes Through a Partisan Lens. *British Journal of Political Science*, 51(3), 1062–1079. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123419000437>

- Feldman, S. (2003). Enforcing Social Conformity: A Theory of Authoritarianism. *Political Psychology*, 24(1), 41–74.
- Feldman, S., & Stenner, K. (1997). Perceived Threat and Authoritarianism. *Political Psychology*, 18(4), 741–770. <https://doi.org/10.1111/0162-895X.00077>
- Fenno, Richard. (1978). *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts*. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. Little, Brown, and Company.
- Fernandez, R. M., Castilla, E. J., & Moore, P. (2000). Social Capital at Work: Networks and Employment at a Phone Center. *American Journal of Sociology*, 105(5), 1288–1356. <https://doi.org/10.1086/210432>
- Field, J. (2008). *Social Capital* (Second). Routledge.
- Fiske, S. T., & Rose Markus, H. (Eds.). (2012). *Facing Social Class*. Russel Sage Foundation.
- Flemmen, M., Jarness, V., & Rosenlund, L. (2018). Social space and cultural class divisions: The forms of capital and contemporary lifestyle differentiation: Social space and cultural class divisions. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 69(1), 124–153. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-4446.12295>
- Fording, R. C., & Schram, S. F. (2023). Pride or Prejudice? Clarifying the Role of White Racial Identity in Recent Presidential Elections. *Polity*, 55(1), 106–136. <https://doi.org/10.1086/722807>
- Freeman, J. (1986). The Political Culture of the Democratic and Republican Parties. *Political Science Quarterly*, 101(3), 327. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2151619>
- Friedman, S., & Laurison, D. (2020). *The Class Ceiling: Why it Pays to be Privileged*. Policy Press.
- Gest, J. (2018). *The White Working Class: What Everyone Needs to Know*. Oxford University Press.
- Gilens, M. (1999). *Why Americans Hate Welfare*. University of Chicago Press.

- Gilens, M., & Page, B. I. (2014). Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens. *Perspectives on Politics*, 12(3), 564–581.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714001595>
- Gilens, Martin. (2012). *Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America*. Princeton University Press.
- Goggin, S. N., Henderson, J. A., & Theodoridis, A. G. (2020). What Goes with Red and Blue? Mapping Partisan and Ideological Associations in the Minds of Voters. *Political Behavior*, 42(4), 985–1013. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-018-09525-6>
- Goggin, S. N., & Theodoridis, A. G. (2017). Disputed Ownership: Parties, Issues, and Traits in the Minds of Voters. *Political Behavior*, 39(3), 675–702. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-016-9375-3>
- Goldthorpe, J., & Jackson, M. (2008). Education-Based Meritocracy: The Barriers to Its Realization. In *Social Class: How Does it Work?* Russel Sage Foundation.
- Green, D. P., & Gerken, A. E. (1989). Self-Interest and Public Opinion Toward Smoking Restrictions and Cigarette Taxes. *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 53(1), 1–16.
- Hamilton, L., Roksa, J., & Nielsen, K. (2018). Providing a “Leg Up”: Parental Involvement and Opportunity Hoarding in College. *Sociology of Education*, 91(2), 111–131.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0038040718759557>
- Hart, R. (2020). *Trump and US: What He Says And Why People Listen*. Cambridge University Press.
- Henderson, M., & Hillygus, D. S. (2011). The dynamics of health care opinion, 2008-2010: Partisanship, self-interest, and racial resentment. *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law*, 36(6), 945–960. <https://doi.org/10.1215/03616878-1460533>

- Hero, Rodney & Preuhs, Robert. (2013). *Black-Latino Relations in U.S. National Politics: Beyond Conflict or Cooperation*. Cambridge University Press.
- Hetherington, M., & Weiler, J. (2018). *Prism or Pickup: How the Answers to Four Simple Questions Explain America's Great Divide*. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company.
- Hiaeshutter-Rice, D., Neuner, F. G., & Soroka, S. (2021). Cued by Culture: Political Imagery and Partisan Evaluations. *Political Behavior*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-021-09726-6>
- Himmelboim, I., Sweetser, K. D., Tinkham, S. F., Cameron, K., Danelo, M., & West, K. (2016). Valence-based homophily on Twitter: Network Analysis of Emotions and Political Talk in the 2012 Presidential Election. *New Media & Society*, 18(7), 1382–1400. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444814555096>
- Hochschild, A. R. (2016). *Strangers in their own land: Anger and mourning on the American right*. The New Press.
- Hout, M., & Laurison, D. (2018). The Realignment of U.S. Presidential Voting. In *Inequality in the 21st Century*. Routledge.
- Huber, G. A., & Malhotra, N. (2017). Political Homophily in Social Relationships: Evidence from Online Dating Behavior. *The Journal of Politics*, 79(1), 269–283. <https://doi.org/10.1086/687533>
- Huddy, L., Mason, L., & Aarøe, L. (2015). Expressive Partisanship: Campaign Involvement, Political Emotion, and Partisan Identity. *American Political Science Review*, 109(1), 1–17. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055414000604>
- Igielnik, R., Keeter, S., & Hartig, H. (2021, June 30). Behind Biden's 2020 Victory. *Pew Research Center - U.S. Politics & Policy*. <https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2021/06/30/behind-bidens-2020-victory/>

- Iyengar, S., & Westwood, S. J. (2015). Fear and Loathing across Party Lines: New Evidence on Group Polarization. *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(3), 690–707.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12152>
- Jack, A. A. (2016). (No) Harm in Asking: Class, Acquired Cultural Capital, and Academic Engagement at an Elite University. *Sociology of Education*, 89(1), 1–19.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0038040715614913>
- Settle, J. (2018). *Frenemies: How Social Media Polarizes America*. Cambridge University Press.
- Jardina, A. (2019). *White Identity Politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Kam, C. D., & Burge, C. D. (2018). Uncovering Reactions to the Racial Resentment Scale across the Racial Divide. *The Journal of Politics*, 80(1), 314–320. <https://doi.org/10.1086/693907>
- Kannan, V. D., & Veazie, P. J. (2018). Political orientation, political environment, and health behaviors in the United States. *Preventive Medicine*, 114, 95–101.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ypmed.2018.06.011>
- Katz, L. F., & Krueger, A. B. (2019). The Rise and Nature of Alternative Work Arrangements in the United States, 1995–2015. *ILR Review*, 72(2), 382–416.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0019793918820008>
- Kennedy, J. A., Anderson, C., & Moore, D. A. (2013). When overconfidence is revealed to others: Testing the status-enhancement theory of overconfidence. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 122(2), 266–279. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2013.08.005>
- Kluegel, J. R., & Smith, E. R. (1983). Affirmative Action Attitudes: Effects of Self-Interest, Racial Affect, and Stratification Beliefs on Whites' Views. *Social Forces*, 61(3), 797–824.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2578135>

- Kossinets, G., & Watts, D. J. (2009). Origins of Homophily in an Evolving Social Network. *American Journal of Sociology*, 115(2), 405–450. <https://doi.org/10.1086/599247>
- Kovacs, B., & Kleinbaum, A. M. (2020). Language-Style Similarity and Social Networks. *Psychological Science*, 31(2), 202–213. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797619894557>
- Kraus, M. W., Park, J. W., & Tan, J. J. X. (2017). Signs of Social Class: The Experience of Economic Inequality in Everyday Life. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 12(3), 422–435. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691616673192>
- Lareau, A. (2003). *Unequal Childhoods: Class, Race, and Family Life, With an Update a Decade Later* (1st ed.). University of California Press.
- Lareau, A. (2008). Introduction: Taking Stock of Class. In A. Lareau & D. Conley (Eds.), *Social Class: How Does It Work?* (pp. 3–24). Russel Sage Foundation.
- Lareau, A. (2015). Cultural Knowledge and Social Inequality. *American Sociological Review*, 80(1), 1–27. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122414565814>
- Lareau, A., & McCrory Calarco, J. (2012). Class, Cultural Capital, and Institutions: The Case of Families and Schools. In S. T. Fiske & H. Rose Markus (Eds.), *Facing Social Class*. Russel Sage Foundation.
- Lareau, A., & Weininger, E. (2008). Class and the Transition to Adulthood: In *Social Class: How does it work*. Russel Sage Foundation.
- Le Roux, B., Rouanet, H., Savage, M., & Warde, A. (2008). Class and Cultural Division in the UK. *Sociology*, 42(6), 1049–1071. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038508096933>
- Liberman, Z., Kinzler, K. D., & Woodward, A. L. (2021). Origins of homophily: Infants expect people with shared preferences to affiliate. *Cognition*, 212, 104695. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104695>

- Lien, Pei-te, M. Margaret Conway, and Janelle Wong. (2004). *The Politics of Asian Americans*.
Routledge.
- Lin, K.-H., & Neely, M. T. (2020). *Divested: Inequality in the Age of Finance*. Oxford University Press.
- Lindh, A., & McCall, L. (2020). Class Position and Political Opinion in Rich Democracies. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 46, 419–441.
- Luttig, M. D. (2021). Reconsidering the Relationship between Authoritarianism and Republican Support in 2016 and Beyond. *The Journal of Politics*, 83(2), 783–787.
<https://doi.org/10.1086/710145>
- Manza, J., & Brooks, C. (2008). Class and Politics. In *Social Class: How does it Work?* Russel Sage Foundation.
- Grossman, M., & Hopkins D. (2016). *Asymmetric Politics: Ideological Republicans and Group Interest Democrats*. Oxford University Press.
- McCarty, N., Poole, K., & Rosenthal, H. (2006). *Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches*. MIT Press.
- McClain, P. D., Carter, N. M., DeFrancesco Soto, V. M., Lyle, M. L., Grynawski, J. D., Nunnally, S. C., Scotto, T. J., Kendrick, J. A., Lackey, G. F., & Cotton, K. D. (2006). Racial Distancing in a Southern City: Latino Immigrants' Views of Black Americans. *The Journal of Politics*, 68(3), 571–584. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00446.x>
- McKenzie, Brian & Rouse, Stella M. (2013). Shades of Faith: Religious Foundations of Political Attitudes among African Americans, Latinos, and Whites. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(1), 218–235. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00611.x>

- Mendelberg, T., McCabe, K. T., & Thal, A. (2017). College Socialization and the Economic Views of Affluent Americans. *American Journal of Political Science*, *61*(3), 606–623.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12265>
- Montagno, M. J., Garrett-Walker, J. J., & Ho, J. T. T. (2021). Two, four, six, eight...why we want to participate: Motivations and barriers to LGBTQ + activism. *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology*, *31*(6), 644–658. <https://doi.org/10.1002/casp.2528>
- Muscattell, K. A., Morelli, S. A., Falk, E. B., Way, B. M., Pfeifer, J. H., Galinsky, A. D., Lieberman, M. D., Dapretto, M., & Eisenberger, N. I. (2012). Social status modulates neural activity in the mentalizing network. *NeuroImage*, *60*(3), 1771–1777.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.01.080>
- Mutz, D. (2021). *Winners and Losers: The Psychology of Foreign Trade*. Princeton University Press.
- Napier, J. L., & Jost, J. T. (2008). The “Antidemocratic Personality” Revisited: A Cross-National Investigation of Working-Class Authoritarianism. *Journal of Social Issues*, *64*(3), 595–617.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.2008.00579.x>
- Neuberg, S. L., & Schaller, M. (2015). Evolutionary social cognition. In M. Mikulincer, P. R. Shaver, E. Borgida, & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), *APA handbook of personality and social psychology, Volume 1: Attitudes and social cognition*. (pp. 3–45). American Psychological Association.
<https://doi.org/10.1037/14341-001>
- Nichols, B. J. (2023). Disentangling Social Class–based Inequality: How Social Position Affects Evaluations of Economic and Cultural Markers of Social Class. *Sociological Perspectives*, *073112142211465*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/07311214221146597>
- Orr, L. V., & Huber, G. A. (2021). Measuring Misperceptions: Limits of Party-Specific Stereotype Reports. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *85*(4), 1076–1091. <https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfab062>

- Owens, L. A., & Pedulla, D. S. (2014). Material Welfare and Changing Political Preferences: The Case of Support for Redistributive Social Policies. *Social Forces*, *92*(3), 1087–1113.
- Page, B. I., Bartels, L. M., & Seawright, J. (2013). Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans. *Perspectives on Politics*, *11*(1), 51–73. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759271200360X>
- Peck, R. (2019). *Fox Populism: Branding Conservatism as Working Class*. Cambridge University Press.
- Peterson, E. (2016). The Rich are Different: The Effect of Wealth on Partisanship. *Political Behavior*, *38*(1), 33–54. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-015-9305-9>
- Pfeffer, F. T., & Killewald, A. (2018). Generations of Advantage. Multigenerational Correlations in Family Wealth. *Social Forces*, *96*(4), 1411–1442. <https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/sox086>
- Phillips, L. T., Stephens, N. M., Townsend, S. S. M., & Goudeau, S. (2020). Access is not enough: Cultural mismatch persists to limit first-generation students' opportunities for achievement throughout college. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *119*(5), 1112–1131. <https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000234>
- Piff, P. K., Kraus, M. W., & Keltner, D. (2018). Unpacking the Inequality Paradox: The Psychological Roots of Inequality and Social Class. In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (Vol. 57, pp. 53–124). Elsevier. <https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.aesp.2017.10.002>
- Piketty, T. (2017). *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*. Harvard University Press.
- Piketty, T., Saez, E., & Zucman, G. (2018). Distributional National Accounts: Methods and Estimates for the United States. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *133*(2), 553–609. <https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjx043>
- Preece, J. R., Stoddard, O. B., & Fisher, R. (2016). Run, Jane, Run! Gendered Responses to Political Party Recruitment. *Political Behavior*, *38*(3), 561–577. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-015-9327-3>

