The Frankish Nobility and The Fall of Acre:
Diplomacy, Society, and War in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, c.1240-1291

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

BY

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IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Michael Lower

October 2016

Acknowledgements

It is a welcome task indeed to thank some of the many individuals and institutions that have helped me bring this project to fruition. I have enjoyed a good deal of financial support from various institutions without which this project would not have been possible. I extend my heartfelt thanks to the UMN Graduate School and College of Liberal Arts; to the History Department; to the Centers for Medieval Studies and Early Modern History at Minnesota; to the U.S. Department of Education for providing me with a Foreign Language and Area Studies award to study Arabic; and to the U.S.-Israel Education Foundation and Fulbright program, for making possible nine months of research in Jerusalem

I cannot name all the marvelous educators I had in secondary school, so O.J. Burns and Ian Campbell of Greens Farms Academy in Westport, CT, two of the very best there have ever been, will need to stand for everyone. Again, I had too many wonderful professors as an undergraduate to thank them all by name, but I do wish to single out Paul Freedman of Yale University for advising my senior essay. My M.Phil. supervisor, Jonathan Riley-Smith, emeritus of Emmanuel College, Cambridge, helped set me on my way in researching the Crusades and the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, as he has done for so many students before me. As I am sure they do, I deeply regret his recent passing. I am also grateful to Reuven Amitai of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, an outstanding mentor while I was in Israel. Whatever I know about Mamluks and Mongols I certainly have learned from him.

At the University of Minnesota, my academic home for most of the last seven years, Bernard Bachrach, Giancarlo Casale, Oliver Nicholson, J.B. Shank, George Sheets

and others have been a fundamental part of my training. I owe a very special debt to the members of my committee—Lianna Farber, Mary Franklin-Brown, Ruth Mazo Karras, and Kathryn L. Reyerson—not only for their service in that connection, but also for their constant professional advice and support throughout my graduate career. Finally, my advisor, Michael Lower, has my enduring gratitude. His guidance since I arrived in Minneapolis in 2009 has been all I could have hoped for and more. So much good that has happened for me during my graduate years I owe to his sage and sober advice—and to the insights that come from chatting over the occasional burrito lunch.

I have had the privilege and delight of meeting a group of friends and colleagues during my time at Minnesota who have contributed enormously to the completion of this dissertation. Much more importantly, they have been a constant source of amusement and edification in both happy and trying times. For this, I gladly thank: Adam Blackler, Cameron Bradley, Chris Flynn, Brian Hill, Matt King, John Manke, Basit Qureshi, Brian Toye, Tiffany Vann Sprecher, Liz Venditto, Alex Wisnoski, and Ann Zimo. There could not be a finer group for me to have rubbed elbows with during my time at the U. I would also like to thank Jessica Andruss, Brian Campbell, and Noah Kaye, all of whom made my research stay in Israel in 2012-13 indescribably better than it ever could have been without them.

A special thanks goes to my wife, Barbara, whose love and unflagging interest in my studies are sacred mysteries to me. Everything became so much better and easier when she appeared on the scene. Finally, pride of place in these acknowledgements must go to my parents, Cheryl and Frank. They have nurtured my interests going back long

before my memory can reach; and each and every day they still think up some new way to show their love and support. This is for them, and because of them.

Abstract

In May of 1291, armies of the Mamluk dynasty, a Sunni Muslim regime based in Cairo, overwhelmed the defenses of the city of Acre, thereby conquering the last major stronghold in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. This brought to a close nearly two hundred years of Frankish settlement in Syria and destroyed the last vestiges of the principalities the Franks had established there during and immediately after the First Crusade (1095-1099). There has long been a pervasive assumption among scholars that the kingdom was terminally weak by the early thirteenth century; that the Franks living there had little control over their own affairs; and that its eventual conquest by a neighboring Muslim power was all but inevitable. In this dissertation I challenge these assumptions through a close study of the nobility's military and diplomatic actions and an analysis of how these actions fit into the broader context of their social and cultural attitudes during the period c.1240-1291. I conclude that the Franks remained more diplomatically and military relevant than commonly believed and that it was a pervasive attitude of political and social competition among its leading nobles and their perception of threat to their economic, social, and political dominance of the Kingdom of Jerusalem from other segments within Frankish society that proved to be its undoing.

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Introduction

On May 16, 1291, sappers in the army of the Mamluk sultan al-Ashraf Khalil mined the King's Tower on the easternmost salient of the encircling wall of Frankish Acre and collapsed its outer façade. The tower's defenders did not fall back immediately, resisting from amidst the ruins for much of the next day. Eventually recognizing their cause was futile, they retreated to St. Anthony's Gate and the Accursed Tower, located on the inner wall of the city just behind the King's Tower. On May 18th the attackers forced their way into the Accursed Tower, thereby gaining entrance to Acre roughly six weeks after having initiated the siege.[1] The ominous beat of the sultan's war drums could be heard everywhere as his men rushed through the tower gate into the city. Panic reigned in the streets and on the quays of the harbor where too many people tried to push their way onto too few boats. Vessels sank, men and women drowned, unscrupulous ship captains gouged the rich and ignored the poor while they pleaded to be delivered from the city before it was given over to the sack.

The military orders and the chivalry of Acre fought stoically but to no avail: they were completely overwhelmed. The inhabitants of the city who had not escaped by sea, or drowned, or been slain, barred themselves inside the Templar compound on the shore in the southwest corner of the city. After ten days of defiance, these holdouts surrendered to al-Ashraf Khalil on the promise that their lives would be spared, but once the Templar gates were opened they were executed.[2] So fell Acre, ending nearly two hundred years of

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[1] The siege began on April 6.

[2] For the most detailed Frankish account, see *Templare di Tiro. Cronaca del templare di Tiro: 1243-1314: la caduta degli stati crociati nel racconto di un testimone ocular*, trans. Laura Minervini (Naples: Liguori, 2000), 206-29. For a study based on the several extant Muslim

Frankish settlement in Syria. After four decades of intermittent warfare against the Kingdom of Jerusalem, the Mamluks had finally burned out its heart; the last Frankish strongholds in the area were abandoned soon after without resistance. Never again in the medieval period would the Franks settle in the Holy Land.[3]

Project Overview

For generations scholarship on the Crusades and the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem has been weighted heavily toward the twelfth century. This has been in part a consequence of the pervasive belief among scholars that the truncated kingdom that survived in the thirteenth century following the conquests of Saladin in 1187 was not an independently viable entity and could last only if propped up by support from the Latin West.[4] A related assumption has been that the Franks living in the thirteenth-century kingdom had little control over their own affairs, and that its eventual destruction was a virtual *fait accompli* after the Franks suffered a terrible defeat at the Battle of la Forbie in 1244 and King Louis IX of France's crusades of 1249-50 and 1270 ended in abject failure.[5] Christopher Tyerman has written that the Kingdom of Jerusalem was at the mercy of "forces over which the Franks held no influence."[6] Similarly, Thomas Madden has claimed that "[f]ew could shake the foreboding feeling…that the armies of Islam

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accounts, see Donald Little, "The Fall of 'Akka in 690/1291: The Muslim Version," *Studies in Islamic History and Civilization: in Honour of Professor David Ayalon*, ed. Moshe Sharon (1986): 159-181.

[3] The island remained under Lusignan and then Venetian control until its conquest by Ottoman Turks in 1571.

[4] Jean Richard, *The Kingdom of Jerusalem*, trans. Janet Shirley, vol. B (New York: North-Holland, 1979)

[5] In the south of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, near Gaza.

[6] Christopher Tyerman, *God's War: A New History of the Crusades* (Cambridge, MA.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 817.

were simply too powerful to resist."[7] These statements, written in recent surveys by two leading scholars in the field, sum up the current state of scholarship on the Kingdom of Jerusalem in the second half of the thirteenth-century.

In this dissertation I challenge the assumption of Frankish helplessness in the period c.1240-1291 through a close study of the nobility's military and diplomatic actions and an analysis of how these actions fit into the broader context of their social and cultural attitudes. My research demonstrates that the Franks' diplomatic and military capabilities have been drastically underestimated. Indeed, the reason for the collapse of the kingdom must be sought elsewhere. In fact, it was a pervasive attitude of political competition and sense of social threat among the Frankish nobility with respect to each other and other non-noble elements within Frankish society that proved to be the Kingdom of Jerusalem's undoing. Because of a bitter in-group competitiveness and—somewhat paradoxically—a shared wariness and resentment of those outside what they considered their chivalrous brotherhood, the nobility consistently and with only rare exception prioritized individual advantage ahead of shared needs.

The Kingdom of Jerusalem in the Thirteenth Century

The events of 1291 were the dramatic conclusion to a story in which political fragmentation among the Franks was a principal theme. Internal strife was a perennial problem for the Kingdom of Jerusalem throughout the thirteenth century. During the 1230s and 1240s a civil war between partisans of the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II—regent of Jerusalem and suzerain over Cyprus—and the most powerful family in the

[7] Thomas Madden, *The New Concise History of the Crusades* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 186.

Latin East, the Ibelins, troubled both kingdoms.[8] During Louis IX's four-year stay in the Holy Land (1250-54) following the failure of his crusade to Egypt, the Latin Kingdom was relatively untroubled by infighting, but in 1256 long-running competition among the Genoese, Pisan, and Venetian merchant communities of Acre and Tyre broke out into open war, the War of St. Sabas. Many of the most prominent of the Frankish nobility leaped into this conflict over the course of the next five years.

There were also struggles over the regency and crown of Jerusalem. The regency was disputed in the kingdom's High Court in the 1240s, changed hands frequently in the 1250s, and was contested again in the 1260s. In 1267 the High Court ratified the claim of Hugh III of Antioch-Lusignan, king of Cyprus, as regent and heir-presumptive to the Jerusalemite throne for the absentee claimant Conrad V Hohenstaufen who was embroiled in struggles with Charles of Anjou over the Kingdom of Sicily and was not likely ever to come to the East.[9] After being defeated by Charles at the Battle of Tagliacozza in 1268, Conradin was executed at Naples and the path seemed clear for Hugh to succeed in the Kingdom of Jerusalem. He was crowned at Tyre in 1269 but his cousin, Maria of Antioch, was in fact a closer blood relative to Conradin than Hugh and, according to the custom and law of the kingdom, actually had the more legitimate claim. Because the local barons and other Frankish nobility knew that Hugh could offer the kingdom more aid through his Cypriot vassals than could Maria, who was unwed and without children, most of them threw their support behind him. But Maria was not to be put off so easily. She tried bringing suit in the Roman curia in 1272.

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[8] Through his marriage to Queen Isabella II (called Yolanda) for their son Conrad IV.

[9] Conradin, as Conrad V is generally known, was the last direct descendant of Isabella II, and if he had ever come to the East, he should have been recognized as rightful king. Peter Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades, 1191-1374* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 90.

In 1277 she sold her claim to Charles of Anjou. Charles was a staunch ally of the Holy See in its struggles against the Hohenstaufen and a cadet of the ruling house of France. He possessed many wealthy lands and resources, including Anjou, Poitou, Provence, the Kingdom of Sicily, and Albania. It seemed likely he would add significantly to these in the near future through an invasion of the Aegean and an attack on Constantinople itself, undertakings which had long been in the planning stages. In spite of the irregular and unprecedented manner by which Charles made his claim on the Jerusalemite throne, the papacy and—at least initially—many of the barons in Syria favored him over Hugh for the same reason they had formerly favored Hugh over Maria; that is, he seemed to offer more potential aid. Nevertheless, some among the Frankish nobility continued to support Hugh at least in part because they were antagonized by what they perceived as the meddling of Rome and Naples in their local affairs. When Roger of San Severino came to the East in 1277 as Charles's regent the kingdom was effectively split into two. Roger held Acre for Charles while Tyre remained loyal to the Lusignan cause.[10]

Charles did what he could for the Holy Land through his proxies but any plans he might have had for a more complete intervention were destroyed by the outbreak of rebellion—the so-called Sicilian Vespers—among the local nobility at Palermo in 1282. Occupied with quelling this uprising and fighting the Aragonese, who supported the local Sicilian nobility in order to further their own interests there, Charles could do nothing for Syria after 1282. He died in 1285 while his son and heir, Charles II of Salerno, languished in an Aragonese prison. The Syrian nobility could see the writing on the wall

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[10] Jean Richard, *The Crusades, c.1271-1291*, trans. Jean Birrell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 450-51.

and even those who had supported the Angevins were now ready to embrace the Lusignans. Although Hugh III had died in 1284 his third son, Henry II, crossed to the mainland from Cyprus in 1286 and was crowned at Tyre. His coronation united Cyprus and Jerusalem under one universally recognized king for the first time since 1205.

All of this unfolded against the backdrop of major new military and political developments in the Near East. Mongol advances into Iran and Mesopotamia in the 1220s pushed the Khwarazmians, a Turkic-speaking people, into Syria. The Khwarazmians soon were serving the Ayyubids of Cairo as mercenaries and they overran Jerusalem (in Christian hands by negotiated settlement since 1229) in August of 1244. The Franks made common cause with the Ayyubids of Damascus, rivals of the Egyptian branch of the dynasty, and in October of that year a joint Frankish-Damascene army took the field near Gaza. In the ensuing battle of la Forbie (Harbiyya) this force was routed and Frankish manpower losses were enormous.

In the mid-1250s the Mongols reappeared in Syria and remained a major military and diplomatic factor there throughout the remainder of the thirteenth century and beyond. Meanwhile, amidst the instability created by the presence of Louis IX's crusader army in the Nile Delta, a group of slave soldiers (*mamluks*) had overthrown the Ayyubid rulers of Cairo and seized control for themselves in May of 1250.[11] Although the consolidation of power in Egypt by the Mamluks (as the new regime came to be called) was by no means inevitable, the energetic Baybars al-Bunduqdari (r.1260-1277) eventually gained control of Cairo. He soon began a systematic campaign aimed at

[11] Their first incursion had been in 1242-44. They turned back, Peter Jackson suggests, at least in part because of damage caused to the hooves of their horses by the summer heat. Robert Irwin, *The Middle East in the Middle Ages: The Early Mamluk Sultanate 1250-1382* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986), 21; Peter Jackson, *The Mongols and the West 1221-1410* (New York: Pearson Longman, 2005), 74.

decimating the Kingdom of Jerusalem. His military successes prepared the way for the final siege of Acre in 1291.

Growing economic challenges placed further pressure on the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Local, regional, and trans-regional trade through the ports of the Levant had always been vital to the kingdom's survival. Syria was already more thoroughly urbanized, monetized, and commercialized than any place in western Europe at the time of the First Crusade (1095-1099) and commerce through its coastal cities played a significant role in the life and prosperity of Frankish settlement from the very outset.[12] Moreover, the commercial economy and the feudal-agrarian system of lordship were interlocked earlier and more completely in the Latin East than in northwest Europe.[13] In fact, far from being an example of "pure feudalism" as was once the prevailing view, the system of lordship and land tenure in the Frankish Syria had always depended significantly on money.[14] Fiefs held entirely in cash or in some combination of cash and service were common; not at all atypical was the lordship of Arsur where, by the mid-thirteenth century, all of its fiefs save two were held in both money and land.[15] Furthermore, much of the nobility lived much of the time in towns and cities, absentee

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[12] David Jacoby, "The Economic Function of the Crusader States of the Levant: A New Approach," in *Relazioni Economische Tra Europa Mondo Islamico secc. XIII-XVIII,* ed. Simonetta Cavaciocchi (Grassina, Italy: Le Monier, 2007), 159-91.

[13] For an overview of this hybrid "feudalism" in the Latin East, see the first chapter of Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1174-1277* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1973), 3-20. For lordship and its advantage over feudalism as a descriptor for the bonds that held together society in the High Middle Ages, see Thomas N. Bisson, *The Crisis of the Twelfth Century: Power, Lordship, and the Origins of European Government* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

[14] On the introduction of money-fiefs, see Alan Murray, "The Origins of Money-Fiefs in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem" in *Mercenaries and Paid Men: The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages*, ed. John France (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 275-86.

[15] Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, 6.

landlords of their rural estates.[16] The importance of commerce, trade, cash, and urban manufactures relative to the production of the agrarian economy only grew during the course of two centuries of Frankish settlement in Syria. Shrinking territory from military losses and, therefore, shrinking agricultural revenues, meant that in the middle and late thirteenth century the nobility became more dependent on the customs and fees generated in the coastal cities than ever before.[17]

But even as the balance of the economy in the Latin kingdom shifted almost exclusively to commerce, much trade that had previously come through the Syrian hinterland to the Frankish ports of Tyre and Acre now more easily flowed through the Black Sea region to the ports of Cilician Armenia. Recent Mongol conquests in central Asia and the political unity it imposed proved, at least temporarily, more conducive to long-distance trade than the patchwork of states—including those of the Franks and Syrian Ayyubids—in the Levant.[18] This shift sharply exacerbated the problem of territorial loss in Frankish Syria. In need of income, its nobility further diminished their shrinking domains by selling off or renting significant portions of their property, a phenomenon that, although it had begun in the twelfth century, continued apace in the thirteenth.

To fully understand the period c.1240-1291 in the Kingdom of Jerusalem, it is necessary to consider not only the issues described above, specific to Frankish Syria, but

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[16] The only example of a similarly urbanized nobility was that of northern Italy, but that region had never been as feudal-agrarian as northwest Europe, a good portion of the Italian nobility's wealth and standing had having always been linked to the commerce of the port cities and never principally predicated on land tenure as came to be the case in northern France. Joshua Prawer, "Etude de quelques problèmes agraires et sociaux d'une seigneurie croisée au XIII siècle," *Byzantion* 22 (1952): 21-24; Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, 5, 97.
[17] Jacoby, "Economic Function," 170, 187; Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, 98.
[18] Jacoby, "Economic Function," 184.

also the impact of certain major political, social, and cultural transformations taking place clear across Latin Christendom in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. By the early thirteenth century the secular nobility in the Francophone lands—France, Flanders and England, but also Latin Greece, Cyprus, and Jerusalem—all of which, to a greater or lesser extent, were "feudal" in their social-political structure and held together by the idea and practice of (often coercive) lordship, were coming to think of themselves as a distinct and well-defined cohort.[19]

In the years before and after the turn of the millennium the superiority of the knight (*miles*) in the former Carolingian heartlands needed little introduction. His decisive impact in battle was evidence enough, and he dominated the military, political, social, and economic scene in northern France and lands conquered by men hailing from that region. However, the reconstitution of central authority in the old Carolingian *regnum* after the anarchy of the tenth and eleventh centuries and the development of administrative kingship, in which professional clerks and ministers played such a vital role, began to threaten the monopoly that the established fighting elite—castellans and *milites*—exercised over political power. Similar processes occurred in England under the Normans and Angevins and in the Kingdom of Sicily under the Normans and Hohenstaufen. Meanwhile, in all of these regions a growing urban patriciate, agents of the commercial growth that scholars have not hesitated to call a revolution, began to chip away at the social and economic dominance that the masters of war had enjoyed in a primarily rural-agrarian economy organized around the idea and practice of lordship.

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[19] David Crouch, *The Birth of the Nobility: Constructing Aristocracy in England and France: 900-1300* (New York: Pearson Longman, 2005), 32; Georges Duby, *The Chivalrous Society*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 179, 182; Bloch, *Feudal Society*, vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 332; Introduction to *Mercenaries and Paid Men,* 7, 11.

Finally, the changing face of warfare itself and the growing importance in royal and ducal armies of mercenaries, archers, crossbowmen, and siege engineers (made possible in large part by the increasing availability of cash), began to undermine the position of the *milites* even in their classic métier.

These changes and the threat they posed provoked among the established military elite increasingly elaborate efforts to distinguish themselves from the rest of society in terms of values, behavior, birth, and privilege—in a sense, compensation for the end of their near-monopoly on real power.[20] One result was that "knight", "lord", and "noble" in both Latin and vernacular languages became virtually interchangeable at around this time—by no means had they been up to this point.[21] Another consequence was an effort by the warrior elite in several regions across Latin Christendom to try to constrain royal power through law, and to ensure that monarchical rule and governance would be consultative and rooted in the consent of a community nobles, rather than be arbitrary and enacted through a king's officials, clerks, ministers, and personal favorites.

The birth and proliferation of new entertainments and fashions such as vernacular literature, tournaments, and dubbing all formalized, celebrated, and valorized the knightly vocation and underwrote the nobility's self-conception as a discrete cohort. Thus, prowess and courage in the cavalry charge, loyalty to one's lord, just conduct to one's peers, the right and need to give counsel, disdain for money, and a congeries of other

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[20] Maurice Keen, *Chivalry* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 90.
[21] Constance Brittain Bouchard, "*Strong of Body, Brave and Noble": Chivalry and Society in Medieval France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 25-26, 112.

qualities came to be viewed by the established secular elite as unique, essential, and inalienable qualities of their group.[22]

In the Kingdom of Jerusalem the general character of noble society was similar to that found in other Francophone lands and the nobility in Frankish Syria experienced a comparable sense of social threat in the thirteenth century. In fact, the particular circumstances of Frankish Syria actually heightened that sense. The outsized importance of trade strengthened the hand of urban burgesses and non-noble merchants while the perpetual shortage of fighting men necessitated heavy reliance on paid soldiers outside of the feudal structure and the bonds of lordship. Decisions made in Rome or in European courts often impacted profoundly the Franks' fate while cutting them out of decision-making. Furthermore, although the Kingdom of Jerusalem lacked the strong administrative monarchy that was developing in England, France, and Sicily, it cannot be overlooked that during much of the thirteenth century two of the most dynamic rulers of the thirteenth century—and administrative rulers *par excellence*—Frederick II and Charles of Anjou, sought to exert control over Syria and Cyprus. In both cases their chief instruments for trying to exert their will in the Latin East were non-local administrators and mercenaries rather than the local nobility; it must not be thought a coincidence that their intrusions into politics there marked two periods of civil war.

Historiography

This dissertation intervenes in two major historiographical debates. The first is about the Franks' relations with non-Franks. Since the middle of the twentieth century,

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[22] Bouchard, ix; Bloch, 292, 305-6; Richard Kaeuper and Elspeth Kennedy, *The Book of Chivalry of Geoffroi de Charny: Text, Context, and Translation* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 26, 30-8, 57.

scholars have treated the history of the Latin East and the history of the Crusades as distinct areas of inquiry, and we now accept it as a matter of course that crusader concerns were not necessarily Frankish concerns, either practically or ideologically, and that the reverse was equally true. One significant divergence between "Crusaders" and "Franks" that has become axiomatic is that the latter were generally more conservative than the former when it came to policy and action towards a succession of Muslim powers in Syria and Egypt. Arguments to explain this have generally been either "accommodationist" (i.e. the Frankish settlers developed an enlightened attitude about their infidel neighbors and settled freely throughout the land) or "segregationist" (i.e. the Franks perceived themselves to be under siege constantly by enemies whom they were wary of provoking, and therefore hunkered down in their well-defended cities and castles).[23]

In the first formulation, the Franks avoided war because they had developed a certain respect for and mutual accommodation with their Muslim neighbors, while in the second, they avoided war because they felt their situation to be parlous, and, fearing those neighbors, segregated themselves by living exclusively in their coastal cities. Proponents of the first view include E.G. Rey, writing in the nineteenth century, and René Grousset, writing in the early twentieth.[24] This view generally held sway until the 1950s and 1960s,

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[23] Ronnie Ellenblum, *Frankish Rural Settlement in the Kingdom of Jerusalem* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 3-38.

[24] René Grousset, *Histoire du croisades et du royaume franc de Jérusalem*, 3 vols. (Paris: Plon, 1934-36); Emmanuel Rey, *Les colonies franques de Syrie aux XIIme et XIIIme siècles* (Paris: A. Picard, 1883).

when R.C. Smail and Joshua Prawer began to challenge it with the second, segregationist view.[25]

Recently, there has been a paradigm shift in this debate in large part due to the publication of Ronnie Ellenblum's *Frankish Rural Settlement and the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*. Ellenblum has shown that neither of the previous views on Frankish settlement is correct: the Franks were not entirely segregated from the local population; however, neither did they settle just anywhere. He argues that the Franks did venture beyond their fortresses and cities to settle the countryside, but only near local Christians and never near local Muslims.[26] Thus, he seems to provide a middle way between those views epitomized in the works of Rey-Grousset and Smail-Prawer. But in fact, he does so only partially—that is, only with respect to the urban-rural debate. With respect to Christian-Muslim relations, he leaves the assumptions of the Smail-Prawer generation more or less intact. Thus, his research, like both the accommodationist and segregationist views espoused in preceding generations, is framed by a fundamental assumption that, one way or another, Frankish actions and attitudes were principally determined by encounter with a Muslim "other."

This dissertation argues that concerns about developments within Frankish society were far more determinative of the actions and attitudes of the nobility than the fact that they happened to live amongst non-Latin Christians and non-Franks. With that said, the fact that ethno-religious encounter or identity was not determinative (or, at least, not primarily determinative) of Frankish actions and attitudes is not to say that the Franks can

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[25] Joshua Prawer, *Estates*, *Histoire du royaume latin de Jérusalem* (Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1969-70); Raymond C. Smail, *Crusading Warfare, 1097-1193* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956).
[26] Ellenblum, 277-87.

be shorn away from their regional context altogether. In fact, Frankish dealings with non-Frankish neighbors are of vital importance. Perhaps counter-intuitively, it is precisely in those dealings that one finds the means of escaping the assumption that the Christian-Muslim divide was the principal determinant of Frankish life in the Kingdom of Jerusalem, and that the nobility's most operational identity was their religious one. In studying Frankish relations with their neighbors, we find strikingly normal and normalized diplomatic and military relations (if words like "normal" can ever be applied to war). Irrespective of religion and ethnicity, the Franks and neighboring powers—Ayyubids, Mamluks, Mongols—shared in a diplomatic discourse. This is not to say Frankish relations with each of these was the same—it most decidedly was not. But they fought or made peace, collaborated or remained neutral, across religious and ethnic boundaries with little substantive difference from how belligerents in western Europe or elsewhere in the Near East did so with those who shared their religion or ethnicity. With this as a central premise of this study, work by Reuven Amitai on Mamluks and Mongols, by Peter Thorau on the sultan Baybars, by Linda Northrup on the sultan Qalawun, as well as by Peter Jackson on Frankish-Mongol relations, are invaluable.[27] So too is Peter Holt's *The Age of the Crusades: The Near East from the Eleventh Century to 1516* which views the Kingdom of Jerusalem in its regional context, rather than as alien and sui generis.[28] Yvonne Friedman's and Michael A. Köhler's work on treaty-making between Franks and

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[27] Reuven Amitai, *Mongols and Mamuks: The Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 1260-1281* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Peter Jackson, *The Mongols and the West, 1221-1410* (Harlow, England: Pearson Longman, 2005); Linda Northrup, *From Slave to Sultan: The Career of al-Mansur Qalawun and the Consolidation of Mamluk Rule in Egypt and Syria* (678-689 A.H./1279-1290 A.D.) (Stuttgart: Verlag, 1998); Peter Thorau, *The Lion of Egypt: Sultan Baybars I and the Near East in the Thirteenth Century*, trans. Peter Holt (London: Longman, 1992).

[28] Peter Holt, *The Age of the Crusades: The Near East from the Eleventh Century to 1517* (New York: Longman, 1986).

Muslim powers in Syria also give important insight into this crucial aspect of life in Frankish Syria, although they focus principally on the period prior to that investigated in here.

While this dissertation's first intervention is a challenge to the current view of Frankish relations with non-Franks, its second intervention is a revision of the standard scholarly positions on the Frankish nobility's relations with non-Syrian Franks—especially, the maritime republics of Italy and the Angevins of Sicily. Michel Balard and David Jacoby have written extensively on the role of Genoese, Pisan, and Venetian merchants in Syria and elsewhere in the Eastern Mediterranean.[29] Indeed, much of what we know about the Latin Kingdom in the thirteenth century—about urban life in particular—we owe to their scholarship. And yet they have tended to overestimate the communes' power vis-à-vis the local nobility and view the latter as merely pawns of the former, a notion that has more or less been absorbed into historiography.[30] Here I argue that, at least until the very end of the 1280s, this characterization does not hold, and the Frankish nobles were as likely to be the ones playing the communes off of each other to

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[29] For example, see: Michel Balard, "I Genovesi in Siria-Palestina (sec XI-XV)," in *Genova: una "porta" del Mediterraneo*, ed. Luciano Gallinari (Genoa: Brigati, 2005); Michel Balard, "Le commerce génois à Alexandrie (XIe-XIVe siècle)," *Alexandrie médiévale* 4 (2011): 125-134; David Jacoby, "Les communes italiennes et les orders militaries à Acre: aspects juridiques, territoriaux et militaries (1191-1291)" In *Etat et colonisation au Moyen Age et à la Renaissance*, ed. M. Balard, (Lyon: La Manufacture, 1989), 193-214; idem "L'expansion occidentale dans le levant: les Vénetians à Acre dans la seconde moitié du treizième siècle," *Journal of Medieval History* 3 (1977): 83-101; "New Venetian evidence on crusader Acre," in *The Experience of Crusading 2: Defining the Crusader Kingdom*, eds. Peter Edbury and Jonathan Philips (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 240-56; David Jacoby, "Le consulat vénetien d'Alexandrie d'après un document inédit de 1284," *Chemins d'outre-mer: études d'histoire sur la Méditerranée médiévale offertes à Michel Balard* 2 (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2004), 461-74.

[30] Jean Richard names two of the chapters "The Kingdom of the Merchants" and "The All-Powerful Communes" in the third part of *The Kingdom of Jerusalem*, trans. Janet Shirley, vol. B (New York: North-Holland, 1979). See 349-371.

aggrandize their own interests as it was to be the other way around.[31] The irony, of course, is that, as described above, the nobles themselves were nevertheless wracked with constant concern that they were losing ground to the merchants—economically, socially, and politically.

Finally, this dissertation offers a new view of the Frankish nobility's attitudes about the Angevin regime in the Kingdom of Jerusalem. As mentioned, Maria of Antioch's sale of the crown of Jerusalem to Charles of Anjou in 1277 complicated significantly the political and diplomatic calculations that had to be made by the Frankish nobility in the late thirteenth century. Thus, examining the Angevin role in Syria is essential to understanding the period c.1240-1291. Foundational works on the Angevins include Emile Leonard's *Les Angevins de Naples* and Peter Herde's *Karl I von Anjou*, although neither studies closely Charles's reign over Jerusalem.[32] Jean Dunbabin's biography on Charles of Anjou is an excellent work, but because its focus is on the man in the context of the rise of royal power and administration in thirteenth century Europe, it also does not explore his impact on Syria in sufficient depth.[33] Moreover, all three of these works maintain that the Kingdom of Jerusalem was actually of little interest to Charles and that he was merely following the path suggested to him by his papal ally, Gregory X (d.1276), who believed the Holy Land's best hope for salvation lay with Charles. Recently this assumption has been revisited, especially by Gian Luca Borghese in his study of Charles, and by Philip Baldwin in his study of Gregory X. Both see

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[31] See especially the discussion of the War of St. Sabas in the section "Civil War" of Chapter 1.
[32] Émile Léonard, *Les Angevins de Naples*, (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1954); Peter Herde, *Karl I. von Anjou*, (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1979).
[33] Jean Dunbabin, *Charles I of Anjou: Power, Kingship and State-Making in Thirteenth Century Europe* (New York: Addison Wesley Longman Ltd., 1998).

Charles as much more active and interested in the Holy Land than previous scholarship.[34] While these reconsiderations are most welcome, they view matters from the vantage point of Naples and Rome rather than Syria; here the matter of Charles and Jerusalem is examined from the viewpoint of the latter. As Borghese and Baldwin do, I believe that Charles took a serious interest in the Kingdom of Jerusalem—and I argue that Frankish attitudes towards him and his regime were far more hostile than scholarship has previously considered.

Sources

There is a broad range of kinds of sources that illuminate the history of the Kingdom of Jerusalem and the world of the Frankish nobility in the years c.1240-1291. Because the archives of the Kingdom of Jerusalem and all the individual lordships except one have been lost, several documentary collections provide the foundation of research on Frankish Syria.[35] These collections include Reinhold Röhricht's *Regesta regni Hierosolymitani 1097-1291* as well as Hans Mayer's recently published corpus of surviving royal charters.[36] Also indispensible is the general cartulary of the Hospitaller Knights of St. John in Jerusalem edited by Joseph Delaville le Roulx between 1894-

[34] Philip Baldwin, *Pope Gregory X and the Crusades* (Woodbridge, Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 2014); Gian Luca Borghese, *Carlo I d'Angiò e il Mediterraneo: poltica, diplomazia e commercio internazionale prima dei Vespri* (Rome: École française de Rome, 2008).
[35] For this lordship see Steven Tibble, *Monarchy and Lordship in the Kingdom of Jerusalem* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), *passim*.
[36] *Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani,* ed. Reinhold Röhricht, 2 vols. (Oeniponti: Libraria Academica Wagneriana, 1893) [hereafter, RRH]. For a new critical edition of Royal Charters, see Hans E. Mayer's *Die Urkunden der lateinischen Könige von Jerusalem*, 4 vols., ed. Hans E. Mayer in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Diplomata regum Latinorum Hierosolymitanorum* (Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 2010).

1904.[37] One can only regret that no comparable Templar archives survive. Also important to any study of the nobility in the Kingdom of Jerusalem are the assizes and law-books pertaining to the High Court, the rights of the crown, matters of fief-holding and inheritance, and military service. These give important insight into how the nobility believed society should be structured. Especially noteworthy are the law-books of two great thirteenth-century jurists, Philip of Novara and John of Ibelin, count of Jaffa.[38]

Extant letters sent from Syria to the West which survive scattered across various document collections also have an important role to play, as they give a keen sense in real time of Frankish attitudes and perceptions about local diplomatic, military, and political developments.[39] The Angevin archives, destroyed by the retreating Nazis in 1943, have been partially reconstructed in *I Registri della cancelleria angioina,* and these constitute

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[37] *Cartulaire général de l'Ordre des Hospitaliers de Saint Jean de Jérusalem, 1100-1310,* ed. Joseph Delaville Le Roulx, 4 vols. (Paris: E. Leroux, 1894-1905) [hereafter, *Cart. Hosp*.]. In fact the entire archive of the Order of St. John up to the eighteenth century survives in Valletta, Malta and in digitized form at St. John's University in Collegeville, Minnesota.

[38] New critical editions have been prepared by Peter Edbury: John of Ibelin, *Le Livre des assises*, ed. and trans., Peter Edbury (Leiden: Brill, 2003) and Philip of Novara, *Le livre de forme de plait*, ed. and trans., Peter Edbury (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Center, 2009).

[39] *Chronicle of Melrose, from the Cottonian Manuscript, Faustina B.IX in the British Museum,* facsimile edition by Alan Orr Anderson and Marjorie Ogilvie Anderson (London: P. Lund, Humphries and Co., 1936), 92; *Diplomatic Documents (Chancery and Exchequer),* ed. Pierre Chaplais, vol. 1., (London: H.M. Stationary Office, 1964), nos. 385 and 386; RRH, nos. 1290, 1325, 1348; *Flores historiarum*, vol. ed. Henry Luard, [Rolls Series 95], (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1895), 451-52; "Lettres inédites concernant les croisades (1275-1307),"ed. Charles Kohler and Charles Langlois, *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes* 52 (1891): 41-63; "Lettre à Charles d'Anjou sur les affaires de Terre Sainte (Acre, 22 avril 1260)" ed. Charles. Langlois, *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes* 78 (1917): 487-90; "Lettre des Chrétiens de Terre-Sainte à Charles d'Anjou," ed. Henri Delaborde, *Revue de l'Orient latin* 2 (1894): 206-15; "Menkonis Chronicon," ed. Ludwig Weiland in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores* 23, ed., Georg Pertz (Hannover, 1874): 547-49; Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora*, vol. 4, ed. Henry Luard, *Rolls Series* (London: Longman, 1872-83), 389-90.

the basis of our knowledge of relations between the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily and the Kingdom of Jerusalem during the Angevin period.[40]

Somewhat marginalized in recent research are the narratives composed either by those living in the Kingdom of Jerusalem or by those who had been there during or shortly after the period under investigation in this dissertation. The abiding interest of scholars in the past few generations has been on the legal-institutional history of the kingdom, and they have built their studies especially on the documentary collections, assizes, and law-books.[41] The narratives have been mined for facts but not much used as windows onto the attitudes, concerns, and values of those who wrote them and the noble audience for whom they were written, as they will be here.

Among these narratives the most essential for this study is the Old French prose chronicle written by the Templar of Tyre, an anonymous inhabitant of the Latin East who was a *valet* in the entourage of Margaret of Antioch-Lusignan, sister of Hugh III of Cyprus and Jerusalem.[42] This alone would position the Templar to be a uniquely valuable source, but he later became the personal secretary of the last grand master of the Temple to serve in the Holy Land, William of Beaujeu. The Templar of Tyre was privy to the political and diplomatic intrigues of this powerful and controversial figure. Thus, the

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[40] *Documents en Français des Archives Angevines de Naples (Règne de Charles Ier),* ed. Alain de Boüard, vol. 1, (Paris: E.de Boccard, 1933); *I registri della cancelleria angioina*, ed. Riccardo Filangieri, 50 vols., (Naples: Accad. Pontaniana, 1957-2010).

[41] Landmark works in this vein include John La Monte's *Feudal Monarchy and the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1100-1291* (Cambridge, MA: Medieval Academy of America, 1932); Jonathan Riley-Smith's *Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1174-1277* (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1973); Joshua Prawer, *Crusader Institutions* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980).

[42] Although known to modern scholars as the Templar of Tyre*,* it is both likely that he was a Cypriot by birth and unlikely that he was actually a Templar himself. See *The "Templar of Tyre": Part III of the "Deeds of the Cypriots,"* ed. and trans. Paul Crawford (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 2.

Templar's connections and responsibilities give us a unique vantage point from which to view the end of the Kingdom of Jerusalem.

Philip of Novara (c.1200-c.1270) is another invaluable source for the thirteenth century.[43] His Old French "memoir" deals with the war between the Ibelins and Frederick II (1228-1243) that played out in Cyprus and Syria, in which Philip himself served on the side of the Ibelins. Chronologically, it is the immediate antecedent to the Templar of Tyre. Philip's depiction of the powerful Ibelin family gives an important glimpse of the political, social, and cultural milieu in Cyprus and Syria. So, too, do the Old French *Rothelin* and *Eracles* continuations of the History of William of Tyre, and the *Life of Saint Louis* written by John of Joinville (c.1224-1317), who came to the East on crusade with Louis IX in 1249-50.[44]

Chapters

This dissertation contains six chapters divided into two parts. Part I is comprised of four chapters structured chronologically, which place into a narrative framework detailed analysis of Frankish diplomacy, politics, and war in the years c.1240-1291. Chapter 1 begins with an overview of the status and role of the monarchy, the High Court, the regency, and the principal lordships of the Kingdom of Jerusalem as they stood in the middle of the thirteenth century. It argues that the nobility actively sought to undermine efforts to promote central authority and promoted disorder for private

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[43] Philip of Novara, *Guerra di Federico II in Oriente (1223-1242)*, ed. and trans. Silvio Melani (Naples: Liguori, 1994).

[44] *L'estoire de Eracles empereur et la conqueste de la terre d'Outremer* in *Recueil des historiens des croisades: historiens occidentaux* 2 (Paris: Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, 1859) 1-481; *Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr de 1229 à 1261, dite du manuscript de Rothelin* in *Recueil des historiens des croisades: historiens occidentaux* 2 (Paris: Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, 1859), 489-639; *Chronicles of the Crusades: Joinville and Villehardouin*, trans. Caroline Smith (New York: Penguin, 2008).

advantage. It also demonstrates that, contrary to the traditional assumption that the nobility was at the mercy of external powers like the merchant communes of the Italian maritime republics during the War of St. Sabas (1256-61), it was actually the nobility who manipulated those rivalries. Chapter 2 focuses on the range of responses by the nobility to the collapse of the Ayyubid regimes in Syria and Egypt and the advent of two new threats in the region, the Mamluks of Egypt and the Ilkhanid Mongols of Iran. It argues that the agency of the Franks to chart their own course and their role in "international relations" during this period have been dramatically underestimated. Chapters 3 argues that the actions of the nobility during struggles over the regency in the 1260s and the crown in the 1270s were primarily motivated by a desire to resist the assertion of any meaningful authority over them as well as a resentment of what they considered meddling by overseas Franks. Chapter 4 analyzes the diplomatic and military actions of the Franks vis-à-vis the Mamluks in the years immediately prior to the fall of the kingdom in 1291 and explores the issue of how the Franks experienced that crisis. Chapters 3 and 4 also analyze the multi-generational civil war between the counts of Tripoli and their chief vassals, the Embriaco lords of Jubail, which became entangled with the Angevin regime and the collapse of the kingdom.

Part II is comprised of two thematic chapters that examine contemporary Old French chronicles written in the Latin East as a window onto the social and cultural preoccupations of the Frankish nobility. Chapter 5 focuses on representations of the ideal Frankish noble in the "memoir" of Philip of Novara and the chronicle of the Templar of Tyre. In the noble self-conception, courtesy, generosity, loyalty, bravery and military prowess marked them out from and made them superior to other Franks, especially

churchmen, women, and merchants. These even more than Muslim military opponents are portrayed in the chronicles as lacking the cardinal virtues, especially martial prowess, of the nobility. Chapter 6 examines the detailed descriptions of ceremony, celebration, and aristocratic play in the chronicle of the Templar of Tyre and argues that these were intended to serve a reparative purpose not only with respect to the loss of Acre, but also the nobility's perceived loss of standing within Frankish society both before the fall of the Kingdom of Jerusalem and in exile on Cyprus.

Part I

Chapter 1

The Permanent Fracturing of the Kingdom

This chapter argues that a handful of powerful nobles who had come to dominate politics in the Kingdom of Jerusalem actively worked to preserve a long-standing vacuum of central authority during the period after the conclusion of the War of the Lombards (1228-42). The prevailing view of the kingdom in this period is that it was at the mercy of powerful merchant communes—especially the Genoese, Pisans, and Venetians—in its cities, and that it was victimized by their rivalries. This chapter demonstrates that, in fact, far from being victims in the War of St. Sabas (1256-61), the Frankish nobles manipulated the Italian rivalries to aggrandize their own interests. However, before examining the political unrest and civil war that wracked the Kingdom of Jerusalem in the middle of the thirteenth century it is first necessary to give an overview of the structures and traditions of government in the kingdom, as well as its key players. Only in this way can the role of the secular nobility in promoting civil disorder be clarified and understood.

Governance

Although Jerusalem was without a duly crowned and recognized monarch for much of the thirteenth-century, the monarchy is the natural place to begin a consideration of Jerusalemite government and politics. In fact, ideas about kingship and the history of the kingdom held by the nobility are inextricably connected to the political strife of the period. The dominant theory of monarchy in Jerusalem in the thirteenth century was

based on the fiction that the crown had been elective from the very outset, with Godfrey of Bouillon having been chosen in 1099 by the other captains of the First Crusade as *Advocatus Sancti Sepulcri*. His successors, Baldwin I (r.1100-18) and Baldwin II (r.1118-31), although they were related to Godfrey by blood, came to the throne by acclaim of the barons of the Jerusalemite High Court rather than through any hereditary right.[1] The ascension of Queen Melisande to the throne in 1131 established a pattern for kinship as a criterion in and of itself for succession. She succeeded Baldwin II, her father, in 1131, and was herself succeeded by Baldwin III, her son with King Fulk, upon Fulk's death in 1143.[2] Baldwin, who died without issue, was succeeded by his brother, Amalric I, who in turn was succeeded by his son, Baldwin IV, the famous Leper King. Dying childless at the age of twenty-four, Baldwin was succeeded by his sister Sibylla's son, Baldwin V, who himself died at the age of nine. This opened up a prolonged series of succession crises that divided the kingdom's nobility for generations. Drawing on the tradition of Godfrey of Bouillon and the First Crusaders, the nobility came to insist that hereditary right alone was insufficient to succeed to the crown or any fief—what was required was hereditary right duly recognized and confirmed by the High Court of Jerusalem.

The High Court was at once a court of justice, a legislative-deliberative body, an advisory council, and—in theory, at least—a political assembly in which all the nobles of the kingdom had standing.[3] In the wake of the destruction of the first kingdom at which time any written assizes were lost, it fell to the nobles of the court to interpret and apply

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[1] Baldwin I was Godfrey's brother and Baldwin II their cousin.
[2] Hans E. Mayer, "Studies in the History of Queen Melisende of Jerusalem," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 26 (1972): 95-182.
[3] John L. La Monte, *Feudal Monarchy and the Kingdom of Jerusalem 1100-1291* (Cambridge, MA.: The Medieval Academy of America, 1932), 88, 91, 98-99, 113-14; Joshua Prawer, *The Crusaders' Kingdom: European colonialism in the Middle Ages* (New York: Praeger, 1972), 95-6.

precedent and custom—in the words of one scholar, "legislation and adjudication were all one."[4] During the periods when Jerusalem lacked a resident king, the power of this body waxed, and what once had been its obligation to advise the crown became, during the course of the thirteenth century, interpreted as a right and, therefore, as a constraint on royal power.[5]

Ironically, it was only in this period, when the High Court was without question the dominant political institution in the kingdom, that a clearly defined theory of the crown's heritability came to be accepted among the kingdom's nobility. However, this theory was set down along lines that clearly favored the nobility's own interests and flattered their collective vanity as an exclusive and coherent group. According to this theory, to succeed to the throne, one had to be the nearest blood relation (*plus dreit heir*) of the previous monarch, had to be bodily present in the Levant, and also had to be fully capable of performing his or her feudal duties. In fact, these were the very same requirements for the inheritance of *any* fief in the kingdom, no matter how great or small, and insisting on them in the case of the crown flattered the nobility's sense of themselves as peers and the king as merely *primus inter pares*, just as did the legend of Godfrey and the First Crusaders.[6]

Instead of hereditary monarchs who were of age, resident in the East, and capable of carrying out their feudal obligations, Jerusalem was nominally governed from the early 1220s until 1269 by a dizzying procession of *baillies* (regents), though in fact, authority devolved more or less completely to a small group of wealthy, aggressive and shrewd

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[4] La Monte, 98-99.
[5] La Monte, 113-14.
[6] La Monte, 87-90, 102-3; Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1174-1277* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1973), 14.

nobles, who dominated the High Court and whose responsibility it was to elect those *baillies*.[7] The sources enumerate at least six different kinds of *bailli*, though for our purposes it is only necessary to introduce three of them. The first—henceforth designated a *royal regent* or simply a *regent*—was the man or woman who was the closest living blood relation (*plus dreit heir aparent*) of an uncrowned monarch (either a minor or not resident in the East).[8] A royal regent, like a monarch, had to be confirmed by the High Court.

Another kind of *bailli* with which we are concerned was an individual chosen by the High Court from among the barons of the king of Jerusalem to be the head of government during a period in which there was no claimant to the throne or the royal regency in the East who was of age. A figure ruling in this capacity will be designated a *vassal regent*. There could only be a vassal regent when a hereditary monarch or royal regent had died and the High Court had not yet confirmed a new monarch or royal regent. During the power struggles of the 1250s, the Ibelin cousins John of Arsur and John of Jaffa several times traded places as vassal regent of the kingdom. I will follow convention in clarifying the final kind of *bailli* to be discussed here as a *lieutenant*. This was, as the name implies, merely a "place holder" for a monarch or a regent who was out of the kingdom temporarily. The lieutenant did not have to be confirmed by the High Court, nor were blood-ties considered in any way necessary in order to be placed in this office.

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[7] La Monte, 91.
[8] As laid out in detail by Jonathan Riley-Smith, the term *bailli* has several different meanings in our sources from the Latin East, and what follows is a simplification of his own taxonomy.

In the thirteenth century royal claims, the court, and the major lordships of the Kingdom of Jerusalem were dominated by just a few lineages.[9] The leading family in both Cyprus and Jerusalem in this period was the Ibelins, who had first risen to prominence in the mid-twelfth century. They had built their fortunes through their possession of the lordship from which they took their name and a knack for making favorable marriage alliances. While they never became kings, they could be found as regents in both Cyprus and Jerusalem, and several of the wealthy and important lordships in both places belonged to them. The Ibelins were major supporters of the Lusignan dynasty, a Poitevin line which enjoyed uninterrupted rule in Cyprus from late in the twelfth century, when they were set up there by Richard I of England during the course of his crusade to the East, until the fifteenth century. They were also kings of Jerusalem from 1269.[10]

Another major lineage in the Kingdom of Jerusalem in the thirteenth century was the Montforts. In contrast to the Ibelins, whose obscurity in Europe is underscored by the fact that they took their family name from a lordship in the East, and the Lusignans, who were a family of middling importance, the Montforts belonged to the first rank of European nobility. They also possessed a proud and extensive crusading legacy, and came to play a key role in the kingdom of Jerusalem in the thirteenth century, especially in the person of Philip of Montfort (d.1270), lord of Toron and Tyre. Philip's uncle Simon was lord of Montfort-l'Amaury, near Paris, and the fifth Earl of Leicester.[11] He

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[9] Joshua Prawer, *Crusader Institutions* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 48-50. The Embriacos, the Greniers, and the Montbéliards also remained significant lineages.
[10] "Annales de Terre sainte," ed. Reinhold Röhricht, *Archives de l'Orient latin* 2 (1884): 434 [hereafter ATS]; Peter Edbury, *Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades, 1191-1374* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 39-41.
[11] John R. Maddicott, *Simon de Montfort* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 1.

was a leader of the Albigensian Crusade in Languedoc and oversaw the siege of the Cathar stronghold at Béziers in July of 1209, winning important victories in 1211 over Count Raymond of Toulouse and in 1213 over King Peter of Aragon.[12]

Simon participated in the Fourth Crusade and, along with his brother Guy (who had been on the Third Crusade, as well), was one of the few crusaders to actually reach the Holy Land rather than change course for Constantinople.[13] In Syria, Guy married Helvis of Ibelin in 1204, and she gave birth to Philip and two daughters.[14] Helvis's immediate family members were quite prominent, particularly her brother John of Ibelin, the so-called "Old Lord" of Beirut, who was elected mayor of the newly formed Commune of Acre in 1232 and, until his death in 1236, was the leader of baronial resistance against Frederick II of Hohenstaufen. Helvis died a few years after Philip's birth, and Guy returned to France with his children.[15]

Raised in Europe, Philip married there, but after his own wife died he joined the crusade of Theobald IV of Navarre and Champagne, departing for Syria in 1239, where he married Maria of Armenia, heiress to Toron.[16] Another of Philip's first cousins, the son of his mother's other brother (also named Philip), was John of Ibelin, count of Jaffa. He was a major force in the political and military life of the Latin East from the 1240s

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[12] Maddicott, 1-8.
[13] Peter Edbury, "The de Montforts in the Latin East," in *Thirteenth Century England, 1999, VIII: Proceedings of the Durham Conference*, eds. Michael Prestwich, Richard H. Britnell and Robin Frame (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell, 2001), 23; Maddicott, 2; Hans E. Mayer, "Ibelin versus Ibelin: The Struggle for the Regency of Jerusalem 1253-1258,"*Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 122 (1978): 29.
[14] Edbury "De Montforts," 23-31.
[15] The exact date is not known, but the Chronicle of Amadi says when Philip was five or six years old, Francesco Amadi, *Chroniques de Chypre d'Amadi et de Strambaldi*, ed. René de Mas-Latrie, vol. 1 (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1891-93), 186-87; Edbury, "De Montforts," 23.
[16] Amadi, 184; ATS, 440; *L'estoire de Eracles empereur et la conqueste de la terre d'Outremer,* in *Recueil des historiens des croisades: historiens occidentaux* 2 (Paris: Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, 1859), 413 [hereafter *Eracles*]; Edbury, "De Montforts," 23; Maddicott, 30.

until his death in 1266. He was born in 1214 or 1215, the only son of Philip of Ibelin (brother of the Old Lord of Beirut) and Alice of Montbéliard, and was related to both the ruling families of Cyprus and Jerusalem. [17]

The House of Antioch, too, was a venerable line, established with Bohemond of Taranto's conquest of that principality in 1098 during the course of the first crusade. The County of Tripoli also came into the family's hands in the late twelfth century. They ruled Antioch until its loss to the Mamluks in 1268 and Tripoli until its loss in 1289. They extended their influence throughout the region through extensive intermarriage with other prominent families, including the Lusignans and the Rupenid and Hetumid dynasties of the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia.

While the Brienne family's influence in the East was already on the wane by the second half of the thirteenth century, they figured prominently in a dispute over the Jerusalemite regency in the 1260s when the High Court was forced to rule on the competing claims of Hugh of Brienne and his cousin Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan. Hugh of Brienne's father, Walter IV, had been Count of Jaffa-Ascalon until his murder in 1244, and his uncle, John of Brienne, had been king-consort of Jerusalem until his wife Maria's death in 1212, regent for his daughter Isabella II thereafter, as well as regent of the Latin Empire of Constantinople from 1228 until his death in 1239.

Fiefs, Fortifications, and Military Forces

By mid-century only a few lordships huddling against the Mediterranean coast remained in Frankish hands. Although few in number, they were of the utmost

[17] *Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani* and *Additamentum,* ed. Reinhold Röhricht, 2 vols (Oeniponti: Libraria Academica Wageriana, 1893; 1904), no. 1149 [hereafter RRH]; Peter Edbury, *John of Ibelin and the Kingdom of Jerusalem* (Woodbridge, Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 1997), 65-66; Mayer "Ibelin versus Ibelin," 30.

importance both for the revenue which was generated by the trade flowing through their ports and because they were potential places of disembarkation for military reinforcements from the West. When Ascalon was lost in 1247, the County of Jaffa became the Kingdom of Jerusalem's bulwark against Egypt. John of Ibelin, a nephew of the Old Lord of Beirut, was installed as count in 1246 or 1247 by Henry I of Cyprus, regent of Jerusalem, and upgraded the defenses of the eponymous port city, which had suffered badly in the Khwarazmian raids of the 1240s. Louis IX stayed there for a year during his time in the Holy Land and contributed significant resources to rebuilding its defenses.[18]

North of Jaffa along the coast was Caesarea. As he did at Acre, Jaffa, and Sidon, Louis IX spent a year at Caesarea and helped to finance the reconstruction of the city's walls.[19] Within the lordship there were several significant castles, most notably Athlit, which belonged to the Templars, and Caco and Tour Rouge, which belonged to the Hospitallers.[20] Although the lordship technically remained in secular hands until its fall to Baybars in 1265, the financial difficulties of its lords still necessitated the sale or lease of significant property and land in the lordship to the military orders.[21] In 1248 the Hospitallers leased several properties for an annual rent of 800 saracen bezants, to be

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[18] For a detailed discussion of John's acquisition of the county, its relationship to neighboring Ascalon, and the papal involvement, see Edbury, *John of Ibelin and the Kingdom of Jerusalem*, 78-84. For military importance of Jaffa see Christopher Marshall, *Warfare in the Latin East, 1192-1291* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 24.

[19] Steven Tibble, *Monarchy and Lordships in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1099-1291* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 99-152; *Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr, de 1229 à 1261, dite du manuscript de Rothelin* in *Recueil des historiens des croisades: historiens occidentaux 2* (Paris: Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, 1844-95), 628 [hereafter, *Rothelin*]; *Joinville and Villehardouin: Chronicles of the Crusades*, ed. and trans. Caroline Smith (New York: Penguin Classics, 2008), 257-58, 283 [hereafter, Joinville].

[20] Meron Benvenisti, *The Crusaders in the Holy Land* (New York: MacMillan, 1972), 26-27; Tibble, 101, 147-150.

[21] E.g.: RRH, nos. 283, 1210, 1234.

renewed every twenty-five years.[22] The southern part of the lordship of Caesarea came into Templar hands by 1255.[23]

North of Caesarea and also on the coast lay the small lordship of Arsur. It had, been in Ibelin hands since John, Old Lord of Beirut, had married Melisende of Arsur in 1207. Upon his death in 1236, the Old Lord left the lordship to his son and namesake, who upgraded the walls of its port in 1240 or 1241 but was forced by the expenses of upkeep to lease significant properties to the Hospitallers in 1241.[24] These alienations notwithstanding, Arsur remained principally in the hands of the Ibelins and passed to John of Arsur's son, Balian, upon the former's death in 1260. However, with expenses rising, Balian was forced to continue to sell off properties and Arsur came entirely under Hospitaller control between 1261 and 1263.[25] The military order spent significant resources to upgrade its fortifications but to little avail; the citadel was besieged and destroyed by the Mamluks in 1265.[26]

Although Tiberias, the administrative seat of the Principality of Galilee, was lost permanently in 1247, the Franks nevertheless retained an important presence in the region, including the great castle of Safad. Built by the Templars in the second half of the twelfth century, it had been destroyed by Saladin, but following the return by treaty of significant territory in Galilee to the Franks in 1240, the Templars began to rebuild the castle at great cost.[27] Also in the region, Mount Tabor was granted to the Hospitallers in

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[22] Tibble, 131.
[23] Malcolm Barber, *The New Knighthood: A History of the Order of the Temple* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 161-64.
[24] Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, 30; Tibble, 180
[25] Benvenisti, 130-35; Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Knights Hospitaller in the Levant, c.1070-1309* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 208; Tibble, 181.
[26] Riley-Smith, *Knights Hospitaller*, 208.
[27] Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, 28.

1255 by Pope Alexander IV.[28] In the upper Galilee lay Montfort castle, which had been built by the Teutonic Knights in the late 1220s and remained their headquarters in the Latin East until its fall in 1271.[29] There were two lesser lordships, Haifa and Scandelion, in the vicinity, but these were rear-fiefs of the royal demesne at Acre and its lords were not tenants-in-chief like the princes of Galilee. [30]

To the north of Galilee lay the port city of Tyre and its hinterlands, which were traditionally part of the royal demesne. According to Marsiglio Zorzi, in 1243 one third of the city belonged to the Venetians, while the remainder was technically part of the royal demesne, although in fact it was in the hands of Philip of Montfort.[31] In 1246 Henry I (the Fat) of Cyprus came into the regency of Jerusalem and confirmed Philip's claim on Tyre.[32] Although Philip's rights over Tyre were not yet unassailable because a regent technically could not alienate any part of the royal demesne, his hand there had been strengthened significantly, and it was not long before he secured the lordship to himself officially through the grace of King Hugh III, whom Philip helped to set on the Jerusalemite throne in 1269.[33] The small lordship of Toron, which had come to the Montforts by marriage, was located inland from Tyre. It is unclear whether it was part of

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[28] Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, 30; idem, *Knights Hospitaller*, 91; Tibble, 65, 164.
[29] Nicholas Edward Morton, *The Teutonic Knights in the Holy Land 1190-1291* (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell Press, 2009), 154-58, 169-84.
[30] Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, 30; Tibble, 52, 69-70, 74, 89.
[31] Benvenisti, 223.
[32] Jonathan Riley-Smith and Peter Edbury have argued that he must surely have enjoyed the support of Philip of Montfort and the Ibelins: that he made Balian his lieutenant in Jerusalem and gave John of Ibelin the county of Jaffa suggest rewards for their support.
[33] *Templare di Tiro. Cronaca del Templare di Tiro: 1243-1314: la caduta degli stati crociati nel racconto di un testimone ocular*, trans. Laura Minervini (Napoli: Liguori, 2000), 128-29; *The "Templar of Tyre": Part III of the "Deeds of the Cypriots,"* ed. and trans. Paul Crawford (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 61-62; Jean Richard, *The Crusades, c.1271-1291*, trans. Jean Birrell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 447; Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility,* 224.

the lordship of Beirut or part of an independent or semi-dependent lordship of Toron Ahmud.[34]

Sidon was one of the wealthiest and most intact lordships in the entire kingdom of Jerusalem by the middle of the thirteenth century. Although the city had been sacked in 1249, Louis IX devoted significant resources to restoring it, paying for the reconstruction of its twin castles, the so-called "land castle" and "sea castle." However, Julian Grenier, lord of Sidon began selling parts of his lordship off piecemeal to the military orders in the early 1250s, including the sale of one of his estates in the Principality of Galilee to the Hospitallers for 24,000 bezants in 1254 and more lands to the Teutonic knights just two years later.[35] He sold Beaufort, a castle situated above the Litani river and overlooking the Biqa' valley, as well as the city of Sidon itself, to the Templars in 1260.[36]

The northernmost lordship in the kingdom of Jerusalem proper, Beirut was another possession of the Ibelins.[37] Territorially small, Beirut was relatively wealthy due to the commerce of its port, although the Old Lord had claimed during his struggles with the Hohenstaufen in the early 1230s that its revenues were insufficient to pay for its own defense and that he had been forced to rely on resources from his other fiefs in Syria and Cyprus to make it secure.[38] It remained more or less in Ibelin hands until the fall of Acre in 1291, with some alienation of lands to the Teutonic Knights.[39] Located in the hinterland on the border between the kingdom proper and the county of Tripoli, the

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[34] Tibble, 60-63.
[35] *Hosp. Cart.,* no. 2688; RRH, no. 1217; Tibble, 173.
[36] Barber, 168; Benvenisti, 15; Hugh Kennedy, *Crusader Castles* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 121-29; Tibble, 169, 172-73.
[37] Kennedy, 120.
[38] Tibble, 78.
[39] Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, 30; Tibble, 26-27.

lordship of the Schuf may originally have been semi-dependent of Beirut.[40] It came into the hands of the Lords of Sidon, though was technically not part of that lordship. It was sold by Julian of Sidon to the Teutonic knights in January of 1256 and lost to the Mamluks in 1261.[41] Its most significant fortification was the Cave de Tyron.[42]

To the north of the kingdom proper, the County of Tripoli came into the hands of the house of Antioch in the late twelfth century and it remained there until its fall to the Mamluks in 1289. Its most significant fortifications were the castles of Tortosa and Gibelcar—which belonged to the Templars—and Crac des Chevaliers—which belonged to the Hospitallers.[43] One of the Latin East's most venerable lineages, the Embriaco, had its seat in the lordship of Jubail. Often at odds with the ruling family of the county in the thirteenth century, the various branches of the Embriaco family would play a significant role in the final decades of the Kingdom of Jerusalem's history. North of Tripoli was the Principality of Antioch. Besides the city of Antioch itself, which remained in the hands of its princes until the Mamluks captured it in 1268, there were several formidable Frankish strongholds in the principality's hinterland that were controlled by the military orders. Two of the most important were Hospitaller Margat, located in the south of the principality, and Templar Gastun, located inland in the Amanus Mountains.[44]

These were all of the lordships remaining to the Franks by the middle of the thirteenth century—save one. Also in Frankish hands was the lordship of Acre, lying on the coast to the west of Galilee and to the south of Tyre. With its double harbor and a

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[40] Tibble, 27-28, 53.
[41] Tibble, 54.
[42] Kennedy, 54; Tibble, 54-55.
[43] Kennedy, 67, 132; David Nicolle, *Crusader Castles in the Holy Land*, 1192-1302 (Oxford: Osprey, 2005), 74, 80; Nicolle, 80; Riley-Smith, *Knights Hospitaller*, 210-11.
[44] Kennedy, 84, 142-44; Nicolle, 77.

double curtain wall the city of Acre, which was part of the royal demesne, was one of the great ports of the medieval Mediterranean as well as the commercial heart and de facto capital of the thirteenth-century kingdom of Jerusalem.[45] The Genoese, the Venetians, the Pisans, the Hospitallers, the Templars, and the Teutonic Knights all had their own quarters in the city. The Genoese had helped capture Acre for the Franks in the early twelfth century, and they were the first Italians established there (1104). Their quarter was completely surrounded by walls and towers with heavily fortified gates. Full of narrow lanes crowded by houses, the Genoese quarter may have been essentially coterminous with the Arab neighborhood of the city before the Frankish conquest in the early twelfth century. At its heart lay the main square (*Platea*) around which all the public buildings were constructed. On the north stood the church of St. Lawrence, Patron of the City of Genoa. On the east was the Old Tower (*Turris Vetus*) of the quarter and at the corners of the square stood several palaces. Genoese documents refer to the Old Palace, where the law court of the commune met, as being in this vicinity.[46] The Genoese quarter was bounded by the Templar quarter to the west, the Pisan quarter to the south, and the Hospitaller quarter to the north.

The Venetian quarter, initially settled in 1110, was enlarged in 1124. It was located near the shore of the outer harbor, although the Venetians did not own the frontage, and were separated from the water by the Street of the Chain. The quarter was entirely enclosed and self-contained by the mid-thirteenth century. Its principal market was in the center of the quarter, while the Church of St. Mark and the Palace of the Commune lay in the northeast. The Pisan quarter, the smallest of the Italian quarters and

[45] Jerusalem remained in Muslim hands for all but a brief period, from 1229 to 1244.
[46] Benvenisti, 100-2.

the last to be established, was in the west of the city. It was bounded on the west by the Templar quarter, on the north by the Genoese, and on the east by the harbor. To the northeast of the Venetian quarter was located the Provençal Quarter. All the major merchant communities owned property outside their own quarters.[47]

Other significant structures in the city were the royal palace, a large Hospitaller compound known as the *Auberge* on the city's northern wall, and a huge Templar palace in the city's southwest, abutting the sea. Another important feature of Acre's layout was Montmusard, a suburb adjoining the main city on the north that had been constructed in the early thirteenth century. The merchant communes and the military orders held possessions in Montmusard, which seems to have been sparsely populated and at least partly used for animal pasturage.

Civil War

Having gained a sense of the institutional and geographic contours of the kingdom we may now examine how the political strife of the thirteenth century played out within that matrix. The 1230s and 1240s witnessed a prolonged civil war in the Kingdoms of Cyprus and Jerusalem between partisans of Emperor Frederick II, who was king of Jerusalem by virtue of his marriage to Queen Isabella II (Yolande), and the most powerful baronial family in the East, the Ibelins. In 1241 one of the leaders of the Barons' Crusade, Richard of Cornwall, helped broker a truce between the imperial and baronial factions, and it was suggested that Simon of Montfort, also a leader of the

[47] Benvenisti, 98-99, 102-12, 229-30.

crusade, be appointed as Frederick II's new lieutenant in the East.[48] Simon of Montfort—the sixth Earl of Leicester, son of the notorious leader of the crusade in Languedoc against the Albigensians, and Philip of Montfort's first cousin—had married Henry III of England's sister, Eleanor, in 1238.[49] Henry's other sister, Isabella, had married Frederick II in 1235, so Simon was a brother-in-law not only of the English king but also of the German emperor and regent of Jerusalem.[50] The logic behind the proposal was that Simon would be palatable to both sides. Not coincidentally, Richard was himself related to both Simon and Frederick by marriage.[51] The Syrian barons agreed to the proposal, and Philip of Montfort joined Balian of Sidon and John of Arsur as signatories to a petition seeking the installation of Simon in the land's highest non-heritable office.[52]

Frederick, however, appears never to have responded to their petition, and the imperial lieutenancy at Tyre remained in the hands of Richard Filangieri. Frederick's tenure as regent for his son Conrad, royal heir through his deceased mother, Isabella II (Yolande), would lapse when Conrad turned fifteen. David Jacoby has argued convincingly that, in fact, Conrad announced that he had reached the age of majority at the beginning of his fifteenth year (that is, in the spring of 1243), rather than at the conclusion, following the usages of Sicily, where he had been born, rather than Jerusalem.[53] This was done with the blessing—or even at the behest of—Frederick who

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[48] There were actually several separate and not necessarily cooperative contingents usually grouped together in historiography as the Barons' Crusade. See Michael Lower, *The Barons' Crusade: A Call to Arms and its Consequences* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005).
[49] Maddicott, 21.
[50] Maddicott, 19.
[51] Frederick II was also related by marriage to Richard of Cornwall.
[52] RRH, no. 1099.
[53] David Jacoby, "The Kingdom of Jerusalem and the Collapse of Hohenstaufen Power in the Levant," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 40 (1986): 83-84 for Conrad's majority.

hoped thereby to reestablish Hohenstaufen authority on a new and firmer basis than that of his own unpopular regency. But he had miscalculated: the barons themselves were only too happy to accept Conrad's announcement, arguing that they need not recognize Filangieri, nor anyone serving in Conrad's name until the latter came to the East to be formerly recognized by the High Court—this, at least, even Frederick had done.[54] They went even further, declaring that all acts that had been carried out in Frederick's name under Filangieri were now void.

We have a detailed although highly partisan account of what transpired next from Philip of Novara, a knight in the service of the Ibelin family who had been closely involved with their rebellion against the Hohenstaufen and later wrote down a sort of "memoir" about events. He claims that at this juncture he himself suggested that the Ibelins invite Alice of Cyprus, formerly the queen-consort of Cyprus through her marriage to Hugh I Lusignan (d.1218) and a daughter of Isabella I of Jerusalem, to take over the regency of the kingdom of Jerusalem for Conrad, as she was his nearest living relative in the East (*plus dreit heir*). By his own account he then engaged in a brief period of vigorous shuttle diplomacy between Cyprus and the mainland, first presenting the offer to Alice and her husband, Ralph of Soissons.[55] He claims that he then helped to conclude in secret an arrangement between them and the Ibelin party by which Balian and Philip of Montfort would be put in custody of the royal fortresses of Jerusalem—including Tyre—until such time as Conrad should come East, even though by custom and law these should belong to the regent.

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[54] Jacoby, "Collapse of Hohenstaufen Power," 90.
[55] She had been married to and divorced from Bohemond V, Prince of Antioch and Count of Tripoli, between Hugh I's death and her marriage to Ralph in 1241.

On June 5, 1243 Balian of Sidon and Philip of Montfort gathered the nobles of Acre, along with Venetian, Genoese, and Templar representatives, and led them in doing homage to Alice and her husband, Ralph of Soissons. Soon after, Ralph joined Balian and Philip in their assault on Tyre, which Filangieri held for the Hohenstaufen. On July 10, after a siege of twenty-eight days, the defenders submitted in exchange for a promise of safe-conduct and the release of Richard Filangieri and his men. Filangieri turned Tyre over to Balian of Ibelin and Philip of Montfort, who now refused to put it into the hands of Alice of Cyprus and her husband, claiming that because the city was part of the royal demesne, it would be their duty to hold it for Conrad. [56] They argued (incredibly) that they could not risk any infringement on his royal prerogative, even by the regent, in spite of the fact that, legally, the regent had every right to all royal possessions.[57] The *Eracles* account of events claims it was this that precipitated Ralph of Soisson's departure from the East.[58] Unsurprisingly, Philip of Novara makes no mention of any resentment; he presents Alice and Ralph as only too happy to accept the barons' stipulation that Balian and Philip would hold Tyre once it was captured and is reticent about their feelings after the fact. Philip also fails to mention the prior selection and quick ouster of Odo of Montbéliard from the regency prior to the barons' petitioning Alice. Odo had proved less pliant to the Ibelins' wishes than they had hoped by temporizing about the move against

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[56] Philip of Novara, *Guerra di Federico II in Oriente (1223-1242)*, ed. and trans. Silvio Melani (Naples: Liguori, 1994), 230-35; *The Wars of Frederick II against the Ibelins in Cyprus and Syria*, ed. and trans. John L. La Monte (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936), 174-80. They equivocated and then outright denied Venetian claims and rights in the city, which the Venetian *bailo*, Marsilio Zorzi, claims he had made the condition of his assistance in the campaign against Tyre. Apparently, concern among the baronial elite over preserving their reputation and honor did not extend to dealing with merchants: Jacoby, "Hohenstaufen," 91.
[57] Riley-Smith talks about this as accepted practice*, Feudal Nobility*, 193, 212.
[58] ATS, 441; Janet Shirley, *Crusader Syria in the Thirteenth Century: The Rothelin Continuation of the History of William of Tyre with part of the Eracles or Acre text* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 127-30.

Tyre and counseling negotiation with the Hohenstaufen representatives in the East. Only then did the barons settle on Alice of Cyprus, whom they did not appeal to in the first instance for the very reason that once in the regency she would demand possession of Tyre, to which she had every right.[59] Either the Ibelins and Philip of Montfort explicitly went back on a promise to Alice and her husband or simply allowed them to assume erroneously that they would have Tyre and its revenues along with the regency, all the while never intending to hand the city over once Frederick II's agents had been driven out. Although the regency was by no means a hollow reward, Alice surely would have been less amenable had she known she would be deprived of Tyre, the royal demesne's richest prize.

The Ibelin party's maneuvers seem even more cynical in light of the fact that Philip managed to establish himself and his family in exclusive control of the lordship of Tyre just a few short years later. When Alice died in 1246, her son, Henry I (the Fat) of Cyprus, who was *not* Conrad's closest living heir in the East, had no right to the regency of Jerusalem, which was not supposed to be heritable.[60] Yet Henry succeeded in securing the regency to himself in spite of the fact that he had an older sister and a female cousin each with a better claim than his. Jonathan Riley-Smith and Peter Edbury have argued that he must surely have enjoyed the support of Philip of Montfort and the Ibelins: that he made Balian his lieutenant in Jerusalem, confirmed Philip's rights over Tyre, and gave John of Ibelin Jaffa suggest rewards for their support. Philip's rights over Tyre were not

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[59] See the account of the Venetian *baillie* at Acre, Marsilio Zorzi, who claims he was one who had come to Philip of Montfort to warn that Richard Filangieri was trying to take over Acre: Gottlieb Tafel and Georg Thomas, *Urkunden zur ilteren Han-dels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig*, vol. 2 (Vienna, Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1856-57), 354-57 and translation in La Monte, *Wars*, 205-7.

[60] Peter Edbury, "The Disputed Regency of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1264/6 and 1268," *Camden Miscellany* 27 (1979): 17.

yet unassailable because, technically, a regent could not alienate any part of the royal demesne. However, his hand there had been strengthened significantly, and it was not long before he secured the lordship to himself officially through the grace of King Hugh III whom Philip helped to set on the Jerusalemite throne in 1269.[61] Hugh officially granted Philip the lordship of Tyre and offered his sister, Margaret Antioch-Lusignan, in marriage to Philip's eldest son, John.

Meanwhile, in 1247 John of Arsur replaced Balian of Ibelin as lieutenant at Acre for Henry, who remained in Cyprus, but stepped down in 1249 (for an otherwise obscure knight, John of Foignon, apparently at Philip of Montfort's urging) at the beginning of Louis IX's crusade. John of Arsur was certainly lieutenant again by 1251 when he attempted to introduce a major piece of reform in the High Court. This was the implementation of a written record of the court's proceedings, intended to replace its system of custom, precedent, and unwritten memory of which the barons were the highly-trained custodians and which they had made it a habit to manipulate to their own advantage and the disadvantage of the crown.[62]

Henry remained royal regent until his death in 1253, which initiated five years during which the Kingdom of Jerusalem lacked a royal regent duly recognized and was governed by vassal regents chosen by the High Court from among the barons. When Henry I died in 1253 and left behind an infant son, Hugh II, in Cyprus, the High Court of Jerusalem chose John of Arsur to become Hugh's vassal regent. This title was to be handed back and forth between the lord of Arsur and his cousin, the count of Jaffa, with

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[61] Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, 224.
[62] Mayer, "Ibelin *versus* Ibelin," 33-34.

dizzying speed in the following years, a topic that Hans Mayer has examined closely.[63] It was clear that the two were becoming political adversaries. Their rivalry was fueled not only by the personal ambition that was a hallmark of the upper nobility, but also because they appear to have had some profoundly different ideas about how to govern the kingdom. This is most clearly evident in their disagreement over the lord of Arsur's proposed reform to procedure in the High Court, and its implications for baronial control over the kingdom.[64]

Although John of Arsur's reform efforts had failed (principally because they were blocked by John of Jaffa and Philip of Montfort, tireless stewards of the barons' interests), the barons nevertheless elevated him to vassal regent, demonstrating that despite his politics (or perhaps even because of them) his leadership was respected. Mayer argues that the barons accepted him because he 1) had experience in the job; 2) had demonstrated that regardless of his personal inclinations, he would submit to their pressure if his views were unpopular; 3) may have had the support of Louis IX, who had knighted his son (and Joinville also speaks favorably of him); and 4) may also have had the support of the Church, which tended to prefer a strong central government in Syria.[65]

With all that said, John of Arsur was replaced as vassal regent by John of Jaffa in 1255. The reasons for this are not entirely clear, but Mayer has posited that, although they did not mind John of Arsur, the barons certainly *preferred* John of Jaffa. The latter was known by all as a staunch champion of noble prerogative, but the lord of Arsur had been the candidate of Louis IX, whose will was simply irresistible—at least while he was

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[63] Mayer, "Ibelin *versus* Ibelin," 25-57.
[64] Mayer, "Ibelin *versus* Ibelin," *passim*.
[65] Mayer, "Ibelin *versus* Ibelin," 37-38.

in the East.[66] And yet in a development so typical of the Frankish barons' enthusiasm for the game of politics, the very next year John of Jaffa was out as vassal regent and John of Arsur was in again![67] As Mayer has pointed out, the former likely had to give up the post because he was preoccupied in Jaffa fighting the Muslims and attempting to recapture Ascalon and that perhaps John of Arsur had made being reinstalled as vassal-regent a condition of his joining the war effort down south.[68]

It must be recalled that during these exchanges of the vassal regency, Hugh II, a minor, was in Cyprus. If he ever came to the kingdom of Jerusalem, it could be argued that *he* should be named royal regent for Conradin, with his mother, Plaisance of Antioch, as his warden. This, of course, would negate any need for a vassal regent. Despite there being no precedent for installing a minor in the regency, Plaisance and her brother, Bohemond VI of Antioch, looked to hedge their bets. In 1254 when John of Arsur was installed as vassal regent for the first time, his son Balian married Plaisance of Antioch, mother of Hugh II. This was certainly a political marriage, and Plaisance and her brother saw connecting themselves to the Ibelins of Arsur as a step towards securing their own grasp on the Kingdom of Jerusalem.[69] Yet the following year when the High Court ousted John of Arsur and installed John of Jaffa in the vassal regency the Antiochenes could not help but fear they had backed the wrong horse, and they began proceedings to secure a papal annulment of the marriage between Plaisance and Balian.[70]

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[66] Mayer, "Ibelin *versus* Ibelin," 37-38.
[67] *Eracles*, 442; RRH, no.1250.
[68] John of Jaffa was out as regent and John of Arsur was back in when the former is down south defending his county: ATS, 446; *Eracles*, 442; Mayer, "Ibelin versus Ibelin," 45.
[69] Mayer, "Ibelin vs. Ibelin," 47.
[70] Amadi, 203; ATS, 446, *Eracles*, 441.

Naturally, this poisoned the relationship between the Ibelins of Arsur and the Antiochenes.[71]

After John of Arsur was returned to the vassal regency in 1256, John of Jaffa was prepared to support Plaisance and Hugh II's coming to Syria, allowing Hugh II to become royal regent as a minor, and for Plaisance to be his warden. Because this would negate the need for a vassal regent, the count of Jaffa's act must be understood as an act of political desperation: he hoped to counter his ouster from office by rendering it obsolete and then aligning himself with Plaisance, Bohemond, and Hugh.