- Prieur, A., Rosenlund, L., & Skjott-Larsen, J. (2008). Cultural capital today. *Poetics*, 36(1), 45–71.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.poetic.2008.02.008>
- Prysbay, C. (2020). *Rich Voter, Poor Voter, Red Voter, Blue Voter: Social Class and Voting Behavior in Contemporary America*. Routledge.
- Putnam, R. (2015). *Our Kids: The American Dream in Crisis*. Simon & Schuster.
- Rein, L. (2005, December 31). Down on the Ranch, President Wages War on the Underbrush. *Washington Post*. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2005/12/31/down-on-the-ranch-president-wages-war-on-the-underbrush/af92d489-cc2b-485d-9a0e-e68db7abf1aa/>
- Ridgeway, C. (2012). Sociological Perspectives on the Face to Face Enactment of Class Distinction. In S. T. Fiske (Ed.), *Facing Social Class*. Russell Sage Foundation.
- Rivera, L.A. (2012). Hiring as Cultural Matching: The Case of Elite Professional Service Firms. *American Sociological Review*, 77(6), 999–1022. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122412463213>
- Rivera, L. A. (2015). *Pedigree: How Elite Students Get Elite Jobs*. Princeton University Press.
- Rivera, L. A., & Tilcsik, A. (2016). Class Advantage, Commitment Penalty: The Gendered Effect of Social Class Signals in an Elite Labor Market. *American Sociological Review*, 81(6), 1097–1131.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122416668154>
- Rivera, L.A., & Tilcsik, A. (2016, December 21). Research: How Subtle Class Cues Can Backfire on Your Resume. *Harvard Business Review*. <https://hbr.org/2016/12/research-how-subtle-class-cues-can-backfire-on-your-resume>
- Robison, J., Stubager, R., Thau, M., & Tilley, J. (2021). Does Class-Based Campaigning Work? How Working Class Appeals Attract and Polarize Voters. *Comparative Political Studies*, 54(5), 723–752. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414020957684>

- Rosenberg, S. (2021, March 17). The split at the heart of tech's new labor movement. *Axios*.
<https://www.axios.com/2021/03/17/techs-new-labor-movement-split>
- Rothschild, J. E., Howat, A. J., Shafranek, R. M., & Busby, E. C. (2019). Pigeonholing Partisans: Stereotypes of Party Supporters and Partisan Polarization. *Political Behavior*, 41(2), 423–443.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-018-9457-5>
- Rouse, S. M. (2013). *Latinos in the Legislative Process: Interests and Influence*. Cambridge University Press.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139507066>
- Saez, E., & Zucman, G. (2020). The Rise of Income and Wealth Inequality in America: Evidence from Distributional Macroeconomic Accounts. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 34(4), 3–26.
<https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.34.4.3>
- Sakamoto, A., Hsu, L., & Jalufka, M. E. (2022). Comparing the Effects of Class Origins versus Race in the Intergenerational Transmission of Poverty. *Social Sciences*, 11(6), 257.
<https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci11060257>
- Schaeffer, K. (2022). 10 facts about today's college graduates. *Pew Research Center*. Retrieved October 20, 2022, from <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2022/04/12/10-facts-about-todays-college-graduates/>
- Schaeffer, K. (2023). Nearly all members of the 118th Congress have a bachelor's degree – and most have a graduate degree, too. *Pew Research Center*. <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/02/02/nearly-all-members-of-the-118th-congress-have-a-bachelors-degree-and-most-have-a-graduate-degree-too/>
- Schwalbe, M., & Shay, H. (2014). Dramaturgy and Dominance. In *Social Capital and Inequality: The Significance of Social Connections*. Springer.

- Sears, D. O., & Citrin, J. (1985). *Tax Revolt: Something for Nothing in California*. Harvard University Press.
- Sen, M., & Wasow, O. (2016). Race as a Bundle of Sticks: Designs that Estimate Effects of Seemingly Immutable Characteristics. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *19*(1), 499–522. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-032015-010015>
- Sherman, R. (2018). ‘A very expensive ordinary life’: Consumption, symbolic boundaries and moral legitimacy among New York elites¹. *Socio-Economic Review*, *16*(2), 411–433. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwy011>
- Sides, J., Tesler, Michael, & Vavreck, Lynn. (2018). *Identity crisis: The 2016 presidential campaign and the battle for the meaning of America*. Princeton University Press.
- Spector, P. (1992). *Summated Rating Scale Construction*. SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Stephens, N. M., Markus, H. R., & Phillips, L. T. (2014). Social Class Culture Cycles: How Three Gateway Contexts Shape Selves and Fuel Inequality. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *65*(1), 611–634. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115143>
- Stephens, N. M., Markus, H. R., & Townsend, S. S. M. (2007). Choice as an act of meaning: The case of social class. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *93*(5), 814–830. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.93.5.814>
- Stephens, N. M., Townsend, S. S. M., & Dittmann, A. G. (2019). Social-Class Disparities in Higher Education and Professional Workplaces: The Role of Cultural Mismatch. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, *28*(1), 67–73. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721418806506>
- Stephens, N., & Townsend, S. (2017, May 22). Research: How You Feel About Individualism Is Influenced by Your Social Class. *Harvard Business Review*. <https://hbr.org/2017/05/research-how-you-feel-about-individualism-is-influenced-by-your-social-class>

- Streib, J. (2011). Class Reproduction by Four Year Olds. *Qualitative Sociology*, 34(2), 337–352.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11133-011-9193-1>
- Streib, J. (2015). Explanations of How Love Crosses Class Lines: Cultural Complements and the Case of Cross-Class Marriages. *Sociological Forum*, 30(1), 18–39.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/socf.12143>
- Thomas, K. (2018). The Labor Market Value of Taste: An Experimental Study of Class Bias in U.S. Employment. *Sociological Science*, 5, 562–595. <https://doi.org/10.15195/v5.a24>
- Thomas, K. (2022). The psychology of distinction: How cultural tastes shape perceptions of class and competence in the U.S. *Poetics*, 101669. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.poetic.2022.101669>
- Tolbert, C. J., Witko, C., & Wolbers, C. (2019). Public Support for Higher Taxes on the Wealthy: California’s Proposition 30. *Politics and Governance*, 7(2), 351–364.
<https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v7i2.1915>
- Tucker, P. D., Montgomery, J. M., & Smith, S. (2019). Party Identification in the Age of Obama: Evidence on the Sources of Stability and Systematic Change in Party Identification from a Long-Term Panel Survey. *Political Research Quarterly*, 72(2), 309–328.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918784215>
- van Noord, J., Kuppens, T., Spruyt, B., & Spears, R. (2022). When and Why People Prefer Higher Educated Politicians: Ingroup Bias, Deference, and Resistance. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 014616722210777. <https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672221077794>
- Veenstra, G. (2007). Social space, social class and Bourdieu: Health inequalities in British Columbia, Canada. *Health & Place*, 13(1), 14–31. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthplace.2005.09.011>
- Watts Smith, Candis. (2014). *Black Mosaic: The Politics of Black Pan-Ethnic Diversity*. New York University Press.

- Weeden, J., & Kurzban, R. (2014). *The Hidden Agenda of the Political Mind*. Princeton University Press.
- White, I. K., & Laird, C. (2021). *Steadfast Democrats: How Social Forces Shape Black Political Behavior*. Princeton University Press.
- Whitehead, A. L., Perry, S. L., & Baker, J. O. (2018). Make America Christian Again: Christian Nationalism and Voting for Donald Trump in the 2016 Presidential Election. *Sociology of Religion*, 79(2), 147–171. <https://doi.org/10.1093/socrel/srx070>
- Williams, J. C. (2017). *White Working Class: Overcoming Class Cluslessness in America*. Harvard Business Review Press.
- Witteveen, D., & Attewell, P. (2017). Family Background and Earnings Inequality among College Graduates. *Social Forces*, 95(4), 1539–1576. <https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/sow109>
- Zingher, J. N. (2022). Diploma divide: Educational attainment and the realignment of the American electorate. *Political Research Quarterly*, 75(2), 263–277. <https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129221079862>

Appendices

Chapter 2 Appendix

Table A2.1 Economic Indicators of Social Class and PID (GSS Data)

	1991-1997	1998-2004	2005-2011	2012-2015	2016-2021
Gender	-.30* (.05)	-.40* (.05)	-.39* (.06)	-.19* (.08)	-.35* (.07)
Married	-.07* (.02)	-.12* (.02)	-.12* (.02)	-.13* (.03)	-.13* (.02)
Age	-.01* (.02)	-.01* (.00)	-0.01* (.02)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)
Education	.14 (.10)	-.05 (.09)	-.33* (.11)	-.67* (.20)	-.71* (.14)
Income	.42* (.12)	.58* (.12)	.95* (.15)	.67* (.20)	.54* (.20)
Occupational Prestige	-0.02 (.15)	.06 (.14)	.15 (.16)	.49* (.21)	-.04 (.20)
Constant	3.86 (.17)	4.04 (.16)	3.71 (.19)	3.45 (.26)	3.99 (.25)
R^2	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
N	6,393	7,505	5,416	2,923	3,358
<p>Note: Entries are OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. *$p < 0.05$ (two-tailed test). Analysis includes white respondents only. Partisanship is measured on 1-7 scale, where negative coefficients denote stronger identification with Democrats and positive coefficients denote stronger identification with Republicans.</p>					

Chapter 3 Appendix

Bovitz Question Wording

Note: All scales were included on Wave 1 unless otherwise noted.

Attention Check 1: People are very busy these days and many do not have time to follow what goes on in the government. We are testing whether people read questions. To show that you've read this much, answer both “extremely interested” and “very interested.” [Extremely interested, very interested, moderately interested (2), Slightly interested (3), Not interested at all (4)] *Individuals who failed this initial attention check were ineligible for completing the rest of the survey.


Partisan Identification:

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, or as an independent? [Democrat, Republican, Independent, Other party (please specify)]
(1-7, missing 0)

Branch if Democrat or Republican:



Would you call yourself a strong [Democrat/Republican] or a not very strong [Democrat/Republican]? (Strong [Democrat/Republican]; (Not very strong [Democrat/Republican])

Branch if Independent: Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party? [Democrat, Republican, Neither]





Feeling Thermometer: We would like to get your feelings toward the following individuals or entities. Please rate these entities using something we call the "feeling thermometer." Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the entity. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the entity and that you don't care too much for that entity. You would rate the entity at the 50-degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the entity. There is no right or wrong answer.

- Republicans (0-100, missing 0)
- Democrats (0-100, missing 0)



Expressive Partisanship (Huddy et al) (0-1)

- How important is being a $\{e://Field/Inparty_person\}$ to you? [Extremely important, Very important, not very important, Not important at all]
- How well does the term $\{e://Field/Inparty_person\}$ describe you? [Extremely well, Very well, Not very well, Not at all]
- When talking about $\{e://Field/Inparty_people\}$, how often do you use "we" instead of "they"? [All of the time, Most of the time, Some of the time, Rarely, Never]
- To what extent do you think of yourself as being a $\{e://Field/Inparty_person\}$ [A great deal, Somewhat, Very little, Not at all]




Partisan Choice

Please rate your feelings toward each of the people or groups below


Response Options: [(5) very favorable, (4) Somewhat favorable, (3) neither favorable or unfavorable, (2) somewhat unfavorable (1) Very unfavorable]

- Make America Great Again (MAGA) Movement (0-1, missing 2)
- Donald Trump (0-1, missing 2)
- Wall Street (0-1, missing 2)
- The National Rifle Association (NRA) (0-1, missing 2)
- Tech Companies (0-1, missing 2)
- Joe Biden (0-1, missing 1)

Favorability Towards Leaders and Groups (0-1)




Net Worth: Please estimate your total wealth. [More than \$2 million; \$1 million to \$2 million; \$500,000 to \$1 million; \$250,000 to \$500,000; \$150,000 to \$250,000; \$100,000 to \$150,000; \$75,000 to \$100,000; \$40,000 to \$75,000; \$20,000 to \$40,000; \$5,000 to \$20,000; \$0 to \$5,000; \$-30,000 to \$0; \$-75,000 to \$-30,000; Less than -\$75,000] (0-1, missing 4)



Household Income: Which of the following describes your total annual household income—that is, the total income everyone living in your household makes together, before taxes? Less than \$10,000 (1); \$10,000-14,999 (2); \$15,000-19,999 (3); \$20,000-24,999 (4); \$25,000-29,999 (5); \$30,000-34,999 (6); \$35,000-39,999 (7); \$40,000-44,999 (8); \$45,000-49,999 (9); \$50,000-54,999 (10); \$55,000-59,999 (11); \$60,000-64,999 (12); \$65,000-69,999 (13); \$70,000-74,999 (14); \$75,000-79,999 (15); \$80,000-

89,999 (16); \$90,000-99,999 (17); \$100,000-109,999 (18); \$110,000-124,999 (19); \$125,000-149,999 (20); \$150,000-174,999 (21); \$175,000-249,999 (22); \$250,000 or more (23) (0-1, missing 1)



Wealth

* Indicates item is part of final scale (0-1, missing 8)

The next set of questions are designed to give estimates of the wealth of families in the United States. **In these questions, “family” means your family living there with you. Your responses are completely anonymous, and answering all questions is strongly encouraged.**

***Real Estate:** If you sold your home(s) and any other real estate that you own today, how much would you expect to get for these properties (minus how much you owe on them)? (1) No one in my household owns any real estate (2) Less than \$50,000 (3) \$50,000 to less than \$100,000 (4) \$100,000 to less than \$200,000 (5) \$200,000 to less than \$300,000 (6) \$300,000 to less than \$500,000 (7) \$500,000 to less than \$700,00 (8) \$700,000 to less than \$900,000 (9) More than \$900,000

***Vehicles:** What about the value of vehicles, including any cars, trucks, motor homes, trailers, or boats – what are they worth all together, minus anything you [or anyone in your family living there] still owe on them? (1) No one in my household owns a vehicle (2) Less than \$2,000 (3) \$2,000 to less than \$10,000 (4) \$10,000 to less than \$25,000 (5) \$25,000 to less than \$35,000 (6) \$35,000 to less than \$50,000 (7) \$50,000 or more

***Stocks:** If you and your family sold all of your shares of stock in publicly held corporations, stock mutual funds, or investment trusts, (not including stock in retirement accounts) and paid off anything you owed on it, how much would you have? (1) No one in my household owns any stock (2) Less than \$15,000 (3) \$15,000 to less than \$50,000 (4) \$50,000 to less than \$150,000 (5) \$150,000 to less than \$250,000 (6) \$250,000 to less than \$500,000 (7) \$500,000 or more


***Retirement Value:** What is the approximate total dollar value of your family's retirement account(s)?(i.e., private annuities, pension plans, IRAs, 401(k), 403(b))(1) No one in my household has a retirement account (2) Less than \$5,000 (3) \$5,000 to less than \$25,000 (4) \$25,000 to less than \$75,000 (5) \$75,000 to less than \$200,000 (6) \$200,000 to less than \$400,000 (7) \$400,000 to less than \$600,000 (8) \$600,000 to less than \$800,000 (9) More than \$800,000

***Savings:** What's the total amount of money in your all your family living there] checking(s) or saving(s) accounts combined? (1) Less than \$500, (2) \$500 to less than \$1,000, (3) \$1,000 to less than \$4,000 (4) \$4,000 to less than \$15,000 (5) \$15,000 to less than \$60,000 (6) \$60,000 or more

***Other Assets:** What is the total cash value you and your family have in a life insurance policy, a valuable collection for investment purposes, or rights in a trust or estate?(1)Less than \$15,000 (2)\$15,000 to less than \$30,000 (3)\$30,000 to less than \$50,000 (4)\$50,000 to less than \$80,000 (5)\$80,000 to less than \$100,000 (6)\$100,000 to less than \$150,000 (7) \$150,000 to less than \$300,000 (8) \$300,000 to less than \$500,000 (9) \$500,000 to less than \$750,000 (10)\$750,000 or more (11) No one in my household has a life insurance policy, a valuable collection, or rights in an estate/trust


Credit Debt: If you added up all credit card and store card debts [for all of your family living there], about how much would they amount to right now? [No one in my household has credit card debt, less than \$1,000, \$1,000 to less than \$5,000, \$5,000 to less than \$10,000, \$10,000 to less than \$15,000, \$15,000 or more]

Loans: If you added up all other debts such as student loans, medical or legal bills, or loans from relatives [for all your family living there], about how much would they amount to right now? [No one in my household has any student loans, loans from relatives, or any outstanding medical/legal bills, Less than \$10,000, \$10,000 to less than \$25,000, \$25,000 to less than \$50,000, \$50,000 to less than \$75,000, \$75,000 or more]




Occupation: Which of the following categories best fits your occupational status? [Professional (both salaried and self-employed, including lawyers, physicians, engineers, teachers, scientists, writers, editors, and social workers) (7); Managers and administrators (all non-retail sales managers) (6) Self-employed (owners, proprietors, and other non-professional self-employed persons including farm owners) (5) Routine white-collar workers (retail, sales, clerical, and white collar service workers) (4) Skilled manual workers & supervisors (skilled workers and foreman in all industries) (3)

Non-skilled manual workers (non-skilled working in all industries including farming and services) (2)
 Non-full-time labor force participants (homemakers, retirees, students, and the disabled working less than 20 hours a week) (1)] (0-1, missing 8)




Population Density (Rural): Do you currently live in a rural area, small town, suburb, or a city?
 [Rural area Small town; Suburb; City] (0=Not Rural, 1=Rural Area; no missing)




Racial Resentment

Stem: Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with each of the following statements? [strongly agree-strongly disagree] (0-1, missing 3)

- Irish, Italian, and Jewish ethnicities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.
- Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.
- Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
- It's really a matter of some people just not trying hard enough: if blacks would only try harder, they could be just as well off as whites.




Education: What is the highest level of education you have completed? [Less than a high school degree or equivalent (for example: GED) (1); High school degree or equivalent (for example: GED) (2) Some college, but no degree (3) 2-year college degree/Associates degree (4) 4-year college degree/Bachelor's degree (5) Postgraduate degree (MA, MBA, MD, JD, PhD, etc.) (6) (0-1, missing 0)]



Authoritarianism

Stem: Please read each pair of qualities that children might have and indicate which of the two is the most desirable quality for a child to have (additive scale) (0-1, missing 1)

- Independence or Respect for elders
- Obedience or self-reliance
- Curiosity or good manners
- Considerate or well-behaved




Tastes (W2)

* Indicates item is part of final scale (0-1, missing 1)

- *How likely are you to eat Hamburger Helper for dinner or lunch? [Extremely unlikely, somewhat unlikely, Neither likely nor unlikely, somewhat likely, extremely likely]
- *How likely are you to eat kale? [Extremely unlikely, somewhat unlikely, Neither likely nor unlikely, somewhat likely, extremely likely]
- *How do you feel about sushi? [Dislike a great deal, Dislike somewhat, Neither like nor dislike, Like somewhat, Like a great deal]
- *If you had to order a dessert, how likely would you be to choose Crème Brûlée? [Extremely unlikely, somewhat unlikely, Neither likely nor unlikely, somewhat likely, extremely likely]
- *How likely are you to eat a hotdog with white bread for lunch or dinner? [Extremely unlikely, somewhat unlikely, Neither likely nor unlikely, somewhat likely, extremely likely]
- *Would you consider eating canned spaghetti? [Definitely not, probably not, Might or might not, probably yes, definitely yes]
- *How likely are you to eat Little Debbies? [Extremely unlikely, somewhat unlikely, Neither likely nor unlikely, somewhat likely, extremely likely]
- *If you had to pick an alcoholic beverage to drink, how likely would you be to pick artisanal wine? [Extremely unlikely, somewhat unlikely, Neither likely nor unlikely, somewhat likely, extremely likely]
- *How likely are you to listen to classical music? [Extremely unlikely, somewhat unlikely, Neither likely nor unlikely, somewhat likely, extremely likely]
- *Would you be interested in visiting an art gallery? [Definitely yes, Probably yes, Might or might not, Probably not, Definitely not]
- *How do you feel about jazz music? [Dislike a great deal, Dislike somewhat, Neither like nor dislike, Like somewhat, Like a great deal]
- *How likely are you to visit a museum in the next year? [Extremely unlikely, somewhat unlikely, Neither likely nor unlikely, somewhat likely, extremely likely]

- *How likely would you be to attend a lecture series that was offered online or in-person through a university? [Extremely unlikely, somewhat unlikely, Neither likely nor unlikely, somewhat likely, extremely likely]
- *How do you feel about tennis? [Dislike a great deal, Dislike somewhat, Neither like nor dislike, Like somewhat, Like a great deal]



Behavioral Norms


Here we briefly describe some people. Please read each description and select the answer that shows how much the person in the description is like you. [Not at all like me, Not really like me, Somewhat like me, A lot like me, very much like me] **(W2)** * Indicates item is part of final scale (0-1)

- [She/He/They] thinks a child should be punished for talking back to an adult
- [She/He/They] is willing to spank a kid for behaving poorly
- *[She/He/They] tells herself and others to 'suck it up' when something bad happens to them
- [She/He/They] thinks it's okay to challenge authority figures
- *[She/He/They] thinks people are too sensitive these days


White Identity

How important is being white to your identity? (0-1, missing 8).

- 5 Extremely important
- 4 Very important
- 3 Moderately important
- 2 A little important
- 1 Not at all important




Age: What is your age? [number] (0-1, missing 0)




Ethnicity: Which of the following best describes your ethnic background? If you are from multiple ethnic backgrounds, please select all the responses that apply. [multi choice] [White/Caucasian, Black/African American, Asian, Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, American Indian or Alaskan native, other race or ethnicity, prefer not to answer]


Gender: Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a woman, a man, or neither? [Woman, Man, Neither] (0=Man, 1=Not man; no missing)



Marital Status: What is your current relationship status? [single choice] [Single, never married, Living with partner, not married, Married, Separated, divorced, or widowed] (0=not married; 1=married, missing)



Region (South): (0=Not South, 1=South; no missing)



Sexual orientation: Which of the following best describes your sexual orientation? [single choice] [Heterosexual/straight, Gay or lesbian, Bisexual, Asexual, Pansexual, Other sexual orientation, Prefer not to say] (0=straight; 1=not straight, 43 missing or proffered not to say)



Prolific Question Wording

Race/Eligibility: What racial or ethnic group best describes you? Please check all that apply.
 [White, Black or African American, Hispanic or Latino, Asian, or Asian-American, Native American
 Middle Eastern, Mixed Race, Other _____”


Attention Check 1: People are very busy these days and many do not have time to follow what goes on in the government. We are testing whether people read questions. To show that you've read this much, answer both “extremely interested” and “very interested.” [Extremely interested, very interested, moderately interested (2), Slightly interested (3), Not interested at all (4)]

Attention Check 2: This is a simple question. You don't need to be a wine connoisseur or avid beer drinker to answer. Please select 'carrot juice' below. [Wine, Beer, Vodka, Whiskey, Carrot Juice, Other]
 *Individuals who failed both attention checks were not eligible to complete the survey


Partisan Identification: Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, or as an independent? [Democrat, Republican, Independent]

Branch if Democrat or Republican: Would you call yourself a strong [Democrat/Republican] or a not very strong [Democrat/Republican]? (Strong [Democrat/Republican]; (Not very strong [Democrat/Republican]


Branch if Independent: Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party? [Democrat, Republican, Neither]




Population Density (Rural): Do you currently live in a rural area, small town, suburb, or a city? [Rural area Small town; Suburb; City] (0=Not Rural, 1=Rural Area; no missing)




Region (South): What region of the U.S. do you live in? [Northeast, South, Midwest, West] (0=Not South, 1=South; no missing)



Gender: Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a woman, a man, or neither? [Woman, Man, Neither] (0=Man, 1=Not man; no missing)




Age: What is your year of birth? [open ended] (0-1; 3 missing)



Household Income: Which of the following describes your total annual household income—that is, the total income everyone living in your household makes together, before taxes? (0-1; 3 missing)


Less than \$10,000 (1); \$10,000-14,999 (2); \$15,000-19,999 (3); \$20,000-24,999 (4); \$25,000-29,999 (5); \$30,000-34,999 (6); \$35,000-39,999 (7); \$40,000-44,999 (8); \$45,000-49,999 (9); \$50,000-54,999 (10); \$55,000-59,999 (11); \$60,000-64,999 (12); \$65,000-69,999 (13); \$70,000-74,999 (14); \$75,000-79,999

(15); \$80,000-89,999 (16); \$90,000-99,999 (17); \$100,000-109,999 (18); \$110,000-124,999 (19); \$125,000-149,999 (20); \$150,000-174,999 (21); \$175,000-249,999 (22); \$250,000 or more (23)



Wealth

* Indicates item is part of final scale



The next set of questions are designed to give estimates of the wealth of families in the United States. **In these questions, “family” means your family living there with you. Your responses are completely anonymous, and answering all questions is strongly encouraged.**

***Real Estate:** If you sold your home(s) and any other real estate that you own today, how much would you expect to get for these properties (minus how much you owe on them)? (1) No one in my household owns any real estate (2) Less than \$50,000 (3) \$50,000 to less than \$100,000 (4) \$100,000 to less than \$200,000 (5) \$200,000 to less than \$300,000 (6) \$300,000 to less than \$500,000 (7) \$500,000 to less than \$700,00 (8) \$700,000 to less than \$900,000 (9) More than \$900,000