Plaisance and her son arrived at Acre on February 1, 1258.[72] Despite the lack of precedent and previous lack of certainty either on the part of the Antiochene party or the rival Ibelin cousins, the High Court did ultimately award the royal regency to Hugh with his mother as warden, which she remained until her death in 1261. But, John of Jaffa's gambit had failed, for John of Arsur had successfully reconciled with the Antiochenes: the lord of Arsur and his son Balian agreed to the dissolution of Balian's marriage to Plaisance, and John of Arsur was installed as Hugh and Plaisance's lieutenant in the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Bohemond even paid for 800 mercenaries to be put at John's disposal at Acre.[73] He acted as Hugh II's lieutenant until John died in 1259, at which time Geoffrey of Sergines was chosen as Hugh's lieutenant. Hugh's aunt Isabella came from Cyprus in 1263 to claim the warden regency, but because she had not brought Hugh II

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[71] Edbury raises the possibility the marriage collapsed for personal, rather than political reasons: see *John of Ibelin and the Kingdom of Jerusalem*, 90.
[72] Amadi, 205; ATS, 448; *Eracles*, 443.
[73] Edbury *John of Ibelin and the Kingdom of Jerusalem*, 89; Mayer, "Ibelin versus Ibelin," 50-55; Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, 216-17. Marino Sanudo Torsello, *The Book of the Secrets of the Faithful of the Cross*, ed. and trans. Peter Lock (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011), 349 [hereafter MST].

with her, the barons refused to do homage to her. In any case, she died the following year. [74]

In the midst of these convoluted political maneuverings, and quickly becoming deeply entwined with them, a brutal war broke out among the Italian merchant communes located in Acre. During the course of the so-called War of St. Sabas, which raged in Acre and along the coast of Syria between 1256 and 1261, the Genoese were supported by the Anconitans, the Hospitallers, and the lords of Jubail and Tyre. The Venetians counted among their allies the Provençals, the count of Jaffa (John of Ibelin), the prince of Antioch-Tripoli, the Templars, and the Teutonic knights.[75] The Pisans were an opportunistic and decisive faction in the conflict, initially siding with their traditional rivals, the Genoese, before eventually shifting their support to the Venetians. John of Ibelin, lord of Arsur, backed the Genoese at first, but when he became the lieutenant for the royal regent, Hugh II of Cyprus, switched his support to the Venetians.[76]

The actual *casus belli* of the War of St. Sabas is the subject of some disagreement, but there can be no doubt that hostilities were fueled by increasing competition between

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[74] Hans Mayer has argued convincingly that John of Jaffa tried to counter this latest development by initiating an affair with Plaisance. Several papal letters seem to reference the princess of Antioch's sinful behavior, pointing to the likelihood that John of Jaffa and Plaisance carried on an affair until her death. In this way, the count of Jaffa may have been able to undercut somewhat the official authority of John of Arsur until the latter's death in 1258, as well as that of Geoffrey of Sergines, who followed him in the lieutenancy. Unsurprisingly, evidence for an affair is absent from the relevant narrative sources, all of which are sympathetic to John of Jaffa. As has been indicated already, Philip of Novara was a staunch support of the Ibelin family in general, but seemed to have some misgivings about John of Arsur. For his part, John of Joinville was related to John of Jaffa; and Philip of Montfort, the father of the Templar of Tyre's first patron, was a frequent political ally of the count of Jaffa. Mayer, "Ibelin versus Ibelin," 51-55.

[75] *Rothelin*, 633-35; Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, 215 for a summary of which barons supported which side in the conflict.

[76] Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, 215-16. Riley-Smith notes that most of the feudatories followed John of Arsur both in his initial policy and in his *volte-face*.

the Genoese and the Venetians across the eastern Mediterranean.[77] There is a major lacuna in the manuscript of chronicle of the Templar of Tyre where one would expect to find a treatment of the beginning of the war. The *Rothelin* and *Eracles* continuations of William of Tyre, as well as the *Liber Secretorum Fidelium Crucis* of Marino Sanudo cite as the principal cause a dispute over a strategically positioned property overlooking the harbor in Acre owned by the Greek monastery of St. Sabas. This was certainly a source of tension, but there were others. The nineteenth-century scholar Georg Caro noted that, according to the Genoese Annals, some five years before (either in 1249 or 1251), a Genoese had been killed by a Venetian for reasons now unknown and the Genoese had retaliated by raiding the Venetian quarter.[78] Further violence was prevented temporarily only by the presence of Louis IX in the Holy Land, but after he departed for France, the Italians prepared to resume hostilities.[79] David Jacoby has pointed out that in 1255 the Venetian *bailli* at Acre, Nicolò Michiel, imposed a new loan on Venetian merchants coming to and from the city, and has suggested that it may have been introduced for the purposes of financing a local war, already being prepared for prior to the St. Sabas affair, and that the dispute over the harbor property was merely a pretext for a major confrontation that was in the offing anyway.[80] Still more hostilities arose in the spring of 1256 when the Genoese purchased and brought to Acre a Venetian ship that had been captured at sea by pirates. Rather than seeking legal recourse in order to have the ship

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[77] David Jacoby, "New Venetian evidence on crusader Acre," *The Experience of Crusading 2*, eds. Peter Edbury and Jonathan Phillips (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 241.
[78] Some time between 1249 and 1251; see Georg Caro, *Genua: Und Die Mächte am Mittelmeer 1257-1311* (Halle a.S. Max Niemeyer, 1895), 28-30 and Joshua Prawer, *Histoire du Royaume latin de Jérusalem,* vol. 2., trans. Gérard Nahon (Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1969-70), 364.
[79] *Royaume latin*, 365.
[80] Jacoby, 242.

restored to them, the Venetians reclaimed it by force. The Genoese retaliated, seizing an unknown number of Venetian ships and invading the Venetian quarter. Soon after, the belligerents signed a truce, but because they could not agree on compensation for the damages to Venetian property, the matter was left unresolved.[81]

Clearly, then, tensions were already running high when Marco Giustiniani came to Acre in late 1256 as Venetian consul and presented a letter from the pope to the patriarch of Jerusalem requesting that the house of St. Sabas be given into the possession of his countrymen.[82] Nearly simultaneously, Leo Grimaldi and Ansaldo Seba, the new Genoese consuls to Acre, brought a papal letter to the prior of the Hospital asserting *their* right to it.[83] Whether this house was so advantageously placed that it was worth going to war over, whether it was a question of neither side willing to lose face, or whether it was merely a pretext for a fight the Genoese and the Venetians had both been spoiling for, we shall never know.[84] Probably it was all three.

Jean Richard has assumed that the murder which Caro believed took place in 1249 or 1251 occurred at this point, immediately after the consuls delivered their letters, and that it was a direct result of the dispute over the waterfront property. Considering the extremely close proximity of the Italian quarters to each other and the heightened tensions, one can imagine the most minor squabble quickly escalating to the point of mob

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[81] Caro, 30-31; Jacoby "New Venetian evidence," 245; Richard, *Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*, B, 364.
[82] *Rothelin*, 633-34; *Royaume latin*, 364-65; Richard, *Latin Kingdom*, B, 364.
[83] Amadi, 204; ATS, 447; Marino Sanudo Torsello, *The Book of the Secrets of the Faithful of the Cross*, ed. and trans. Peter Lock (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011), 349 [hereafter MST].
[84] The issue is further confused by the fact that Innocent IV (himself Genoese) had encouraged the monastery to sell or rent the property for a period of ten years to the Genoese in 1251. Then, in 1255 the Monastery of St. Sabas was instructed *not* to sell to the Genoese by Alexander IV. However, in the very same year Alexander then gave his blessing to the sale. Prawer, *Royaume latin*, 364.

violence.[85] What we know for certain is that the Genoese overran the Venetian quarter yet again, raiding up to the church of St. Mark. They also seized the disputed house and fortified it.[86] The Genoese solicited help from the lordship of Acre and the constable (i.e. commander of the army) of the kingdom, John of Arsur. Meanwhile, his cousin and political rival, John of Jaffa, supported the Venetians, not only to counter John of Arsur, but also because there was bad blood between him and the Genoese from an incident that had occurred while he had been lieutenant in the kingdom.[87] Philip of Montfort expelled the Venetians from his lordship, taking advantage of the situation in Acre to challenge their increasingly privileged position at Tyre.[88] Defeated in Acre and turned out of Tyre, the Venetians sued for peace.[89]

But the Genoese had little time to savor their victory. The Pisans soon broke with them over a matter in Sardinia.[90] In truth, their alliance had been tenuous from the first: as the two major naval powers of the Tyrrhenian Sea, they were historic rivals, and it is unlikely they could have cooperated for long in the Levant. [91] A dispute between Pisa and Venice over weights and measures used in the East had occasioned the former's cooperation with Genoa, but in July, 1257 that issue was resolved and Venice agreed to a

[85] For the Italian quarters in Acre, see Benvenisti, 98-104.
[86] Jacoby "New Venetian evidence," 247
[87] Amadi, 204-5. When he was lieutenant and magistrate in charge of justice (1254-1256), the count of Jaffa had ordered the hand of a Genoese boy to be cut off in punishment for a crime. The Genoese took exception to this, and when he was no longer lieutenant, they assaulted him and forced him to seek refuge in the Pisan quarter.
[88] Dandolo, 307; Jacoby, "New Venetian evidence," 243-45.
[89] ATS, 447.
[90] *Royaume latin*, 363.
[91] It was established in 1251

twenty-year alliance with the Tuscan city.[92] Together, the Genoese and John of Arsur undertook an attack on Pisa's quarter, and captured two towers.[93]

In retaliation, the Venetians sent Lorenzo Tiepolo east with thirteen galleys. His force broke the chain of the harbor at Acre and burned two galleys and twenty-eight ships. The Venetians captured the disputed house from the Genoese and razed it.[94] The next day, the Pisans and Venetians occupied the Genoese quarter and the suburb of *Montmusard*. The Genoese sought terms and the combatants agreed to a temporary truce. It was at this time that Bohemond VI of Antioch-Tripoli came to Acre with Plaisance and his nephew, Hugh II, so that the latter could claim the regency that was rightfully his by birth. When the High Court installed Plaisance as warden for her son's regency she promptly took the part of the Venetians and Pisans, not only because they now seemed to be winning, but at the urging of her brother. Apparently, the counts of Tripoli since the time of Bohemond IV (r.1187-1233) had been denying the Genoese their historic privileges and extraterritorial concessions in the county, and Bohemond VI feared that if victorious, they would be in a position to reestablish them.[95] Thus, he allied himself with the Venetians for much the same reasons that the lord of Tyre had allied himself with the Genoese. The feudatories fell in line behind Plaisance, shifting their support away from the Genoese, who now found themselves isolated.

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[92] Jacoby points to the published treaty in *Documenti sulle relazioni della città toscane coll'Oriente cristiano e coi Turchi fino all'anno MDXXXI*, ed. Joseph Müller (Florence, 1879; repr. Roma: Societa' Multigrafica Editrice, 1966), 447-50; Jacoby, "New Venetian evidence," 241.
[93] Amadi, 204-5; ATS, 447; Dandolo, 307; *Eracles*, 443.
[94] Martin da Canale, *Les Estoires de Venise: Cronaca veneziana in lingua francese dale origini al 1275*, ed. Alberto Limentani (Firenze: L.S. Olschki, 1972), 158-60.
[95] *Templare di Tiro*, 66-67; Crawford, 26.

A fragile truce was still in effect, but Acre prepared itself for full-scale war. Towers were fortified and siege engines made ready. Seeing these military preparations, the notables of Acre gathered together in a house belonging to Philip of Montfort to make a last-ditch attempt to reconcile the two sides in a more permanent way. One might be forgiven for thinking this role as mediator seems an odd one for Philip, considering he had obviously been a partisan of the Genoese in the early stages of the war and had much to gain from Venetian suffering.[96] He had used the outbreak of hostilities in 1256 as an excuse to expel the Venetians from Tyre (their rights there had been infringed upon since Balian and Philip had captured the city from the imperialists in 1243) and aided the Genoese when their quarter at Acre was besieged in 1257 by sending supplies that were smuggled through the Hospital of St. John.[97] When this mediation failed and full-scale war broke out, the following year he brought with him to Acre a force of eighty mounted soldiers and thirty archers with the intention of assaulting the city by land while Rossa de la Turca's Genoese fleet attacked by sea, although once he saw the Genoese were routed he and his men retreated to Tyre without a fight.[98] Soon after, Tiepolo departed Acre with his fleet and attacked Tyre.[99] When the Venetians arrived the Genoese rushed to their galleys, but because they did so in a hurry, "with commotion and without a plan having

[96] David Jacoby notes that the fact the meeting was held in a house belonging to Philip of Montfort suggests that he could still be viewed as at least somewhat impartial—presumably he had not yet ejected the Venetians from Tyre. However, Jacoby also argues that preparations for war did not begin in earnest until after this meeting, a notion contradicted by the Templar of Tyre and, indeed, by Jacoby's own hypothesis that the loan imposed on Venetian merchants in 1255 may have been made with an eye toward a coming war. See "New venetian evidence," 246.
[97] *Templare di Tiro*, 66-67; Crawford, 26.
[98] *Templare di Tiro*, 70-73; Crawford, 27-28.
[99] Amadi, 204; Dandolo, 307-8; the "Annales de Terre Sainte" says four galleys were captured, 447; Jacoby, "New Venetian evidence," 241.

been set in order," three galleys strayed too far ahead of the rest, and the Venetians captured them easily.[100] Meanwhile, armed bands roamed the streets of Acre.

During this time, the city also suffered from massive bombardment. Projectiles weighing hundreds of pounds were launched from several dozen great war-machines located in the Italian quarters, leveling houses, towers, and walls. The Templar of Tyre tells us some of their names: to the Genoese belonged *Boverel*, *Vincheguerre*, and *Peretin*, while the Venetians possessed an especially large engine called *Marquemose*. The devastation was complete, and *Eracles* numbers the dead at 20,000.[101] No doubt this is an exaggeration, but even allowing for hyperbole, casualties must have been high. Eventually the assault of the Pisan quarter grew so terrifying that the Templar master Thomas Bérard removed himself from his order's compound—lying just adjacent—for fear of being struck by a missile. Bohemond VI and his sister and nephew fled to Tripoli during the heavy fighting, leaving John of Arsur as their lieutenant of Acre.[102] Meanwhile, the Genoese quarter—in which there were some 800 soldiers as well as numerous non-combatants—was invested by the Pisans and Venetians and cut off from supplies. The Genoese were spared from total starvation through the help of Philip of Montfort and the Hospitaller knights, who brought supplies into the quarter by way of the adjoining Hospital.[103] Nevertheless, the Genoese are said to have suffered greatly.

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[100] *Templare di Tiro*, 64-67, 74-77; Crawford, 25, 30-31.
[101] *Rothelin*, 635.
[102] Bohemond agreed to pay for a troop of 800 French *stipendarii* to support John of Arsur for one year. According to *Rothelin*, these troops were already in the Latin East, but it is doubtful they belonged to the regiment left behind by Louis IX, as those were already contracted to service under Geoffrey. However, in his capacity as the representative of Louis, we can assume that Geoffrey and the regiment supported the regent and his lieutenant. *Rothelin*, 635; *Templare di Tiro*, 68-69; Crawford, 26.
[103] *Templare di Tiro,* 66-69*;* Crawford, 26.

Despite a papal command to cease all hostilities, that summer a Genoese fleet of forty-eight galleys and four *nefs* under the captaincy of Rossa della Turca assaulted Acre.[104] Philip of Montfort came overland from Tyre with eighty horsemen and thirty peasant archers. He camped near Acre, at *La Vigne-Neuve*, while the Hospitaller master, William of Châteauneuf, brought up knights and sergeants. There they waited for the Venetian fleet to leave the harbor and give battle to della Turca so they could assault the relatively unguarded Pisan and Venetian quarters by land.[105] The forty Venetian galleys at Acre delayed putting to sea for fear of just such an attack, but the master of the Temple, Thomas Bérard, assured the Pisan consul and Venetian consuls that he and his fellow Templar knights would protect their interests on land. Satisfied that their property in the city was secure, the Venetians and Pisans solicited the help of anyone in the city who would fight for them, offering to pay handsomely. They were able to muster more than seventy additional vessels, all manned with crossbowmen, to support their forty war galleys.[106]

Rosso della Turca and his fleet were routed by the much larger enemy force. The Genoese lost nineteen galleys initially. Five more were captured in flight. Several sources put their casualties (captured or killed) at seventeen hundred men. Seeing that all was lost, Philip of Montfort returned to Tyre and the Genoese fled their quarter and sought refuge in the Hospital. Under the terms of the ensuing truce, the Genoese were expelled from Acre. The Pisans and Venetians leveled their shops and pulled down their

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[104] Or forty-nine or fifty, depending on the source.
[105] *Templare di Tiro*, 68-69, 70-71; Crawford, 27.
[106] *Templare di Tiro*, 70-73; Crawford, 28.

towers, whose stones they used to reinforce their own fortifications and shops.[107] As a final insult, the victors forced the vanquished to pass under their swords while the latter exited the city in abject humiliation.[108]

In a coda to this principal engagement, the Genoese armed three new fleets in the three succeeding summers and sent them to the Levant. Each was defeated handily.[109] Finally, in January of 1261, the papal legate at Acre, Thomas Agni, prevailed upon the Italian republics to sign a peace.[110] This was the official end to the War of St. Sabas and the end of major fighting among the merchant communes in the kingdom of Jerusalem—although by no means the end of their rivalries elsewhere throughout the Mediterranean.

Conclusion

This chapter's focus has been on the nobility and their primary responsibility for the political strife within the Kingdom of Jerusalem from the end of the War of the Lombards through the War of St. Sabas. The power of the Italian communes has been overstated and treated too much in isolation: their rivalries had such a disastrous impact only because the nobility actively engaged them in their own quarrels. Claims about a lack of central authority and the rivalries of the communes providing the conditions for civil strife have mistaken the cause for the effect. The nobility, especially the Ibelins, established their self-serving agenda during the war against the Hohenstaufen from 1228 to 1243, and continued to pursue it under the pretext of the Genoese-Venetian rivalry in the East between 1256 and 1261. Meanwhile, while the Franks were engaged in this

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[107] Amadi, 204-5; Dandolo, 309; *Eracles*, 443; MST, 349-50; *Templare di Tiro*, 68-69, 72-73; Crawford, 26-29.
[108] *Rothelin*, 635.
[109] *Templare di Tiro*, 72-75; Crawford, 29-30.
[110] RRH, no. 1298.

infighting, two new and important players, the Mamluks of Egypt and the Ilkhanid Mongols of Persia, had come on the scene in the Near East. It is to them, and to the Frankish nobility's response to their arrival in the arena of Syrian diplomacy, politics, and war, that we now turn.

Chapter 2

Franks, Mamluks, and Mongols

The internal strife in the Kingdom of Jerusalem that was described and analyzed in Chapter 1 occurred against the backdrop of radical transformations in the rest of the Near East. In 1250 Turanshah, Ayyubid sultan of Cairo, was murdered by a cabal of his deceased father's *mamluks*, who seized power for themselves. Over the course of the following decade this Mamluk regime, which would eventually be the agent of the Franks' destruction, began to consolidate its control over Egypt while an Ayyubid, al-Nasir Yusuf, ruled Damascus and Aleppo. Meanwhile, the Mongols, who had first invaded Syria in the 1240s, prepared a second attempt at its conquest. The Franks existed precariously in this matrix, but the fractured state of the region and the volatility of the military-diplomatic situation brought them opportunity as well as danger. This chapter demonstrates that the Franks' diplomatic and military capabilities in the 1250s and 1260s have been underestimated and that the Franks have unnecessarily been deprived of agency in shaping their policy towards Egypt and the Ilkhanids.

The New Near-Eastern Context

During the 1240s the sultan of Cairo, al-Salih Ayyub, succeeded in bringing all the major cities of Syria other than Aleppo under his sway. In order to fight his mostly internal wars, he purchased and trained vast numbers of new *mamluks* that he bought cheaply from the glut of slaves coming to market from the Black Sea region, a

consequence of the ravages of the Mongols there.[1] The growing ranks of al-Salih's *mamluks*, called the *Bahriyya* because their barracks in Cairo were located on an island in the Nile River (*Bahr al-Nil*), led directly to the uprising that took place after his death in November of 1249.[2] He had succeeded in cultivating in them an intense loyalty to him personally, and a powerful *esprit de corps*, but they lacked any particular devotion to the Ayyubid regime or to his family. After his death al-Salih's son and successor, al-Mu'azzam Turanshah, favored his own *mamluks* and the *Bahriyya* murdered him.[3] In order to cover their action with a veneer of legitimacy, the leaders of the military coup made Shajar al-Durr, al-Salih Ayyub's widow, the sultana while they chose one of their own, 'Izz al-Din Aybeg, as *atabeg*.[4] He became the *de facto* ruler of Egypt but in order to further maintain pretenses the *Bahriyya* briefly chose as the new sultan al-Ashraf Musa, a young princeling and scion of the Ayyubid family whom they knew they could

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[1] Reuven Amitai, *Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk Ilkhanid War, 1260-1281* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 18.

[2] R. Stephen Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols: The Ayyubids of Damascus, 1193-1260* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1977), 304.

[3] An officer named Faris al-Din Aqtay, a man who would feature prominently in the ensuing power struggles in Cairo, delivered the killing blow. *Ayyubids, Mamlukes and Crusaders. Selections from the Tarikh al-Duwal wa'l-Muluk of Ibn al-Furat*, translated by Ursula and Malcolm Lyons; historical introduction and notes by Jonathan Riley-Smith (Cambridge: Heffer, 1971), 1:39 [Arabic]; 2:32 [English], [hereafter, Ibn al-Furat (Lyons)]; Francesco Gabrieli and Peter Jackson provide partial translations of the Arabic account by Ibn Wasil, an official in both Ayyubid and Mamluk administrations in Cairo: Gabrieli, *Arab Historians of the Crusades*, translated from Italian by E.J. Costello (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 295-97 and Jackson, *The Seventh Crusade, 1244-1254: Sources and Documents* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009), 140-42. Also see Humphreys, *Saladin*, 302; Robert Irwin, *The Middle East in the Middle Ages: The Early Mamluk Sultanate, 1250-1382* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986), 20-21.

[4] Ibn Wasil's account in Gabrieli, 297-98 and Jackson, 140-42; Ibn al-'Amid's account in Jackson, *Seventh Crusade*, 226-29; Peter Holt, *The Age of the Crusades: The Near East from the Eleventh Century to 1517* (New York: Longman, 1986), 83; Humphreys, *Saladin*, 303; Irwin, 26.

easily control.[5] Even so, this did not prevent Aybeg from attempting to bolster his own claim to authority by marrying Shajar al-Durr.[6]

Al-Nasir Yusuf, Ayyubid ruler of Aleppo, took advantage of the turmoil in Cairo to assert his control over most of Syria—it had been mostly under Egypt's sway during the rule of al-Salih Ayyub—and to establish himself in opposition to the *Bahri* junta.[7] He was proclaimed lord of Damascus by its citizens, came to favorable terms with the independent lord of al-Karak, and prepared to invade Egypt.[8] He mustered the strength of Aleppo, Damascus, and al-Karak and met the Egyptian army at Kura on February 3, 1251. The Egyptians were put into disarray by an early cavalry charge but a small detachment led by Aybeg and Aqtay attacked al-Nasir, who beat a hasty retreat and squandered what had been a legitimate chance at victory.[9]

After the battle, tensions mounted between Aybeg and Aqtay, who was now the top officer of the *Bahriyya*. Fearing the regiment's loyalty would rest with their field commander rather than with him, Aybeg used one of his personal *mamluks*, Sayf al-Din Qutuz, to kill Aqtay.[10] Learning of what had happened to Aqtay and seeing that Aybeg's *mamluks* were in the ascendant, most of the *Bahriyya* fled Egypt, led by an officer who would have a major part to play in the coming decades: Rukn al-Din Baybars al-Bunduqdari.

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[5] Holt, *Age of the Crusades,* 84; Humphreys, *Saladin*, 303; Irwin, 20, 26.
[6] Holt, *Age of the Crusades,* 84.
[7] Humphreys, *Saladin*, 305-6.
[8] Ibn Wasil in Jackson, *The Seventh Crusade*, 214-15.
[9] Ibn al-'Amid in Jackson, *The Seventh Crusade*, 226; Humphreys, *Saladin*, 318-19
[10] Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, *Rawd al-zahir fi sirat al-Malik al-Zahir,* ed. 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Khuwaytir (Riyad, 1396 H/1976), 53; Ibn al-'Amid in Jackson, *The Seventh Crusade,* 218-23, 226-28; Holt, *Age of the Crusades,* 84; Humphreys, *Saladin,* 326; Irwin, 28.

With Aqtay gone and the *Bahriyya* out of Egypt, Aybeg was ready to dispense altogether with pretense: he deposed al-Musa and proclaimed himself sultan.[11] He also took a new wife, a lady from a noble Seljuk family. Jealous, marginalized, and assuming her own murder was imminent, Shajar al-Durr arranged a plot on Aybeg's life. On April 10, 1257, her agents stabbed him to death while he was bathing. She was caught and killed by Aybeg's emirs, and they proclaimed his fifteen-year-old son, al-Mansur 'Ali, as the new sultan. Al-Mansur was every bit as much a figurehead as al-Musa had been; this time it was Qutuz who stood behind the throne.[12] Remarkably, this arrangement lasted for two and a half years, but Qutuz eventually deposed al-Mansur in November of 1259 and proclaimed himself sultan.

Meanwhile, Baybars, with the *Bahriyya* behind him, spent his exile as kingmaker in Syria, throwing his allegiance at times behind al-Nasir and at times behind the lord of al-Karak, who had reasserted his independence shortly after the former's humiliating defeat in 1251 at Kura. Always keeping an eye on how they might exploit divisions in Syria and win allies to help them return to Egypt with fire and sword, the *Bahriyya* actually returned home peaceably that spring: they agreed to join Qutuz once it became clear that neither al-Nasir nor the lord of al-Karak possessed the wherewithal to help them take Egypt by force, or to defy the growing Mongol threat to Syria.[13]

That threat was significant. The Mongols had made incursions into Anatolia and Syria as early as 1242 and defeated the Seljuks of Rum at a decisive battle in June of

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[11] Humphreys, *Saladin,* 326.
[12] Humphreys, *Saladin,* 330; Irwin, 29
[13] Humphreys, *Saladin,* 331; Irwin, 30.

1243.[14] In 1244 they threatened the Ayyubids of Syria and Bohemond V of Antioch-Tripoli, demanding the payment of tribute. Bohemond obliged while the Ayyubids refused, but a summary withdrawal from the Near East by the Mongols shortly after for reasons that remain a matter of considerable debate earned both a reprieve.[15]

By the 1250s the Mongols had again set their sights on the conquest of southwest Asia. In 1252-53 the newly established Great Khan, Möngke, undertook the invasion of Sung China with one brother, Kublai, and appointed another, Hülegü, as governor of Mongol forces in Iran. He charged Hülegü with the task of crushing the irksome Isma'ili sect known as the Assassins and forcing the unconditional surrender of the 'Abbasid caliph of Baghdad, whose claim to universal sovereignty was an intolerable affront to the Mongols' own universalist imperial ideology. If the caliph refused, Hülegü was instructed, he was to be put to death.

Hülegü was successful in executing Möngke's policy. After mustering a massive army—it was comprised of a levy of one in five men from the entire Mongol army and took two years to assemble—he departed Mongolia in the winter of 1254 and aimed for the heartlands of Islam. It took two more years before his forces advanced past the Oxus. By the end of 1256 one of Hülegü's generals (Baichu) had successfully invaded Anatolia

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[14] John A. Boyle, "Dynastic and Political History of the Il-Khāns," in *The Cambridge History of Iran* 5, ed. Boyle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968): 303-421; Peter Jackson, *The Mongols and the West, 1221-1410* (New York: Pearson Longman 2005), 74.

[15] David Morgan has suggested that a lack of suitable pasturage meant the full Ilkhanid force could not remain in Syria for extended periods. See David O. Morgan "The Mongols in Syria" in *Crusade and Settlement*, ed. Peter Edbury (Cardiff: University College of Cardiff Press, 1985), 231-33. Also see Peter Jackson, "The Crisis in the Holy Land in 1260," *The English Historical Review* 95 (1980): 481-513; idem, *The Mongols and the West*, 74-75.

again while the main force of the army hunted down the Assassins, virtually destroying the sect in Iran.[16]

Knowledge of what the Mongols had done in Anatolia and Iran and the ease with which they had done it seems to have stirred profound fear among the Franks of the Latin East. A letter sent in October of 1256 from the Templar preceptor in the Holy Land to the bishop of Orléans and a letter sent by the patriarch of Jerusalem to Pope Alexander IV in late 1256 or early 1257 make plain that the Franks were preoccupied with the Mongol threat, and little concerned about the regimes in either Cairo or Damascus.[17]

The letter sent by the Templar preceptor, Guy of Basainville, describes how the Mongols had overrun Anatolia and massacred the people of its cities, averring that those whom they did not kill they took as slaves.[18] The pillage and rapine, according to Guy, lasted two months and no man could resist or escape. The ominous glow of fires, burning day and night, could be seen from Baghdad. So pervasive was fear in Syria that the sultans of Damascus and Egypt, "previously engaged in bitter discord…made peace with each other." He mistakenly asserts that the Mongol army had sacked Mecca and Medina and "burned all the surrounding lands," but even this misinformation is telling of how widespread the Franks believed the Mongols' ravages to have been. Guy claims nothing

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[16] Humphreys, *Saladin,* 336-37; Jackson, "Crisis in the Holy Land" 489; idem, *The Mongols and the West*, 115-16.

[17] Alexander IV, *Registres: Recueil des bulles de ce pape publiées ou analysées d'après les manuscrits originaux des archives du Vatican*, ed. Joseph de Loye and Pierre de Cenival, vol. 2 (Paris: A. Fontemoing, 1902), no. 1726; also in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Epistolae Saeculi XIII*, ed. Charles Rodenberg, vol. 3 (Berlin: Apud Weidmannos, 1883-94), no. 450; André Duchesne, *Historiae Francorum Scriptores* vol. 5 (Paris, 1649), 272; *Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani* and *Additamentum,* ed. Reinhold Röhricht, (Oeniponti: Libraria Academica Wagneriana, 1893, 1904), no.1251 [hereafter, RRH]; Malcolm Barber, *The New Knighthood: A History of the Order of the Temple* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 158; Peter Jackson, "Crisis in the Holy Land," 489.

[18] Duchesne, *Historia Francorum*, 272.

but scorched earth was left. He also warns that, according to King Hetoum of Armenia, the Mongols were preparing to strike Syria the following April.[19]

Although we do not have the letter sent to Alexander IV by Jacques Pantaléon, patriarch of Jerusalem, we know at least part of its content from Alexander's reply, which makes explicit reference to news about the coming of the Mongols and the Franks' growing dread at their arrival on the scene.[20] Moreover, Alexander sent letters in February of 1260 to the notables of the West encouraging them to contribute men and money to the succor of the Holy Land and describing how all the "kings and the kingdoms of the Saracens had been conquered and swept away and the Mongols had struck powerful fear into Antioch and Acre and all the other Christian provinces in Syria"—an impression he surely had by way of the patriarch's letter.[21] Thus, it is clear that most of the Franks understood that the Mongols constituted an existential threat to local Muslim powers as much as to the Latin principalities.

In February of 1258 the Mongols besieged Baghdad and in a matter of days the symbolic seat of Islam was overrun and the caliph executed.[22] They crossed the Euphrates into Syria the following winter, and took the city of Aleppo on January 24, 1260 after a week-long siege, although the citadel held out for another month.[23] Soon Harim, Hama, and Homs all surrendered. Hearing of the destruction, al-Nasir Yusuf abandoned Damascus and fled towards Egypt, but was eventually captured by the Mongols, with whom he collaborated until, in a fit of pique after the battle of 'Ayn Jalut,

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[19] See Humphreys, *Saladin,* 328 for this peace.
[20] *Epistolae saeculi XIII*, no. 450; Jackson, "Crisis in the Holy Land," 489.
[21] "Hermanni Altahensis annales," in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores* 17, ed. Georg Pertz (Hannover, 1861), 402.
[22] Humphreys, *Saladin*, 339.
[23] Amitai, *Mongols and Mamluks*, 26-27; Jackson, "Crisis in the Holy Land," 481.

Hülegü ordered him executed.[24] In the meantime, Damascus surrendered on March 2, 1260.[25]

The Templar of Tyre tells us that around this time King Hetoum of Armenia and Bohemond VI of Antioch-Tripoli accepted Hülegü as their suzerain and invited him to be their protector against the Muslims. Hetoum had already made similar overtures in 1254, when he led an embassy to the Mongol capital at Qaraqorum; there were even Armenian troops in the Mongol army when it took Aleppo in December of 1259. The Templar claims both King Hetoum of Armenia and Bohemond VI of Antioch-Tripoli were present at the conquest of Damascus and adds that that the prince of Antioch ordered a Catholic mass to be sung in the great mosque, rang bells from the towers of the city's churches, and allowed his men to desecrate other mosques.[26]

Peter Jackson has challenged this account as a fabrication inserted for propagandistic reasons into late-thirteenth- and early-fourteenth-century Armenian (Hetoum's *La Flor des Estoires*) and Frankish sources (The Templar of Tyre) when the Mamluks had established themselves as masters of the Near East and the Mongols seemed a relatively diminished threat and an attractive ally.[27] He has noted the conspicuous absence of any mention of Bohemond's presence in contemporary Muslim sources and has found it hard to believe that such an outrage would go unremarked upon,

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[24] Amitai, *Mongols and Mamluks*, 33.
[25] Amitai, *Mongols and Mamluks*, 30; Jackson, "Crisis in the Holy Land," 491.
[26] *Cronaca del templare di Tiro: 1243-1314: la caduta degli stati crociati nel racconto di un testimone ocular*, trans. Laura Minervini (Naples: Liguori, 2000), 80-83 [hereafter, *Templare di Tiro*]; *The Templar of Tyre: Part III of the "Deeds of the Cypriots*," ed. Paul Crawford (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 34-35.
[27] See Hayton or Hetoum, "La Flor des Estoires de la Terre d'Orient," in *Recueil des historiens des croisades: documents arméniens* 2 (Paris: Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, 1906), 171-72. This is *not* King Hetoum, but rather a chronicler by the same name. Jackson, "Crisis in the Holy Land," 486-87.

especially by Baybars's court biographer, Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir.[28] However, the accounts of several Arabic sources all claim that the native Christians—though almost certainly not Franks—did run amuck after Hülegü's conquest and acted out against their Muslim neighbors.[29]

In contrast to the Armenians and the Franks of Antioch and Tripoli, the Franks of the Kingdom of Jerusalem proper remained defiant towards the Mongols. The Templar of Tyre records a brave but hopeless defense of Sidon by its lord, Julian Grenier, against the Mongols and their commander, Kitbogha, in August of 1260.[30] The papal legate and bishop of Bethlehem, Thomas Agni of Lentino, excommunicated Bohemond for the outrage of his submission to the Mongols.[31] Acre agreed that there would be no surrender, although they did send an embassy to Hülegü under the direction of a Dominican friar, David of Ashby, as well as gifts to Kitbogha, Hülegü's commander in Syria.[32] The military orders made ready to defend their castles but a Frankish chronicler describes the difficulties they had in finding mercenaries willing to serve: those solicited demanded hazard pay, believing that to serve against the Mongols was a fool's errand and would mean almost certain death.[33]

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[28] Jackson, "Crisis in the Holy Land," 493-94.
[29] The improvement in Christian circumstances may have been due to the fact that Hülegü's chief officer, Kitbogha, was a Nestorian, or simply to the fact that all religious sects were made equal under Mongol rule, which would have removed the Christians from *dhimmi* (i.e. protected but taxed) status under Muslim authority. See Jackson, *Mongols and the West*, 120.
[30] *Templare di* Tiro, 82-85; Crawford, 34-37.
[31] Urban IV, *Registres: Recueil des bulles de ce pape publiées ou analysées d'après les manuscrits originaux des archives du Vatican,* vol. 2, ed. Jean Guiraud (Paris: A. Fontemoing, 1901), no. 292; Jackson, *Mongols and the West*, 117.
[32] Ibn al-Furat (Lyons), 1:40; 2:41. For discussion of David of Ashby's mission and its sources, see Jackson, "Crisis in the Holy Land," 505. For the gifts sent, see Amitai, *Mongols and Mamluks*, 32.
[33] *Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr, de 1229 à 1261, dite du manuscript de Rothelin* in *Recueil des historiens des croisades: historiens occidentaux* 2 (Paris: Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, 1859), 636 [hereafter, *Rothelin*].

Meanwhile, during the previous spring several urgent letters had been sent to Europe. Thomas Agni wrote in March of 1260 lamenting the danger in Syria and the several unappealing options the Franks faced: abandoning the Holy Land, resisting and facing almost certain death, or submitting to Mongol overlordship. The letter describes the fall of Baghdad and the cities of northern Syria, whose people were so preoccupied with saving themselves that "fathers deserted children, brothers deserted sisters, husbands deserted wives, the wealthy deserted their riches, and all trampled over the weak and infirm." The bishop writes of Bohemond VI's submission as well as the defiance of Acre and Tyre and the tireless efforts of the military orders to put their castles into a state of readiness. He concludes his letter with a plea for help, claiming that the Franks mournfully await attack but have faith the princes of Latin Christendom will be their shield, send them aid, and prevent the Holy Land from being overrun.[34]

Another letter sent that month, this one from Master Thomas Bérard of the Templars to the grand preceptor of the order in England, echoes that of the papal legate, announcing the fall of Baghdad and the Ayyubid cities of Syria and describing the Mongols as the instrument of divine judgment.[35] The Templar master writes of an unprecedented threat and unprecedented expenses in readying the order's castles against the enemy, lamenting Templar difficulties in maintaining their defense and the possibility that, without aid from the West, the order would need to abandon its duties and alienate its properties in the Holy Land for lack of resources.

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[34] "Menkonis Chronicon," ed. Ludwig Weiland in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores* 23, ed., George Pertz (Hannover, 1874), 547-49; RRH, no. 1288.
[35] "Annales monasterii Burtonensis," ed. Henry Luard, *Annales monastici*, Rolls Series 36:1 (1864): 491-95; *Monumenta Boica* 29.2 (1831): 197-202; RRH, no. 1299.

In April Thomas Agni wrote to the West again, this time to Charles of Anjou, reiterating much of what had been in his previous letter about the ravages of the Mongols and the dangerous situation facing the Franks. However, Peter Jackson has rightly pointed out that this letter also strikes an unmistakable note of optimism.[36] Thomas exults that the Muslims have been scattered and weakened, and even claims that the entire Kingdom of Jerusalem is ready to fall into Frankish hands. Equally important, he contends that the Mongols will surely "put away their cruel sword" if faced with a stiff Latin resistance. The reason for this optimism is uncertain, but most likely it was due to the fact that the greater part of the Mongol force had departed Syria in March between the first and second of the bishop's extant letters, and Hülegü had left no more than 10,000 men behind under the command of Kitbogha, a Nestorian Christian—although it is admittedly puzzling that the letter makes no mention of this.[37]

If there was indeed opportunity for the Franks, they did not seize it successfully. In 1260 Qutuz and Baybars temporarily put their differences aside in order to lead an army from Cairo into Syria and meet the Mongols there.[38] One Frankish chronicle, the so-called *Rothelin* continuation of William of Tyre's twelfth-century history, tells us that the sultan of Egypt proposed joint military action to the leaders at Acre—although another contemporary chronicle makes no mention of this—and Arabic sources claim it

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[36] Jackson, "Crisis in the Holy Land," 505-6.

[37] Amitai, *Mongols and Mamluks*, 27-30; Irwin, 32; Jackson, "Crisis in the Holy Land," 500. It has long been assumed that Hülegü left Syria at this time because the Great Khan, Möngke, had died recently and the Ilkhan wished to return to the Mongol heartlands to see about the succession. Reuven Amitai does not believe this was the story at all. He suggests the potential for hostilities with Berke Khan and the Golden Horde in northwest Iran in the wake of the Great Khan's death as the first reason that Hülegü took most of his forces out of Syria and "faulty intelligence" about the threat posed by the Mamluks at this time. Again, there is always the issue of pasturage.

[38] For possible reasons Qutuz preferred to face Kitbogha in Syria rather than wait for him in Egypt. See Amitai, *Mongols and Mamluks*, 38.

was the Franks who offered their assistance and were refused by Qutuz, who made them swear to remain neutral and threatened reprisal if they did not.[39] According to *Rothelin*, most of the Franks were prepared to join Qutuz, but were convinced not to by the master of the Teutonic knights, Anno of Sangerhausen. He argued that the Mamluks could not be trusted, and that if the Franks expended themselves in a fight with the Mongols they would leave themselves vulnerable to sudden attack from Egypt.[40]

However, the Franks did allow the Mamluk army safe passage through their lands on the way to the valley of Jezreel. In return, they were promised a share of the booty should the Mamluks prove victorious in the coming battle. The Franks also permitted the Mamluks to camp outside Acre, provisioned them, and permitted some of their leaders entrance to the city. But the hosts soon grew skittish at the large number of Mamluks in the city, and pressed them to leave by force and bribery.[41] Following Peter Jackson, it seems likely that the fact that few Muslim sources mention this episode and that Ibn ʻAbd al-Zahir, who was among those who stayed in Acre, does so in only a cursory manner, is compelling evidence that it was the Mamluks who proposed an alliance—something that would not have made it into the official histories and court biographies for obvious reasons.[42]

Qutuz's army, which likely consisted of about 10,000 Egyptian troops in addition to other Syrians, Turkmen, Bedouins, and Kurds, continued on from Acre and met

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[39] Ibn al-Furat (Lyons), 1:51; 2:42; al-Maqrizi in *Histoire des sultans mamlouks de l'Égypte*, trans. Étienne Marc Quatremère 2 vols. in 4 parts (Paris: Oriental Translation Fund of Great Britain and Ireland, 1837-45), 1A, 104 [hereafter, al-Maqrizi (Quatremère)]; *Rothelin*, 637.
[40] *Rothelin*, 637.
[41] *Templare di Tiro,* 86-87; Crawford, 37.
[42] Ibn ʻAbd al-Zahir, 63-64; Jackson, "Crisis in the Holy Land," 503.

Kitbogha on Sept 3, 1260 at ‘Ayn Jalut in the Galilee.[43] The Mongols took the early advantage but the Mamluks eventually turned the tide of battle thanks in no small part to the brilliant leadership of Qutuz and Baybars. Kitbogha was killed and the Egyptians prevailed.[44] In the aftermath of the battle, the Mamluks hunted down and captured or killed most of those who had escaped.[45] By no means was Ilkhanid power broken, but ‘Ayn Jalut marked the first time the Mongols had been turned back in the Middle East, and it surely helped dispel the aura of invincibility previously surrounding them in the eyes of Franks and Mamluks, alike.[46] However, it hardly guaranteed the survival of the Mamluk regime: shortly after the battle, Qutuz was murdered—if not by Baybars himself, then certainly with his connivance.

The Franks attempted to exploit this transitional moment by sending an army against a group of Turcomans in the vicinity of Tiberias in February of 1261.[47] The force was led by John of Ibelin of Beirut and his son Balian, as well as John of Jubail (marshal of the kingdom), and Templars from Acre, Safad, Château Pèlerin and Beaufort. According to one Arabic source it consisted of 900 knights, 1,500 turcopoles, and 3,000 foot-soldiers.[48] The expedition was a disaster. The Franks were defeated and many notable figures were captured, including John of Beirut, John of Jubail, and the

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[43] “Annales Sanctae Justinae Patavini,” ed. Philip Jaffé, *Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores* 19, ed. Georg Pertz (Hannover, 1866) 191-92. For estimates about the size of Qutuz’s army and the reticence of the sources, see Amitai, *Mongols and Mamluks*, 37.
[44] For a detailed account of the battle, see Amitai, *Mongols and Mamluks*, 26-48.
[45] Amitai, 43-44.
[46] Amitai, 47. For images of the Mongols, see Jackson, *Mongols and the West*, 135-64.
[47] “Annales de Terre sainte,” ed. Reinhold Röhricht, *Archives de l’Orient latin* 2 (1884): 449-50 [hereafter ATS]; Barber, *New Knighthood*, 158.
[48] Ibn al-Furat (Lyons), 1:59; 2:49. The Templar of Tyre seems to suggest that this took place before Qutuz and Baibars came to Acre and ‘Ayn Jalut: *Templare di Tiro*, 84; Crawford, 36-37. *Eracles* says the raid took place after ‘Ayn Jalut: *L’estoire de Eracles empereur et la conqueste de la terre d’Outremer,* in *Recueil des historiens des croisades: historiens occidentaux* 2 (Paris: Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, 1859): 445 [hereafter, *Eracles*]; Barber, *New Knighthood*, 158.

commander of the Templars. Also captured were William of Beaujeu, future Templar grand master, and Theobald Gaudin, future Templar commander in Syria. The raid on Tiberias, though a failure, was not the only sign that the Franks had been emboldened by the setback the Mongols had suffered at ‘Ayn Jalut. Bohemond VI took advantage of the turmoil in Syria by seizing Laodicea and reestablishing territorial continuity between Antioch and Tripoli.[49]

Letters sent from the lay and religious leaders of Acre to Henry III of England on April 4-5, 1263 signal a clear shift in Frankish perceptions of the military and diplomatic situation in Syria since three years prior: fear of the Mongols has been surpassed by a concern over the growing power of the Mamluks.[50] The letter sent on April 4th describes a Latin population still gripped by terror, despite the dormancy of the Mongol threat. The Franks of Acre lamented that they were “exposed to the gaping jaws of Babylon” and facing a sultan who, “in the vigor of his strength,” refused to honor old agreements or to desist from harrying the Franks and despoiling their lands. A letter sent the next day (April 5) put it bluntly: without aid from the king of France or England—or else by some miracle of God—the Franks did not believe themselves to have any hope of survival.[51] Indeed, later that month, Baybars raided up to the wall of Acre twice. [52]

After 1260 the Franks appear to have endeavored to aid the Mongols in whatever way they could against the Mamluks. In the aftermath of the battle of ‘Ayn Jalut when the Ilkhanids were still regrouping a small Mongol force at Aleppo was warned of an

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[49] Jackson, *Mongols and the West*, 120-22.
[50] Barber, *New Knighthood*, 159.
[51] *Diplomatic Documents (Chancery and Exchequer)*, ed. Pierre Chaplais, vol. 1 (1101-1271) (London: H.M. Stationary Office, 1964), doc. 386; Barber, *New Knighthood*, 159.
[52] On April 14 (*Eracles*, 447), or April 15 (*Templare di Tiro*, 90-93; Crawford, 40-41.

imminent Mamluk attack by certain Franks of Acre.[53] Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir, a contemporary biographer of Baybars, tells us that in late 1264, when the sultan was hunting and reconnoitering Arsur, some Franks tipped off the Mongols that the Mamluk army was scattered so its animals could graze and that the time was ripe for a Mongol raid on northern Syria.[54] According to Shafi‘ ibn ‘Ali, another roughly contemporary source, at the instigation of the Franks the Mongols attacked al-Bira, a Mamluk stronghold on the Euphrates guarding the approach to Syria, in 664 A.H. (1264-65 A.D.).[55] Shafi‘ ibn ‘Ali writes that Baybars knew the Franks had previously made contact with the Mongols in hopes of taking advantage of this attack and raiding his lands:

> I’ve had great troubles from the letter they [i.e. the Franks] have sent to the Tartars inviting them to invade my lands, and also from the damages and raids they’ve done on their own.[56]

As Reuven Amitai has pointed out, it is quite clear that Baybars was convinced the Franks were “in contact with the Mongols, assisting them with intelligence, encouraging them to attack the Muslims, and possibly even planning a joint campaign with,” and that this provoked his ire and likely galvanized his systematic efforts against the Franks in the years 1264-70. The overtures made by the Franks to the Mongols in 1264 were the primary reason Baybars became far more aggressive towards the Franks late in that

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[53] al-Yunini, *Dhayl Mir’at al-Zaman* (Hyderabad, 1954-61), 1:439-40; 2:93; Ibn al-Dawadari, *Kanz al-Durar wa-Jami‘ al-Ghurar*, vol. 8 (Wiesbaden: Steiner-Verlag, 1960), 71-72. Amitai, *Mongols and Mamluks,* 53. Amitai notes that it is unclear whether this warning was “the policy of the leaders of Acre, or the private initiative of one or more individuals.”

[54] Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir, 222; Reuven Amitai, “The Conquest of Arsuf by Baybars: Political and Military Aspects,” *Mamluk Studies Review* 9 (2005): 62.

[55] Shafi‘ ibn ‘Ali, “Vie de Baibars,” in *Histoire des Croisades* 7, ed. Joseph-François Michaud (Paris: L.G Michaud, Pillet, 1822), 670 [Hereafter, Shafi‘ ibn ‘Ali (Michaud)].

[56] Shafi‘ ibn ‘Ali (Michaud), 670-71.

year.[57] The Franks of Syria also collaborated with the Mongols in 1269 around the time that James of Aragon's crusade arrived in the Holy Land.[58] Ibn al-Furat, a later though generally reliable source, tells us that the Mongols were preparing an attack and had made an agreement with the Franks of *al-Sahil* (i.e. "the coast"/Acre) to cooperate, although there is no evidence such cooperation ever materialized.[59]

Sultan Baybars

While the Franks were writing to the West for aid and encouraging Mongol activities against the Mamluks in northern Syria, they were also sending frequent embassies to the sultan. The political disarray of the Franks is acutely evident, as the individual lordships and the military orders were at this point pursuing their own, inconsistent policies vis-à-vis the Mamluks. In 1261 the government at Acre, the military orders, the count of Jaffa, and the lord of Beirut each sent a separate embassy to Baybars while he was at Damascus.[60] The Franks from Acre were received roughly by the sultan but he eventually offered them a conditional peace. According to Amitai he was willing to "adopt a more conciliatory stance" than he would later because of the need to import grain to Syria—suffering as it was from famine and inflation—through the Frankish ports, and because he was as yet still preoccupied with the Mongol threat.[61]

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[57] Amitai, "The Conquest of Arsuf," 67-68.
[58] Amitai, *Mongols and Mamluks*, 102.
[59] Ibn al-Furat (Lyons), 1:172; 2:136.
[60] Ibn al-Furat (Lyons), 1:52-3; 2:43-44; Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, 118-19. This was John II of Beirut, son of Balian, grandson of the Old Lord of Beirut, and father of Isabel of Beirut. John II died in 1264. Peter Thorau, *The Lion of Egypt: Sultan Baybars I and the Near East in the Thirteenth Century*, (New York: Longman, 1992), 142-43; Peter Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy, 1260-1290: Treaties of Baybars and Qalawun with Christian Rulers* (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 13; Holt, 69:
[61] Amitai, *Mongols and Mamluks*, 54; Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, 13; Thorau, 143-44.

The Franks of Acre at first refused the sultan, but after dispatching raiders into their territory, he was able to compel them to reconsider and accept a treaty and agree to exchange prisoners at the rate of two Muslims for one Christian. The count of Jaffa and lord of Beirut accepted similar terms. However, when the embassy from Acre returned home, the Hospitallers and Templars, perhaps emboldened by the sultan's departure from Syria for Egypt after the embassy had left, refused to ratify the treaty because they would not agree to release any prisoners; apparently they did not wish to lose the advantage of their slave labor. [62]

When Baybars returned to Syria in the spring of 1263 he again received envoys from Jaffa and Acre, as well as from Arsur. Those from Jaffa and Arsur promised to maintain peace and were treated cordially. As for the embassy from Acre—Baybars berated them on account of what he considered Frankish greed and duplicity in failing to ratify the truce of 1261. Indeed, not only had the Franks not released their prisoners, they had subsequently made territorial demands, asking for the town of Petit Guerin to be returned to them. But now that the sultan had returned to Syria at the head of an army, they pleaded with him for forgiveness and promised to honor the conditions of their agreements henceforth. He would not indulge them and soon attacked Nazareth, Mount Tabor, Bethlehem, and the *faubourg* of Acre.[63] Letters exchanged between the sultan and Hugh Revel in 1263 make it clear that the Hospitallers also broke an agreement once the sultan had left Syria for Egypt, ignoring their promise to suspend all building projects around Arsur.[64]

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[62] *Eracles*, 442; *Templare di Tiro*, 90-91; Crawford, 40; Thorau, 144.
[63] Ibn al-Furat (Lyons) 1:66-68; 2:56-57; al-Maqrizi (Quatremère), 1A, 194-97; Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, 153-56; Thorau, 145-147.
[64] Ibn al-Furat (Lyons), 1:65; 2:54; Shafi' ibn 'Ali (Michaud), 668; Amitai, "Siege of Arsuf," 77.

We have already mentioned the effect on Baybars of the realization that the Franks were in communication with the Mongols; surely the equivocation and temporizing of certain Franks and their failure to implement the terms of past agreements also contributed to the sultan's subsequent aggressiveness. In April of 1264, Baybars returned to the vicinity of Acre again devastating its suburbs and destroying the Templar mill at Doc, part of the outworks of the city's fortifications.[65] He seized Caesarea in March of 1265. The Hospitallers' violation of their promise not to build at Arsur availed them of little: the citadel fell to the Mamluks on April 29, 1265 after a siege of little more than a month.[66] Baybars ordered that both Caesarea and Arsur be demolished to prevent any possibility of their being used as beachheads for reinforcements from the West.[67] The following year, Baybars captured Halba, Arqa, and Qu'lat, though an assault on Montfort failed.[68] His armies also raided the regions around Tripoli, Tyre, and Tortosa, defeated an Armenian force and sacked Sis, and again attacked the suburbs of Acre.[69] In June, Baybars began the siege of Safad, the mighty Templar fortress in the Galilee. According to the Templar of Tyre Baybars sent gifts to the garrison as an opening to negotiations for its surrender, but the defenders threw them back using mangonels. Having had his ire provoked the sultan "swore by Mohammed that he would put them all to the sword." The castle surrendered on July 22 and the garrison was massacred, having been tricked by a

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[65] Ibn al-Furat (Lyons), 1:69; 2:57.
[66] Abu al-Fida, *Kitab al-Mukhtasar fi Akbhar al-Bashar*, vol. 4 (Cairo, 1998), 2; al-Ayni, "Perles d'Histoire," *Recueil des historiens des croisades: historiens orientaux* 2 (Paris: Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, 1876), 218-20; ATS, 451-52; *Eracles*, 450; Ibn al-Furat (Lyons), 1:86-107; 2:70-83; MST, 351-52; al-Maqrizi (Quatremère), 1B, 6-15; Shafi' ibn 'Ali (Michaud), 671-72; *Templare di Tiro*, 96-99; Crawford, 44; Irwin, *Middle East in the Middle Ages*, 49.
[67] Thorau, 162.
[68] Irwin, 47; Thorau, 167-8;
[69] Ibn al-Furat (Lyons), 1:109-11; 2:85-87; al-Ayni, 229-33; MST, 355-56.

traitor and a false promise from the sultan of safe conduct.[70] Unlike the coastal fortresses of Caesarea and Arsuf that he had demolished, Baybars ordered the refortification of Safad: it would help him hold the Galilee against the Mongols.[71]

Baybars dealt imperiously with various Frankish attempts at negotiation in 1266. An envoy from the lord of Tyre was rebuffed during the siege of Safad. In rejecting the embassy Baybars listed several grievances against Philip of Montfort, among them the lord of Tyre's responsibility in the death of the son of one of the sultan's men and Philip's failure to deliver on a promise that he and the Genoese would aid the sultan in the Mamluk attack on Acre in the spring of 1263.[72] An embassy from Guy of Ibelin, count of Jaffa since his father's death earlier that year, also came to Baybars but was turned away without any assurances.[73] A Hospitaller embassy was moderately successful, leading to the concluding of a truce in 1267. Its terms were, however, far more favorable to the sultan than the Hospitallers, who agreed to the demolition of their fortified mill at Recordane near Acre and ceded to the sultan their right to revenues and tribute from the regions of Hama and Abu Qubays as well as from the Assassins.[74] There were several other uneven agreements in 1267. Baybars extracted from Acre a concession that Sidon would henceforth be a condominium; yet in May he attacked the

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[70] Abu al-Fida, *Kitab,* 3; al-Ayni, 222-25; ATS, 452; *Eracles*, 454; Ibn al-Furat (Lyons), 1:112-122; 2: 88-96; al-Maqrizi in Quatremère, 1B, 29-30; MST, 352; Shafi' ibn 'Ali (Michaud), 674; *Templare di Tiro*, 96-99, 108-11; Crawford, 44, 50-51; Holt, *Age of the Crusades*, 95-96. On the deceit used to force Safad's surrender the Arabic and Frankish sources agree.

[71] Amitai, *Mongols and Mamluks*, 76-77. Baybars's policy of demolishing Frankish fortresses on the coast based on the fear of them being beachheads for reconquest by a new crusade and belief that he could not spare the men to garrison them in the midst of the Ilkhanid war.

[72] Ibn al-Furat (Lyons), 1:114; 2:89-90; al-Maqrizi (Quatremère), 1B, 42-43; Shafi' ibn 'Ali (Michaud), 674; Wilhelm Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen-âge*, trans. Furcy Raynaud, vol. 1 (Leipzig: O. Harrassowitz, 1885-1886), 353-54; Holt, *Early Mamluk diplomacy*, 15, 107.

[73] Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, 15.

[74] Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, 14, 32-33.

faubourg of Acre again, anyway.[75] An embassy from Beirut came to Baybars bringing Muslim prisoners and Templar envoys pleaded with the sultan not to attack their fortresses of Tortosa and Safita; he agreed in exchange for the return of 300 Muslim prisoners.[76] Representatives from Tyre came to Baybars during Ramadan (i.e. May or June) bearing the "blood price" for the son of the sultan's man. Baybars now agreed to a ten-year truce with Philip of Montfort, though it did not last long: the sultan raided the environs of the city in May of 1269.[77]

John of Jaffa had managed to secure peace for his county in 1261 and again in 1263, but his son was considerably less effective in negotiating, having had diplomatic overtures rejected in 1266 and 1267. Baybars attacked Jaffa in March of 1268. The city and citadel fell in the course of a single day.[78] The next month Beaufort succumbed in approximately two weeks' time.[79] From Antioch the sultan demanded an annual tribute of one dinar for each inhabitant.[80] The prince refused and Baybars laid siege to his city in late May; it held out for only two days and following its capture many were slaughtered or enslaved.[81] The sultan sent Bohemond VI a letter taunting him that Tripoli would also meet its doom in just a matter of time. After the fall of Antioch, the Templars abandoned

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[75] *Eracles*, 455; Ibn al-Furat (Lyons), 1:129-31; 2:102-3; MST, 352; *Templare di Tiro*, 112-15; Crawford, 52-53; see Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, 15. al-Maqrizi says the Franks of Acre sent an embassy to Baybars, and he agreed to a 10-year, 10-month, 10 day truce in exchange for a partition in half of the land surrounding Acre and Carmel. He sent to the Franks in return an envoy with gifts and some prisoners he had taken at Antioch: al-Maqrizi (Quatremère), 1B, 56-57.

[76] al-Ayni, 228; Ibn-Furat, (Lyons) 1:148-9; 2:117-118; Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, 396; Thorau, 190.

[77] Ibn al-Furat (Lyons), 1:129-31; 2: 102-3 for the truce and 1:168-69; 2:133 for its violation: according to Ibn al-Furat in retaliation for forcing Muslim prisoners to convert to Christianity and also for raiding in the vicinity of Safad.

[78] Ibn al-Furat (Lyons), 1:134-136; 2:106-8; Thorau, 188.

[79] Abu al-Fida, 4-5; al-Ayni, 226; ATS, 453; *Eracles*, 456; Ibn al-Furat, (Lyons), 1:137-42; 2:108-13; MST, 353; *Templare di Tiro*, 124-25; Crawford, 59; *Holt, Age of the Crusades*, 96.

[80] Thorau, 191.

[81] Abu al-Fida, 4-5; al-Ayni, 228-29; *Eracles*, 456-57; MST, 353; Holt, *Age of the Crusades*, 96.

their fortresses in the region, Baghras and La Roche de Russole.[82] Baybars forced on Beirut a "protectorate" in 1269—the terms of a treaty with the Lady Isabel reveal the sultan to be effectively her overlord henceforth.[83]

The most significant diplomatic overture from the Franks during these years was the embassy sent from Hugh III—king of Cyprus and regent of Jerusalem—to Baybars when the sultan was at Damascus in May of 1268.[84] A ten-year truce covering Acre, its surrounding estates, and Cyprus was agreed. Baybars sent the head of his chancery, Ibn ʻAbd al-Zahir, to Acre to ratify terms in July. From the latter we have a telling picture of the Frankish mindset at this time. Ibn ʻAbd al-Zahir brought with him twenty prisoners from Antioch as a show of good faith and to open negotiations, but Hugh III behaved haughtily towards the Muslim ambassadors and equivocated.[85] According to Ibn ʻAbd al-Zahir Hugh arrogantly attempted to seat the Muslims below his raised throne. In her study on the protocols of peacemaking in the Latin East, Yvonne Friedman identifies this gesture as an obvious "power play"—one that the ambassadors would have immediately recognized.[86] They refused, demanding seats that were equal in height to the king's. Hugh also insisted on securing a separate peace for Cyprus, temporized about the return of certain hostages "and some other clauses," and ultimately refused to ratify any peace,

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[82] Abu al-Fida, 4-5; al-Ayni, 234-35; Ibn al-Furat (Lyons), 1:162; 2:127; al-Maqrizi (Quatrèmere, 1B), 56-57; Shafiʻ ibn ʻAli (Michaud), 681; *Templare di Tiro*, 124-25; Crawford, 59; Jean Richard, *The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*, B, trans. Janet Shirley, (New York: North-Holland Publishing, 1979), 396.
[83] Holt, 42-43.
[84] Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, 69.
[85] For gift exchange see Yvonne Friedman, "Peacemaking: Perceptions and Practices in the Medieval Latin East," in *The Crusades and the Near East: Cultural Histories*, ed. Conor Kostick (New York: Routledge, 2011), 244-45.
[86] Friedman, 244.

making the excuse that he feared Charles of Anjou and could not agree to anything without his blessing.[87]

As Peter Holt has pointed out, Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir’s nephew, Shafi‘ ibn ‘Ali, also “gives a somewhat more lively account…ostensibly in his uncle’s own words, which contrast with the more formal report in the court biography.”[88] Shafi‘ claims that during the reception of the Muslim envoys in the throne room Hugh threatened them by packing it with soldiers. Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir responded to this act of intimidation by telling the king that the number of Frankish prisoners held in Egypt was greater than the number of men Hugh had called in to threaten them. Infuriated by this remark the king sent the ambassadors away, though he eventually recalled them. Unlike in Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir’s report, in Shafi’s account Hugh agreed to the terms of the treaty before the embassy departed.[89]

At the end of the decade, while Baybars waited to see what course Louis IX’s new crusade would take, the Franks in Syria enjoyed a brief respite from his onslaughts. However, once the crusade was directed at Tunis and Louis died in 1270 the sultan resumed his aggressive policies. He began the siege of Crac des Chevaliers in late February of 1271; the citadel fell on April 8th. Baybars spared the inhabitants and would eventually restore the fortifications to help him control the area around Tripoli.[90] He took the Templar fortress of Gibelcar soon after, but the Templars of Tortosa and the Hospitallers of Margat managed to secure truces in exchange for relinquishing their

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[87] Ibn al-Furat (Lyons), 1:164-65; 2:129-30; Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir, 331-33; Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, 70.
[88] Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, 70.
[89] Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, 71.
[90] ATS, 455; *Eracles*, 460; Marino Sanudo Torsello, *The Book of the Secrets of the Faithful of the Cross*, ed. Peter Lock (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2011), 355 [hereafter, MST]; *Templare di Tiro*, 136-39; Crawford, 66-67; Barber, *New Knighthood*, 160.

annual tribute from the local Muslim population and the abandonment of Chastel Blanc.[91] In June Baybars finally captured the Teutonic castle of Montfort, which he had unsuccessfully besieged in 1266. Indeed, he suffered only a single major setback against the Franks in these years: he armed a fleet to attack Cyprus in 1272, but it was wrecked off of Limassol.[92] The Mamluks would refrain from further naval adventures for the rest of the period that the Franks were in the Holy Land.

Frankish Resistance

The military strength of Frankish Syria was comprised of the Kingdom of Jerusalem's feudal levies, the troops of the military orders, mercenaries, a standing regiment of troops based at Acre and paid for by the French crown, and the haphazard arrival of support from Cyprus and the West.

The levy of Jerusalem before the disastrous Battle of Hattin was 670 knights, and it may have been comparable to that in the middle of the thirteenth century, with the shortfall of service from lands lost to the Muslims made up in money fiefs. To these would have been added the levies of Tripoli and Antioch, which, combined, were still less than that of Jerusalem proper, though nonetheless significant.[93] The Hospitallers and Templars each could supply about 300 knights with the Teutonic knights contributing significantly fewer. [94] Before he left the Holy Land in 1254, Louis IX made arrangements for a permanent garrison of a hundred French knights along with as many as a thousand

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[91] ATS, 455; MST, 355; Holt, Early Mamluk Diplomacy, 48-49; Jean Richard, *The Crusades, c.1271-1291*, trans. Jean Birrell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 419.
[92] ATS, 455; *Eracles*, 460; MST, 355; *Templare di Tiro*, 138-39; Crawford, 67; Amitai, *Mongols and Mamluks*, 125.
[93] Marshall, 51.
[94] Marshall, 52

crossbowmen, sergeants, and others to be stationed at Acre under the command of Geoffrey of Sergines, one of his most trusted knights and counselors. This regiment was to be sustained at the expense of the crown of France, a policy that continued with only minor interruption—usually when it was temporarily merged into a larger crusading host—throughout the reigns of Philip III and Philip IV down to 1291.[95] It consisted of a hundred knights along and perhaps as many as a thousand other troops.[96]

Nevertheless a basic fact of military circumstances throughout the thirteenth-century history of the Kingdom of Jerusalem is that significant Frankish manpower disadvantages in battle were a constant. Frankish armies usually numbered in the hundreds while Ayyubid, Mamluk and Mongol armies ranged in the tens of thousands.[97] At the Battle of la Forbie in 1244, fought against the Ayyubids of Cairo and their Khwarazmian allies, the Franks put into the field 600 secular knights, 600 knights from the military orders, and perhaps as many as 300 knights from Antioch and Cyprus—what was in essence the totality of their manpower available in Syria. In comparison, the forces arrayed against them may have been between twenty and thirty thousand.[98]

With these limited but not insignificant assets at their disposal, the Franks defied Baybars through frequent small-scale raiding despite the fact they surely must have expected that such raids no less than their oft-insincere diplomacy would provoke significant reprisal. In fact, they launched *chevauchées* almost constantly. Ibn al-Furat

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[95] Xavier Hélary, "De la croisade de Tunis à la chute d'Acre", *Annuaire-Bulletin de La Société de L'Histoire de France* (2005): 41-73; Christopher Marshall, *Warfare in the Latin East, 1192-1291* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 77-83; Jonathan Riley-Smith, "The Crown of France and Acre, 1254-1291," *France and the Holy Land: Frankish Culture at the End of the Crusades,* eds. Daniel H. Weiss and Lisa Mahoney (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 45-62.
[96] Marshall, 77-83; Riley-Smith, "The Crown of France and Acre, 1254-1291," 47-56.
[97] Marshall, 147
[98] Marshall, 148-50.

reports that in 1263 Baybars received letters from some of his governors "telling him that brigands had robbed them, coming sometimes from the direction of al-Atrun (Toron des Chevaliers) and sometimes from the direction of Baniyas (Belinas)" and others "complaining about the Franks, and saying that they had done things that breached the truce."[99] In January of 1264 the Hospitallers and Templars raided Lilion.[100] Franks from Jaffa attacked Ramla in March or April and Franks from Acre and Jaffaraided the lands around Ascalon in June of 1265. [101]

In November of 1265 the Franks attacked Bethsan and took plunder and prisoners there.[102] The following year Bohemond VI and a contingent of Hospitallers and Templars attempted a raid on Homs and were beaten back.[103] The Franks of Acre were again in the field in August of 1266, this time in the vicinity of Tiberias accompanied by the regent of Cyprus (and future king of Cyprus and Jerusalem), Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan. [104] The campaign began auspiciously enough but the Franks fell into an ambush, with the vanguard cut off from the rest of their force. They were quickly put to rout, with some 500 knights and footmen killed.[105] Many of the survivors were slain that night by local peasants who plundered their armor and clothing.[106]

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[99] Ibn al-Furat (Lyons) 1:64; 2:53.
[100] ATS, 451; MST, 351.
[101] ATS, 450-51; Francesco Amadi, *Chroniques de Chypre d'Amadi et de Strambaldi*, ed. René de Mas-Latrie vol. 1 (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1891), 207; MST, 351; Thorau, 149.
[102] ATS, 451; MST, 351.
[103] Ibn al-Furat (Lyons), 1:107-8; 2:84; al-Ayni, 223.
[104] *Eracles*, 450; Ibn al-Furat (Lyons), 1:127; 2: 100; MST, 351-52; al-Maqrizi (Quatrèmere), 1B, 38; RRH, no. 1348; Shafi' ibn 'Ali (Michaud), 675; *Templare di Tiro,* 96-99, 112-13; Crawford, 44, 52.
[105] Amadi, 1:207-8; ATS, 452-53; *Eracles*, 455; *Templare di Tiro,* 112-13; Crawford, 52.
[106] *Eracles*, 455; *Templare di Tiro,* 112-13; Crawford, 52.

A party from Acre raided in the vicinity of Safad in the spring of 1267 but was ambushed when returning, and many Franks were killed or captured.[107] Bohemond VI attacked one of Baybars's emirs at Jubail in 1268.[108] Just before Christmas in 1269 the Franks undertook a raid in the vicinity of Montfort. When the sultan heard report of this he sent a detachment of troops, successfully cutting off their retreat to Acre.[109] *Eracles* reports that "…so many Saracens came there that our men could not hold out. And indeed, the Sultan was there with some 1000 mounted soldiers…[that] some 200 other knights and sergeants were slaughtered, and so were as many Saracens or more."[110] The Templar of Tyre, who mistakenly dates this encounter to the spring of 1267 (possibly confusing it with that mentioned by al-Ayni), otherwise gives a helpful account:

> As they were making their way back towards Acre, the Saracens came from behind them…and they defended themselves for such a long time that the Saracens were unable to bring them down…So all the Saracens began to attack and kill the horses, and the battle was quickly over, because when one of our men was on foot, he was as good as dead. In the end those on our side were beaten and more than four hundred of them killed…[111]

Al-Maqrizi, a later (d.1444 A.D) though generally reliable source with considerable access to contemporary materials, tells us that these setbacks did not prevent the Franks from further raiding: in 1270 they attacked the vicinity of Shagur, "took possession of this place, carried everywhere devastation, and handed over the grain to the flames."[112]

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[107] Abu Shama (by way of al-Ayni, 224-25).
[108] Ibn al-Furat (Lyons), 1:163; 2:128.
[109] The Templar of Tyre places this raid in May, 1267, *Templare di Tiro*, 112-19, 126-27; Crawford, 52-55, 60, esp. 52 n.5.
[110] ATS, 453; *Eracles*, 458.
[111] *Templare di Tiro*, 112-15; Crawford, 52-53.
[112] al-Maqrizi (Quatremère), 1B, 89.

The greatest potential for counter-raiding in this period lay with the contingent of crusaders who arrived in May of 1271 with the Lord Edward of England.[113] Edward reached out to the Mongols but failed to arrange any kind of coordinated action.[114] He went out to attack St. George, a village near Acre, in July, "when it was extremely hot," with Hospitaller and Templar knights, and, the Templar of Tyre tells us, "a number of our men died there, on account of honey from bees and other things which they ate…so that they died on the road, from heat and from exhaustion and from the hot food which they had eaten."[115] Nevertheless, Edward and King Hugh aimed an attack on Qaqun near Tiberias. One Frankish sources says they "did a good deal of damage to the Saracens, and took two Turcoman encampments; they slew many Saracens and captured animals, great and small, about 12,000 of them…" although they did not accomplish their main objective of seizing Qaqun.[116] Muslim sources claim that the attack had been coordinated with a Mongol attack on northern Syria, though this is not mentioned in the Frankish sources.[117]

Acre and the sultan concluded a truce for ten years and ten months in the spring of 1272.[118] Jean Richard has suggested it was the presence of the Lord Edward and his crusaders that helped this along—even if their successes in the field had been modest.[119] This assumption is corroborated by the fact that Baybars arranged an attempt on the Lord Edward's life shortly after, on June 18, 1272, about which the Templar of Tyre gives a

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[113] ATS, 455; MST, 355-56; *Templare di Tiro*, 136-39; Crawford, 66-67.
[114] *Eracles*, 461; Amitai, *Mongols and Mamluks*, 98-99; Richard, *Crusades*, 433.
[115] *Templare di Tiro*, 138-39; Crawford, 68.
[116] ATS, 455; *Eracles*, 461; MST, 356; *Templare di Tiro*, 140-41; Crawford, 68.
[117] Al-Maqrizi (Quatremère), 1B, 101;Amitai, *Mongols and Mamluks*, 99; Thorau, 209.
[118] ATS, 455; *Eracles*, 462; MST, 356; Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, 17.
[119] Richard, *Crusades*, 433.

detailed report.[120] Edward's brother Edmund Crouchback had left Syria in May and Edward followed him in September, departing from Acre for England on the twenty-third of that month. However, it was not only the presence of Edward, clearly a nuisance to Baybars, which likely inclined the sultan to believe that a truce with the Franks was expedient at this time: Jean Richard and Malcolm Barber have both noted the importance of an intervention by Charles of Anjou—a man about whom Baybars knew much and had already had some diplomatic contact.[121]

Conclusion

It has been suggested by some scholars that the Franks were little more than passive witnesses to the events that were unfolding beyond the borders of their meager possessions; that the future of the Holy Land would be shaped exclusively by powers beyond their control; and that their destruction was not so much a matter of *if* as a matter of *when*. Such an assessment does not properly account for the fluidity of the military and political situation in Syria and Egypt. The Franks, it is true, could accomplish little on their own. However, they remained an active element in the dynamics of Syrian politics in two ways after the departure of Louis IX. The Franks constituted just enough of a military threat that the "great powers" in Syria were compelled to weigh out how potential support or opposition from the Franks might affect their struggles with each other. Also, as a beachhead for the arrival of a massive new crusading army from the West, the Franks of the Latin East continued to frighten these powers all the way up to the fall of Acre in 1291.

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[120] ATS, 456; MST, 356; *Templare di Tiro*, 140-41; Crawford, 68-69.
[121] R. Stephen Humphreys, "Ayyubids, Mamluks, and the Latin East in the Thirteenth Century," *Mamluk Studies Review* 2 (1998): 14-15.

Furthermore, there were several moments of contingency in this period—both in regard to developments within the Ayyubid, Mamluk, and Mongol polities and in regard to their struggles against each other—such that the outcome of events strikes one as far more improbable than it does inevitable. The Mamluks experienced an extraordinary run of success beginning at ‘Ayn Jalut in 1260, but the regime was fragile on either side of that pivotal year. The resurgent Ayyubid sultan of Damascus and Aleppo, al-Nasir Yusuf, might have strangled the new regime in its crib. The factionalism and political violence of the early Mamluks easily could have been their undoing: the fact that no fewer than five sultans or would-be sultans were murdered through the machinations of their household or *mamluks* between 1250 and 1260 does not suggest institutional stability. One wonders how long such a precarious situation could have continued absent the appearance of a man of Baybars’s ruthless talent.

The early Mamluk sultanate was no more in a position to summarily remove the Franks from the coast of Syria than the Ayyubids of Damascus were or those of Cairo had been. More importantly the Franks understood circumstances in precisely this way. They recognized that their days of making their destiny with the edge of their own sword were over, but a belief that opportunity as well as danger was present in their circumstances can be identified often in the 1250s and 1260s.

Chapter 3

The Crown of Jerusalem and the Nobility

Even in the face of the threat posed by Baybars, the Frankish nobility continued to play politics as they had before. Scholarship has traditionally assumed it was a sense of pragmatism and concern over the Mamluk threat that first put Hugh on the throne in 1269 in preference to his cousin Maria, and then, in 1277, gave Charles of Anjou an opening to challenge Hugh's claim.[1] The situation was in fact more complicated. While some of the nobility must have been idealists and others must have had a sense of the collective good—and all had security concerns—generally, they did whatever they could to promote their individual interests over security, stability, or legal correctitude. Much (though not all) of the Frankish nobility supported Charles's purchase of Maria's claim at first when they believed that his interests elsewhere in his far-flung lands would leave them lightly touched by his regime and allow them to continue to govern themselves. They counted on his rule bringing increased aid in terms of troops, grain, and war materiel, but little direct intervention in their affairs. However, Charles earnestly tried to establish control in Syria. He attempted this principally through placement of non-locals in important positions—little different from how the despised Frederick II had tried to rule. An accident of source survival—namely, that the Templar of Tyre is generally favorable to the Angevins—has occluded from view the resentment against them that began to emerge among the Frankish nobility not long after Charles's vassal regent, Roger of San Severino, arrived at Acre. Yet it is consistent with a pervasive attitude of

[1] Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1174-1277* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1973), 98.

acute hostility among the Frankish nobility to outsiders' involvement in the government and politics of Syria. This chapter demonstrates how that attitude, also apparent in the revolt of the Embriaco lords of Jubail against the counts of Tripoli in the same years as Charles's reign, had a decisive impact on the course of events in the Kingdom of Jerusalem.

Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan (Hugh III of Cyprus and Jerusalem)

We begin with a dispute over the regency of Jerusalem during the mid-1260s, which was a preamble to a dispute over the crown that would unfold in 1268-69. It will be recalled from Chapter 1 that Henry I of Cyprus died in 1253, leaving an infant heir, Hugh II of Cyprus. Hugh II's mother, Plaisance, brought him to Syria and the Jerusalemite High Court recognized him as royal regent for Conradin Hohenstaufen with Plaisance as his warden. When she died in 1261 Hugh II's eldest cousin, Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan, became his warden in Cyprus.[2] It will also be recalled from Chapter 1 that when Hugh II's aunt Isabella, Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan's mother, came from Cyprus in 1263 the Jerusalemite court refused to recognize her as Hugh's warden because she had not brought young Hugh II with her. Isabella deferred to her son respect to becoming Hugh II's in Cyprus; Isabella's other nephew, Hugh of Brienne, had a claim equally as good as that of Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan (all three Hughs were first cousins), but Hugh of Brienne did not pursue wardship over Hugh II in Cyprus because of his close

[2] Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan was the son of Henry of Antioch and Isabella of Cyprus, sister of King Henry I of Cyprus and second daughter of King Hugh I of Cyprus. *Templare di Tiro. Cronaca del Templare di Tiro: 1243-1314: la caduta degli stati crociati nel racconto di un testimone ocular*, trans. Laura Minervini (Naples: Liguori, 2000), 74-77, 90-91; Paul Crawford, ed., *The 'Templar of Tyre', Part III of the 'Deeds of the Cypriots'*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 30-31, 39; George Hill, *A History of Cyprus,* vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948), 151. Refer to Chapter 1 for the various kinds of regent.

relationship with Isabella.[3] When Isabella died in 1264 Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan had already been recognized by the High Court of Cyprus as Hugh II's ward there, but the child still needed a warden in Jerusalem, and Hugh of Brienne's deference to his aunt did not extend beyond the grave.