***Vehicles:** What about the value of vehicles, including any cars, trucks, motor homes, trailers, or boats – what are they worth all together, minus anything you [or anyone in your family living there] still owe on them? (1) No one in my household owns a vehicle (2) Less than \$2,000 (3) \$2,000 to less than \$10,000 (4) \$10,000 to less than \$25,000 (5) \$25,000 to less than \$35,000 (6) \$35,000 to less than \$50,000 (7) \$50,000 or more

***Stocks:** If you and your family sold all of your shares of stock in publicly held corporations, stock mutual funds, or investment trusts, (not including stock in retirement accounts) and paid off anything you owed on it, how much would you have? (1) No one in my household owns any stock (2) Less than \$15,000 (3) \$15,000 to less than \$50,000 (4) \$50,000 to less than \$150,000 (5) \$150,000 to less than \$250,000 (6) \$250,000 to less than \$500,000 (7) \$500,000 or more

***Retirement Value:** What is the approximate total dollar value of your family's retirement account(s)?(i.e., private annuities, pension plans, IRAs, 401(k), 403(b))(1) No one in my household has a retirement account (2) Less than \$5,000 (3) \$5,000 to less than \$25,000 (4) \$25,000 to less than \$75,000 (5) \$75,000 to less than \$200,000 (6) \$200,000 to less than \$400,000 (7) \$400,000 to less than \$600,000 (8) \$600,000 to less than \$800,000 (9) More than \$800,000

***Savings:** What's the total amount of money in your all your family living there] checking(s) or saving(s) accounts combined? (1) Less than \$500, (2) \$500 to less than \$1,000, (3) \$1,000 to less than \$4,000 (4) \$4,000 to less than \$15,000 (5) \$15,000 to less than \$60,000 (6) \$60,000 or more


***Other Assets:** What is the total cash value you and your family have in a life insurance policy, a valuable collection for investment purposes, or rights in a trust or estate?(1)Less than \$15,000 (2)\$15,000 to less than \$30,000 (3)\$30,000 to less than \$50,000 (4)\$50,000 to less than \$80,000 (5)\$80,000 to less than \$100,000 (6)\$100,000 to less than \$150,000 (7) \$150,000 to less than \$300,000 (8) \$300,000 to less than \$500,000 (9) \$500,000 to less than \$750,000 (10)\$750,000 or more (11) No one in my household has a life insurance policy, a valuable collection, or rights in an estate/trust

Credit Debt: If you added up all credit card and store card debts [for all of your family living there], about how much would they amount to right now? [No one in my household has credit card debt, less than \$1,000, \$1,000 to less than \$5,000, \$5,000 to less than \$10,000, \$10,000 to less than \$15,000, \$15,000 or more]


Loans: If you added up all other debts such as student loans, medical or legal bills, or loans from relatives [for all your family living there], about how much would they amount to right now? [No one in my household has any student loans, loans from relatives, or any outstanding medical/legal bills, Less than \$10,000, \$10,000 to less than \$25,000, \$25,000 to less than \$50,000, \$50,000 to less than \$75,000, \$75,000 or more]

Occupation: Which of the following categories best fits your occupational status? [Professional (both salaried and self-employed, including lawyers, physicians, engineers, teachers, scientists, writers, editors, and social workers) (7); Managers and administrators (all non-retail sales managers) (6) Self-employed (owners, proprietors, and other non-professional self-employed persons including farm owners) (5) Routine white-collar workers (retail, sales, clerical, and white collar service workers) (4) Skilled manual workers & supervisors (skilled workers and foreman in all industries) (3) Non-skilled manual workers (non-skilled working in all industries including farming and services) (2)

Non-full-time labor force participants (homemakers, retirees, students, and the disabled working less than 20 hours a week) (1)]



Education: What is the highest level of education you have completed? [(1) Less than a high school degree or equivalent; High school degree or equivalent (for example: GED) (2); Some college, but no degree (3); 2-year college degree/Associates degree (4) 4-year college degree/bachelor's degree (5) Postgraduate degree (MA, MBA, MD, JD, PhD, etc.) (6)] (0-1, no missing)



Tastes

* Indicates item is part of final scale

- *How likely are you to eat Hamburger Helper for dinner or lunch? [Extremely unlikely, somewhat unlikely, Neither likely nor unlikely, somewhat likely, extremely likely]
- *How likely are you to eat kale? [Extremely unlikely, somewhat unlikely, Neither likely nor unlikely, somewhat likely, extremely likely]
- If you had to pick an alcoholic beverage to drink, how likely would you be to pick Budweiser? [Extremely unlikely, somewhat unlikely, Neither likely nor unlikely, somewhat likely, extremely likely]
- *How do you feel about sushi? [Dislike a great deal, Dislike somewhat, Neither like nor dislike, Like somewhat, Like a great deal]

- *If you had to order a dessert, how likely would you be to choose Crème Brûlée? [Extremely unlikely, somewhat likely, Neither likely nor unlikely, somewhat likely, extremely likely]
- *How likely are you to eat a hotdog with white bread for lunch or dinner? [Extremely unlikely, somewhat unlikely, Neither likely nor unlikely, somewhat likely, extremely likely]
- *Would you consider eating canned spaghetti? [Definitely not, probably not, Might or might not, probably yes, definitely yes]
- How likely are you to order filet mignon? [Extremely unlikely, somewhat unlikely, Neither likely nor unlikely, somewhat likely, extremely likely]
- How do you feel about risotto? [Dislike a great deal, Dislike somewhat, Neither like nor dislike, Like somewhat, Like a great deal]
- *How likely are you to eat Little Debbies? [Extremely unlikely, somewhat unlikely, Neither likely nor unlikely, somewhat likely, extremely likely]
- How do you feel about tuna noodle casserole [Dislike a great deal, Dislike somewhat, Neither like nor dislike, Like somewhat, Like a great deal]
- *If you had to pick an alcoholic beverage to drink, how likely would you be to pick artisanal wine? [Extremely unlikely, somewhat unlikely, Neither likely nor unlikely, somewhat likely, extremely likely]
- How do you feel about bowling? [Dislike a great deal, Dislike somewhat, Neither like nor dislike, Like somewhat, Like a great deal]
- *How likely are you to listen to classical music? [Extremely unlikely, somewhat unlikely, Neither likely nor unlikely, somewhat likely, extremely likely]
- How likely are you to go fishing in the next year? [Extremely unlikely, somewhat unlikely, Neither likely nor unlikely, somewhat likely, extremely likely]
- How do you feel about Nascar? [Dislike a great deal, Dislike somewhat, Neither like nor dislike, Like somewhat, Like a great deal]
- How likely are you to go deer hunting during open season? [Extremely unlikely, somewhat unlikely, Neither likely nor unlikely, somewhat likely, extremely likely]
- How likely are you to watch or go to a rodeo? [Extremely unlikely, somewhat unlikely, Neither likely nor unlikely, somewhat likely, extremely likely]
- *Would you be interested in visiting an art gallery? [Definitely yes, Probably yes, Might or might not, Probably not, Definitely not]
- *How do you feel about jazz music? [Dislike a great deal, Dislike somewhat, Neither like nor dislike, Like somewhat, Like a great deal]
- *How likely are you to visit a museum in the next year? [Extremely unlikely, somewhat unlikely, Neither likely nor unlikely, somewhat likely, extremely likely]
- How do you feel about country music? [Dislike a great deal, Dislike somewhat, Neither like nor dislike, Like somewhat, Like a great deal]
- *How likely would you be to attend a lecture series that was offered online or in-person through a university? [Extremely unlikely, somewhat unlikely, Neither likely nor unlikely, somewhat likely, extremely likely]
- *How do you feel about tennis? [Dislike a great deal, Dislike somewhat, Neither like nor dislike, Like somewhat, Like a great deal]

Behavioral Norms

Here we briefly describe some people. Please read each description and select the answer that shows how much the person in the description is like you. [Not at all like me, Not really like me, Somewhat like me, A lot like me, Very much like me]

- [She/He/They] avoids using big words
- [She/He/They] thinks parents get too involved with their children's lives today
- [She/He/They] would be disappointed if she had a child who did not graduate with a 4-year college degree
- *[She/He/They] thinks a child should be punished for talking back to an adult
- [She/He/They] is reluctant to brag about her accomplishments
- [She/He/They] makes her feelings and needs known to those around her
- *[She/He/They] is willing to spank a kid for behaving poorly
- [She/He/They] would rather do something by herself and fail then accept help from others and succeed
- *[She/He/They] tells herself and others to 'suck it up' when something bad happens to them
- *[She/He/They] thinks it's okay to challenge authority figures
- [She/He/They] Even if she's struggling financially, she would not accept help from the government
- [She/He/They] thinks it's okay for a student to ask for an exam to be regraded if the student did not agree with the grade
- [She/He/They] tries to avoid standing out in a crowd
- *[She/He/They] thinks people are too sensitive these days
- [She/He/They] generally follows the rules, even when she knows she won't get caught for breaking them
- [She/He/They] thinks "networking" is wrong

AmeriSpeaks NORC Question Wording

Wealth (0-1, missing 44)

The next set of questions are designed to give estimates of the wealth of families in the United States. **In these questions, “family” means your family living there with you. Your responses are completely anonymous, and answering all questions is strongly encouraged.**

Real Estate: If you sold your home(s) and any other real estate that you own today, how much would you expect to get for these properties (minus how much you owe on them)? (1) No one in my household owns any real estate (2) Less than \$50,000 (3) \$50,000 to less than \$100,000 (4) \$100,000 to less than \$200,000 (5) \$200,000 to less than \$300,000 (6) \$300,000 to less than \$500,000 (7) \$500,000

to less than \$700,00 (8) \$700,000 to less than \$900,000 (9) More than \$900,000; Don't know (77); Skipped on Web or Refused (98)


Vehicles: What about the value of vehicles, including any cars, trucks, motor homes, trailers, or boats – what are they worth all together, minus anything you [or anyone in your family living there] still owe on them? (1) No one in my household owns a vehicle (2) Less than \$2,000 (3) \$2,000 to less than \$10,000 (4) \$10,000 to less than \$25,000 (5) \$25,000 to less than \$35,000 (6) \$35,000 to less than \$50,000 (7) \$50,000 or more; Don't know (77); Skipped on Web or Refused (98)

Stocks: If you and your family sold all your shares of stock in publicly held corporations, stock mutual funds, or investment trusts, (not including stock in retirement accounts) and paid off anything you owed on it, how much would you have? (1) No one in my household owns any stock (2) Less than \$15,000 (3) \$15,000 to less than \$50,000 (4) \$50,000 to less than \$150,000 (5) \$150,000 to less than \$250,000 (6) \$250,000 to less than \$500,000 (7) \$500,000 or more; Don't know (77); Skipped on Web or Refused (98)

Retirement Value: What is the approximate total dollar value of your family's retirement account(s)?(i.e., private annuities, pension plans, IRAs, 401(k), 403(b))(1) No one in my household has a retirement account (2) Less than \$5,000 (3) \$5,000 to less than \$25,000 (4) \$25,000 to less than \$75,000 (5) \$75,000 to less than \$200,000 (6) \$200,000 to less than \$400,000 (7) \$400,000 to less than \$600,000 (8) \$600,000 to less than \$800,000 (9) More than \$800,000; Don't know (77); Skipped on Web or Refused (98)

Savings: What's the total amount of money in your all your family living there] checking(s) or saving(s) accounts combined? (1) Less than \$500, (2) \$500 to less than \$1,000, (3) \$1,000 to less than \$4,000 (4) \$4,000 to less than \$15,000 (5) \$15,000 to less than \$60,000 (6) \$60,000 or more; Don't know (77); Skipped on Web or Refused (98)

Other Assets: What is the total cash value you and your family have in a life insurance policy, a valuable collection for investment purposes, or rights in a trust or estate?(1)Less than \$15,000 (2)\$15,000 to less than \$30,000 (3)\$30,000 to less than \$50,000 (4)\$50,000 to less than \$80,000 (5)\$80,000 to less than \$100,000 (6)\$100,000 to less than \$150,000 (7) \$150,000 to less than \$300,000 (8) \$300,000 to less than \$500,000 (9) \$500,000 to less than \$750,000 (10)\$750,000 or more (11) No one in my household has a life insurance policy, a valuable collection, or rights in an estate/trust; Don't know (77); Skipped on Web or Refused (98)



Racial Resentment (0-1, missing 14)

Stem: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?


Response Options: [Strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, Strongly disagree; Don't know, Skipped on Web or Refused]

Irish, Italian, and Jewish ethnicities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.

Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.

Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.

It's really a matter of some people just not trying hard enough: if blacks would only try harder, they could be just as well off as whites.



Partisan Choice


Please rate your feelings toward each of the people or groups below.

Response Options:

[(5) very favorable, (4) Somewhat favorable, (3) somewhat unfavorable, (2) Very unfavorable, (99) no opinion/never heard of that person or group; Don't know, Skipped on Web or Refused]

Phone version: Please rate your feelings toward each of the people or groups below. Do you feel very favorable toward them, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable? If you have no opinion or have never heard of that person, please check that box

- Make America Great Again (MAGA) Movement (0-1, missing 61)
- Wall Street (0-1, missing 93)
- The National Rifle Association (NRA) (0-1, missing 61)
- Joe Biden (0-1, missing 30)



Partisan Identification: (1-7, missing 2)


Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, or as an independent? [Democrat, Republican, Independent, Other party (please specify)]

Branch if Democrat or Republican:

Would you call yourself a strong [Democrat/Republican] or a not very strong

[Democrat/Republican]? (Strong [Democrat/Republican]; (Not very strong [Democrat/Republican])


Branch if Independent: Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party? [Democrat, Republican, Neither]



White Identity

How important is being [pipe in Respondent's race] to your identity? (0-1, missing 3).