Thus, in 1264 Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan and Hugh of Brienne lodged competing claims with the High Court of Jerusalem for the right to be installed as warden for Hugh II, their cousin. Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan rested his claim on the fact that he was Isabella's son and older than Hugh of Brienne. Hugh of Brienne made his case based on the fact that, although he was younger than Hugh of Antioch, his own mother, Maria, had been the elder sister of Isabella.[4] Riley-Smith and others have argued that according to the custom and law Hugh of Brienne's case was legally stronger. However, Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan prevailed probably in no small part because he was already warden for Hugh II in Cyprus and heir-presumptive should the latter not have children.[5]

In fact, he did not. Hugh II died in November or December of 1267 at the age of fourteen and Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan was crowned at Nicosia on Christmas Eve Day.[6] In Jerusalem, however, his wardship lapsed with the death of Hugh, who, it must be

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[3] Francesco Amadi, *Chroniques de Chypre d'Amadi et de Strambaldi*, ed. René de Mas-Latrie, vol. 1 (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1891-93), 209; *Templare di Tiro*, 120-21; Crawford 56; Hill, 151.

[4] Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, 218-19.

[5] Peter Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades, 1191-1374* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 35, 89; Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility,* 220.

[6] Peter Edbury, "The Disputed Regency of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1264/6 and 1268," *Camden Miscellany* 27 (1279): 5. Peter Edbury has pointed out that one of the challenges to understanding the way the dispute unfolded in 1264 is knowing just what contemporary expectations were about whether Hugh II would ever reach the age of majority and produce offspring. If the assumption was that he would reach adulthood, then the only stakes were a temporary warden regency of Jerusalem; Hugh would come of age in 1268. If, however, Hugh was a sickly child whose prospects for reaching adulthood seemed shaky, the claimants for the warden regency would have known there could be an indefinite regency if the Hohenstaufen claimant never came East—and it was not expected that he would. Edbury has found no evidence to suggest that Hugh was sickly, but the absence of evidence is not necessarily probative.

remembered, was himself only regent for Conradin and not king as he had been in Cyprus. The issue between Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan, now Hugh III of Cyprus, and Hugh of Brienne had already been settled; acquiring the crown of Cyprus certainly would do nothing to diminish Hugh III's case for possessing the regency for Conradin in the eyes of the Jerusalemite High Court. But now another challenger arose: Maria of Antioch.[7] Maria was the *plus dreit heir* of Conradin and the closest living relative of Isabella II (Yolanda), Conradin's great-great-grandmother and the last crowned Queen of Jerusalem.[8] Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan made his case based on the fact that he was the closest living relative of Hugh II (as determined in 1264), which, according to the customs and laws of the kingdom, should not have mattered—certainly not against Maria's closer ties to Isabella II and Conradin. Hugh had never been king of Jerusalem—king of Cyprus, yes, but only regent for Conradin in Jerusalem.

It is true, as Peter Edbury has shown, the precedent had been set when Henry I succeeded Alice of Cyprus in the Jerusalem regency for Conrad in 1246 of confirming a new regent based on his relationship to the last regent rather than to the last reigning monarch. However, that argument was not the one that had carried the day in the dispute between Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan and Hugh of Brienne, in which the High Court's

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[7] "Annales de Terre sainte," ed. Reinhold Röhricht, *Archives de l'Orient latin* 2 (1884): 453 [hereafter ATS]; *L'estoire de Eracles empereur et la conqueste de la terre d'Outremer,* in *Recueil des historiens des croisades: historiens occidentaux* 2 (Paris: Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, 1859): 457 [hereafter, *Eracles*]; *Templare di Tiro*, 12-27; Crawford, 60-61. There has been some disagreement as to whether the dispute was in 1268 or 1269, and whether it was over the regency of Jerusalem or the crown. Peter Edbury has shown convincingly that the dispute belonged to 1268 and was in the first instance over the regency. See Edbury, "Disputed Regency," 9.

[8] Edbury, "Disputed Regency,"15. According to this theory, to succeed to the throne, one had to be the nearest blood relation (*plus dreit heir*) of the previous monarch, had to be bodily present in the Levant, and also had to be fully capable of performing his or her feudal duties. Also see Riley-Smith*, Feudal Nobility*, 14.

attention was focused on the relationship of the disputants to the last person in *seizen* of the crown of Jerusalem (i.e. Isabella II). Yet it proved effective here. The High Court of Jerusalem referred back to the precedent of 1246 rather than the more recent precedent of 1264, and in 1268 the regency of Jerusalem was awarded to Hugh III of Cyprus, who was also recognized as Conradin's heir. In that same year Charles of Anjou defeated Conradin at the Battle of Tagliacozzo and had him executed at Naples. The right to the crown of Jerusalem thus came to Hugh III. He was crowned by the Bishop of Lydda at Tyre on September 24th. There was a resident king of Jerusalem for the first time in decades and he happened, also, to occupy the throne of Cyprus.

Hugh III's reign proved to be a bitter disappointment to those who hoped it would inaugurate a new area of unity and coordination among the Franks. He had difficulty handling his barons in Cyprus, who refused to serve him again in Syria. Eventually he reached an agreement with them that they would serve for four months out of the year in Cyprus or in Jerusalem, but they could only be forced to do so if Hugh himself or his son led the host.[9] His difficulties were far from over: upon the death of Prince Bohemond VI, described by *Eracles* as Hugh's "cousin germain," the king of Cyprus "came to Tripoli with a great company and many men-at-arms to give aid and counsel to the young son of the prince [i.e. Bohemond VII], who was still in his minority."[10] However, Bartholomew, bishop of Tortosa had come earlier and taken custody of the child through the connivance of his mother, Sibylla of Armenia. They opposed the king, "who could not accomplish what he had come for" and thus he departed Tripoli for Acre.[11]

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[9] *Eracles*, 463-64.
[10] *Eracles* 467. Their fathers, Henry of Antioch and Bohemond V of Antioch, were sons of Bohemond IV of Antioch and Plaisance Embriaco of Jubail.
[11] *Eracles*, 467; MST, 359.

Here, too, he was thwarted. He quarreled with the Knights Templar over the Templars' purchase without his permission of the village of Fauconnerie, near Acre.[12] Discouraged at Acre by the locals whom he could not bring to heel, he left for Tyre without appointing a lieutenant.[13] However, the elements in the Kingdom of Jerusalem more inclined to reconciliation were ultimately able to convince him not to wash his hands of their affairs completely and he appointed Balian of Ibelin, lord of Arsuf, as lieutenant. Significantly, however, the Templars and the Venetians remained hostile. *Eracles* and Marino Sanudo offer a rather scathing condemnation of Hugh and his supporters, claiming that they had deliberately fomented strife and violence in the streets once Hugh had left so that the notables of the city would be forced to plead for his return and he would then look like a hero.[14]

But at this time, events that had been set in motion nearly a decade earlier offered the Frankish nobility an alternative to Hugh. This alternative came in the person of Charles of Anjou, one of the great political figures of his age. A cadet of the Capetian family (Louis IX's younger brother) and a papal ally in its war against the Hohenstaufen, Charles's star was on the rise throughout the 1260s and 1270s. He conquered the throne of Sicily in 1266, adding that rich kingdom to his other lands—Anjou and Maine, which he held as appanages of the French crown, and Provence, which he held through his wife.[15] Over the course of the following decade his authority extended beyond the Adriatic as he acquired the crown of Albania in 1272 and became Prince of Achaea in

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[12] ATS, 456; *Eracles*, 474; MST, 360.
[13] ATS, 456; *Eracles*, 464; MST, 360; *Templare di Tiro*, 148-49; Crawford, 74.
[14] Amadi, 214; ATS, 456; *Eracles*, 474; MST, 360.
[15] He defeated Conradin, the last Hohenstaufen claimant to the Kingdom of Sicily, at the Battle of Tagliacozza in the summer of 1268. Conradin was executed at Naples later that year at Charles's command.

1278. He had even set his sights on the conquest of Constantinople itself. He therefore represented to the Frankish nobility an ideal alternative to Hugh—he was wealthy and powerful, with a strong family crusading tradition, yet seemed to be preoccupied with acquiring Greece rather than asserting himself in the Latin East and appeared to offer the prospect of intervening little in its local affairs.

The exact sequence of events by which Charles of Anjou came to purchase the crown from Maria in 1277 in exchange for lands and an annuity remains somewhat unclear.[16] We do know that Maria was pushing her claim even before the death of Conradin in 1268, seeking the support of the patriarch of Jerusalem, William of Agen, who declined to give it.[17] When the High Court of Jerusalem decided in favor of Hugh she sought remedy for her grievance at Rome. She was in Sicily by the end of 1270 and continued on to Naples, and it is probably at this time that she opened negotiations with Charles.[18]

Pope Gregory X, who had been in Acre when Hugh had come to the throne, seemed to be sympathetic to Maria. In a letter to the Archbishop of Bethlehem and Nazareth from October of 1272 he instructed that Hugh was to be considered *de facto* king, but not *de jure*, pending a hearing of Maria's complaint at the papal Curia—and even that his own (i.e. Gregory's) use of the title "king" as an expedient in

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[16] *Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani* and *Additamentum,* ed. Reinhold Röhricht 2 vols. (Oeniponti: Libraria Academica Wagneriana, 1893, 1904), nos. 1411, 1486 [hereafter RRH]. Maria was paid an annuity of 4,000 *livres tournois* from the county of Anjou and 10,000 bezants from the revenues of the city of Acre, but the payments would not begin for four years. This arrangement was renewed under the same terms with Charles's successor, Charles II of Salerno, in 1289, although by this time the Angevins had effectively been ousted from the Holy Land, were embroiled in conflicts across the Mediterranean.

[17] Gian Luca Borghese, *Carlo I d'Angiò e il Mediterraneo: poltica, diplomazia e commercio internazionale prima dei Vespri* (Rome: École française de Rome, 2008), 190.

[18] Hill, 151-78.

correspondence with Hugh should not be considered by anyone to be prejudicial to Maria's case.[19] By Gregory's lights, the patriarch of Jerusalem had acted inappropriately by instructing the bishop of Lydda to proceed with Hugh's coronation following the decision of the High Court without waiting for Rome's decision on Maria's appeal, and Gregory sent three legates to inquire into the matter and summon Hugh to appear before the curia within nine months.[20] Hugh's procurators—*Eracles* tells us they were the archbishop of Tyre, the bishop of Jaffa, the seneschal of Jerusalem, and others—came to the Second Council of Lyons (1274), but the matter went unresolved.[21] They later appeared at Rome, where they insisted that the Holy See had no jurisdiction over the Jerusalemite succession—on that, they insisted, the High Court of Jerusalem alone could rule.[22]

Philip Baldwin has argued that Gregory was not necessarily ill-disposed to Hugh as king, and regularly addressed him as King of Cyprus and Jerusalem, both before and after the council. According to Baldwin, Gregory's caution in the letter was merely a sign of due diligence and probity before hearing Maria's case in Rome. Baldwin asserts that this chief priority with respect to the Jerusalemite crown was facilitating stability in order to prepare the way for a new crusade.[23] This view seems more credible than the previous scholarly consensus that Gregory had orchestrated Charles's pursuit of the crown of

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[19] Gregory X, *Registres: Recueil des bulles de ce pape publiées ou analysées d'après les manuscrits originaux des archives du Vatican*, vol. 1, ed. Jean Guiraud (Paris: E. Thorin, 1892), nos. 3, 103; Philip Baldwin, *Pope Gregory X and the Crusades* (Woodbridge, Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 2014), 123, 125-26.
[20] Hill, 164.
[21] *Eracles*, 464; John L. La Monte, *Feudal Monarchy in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1100-1291* (Cambridge, MA: The Medieval Academy of America, 1932), 78-79.
[22] Hill, *Cyprus*, 164, 190-92.
[23] Baldwin, 123-26.

Jerusalem in the hope that incorporating the Holy Land into an Angevin empire in the Mediterranean offered its best hope for survival.[24]

The Second Council of Lyons

After Maria's appeal to Rome but before Charles's purchase of her claim, Gregory X convened the Second Council of Lyons on May 7, 1274. His chief aims were to aid the Holy Land, reform the Latin Church, and pursue reconciliation with the Greek Church. He had already made contributions to the first of these during his pontificate. Raising a loan of 25,000 marks from merchants of Piacenza, Florence, and Lucca which he requested Philip III pay back on his behalf, Gregory dispatched a cohort of 500 knights and foot-soldiers with Thomas Agni, the new patriarch of Jerusalem and papal legate, in the autumn of 1272.[25] In the spring of 1273 Oliver of Termes arrived at Acre with a force of 25 mounted soldiers and 100 crossbowmen to be paid for out of a loan to Gregory from Philip III.[26] Also paid by Gregory out of this loan from the crown of France was a contingent of 400 crossbowmen that arrived in the autumn of 1273 and a contingent of 300 in the spring of 1274.[27]

The council was attended by 300 archbishops and bishops; envoys from the kings of England, France, Sicily, Cyprus, Byzantium, and the German Empire; the masters of

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[24] Jean Dunbabin, *Charles of Anjou: Power, Kingship, and State-Making in Thirteenth-Century Europe* (New York: Longman, 1998), 96; Jonathan Riley-Smith, "The Crown of France and Acre, 1254-1291," in *France and the Holy Land: Frankish Culture at the End of the Crusades*, ed. Daniel Weiss and Lisa Mahoney (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 45-62.
[25] *Eracles*, 462; Gregory X, nos. 789-92, 898; Baldwin, 82-83.
[26] *Eracles,* 463; Gregory X, no. 796; Baldwin, 85; Riley-Smith, "Crown of France and Acre," 45-62.
[27] *Eracles*, 61; Gregory X, nos. 336-37, 811; Baldwin, 86.

the Hospital and the Temple; and James I of Aragon.[28] However, neither Henry III of England nor Philip III of France, whom Gregory hoped would be leaders of a new crusade, attended. As mentioned above, the most prominent figures representing Hugh III included the archbishops of Tyre, the bishop of Paphos, and John of Grailly, seneschal of the Kingdom of Jerusalem.[29] Representing the Templars and Hospitallers were their masters, William of Beaujeu and Hugh Revel.[30] James of Aragon was the only monarch in attendance. He called for an advance contingent of 500 knights and 2,000 foot-soldiers to disembark for the East and replenish the garrisons of the castles of Syria and to be followed two years later by another 1,000 knights which he himself would lead.[31]

According to James's account, William of Beaujeu was reluctant to speak on the matter of a new crusade. He deferred to another Templar who was present on the grounds of the latter's tenure and experience in the order.[32] When bidden by Gregory to speak, William submitted that the Holy Land was in dire need of aid, but that James's proposal was not a good one. According to James's memoir, William "said there was great need for help in the land of Outremer…of every kind—arms, provisions, and still more, of troops, for there were not any there. And also people, as there were not so many there as

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[28] Sylvia Schein, *Fideles Crucis: The Papacy, the West, and the Recovery of the Holy Land 1274-1314* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 21.
[29] *Eracles* 464; Baldwin, 133.
[30] Schein, 37; Throop, 214-28.
[31] *The Book of Deeds of James I of Aragon: A Translation of the Medieval Catalan Llibre del fets*, trans. Damian J. Smith and Helena Buffery (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), section 531; Hans E. Mayer, *The Crusades* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 282-83; Schein 37-38; Throop, 228-33.
[32] *Deeds of James I*, section 532.

were needed." And yet William submitted that only between 250 to 300 knights and 500 footmen should be sent immediately.[33]

Malcolm Barber has argued that the Templars in general, and the new grand master especially, had thrown in their lot with the Angevins already.[34] The rivalry and antagonism between the Angevins and Aragonese in the Mediterranean militated against significant crusading aid from both, and William and the Templars were already affiliated with the Angevins—and probably considered them a more potent ally than James, in any case.[35] Sylvia Schein has given credence to the notion that William of Beaujeu was sincere in his skepticism of James's idea and that he truly feared his proposed contingent would do more harm than good. It certainly was too small to tilt the balance in Syria in the Franks' favor, yet was large enough to disrupt the precarious peace that had been established with the Mamluks in 1271.[36]

Both these views—that there was a partisan and also an authentically strategic aspect to William of Beaujeu's doubt—are plausible, and by no means mutually exclusive. What does not seem to be the case, contrary to the view of much past scholarship, is that there had been a sea-change in thinking by either the papacy or the western monarchs with regard to the project of a crusade. Scholars from Sylvia Schein to Norman Housley have tended to emphasize 1274 as a major turning point in crusading strategy in the west: it was believed that frequent, small expeditions (*passagia particularia*) sent to support permanent and semi-permanent garrisons in the Latin East

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[33] Baldwin, 60-61, 95-97; Malcolm Barber, *The New Knighthood: A History of the Order of the Temple* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 171; Schein, 38.
[34] Barber, 171-73.
[35] First and foremost through a Capetian connection—From 1277, William's brother was Constable of France for Philip III, Charles's nephew.
[36] See Chapter 4.

would be more effective than large expeditions (*passagia generalia*) of the type that Louis IX had undertaken in 1250 and 1270.[37]

However, through his close study of the pontificate of Gregory X, Philip Baldwin has argued that, at least in theory, launching a *passagium generale* at some point in the near future remained a central aspect of the pope's crusading policy.[38] But James I's proposal was far too modest to fill that need. It was by necessity that the council closed with the plan to hew to the more modest and less disruptive approach of augmenting the French crown's permanent garrison at Acre with small expeditions.

The Angevin Regime in Syria

Charles of Anjou purchased Maria of Antioch's rights and claims to the Jerusalemite crown in 1277, a year after Gregory X's death and sent Roger of San Severino to Acre to inaugurate his regime in the Kingdom of Jerusalem.[39] Some of the local Frankish nobility initially opposed him but the Angevins quickly succeeded in making themselves masters of Frankish Syria.[40] For the next several years they dominated its high offices and directed its foreign policy in accordance with the priorities of Charles, which were not always consonant with those of the Frankish nobility, and would maintain a presence in the Holy Land until 1286, a year after Charles's death.

Until recently Angevin rule in the Kingdom of Jerusalem has been relatively under-explored. Gian Luca Borghese and Philip Baldwin have gone some way towards

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[37] Norman Housley, *The Later Crusades, 1274-1580: From Lyons to Alcazar* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 12; Schein, 1-50.
[38] Baldwin, 99-102, 136; Schein, 16-19, 24-45.
[39] La Monte, *Feudal Monarchy*, 78-79. La Monte calls it an invasion, and claims it was about politics, not law. He is the only scholar who seems to take seriously the resentment—but does not investigate it closely.
[40] *Eracles*, 478-79.

addressing this neglect by demonstrating that Charles was far more keen on acquiring the crown of Jerusalem and tried to do so at a far earlier date (possibly as early as 1272) than had previously been assumed, and also that the Angevin archives give ample evidence of his significant commitments to the Latin East in terms of men, materiel, and money even before he acquired the crown.[41] The archives of his reign are replete with details on Charles's instructions for the organization of aid, especially in the form of grain, for the Holy Land long before 1277. From 1269 he regularly sent money and supplies, and the French regiment established by Louis IX in 1254 had a heavy Angevin component.[42] From 1277 the shipment of supplies only increased.[43]

With respect to his direct rule over Jerusalem—as in his other domains—Charles principally governed through foreign appointees rather than locals, and his government at Acre had a heavy Angevin and Italian (rather than Franco-Syrian or Cypriot) flavor.[44] He was tied to the Holy Land long before 1277 through certain key individuals and responded to their requests for aid. One individual of note was Thomas of Lentino, patriarch of Jerusalem, who was a partisan and close ally of Charles, and left Acre for Naples with two of Charles's ships in October of 1272. Geoffrey of Sergines, first commander of the French regiment, may have held the honorary title of seneschal in Sicily. Oliver of Termes, Geoffrey's successor in that post from 1273-74, enjoyed lavish financial support from Charles of Anjou; he also had first arrived at Acre on one of Charles of Anjou's ships. After 1277 Charles appointed Italian or French—rather than local Frankish—officials to enact his regime: Roger of San Severino and Odo Poilechien

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[41] Such as they are—they were unfortunately partially destroyed in 1943 by retreating Nazis. Borghese, 5-7, 188.
[42] Baldwin, 106-36.
[43] Borghese, 157, 187, 222-25.
[44] Borghese, 212, 220-33.

were his lieutenants in the government at Acre. Another key figure in supporting Charles's regime was the grand master of the Templars, William of Beaujeu, whose brother was constable of France, and was therefore closely linked to the Angevin-Capetian network. He, along with Charles's direct appointees, worked against Hugh's efforts to reestablish himself on the mainland.

There has been a tacit assumption in scholarship that because the Angevins were basically French, and because Charles of Anjou was a brother of the great Crusader King, Louis IX, whose stay in the Holy Land between 1250 and 1254 had been welcomed even following the disaster of his crusade in Egypt, and whose authority was unassailable, the local nobility would accept Charles's regime with open arms, as they had accepted Louis before him. But this proved to be far from the case, and there are a number of reasons why. In personal style and worldly ambition, Charles resembled Frederick II. Charles's policies and manner of rulership seriously rankled the local nobility. Specifically, he rarely governed through natives, a fact deeply resented in both Sicily and Jerusalem.[45] In both kingdoms, there was a profound distaste for what was perceived as foreign rule. Roger of San Severino, Oliver of Termes, Odo of Poilechien, William of Beaujeu—all to a greater or lesser extent were instrumental in carrying out the Angevin regime in Syria, and none of them belonged to the native baronage.

The Frankish nobility's hatred of the Hohenstaufen regime in the 1230s and early 1240s is well rehearsed—it is with the end of the nobility's struggle against the Hohenstaufen that this study began.[46] But in point of fact, the experience of the Angevins

[45] Borghese, 7-49, 181-204, 220-27; Dunbabin, 25-125.
[46] See, for example, La Monte's introduction in Philip of Novara, *The Wars of Frederick II Against the Ibelins in Syria and Cyprus*, trans. John L. La Monte (New York: Columbia

in the Latin East, not substantially different from that of the Hohenstaufen, has been relatively little considered. This is likely at least in part due to the fact that the very different personal commitments of the chief sources for the Hohenstaufen and Angevin regimes have given us a distorted sense of things. The narrator of the resistance to Frederick II was himself a partisan and staunch ally of the leaders of that resistance, the Ibelin family, so no complaint against the emperor was too petty to catalogue. We are made to know and feel (and, in the author's opinion, hopefully share) the nobility's hatred of Hohenstaufen rule. The narrator of the period during which the Angevins ruled in the East—or at least ruled Acre—was the personal secretary of William of Beajeu, the last grand master of the Templars to serve in the Holy Land, one of Charles of Anjou's chief instruments in the East, and a man whose brother was constable of France, and therefore had close Capetian and Angevin ties. William of Beaujeu supported Charles, and his secretary's narrative is generally supportive of the Grand Master's actions. However, the *Eracles* continuation of William of Tyre gives a fairly strong sense that the nobility were at best equivocal in their acceptance of Charles of Anjou's regime, and that they were actually quite reluctant to pay homage to Roger of San Severino when he arrived at Acre.[47]

Yet almost in spite of himself, the Templar of Tyre offers us precious clues about negative local attitudes towards the Angevins. He frequently alludes to other instances in which local nobilities were antagonized by foreign meddling—indeed, it is one of his favorite themes, and he unfailingly sees the former, the locals, in the right over the latter, the foreigners. We are told that one of the chief crimes of Bohemond V, a villainous

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University Press), 21-57; David Jacoby, "The Kingdom of Jerusalem and the Collapse of Hohenstaufen Power in the Levant," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 40 (1986): 83-101.

[47] *Eracles*, 478-79.

prince of Antioch-Tripoli, is that he favored foreigners at court in preference to his Tripolitan vassals. Perhaps even more telling is a long excursus the chronicler makes on affairs seemingly entirely unrelated to the events that form the core of his narrative: namely, he discusses Simon of Montfort's leadership of baronial resistance to King Henry III of England, whom the chronicler emphasizes had brought trouble and disorder to his realm through his favoritism of foreigners at court over his English barons.

In any event, Angevin rule was but a moment in the history of the Latin East. The policy of Charles of Anjou in the Holy Land changed substantially in 1281, following the accession to the papal throne of Martin IV, who was far more inclined than his predecessors to allow Charles to press his interests in the Aegean, and against the Greek Emperor, Michael VIII Paleologus. Charles, like kings of Sicily before him going back to the Normans, had designs on making Constantinople his own and, in the parlance of our times, he decided to pivot away from Middle Eastern affairs long before the denouement of his conflict with the locals occurred in 1286. Distracted by his preparations for winning this new prize, his attention to the Holy Land lapsed—as it did even nearer to his throne in Naples—how else to explain the Angevins' utter unpreparedness for the rebellion of the local nobility (supported by Aragonese agitators) across Sicily on March 30, 1282 that launched the Sicilian Vespers?

Revolts of the Embriaco Lords of Jubail

Complicating the struggle over the crown of Jerusalem and further highlighting the independent streak (or recalcitrance) of the local nobility was the brutal civil war that erupted in the County of Tripoli between 1277 and 1282 between Bohemond VII, titular prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli, and his chief vassals, the Embriaco lords of

Jubail. However, because of the cross-currents which put Hugh III and Charles's faction in the East at odds—with the nobility to some extent playing the two parties against each other—this local dispute spread to the Kingdom of Jerusalem as well as Cyprus.

There were in fact many aspects to the conflict in Tripoli. One background element was Bohemond V (1233-1251) of Antioch-Tripoli's marriage to Lucy of Conti, a relative of pope Innocent III. Lucy exerted significant influence in her husband's domains; a contemporary chronicler living in the Latin East tells us that she was resented by the local nobility because she was a foreigner and because she encouraged the immigration of—and gave preferment to—her family and other 'Romans' who began to flood the county. She particularly inflamed local sentiment against her by installing her brother, Paul of Segni, as the bishop of Tripoli while she was regent for her son Bohemond VI after her husband died in 1252.[48]

Bohemond VI came of age later that year and took over from his mother, soon turning his attention to two conflicts that had begun to unfold in the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Of particular importance for our subject here is the fact that Bohemond VI and his chief vassals, the various branches of the Embriaco family, supported different sides in the war of St Sabas. The Embriaco were of Genoese extraction; the family had played a critical role in establishing the county of Tripoli in the early twelfth century and had been of major importance there ever since. However, they also continued to feel a sense of kinship and affinity for their Ligurian cousins, and supported them in the East against the Venetians while Bohemond supported the latter.

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[48] Nicholas III, *Registres: Recueil des bulles de ce pape publiées ou analysées d'après les manuscrits originaux des archives du Vatican*, vol.1, ed. Jules Gay (Paris: A. Fontemoing, 1898), no. 520; *Templare di Tiro*, 74-77; Crawford, 30-31.

Some time in 1258 a Genoese band was raiding in Acre and was confronted in a street called *La Carcaisserie* by Bohemond VI and a contingent of his knights. Bohemond ordered one of his chief vassals, Bertrand II, a cousin of Henry Embriaco, lord of Jubail, and a scion of a cadet branch of the family, to charge them.[49] Bertrand refused; Bohemond insisted; Bertrand finally acquiesced to attack, but as he rode forward he turned his lance around so the blunt end rather than the point faced forward and identified himself by name to signal to the Genoese that he was a friend and kinsman. Bohemond was livid at this act of defiance and henceforth he seems to have treated the entire Embriaco clan with deep suspicion and antipathy.[50]

Meanwhile, in Tripoli the influence of Lucy of Conti and the Roman party continued to be a source of resentment among the local nobility, including the Embriaco. Combined with the animosity stirred up in the war of St Sabas and the disfavor shown by the count after the episode involving him and Bertrand at Acre, many of Bohemond's Embriaco vassals broke out in rebellion during the course of the following year (1259).[51] They were led by Bertrand and William of Antioch, who was Bertrand's cousin and the lord of Botron.[52] In a skirmish outside the city of Tripoli, Bohemond was defeated and

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[49] This was the "Porcelet" branch of the family. See Jean Richard, "Le comté de Tripoli dans les chartes du fonds des Porcellet," *Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes* 130 (1972): 339-82, esp. 348-66.

[50] *Templare di Tiro*, 74-77; Crawford, 30-31. On the Embriaco family in Syria, see Emmanuel Rey, "Les Seigneurs de Giblet," *Revue de l'Orient latin* 3 (1895): 398-422, cited in Crawford, 33 n.1. In 1157, William II Embriaco, lord of Jubail, had four sons: Hugh succeeded him as lord of Jubail (becoming the senior branch of the family) and Bertrand, Raymond, and William sired junior lines of the family. In the senior line (i.e the lords of Jubail) William II sired Hugh II who sired Hugh III. Hugh III sired Guy I of Jubail. Henry, lord of Jubail in the 1250s (i.e., during these events), was the eldest of the three sons of Guy I, lord of Jubail, and Alix of Antioch, the sister of Bohemond IV.

[51] *Eracles,* 441; RRH, no.1201; *Templare di Tiro*, 74-77; Crawford, 30-31; Jean Richard, "Les comtes de Tripoli et leurs vassaux sous la dynastie antiochénienne," *Crusade and Settlement*, ed. Peter Edbury (Cardiff; University College Press, 1985), 213-24.

[52] Richard, "Les comtes de Tripoli," 216

wounded by the rebels. He vowed to have his revenge, and he exacted it soon after by contracting some of Bertrand's peasants to ambush and murder him while he was out inspecting his lands. Bertrand was decapitated and his head was brought in a basket to Bohemond.[53] Although Bertrand's father Hugh tried to continue the Embriaco rebellion in his son's stead, the loss of their leader robbed the rebels of their appetite for war, and the Templars were able to mediate a truce.[54]

Both the Angevins and William of Beaujeu would play key roles in a new round of internal discord in Tripoli following the death of Bohemond VI in 1275. Because Bohemond VII had not yet come of age, his mother and Bohemond VI's widow, Sibylla of Armenia, introduced as regent Bartholomew, bishop of Tortosa—we have already seen how the efforts of Hugh III to claim the regency during his cousin's minority failed.[55] There had been ties between the Angevin court and Tripoli even during the reign of Bohemond VI, and it has been suggested that Bohemond VII's mother, an Armenian princess, may have brought in the Bishop of Tortosa in part to counter growing Angevin influence in the county.[56] Apparently, the knights of Tripoli were not at all pleased by having a churchman set above them in the regency, but at least for the moment they accepted him as a counterweight to both the Roman and Angevin elements in the kingdom, both of which were perceived as foreign interlopers.[57]

However, once Bohemond came of age in 1277 he embraced the opportunity for closer ties with Charles of Anjou, presumably against his mother's wishes. There were

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[53] *Templare di Tiro*, 76-77, Crawford, 31-32; Richard, "Les comtes de Tripoli," 217.
[54] RRH, no. 1201; Richard, "Les comtes de Tripoli," 216.
[55] *Eracles,* 467; MST, 358-60; *Templare di Tiro*, 142-43; Crawford, 69-70.
[56] Borghese 191-92. For Bartholomew, Bishop of Tortosa, see Bernard Hamilton, *The Latin Church in the Crusader States: The Secular Church* (London: Variorum Publications, 1980), 235, 237-41.
[57] *Templare di Tiro*, 142-43; Crawford, 69-70; Barber, 173; Borghese, 192.

frequent embassies from the count of Tripoli to the Angevin court. Bohemond VII's sister, Lucy, married Narjot of Toucy, admiral of Apulia. Another sister of Bohemond's also married a man of the Angevin court, and in 1278 Bohemond's own marriage to Marguerite, daughter of the viscount Louis de Beaumont, kinsman of Charles, was sealed by proxy with a dowry of ten thousand bezants per year drawn from the rents of Tripoli.[58]

Bohemond also had warm relations with the Embriaco at first.[59] However, this was to change quickly when the count broke a promise to Guy II Embriaco, lord of Jubail, that his brother could have the hand of a local heiress in marriage.[60] After making this promise, the count changed his mind and instead allowed the heiress to marry the nephew of the Bishop of Tortosa at the latter's request. Aggrieved by this betrayal, the lord of Jubail hastily compacted his brother's marriage, then fled to the Templar house at Acre where he became a *confrère* of the order. William of Beaujeu gave Guy thirty knights to defend Jubail against the reprisal by Bohemond that the lord knew was coming.

Meanwhile, there was another issue coming to a head in Tripoli. Paul of Segni, the bishop of Tripoli, whose foreign influence had been so deeply resented in the 1250s, was a friend of William of Beaujeu (they had met at the Council of Lyons in 1274) and had also become a *confrère* of the Temple. This common link with the Templars led to nothing short of a diplomatic revolution in the county of Tripoli with respect to the Embriaco family and the so-called Roman party of Paul of Segni.[61] Sometime in the

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[58] Borghese, 191, 193-94.
[59] Guy II Embriaco, lord of Jubail, was the son of Henry of Jubail and Isabella of Beirut. and who played such an important role in the events of 1277-1282: see Rey, 7.
[60] The Templar of Tyre gives his Embriaco and Ibelin lineage: *Templare di Tiro*, 144-45; Crawford, 71; Richard, "Les comtes de Tripoli," 217-19.
[61] Barber, 173; Richard, "Les comtes de Tripoli," 215-21.

winter of 1277-78 a riot broke out in the city in which four Roman knights were killed and Paul of Segni was assaulted.[62] He took refuge in the Temple, which was attacked by men in the service of Bohemond and the Bishop of Tortosa, who now conflated Paul's partisans, the Embriaco, and the Templars because of Guy's and Paul's affiliation with—and appeal to—the Templars.[63] Bohemond VII was excommunicated and Tripoli placed under interdict by the bishop of Tripoli, which precipitated a new round of violence.[64] This private animosity seems not to have been neutralized by Bohemond's ties to the Angevins—while Charles seems to have been able to rely on the Templar grand master for support against Hugh III, William nevertheless felt free to act as he pleased with respect to the count of Tripoli.

Bohemond VII proceeded to demolish the Templar house in Tripoli and cut down the order's wood at Montroque.[65] In retaliation, William of Beaujeu laid siege to Nephin. Over the course of the following year, amidst several truces that did not hold, Bohemond launched unsuccessful attacks against Jubail and Sidon (which belonged to the Templars) while the Templar-Embriaco alliance launched several unsuccessful assaults on Tripoli.[66] Finally, in 1282 the lord of Jubail, apparently at William of Beaujeu's urging, attempted to accomplish through cunning what he could not achieve by force. Guy hired a Genoese

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[62] For the difficulty of dating this event exactly, see Richard, "Les comtes des Tripoli," 217-18 and note 35.
[63] MST, 362-64.
[64] Nicholas III, nos.104, 520; *Templare di Tiro*, 150-51; Crawford, 75; Borghese, 193; Hamilton, 238-39. In his capacity as the vicar of the Patriarch of Antioch, whose ecclesiastical authority was greater than the bishop of Tripoli's, Bartholomew countermanded the latter's order of excommunication. Pursuant to this, Bartholomew was cited to appear in Rome to answer charges made against him by the bishop of Tripoli, but nothing came of it—at least nothing that diverted Bohemond from his course of action against the Templars and the Embriaco.
[65] *Templare di Tiro*, 146-47; Crawford, 72-73.
[66] RRH, no. 1444; *Templare di Tiro*, 146-49; Crawford, 73-74; Richard, "Les comtes de Tripoli," 219.

galley and came to Tripoli with some trusted allies and more than four hundred troops.[67] They lay off shore and Guy landed at night, having arranged to wait in the Templar house in the city with his men and take Bohemond by surprise.

However, the commander of the Templars, a Brother Reddecoeur, was not there. Guy and his knights panicked and fled to the Hospitaller house in Tripoli, but not before being discovered. Bohemond was awakened and came with his men to surround the Hospital. The commander of the Hospital brokered a settlement between Guy and Bohemond—that Guy should spend five years in prison, but after that he should be exonerated and allowed to return to his lands. Bohemond swore on the gospels to uphold the agreement, but when Guy surrendered, the prince had him seized. He ordered his men to 'put out the eyes of all the Genoese and foreigners.' As for the men of Jubail, Bohemond ordered the Embriaco lord and his followers to be thrown into a ditch which was then covered over and where they were starved to death.[68]

Conclusion

The actions of the nobility between the mid-1260s and mid-1280s were driven by a need to gain aid for the defense of the kingdom; a desire to resist the assertion of any meaningful royal authority over them; and a resentment of what they considered meddling by overseas Franks. However, they did not hold these priorities necessarily in that order, and the latter two were not entirely compatible with the first. This chapter has argued that, in fact, the nobility's hostility to royal authority and their resentment of "foreign" Franks trumped their hope for external aid.

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[67] Louis de Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan*, vol.3 (Paris, Imprimerie impériale, 1861), 662-68.
[68] *Templare di Tiro*, 156-59; Crawford, 78-79.

The words of John of Ibelin, Old Lord of Beirut, according to Philip of Novara's "Memoir" concerning Hohenstaufen imperial pretensions in Cyprus and Jerusalem underscore both the truculence of the local nobility and its obvious attachment to its native lands and institutions, and could just as well describe their sentiments under Angevin rule. The Old Lord claims that should his cause fail and the Hohenstaufen be victorious, he did not wish

> that any one of my family who bears the name of Ibelin should remain [in the East]. If we conquer, each will have his part in the honor and profits; if we lose, we will all die together and for God in our rightful heritage, there where most of my relatives have been born and died.

When arguing to his supporters to make plans for defending his seat at Beirut, he further emphasizes his attachment, not only to guarding his honor and his principles, but also to his native land:

> If I do not start now I know well that the castle will be lost and all the country after it. If God gives me grace to pass over all will be recovered and there will be great honor; if Our Lord wills that I die, may it be on the way, for I prefer to die before I know my loss than after. Nor ever, if God pleases, in my time shall be lost the land of my lord or mine own.[69]

Occupied with quelling the uprising in Sicily and fighting the Aragonese Charles could do nothing for Syria after 1282. He died in 1285 with his son and heir; even the members of the Syrian and Cypriot nobility who had supported them could see they could gain nothing from the Angevins anymore, and decided to embrace the Lusignans. Although Hugh III had died in 1284, his third son, Henry II, crossed to the mainland from

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[69] Philip of Novara, *Guerra di Federico II in Oriente (1223-1242)*, ed. and trans. Silvio Melani (Naples: Liguori, 1994), 152-55; *The Wars of Frederick II against the Ibelins in Cyprus and Syria*, ed. and trans. John L. La Monte (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936), 127-28.

Cyprus in the summer of 1286 and was crowned at Tyre. He thus united the two Latin kingdoms under one universally recognized, local king for the first time since 1205.

Chapter 4

The Fall of Acre

The final years of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem's existence were as turbulent as any that had preceded them—both in terms of its domestic politics and foreign diplomacy. The plight of the Angevins paved the way for a Lusignan restoration in the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Although Hugh III died in 1284 and his son and successor John died the following year, Hugh's next eldest son, Henry, came to Syria in the summer of 1286 and was crowned at Tyre as Henry II.

Meanwhile, the troubles that had wracked Tripoli since the 1250s had not yet run their course. In 1287 Bohemond VII died without a child. His sister, Lucy, was his rightful heir, but the local nobility did not wish for her and her husband, an Angevin noble, to rule in the county. Nor would they accept the regency of Bohemond's mother—her effort to restore the despised prelate Bartholomew, bishop of Tortosa, led to a final revolt by the Embriaco lords of Jubail. Backed by the majority of Tripoli's knights and burgesses and promised support from Genoa, Bartholomew Embriaco proclaimed a commune. However, it soon became apparent that Genoa had no intention of being a junior party in any power-sharing arrangement in Tripoli, and they sent a *podestà* to assert direct control there. Fear of Genoese domination—either from initial supporters of the commune who had changed their mind once they realized how fully the Genoese intended to intrude, or by Venetians to whom Genoese involvement always would have been intolerable—resulted in the two Franks introduced above reaching out to the sultan of Egypt.

For their part, the Mamluks also faced major transitions in this period. Baybars, scourge of Armenians, Franks, and Mongols—the man who had stabilized the Mamluk regime in Cairo after its first turbulent decade (1250-1260)—died in 1277. Despite his efforts to prepare the way for his son, Baraka Khan, to succeed him, one of Baybars's emirs, Qalawun, seized power shortly after the sultan's death.[1] Meanwhile, the Ilkhanid Mongols remained determined to return to Syria in force and crush the Mamluks after their humiliating defeat at 'Ayn Jalut in 1260. Möngke Timür, brother of Abagha, the Ilkhan, led an invasion in the fall of 1281. His host was met and defeated outside of Homs by Qalawun's army on October 29. Although a key victory for the Mamluks, it came at a high cost in terms of causalities, a fact that made the Mamluks especially vulnerable to the arrival of a new crusade from the west or a Franco-Mongol alliance.[2]

This chapter has two goals. The first is to narrate the events of the years c.1287-1291 with special attention to how the Franks of Acre were caught up in the cross-currents of interests beyond their shores—especially long-distance commerce—yet even still retained agency and a hand in their own fate. The second goal is to embrace the subjectivity of the source material. As seen in Chapter 2, letters to the West offer valuable insight into the mindset of the Frankish nobility and how it changed within a relatively compressed time period—in this case between the early 1270s and 1291. These, along with the account of the Templar of Tyre, offer an intimate portrait of the lived experience of the Franks, who, only at the very end, comprehended that what had survived for nearly two hundred years—the Kingdom of Jerusalem—was lost.

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[1] al-Malik al-Sa'id Muhummad Baraka Khan is not to be confused with the Berke Khan who was
[2] R. Stephen Humphreys, "Ayyubids, Mamluks, and the Latin East in the Thirteenth Century," *Mamluk Studies Review* 2 (1998): 1-17.

Last Diplomatic Hopes

In May of 1273, Hugh Revel, master of the Hospitallers, wrote to Guy Dampierre, count of Flanders, announcing the death of Thomas Bérard and the election of William of Beaujeu as master of the Templars, claiming to Guy that the selection hade been made by the Templars at least in part "out of reverence for you and the king of France…" As for the state of the Holy Land, he reported rather laconically that it was poor (*malvais*). Hugh Revel concluded his short letter with a lament that the Holy Land "has no hope of survival without your assistance, and that of the king of France, and of other lords overseas."[3]

Thomas Agni, patriarch of Jerusalem and bishop of Bethlehem, wrote to Rudolph I of Germany twice in 1275. One of his letters details the Holy Land's destitution (*inopia*) and Baybar's recent campaigning in Armenia and Tripoli (*pressi sint*).[4] The other warns that Baybars was "zealously preparing the necessary equipment for expunging our cities…"[5] Hugh III of Cyprus and William of Beaujeu each also wrote to Rudolph in that year describing the "mournful events" in the Holy Land and seeking aid. [6]

In a letter dated September 30, 1275 Hugh Revel wrote to Edward I reporting that the Ilkhanids were on the move, and also that a great illness had struck the sultan's army

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[3] *Archive de l'Orient latin* 2, ed. Paul Riant, vol. 1 (Paris: E. Leroux, 1881-84), 390-91; *Cartulaire general de l'ordre des hospitaliers de S. Jean de Jerusalem*, *1100-1310,* ed. Joseph Delaville le Roulx, 4 vols. (Paris: E. Leroux, 1894), 3:3507 [Hereafter, *Cart. Hosp*.].
[4] *Codex Epistolaris Rudolphi I Romanorum Regis*, ed. Martin Gerbert (Sankt Blasien, Germany, 1772), no.5; RRH, no. 1405.
[5] *Codex Epistolaris Rudolphi*, no. 4; RRH, no. 1410.
[6] *Codex Epistolaris Rudolphi*, no.5; *Eine Wiener Briefsammlung zur Geschichte des deutschen Reiches und der österreichischen Länder in der zweiten Hälfte des XIII. Jarhunderts,* ed. Oswald Redlich (Vienna, 1894), 63-64, no. 55; RRH, nos. 1405, ad. 1402b.

while it was returning from a campaign in Cilician Armenia, and therefore that it had been greatly weakened.[7] In a letter dated Oct 2, 1275, William of Beaujeu wrote to Edward that the sultan had raided around Acre and its suburbs on 15 September, that great expenses continued to be incurred by the order, and that its resources were stretched impossibly thin. In asking for aid he wrote that "nothing good can be said" about the state of the Holy Land and that when he had returned to Acre he had found its inhabitants "inconsolable."[8] He continued:

> the inhabitants on this side of the sea see him [Baybars] as a greater threat to them than the previous ones. Although the arrival of the Tartars is frequently mentioned elsewhere—a rumor, it is said, orchestrated by the sultan—a stronger rumour says that the enemy actually wishes their arrival and from possible premeditated perversity will cause damage in those places that have remained Christian, especially as the Christians now have a stronger belief in the Tartars' arrival.

As for his own order, he describes it as "weaker and more fragile than it ever was in the past; food is lacking, there are many expenses, [and] revenues are almost non-existent." Fearful that the Templars would "fail in our duty and abandon the Holy Land in desolation" he pleaded for help to sustain them until the coming of a *passagium generale*.[9]

The military threat of the Mamluks and uncertainty about what to expect from a return of the Mongols to Syria was exacerbated by rampant drought, famine, and inflation

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[7] "Lettres inédites concernant les croisades (1275-1307)," ed. Charles Kohler and Charles Langlois, *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes* 52 (1891): no.1; RRH, no. 1403.
[8] As discussed in Chapter 3, William of Beaujeu, though having long served in Syria, was in the West in for the Second Council of Lyons in 1274.
[9] Barber and Bate, 162-63; Kohler and Langlois, no. 2; RRH, no.1404. Also see Jonathan Riley-Smith, The *Knights Hospitaller in the Levant, c.1070-1309* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 86-88.

throughout the region. Aspects of these complications are detailed in letters from the early 1280s. Geoffrey, bishop of Hebron, wrote to Edward of England in October of 1280 about dire inflation and a plague of locusts that had ravaged crops in Cyprus and Armenia. In it he laments that Charles of Anjou could provide the Holy Land no aid because of his distraction by affairs elsewhere and complains of the Mamluks' refusal to abide by a treaty that was in place until March of 1281.[10] He also relays rumors of the Mongols returning to Syria with 50,000 horsemen and their rather imperious demand of the leaders at Acre that the Franks aid them with manpower and supplies.[11] Finally, he claims that the Ilkhan's messengers told the Franks of Acre that he would deliver them from the Mamluks.[12]

The Grand Master of the Hospital, Nicholas Lorgne, wrote to Edward in June of 1280 that the Holy Land was in "a most weakened position" and that it was suffering from "great pestilence and famine" both in the Frankish and Muslim parts of Syria, as well as in Cilician Armenia and Cyprus, and that the price of a measure (*mine*) of wheat had skyrocketed to four bezants—and none is to be found in any case.[13] In September of 1281, Nicholas wrote to Edward again and, like the bishop of Hebron, reported the imminent return of the Mongols to Syria and stating that "the land has never been in greater trouble, because the Mongols have come fearlessly, and Möngke Timür, brother

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[10] The letter cites the recent slaughter of some thirty Christians on the road between Acre and Tyre.

[11] They in fact had made a brief incursion into Syria in September but were mustering for a full-scale invasion the following year. Reuven Amitai, *Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 1260-1281* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 183-87; Irwin, *Middle East in the Middle Ages*, 66.

[12] RRH, no. 1436; Thomas Rymer, *Foedera*, vol. 1 (London, 1704-35), 88-89.

[13] *Lettres de Reis, Reines et autres personages des cours de France at d'Angleterre depuis Louis VII jusquii Henri IV, tirées des archives de Londres par Brequigny*, ed. Jacques Joseph Champollion-Figeac, vol. 1 (1162-1300) (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1839), no. 253.

of Abagha, king of the Mongols [Ilkhan], was, as of the sending of this letter two days' ride from Armenia with 100,000 horsemen."[14] The letter warns that the Mongols were preparing to invade Syria the following month, in October, while the Sultan of Egypt had his entire host at Damascus and was making ready to join battle with them.[15] It claims that, although the Franks still did not know definitively what would come of the Mongols' actions, the latter seemed to want to make common cause against the Mamluks. In the meantime, the Hospitallers had reinforced the garrison at Margat out of fear that Qalawun would ignore the truce they have in place with him.[16]

In a letter to Edward dated March 31, 1282, Joseph of Cancy, the Hospitaller treasurer at Acre, reported on the lead-up and aftermath of the battle of Homs. He claims the sultan of Egypt came to the battle with 50,000 horsemen and the Mongols had 40,000.[17] He describes the battle as essentially a draw—the Mongols retreated, but the Mamluks had suffered terrible causalities. The sultan took counsel with his emirs about what route was the best by which to return to Egypt. Roger of San Severino sent messengers to the sultan, but the sultan, not wanting the Franks to see "the bad state his army was in and the misfortune that had befallen them, sent a courteous reply to Acre and departed under cover of darkness "to get back to Egypt.

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[14] Kohler and Langlois, no. 4.
[15] See Holt, *Age of the Crusades*, 102.
[16] For the Ilkhanids and the Franks, see Amitai, *Mongols and Mamluks*, 94-102 and Jackson, *Mongols and the West,* 166-86; also see Riley-Smith, *Knights Hospitaller,* 86-88. On the invasion of Syria, see Amitai, *Mongols and Mamluks*, 183-87.
[17] Muslim sources offer a wide range of estimates of the armies' size. See Amitai, 193-95 and Irwin, *Middle East in the Middle Ages*, 66. Cancy's understanding of what transpired does not agree with the unfolding of the battle as generally agreed on by modern scholarship, which has viewed it as far less costly and far more decisive for the Mamluks than the impression given by Cancy. See Riley-Smith, *Knights Hospitaller*, 86-88 for Joseph of Cancy or Chauncy.

According to Cancy, Cairo was in fear and disarray after the return of the army: the sultan executed fifteen emirs—those who had deserted him in battle. Those who had remained in Egypt rather than joining the muster at Damascus he allowed to continue to remain there—in prison. On account of this everyone was "discouraged and bitter," and some refused to go to Syria. Although the Holy Land suffered drought and "diverse other pestilence," the Mamluks suffered similarly, and were also fearful of war. For these reasons, the time was ripe for a new Crusade, for "the Holy Land had never been so susceptible to (Christian) conquest" as it was at that moment.[18] Nicholas Lorgne wrote yet again to Edward I in March of 1282, also reporting his understanding of the clash at Homs. He claims that the sultan was "most distressed and heavily pursued" and had lost 30,000 men, and that the Mongols would return again the next winter. Like that sent by Cancy, this letter describes Egypt as severely weakened and the position of the Christians as considerably improved.

From these letters we see that there was no universal attitude among the Franks about how to interpret and react to their circumstances vis-à-vis the Mongols, and that their understanding of the outcome of the Battle of Homs was confused—modern scholarship has judged it to have been a Mamluk rout.[19] There is not the same sheer terror evident now that there had been in the late 1250s, but even with the ascendance of the Mamluks since then, the Mongols still were by no means obvious allies. The Frankish attitude is best characterized as one of circumspection, and Frankish-Mongol relations remained fluid and uncertain.[20] The Franks remained unresolved about what to make of

[18] Champollion-Figeac, 288-95, no. 231; Riley-Smith, *Knights Hospitaller*, 86-88.
[19] Amitai, 187-201; Holt, *Age of the Crusades*, 102.
[20] Thus, the binary concerning this topic—either the Franks missed an opportunity for an alliance, a view of which René Grousset was a major proponent; or Peter Jackson's view that there never

the Mongols—how much to embrace them or continue to fear them as a threat commensurate with that of Egypt.

Meanwhile, the Franks continued to try to forestall the Mamluks through negotiation.[21] While the treaties established in this period generally were strongly slanted in favor of the latter, they nevertheless allowed the Franks to continue to preserve some hope of being redeemed by means of a new crusade or a decisive Mongol victory over the Mamluks.[22] A truce had been concluded between Baybars and Bohemond VII in July 1275 and renewed for ten years in 1281 with Qalawun. Shafi‘ ibn ‘Ali ‘al-Asqalani, a clerk in Qalawun's chancery and cousin to the head of the chancery, Fath al-Din Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir, helped negotiate the terms in 1281 and recorded his recollections of the negotiation.[23] The sultan spoke in Turkish, which was translated into Arabic for the benefit of the Frankish ambassador, who spoke the latter but not the former. The Frank asked for a renewal of the truce that had been agreed upon between Bohemond and Baybars. Qalawun agreed, but stipulated he would not include the town of ‘Arqa, "even though it is included in the [original] truce." Qalawun argued that he now possessed ‘Arqa and had every right to it, because when the original terms of the treaty had been negotiated, the Franks had promised that they would hand over "a good deal of wealth

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could have been an alliance between the Franks and Mongols because of the latter's ideology of universal empire—must be considered too rigid. For an in-depth consideration of the historiography on this topic, see Peter Jackson "The Crisis in the Holy Land," *The English Historical Review* 95 (1980): 481-513 and *Mongols and the West*, 119-23, 166-86.

[21] Rymer, 188-89.

[22] Humphreys, 7-10. On the process of treaty-making between Franks and various Muslim powers in Syria in the thirteenth century, see Chapter IV in Köhler, *Alliances and Treaties between Frankish and Muslim Rulers in the Middle East*, ed. Peter Holt. (Leiden: Brill, 2013). Also see Yvonne Friedman, "Peacemaking: Perception and practices in the Medieval Latin East," in *The Crusades and the Near East: Cultural Histories*, ed. Conor Kostick (New York: Routledge, 2011), 229-57.

[23] Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, 58-62.

and a number of Muslim prisoners…"[24] According to Shafi' ibn 'Ali, the Franks had stalled, equivocated, and never produced any wealth or prisoners, so Baybars seized 'Arqa. Even now, the present ambassador was "argumentative, sly and cunning."

Nevertheless, the two parties did agree that 'Arqa was to remain in the sultan's hands. Tripoli, Botron and its environs, Jubail and its environs, and Arqa remained in the Count of Tripoli's hands. The sultan's agents were to continue collecting bridge tolls on the way to Tripoli, while no new military fortifications were permitted for either side and shipping was to remain immune from assault. Finally, it was stated that "[t]his shall not be abrogated by the death or change of either party, nor by an invasion by the Franks or the Mongols; but this truce shall remain."[25]

That same year the Hospitallers led a successful raid from Margat, and even when a much larger party of "Turcomans and Turks from Babylon" fell upon them while they were returning to the citadel, they were victorious.[26] Even so, Qalawun agreed to a truce that Robert Irwin has described as quite favorable to the Hospitallers, obviously the result of the sultan's efforts to protect his flank while he prepared to meet the Ilkhanids in northern Syria.[27] When the Mongols returned to Syria in the fall of 1281, Bohemond VII and the Hospitallers allied themselves with them, and the Franks raided in the Biqa' valley while Mongol forces devastated the area around Aleppo, most of whose

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[24] 'Arqa, a town which Holt describes as being "situated in a fertile and well-watered region, and stregically placed on the route from Tripoli to Hims," had long been a bone of contention between the Franks and Mamluks. See Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, 18, 59.
[25] Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy,* 65.
[26] "Annales de Terre sainte," ed. Reinhold Röhricht, *Archives de l'Orient latin* 2 (1884): 457 [hereafter, ATS]; *Cronaca del Templare di Tiro: 1243-1314: la caduta degli stati crociati nel racconto di un testimone ocular*, ed. and trans. Laura Minervini (Naples: Liguori, 2000), 152-53 [hereafter, *Templare di Tiro*]; *The 'Templar of Tyre', Part III of the 'Deeds of the Cypriots,'* trans. Paul Crawford, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 75-76; Amitai, *Mongols and Mamluks*, 185.
[27] *Cart. Hosp*. 3:3766; Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy,* 63; Irwin, *Middle East in the Middle Ages*, 66; Riley-Smith, 86.

inhabitants fled to Damascus. The Hospitallers then successfully defended Margat against Mamluk retaliation for their cooperation with the Mongols.[28] The following year, 1282, William of Beaujeu succeeded in renewing the Templar's truce of 1271. The Templar port and castle of Tortosa were to remain inviolate but no new construction was permitted. Of note is the clause dealing with shipwreck: Frankish shipwrecked goods and people were to be returned into Frankish hands and Muslim shipwrecked goods and people were to be returned into Muslim hands.[29]

A treaty struck between Qalawun and the Franks of Acre in June of 1283 was a renewal of a 1272 treaty. The Franks of Acre had been pleading with the sultan for a renewal. Qalawun agreed, but stipulated that the Frankish ambassadors must come by sea—according to Peter Holt this provision was intended to preclude acts of espionage in the sultan's lands. This was the treaty abrogated by the events of 1291 leading to the final siege and conquest. As was typical, there was a clause forbidding any new construction or repairs by the Franks. The lords of Acre were required to give the sultan two months' warning in the event of a new crusade. Should Muslims flee from northern Syria in the face of renewed Mongol attack, the Franks were "required to guard and defend them, and to obstruct those who seek to harm them; and they shall be safe and secure in what they have with them."[30]

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[28] *Templare di Tiro*, 154-54; Crawford, 77; Riley-Smith, *Knights Hospitaller*, 86; Prawer, *Royaume latin*, 521.
[29] RRH, no. 1447; Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, 66-68; Köhler, 295.
[30] Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, 69-91.

In 1285 the Lady Margaret of Tyre and Qalawun renewed a treaty that had originally been agreed upon by her deceased husband, John of Montfort, lord of Tyre, and Baybars in the year 1271.[31] This treaty included a rather astonishing clause:

> None of the soldiery, troops and allies of our lord the Sultan shall make an attempt against the Lady, Dame Margaret, the Lady of Tyre, in her person, her knights or her companions, except the Isma'ilis [i.e. the Assassins] who are under the jurisdiction of our lord the Sultan.[32] Our lord the Sultan may dispatch whom of them he wishes to the Lady of Tyre with evil and injury when he wishes.[33]

Margaret's father-in-law, Philip of Montfort had been assassinated on Baybars's orders in 1270, and Peter Holt notes the "blatant threat" here from Qalawun. It is rather difficult to imagine anyone agreeing to a treaty that included such a clause, but Margaret did, suggesting that she was essentially submitting to the sultan. This threat, along with previous assassination attempts against the lords of Tyre and Sidon in 1270 and the Lord Edward at Acre in 1271 are an important reminder that despite the picture painted by many general studies of the Crusades and the Latin East in this period, the Mamluks were by no means in a position to dominate the Franks simply through overwhelming force. The role of espionage, threats of assassination, clandestine activities, and the efforts to protect commercial interests all complicate the idea of the Franks of Syria helplessly awaiting their fate and the Mamluks prepared to dispose of them with unthinking ease at any time they wished.

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[31] John had died in 1283.
[32] The Assassins were Isma'aili Shi'i. For the first half of the thirteenth-century, they had pursued their own policies, diplomacy, and agenda with respect to local Muslim powers. Baybars's succeeded in subjugating the Assassins of Syria in the late 1260s.
[33] Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, 106-17.

The Fall of Tripoli

This, then, was the diplomatic and military situation obtaining in Syria prior to the kingdom of Jerusalem's final crisis, as well as the Franks' perception of it. The first stage of that crisis was the Mamluks' siege and conquest of Tripoli. The prelude to the siege of Tripoli included the capture of Margat (1285) and Latakia (1287), but the precipitating event was the death of Bohemond VII (1287).[34] Without children, Bohemond's sister Lucy was set to inherit Tripoli. Upon receiving news of Bohemond's death, she departed France with her Angevin husband, Narjot of Toucy, admiral of Sicily, for the East. [35] However, the local nobility refused to accept her, not only because she was a woman but also because they saw her as essentially a foreigner, and feared that through her and her husband they would experience the kind of favoritism of non-Syrians that had been a problem in Tripolitan politics since Bohemond V's marriage to Lucy of Conti in 1238 (see Chapter 3). They also would not abide another regency under Bohemond's mother, Sibylla of Armenia. They insisted, rather transparently, that she could not govern them because she was too grief-stricken by the loss of her son.[36] Apparently indifferent to the local nobility's chafing under Bartholomew of Tortosa's first regency in the county, Sybilla now invited him to take it up a second time. In response, the local knights and burgesses proclaimed a commune and chose Bartholomew Embriaco, the son of Bertrand

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[34] Francesco Amadi, *Chroniques de Chypre d'Amadi et de Strambaldi*, ed. René de Mas-Latrie vol. 1 (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1891-93), 216-18; *Templare di Tiro*, 186-87; Crawford, 95.
[35] *Templare di Tiro*, 188-91; Crawford, 96; Gian Luca Borghese, *Carlo I d'Angiò e il Mediterraneo: poltica, diplomazia e commercio internazionale prima dei Vespri* (Rome: École française de Rome, 2008), 191-94.
[36] *Templare di Tiro*, 188-91; Crawford, 96.

II (the man who had defied Bohemond VI in the streets of Acre and been decapitated in 1259) and a cousin of Guy II, as their leader.[37]

Led by an Embriaco, it is not surprising that the commune courted Genoese support, offering the latter an opportunity to outmaneuver their Venetian rivals and gain exclusive commercial access to Tripoli. The adventurer Benedetto Zaccaria came to Tripoli and succeeded in extracting from the commune unprecedented concessions in favor of the Genoese, though it is unclear to what extent he was actually acting on his own initiative and against Genoese policy.[38] Those in control back in Genoa were equivocal in their support of Zaccaria's accomplishment out of a sense of the need to preserve goodwill with Egypt to continue trading there. Nevertheless, they intended to send a podestà, Caccenimico da Volta, to Tripoli, an obvious indication they saw themselves as senior partners in their relationship to the commune and an unprecedented step for an Italian republic in Syria.[39] Some in the Commune of Tripoli now began to have second thoughts about their courtship of the Genoese, sensing they had perhaps given away too much, and were even willing to reach out to Lucy and Narjot of Toucy to help limit Genoese influence.[40]

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[37] On the commune of Tripoli, see Joshua Prawer, *Crusader Institutions* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 77-79.

[38] *Iacobi Auriae annales* in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores* 18, ed. Georg Pertz (Hannover, 1863), 322 [hereafter, *Annales Ianuenses*]; Georg Caro, *Genua und die mächte am Mittelmeer 1257-1311. Ein beitrag zur geschichte des XIII. jahrhunderts* (Halle a.S.: M. Niemeyer, 1895-99), 125; Prawer, *Royaume latin*, 532-34.

[39] *Annales Ianuenses*, 324, 326; Caro, 126; Roberto S. Lopez*, Benedetto Zaccaria: ammiraglio e mercante nella Genova del Duecento* (Milan: G. Principato, 1933), 137-38; Prawer, *Crusader Institutions*, 77-79; idem, *Royaume latin*, 534-35.

[40] Marino Sanudo Torsello, *The Book of the Secrets of the Faithful of the Cross*, trans. Peter Lock (Aldershot, 2011), 364-67 [hereafter MST]; *Templare di Tiro*, 192-95; Crawford, 98; Caro, 128; Steven Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese, 958-1528* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 179; Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, 141-42; Lopez, 145-46; Prawer, *Crusader Institutions*, 76-79; idem, *Royaume latin*, 534, 536-37.

It was at this time that two Frankish emissaries went to Cairo to see Qalawun and promised to split control of Tripoli if he would help to eject the Genoese. [41] The Templar of Tyre claims to have known exactly who they were, but declines to name them.[42] The embassy may have been a scheme of the Venetians or Pisans, who could not abide a Genoese monopoly in Tripoli and knew the sultan would take a similarly dim view of the prospect. They equally could have been any members of the commune who feared they had relinquished self-determination through their cooperation with Genoa.[43] Whatever the case, the embassy provided an ideal pretext for the sultan to intervene, and his concern over protecting Egypt's trade revenues provided a strong motivation for him to strike before the Genoese became entrenched. According to a later Muslim chronicler who drew on contemporary sources, Qalawun felt the Tripolitans had broken the truce of 1281, though he does not specify in what way. Another Muslim source asserts that Bartholomew of Embriaco had colluded with Qalawun in the latter's capture of Maraclea in 1285 and had promised to divide rule of Tripoli with the sultan if he should aid in overthrowing the comital family.[44]

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[41] ATS, 460; *Templare di Tiro*, 196-99; Crawford, 100-1. Arabic sources do not agree on the precise date. See Northrup, 153-54; Joshua Prawer, *Histoire du Royaume latin de Jérusalem,* vol. 2., trans. Gérard Nahon (Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1969-70), 536-37.

[42] *Templare di Tiro*, 192-95; Crawford, 98.

[43] The Venetians had concluded treaties with Egypt in 1284 and 1288. *Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani* and *Additamentum,* ed. Reinhold Röhricht 2 vols. (Oeniponti: Libraria Academica Wagneriana, 1893, 1904), no. 1481 [hereafter, RRH]; Eliyahu Ashtor, *Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 10; David Jacoby, "Le consulat vénetien d'Alexandrie d'après un document inédit de 1284," *Chemins d'outre-mer: études d'histoire sur la Méditerranée médiévale offertes à Michel Balard* 2 (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2004), 461-74; Prawer, *Royaume latin*, 536-37.

[44] Ibn al-Furat, *Ta'rikh al-duwal wa'l-muluk*, ed. Qustantin Zurayk, vols. 7-9 (Beirut, 1939) 8:80; Joseph-Franç. Michaud and Joseph Reinaud, *Bibliothèque des Croisades,* vol. 4 (Paris: A.J. Ducollet, 1829), 561; Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, 58-65; Robert Irwin, "The Mamluk Conquest of the County of Tripoli" in *Crusade and Settlement: Papers read at the First Conference of the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East and presented to R.C.*

William of Beaujeu attempted to forewarn the inhabitants of the city, having been informed of the sultan's intentions by one of his Muslim spies, but, unsurprisingly considering his recent partisanship, he was ignored. The Templar of Tyre describes what happened next in the following way:

> …there was a very old emir, one of the four who governed Paynimie; he made my lord master of the Templar aware of these developments. This emir was called the Emir Silah, and he was accustomed to notify the master of the Temple of matters of interest to Christendom, when the sultan wished to injure Christianity in any manner. This contact cost the master fine presents every year, which he sent to him."

The master tried to warn the people of Tripoli. However:

> They did not want to believe this [that the Sultan was coming], and…said ugly things about the master, to the effect that he wanted to alarm them so that they would need him as an intermediary between him and the sultan, so it would seem as though the master had induced the Saracens to go back, but in fact they were not coming at all.[45]

One can hardly blame the Tripolitans for their suspicions of William of Beaujeu, who had hardly been dispassionate in the political strife in the county, but finally they were convinced to make preparations. Amalric of Lusignan, brother of Henry II, and now the lord of Tyre and constable of Jerusalem, arrived at Tripoli bringing "fine men-at-arms, with him, knights and others." Some of the French regiment came from Acre. The siege began on March 17. The Templar of Tyre describes it:

> The city was well-defended, with strong walls of stone. But the sultan attacked it and pressed the assault against the weakest place in the town (the Bishop's Tower), which

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Smail ed. Peter Edbury (Cardiff: University College Cardiff Press, 1985), 248; Linda Northrup, *From Slave to Sultan: the career of Al-Mansur Qalawun and the consolidation of Mamluk rule in Egypt and Syria (678-689 A.H./1279-1290 A.D.)* (Stuttgart, 1998),152-53.

[45] *Templare di Tiro*, 194-97; Crawford, 98-100.

> was strongly defended. The siege engines battered it so thoroughly that it was completely knocked apart. Likewise, the Tower of the Hospitallers, which was new and sturdy, was split open so badly that a horse could pass through it. The sultan had so many men that at each emplacement there were twenty Saracen archers shooting, so that none of our crossbowmen dared showed themselves to shoot either bows or crossbows. If they attempted to do so they were immediately hit.[46]

According to the Templar, the Venetians left, as did the Genoese led by Benedetto Zaccaria. The Mamluks took the city in "a single assault" on April 26, "because it lacked adequate defenders, who one by one had abandoned the defense."[47] Bartholomew Embriaco died there—in the words of one Muslim chronicler, he died "a Pharaonic death," presumably alluding to the Hebrews' exodus from Egypt and meaning that he drowned.[48] Lucy, Bohemond's sister, was permitted by the sultan to keep some small properties in the vicinity—continuing a possible pattern of Baybars and Qalawun of allowing noble women to rule Frankish lordships under their own tutelage. Guy II's son, Peter Embriaco, was allowed to keep Jubail, which remained nominally in Frankish hands, though under Mamluk suzerainty, until 1302.[49]

Fearful of the kind of adventurism that had led Zaccaria into Tripoli, yet desirous of maintaining good relations with Genoa, who, with their domination of the Black Sea region, were and would remain the chief supplier of new slaves to Alexandria, Egypt cemented a treaty with the maritime republic 1290.[50] The Genoese agreed to curtail

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[46] *Templare di Tiro*, 196-199; Crawford, 100-1.
[47] Amadi, 218-19; MST, 365-67; *Templare di Tiro*, 194-99; Crawford, 98-101.
[48] Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, *Tashrif al-ayyam wa'l-'usur fi sirat al-malik al-mansur,* ed. Murad Kamil (Cairo, 1961), 165; Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, 142; *Templare di Tiro*, 196-99; Crawford, 100-1.
[49] MST, 230.
[50] Amitai, 85-86, 94, 103; Epstein, 141-43, 180; Robert Irwin, *The Middle East in the Middle Ages: The Early Mamluk Sultanate, 1250-1382* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University

piracy in exchange for commercial considerations in Egypt.[51] Muslim sources even state the embassy told Qalawun that, henceforth, Zaccaria would be *persona non grata* at home.[52]

The Fall of Acre

The loss of Tripoli left Tyre and Acre alone as major Frankish ports in Syria. The sense of alarm was profound, as the Franks in the Kingdom of Jerusalem sought reinforcements to shore up Acre and parties in the West hastened to oblige them. John of Villiers wrote that the Hospitallers had lost forty brothers at Tripoli, as well as "nearly 100 warhorses" and others, "more than 1,500 silver marks' worth of arms." He ordered "everybody whose proven abilities render them suitable for service in the Holy Land to be sent here from all our provinces to strengthen our congregation."[53] John of Grailly, who previously had been seneschal of Jerusalem and would command the French regiment in the lead-up to and during the siege of Acre, traveled personally to Rome to plead for reinforcements.[54] Nicholas IV sent 4,000 *livres tournois* to Nicholas of

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Press, 1986), 52; Peter Jackson, *The Mongols and the West, 1220-1410* (New York: Pearson/Longman, 2005), 126.

[51] Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, 141-51; Luigi Belgrano, "Trattato del sultano d'Egitto col commune di Genova nel 1290," *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria* 19 (1887): 163-75; *Tashrif*, 165.

[52] *Tashrif,* 165*;* Holt, 142; Lopez, 140, 142, 153. Of course, this proved not to be quite true—Zaccaria's career was only just beginning: see Lopez, *passim*.

[53] Malcolm Barber and Keith Bate, *Letters from the East: Crusaders, Pilgrims and Settlers in the 12th-13th Centuries* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010), 164-65.

[54] MST, 230; Jonathan Riley-Smith, "The Crown of France and Acre, 1254-1291," *France and the Holy Land: Frankish Culture at the End of the Crusades*, ed. Daniel H. Weiss and Lisa Mahoney (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 47, 56; Sylvia Schein, *Fidelis Crucis: The Papacy, the West, and the Recovery of the Holy Land, 1274-1314* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 67.

Hanapes, patriarch of Jerusalem, for the repair of Acre's walls, the construction of siege machines, and the redemption of captives.[55]

Henry II came from Cyprus to Acre four days after the fall of Tripoli and concluded a two-year truce with Egypt.[56] According to Muslim sources, this was a treaty that actually had been in effect for seven years—it is likely that Henry was merely reconfirming or reestablishing it following the crisis at Tripoli.[57] After the fall of Tripoli, pope sent twenty Venetian galleys led by Jacob Tiepolo, son of the former Doge (Lorenzo, 1268-75). According to the Templar of Tyre, the contingent was accompanied by "a great number of low-born men (*menues gens*) of Italy" who had taken the cross.[58] In his account, this was in fact what precipitated the siege of Acre:

> When these people came to Acre, the truce that the king had made with the sultan was well-maintained between the two parties. Poor Saracen peasants came into Acre carrying goods to sell, as they were accustomed to do. It happened one day, by the agency of the Enemy from Hell (who desires to arrange evil deeds between good people), that the crusaders, who had come to do good and to arm themselves for the succor of the city of Acre, brought about its destruction, for one day they rushed through Acre, putting all the poor peasants who had brought goods (both wheat and other things) to sell in Acre to the sword…This was ill-done indeed, for Acre was taken by the Saracens because of it…[59]

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[55] Nicholas IV, *Registres: Recueil des bulles de ce pape publiées ou analysées d'après les manuscrits originaux des archives du Vatican*, ed. Ernest Langlois, vol. 1 (Paris: E. Thorin, 1886), no. 1357; RRH, nos. 1495, 1500; Schein, 67.
[56] *Templare di Tiro*, 198-99; Crawford, 101; Philip Baldwin, *Pope Gregory X and the Crusades* (Woodbridge, Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 2014), 77.
[57] Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, 69-91; Donald Little, "The Fall of 'Akka in 690/1291: The Muslim Version" in *Studies in Islamic History and Civilization in Honour of Professor David Ayalon*, ed. Moshe Sharon (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 159-81.
[58] *Templare di Tiro*, 198-201; Crawford, 101.
[59] *Templare di Tiro*, 198-201; Crawford, 101-2. One Muslim version claims that a Frankish husband had discovered his wife in bed with a Muslim, which led to rioting; another tells of a drinking party gone out of control. See Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, 69-91 and Little, 165-68.

The bloody clothes of the merchants were brought back to the sultan.[60] Enraged, he sent emissaries to the leadership at Acre accusing them of breaking their truce and demanding that they produce the culprits of the indiscriminate slaughter. William of Beaujeu advised the other leaders at Acre that they should choose men who were already imprisoned in the city and condemned to die, and offer them up to Qalawun as the perpetrators of the attack, agreeing this would mollify him and he would never be the wiser. There was disagreement over whether this was a wise course of action, and in the end nobody was offered up to the sultan. Instead, "they told the sultan that these crusaders who had done the deed were foreigners from overseas, and not subject to their justice, and that they were unable to lay a finger on them." Rather laconically, the Templar of Tyre reports that "[T]he sultan took this answer badly" and made ready for a full-scale siege of Acre.[61] According to Shafi' ibn 'Ali, the sultan sought the counsel of his emirs, who considered themselves still bound by the treaty. He claims it was he himself who had written the truce, and that when he now read it again, he found that the Franks had violated its provision for safe-conduct of merchants. Little has suggested the *casus belli* was not merely one of insult, but also a perception of a "threat to commercial interests" on the part of the Muslims of Cairo, a notion certainly consistent with the wider commercial context of the fall of Tripoli discussed above.[62]

Again, the Emir Silah gave William of Beaujeu notice of the sultan's intentions, and, again, William played the role of Cassandra. Qalawun readied his forces and departed Egypt, but died of illness in November of 1290. The Franks believed they had been granted a reprieve, assuming it would take at least some time for a successor to

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[60] This is corroborated by Shafi' ibn 'Ali. See Little, 165.
[61] *Templare di Tiro*, 200-3; Crawford, 102.
[62] Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, 69-91; Little, 165-68.

emerge. But Qalawun's son al-Ashrif Khalil succeeded him immediately, holding to Qalawun's plan to take Acre and break the Frankish presence in Syria once and for all. He sent a message to William of Beaujeu, which the Templar of Tyre says "was translated into French by my hand, and I took the translation and showed it to my lord the master and to all the lords of Acre…" He records the text in his chronicle, enjoining the reader to "notice the sort of salutation which the sultan sent in his letter, which went as follows:

> The Sultan of Sultans, King of Kings, Lord of Lords, al-Malik al-Ashraf, the Powerful, the Dreadful, the Scourge of Rebels, Hunter of Franks and Tartars and Armenians, Snatcher of Castles, from the Hands of Miscreants, Lord of the Two Seas, Guardian of the Two Pilgrim Sites, Khalil al-Salihi, [t]o the noble master of the Temple, the true and wise: Greetings and our good will! Because you have been a true man, so we send you advance notice of our intentions, and give you to understand that we are coming into your parts to right the wrongs that have been done. Therefore we do not want the community of Acre to send us any letters or presents, for we will by no means receive them.[63]

Desperate, the Franks at Acre sent a gift with four messengers to the sultan, who had them imprisoned. The siege began on April 5 or 6.[64] The Templar reports that the sultan brought an army of 70,000 horsemen and more than 150,000 footmen to Syria, while the defenses at Acre included only 30,000-40,000 people "counting women and men and children) and 700-800 mounted troops and 13,000 footmen.[65] The sultan's army encamped in the plain of Acre while they moved their siege engines, each capable of

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[63] *Templare di Tiro*, 204-5; Crawford, 104.
[64] April 5 according to the Templar of Tyre; April 6 according to Muslim sources: see Little, 171.
[65] *Templare di Tiro*, 202-5; Crawford, 103. For figures cited across all sources, see Christopher Marshall, *Warfare in the Latin East, 1192-1291* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), Table 5, 216-221. There seems to be general consensus among the sources that the non-fighting population was approximately 30,000-40,000, there were approximately 15,000-20,000 foot-soldiers, and about 1,000 knights (but as many as 300 more or fewer).

throwing stones of a hundred pounds each (a *quintar*), into place. Muslim sources tell of seventy-two mangonels of four types. The largest, according to al-Yunini, a later chronicler who drew heavily on contemporary sources, could hurl stones of up to a hundred pounds. Abu al-Fida, an eyewitness in the right wing of the sultan's army, claimed the array of siege engines "was the largest ever assembled against a city."[66]

The Mamluk forces erected mobile "wicker screens" (*buches*) around the walls, and moved them in closer each night under cover of darkness until they had "brought them so far forward that they came to the lip of the *fosse*." Behind these screens the attacking forces were protected, while the Franks could do nothing to prevent their encroachment. The besieging army then began to erect a wooden rampart "so strong and so high that no one could strike or shoot" at the troops behind it, who were armed *carabohas*, which the Templar describes as "small hand-operated Turkish devices with a high rate of fire". The attackers then began to mine the outer walls and the Franks countermined. The Franks also chanced two forays outside the walls but accomplished little with them.