- 5 Extremely important
- 4 Very important
- 3 Moderately important
- 2 A little important
- 1 Not at all important
- 99 Don't know; Skipped on Web or Refused




Behavioral Norms (0-1, missing 16)

Stem: Here we briefly describe some people. Please read (phone: Please listen to) each description and select the answer that shows how much the person in the description is like you. (5) Not at all like me, (4) not really like me, (3) somewhat like me, (2) a lot like me, (1) very much like me (99) Don't know; Skipped on Web or Refused

They think a child should be punished for talking back to an adult

They are willing to spank a kid for behaving poorly
 They tell themselves and others to 'suck it up' when something bad happens to them
 They think it's okay to challenge authority figures (Reversed scored)
 They think people are too sensitive these days



Tastes

Stem: How likely are you to eat the following foods (1) Extremely unlikely (2) Somewhat unlikely (3) Neither likely nor unlikely (4) Somewhat likely (5) Extremely likely (6) Don't know; Skipped on Web or Refused

- Hamburger Helper
- Little Debbies
- Kale
- Hotdog with white bread

Stem: How do you feel about the following foods and activities? (1) Dislike a great deal (2) Dislike somewhat (3) Neither like nor dislike (4) Like somewhat (5) Like a great deal (6) Don't know; Skipped on Web or Refused

- sushi
- tennis
- jazz music


Stem: How likely are you to do the following activities (1) Extremely unlikely (2) Somewhat unlikely (3) Neither likely nor unlikely (4) Somewhat likely (5) Extremely likely (6) Don't know; Skipped on Web or Refused

- visiting a museum
- visiting an art gallery
- listening to classical music
- attending a lecture series that was offered online or in-person through a university

If you had to order a dessert, how likely would you be to choose Crème Brûlée? (1) Extremely unlikely (2) Somewhat unlikely (3) Neither likely nor unlikely (4) Somewhat likely (5) Extremely likely (6) Don't know; Skipped on Web or Refused

If you had to pick an alcoholic beverage to drink, how likely would you be to pick artisanal wine? (1) Extremely unlikely (2) Somewhat unlikely (3) Neither likely nor unlikely (4) Somewhat likely (5) Extremely likely (6) Don't know; Skipped on Web or Refused


Would you consider eating canned spaghetti? (1) Definitely not (2) Probably not (3) Might or might not (4) Probably yes (5) Definitely yes (6) Don't know; Skipped on Web or Refused




Authoritarianism

Stem: Please read each pair of qualities that children might have and indicate which of the two is the most desirable quality for a child to have. (0-1, 15 missing)


- Independence or Respect for elders
- Obedience or self-reliance
- Curiosity or good manners
- Considerate or well-behaved



Gender: 0 Male; 1 Female (1 missing)




Age: [(1)18-24 (2) 25-34 (3) 35-44 (4) 45-54 (5)55-64 (6)65-74 (7) 75-99]




Education (0-1, missing 1)

- 1 Less than HS
- 2 HS graduate or equivalent.
- 3 Some college/ associate degree
- 4 bachelor's degree
- 5 Post grad study/professional degree




Married

0 Widowed, Divorced, Separated, or Never married
 1 Married



Employment


0 Not working - on temporary layoff from a job, looking for work, retired, disabled, other
 1 Working - as a paid employee or self-employed.



Income:


1 Less than \$5,000
 2 \$5,000 to \$9,999
 3 \$10,000 to \$14,999

- 4 \$15,000 to \$19,999
- 5 \$20,000 to \$24,999
- 6 \$25,000 to \$29,999
- 7 \$30,000 to \$34,999
- 8 \$35,000 to \$39,999
- 9 \$40,000 to \$49,999
- 10 \$50,000 to \$59,999
- 11 \$60,000 to \$74,999
- 12 \$75,000 to \$84,999
- 13 \$85,000 to \$99,999
- 14 \$100,000 to \$124,999
- 15 \$125,000 to \$149,999
- 16 \$150,000 to \$174,999
- 17 \$175,000 to \$199,999
- 18 \$200,000 or more



Region (South)


(0=Northeast, Midwest or West; 1=South, missing 1)



Metro

0 Non-Metro Area

1 Metro Area



Chapter 4 Appendix

Table A4.1 Average Perceived “Sophisticated/Classiness” of Activities & Hobbies

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Country	401	3.67	1.93	0	10
Wrestling	401	2.31	1.89	0	10
Water skiing	401	5.67	1.90	0	10
Tennis	401	6.73	1.95	0	10
Squash	401	5.94	2.06	0	10
Sailing	401	7.30	1.97	0	10
Running	401	5.52	1.77	0	10
Rodeo	401	2.98	1.91	0	9
Radio	401	4.82	1.81	0	10
Reality Tv	401	3.16	1.97	0	10
Pool	401	4.55	1.87	0	10
Polo	401	6.89	2.36	0	10
Play	401	7.66	1.72	0	10
News	401	5.22	2.25	0	10
Orchestra	401	8.27	1.78	0	10
Nascar	401	2.66	2.04	0	10
Music	401	7.28	1.72	0	10
Museum	401	7.99	1.76	0	10
Lecture	401	8.00	1.81	0	10
Hunting	401	3.22	2.03	0	10
Horse racing	401	5.89	2.23	0	10
Gourmet Cooking	401	7.49	1.71	0	10
Golf	401	6.26	2.18	0	10
Football	401	4.28	1.93	0	10
Jazz	401	6.48	1.78	0	10
Fishing	401	4.51	1.99	0	10
Fiction	401	6.34	1.86	0	10
Equestrian	401	6.79	2.28	0	10
Drama TV	401	5.52	1.85	0	10
Diving	401	6.27	1.83	0	10
Dance	401	7.11	1.80	0	10
Crew	401	5.75	2.08	0	10
Comedy TV	401	4.54	1.99	0	10
Classical Music	401	7.89	1.88	0	10
Art Gallery	401	8.26	1.69	0	10
Boxing	401	3.61	1.95	0	10
Bingo	401	3.92	1.99	0	10
Bowling	401	4.36	1.94	0	10

Table A4.2 Average Perceived “Sophisticated/Classiness” of Foods and Beverages

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Tuna Noodle Casserole	401	3.21	2.08	0	10
Tofu	401	5.78	1.94	0	10
Sushi	401	7.42	1.78	0	10
Scallops	401	6.92	1.78	0	10
Salmon	401	6.97	1.75	0	10
Risotto	401	6.84	1.66	0	10
Pork & Beans	401	2.31	1.86	0	10
Panna Cotta	401	6.59	1.69	0	10
Oysters	401	7.14	1.97	0	10
Organic Raspberries'	401	6.66	1.89	0	10
Milk Alternative	401	6.18	1.78	0	10
Mayonnaise Sandwich	401	1.26	1.65	0	10
Mango	401	5.51	1.73	0	10
Lobster	401	8.22	1.73	0	10
Little Debbies	401	2.50	1.86	0	10
Latte	401	6.20	1.93	0	10
Kale	401	6.32	1.87	0	10
Hamburger Helper	401	2.14	1.84	0	10
Green Juice	401	6.02	2.04	0	10
Fruit Cocktail	401	2.77	1.95	0	10
Ethnic Food	401	5.19	2.10	0	10
Espresso	401	6.44	1.76	0	10
Dorothy Lynch Dressing	401	4.58	1.72	0	10
Croissant	401	6.27	1.75	0	10
Crème Brûlée	401	7.31	1.62	0	10
Craft Beer	401	6.36	2.02	0	10
Coq Au Vin	401	7.03	1.99	0	10
Coconut Water	401	6.11	1.93	0	10
Coconut Oil	401	6.09	1.79	0	10
Chicken Marsala	401	6.40	1.68	0	10
Canned Spaghetti	401	1.79	1.61	0	10
Calamari	401	6.95	1.86	0	10
Budweiser	401	3.03	2.07	0	10
Bud Light	181	2.30	1.76	0	10
Busch Light	181	2.12	1.73	0	10
Brussel sprouts	401	5.42	1.83	0	10
Bologna	401	1.92	1.79	0	10
Boiled Hotdog	401	1.44	1.67	0	10
Balsamic	401	6.21	1.73	0	10
Arugula	401	6.30	1.89	0	10

Artisanal Wine	401	8.12	1.82	0	10
Almond Butter	401	6.22	1.72	0	10
McDonalds Fries	401	2.56	1.96	0	10
Food Truck Fries	401	3.52	2.17	0	10
Applebee's	401	3.45	1.96	0	10
Filet Mignon	401	8.06	1.80	0	10

Table A4.3 Item Analysis of Wealth Scale (Prolific Data)

Item	Obs	Sign	Item-Test Correlation	Item-Rest Correlation	Average Interitem Covariance	Alpha
Vehicles	1210	+	0.72	0.59	0.04	0.80
Savings	1210	+	0.75	0.60	0.04	0.80
Real Estate	1210	+	0.74	0.62	0.04	0.80
Stock Value	1210	+	0.77	0.64	0.04	0.79
Other Assets	1210	+	0.66	0.46	0.04	0.83
Retirement	1210	+	0.82	0.72	0.04	0.78
Test Scale Mean (standardized items)					0.04	0.83

Table A4.4 Item Analysis of Wealth Scale (Bovitz Data)

Item	Obs	Sign	Item-Test Correlation	Item-Rest Correlation	Average Interitem Covariance	Alpha
Vehicles	870	+	0.75	0.64	0.04	0.82
Savings	870	+	0.78	0.65	0.04	0.82
Real Estate	870	+	0.75	0.64	0.04	0.83
Stock Value	870	+	0.75	0.63	0.04	0.83
Other Assets	870	+	0.69	0.53	0.04	0.85
Retirement	870	+	0.83	0.75	0.04	0.81
Test Scale Mean (standardized items)					0.04	0.85

Table A4.5 Item Analysis of Wealth Scale (NORC Data)

Item	Obs	Sign	Item-Test Correlation	Item-Rest Correlation	Average Interitem Covariance	Alpha
Vehicles	708	+	0.69	0.55	0.00	0.80
Savings	689	+	0.72	0.58	0.04	0.79
Real Estate	705	+	0.75	0.63	0.04	0.78
Stock Value	696	+	0.78	0.63	0.04	0.79
Other Assets	689	+	0.61	0.42	0.05	0.85
Retirement	694	+	0.81	0.70	0.04	0.76
Test Scale Mean (standardized items)					0.04	0.82

Table A4.6 Item Analysis of Tastes Scale (Prolific Data)

Item	Obs	Sign	Item-Test Correlation	Item-Rest Correlation	Average Interitem Covariance	Alpha
Lecture	1210	+	0.48	0.36	0.31	0.71
Museum	1210	+	0.56	0.45	0.29	0.70
Art Gallery	1210	+	0.53	0.41	0.30	0.71
Wine	1210	+	0.54	0.43	0.30	0.71
Sushi	1210	+	0.45	0.29	0.31	0.72
Kale	1210	+	0.56	0.43	0.29	0.71
Crème Brûlée	1210	+	0.42	0.29	0.31	0.72
Tennis	1210	+	0.38	0.26	0.32	0.72
Classical Music	1210	+	0.45	0.32	0.31	0.72
Jazz	1210	+	0.43	0.32	0.31	0.72
Canned Spaghetti	1210	+	0.39	0.25	0.32	0.73
Little Debbies	1210	+	0.51	0.37	0.30	0.72
Hot Dog & White Bread	1210	+	0.46	0.32	0.31	0.72
Hamburger Helper	1210	+	0.45	0.32	0.31	0.72
Test Scale Mean (standardized items)					0.31	0.73

Table A4.7 Item Analysis of Tastes Scale (NORC Data)

Item	Obs	Sign	Item-Test Correlation	Item-Rest Correlation	Average Interitem Covariance	Alpha
Lecture	713	+	0.55	0.44	0.26	0.70
Museum	715	+	0.50	0.40	0.28	0.71
Art Gallery	715	+	0.57	0.46	0.26	0.70
Wine	712	+	0.43	0.30	0.28	0.72
Sushi	713	+	0.52	0.36	0.26	0.71
Kale	713	+	0.50	0.36	0.27	0.71
Crème Brûlée	714	+	0.36	0.22	0.29	0.73
Tennis	713	+	0.37	0.26	0.29	0.72
Classical Music	715	+	0.51	0.39	0.27	0.71
Jazz	714	+	0.47	0.36	0.28	0.71
Canned Spaghetti	711	+	0.36	0.21	0.29	0.73
Little Debbies	714	+	0.52	0.38	0.26	0.71
Hot Dog & White Bread	711	+	0.44	0.29	0.28	0.72
Hamburger Helper	715	+	0.51	0.36	0.27	0.71
Test Scale Mean (standardized items)					0.27	0.73