Meanwhile, Henry II had assembled a force at Famagusta and arrived at Acre on May 4, an act which the Templar claims strongly boosted Frankish morale. The Franks sent messengers to the sultan and a ceasefire was declared. According to the Templar, when the messengers arrived at the sultan's tent, he mocked them, asking: "Have you brought me the keys of the city, then?" He then offered the inhabitants of the city safe-

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[66] Little, 171. Several eyewitnesses give accounts of the siege. These include the Templar of Tyre as well as Abu al-Fida, who became prince of Hama in 1310 A.D., the emir Baybars al-Mansuri (d.1325 A.D.), and an anonymous Muslim soldier. *Templare di Tiro*, 206-33; Crawford 105-121. See Little, 162-63 for a discussion of Muslim accounts. See also Andreas D'Souza, "The Conquest of Akka (690/1291) A Comparative Analysis of Christian and Muslim Sources," in *The Muslim World* 80 (1990): 234-50.

conduct if they surrendered immediately; the messengers refused. It then happened that a stone from an engine inside the city landed nearby, and the sultan feigned drawing his sword to execute the messengers; they were allowed to return to the city without harm.

On Wednesday, May 16 the besiegers successfully mined the Tower of the King on the outer enceinte of the city; it collapsed and the Franks fell back. On Thursday the women and children who had gone out to the ships anchored outside the harbor to make their escape were forced to return to the city because of the rough seas. On Friday, May 18, the Mamluks began a full-scale assault. They concentrated their attack on the weakest point of the inner wall, the Accursed Tower, in the northeast of the city, and at the St. Anthony's gate.[67] They soon breached both, a clear sign to all that the city was lost. William of Beaujeu was mortally wounded in the defense of the St. Anthony's gate, while the king of Cyprus and John of Villiers, master of the Hospital "perceived plainly that neither counsel nor reinforcement were of any further value, so they saved themselves, and boarded their galleys."[68]

It is impossible to estimate the number of ships available to help the population escape, but what is clear is the number was woefully inadequate.[69] The Templar Roger of Flor, later a mercenary of the Catalan Company, "brought away ladies and damsels and great treasure and many important people…" on the ship *Falco*, and made "made infinite gain," a strong indication that only those who could pay exorbitant sums had any chance

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[67] *Templare di Tiro*, 216-19; Crawford, 110-13; *Excidio Urbis Acconis*, eds. Edmond Martène and Ursin Durand, vol 5. (Paris, 1724), col.781A.
[68] Barber and Bate, 165-66.
[69] *Templare di Tiro*, 194-97; Crawford, 98-100; Marie Luise Favreau-Lilie, "The Military Orders and the Escape of the Christian population from the Holy Land in 1291," *Journal of Medieval History* 19 (1993): 201-27.

of securing their escape.[70] Like Bartholomew Embriaco at Tripoli, many drowned in their attempted flight, including the patriarch of Jerusalem, Nicholas of Hanapes.[71] The Templar of Tyre records:

> A sailor seized him by the hand, but he slipped and fell into the sea and drowned. No one knows if he who took him by the hand let him go because he had put his valuables on that ship, or if he slipped from his hand because he could not hold onto him…[72]

Those who could not escape by sea tried to make their way to the massive Templar compound in the far southwest of the city, where they barred themselves in. There they remained—maybe as many as 10,000 people or more—for ten or twelve days, after which they, too, surrendered.[73] The Templar of Tyre was among those who managed to escape by sea to Cyprus; thus his account of the defense of the Templar citadel is second-hand rather than eyewitness. However, he and the main Muslim sources agree that after the Franks in compound surrendered on a promise of safe-conduct, the men were beheaded and the women and children taken prisoner.

There is no way to reliably estimate Frankish causalities during the siege, but sources cite numbers as disparate between 30,000 and 100,000 dead and 10,000 taken prisoner, although the maximal number seems impossibly high, likely more than the entire population of the city.[74] Conquered, the city was now promptly demolished. The

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[70] *The Chronicle of Ramon Muntaner*, trans. Lady Goodenough, 2 vols. (London: Hakluyt Society, 1920-21), Chapter 194; Favreau-Lilie, 210.
[71] ATS, 460-61; MST, 231-32; *Templare di Tiro*, 223-25; Crawford, 115-16.
[72] *Excidio Urbis Acconis*, col.782A; *Templare di Tiro*, 222-25; Crawford, 115.
[73] *Templare di Tiro*, 220-23; Crawford, 113-14.
[74] 100,000 seems impossibly high—more than the figure cited by any source for the total number of defenders. See Favreau-Lilie, 216 n.44 and Reinhold Röhricht, *Geschichte königreichs Jerusalem (1100-1291)* (Innsbruck: Wagner, 1898), 1021 n.3 for discussion of the numbers cited in various sources. For the number of defenders, again, see Marshall, Table 5, 215-21.

last few Frankish strongholds and cities in the Holy Land surrendered in the following months to al-Ashraf Khalil essentially without resistance—the Franks had counted on Acre for their final defense and had failed.

Conclusion

Shortly after the loss of Acre, John of Villiers wrote from Cyprus to William of Villaret, Prior of the Hospital of St. Gilles, who himself later became master of the order, and was instrumental in ensuring their survival even while the last Templars burned at the stake in Paris in 1314:

> May you know, dear friend, that recently…the sultan of Babylon completely surrounded the city of Acre from one sea to the other from dawn to tierce with horsemen and foot-soldiers. In the other part of the east as far as the Euphrates he installed his war machines. Thus, with several machines and huge forces he besieged the city, and from that moment until the following Monday they did not cease from digging the soil to set up their machines, their defences, their trenches, their barricades of their other forms of protection…We and our brothers made our stance at the St. Antony Gate, where the Saracens were in huge numbers...[75]

As for others in the city, the Templar of Tyre tells us:

> the ladies and the burgesses and the cloistered maidens and other lesser folk came fleeing through the streets, their children in their arms, weeping and despairing, and fleeing to the sailors to save them from death.

John of Villiers tells a similar story:

> Before the huge numbers of Saracens who were entering the city from all parts of the land and the sea, and running through the breaches in the collapsed walls into all the streets of the city, could reach our watchtowers, our servants and our valets, mercenaries, crusaders and others began to

[75] Barber and Bate, 165-66; Cart. Hosp. 3:592-93, no. 4157.

> lose hope. They fled to the ships, throwing away their arms and armour. [76]

Certainly none of the great mass of poor at Acre, itself a catchment point during recent years for Frankish commoners fleeing from other Mamluk conquests in the region, had any means of escape from the city.[77] While some of the Syrian nobility were able to reach Cyprus, for the most part their plight afterwards was unenviable.[78] The Templar of Tyre, himself one of these refugees, allows that the Dominicans and Franciscans did ameliorate the plight of these erstwhile nobles somewhat, and that Henry II "had the poor knights and sergeants put on a payroll, and he gave great alms and many good things to them, and the King and the Queen established relief specifically to be given to these poor people." But in general,

> "[t]hose who escaped from Acre…were in great poverty. Even if there was anyone there who had been able to bring away something of his own and carry it to Cyprus with him, it was worth less than half of what it had been, because foodstuffs were in great scarcity. Even houses which had been renting for ten bezants a year went up to a hundred bezants…All their friends in Cyprus forgot about them and made no kindly mention of them.[79]

The Templar follows this complaint with a long poem in which he laments what he perceives as the passing away of the old order, one dominated benevolently by noblemen—*prudommes*—defined by qualities of bravery, loyalty, and generosity, in favor of a new and perverse order in which men of low birth and few qualities have come to manipulate Frankish society through cash. This theme as it is explored in the

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[76] Barber and Bate, 165-66; Cart. Hosp. 3:592-93, no. 4157.
[77] Favreau-Lilie, 218-26.
[78] Amadi, 227, MST 232, Templare di Tiro, 230-31; Crawford, 119-20; Edbury, 101-2;
[79] Templare di Tiro, 230-31; Crawford, 119-120.

contemporary Old French texts of the Latin East—especially but not exclusively that of the Templar of Tyre—is the subject of Part II.

Part II

Chapter 5

A Chivalrous Community

We have already seen that in the years c.1240-1291 the Frankish nobility were often practical rather than idealistic with respect to the Mamluks, and frequently cut deals and made treaties in the interest of self-preservation. Yet the fact that they did not hesitate to buy peace when they believed it was their best or only option is not incompatible with the nearly endless parade of chivalrous behavior depicted in contemporary chronicles written in the Latin East. This chapter will investigate the presentation of the Frankish nobility in the works of Philip of Novara and the so-called Templar of Tyre. According to these authors, the classic attributes of the fighting nobility—bravery, restraint, and openhandedness—are what bind them together and demarcate them from bad rulers, churchmen, women, and merchants. In Philip's and the Templar's conception, this cohesion and these qualities are the ideals that preserve society, keep it well ordered, stable, and safe. Both works occlude the reality of noble life in the Kingdom of Jerusalem and seek, through narration, to transform its greatest deficit—the conduct of the nobles—into its only remedy.

A knight in the Ibelin entourage, Philip played a significant role in the Ibelin struggle against the Hohenstaufen (1228-1243). For his part, the Templar served the powerful and politically active Montfort family from 1267 to 1274, and then was the secretary and personal confidante of William of Beaujeu until William's death in 1291. The Templar escaped to Cyprus during the siege of Acre and completed his work some time in the first decades of the fourteenth century. These men were close to the events they narrate—and have rather specific and strong opinions about them. However, far

from being limitations, their commitments open up for us a window onto the Frankish nobility, with whom they were closely affiliated, to whom they were sympathetic, and for whose entertainment, edification, and glorification they were writing.

Making War and Maintaining Peace

Early in his account Philip of Novara writes that his purpose is to relate the history of "the men and the great deeds" (*les homes et les grans fais*) that shaped and defined the Hohenstaufen-Ibelin struggle.[1] Similarly, the words he attributes to John of Ibelin, Old Lord of Beirut, serve as the keynote for his general theme: "many times has it happened that by one noble man was everything won and for lack of one noble man was all lost…"[2] Thus, he articulates the notion that binds Philip's work with that of the Templar of Tyre: the crucial importance of brave noblemen and great deeds in matters of war.

One of the first illustrations of this mentality is an episode that transpired in 1232, when John of Ibelin, later the lord of Arsur and one of the Old Lord of Beirut's sons, was asked by his father to help break the naval blockade of Beirut imposed by Frederick II's lieutenant in the East, Richard Filangieri. John's older brothers were incensed that it was he rather than one of them who had been asked to undertake this crucial, difficult, and dangerous task.[3] Philip of Novara writes that John was "wise and worthy" (*sot et valu*

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[1] Philip of Novara, *Guerra di Federico II in Oriente (1223-1242)*, ed. and trans. Silvio Melani (Naples: Liguori, 1994), 66-67 [hereafter, *Guerra di Federico II*]; *The Wars of Frederick II Against the Ibelins in Syria and Cyprus*, trans. John L. La Monte (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936), 61.

[2] "*mainte fois est avenue que par .i. preudome est tout gaaigné et pour soufraite est tout perdu…" Guerra di Federico II*, 152-55; La Monte, 127-28.

[3] Hans Mayer and Peter Edbury have disagreed about whether picking John was a mark of their father's favor and trust of him (Edbury's view), or whether it was actually an indication that the Old Lord thought him the most expendable of his sons (Mayer's view). It seems unlikely that the Old Lord of Beirut would have trusted John to attempt to break the naval blockade in 1232 had he

assés)[4] and "the other vassals of the host as soon as they knew of it [the plan to run the blockade] hurried there in eager rivalry, and so many were there that the vessel could scarce float." According to Philip, not only did these vassals enthusiastically volunteer for this dangerous mission, they thanked the Old Lord for the opportunity."[5]

In a similar vein, the Templar of Tyre introduces us to Julian Grenier, lord of Sidon. On the one hand, Julian is castigated as "reckless and lacking in good judgment" and "an avid gambler" who "indulged the lusts of the flesh." Worse still, "in his impudence he made war on his own uncle…"[6] Yet for all that, when facing the Mongol threat to Syria in 1258-60, he was one of the few men in the entire region—Frankish or Muslim—who remained steadfast and undaunted in defense of his lands. So brave was he, we are told, that he actually went on the offensive against the Mongols, raiding with a small force in the Biqa' Valley and killing a Mongol lieutenant. When the Mongols came to exact revenge and destroy his lordship, Julian stood fast at the gates of Sidon, "defending the

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any reason to distrust him. Though the mission was dangerous, and one might argue (as Mayer does) that he considered John the most expendable of his sons, it was also vitally important, and if he had any doubts about John's loyalty or competence, he surely would not have sent him. Rather, his sending John is clearly a sign of favor. Why else would his brothers be incensed at being passed over? Peter Edbury, "John of Ibelin's Title to the County of Jaffa and Ascalon," *English Historical Review* 98 (1983): 131.

[4] "*sapeva et valeva*" *assai* in sixteenth-century account by Florio Bustron which made use of Philip of Novara's work. Florio Bustron, *Chronique de l'îsle de Chypre*, ed. René Mas-Latrie (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1884), 86. Confusingly, "sot" or a variant (e.g. "sout") can mean either "knew" [past definite, singular—see François Frédéric Roget, *An Introduction to Old French* (London, 1887), 159; Ti Alkire and Carol Rosen, *Romance Languages: A Historical Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 156-57] or "foolish"; here it is clear from context and all subsequent readings and translations that the former is intended. So here the sense is that he "knew and dared plenty"—i.e. he was both wise and brave. But in light of our discussion here, one cannot help but consider the possible double meaning of "sot" in light of what seems an impetuous and brave undertaking by John of Arsur.

[5] *Guerra di Federico II*, 156-161; La Monte, 131-32.

[6] *Cronaca del Templare di Tiro: 1243-1314: la caduta degli stati crociati nel racconto di un testimone ocular*, ed. and trans. Laura Minervini (Naples: Liguori, 2000), 84-85; *The 'Templar of Tyre', Part III of the 'Deeds of the Cypriots,'* trans. Paul Crawford (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 36. Also see Peter Jackson, *The Mongols and the West, 1221-1410* (New York: Pearson Longman 2005), 120-21.

entrance so vigorously with the few men that he had that two horses were killed under him" and allowing much of the city's population to escape by sea.[7] Consider, too, the Templar's description of the vigor of Bertrand Embriaco of Jubail, who, when ambushed by a dozen of his own peasants

> …had his naked sword in his hand, though he had no other weapon, and he defended himself so well that no one dared approach him. But they shot so many arrows into him that they killed him anyway, and cut off his head.[8]

These bold deeds have their verbal counterpart in Geoffrey of Sergines' response to an embassy from the sultan of Damascus, al-Nasir Yusuf, which sought to buy back the head of the emir of Jerusalem, which had been taken by the Franks as a prize in battle. The sultan promised to return the count of Jaffa's horse which had been captured in the fighting and to pay a ransom of 10,000 bezants.[9] Geoffrey retorted that he would never return the head, even in exchange for a "whole tower of bezants and horses."[10]

The nobleman's courage and bravura in war rested in counterpoise with his largesse and restraint in peace. The Templar depicts Geoffrey of Sergines as carrying out a stern and admirably incorruptible form of justice as lieutenant and seneschal of the Kingdom of Jerusalem in the 1250s: he is called a "a very strong magistrate" and praised for executing many thieves and murderers, punishing their crimes, and refusing to allow bribes, status, or connections to interfere with justice.[11]

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[7] *Templare di Tiro*, 82-3; Crawford 34-35.
[8] *Templare di Tiro*, 76-77, Crawford, 31.
[9] Reinhold Röhricht, *Geschichte des Königreichs Jerusalem (1100-1291)* (Innsbruck: Wagner, 1898), 894-95.
[10] *Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr, de 1229 à 1261, dite du manuscript de Rothelin* in *Recueil des historiens des croisades: historiens occidentaux* 2 (Paris: Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, 1844-95), 632.
[11] "Annales de Terre sainte," ed. Reinhold Röhricht, *Archives de l'Orient latin* 2 (Paris: E. Leroux, 1881-84), 448; *L'estoire de Eracles empereur et la conqueste de la terre d'Outremer,* in

The Templar also describes an incident during an armistice in the War of St. Sabas when John of Jaffa was inspecting the fortifications of a Pisan tower and was exposed to the view of a Genoese crossbowman on a nearby tower. Though he had a clean shot available to him, the crossbowman's hand was stayed by one of the Genoese consuls, Ansaldo Ceba, on account of the armistice. When John heard of this, he rewarded the crossbowman lavishly for his honorable behavior, granting him, according to the Templar of Tyre, a knighthood, a fief at Jaffa and 500 bezants annually.[12]

The generosity and restraint of the Old Lord of Beirut is juxtaposed in Philip of Novara's work with the greed, ungovernable rage, and grudge-holding of Frederick II and his followers. We are told that after having secured a peace with partisans of the emperor after the nearly year-long siege of Dieudamor in Cyprus (1229-1230):

> the good lord of Beirut and his children …held nothing in their hearts of that which had been. But their enemies guarded and retained their foolish desires and well they revealed them as soon as they were able.[13]

Showing openhandedness with his wealth and disdain for money, the Old Lord of Beirut "conferred great goods, great honors, and great reverence on their enemies, and gave them horses, robes, arms, and other presents, and they sought their company…" The Barlais family, major Hohenstaufen supporters, are painted in stark contrast. Although they "had received many possessions and much love" from the Ibelins and the Old Lord

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Recuel des historiens des croisades. historiens occidentaux 2 (Paris: Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, 1859), 444; Marino Sanudo Torsello, *The Book of the Secrets of the Faithful of the Cross*, trans. Peter Lock (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2011), 349-50 [hereafter, MST]; *Templare di Tiro*, 80-81, Crawford, 33.

[12] *Templare di Tiro*, 62-65; Crawford, 23-24.

[13] *Guerra di Federico II*, 144-45; La Monte, 116-17.

of Beirut, "folly and pride, which often spring from richness and repose…" led them to betrayal and rebellion.[14]

During a joust at the celebration of the knighting of one of the Old Lord's sons, one of the knights of the Ibelin entourage struck the knight Amaury Barlais, who took umbrage and complained that it had been done "feloniously and too hard."[15] Amaury, intending to seize vengeance, ambushed the knight the next day and attacked him so ferociously that the knight was nearly killed. Even so, John of Ibelin forgave and pardoned Amaury.[16] He also intervened in a quarrel between two Cypriot knights—the settling of an accusation of treason by one against the other—before it ended in the death of one of the combatants.[17]

This ability to mediate is a quality that was clearly much prized—at least in rhetoric and theory, if not necessarily in practice. We see it attributed to Philip of Montfort by the Templar of Tyre for his actions during the War of St. Sabas.[18] The Templar tells us that during a truce between the Genoese and Venetians Philip of Montfort made a last-ditch attempt to reconcile the two sides in a more permanent way. Yet as we saw in Chapter 1, the lord of Tyre was hardly disinterested or altogether ingenuous, having used—or even encouraged—the outbreak of hostilities between the Genoese and Venetians in 1256 as an excuse to expel the Venetians from Tyre and repeal the sizeable commercial privileges they had accrued there.[19] Similarly, we have seen in Chapters 3 and 4 how deeply William of Beaujeu was involved in factional fighting

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[14] *Guerra di Federico II*, 72-73; La Monte, 65
[15] *Felonessement feru et trop fort*
[16] *Guerra di Federico II*, 72-75; La Monte, 66-67.
[17] *Guerra di Federico II,*78-83; La Monte, 70-73.
[18] See Chapter 1.
[19] *Templare di Tiro*, 66-67; Crawford, 26.

among the Franks in Tripoli during the 1270s and 1280s—but one might hardly know how much of this strife he himself helped to instigate and perpetuate if forced to rely exclusively on the account of affairs provided by the Templar of Tyre, whose reticence on the matter is itself highly telling. Instead William is shown to us as the voice of reason trying to counsel peace among the Franks at Tripoli before its fall in 1289.

In contrast to these examples of restraint and peacemaking, Philip of Novara emphasizes the destructive anger of Frederick II and his followers. We have already witnessed the conduct of Amaury Barlais after being bested in a joust. In Philip of Novara's narrative, this is a mere foreshadowing of Frederick II's treachery. Arranging ambush for the Old Lord of Beirut at a feast at Limassol in 1228, Frederick demanded that John of Ibelin surrender Beirut to him and hand over the revenues the latter had collected since beginning his tenure as regent for the minor Henry I Lusignan earlier that year.[20]

John replied in a "loud voice with commanding presence" (*et dist mout hautement, à mout beau semblant*) that Beirut was his rightful fief and Frederick had no legitimate cause to seize it from him, while neither he nor his brother Philip during Philip's regency ever had or took any revenues from it. Philip of Novara tells us Frederick was "greatly angered" (*L'emperere se coroussa mout et jura et menassa*); that he became "much enraged and changed color often" (*fu mout corouscié et chanja souvent coulour*); and that he made many threats and "strange and menacing demands" (*faisoit de mout estranges requestes et perillouses*). He then demanded from John two of his sons as

[20] *Guerra di Federico II*, 86-93; La Monte, 77-78.

hostages. John was compelled to oblige him as his vassal, and did so; according to Philip, the emperor promptly placed them in pillories.[21]

If Frederick and the Barlais are obvious villains in Philip of Novara's narrative, Bohemond V and Bohemond VII, princes of Antioch-Tripoli, are similarly cast in the Templar of Tyre's narrative.[22] The Templar tells us that Bohemond V "looked darkly and with ill-will [*fu moult escur et de male volenté*] on the lord of Jubail and Sir Bertrand of Jubail and their family" for events that had transpired between them in Acre during the War of St. Sabas. Like Amaury Barlais or the Hohenstaufen partisans after the truce at Dieudamour, but unlike the Lord of Beirut, Bohemond V was incapable of swallowing his bitterness: he hired peasants to ambush Bertrand, murder him, and bring back his head as a trophy.[23] Bohemond VII was his grandfather's equal in vengeful cruelty. When the Hospitaller commander of Tripoli brokered a peace between him and the rebellious Guy of Jubail in 1282, the latter agreed to surrender and spend five years in the prince's prison. Bohemond swore on the gospels that he would accept the agreement and spare his vassal's life, but once he was in the prince's hands, the prince executed him in gruesome fashion, shutting him up in a ditch along and letting him starve to death.[24]

Appearance and Reputation

For the noblemen in these works, how they appeared to others was just as important as their conduct. One crucial element of that appearance was reputation. When Frederick II first came to Cyprus in 1228 John's men counseled him to refuse to meet

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[21] *Guerra di Federico II*, 86-95; La Monte, 77-81.
[22] See Chapters 3-4.
[23] *Templare di Tiro*, 74-77; Crawford, 30-31.
[24] *Templare di Tiro*, 156-59; Crawford, 79.

with the emperor, whom they did not trust. Philip of Novara says that John of Ibelin replied that:

> he preferred to be captured or slain and to suffer that which God had in store for him, rather than consent that anyone should be able to say that through him and his house or through the people on this side of the seas was lacking or delayed the service of God…for he did not wish to do ill by Our Lord…[25]

In 1243 when the Ibelin party was conspiring to seize Tyre from the Hohenstaufen, Philip of Novara came up with a plan that he not only thought would succeed, but equally importantly, would "save them from blame." ["*Sire, je ay pencé une chose quy vous gardera de blahme*."][26] His plan hardly seems blameless to the modern observer—as discussed in Chapter 1, he promoted the regency of Alice of Cyprus in order to abrogate Hohenstaufen rights in the Kingdom of Jerusalem and seize Tyre only to then rely on a legal technicality to undermine Alice's authority and deny her control of Tyre and its revenues. Not only is Philip of Novara untroubled by this seeming double-cross, he is in fact quite proud of having thought it up because it was technically legal. No doubt such an attitude was the product of the legal training so highly prized among the nobility of the kingdoms of Jerusalem and Cyprus, and their admiration for skilled pleading in the respective High Courts. In this connection, the Old Lord of Beirut is praised by Philip of Novara for his "good memory" (*à boune memoire*) and Bertrand of Jubail, is praised by the Templar of Tyre for his "keen memory" (*bien menbrant*).[27] Philip of Novara seems to have learned his legal education through conversation with the master

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[25] *Guerra di Federico II*, 84-87; La Monte, 75-76.
[26] *Guerra di Federico II*, 226-231; La Monte, 174-76.
[27] *Guerra di Federico II*, 210-11; La Monte, 169-70; *Templare di Tiro*, 76-77; Crawford, 31.

jurists of the prior generation, Ralph of Tiberias, who enjoined him to "remember" rather than study. [28]

A strong indication of the value put on this oral, mnemonic legalist tradition is the dispute between John of Ibelin, lord of Arsur, and several other nobles, including the count of Jaffa and the lord of Tyre, concerning the lord of Arsur's proposal in the 1250s of introducing a scribe, and therefore a written record, into the proceedings of both the Burgess Court and the High Court of Jerusalem. Opposition seems to have been nearly universal from the nobility, a fact that little surprises considering a purely oral and mnemonic tradition made the nobles the sole repository of legal custom in the kingdom and facilitated self-serving manipulations.[29]

If public reputation was in some sense considered synonymous with actual virtue, the essence of nobility was also believed to be revealed through an individual's physical aspect.[30] Of Sir Anceau of Brie, a beloved cousin of the Old Lord of Beirut, Philip of Novara writes that he was:

> a young man, strong and hardy, muscular and bony, vigorous and hard, ready to undertake and to accomplish, courteous to friend and to foe, generous with all that he might have, fair and blond, and with a splotched skin and a flat nose, with a ferocious face resembling a leopard.[31]

Although the Templar of Tyre admits that Hugh III Lusignan became "hugely fat" in his old age, he also ascribes to him "great intelligence and virtue," and writes that he

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[28] "*il meismes me conteit moult de chozes dou royaume de Jerusalem et des us et des assises, et disoit que de les retenisse*." La Monte, 9.
[29] Hans E. Mayer, "Ibelin versus Ibelin: The Struggle for the Regency of Jerusalem 1253-1258," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 122 (1978): 33-34.
[30] See Geraldine Heng, *Empires of Magic: Medieval Romance and the Politics of Cultural Fantasy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 179-80.
[31] s*i estoit juenes hom et fort et durs, membrus et ossus, vigourous et penibles et entreprenans et faiseour,* amy et aenemy cortois, et large de quanque il pooit tenir, *blans et blondes et vayrs et camus, à une chiere grefaigne semblant a leupart. Guerra di Federico II*, 74-77; La Monte, 69.

was "so fair and so noble that, if he had been in the midst of a thousand knights one could have picked him out as king" and "fair and good and courtly" (*il fu biau et bon et cortois*). [32] Bertrand of Jubail, the leader of the Embriaco revolt against Bohemond VI, is described by the Templar of Tyre as a "knight of considered judgement [sic], hardy and strong and with a keen memory" (*esteit chevalier preu et hardy et fort et bien menbrant*).[33] Of Guy Embriaco, the Templar writes that he was "exceedingly handsome," and a man who had "a great presence." Guy was "big and large-limbed and fair and blond and blue-eyed and of a lively color," and although "a bit on the stout side," was "valiant and hardy"—although the Templar allows that he was also "willful,"—usually a more dubious quality.[34] He characterizes Julian Grenier in a very similar way: the lord of Sidon is profligate, hotheaded, even rebellious—but also exceedingly brave, a quality inscribed in his large limbs themselves.[35] John of Montfort, although "much troubled with gout in his feet and hands, so much so that he was quite crippled" was a "very fine knight, most pleasant, a wise prud'homme."[36] So, too, was his brother and successor, Humphrey, described as "a fine great knight, without peer in his day…" and "a very fine

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[32] *Templare di Tiro*, 128-29, 164-67; Crawford, 62, 83-84.
[33] *Templare di Tiro,* 76-77; Crawford, 31.
[34] "*…et fu ce seignor de Giblet moult bel home, de grant meniere, car il fu grant et bien menbru et blanc et blond et vair, et couloury d'une vive coulour, et prou et hardy, mais il fu un poy estout et de volenté…*" *Templare di Tiro*, 144-47; Crawford, 71-72. It is worth noting that an Arabic source, al-Yunini, describes Guy in similar terms: "He was a famous knight among the Franks beloved by them for his boldness and generosity and he was one of the greatest knights in Tripoli." This raises interesting, not necessarily mutually exclusive, propositions: is this Arabic source corroborative? Or an example of shared or mimicked literary discourse? al-Yunini, *Dhayl mir'at al-zaman*, 4 vols. (Hyderabad: 1954-1961), 4:4. Translated in Robert Irwin, "The Mamluk Conquest of the County of Tripoli" in *Crusade and Settlement: Papers read at the First Conference of the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East and presented to R.C. Smail* ed. Peter Edbury (Cardiff: University College Cardiff Press, 1985), 247.
[35] "*…car sestu seignor de Sayete, ja soit ce que il estet home de volenté et avoit mau fait ses afaires, toute fois en conseill de fait d'armes il estoit bien asagé et bien conussant et prou et hardy et grant et fort…*" *Templare di Tiro*, 131-33; Crawford, 66.
[36] "*il fu moult biau chevalier et mout plaissant et prodome et sage et bien aidant chevalier*."*Templare di Tiro*, 128-29; Crawford, 62.

knight with a great presence, so much so that once when the king of France saw him, he avowed that he was the finest knight that he had ever seen up to that moment."[37]

Yet these bodies could all too easily be destroyed, and the narration of their destruction is deeply revealing of the noble self-conception. In Philip of Novara's telling, John of Ibelin, the Old Lord of Beirut (d.1236), after having suffered mortal injuries in a riding or hunting accident, drew up his will in an "orderly manner," dispensed his lands to his sons, paid all his debts, and then joined the Templars as a brother, honoring a previously-made vow. He soon died and before the moment of death he asked Philip of Novara to carry a crucifix to him and kissed the feet of Jesus while exclaiming "*In manus tuas Domine commendo spiritum meum*." In Philip's words, "The body did not change in death, and if one believes that good souls go before God, one can be certain that his soul went there to paradise."[38] What is offered here is both a consummate stoicism and a near-saintly death for a man whose virtues were wholly those of the secular nobility.

William of Beaujeu, grand master of the Templars, is shown to be similarly stoic despite recognizing his death was imminent when the Mamluks breached the walls of Acre in May of 1291.[39] We are told by the Templar of Tyre that amidst the onslaught the master rushed to the St. Anthony gate where the Mamluks were concentrating their attack. He and a dozen or so knights and a handful of his own household troops saw the enemy pouring into the city. When he and the master of the Hospital arrived and joined the fighting, it:

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[37] "*biau chevalier et grant, quy nen avoit per a luy a son tens*", "*biau chevalier de grant maniere, que quant il vy, le roy de France li douna tesmoin que il estoit le plus biau chevalier que il ot onques vi jusques a sel jour*." *Templare di Tiro*, 128-29, 164-65; Crawford, 62, 83.
[38] *Guerra di Federico II*, 210-11; La Monte, 169-70.
[39] "*quy fu mout gentil home…et si fu mout large et liberal en moult de raysons et mout amonier, dont il fu moult renomé...*"*Templare di Tiro*, 142-43; Crawford, 69.

> …seemed as if they hurled themselves against a stone wall. Those of the enemy who were hurling Greek fire hurled it so often and so thickly that there was so much smoke that one man could scarcely see another. Amongst the smoke, archers shot feathered arrows so densely that our men and mounts were terribly hurt.

The Templar grand master was struck by a dart and "the shaft sank into his body a palm's-length; it came in through the gap where the plates to the armor were not joined. This was not his proper armor, but rather light armor for putting on hastily at an alarm." Sensing he was mortally wounded, he had the presence of mind to warn his comrades that he could fight no more, but "as he spoke he dropped [his] spear on the ground, and his head slumped to one side." As he started to fall from his horse, his household men caught him and laid him on a shield, carrying him away from the front lines. He lay dying in the house to which they brought him and uttered hardly a word save to ask anxiously after the course of the battle, otherwise expiring and accepting his own death in perfect equanimity. He was buried "before his tabernacle, which was the altar where they said Mass."[40]

Perhaps the most telling account of a noble death, which stands out both for its detail and strangeness, is that of Philip of Montfort in 1270.[41] On orders from Baybars, two Assassins came to Philip of Montfort at Tyre dressed as Muslim soldiers; they offered their services to him, saying they wished to renounce Islam and be baptized as Christians.[42] One of the Assassins took Philip as his own Christian name while the other

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[40] *Templare di Tiro*, 216-219; Crawford, 110-13.
[41] Robert Irwin, *The Middle East in the Middle Ages: The Early Mamluk Sultanate, 1250-1382* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986), 49.
[42] *Templare di Tiro*, 130-37; Crawford, 63-66.

took that of the lord of Montfort's nephew, Julian of Sidon.[43] The Templar tells us that he "trusted them greatly." Even so:

> …it was said to the lord of Tyre that he ought to be on his guard, because the sultan sought his death and had sent out Assassins to kill him—to which the lord of Tyre replied that he was no longer the lord of Tyre, but that his son was its lord, so that the sultan had no reason to want him dead. Still, he had his viscount seek out and monitor foreign people who came into Tyre—but he made no attempt to protect himself from these two, whom he kept in his own residence.[44]

On Sunday, August 17th the Assassin who had taken Philip's name stabbed and killed him outside the Montfort family's chapel after Philip had heard mass himself and also given money for the offering to his servant-cum-Assassin. Philip died while his son John chased the Assassin back into the chapel and killed him.[45] The other Assassin had left for Beirut with Julian of Sidon and John sent word to Julian warning him of danger. The lord of Sidon's would-be attacker fled without accomplishing his mission. Philip of Montfort was buried shortly after at the Church of the Holy Cross in Tyre.[46]

There are important questions that must be asked about the Templar of Tyre's account of these events. One cannot help but question the attitudes, assumptions, and behavior imputed to Philip by the Templar regarding the two Muslims seeking to be baptized and to enter his service. It seems strange to the modern reader that Philip should be so credulous—even naïve—considering how canny Philip clearly was, as seen through his machinations in the Ibelin resistance to the Hohenstaufen and during the War of St.

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[43] Julian's father, Balian, and Philip were half-brothers—sons of Helvis of Ibelin by Reginald of Sidon and Guy of Montfort, respectively.
[44] *Templare di Tiro*, 130-37; Crawford, 63-66.
[45] Francesco Amadi, *Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi*, ed. René de Mas-Latrie vol. 1 (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1891-93), 177-78; ATS*,* 454; *Eracles,* 450. *Templare di Tiro*, 130-37; Crawford, 63-66.
[46] *Templare di Tiro*, 130-37; Crawford, 63-66.

Sabas. A few interpretations are possible. Such requests for conversion, baptism, and a place in the household of a notable lord probably occurred far more frequently than they are recorded in the sources, and would not necessarily be a cause for suspicion. Certainly the fact that the circumstances surrounding an attempt on Edward of England's life in 1272, also described by the Templar, were so similar to those leading to Philip's murder lends weight to this view.[47] Another possibility is that Philip genuinely did not believe, as he apparently claimed, that Baybars would bother trying to remove him because he was no longer lord of Tyre and therefore the sultan of Egypt should have no desire to kill him.[48] This seems a strange rationalization. Even if Philip believed he had no reason to be cautious with his own life, surely he would have been wary of any threat to his son and heir.

The circumstance of a Muslim seeking baptism and service could be a delicate one. A good and pious Christian surely could not be seen to refuse such a request without having his own piety and motives impugned—the reputation of the Knights Templar suffered greatly at the hands of contemporary chroniclers when they refused to allow Muslims to be baptized because the Templars did not wish to lose their labor as

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[47] Apparently, a Muslim "man-at-arms" had come to Acre to be baptized, and once he had converted to Christianity, the Lord Edward received him into his personal service. The Templar tells us that "this fellow served the Lord Edward in such a capacity that he would go to spy on the Saracens to find out where one might do them harm, and he performed this service many times." The Templar even claims that it was he who had tipped off Edward to the fact that St. George and Qaqun were vulnerable and ripe for plunder. It is unsurprising, then, that Edward came to trust him, and that he thought little of it when the convert came to his chambers one night with a translator, claiming the need to speak with him after having "had just come from praying." Edward opened the door to his chamber and his man "stabbed him on the hip with a dagger, making a deep, dangerous wound." Edward landed "a blow with his fist, on the temple, which knocked him senseless to the ground for a moment," and the prince seized a dagger from a nearby table and stabbed his assailant in the head, killing him. The Templar claims the assassin's dagger had been poisoned, but that the lords of Acre "summoned all the doctors and slaves, who sutured his wound and drew out the poison." *Templare di Tiro*, 140-41; Crawford, 68-69.

[48] *Templare di Tiro*, 130-137; Crawford, 63-66.

slaves. In the twelfth century, the Templars came in for criticism from William of Tyre when they ransomed rather than converted an eminent Muslim, Nasir al-Din, who "asked most eagerly to be baptized."[49] They continued to be criticized in the thirteenth century for the same practice.[50]

Furthermore, to persecute without provocation a man who had been taken into a lord's household, and therefore into his protection, and who had also taken his name, would have been behavior unworthy of a great nobleman. The Templar of Tyre's tableau of Philip's assassination shows him as nothing if not that—pious, ingenuous, charitable, and fearless. Such a death, while it seems the result of astonishing carelessness to the modern eye, is entirely consistent with the narrative and representational program of the Old French works under consideration here. Likely Philip never really knew of a threat, but the Templar wished to show the lord of Tyre in the best possible light—as fearless and honorable—rather than simply as a man who had been duped and paid for it with his life.

The possibility that the circumstances surrounding Philip's death were fabricated to show him in a positive light seem supported by a comparison with Philip of Novara's portrayal of the Old Lord of Beirut after Frederick II ambushed him at the feast at Limassol. John is reported to have said to the emperor:

> Sire…I have also often and long since heard of your deeds; and when I thought of coming here, all my council with one voice warned me of these things that you are now doing and worse; but I did not wish to believe them at all. It was not that I did not fear you greatly, nonetheless I came forth

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[49] William of Tyre, *Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum*, ed. Robert B.C. Huygens (Turnhout: Brepols, 1986), 822-23. See introduction to Malcolm Barber and Keith Bate, trans., *The Templars: selected sources* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2002), 9.
[50] Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1174-1277* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1973), 62-63.

> well witting and forewarned. From you I will still more willingly receive imprisonment or death than consent that anyone shall be able to say aught to our ill…I came quite prepared to suffer whatever might come, for love of Our Lord Jesus Christ who suffered passion and death for us and who will deliver us from it if it pleases Him; and if He wishes and designs to decree that we shall receive death or imprisonment, I thank Him therefore; and to Him I hold throughout.[51]

As described above, Frederick took two of John's sons as hostages, putting them in stocks, and the Old Lord prepared to fortify the castles of Cyprus against the emperor. Some of John's counselors advised that they conspire to kill Frederick, to which John is said to have "threatened to strike and kill them if they ever again spoke of it," and said "that thus would they be dishonored for always" and:

> because he would be dead and we alive and safe, our right would become wrong, and the truth of it would never be believed….He is our lord; whatever he does we will guard our faith and our honor.[52]

Churchmen and Women in Power

In August of 1286, Henry II was crowned king of Jerusalem at Tyre. When he came to Acre, the Templar of Tyre tells us there was a celebration in the *Auberge*, a Hospitaller palace in the city, where he witnessed jousting and play-acting that included:

> stories of the Round Table [*la table reonde*] and also of the Queen of Feminie [*la reine de Femenie*], with knights dressed up like women jousting together. Then they had nuns, who were dressed as monks and who jousted together, and they role-played Lancelot and Tristan and Pilamedes and many other fair and delightful and pleasant scenes.[53]

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[51] *Guerra di Federico II*, 90-93; La Monte, 79-80.
[52] *Guerra di Federico II*, 94-97; La Monte, 81-82.
[53] *Templare di Tiro*, 170-73; Crawford, 86-87.