Table A4.8 Item Analysis of Tastes Scale (Bovitz Data)

Item	Obs	Sign	Item-Test Correlation	Item-Rest Correlation	Average Interitem Covariance	Alpha
Lecture	871	+	0.51	0.39	0.29	0.71
Museum	872	+	0.56	0.44	0.28	0.70
Art Gallery	872	+	0.52	0.41	0.29	0.71
Wine	871	+	0.49	0.37	0.29	0.71
Sushi	872	+	0.50	0.33	0.28	0.72
Kale	872	+	0.50	0.37	0.29	0.71
Crème Brûlée	872	+	0.44	0.31	0.30	0.72
Tennis	871	+	0.34	0.34	0.31	0.71

Classical Music	872	+	0.53	0.41	0.28	0.71
Jazz	872	+	0.43	0.43	0.30	0.72
Canned Spaghetti	872	+	0.41	0.27	0.30	0.72
Little Debbies	872	+	0.48	0.34	0.29	0.71
Hot Dog & White Bread	872	+	0.46	0.32	0.29	0.72
Hamburger Helper	872	+	0.42	0.27	0.30	0.72
Test Scale Mean (standardized items)					0.29	0.73

Table A4.9 Item Analysis of Five Item Behavioral Norm Scale (Prolific Data)

Item	Obs	Sign	Item-Test Correlation	Item-Rest Correlation	Average Interitem Covariance	Alpha
Talking Back	1210	+	0.76	0.60	0.03	0.60
Spanking	1210	+	0.72	0.52	0.03	0.62
Sensitivity	1210	+	0.74	0.53	0.03	0.62
Resilience	1210	+	0.60	0.36	0.05	0.69
Challenge Authority	1210	+	0.55	0.30	0.04	0.71
Test Scale Mean (standardized items)					0.03	0.70

Table A4.10 Item Analysis of Five Item Behavioral Norm Scale (NORC Data)

Item	Obs	Sign	Item-Test Correlation	Item-Rest Correlation	Average Interitem Covariance	Alpha
Talking Back	710	+	0.76	0.58	0.30	0.56
Spanking	708	+	0.80	0.64	0.26	0.53
Sensitivity	706	+	0.75	0.53	0.29	0.58
Resilience	708	+	0.67	0.46	0.37	0.62
Challenge Authority	706	+	0.31	0.02	0.59	0.78
Test Scale Mean (standardized items)					0.36	0.68

Table A4.11 Item Analysis of Five Item Behavioral Norm Scale (Bovitz Data)

Item	Obs	Sign	Item-Test Correlation	Item-Rest Correlation	Average Interitem Covariance	Alpha
Talking Back	869	+	0.74	0.55	0.02	0.46
Spanking	870	+	0.74	0.52	0.02	0.47
Sensitivity	870	+	0.68	0.38	0.02	0.55
Resilience	870	+	0.58	0.34	0.02	0.57
Challenge Authority	870	+	0.39	0.09	0.03	0.68
Test Scale Mean (standardized items)					0.02	0.61

Table A4.12 Item Analysis of Two-Item Behavioral Norm Scale (Prolific Data)

Test Scale Mean (standardized items)	Average Interitem Covariance	Alpha
	0.04	0.55

Table A4.13 Item Analysis of Two-Item Behavioral Norm Scale (NORC Data)

Test Scale Mean (standardized items)	Average Interitem Covariance	Alpha
	0.04	0.65

Table A4.14 Item Analysis of Two-Item Behavioral Norm Scale (Bovitz Data)

Test Scale Mean (standardized items)	Average Interitem Covariance	Alpha
	0.04	0.57

Table A4.15 Factor Loadings for Wealth Items (Prolific Data)

Variable	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Factor4	Factor5	Uniqueness
vehicles_01	0.66	0.31	-0.05	0.08	-0.02	0.46
savings_t~01	0.66	0.17	0.06	-0.13	-0.06	0.53
homevalue_01	0.70	0.10	-0.18	-0.06	0.06	0.46
Stock_val~01	0.75	-0.25	-0.11	0.10	-0.04	0.35
assets_ot~01	0.51	0.12	0.24	0.06	0.03	0.66
retiremen~01	0.83	-0.27	0.10	-0.04	0.02	0.22

Table A4.16 Factor Loadings for Wealth Items (Bovitz Data)

Variable	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Factor4	Factor5	Uniqueness
vehicles_01	0.72	0.28	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.40
savings_t~01	0.72	-0.03	-0.19	0.06	-0.02	0.44
homevalue_01	0.70	0.19	-0.10	-0.08	-0.01	0.45
stock_val~01	0.70	-0.23	-0.03	-0.01	0.07	0.45
assets_ot~01	0.59	0.03	0.26	0.01	-0.01	0.58
retiremen~01	0.84	-0.21	0.05	-0.02	-0.05	0.24

Table A4.17 Factor Loadings for Wealth Items (NORC Data)

Variable	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Factor4	Factor5	Uniqueness
----------	---------	---------	---------	---------	---------	------------

vehicles_01	0.63	0.25	0.03	-0.07	-0.03	0.53
savings_t~01	0.64	-0.00	0.16	-0.04	0.04	0.56
homevalue_01	0.73	0.21	-0.12	0.02	0.02	0.40
stock_val~01	0.74	-0.22	-0.13	0.13	0.01	0.38
assets_ot~01	0.46	0.08	0.03	0.03	-0.00	0.76
retiremen~01	0.82	-0.23	0.06	-0.06	-0.03	0.27

Table A4.18 Factor Loadings for Five-Item Behavioral Norm Items (Prolific Data)

Variable	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Factor4	Uniqueness
talking_b~01	0.78	-0.25	-0.05	0.08	0.33
spaking_01	0.67	0.02	-0.24	-0.05	0.49
sensitivi~01	0.66	0.24	0.12	-0.08	0.49
resilienc~01	0.45	0.34	0.09	0.09	0.66
challenge~01	0.40	-0.33	0.21	-0.03	0.69

Table A4.19 Factor Loadings for Five-Item Behavioral Norm Items (NORC Data)

Variable	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Factor4	Uniqueness
talking_b~01	0.73	0.29	-0.01	-0.07	0.38
spaking_01	0.81	0.18	-0.11	0.06	0.30
sensitivi~01	0.64	-0.36	-0.04	0.04	0.46
resilienc~01	0.68	-0.20	0.18	-0.03	0.47
challenge~01	0.30	0.25	0.18	-0.08	0.90

Table A4.20 Factor Loadings for Five-Item Behavioral Norm Items (Bovitz Data)

Variable	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Factor4	Uniqueness
talking_b~01	0.76	0.31	0.04	-0.12	0.32
spaking_01	0.71	0.14	-0.22	0.06	0.43
sensitivi~01	0.55	-0.33	0.07	0.16	0.55
resilienc~01	0.50	-0.43	0.11	-0.11	0.54
challenge~01	0.15	0.42	0.22	0.09	0.75

Table A4.21 Factor Loadings for Five-Item Behavioral Scale & Authoritarianism Items (Bovitz Data)

(obs=868)

Factor analysis/correlation

Method: iterated principal factors

Rotation: (unrotated)

Number of obs=868

Retained factors =8

Number of params =36

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor1	2.555	1.585	0.576	0.576
Factor2	0.970	0.595	0.218	0.794
Factor3	0.374	0.185	0.084	0.878
Factor4	0.189	0.020	0.043	0.921
Factor5	0.169	0.055	0.038	0.959
Factor6	0.114	0.059	0.026	0.985
Factor7	0.055	0.041	0.012	0.997
Factor8	0.014	0.014	0.003	1.000
Factor9	-0.000	.	-0.000	1.000

LR test: independent vs. saturated: $\chi^2(36) = 1543.13$ Prob> $\chi^2 = 0.0000$

Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

Variable	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Factor4	Uniqueness
talking_b~01	0.725	0.119	0.330	0.034	0.318
spanking_01	0.651	0.235	0.311	-0.087	0.380
sensitivi~01	0.426	0.513	-0.191	0.222	0.457
resilienc~01	0.363	0.501	-0.237	-0.131	0.511
challenge~01	0.357	-0.405	0.048	0.195	0.639
auth1	-0.636	0.195	0.159	-0.101	0.454
auth2	-0.518	0.238	0.110	0.247	0.568
auth3	-0.552	0.302	0.140	-0.015	0.544
auth4	-0.434	0.188	0.129	0.067	0.690

Table A4.21 Factor Loadings for Five-Item Behavioral Scale & Authoritarianism Items (NORC Data)

(obs=690)

Factor analysis/correlation

Number of obs=690

Method: iterated principal factors

Retained factors = 8

Rotation: (unrotated)

Number of params = 36

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor1	2.860	1.910	0.621	0.621
Factor2	0.950	0.675	0.206	0.828
Factor3	0.275	0.046	0.060	0.888
Factor4	0.229	0.078	0.050	0.937
Factor5	0.151	0.068	0.033	0.970
Factor6	0.083	0.031	0.018	0.988
Factor7	0.052	0.049	0.011	1.000
Factor8	0.003	0.003	0.001	1.000
Factor9	-0.000	.	-0.000	1.000

LR test: independent vs. saturated: $\chi^2(36) = 1514.45$ Prob> $\chi^2 = 0.0000$

Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

Variable	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Factor4	Factor8	Uniqueness
revtalking~k	0.725	0.138	0.326	-0.033	0.000	0.334
revspaking	0.780	0.217	0.185	-0.026	0.007	0.275
revresilie~e	0.543	0.403	-0.286	-0.001	0.030	0.454
revsensiti~y	0.577	0.404	-0.116	0.133	-0.024	0.443
challenge_~y	0.189	-0.389	0.028	0.198	0.027	0.716
auth1	-0.612	0.367	0.097	-0.253	0.016	0.397
revauth2	-0.499	0.395	-0.010	0.096	-0.010	0.523
auth3	-0.554	0.291	0.116	0.132	0.014	0.545
auth4	-0.364	0.178	0.125	0.282	0.004	0.711

Table A4.22 Factor Loadings of Tastes Items (Prolific Data)

Variable	Factor1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Uniqueness
Museum	0.60	-0.18	-0.17	-0.35	-0.09	0.42
Art gallery	0.56	-0.20	-0.35	-0.16	-0.17	0.44
Wine	0.50	-0.05	0.20	-0.12	0.17	0.61
Sushi	0.35	-0.09	0.35	0.09	-0.16	0.67
Kale	0.52	-0.09	0.33	0.07	-0.19	0.54
Creme Brulé	0.37	-0.19	0.31	-0.07	0.12	0.65
Lecture	0.47	-0.25	-0.03	-0.11	0.16	0.60
Tennis	0.32	-0.09	0.04	0.10	0.06	0.79
classical	0.44	-0.26	-0.22	0.30	0.18	0.53
Jazz	0.41	-0.23	-0.15	0.37	0.00	0.57
Canned Spaghetti	0.30	0.54	0.01	-0.11	0.27	0.51
Little Debbie's	0.42	0.50	0.00	0.12	-0.03	0.50
Hot Dog	0.36	0.51	-0.07	0.00	-0.01	0.55
Hamburger Helper	0.39	0.51	-0.08	0.09	-0.15	0.51

Table A4.23 Factor Loadings of Tastes Items (NORC Data)

Variable	Factor1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Uniqueness
Museum	0.64	-0.26	-0.36	0.19	0.04	0.30
Art gallery	0.74	-0.30	-0.36	0.20	0.10	0.14
Wine	0.37	-0.05	0.28	0.18	-0.01	0.64
Sushi	0.41	0.03	0.32	0.22	0.03	0.61

Kale	0.43	-0.02	0.34	0.18	0.04	0.61
Creme Brulé	0.26	-0.05	0.33	0.11	-0.06	0.72
Lecture	0.57	-0.14	0.03	-0.10	-0.19	0.56
Tennis	0.32	-0.05	0.16	-0.25	0.15	0.73
classical	0.58	-0.23	-0.07	-0.32	-0.24	0.42
Jazz	0.50	-0.14	0.16	-0.39	0.20	0.49
Canned Spaghetti	0.17	0.47	-0.09	0.03	0.18	0.60
Little Debbie's	0.37	0.65	-0.05	-0.03	-0.02	0.35
Hot Dog	0.25	0.56	-0.01	0.07	-0.25	0.50
Hamburger Helper	0.34	0.73	-0.11	-0.08	0.08	0.28

Table A4.24 Factor Loadings of Tastes Items (Bovitz Data)						
Variable	Factor1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Uniqueness
Museum	0.62	-0.17	-0.14	-0.41	-0.04	0.38
Art gallery	0.58	-0.21	-0.29	-0.05	-0.03	0.46
Wine	0.47	-0.11	0.37	0.02	0.10	0.55
Sushi	0.41	0.00	0.26	0.04	-0.21	0.66
Kale	0.46	-0.10	0.26	0.15	-0.15	0.60
Creme Brulé	0.39	-0.09	0.31	-0.05	0.14	0.65
Lecture	0.55	-0.25	-0.02	-0.16	0.00	0.53
Tennis	0.28	-0.05	-0.04	0.06	0.07	0.85
classical	0.55	-0.17	-0.22	0.25	-0.00	0.50
Jazz	0.45	-0.17	-0.20	0.31	0.17	0.56
Canned Spaghetti	0.24	0.60	-0.01	-0.13	0.24	0.46
Little Debbie's	0.31	0.55	0.07	0.07	0.04	0.50
Hot Dog	0.31	0.66	-0.15	0.03	-0.22	0.35
Hamburger Helper	0.25	0.62	-0.01	0.01	0.02	0.46

Chapter 5 Appendix

Table A5.1 Relative Odds of Identifying as a Democrat vs. an Independent

	Prolific Sample		AmeriSpeaks NORC		Bovitz	
	“Strong/Weak” Democrats	Leaners Included	“Strong/Weak” Democrats	Leaners Included	“Strong/Weak” Democrats	Leaners Included
Wealth	-.43 (.57)	-.64 (.81)	-.74 (.64)	.44 (.83)	1.35* (.61)	1.80* (.82)
Income	.05 (.39)	.14 (.54)	.86 (.63)	1.21 (.79)	-.25 (.48)	-.34 (.62)
Occupation	.26 (.24)	.75* (.34)	---	---	.16 (.27)	-.26 (.35)
Education	1.37* (.35)	1.53* (.48)	.47 (.45)	.89 (.59)	-.12 (.46)	.98 (.50)
Tastes	.03 (.50)	-.08 (.69)	.75 (.64)	1.23 (.80)	.60 (.58)	.80 (.74)
Behavioral Norms	2.72* (.47)	3.40* (.66)	2.56* (.64)	3.50* (.83)	3.01* (.54)	3.60* (.71)
Gender	.31 (.18)	.68* (.23)	.33 (.25)	.13 (.32)	.68* (.18)	.52* (.23)
Age	.59 (.41)	1.40* (.58)	.72 (.46)	1.10 (.58)	1.47* (.44)	.02 (.56)
South	.12 (.17)	-.29 (.23)	.37 (.23)	.29 (.34)	-.04 (.19)	.12 (.24)
Rural	-.28 (.22)	-.84* (.27)	---	---	-.56* (.24)	-.28 (.28)
Working	---	---	-.18 (.26)	-.19 (.33)	---	---
Married	---	---	.17 (.23)	-.32 (.29)	-.23 (.20)	-.16 (.26)
Non-Metro	---	---	-.47 (.32)	-.58 (.36)	---	---
Constant	-2.72* (.44)	-2.31* (.60)	-3.25* (.70)	-3.31* (.86)	-3.04 (.47)	-2.06 (.58)
-2LL	-1052.22	-839.02	-614.48	-521.20	-812.98	-713.56
N	1,205	1,205	648	648	855	855

Note: Entries are multinomial logit coefficients.*p<0.05 (two-tailed test). Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A5.2 Relative Odds of Identifying as a Republican vs. an Independent

	Prolific Sample		AmeriSpeaks NORC		Bovitz	
	“Strong/Weak” Republicans	Leaners Included	“Strong/Weak” Republicans	Leaners Included	“Strong/Weak” Republicans	Leaners Included
Wealth	.92 (.55)	1.12 (.79)	1.35* (.63)	2.34* (.82)	1.53* (.62)	2.02* (.81)
Income	.68 (.39)	.77 (.53)	-.48 (.64)	.07 (.78)	-.01 (.49)	-.11 (.61)
Occupation	.16 (.25)	.39 (.34)	---	---	.29 (.29)	-.10 (.35)
Education	.11 (.35)	.40 (.48)	-.58 (.48)	-.09 (.60)	-.15 (.47)	0.78 (.59)
Tastes	-1.00* (.49)	-.92 (.68)	-1.19 (.63)	-.93 (.79)	-1.10 (.59)	-.54 (.74)
Behavioral Norms	-4.91* (.49)	-4.59* (.67)	-4.33* (.66)	-3.93* (.83)	-3.20* (.58)	-2.82* (.72)
Gender	.26 (.17)	.67* (.23)	.61* (.27)	.36 (.32)	.69* (.19)	.32 (.23)
Age	.67 (.40)	.99 (.57)	.46 (.47)	.80 (.58)	1.60* (.48)	.29 (.58)
South	.30 (.17)	-.01 (.23)	.23 (.22)	.17 (.28)	.32 (.19)	.47* (.23)
Rural	.10 (.20)	-.31 (.26)	---	---	.16 (.21)	.22 (.26)
Working	---	---	-.05 (.25)	.03 (.32)	---	---
Married	---	---	.53* (.23)	-.03 (.28)	.18 (.20)	.15 (.25)
Non-Metro	---	---	-.42 (.28)	-.46 (.33)	---	---
Constant	2.39 (.40)	2.87 (.56)	1.88* (.63)	2.17* (.80)	0.21 (.45)	1.38 (.55)
-2LL	-1052.22	-839.02	-614.48	-521.20	-812.98	-713.56
N	1,205	1,205	648	648	855	855

Note: Entries are multinomial logit coefficients.*p<0.05 (two-tailed test). Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A5.3 Relative Odds of Identifying as a Democrat vs. an Independent (Two-Item Measure)

	Prolific Sample		AmeriSpeaks NORC		Bovitz	
	"Strong/Weak" Democrats	Leaners Included	"Strong/Weak" Democrats	Leaners Included	"Strong/Weak" Democrats	Leaners Included
Wealth	-.43 (.57)	-.69 (.82)	-.62 (.64)	.54 (.83)	1.33* (.61)	1.83* (.82)
Income	.04 (.39)	.16 (.55)	.80 (.62)	1.18 (.78)	-.11 (.48)	-.21 (.62)
Occupation	.31 (.24)	.82* (.34)	--- ---	--- ---	.16 (.27)	-.36 (.35)
Education	1.37* (.35)	1.55* (.49)	.53 (.45)	1.00 (.59)	.12 (.46)	1.28* (.59)
Tastes	.28 (.49)	.23 (.67)	1.04 (.63)	1.61* (.80)	.87 (.57)	1.10 (.73)
Behavioral Norms	2.16* (.34)	2.92* (.47)	1.64* (.46)	2.42* (.60)	2.45* (.38)	2.93* (.48)
Gender	.19 (.17)	.58* (.24)	.24 (.26)	-.01 (.32)	.53* (.19)	.30 (.23)
Age	.60 (.41)	1.46* (.58)	.55 (.46)	.88 (.58)	1.41* (.44)	-.08 (.56)
South	.08 (.17)	-.33 (.23)	.30 (.22)	.10 (.29)	-.13 (.19)	.02 (.23)
Rural	-.34 (.22)	-.89* (.27)	--- ---	--- ---	-.64* (.24)	-.37 (.28)
Working	--- ---	--- ---	-.19 (.26)	-.21 (.33)	--- ---	--- ---
Married	--- ---	--- ---	.12 (.23)	-.37 (.29)	-.29 (.20)	-.25 (.26)
Non-Metro	--- ---	--- ---	-.51 (.32)	-.62 (.36)	--- ---	--- ---
Constant	-2.39* (.39)	-2.02* (.60)	-2.77* (.65)	-2.79* (.81)	-2.82 (.43)	-1.74 (.51)
-2LL	-1114.73	-906.21	-631.63	-532.90	-833.58	-737.32
N	1,205	1,205	650	650	856	856

Note: Entries are multinomial logit coefficients.*p<0.05 (two-tailed test). Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A5.4 Relative Odds of Identifying as a Republican vs. an Independent (Two-Item Behavioral Norm Measure)						
	Prolific Sample		AmeriSpeaks NORC		Bovitz	
	"Strong/Weak" Republicans	Leaners Included	"Strong/Weak" Republicans	Leaners Included	"Strong/Weak" Republicans	Leaners Included
Wealth	.95 (.53)	1.11 (.78)	1.22* (.62)	2.10* (.81)	1.64* (.60)	2.22* (.80)
Income	.61 (.38)	.71 (.53)	-.49 (.63)	.09 (.77)	-.13 (.48)	-.25 (.60)
Occupation	.24 (.24)	.52 (.33)	--- ---	--- ---	.28 (.28)	-.15 (.35)
Education	.14 (.34)	.45 (.47)	-.71 (.47)	-.17 (.59)	-.24 (.47)	0.71 (.58)
Tastes	-1.78* (.46)	-1.66* (.65)	-1.56* (.62)	-1.26 (.78)	-1.59* (.58)	-1.02 (.72)
Behavioral Norm	-2.02* (.32)	-1.44* (.45)	-2.44* (.45)	-2.47* (.59)	-.86* (.37)	-.58 (.47)
Gender	.36* (.16)	.67* (.23)	.69* (.27)	.46 (.33)	.69* (.19)	.31 (.23)
Age	.88* (.39)	1.31* (.56)	.67 (.46)	.98 (.57)	1.71* (.46)	.40 (.56)
South	.46* (.16)	.15 (.22)	.23 (.22)	.24 (.28)	.40* (.18)	.55* (.23)
Rural	.14 (.20)	-.28 (.25)	--- ---	--- ---	.22 (.21)	.27 (.26)
Working	--- ---	--- ---	-.01 (.25)	.06 (.32)	--- ---	--- ---
Married	--- ---	--- ---	.55* (.22)	.03 (.28)	.19 (.20)	.14 (.25)
Non-Metro	--- ---	--- ---	-.36 (.27)	-.41 (.32)	--- ---	--- ---
Constant	0.93 (.34)	1.23 (.48)	1.08* (.59)	1.56* (.75)	-0.78 (.41)	.43 (.49)
-2LL	-1114.73	-906.21	-631.63	-532.90	-833.58	-737.32
N	1,205	1,205	650	650	856	856

Note: Entries are multinomial logit coefficients.*p<0.05 (two-tailed test). Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A5.5 Aspects of Social Class on PID
(Two-Item Behavioral Norm Measure)

	Prolific Sample		AmeriSpeaks NORC			Bovitz		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Wealth	1.04*	1.04*	0.93	1.03*	.76*	.46	.34	.26
	(.38)	(.39)	(.42)	(.46)	(.38)	(.47)	(.47)	(.44)
Income	.40	.46	-.75	-.61	-.43	.06	-.10	-.29
	(.27)	(.28)	(.44)	(.47)	(.39)	(.37)	(.36)	(.34)
Occupation	-.11	-.10	---	---	---	-.04	.09	.09
	(.17)	(.17)	---	---	---	(.20)	(.21)	(.18)
Education	-.97*	-.92*	-.86*	-1.03*	-.11	-.49	-.37	.01
	(.24)	(.24)	(.32)	(.34)	(.29)	(.37)	(.37)	(.33)
Tastes	-1.70*	-1.64*	-2.35*	-1.87*	-.35	-2.06*	-1.88*	-.35
	(.32)	(.32)	(.44)	(.49)	(.41)	(.44)	(.45)	(.42)
Norms	-3.73*	-3.67*	-3.42*	-3.39*	-1.06*	-3.00*	-2.97*	-1.03*
	(.21)	(.22)	(.29)	(.30)	(.29)	(.27)	(.28)	(.30)
Working	---	---	-.02	.06	.23	---	---	---
	---	---	(.16)	(.20)	(.16)	---	---	---
Gender	---	.10	---	.27	.22	---	.08	-.03
	---	(.12)	---	(.20)	(.16)	---	(.15)	(.13)
Age	---	.06	---	.03	-.65*	---	.26	-1.04*
	---	(.29)	---	(.37)	(.30)	---	(.35)	(.32)
South	---	.38	---	.15	-.06	---	.51*	.37*
	---	(.12)	---	(.16)	(.14)	---	(.15)	(.13)
Rural	---	.34	---	---	---	---	.58*	.40*
	---	(.15)	---	---	---	---	(.17)	(.16)
Married	---	---	---	.19	.15	---	.38*	.41*
	---	---	---	(.17)	(.14)	---	(.16)	(.15)
Non-Metro	---	---	---	.01	-.10	---	---	---
	---	---	---	(.19)	(.16)	---	---	---
Authoritarianism	---	---	---	---	.47*	---	---	.36
	---	---	---	---	(.23)	---	---	(.22)
White Identity	---	---	---	---	-.19	---	---	.23
	---	---	---	---	(.20)	---	---	(.21)
Racial Resentment	---	---	---	---	4.24*	---	---	3.68*
	---	---	---	---	(.27)	---	---	(.27)
Constant	7.17*	6.75*	7.27*	7.13*	2.73*	6.60*	5.83*	2.60*
	(.21)	(.25)	(.31)	(.44)	(.45)	(.23)	(.31)	(.36)
R ²	.27	0.28	0.23	0.25	.50	0.17	0.20	0.39
N	1,208	1,205	650	650	635	856	856	848

Note: Entries are OLS coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05 (two-tailed test). Party ID is on a 1–7 scale, higher scores indicate stronger Republican PID. All variables are coded 0-1 or/are dummies.

Chapter 6 Appendix

Table A6.1 Aspects of Social Class on Feelings towards Democrats/Republicans						
	Democratic Feelings			Republican Feelings		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Wealth	9.73 (6.43)	11.00 (6.59)	12.81* (6.60)	7.02* (6.32)	4.92 (6.38)	2.85 (6.11)
Income	-2.59 (4.51)	.07 (5.39)	2.75 (5.19)	2.34 (5.09)	.68 (5.11)	-.39 (4.76)
Occupation	-.24 (2.85)	1.49 (3.00)	1.02 (2.82)	2.56 (2.89)	4.90 (3.01)	4.72 (2.79)
Education	7.21 (5.20)	4.77 (5.30)	3.62 (5.04)	-7.67 (5.19)	-8.04 (5.29)	-4.65 (4.92)
Tastes	5.94 (6.73)	2.04 (6.70)	-8.18 (6.49)	-18.08* (6.62)	-18.03* (6.66)	-4.26 (6.46)
Norms	58.03* (5.62)	55.60* (5.77)	21.48* (7.21)	-74.83* (5.42)	-70.82* (5.64)	-24.98* (6.68)
Gender	---	6.81* (2.08)	6.50* (1.93)	---	2.07 (2.09)	1.24 (1.94)
Age	---	6.57 (4.94)	16.72* (4.72)	---	6.84 (4.95)	-7.59 (4.66)
South	---	-2.84 (2.11)	-2.59 (2.00)	---	5.39* (2.10)	5.07* (1.93)
Rural	---	-5.16* (2.62)	-4.49 (2.51)	---	3.27 (2.65)	2.30 (2.52)
Married	---	-3.60 (2.24)	-4.50* (2.12)	---	4.84* (2.23)	5.27* (2.06)
Racial Resentment	---	---	-44.79* (4.34)	---	---	41.58* (4.22)
Authoritarianism	---	---	7.54* (3.31)	---	---	8.33* (3.31)
White Identity	---	---	-4.16 (3.11)	---	---	11.49* (3.12)
Constant	8.62* (3.70)	7.60* (4.81)	46.88* (6.82)	95.35* (3.66)	84.23* (4.85)	30.72* (6.31)
R2	0.14	0.16	0.28	0.22	0.24	0.37
N	853	853	845	853	853	845

Note: Entries are OLS coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05 (two-tailed test). Feeling thermometers are on a 0–100 scale, higher scores indicate warmer feelings. All variables are coded 0-1 or/are dummies.

Table A6.2 Aspects of Social Class on Feelings towards Democrats/Republicans (Two-Item Behavioral Norm Measure)						
	Democratic Feelings			Republican Feelings		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Wealth	7.90 (6.41)	9.31 (6.59)	12.81* (6.60)	10.35 (6.78)	7.07 (6.79)	3.36 (6.19)
Income	-.43 (5.29)	2.35 (5.36)	2.75 (5.19)	1.00 (5.46)	-.73 (5.36)	-.43 (4.82)
Occupation	.16 (2.84)	.91 (2.98)	1.02 (2.82)	1.40 (3.02)	5.24 (3.16)	4.69 (2.82)
Education	10.88* (5.29)	8.38 (5.36)	3.62 (5.04)	-11.43* (5.52)	-11.86* (5.58)	-4.98 (5.02)
Tastes	12.86* (6.58)	9.02 (6.59)	-8.18 (6.49)	-31.71* (6.78)	-30.40* (6.77)	-6.17 (6.45)
Norms	39.67* (3.92)	38.09* (4.05)	21.48* (7.21)	-33.56* (4.20)	-33.36* (4.21)	-4.84 (4.22)
Gender	---	4.54* (2.12)	6.50* (1.93)	---	3.64 (2.21)	1.21 (1.99)
Age	---	4.26 (4.92)	16.72* (4.72)	---	11.50 (5.15)	-8.06 (4.69)
South	---	-4.50 (2.09)	-2.59 (2.00)	---	7.50 (2.19)	5.59* (1.94)
Rural	---	-6.31* (2.53)	-4.49 (2.51)	---	5.33* (2.68)	2.71 (2.51)
Married	---	-4.62* (2.24)	-4.89* (2.11)	---	5.92* (2.36)	5.61* (2.08)
Racial Resentment	---	---	-44.79* (4.34)	---	---	46.46* (4.09)
Authoritarianism	---	---	7.54* (3.31)	---	---	11.91* (3.18)
White Identity	---	---	-4.16 (3.11)	---	---	12.07* (3.16)
Constant	12.65* (3.44)	7.60* (4.81)	46.88* (6.82)	81.24* (3.62)	66.55* (4.68)	16.16 (5.18)
R2	0.14	0.16	0.28	0.12	.16	.36
N	853	853	845	853	853	845

Note: Entries are OLS coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05 (two-tailed test). Feeling thermometers are on a 0–100 scale, higher scores indicate warmer feelings. All variables are coded 0-1 or/are dummies.

Table A6.3 Aspects of Social Class on Expressive Partisan Identity						
	Democratic Identity			Republican Identity		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Wealth	.20*	.18*	.17*	.13	.09	.06
	(.07)	(.07)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)
Income	-.09	-.04	-.03	-.13	-.12	-.06
	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)
Occupation	.06	.10*	.09*	.01	.07	.07
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Education	-.08	-.11	-.13*	-.08	-.13*	-.07*
	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.05)
Tastes	0.21*	.15*	.11	-.06	-.09	.03
	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)
Norms	.14*	.20*	.13	-.30*	-.30*	-.19*
	(.07)	(.07)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)
Gender	---	.04	.03	---	.08*	.05*
	---	(.03)	(.03)	---	(.03)	(.02)
Age	---	.25*	.27*	---	.19*	.11*
	---	(.06)	(.06)	---	(.07)	(.07)
South	---	.01	.01	---	.03	.01
	---	(.03)	(.03)	---	(.03)	(.02)
Rural	---	-.05	-.05	---	-.05	-.02
	---	(.04)	(.04)	---	(.03)	(.02)
Married	---	-.05	-.06*	---	.03	.01
	---	(.03)	(.03)	---	(.03)	(.03)
Racial Resentment	---	---	-.21*	---	---	-.01
Authoritarianism	---	---	(.05)	---	---	(.06)
	---	---	.06	---	---	.13*
White Identity	---	---	(.05)	---	---	(.04)
	---	---	.10*	---	---	.25*
	---	---	(.04)	---	---	(.04)
Constant	.38*	.25*	.33*	.79*	.65*	.41*
	(.05)	(.07)	(.09)	(.05)	(.07)	(.08)
R2	0.07	0.13	0.17	0.06	0.11	0.27
N	383	383	381	360	360	356

Note: Entries are OLS coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05 (two-tailed test). Expressive identity is on a 0–1 scale, higher scores indicate greater expressive partisan identity. All variables are coded 0-1 or/are dummies.

Table A6.4 Aspects of Social Class on Expressive Partisan Identity Two-Item Behavioral Norms						
	Democratic Identity			Republican Identity		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Wealth	.20* (.07)	.17* (.07)	.17* (.07)	.12 (.08)	.07 (.08)	.05 (.08)
Income	-.09 (.06)	-.04 (.06)	-.02 (.06)	-.12 (.07)	-.11 (.07)	-.06 (.07)
Occupation	.06 (.03)	.09* (.03)	.09* (.03)	.01 (.04)	.08 (.04)	.07 (.04)
Education	-.07 (.06)	-.11 (.06)	-.12* (.06)	-.08 (.06)	-.13* (.06)	-.08 (.05)
Tastes	0.22* (.08)	.17* (.08)	.12 (.08)	-.09 (.09)	-.12 (.09)	.02 (.08)
Norms	.14* (.06)	.18* (.06)	.12* (.06)	-.02 (.05)	-.07 (.05)	-.04 (.05)
Gender	---	.03 (.03)	.03 (.03)	---	.08* (.03)	.05* (.03)
Age	---	.24* (.06)	.27* (.06)	---	.20* (.07)	.11 (.07)
South	---	.00 (.03)	.01 (.03)	---	.04 (.03)	.01 (.02)
Rural	---	-.01 (.04)	-.06 (.04)	---	-.04 (.03)	-.02 (.02)
Married	---	-.05 (.03)	-.06* (.03)	---	.03* (.06)	.02 (.03)
Racial Resentment	---	---	-.20* (.05)	---	---	.01 (.06)
Authoritarianism	---	---	.04 (.04)	---	---	.15* (.04)
White Identity	---	---	.11* (.04)	---	---	.25* (.04)
Constant	.36* (.05)	.26* (.06)	.34* (.07)	.67* (.05)	.55* (.06)	.32* (.07)
R2	0.08	0.14	0.17	0.02	0.09	0.26
N	383	383	381	360	360	356

Note: Entries are OLS coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05 (two-tailed test). Expressive identity is on a 0–1 scale, higher scores indicate greater expressive partisan identity. All variables are coded 0-1 or/are dummies

	NORC						Bovitz							
	MAGA M1	MAGA M2	NRA M1	NRA M2	Biden M1	Biden M2	MAGA M1	MAGA M2	NRA M1	NRA M2	Biden M1	Biden M2	Trump M1	Trump M2
Wealth	.06 (.09)	.01 (.08)	.01 (.08)	-.01 (.07)	-.08 (.08)	-.03 (.07)	-.01 (.08)	-.05 (.07)	-.00 (.07)	-.04 (.06)	.02 (.08)	.02 (.07)	.07 (.08)	.02 (.08)
Income	-.11 (.09)	-.07 (.08)	-.04 (.09)	-.00 (.07)	.13 (.08)	.11 (.07)	-.03 (.06)	-.03 (.06)	.01 (.06)	.00 (.05)	-.04 (.06)	.00 (.06)	-.08 (.06)	-.08 (.06)
Occupation	---	---	---	---	---	---	.06 (.03)	.06 (.03)	.07* (.03)	.06* (.03)	-.01 (.04)	-.01 (.03)	.08* (.04)	.08* (.03)
Education	-.28* (.06)	-.11 (.06)	-.31* (.06)	-.15* (.05)	.19* (.06)	.06 (.05)	-.18* (.07)	-.10 (.05)	-.18* (.06)	-.11* (.05)	.17* (.06)	.12* (.06)	-.23* (.07)	-.16* (.06)
Tastes	-.36* (.09)	-.14 (.08)	-.36* (.09)	-.13 (.08)	.31* (.08)	.13 (.07)	-.36* (.08)	-.06 (.07)	-.39* (.07)	-.13* (.07)	.27* (.07)	.05 (.07)	-.35* (.08)	-.06* (.07)
Behavioral	-.67* (.06)	-.27* (.07)	-.56* (.06)	-.15* (.06)	.59* (.06)	.23* (.06)	-.52* (.05)	-.15* (.05)	-.51* (.04)	-.17* (.05)	.51* (.05)	.19* (.05)	-.45* (.05)	-.10* (.05)
Gender	.08* (.04)	.09* (.03)	.04 (.03)	.02 (.03)	-.07* (.03)	-.06 (.03)	.03 (.03)	.00 (.02)	.02 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	.00 (.02)	.01 (.02)	.04 (.03)	.02 (.02)
Age	.19* (.07)	.08 (.06)	.13 (.07)	.02 (.06)	.06 (.06)	.16* (.05)	.27* (.06)	.02 (.05)	.16* (.05)	-.05 (.05)	.24* (.06)	.24* (.06)	.12* (.06)	-.12* (.05)
South	.08* (.03)	.05 (.03)	.04 (.03)	.02 (.03)	-.02 (.03)	.00 (.03)	.09* (.03)	.06* (.02)	.10* (.02)	.08* (.02)	-.04 (.02)	-.02 (.03)	.10* (.03)	.07* (.02)
Rural	---	---	---	---	---	---	.08* (.03)	.05 (.03)	.09* (.03)	.06* (.02)	-.09* (.03)	-.06* (.03)	.07* (.03)	.04 (.03)
Married	.01 (.03)	-.01 (.03)	.01 (.03)	-.01 (.03)	-.04 (.03)	-.03 (.03)	.04 (.03)	.04 (.02)	.03 (.02)	.03 (.03)	-.03 (.03)	-.05 (.02)	.05 (.03)	.05* (.03)
Working	.02 (.04)	.04 (.03)	.01 (.04)	.03 (.03)	-.06 (.03)	-.08* (.03)	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Non-Metro	.01 (.04)	.01 (.04)	.08* (.04)	.08* (.03)	.03 (.04)	.04 (.03)	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Auth	---	.11* (.05)	---	.06 (.04)	---	-.01 (.04)	---	.15* (.04)	---	.11* (.03)	---	.04 (.04)	---	.10* (.04)
RR	---	.67* (.06)	---	.71* (.05)	---	-.64* (.05)	---	.63* (.05)	---	.58* (.04)	---	-.68* (.05)	---	.62* (.05)
White Identity	---	-.04 (.04)	---	-.07 (.04)	---	.06* (.09)	---	.10* (.04)	---	.07* (.03)	---	.06 (.03)	---	.10* (.04)
Constant	.95 (.09)	.23 (.10)	.98 (.08)	.25 (.10)	-.23 (.08)	.37 (.09)	.74 (.05)	.08 (.06)	.81 (.05)	.24 (.06)	-.06 (.05)	.43 (.06)	.71 (.06)	.11 (.06)
R ²	.33	.51	.31	.51	.24	.42	.24	.44	.26	.45	.19	.37	.19	.37
N	603	591	601	589	630	616	856	848	856	848	856	848	856	848

Note: Entries reflect OLS coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05 (two-tailed test). All DVs standardized from 0-1, higher scores indicate greater favorability