Ad Putter has emphasized this scene's implications for reinforcing the identity of the noble warrior in contradistinction to women and clerics. The transvestite elements are meant in a satirical mode, intended to provoke laughter at an inconceivable reversals of roles. The farce of nuns dressed as monks jousting, and knights jousting as women—satirical subversions and double-subversions of the natural order of things—serve to emphasize nobility's martial, masculine, and non-clerical essence.[54]

But Frankish Syria was not entirely a man's world—or a warrior's world.[55] Both women and churchmen played prominent political roles throughout the history of Frankish Syria, a fact that seems to have been much to the male, lay nobility's chagrin. Instances of women succeeding to the crown and important lordships are not at all unusual in the two-century history of the Kingdom of Jerusalem.[56] According to custom and law, women could inherit the crown and fiefs, and they often did. Kings who married queens were their consorts and lost their claim if their wives died; and royal claims often rested on kinship in the maternal line. The infamous Guy of Lusignan claimed the crown in right of his wife Sibylla only to have that right voided upon her death in 1190. Conrad of Montferrat held the crown in right of Sibylla's half-sister, Isabella, the surviving heir of King Amalric (d.1174).

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[54] Ad Putter, "Transvestite Knights in Medieval Life and Literature," in *Becoming Male in the Middle Ages*, eds. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen and Bonnie Wheeler (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc. 2000), 279-302. Also see Heng, 172.

[55] This is a point underscored by Michel Zink in his remarks on Froissart and the rise of vernacular history and chronicles in the thirteenth and fourteenth century Michel Zink, *Medieval French Literature: An Introduction* (Binghamton, NY: Center for Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1995), 116-18.

[56] For what appears to have been the normative view, see Peter Edbury, "Women and the customs of the High Court of Jerusalem according to John of Ibelin," *Chemins d'outre-mer* 1 (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2004), 285-92.

The Champenois baron John of Brienne was king by right of marriage only until the death (1212) of his wife Maria, daughter of Conrad and Isabella I. Frederick II Hohenstaufen could claim the royal dignity until the death (1228) of his wife Isabella II (Yolande), the daughter of John of Brienne and Queen Maria, at which point it passed to their son, Conrad. Indeed, from the middle of the twelfth century a female's claim to the crown was a major factor in virtually every royal succession and regency dispute throughout the remainder of the kingdom's history.

Yet the fact that women had solid *de jure* standing in the customary law of both Jerusalem and Cyprus and considerable *de facto* influence in no way contradicts the fact that when women were involved in succession and lordship disputes they regularly were challenged by dubious circumventions of custom and legal casuistry. We may again recall the Ibelin party's efforts in the 1240s to eject the Hohenstaufen from Tyre and short-circuit Conrad IV's claim to the Jerusalemite throne followed by their compulsion of Alice to agree that when she was installed in the regency all the fortifications of the kingdom should nevertheless remain in Ibelin and Montfort hands.

We have also seen the actions of the High Court in the 1260s concerning Maria of Antioch's challenge to Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan's claim on the regency of Jerusalem—and therefore for recognition as heir-presumptive to the throne. In 1267 Maria of Antioch was the *plus dreit heir* of Conradin, who should have been king if he ever came to the East. She was also the closest living relative of Isabella II (d.1228), the last to wear the Jerusalemite crown by right of blood. Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan made his legal case against Maria based on the fact that he was the closest living relative of Hugh II (as had

determined in 1264), which, according to the customs and laws of the kingdom, should not have mattered—certainly not against Maria's closer ties to Isabella II and Conradin.

As Edbury has shown, it is true that a precedent had been set in 1246 of confirming the new regent based on his relationship to the last recognized regent rather than the last recognized monarch.[57] However, that argument was not the one that had carried the day in the dispute over the regency between Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan and Hugh of Brienne when the High Court's attention was focused on the relationship of the disputants to Isabella II. And yet now, against Maria, a different criterion was applied, and the Court returned to the precedent of 1246, awarding the regency of Jerusalem and recognition as Conradin's heir based on his closer relation to the last recognized regent, who was his mother, Isabella of Cyprus. The High Court had changed the rules of the game in 1246, again in 1264, and then back again in 1267—in 1246 and 1267 it was in no small part to throw doubt upon a woman's legitimate claim.

Attitudes of the male nobility may also be revealed through the examples of Isabella of Ibelin, lady of Beirut, who concluded a treaty in 1269 with the sultan Baybars, and lady Margaret of Tyre, who concluded a treaty with the sultan Qalawun in1285.[58] These women were not only heads of two of the most important surviving lordships, they conducted their own diplomacy with Egypt in the same way as men like Philip of Montfort or John of Jaffa. Yet the narrative sources barely give notice to either's diplomacy—we know more about them from Muslim sources than Frankish ones. It is barely mentioned by the Templar of Tyre that Isabella came to control Beirut or that Margaret came to control Tyre. Neglect of the latter is particularly telling considering the

[57] I.e. When Henry I succeeded Alice of Cyprus in the Jerusalemite regency for Conrad.
[58] Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy, 1260-1290: Treaties of Baybars and Qalawun with Christian Rulers* (New York: Brill, 1996), 42-47, 106-17.

Templar's close ties to Margaret throughout her life and about whom he writes: "I saw her all the time, since I was one of four *valés* who served her..."[59]

That he barely acknowledges in his narrative the fact that she took over the rule of Tyre after the death of her husband, John of Montfort, and her brother-in-law, Humphrey, is consistent with the Templar of Tyre's treatment of the regency in the county of Tripoli for the young Bohemond VII after his father's death in 1275. It was in that year that Bohemond VI's widow, Sibylla of Armenia, introduced as regent Bartholomew, bishop of Tortosa.[60] According to the Templar of Tyre the knights of Tripoli were "deeply disgusted" by having a churchman set above them in the regency but "endured it and did not show their disdain."[61] And yet, as Bernard Hamilton and more recently Philip Baldwin have shown, at this juncture the papacy, at least, treated the leading ecclesiastics (e.g. the patriarch of Jerusalem and the bishop of Tripoli) as the chief leaders in the Latin East.[62] According to the Templar, the sense that they had been subjected to churchmen clearly rankled the local nobility.

Also according to the Templar, when Bohemond came of age he made a promise to Guy that Guy's brother could have the hand of a local heiress in marriage.[63] Apparently, the count then changed his mind and instead allowed the heiress to marry the nephew of the bishop of Tortosa at the latter's request.[64] Aggrieved by this betrayal—and likely the meddling of the prelate under whose regency the knights of Tripoli already

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[59] *Templare di Tiro*, 128-29; Crawford, 62.
[60] *Templare di Tiro*, 142-43; Crawford, 69-70.
[61] "*…les chevaliers eurent a grant disdain d'estre gouvernés par clerc, et toute fois le soufryrent et ne firent semblant*." *Templare di Tiro*, 142-43; Crawford, 69-70; Borghese, 192.
[62] Baldwin, 118-19; Bernard Hamilton, *The Latin Church in the Crusader States: The Secular Church* (London: Variorum Publications, 1980), 273.
[63] Guy's brother John married the daughter of Hugh Salamon. *Templare di Tiro*, 144-47, Crawford, 71-72; Richard, "Les comtes de Tripoli," 218.
[64] *Templare di Tiro*, 144-47; Crawford, 71-72.

chafed—the lord of Jubail arranged his brother's marriage and fled to the Templar house at Acre where he became a confrère of the order.[65]

When Bohemond VII died in 1287 his sister Lucy was set to inherit from him because he had no children. Upon receiving news of his death, she departed France with her husband, Narjot of Toucy, for the East. [66] As has already been seen in Chapter 4 the local nobility did not want her, partly because they viewed her and her husband as yet more foreign interlopers, but surely also because they did not want a female ruler in the county. They also would not abide another regency under Bohemond's mother for the same reason, a chauvinism clearly revealed by their rather flimsy protests that to govern would be too much of a burden for her because she was far too grief-stricken by the death of her son.[67] Nor would they tolerate being once again under the rule of Bartholomew of Tortosa, whom she now invited back into the fold to take up the regency on her family's behalf. Instead, as discussed in Chapter 4, they proclaimed a commune dedicated to the Virgin Mary, of which the local knights and burgesses chose Bartholomew Embriaco, the son of Bertrand II (i.e. the man who had defied Bohemond VI in the streets of Acre and been decapitated in 1259) and a cousin of Guy II, as their leader.[68]

Merchants and Money

Clergy and women are not the only ones who appear as objects of ridicule in the literary sources. In juxtaposition to the "Round Table" in the *Auberge*, the Templar of

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[65] Richard, "Les comtes de Tripoli" 217-18. The two main narrative sources (*Eracles* and the Templar of Tyre) are not in agreement on dates or the order of events. Here I follow Jean Richard's convincing reconstruction: the marriage took place in 1277, the attack on the bishop of Tripoli in the winter of 1277-78, and the Templars became involved in the conflict early in 1278.
[66] Borghese, 191-94; *Templare di Tiro*, 188-91; Crawford, 96-97.
[67] *Templare di Tiro*, 188-91; Crawford, 96-97.
[68] Irwin, "The Mamluk Conquest of the County of Tripoli," 248-49.

Tyre also narrates a very different kind of celebration, one that took place in the Pisan quarter at Acre. The Templar tells us:

> The Pisans of Acre put on a very great festival over the capture of the lord of Jubail, and illuminated their quarter and their houses brightly, and celebrated with trumpets, and *chalemiaus* and drums and many kinds of instruments, and held dances and drinking parties and all kinds of other festive activities. They dressed a man up richly in a fine robe, with a belt of silver and a silver sword, and put him on a platform where he played the role of the prince, and had sergeants around him, and they took another good-sezed man and dressed him in *epaulières* and put a mantle lined with fine squirrel fur on him, and he played the role of the lord of Jubail. They had the sergeants take him and bring him before the 'prince', where he fell on his knees before him. The 'prince' said to him, 'Guy of Ibelin, do you know me? Am I not the prince, your lord? And he replied, 'Yes, Sir'. And then the 'prince' said to him, 'I will make you die like a traitor!' They repeated this three or four times through that night.[69]

While the amusement for the nobles in the *Auberge* derives from the absurdity of the notion that a knight and a nobleman could ever be mistaken for anything but a knight and a nobleman, or that a cleric could be mistaken for a knight, or that a man could be mistaken for a woman, the humor for the Pisans—clearly low-born men—derives from the abject humiliation of a nobleman and the cruelty and vengefulness of his lord. They take delight in the breakdown of the lord-vassal relationship, essential to the noble ethic and self-conception. The Templar's tone and vantage point here is unmistakably caustic, in contrast to his tone concerning the knightly celebrations in the *Auberge*, which is admiring. His narration of the scene in the Pisan quarter allows him to mock the mockers—and, thereby, attempt to restore the right order of things.

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[69] *Templare di Tiro*, 158-59; Crawford, 80.

If the Templar's view of those who live by profit or prebend rather than within the lord-vassal framework of reciprocal rights and duties is not already clear, he drives the point home in several stanzas of a poem inserted in his narrative following his account of the siege of Acre. He writes acidly that:

> … those who lend out at usury
> Are given great honours without measure,
> And are cherished and well-beloved
> A great deal more than a loyal prud'homme.
>
> And cowardly fellows of vile birth
> Are invited by quality folk to dances,
> And are given honours and rewards
> And are received by noblemen.
> …
>
> And again, for lust of money
> Some will rob others,
> And one seizes land from another,
> And Christianity is sold out by everyone.
> …
>
> Now I want to tell you about the clergy,
> Who are all addicted to simony.
> No one gets a prebend for his virtues
> Or his wisdom—only by offering bribes.
>
> Nobody can get any of the benefits
> Of the Church in any way—
> Neither baptism nor burial—
> Except through the offices of Lord Money.[70]

Conclusion

Bravery, largesse, restraint, a concern over reputation, and physical beauty, *inter alia*, were prized qualities of the Frankish nobility. These bound them together, marked them out from other (lesser) Franks. The themes, tropes, and subjects that can be discerned in the works of Philip of Novara and the Templar of Tyre are also evident in

[70] *Templare di Tiro*, 236-53; Crawford, 123-29.

other vernacular chronicles. Boldness bordering on impetuosity is evident among the knights coming ashore at Constantinople in July of 1203 as described by Geoffrey of Villehardouin. Amid trumpet blasts heralding their arrival, the Franks rushed for the shore, every man eager to be the first to land:

> Nobody asked which ship should go first, but instead each of them landed as soon as they were able to. The knights came out of the transports, leaping into the sea up to their waists, fully armed, their helmets laced and their lances in their hands.[71]

In John of Joinville's description of the arrival of the count of Jaffa to join Louis IX's host in Egypt, "the count and his knights leapt down from the galley, very well armed and very well equipped."[72] Like Philip of Novara's chronicle, Joinville's also reveals a preoccupation with fear of blame for ignoble behavior. Soon after a disastrous defeat of a detachment of Louis's army at Mansurah in 1250, when the crusaders were suffering from starvation and illness in their camp, they nevertheless succeeded in striking an agreement with the sultan of Egypt: the Franks would relinquish Damietta, captured early in the Egyptian campaign, in exchange for Jerusalem. However, the sultan demanded that the crusaders leave Louis as a hostage, and Joinville tells us that Geoffrey exclaimed that he would sooner see all the Franks captured or killed—himself included—than be criticized for leaving the king behind.

When some of his barons advised Louis IX to leave the Holy Land after he was ransomed from Egypt and had come to Acre, Joinville tells us that the king sought the count of Jaffa's advice, but the count demurred "Since…my castles are on the frontier, and if I advise the king to stay, it might be thought that this was for my own benefit." But

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[71] *Chronicles of the Crusades*, trans. Caroline Smith, (New York: Penguin, 2008), Villehardouin, section 156.
[72] *Chronicles of the Crusades*, Joinville, sections 158-59.

Louis pressed him to speak freely, and John of Jaffa responded "that if the king could manage to stay in the field for a year, he would do himself great honour by remaining"—advice with which Joinville agreed.[73] The notion of saving one's self from blame is a rhetorical trope not limited to the chronicles. William of Beaujeu wrote a letter to Edward I of England in October of 1275 asking for aid and pleading that the king "bring some suitable remedy, so that we cannot be blamed afterwards [*nobis non possit in posterum imputari]* should something disastrous happen..."[74]

However, unlike the Old French chronicles created in the Latin East, contemporary vernacular prose chronicles and romances created in the Latin West have been investigated extensively as literature, as integrated works with internal logics and underlying themes both intended and unintended, rather than mined simply for facts and interrogated for literal veracity.[75] Around the year 1200, the nobility of France and Flanders began experiencing new threats—more assertive monarchs; urban merchants whose profits made them wealthy rivals; changes in the conduct of warfare; and the intrusion of cash relations into all facets of life. The nobility sought to close ranks by insisting on the importance of lineage and the innate superiority of their way of life and its attendant values—most important of all, their unique mode of combat. As Gabrielle Spiegel has argued, French prose historiography became part and parcel of this project.

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[73] *Chronicles of the Crusades*, Joinville, sections 424-25.
[74] Charles Kohler and Charles Langlois, "Lettres inédites concernant les Croisades (1275-1307)", *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes* 52 (1891): no. 2. English translation from Malcolm Barber and Keith Bate, *Letters from the East: Crusaders, Pilgrims and Settlers in the 12th-13th Centuries* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010), 162-63.
[75] See especially Gabrielle Spiegel, *Romancing the Past: The Rise of Vernacular Prose Historiography in Thirteenth-Century France* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1993) and *The Past as Text: The Theory and Practice of Medieval Historiography* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). Also see Caroline Smith, *Crusading in the Age of Joinville* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).

Because the historical, linguistic, cultural, and familial links between northwest Europe and the Latin East were many and lasting, it is reasonable to expect that some of the ideology that appeared in the works produced in Europe would resonate in the Latin East simply out of a broad sense of cultural affinity.

However, there is more to it than just that. A similar kind of vernacular prose appeared in the Latin East, not out of mimicry or merely diffusion, but because a comparable social cohort was facing comparable challenges. The wealth and power of merchants and burgesses in the coastal cities of the Latin East provoked a sense of threat among the nobility. The latter were constantly strapped for cash and frequently selling off castles and lands to the military orders; yet land itself was scarce, and knights fees were often held entirely or partly in cash, making it difficult to sustain a family's wealth and name over time and contributing to the nobility's sense of doom.

Admittedly, the growth of royal power and the French monarchy's increasing reliance on clerks and professional administrators to support its aims, perceived by the nobles of France and Flanders as major threats, does not have an exact analogue in the Latin East—after all, in the Kingdom of Jerusalem, there was not even a resident king for much of the thirteenth century. Nevertheless, the imperial figures and imperial pretensions that Frederick II and Charles of Anjou had towards the Latin East are suitable stand-ins for the increasingly assertive Capetians in France.

Chapter 6

A Vanishing World

It was long a commonplace of scholarship that the cultural achievements of the Franks of Syria were minor and inconsequential.[1] Fortunately, in recent years much important work has been done to push against this notion. Especially enlightening in this connection has been the research on material culture, art history, and manuscript production.[2] However, the artistic, cultural, and literary possibilities of the narrative texts of the Latin East—as well as how they were intimately bound up with the political life of the Frankish nobility—have had little written about them. Some attention has been paid to issues of textual circulation and diffusion, and to linguistic hybridity, yet between the wide lens of the former and the very fine-grained lens of the latter, there has been little consideration of the narratives themselves and how they do their work.[3] This chapter further explores the Templar of Tyre's celebration of the idea of Frankish nobility, proceeds to an exploration of its intertextuality, and concludes with a consideration of

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[1] John La Monte, wrote of Philip of Novara's "Memoir", which he himself translated, that it "Cannot claim to be one of the great masterpieces of literature." *The Wars of Frederick II Against the Ibelins in Syria and Cyprus*, English trans. John L. La Monte (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936), 17. In his three-volume history of the Crusades, Steven Runciman wrote "The modest, sturdy work of twelfth-century Outremer was a prelude that led to nothing. Thirteenth-century Outremer was only a distant province of the Mediterranean Gothic world." Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954), 386.

[2] Jaroslav Folda, *Crusader Art in the Holy Land: From the Third Crusade to the fall of Acre, 1187-1291* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); *France and the Holy Land: Frankish Culture at the End of the Crusades*, ed. Daniel H. Weiss and Lisa Mahoney (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).

[3] See Gilles Grivaud "Literature" in *Cyprus: Society and Culture, 1191-1374*, eds. Angel Nicolaou-Konnari and Chris Schabel (Leiden: Brill, 2005),

how it commemorates not only the loss of the Kingdom of Jerusalem but the vanishing world of chivalry.

Symbolic Communication and Images of Consensus

We begin with the Templar of Tyre's account of Henry II's arrival at Acre in 1286 and his description of the subsequent celebrations, already introduced in the previous chapter, that took place in the *Auberge*:

> … King Henry II of Cyprus arrived at Acre on the feast day of St. John the Baptist… he brought a very fine force of knights with him, along with other horsemen and footmen and a lovely fleet of galleys and of other vessels. He was received by everyone with the greatest of honours and with great joy. A procession, and all the people, came to meet him, and brought him to the mother church, called the Church of the Holy Cross.
> …
> In the same year, on the Feast of Our Lady in August, King Henry was crowned king of Jerusalem at Tyre… when the king came to Acre, they put on a festival that lasted fifteen days in a place at Acre called the *Auberge* of the Hospital of St. John, where the Hospitallers had a very great palace. It was the loveliest festival anyone had seen for a hundred years, with amusements and jousts with blunted lances. They re-enacted the stories of the Round Table and also of the Queen of Feminie, with knights dressed up like women jousting together. Then they had nuns, who were dressed as monks and who jousted together, and they role-played Lancelot and Tristan and Pilamedes and many other fair and delightful and pleasant scenes.[4]

Henry's formal reception by the people of Acre outside the city prior to his entry is intimately tied to the later celebration at the *Auberge*, forming a coherent script of rapprochement between the city and the Lusignians. There are several details that suggest

[4] *Cronaca del Templare di Tiro: 1243-1314: la caduta degli stati crociati nel racconto di un testimone ocular*, trans. Laura Minervini (Naples: Liguori, 2000; Paul Crawford, ed., *The 'Templar of Tyre', Part III of the 'Deeds of the Cypriots'* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003).

a political symbolism encoded in the events the Templar of Tyre narrates. The entry ceremony of a king or emperor into one of his subject cities—the *adventus*—had its origins in antiquity, and it never really died out in the Middle Ages, although it underwent significant development.[5] Roman custom took on a particular cast with the Christianization of the empire in the Late Antique period, and royal entrances to cities in the Byzantine, Merovingian, and Carolingian worlds were opportunities to celebrate the confirmation of the natural order both on earth and in heaven.[6]

A good deal of scholarship has been devoted to the particular character of the late medieval festival as an expression of communal solidarity and joy, (called the "Joyous Entry," *joyeus entrée, première, joyeuse*, or *solenelle*) as well as to the symbolic richness of spectacle as a means of communication in late medieval towns and cities, differentiating it from what had gone before.[7] By the Late Middle Ages, with the extraordinary growth of cities and attendant growth of the power and self-awareness of their various corporate interests, the occasion of entry symbolized a new kind of reciprocal relationship between ruler and ruled, rather than the domination of the latter by the former: "the community's deference to the king as a symbol of justice and right order

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[5] Gordon Kipling, *Enter the King: Theatre, Liturgy and Ritual in the Medieval Civic Triumph* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 2; Michael McCormick, *Eternal Victory: Triumphal rulership in late antiquity, Byzantium, and the early medieval West* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 184.

[6] Sabine McCormack, *Art and Ceremony in Late Antiquity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 275.

[7] Lawrence M. Bryant, "The Medieval Entry Ceremony at Paris," in *Coronations: Medieval and Early Modern Monarchic Ritual*, ed. Janos M. Bak (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 91, 112; Kipling, 2-3; James Murray, *Bruges*, *Cradle of Capitalism, 1280-1390* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 345.

and the urban corporations' assertions of rights and liberties" were put into delicate balance.[8]

There were two Christian models (in addition to the imperial Roman one) for the entrance of a king: the first was of Christ into Jerusalem on Palm Sunday, the second of John the Baptist as a forerunner of Christ—Henry II makes his entry to Acre on the feast day of John the Baptist.[9] Henry's entrance to Acre would have drawn on both exempla because he was received as the newly-crowned king of Jerusalem—despite the fact that the city itself was in Muslim hands—and because of the particular day of the arrival. Equally significant is the fact that "all the people, came to meet him" outside the walls of the city and then processed with him to the Church of the Holy Cross. The emphasis here is on consensus rather than on triumph: Henry does not enter Acre unbidden as conqueror, but is met outside the city by its people and invited in "by everyone with the greatest of honours and with great joy" (*à trop grant henor & à grant joie*). The king is not coming to claim *his* city, the people are inviting him to take his rightful place as ruler of *their* city. In this distinction are contained notions of corporate liberty and reciprocal power relations.

The events in the *Auberge*, although they did not take place on the occasion of Henry's initial arrival at Acre at the end of June, but rather upon his return in August after having been crowned at Acre, nevertheless should be seen as working in conjunction with the royal entry. The arrival of the king had been celebrated in a public way and was now followed by a very private celebration, seen by Lawrence Bryant as

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[8] Bryant, "The Medieval Entry Ceremony," 90.

[9] Barbara A. Hanawalt and Kathryn L. Reyerson, ed., *City and Spectacle in Medieval Europe* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), xii; Teofilo F. Ruiz, *A King Travels: Festive Traditions in Late Medieval and Early Modern Spain* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 46-47 and 212 for Festival on St. John's Day in Iberia.

absolutely typical of the late medieval and Early Modern entry ceremony.[10] The symbolism of the fifteen-day celebration in the *Auberge* placed at center-stage the nobility through whom the king would be forced to govern.[11] The prominent position given to Henry's uncle Baldwin, constable of Cyprus and his regent in the Kingdom of Jerusalem, is also characteristic of what Bryant has called "composite and corporate" kingship. [12]

Similarly, the jousting and pageantry in the *Auberge* were not necessarily typical of the celebration of royal entry by this time in Europe, but would be by the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.[13] One symbolic act that came to characterize the late medieval entry in France and Flanders that is absent in the Templar of Tyre's narrative is the bestowal of a gift by the people of the city on the new king. However, Hugo Buchthal has argued that one of the Acre-produced manuscripts of the *Histoire Universelle* was likely presented to Henry II as precisely such a gift.[14] Another element missing from the scene at Acre that would make it the ideal type of a late medieval entry ceremony is the arrangement along the city streets of elaborate pageant shows imbued with allegorical meaning. But it seems clear that the events described by the Templar of Tyre are pointing in that direction: the symbolism of the pageantry in the *Auberge*, with its themes of comradely arms and a community of equals, was no accident.

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[10] Bryant, "Medieval Entry Ceremony," 90.
[11] McCormick, 390.
[12] Bryant, "Medieval Entry Ceremony," 110-11.
[13] Murray, *Cradle of Capitalism*, 369.
[14] Bryant, "Medieval Entry Ceremony," 95; Hugo Buchthal, *Miniature Painting in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), 68-69, 78-87. David Jacoby finds Buchthal's assertion to be unsubstantiated. See his "Society, Culture, and the Arts," in *France and the Holy Land*, 116.

The elements we see in this passage—the people of the city coming out to meet the king and their procession together, the public celebration and spectacle followed by a more private celebration hosted by one or more of the urban corporations, the (possible) bestowal of a symbolic gift on Henry II, the prominent position given to his chief officer, Baldwin of Ibelin, the joust held in the *Auberge*—are features that consistently appear together in the entry ceremonies of England, France, Flanders, and Spain in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries—but much less so in the thirteenth.[15] In his recent monograph *A King Travels*, Teofilo Ruiz has considered similar aesthetic and political developments in Christian Iberia, and has understood them as similarly entangled.[16] In the Iberian context, the 1320s and 1330s mark the first detailed descriptions of elaborate entry ceremonies in the Castilian chronicles. The chronicles are minimalist with respect to narrating entries in thirteenth century in Spain. Even allowing for the fact that the Templar did not complete his history until a couple of decades later, this narrative is still among the earliest we know of anywhere in Latin Christendom.[17]

Intertexts

Scholarship on entries in the Latin West and their elaborate narration by chroniclers in the Late Middle Ages emphasizes their fundamental intertextuality.[18] The symbolic power of this particular entry is deepened by the events in the *Auberge*. There is jousting (*behors*) and a "Round Table," (*contrefirent la table reonde*) in which the

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[15] Andrew Brown, "Ritual and State-Building: Ceremonies in Late Medieval Bruges" in *Symbolic Communication in Late Medieval Towns*, ed. Jacoba Van Leeuwen (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2006), 14; Murray, *Cradle of Capitalism*, 344.
[16] See especially Ruiz, 113-45.
[17] On early examples and origins, see Bryant, "Medieval Entry Ceremony," 100; Ruiz, 49-54, 72. Also see James Murray, "The Liturgy of the Count's Advent in Bruges" in *City and Spectacle*, 137-52.
[18] Ruiz, 114.

participating knights played roles of Arthurian heroes from twelfth century romance and dressed as Amazons (*la raine de Femenie*) while nuns dressed as monks and jousted as knights, flirting with gender and status transgressions. The "Round Table" was a typical knightly activity of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries that enjoyed widespread popularity in Europe. Marked by jousting, feasting, dancing, song, and the play-acting that we see described in the passage, it was based on prose and verse versions of the tales of Lancelot, Tristan, and Palamedes, although the events being acted out did not necessarily correspond exactly to the plots of the tales.[19] *Lancelot, Tristan*, and *Palamède*, widely known in both the West and East by the end of the thirteenth century, enforced the chivalric ideals of honor, bravery, martial prowess, loyalty, courtly love, and—especially important for our purposes here—consensus among fellow knights.[20] Especially intriguing is the mention of Palamedes, a virtuous Saracen knight who later converted to Christianity while remaining steadfast in his unrequited love for Tristan's Iseult.[21] David Jacoby notes that the literary trope of the Muslim who undergoes baptism was common in the West from the twelfth century, but was conspicuously absent in literature produced in the Levant. He reasons that this was because the knights of the Latin East "had a more sober and realistic view of their Muslim neighbors."[22]

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[19] David Jacoby, "La littérature française dans les états latins de la Méditerranée orientale à l'époque des croisades: diffusion et création" in *Essor et fortune de la chanson de geste dans l'Europe et l'Orient latin. Actes du IXe Congrès International de la Société Rencesvals pour l'Étude des Épopées Romanes* (Modena: Mucchi Editore, 1984): 628-29.

[20] *Lancelot* was in the Levant from the time of Frederick II—it is referenced by Philip of Novara—while *Tristan* and *Palamède* were known by 1271, as the Lord Edward of England had a copy of each during his stay in the Holy Land, "La littérature française," 630.

[21] Emmanuèle Baumgarner, trans. Sarah Singer "Prose Tristan," in *The Arthur of the French: the Arthurian Legend in Medieval French and Occitan Literature*, eds. Burgess, Glyn S. and Karen Pratt (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2006), 330; William T.H. Jackson, *Medieval Literature: A History and a Guide* (New York: Collier Ltd, 1966), 81.

[22] David Jacoby, "Knightly Values and Class Consciousness in the Crusader States of the Eastern Mediterranean," *Mediterranean Historical Review* 1 (1986): 175.

The "Round Table" and reenactment of Arthurian romance has a further resonance here, taking place as it does as part of a coronation celebration. In most versions of the Arthurian cycle before Malory, the king is relatively unimportant; it is the knights themselves who take center-stage.[23] The emphasis of "Arthurian" tales is not on Arthur, but on the bravery, prowess, and "mutual respect" of the fellow knights of the Round Table: comrades-in-arms, a brotherhood of equals, a "community of the chosen."[24] This meaning would not have been lost on the participants, the king, or the Templar of Tyre himself; indeed the material presented in the "Round Table" was quite deliberately chosen for its symbolic message, as the barons of the Latin East of the thirteenth century insisted on their rights *vis-à-vis* the king, basing "their ideals on a mythological and unreal history of the founding and early legislation of the kingdom."[25] In the *Auberge* these knights were expressing their sense of themselves as a well-defined social cohort.[26] The messages implicit in the Arthurian and classical performances held in the Hospitaller compound—and significantly, not in the royal residence—would have been obvious: the knights of the Order and the kingdom were a noble community in possession of clearly defined rights in relation to their king, a self-image mirrored by the classical and Arthurian themes invoked in their revelry.[27]

The other specific literary allusion the Templar makes in §439 is to the Queen of Feminie, or Queen of the Amazons. The Amazons would have been known to the Franks through a genre of literature popular in the East as well as in northern France: the verse

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[23] For Arthurian-themed tournaments in Iberia in the Late Medieval and Early Modern, see Ruiz, 232-33.
[24] Jacoby, "Knightly Values," 168.
[25] Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, 230.
[26] Jacoby, "Knightly Values," 160.
[27] See Ruiz on place and space, (Royal, Ecclesiastical, Civic), 64-65.

romances drawing on classical history and legend such as the *Roman de Thèbes*, the *Roman de Troie*, the *Roman d'Alexandre*, and the *Roman d'Èneas*. These invoked classical heroes and tales reinterpreted in a thirteenth-century chivalric idiom.[28] Thus, like Arthurian literature, they provided a kind of typology of the knight for its audience, while also pointing to a classical past and expounding upon "one of the favourite theories of [French] medieval historiography," the Trojan lineage of the Franks. It has been suggested—and to me seems plausible—that the story of the fall of Troy, which was regarded by Romans and medieval people alike as "the epoch-making event of pre-Roman history," may have taken on a special resonance in the East, where Franks viewed neighboring Byzantine Greeks with suspicion and hostility. Moreover, as with the Arthurian literature, there is an emphasis on the sovereign rights of the knights as a social cohort—in the classical romances it is the knights themselves and not a king who hold councils "to decide about peace and war."[29]

The Amazons enjoyed a popularity in the Latin East in the 1270s and 1280s that far outstripped their limited role in the romances, a fact that is demonstrated by their appearance not only in the festivities at the *Auberge* but also in William of Tyre's late twelfth-century *Histoire d'Outremer* and in the three illuminated manuscripts of the *Histoire Universelle* produced at Acre during this period. The *Histoire* was a pastiche of biblical and literary stories that attempted to give "a continuous narration of world history from Creation to the time of Julius Caesar," and it would have complemented the work of William of Tyre and the classical romances nicely in reiterating the Franks' sense of their

[28] Jackson, *Medieval Literature*, 96.
[29] Buchthal, 68, 75; Jacoby, "Knightly Values," 171.

own place in the continuous flow of a history that stretched all the way back through the idealized founding of the Kingdom of Jerusalem to the fall of Troy.[30]

Like the Arthurian and classical romances, the *Histoire Universelle* was known in both West and East, but may have taken on a particular character in the context of Frankish Syria. Anne Derbes and Mark Sandona have argued that the three manuscripts of the work produced at Acre assign a far more prominent and rather different role to the Amazons than do those manuscripts produced in France and Italy at roughly the same time.[31] While the western manuscripts portray and describe the women-warriors with hostility—that is, being vanquished and brutalized by men—the Acre manuscripts do not offer them as "transgressive threats to the social order but rather [as] its defenders, avenging their sons and husbands, and coming to the aid of the Trojans."[32]

Derbes and Sandona argue that in the context of the crusades, the Amazons began to be viewed in a more positive light than was traditional in the West. This was true in the first place because of the new opportunities that became available to women as crusaders or financiers of crusading after they were first permitted to take the crusading vow in the pontificate of Innocent III. It was also true because the Franks believed that the Amazons "were one of many groups of exotic races" living just beyond the Latin East, and that they were potential allies against the Muslims, a hope made explicit by their mention in an apocryphal twelfth-century letter from Prester John, William of Tyre's history, and Guibert of Nogent's *Gesta dei per Francos*.[33] Finally, the Franks'

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[30] Buchthal, 68; Jaroslav Folda, *Crusader Art in the Holy Land: From the Third Crusade to the fall of Acre, 1187-1291* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 383.
[31] Anne Derbes and Mark Sandona, "Amazons and Crusaders: the Histoire Universelle in Flanders and the Holy Land," in *France and the Holy Land*, 188.
[32] Derbes and Sandona, 206.
[33] Derbes and Sandona, 207-8.

particular view of secular history in which they styled themselves descendants of the Trojans whom they believed had made common cause with the Amazons against the Greeks, contributed to the positive depictions of the warrior women.[34]

Henry II's reception into the city of Acre in 1286 may well be an early, incompletely developed instance of the elaborate royal entry ceremony as it would be performed in the Latin West in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. This possibility seems even more likely in light of that fact that the first attested "Round Table" took place not in Flanders, France, or Iberia, but in the Latin East, at the knighting of the son of John of Ibelin of Beirut in 1223—although Philip of Novara offers less detail about it than the Templar of Tyre does about the one from 1286.[35]

Another aspect of the intertextuality of the Templar's work is his treatment of the Mongols. Peter Jackson has surveyed representations of the Mongols in western Christian sources and analyzed the position the Mongols occupied in Europe's imagination and cosmology. As he points out, at first they did not have a place in its scriptural tradition and so early writings on the Mongols described them as something of a prodigy; later they were fit to Biblical tradition and became associated variously with Gog and Magog,

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[34] It is worth noting that David Jacoby does not see any political overtones in either the Arthurian material or the portrayal of the Amazons at the *Auberge*, and considers the "Round Table" to be purely satirical: "La representation des Amazones à Acre était dépourvue d'allusions politiques. N'empêche que son caractère satirique semble évident" and "…la représentation des Amazones à Ace était bel et bien une parodie. Elle a d'ailleurs été suivie d'une autre representation [that of the nuns dressed as monks jousting], où la satire et le ridicule étaient encore plus prononcés." Jacoby, "La literature française," 632. However, I think the work that has been done by Derbes and Sandona in the years since Jacoby's article has convincingly demonstrated the positive view of the Amazons in crusader culture. Moreover, satirical playfulness and serious political symbolism are not necessarily mutually exclusive, a point made by Ad Putter. The events in the *Auberge* almost certainly contained more than a single layer of meaning. Ad Putter, "Transvestite Knights in Medieval Life and Literature," in *Becoming Male in the Middle Ages*, ed. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen and Bonnie Wheeler (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc. 2000), 279-302.

[35] Roger Sherman Loomis, ed., *Arthurian Literature in the Middle Ages: A Collaborative History*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), 553.

the "Inclosed Nations" supposedly imprisoned by Alexander the Great, the Ishmaelites, the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel, Prester John, and Antichrist and the Apocalypse.[36] The Templar of Tyre alludes to the "Inclosed Nation" myth in a lengthy excursus:

> The Tartars are a Mongol [OF] people: they are called this because they come from a country called Mongolia [OF], which lies by the Ocean Sea. Their country is enclosed by very high mountains facing both sea and the land. It is said that Alexander the Great blocked up a narrow pass so that they could not come out of their country and go into any other lands. He boxed them in so that they might not come out, till one of their valiant men named Genghis Khan, a very enterprising man, got out of that place by his vigor and ingenuity.

The Templar of Tyre, in addition to noting that they rode their horses bareback, describes the Mongol diet:

> The Tartars lived without bread, because they knew nothing about bread except that it exists. They ate meat; that is to say, when a horse or an ass or a dog died, they ate it. But they derived their main sustenance from the milk of mares and ewes, and from wild herbs and from fowl.[37]

Most likely this information would have come to the Templar of Tyre via either word of mouth or writings of the ambassadors that traveled between the Latin Christendom and the court of the Ilkhan in the thirteenth century—David of Ashby, John of Plano of Carpini, Simon of Saint Quentin, and William of Rubruck. The above descriptions align closely with those found in the writings of the travellers themselves, as

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[36] Peter Jackson, *The Mongols and the West, 1221-1410* (New York: Pearson Longman 2005), 138.
[37] *Templare di Tiro*, 284-85, Crawford, 147-7.

well as other chroniclers like Matthew Paris who are known to have made use of their work.[38]

The Templar's descriptions also align well with those found in Joinville's *Life of Saint Louis*; the Mongols are depicted as a mighty, though distant, pagan people.[39] Joinville, who, as a trusted member of Louis IX's inner circle, would have been privy to information from the ambassadors between the French king and the Ilkhanate, claims the Mongols ate no bread but instead lived off horsemeat and fermented mare's milk, and did not shy away from eating carrion: "They eat the flesh of any and every kind of animal that dies in their camp" while the "soldiers place raw meat between their saddles and saddle-blankets; when all the blood has been pressed out, they eat it, still completely raw."[40] Joinville wrote that the Mongols indiscriminately conquered Muslim and Christian peoples and lands, and that they used their Muslim subjects to attack Christians and their Christian subjects to attack Muslims.[41] This assertion is echoed by the *Rothelin* continuation of William of Tyre who wrote that because "They believed in nothing," they were equally enthusiastic in vanquishing Christian and Muslim foes. A similar notion is found in the Templar of Tyre's claim that one of the Ilkhans in the late thirteenth century (Ghazan) persecuted the Christians under his rule, yet also made war against Muslims despite having converted to Islam himself upon his accession to power.[42] About their universal conquests prior to coming to Syria, *Rothelin* reports:

> There was scarcely a land…which they did not conquer,
> utterly destroy or hold in subjection through huge exactions

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[38] Jackson, *Mongols and the West*, 137-40.
[39] *Chronicles of the Crusades*, ed. and trans. Caroline Smith (New York: Penguin, 2008), Joinville, section 470.
[40] *Chronicles of the Crusades*, Joinville, section 487-89.
[41] *Chronicles of the Crusades*, Joinville, section 488.
[42] *Templare di Tiro*, 290-91, Crawford, 150.

> of gold and silver, of men and women and many other forms of slavery, so that they would all have been better dead.[43]

Clearly the Templar of Tyre was participating in the verbal and textual discourse on the Mongols in Latin Christendom. However, he offers details about the Mongols not to be found elsewhere in Frankish sources, and these have been the subject of some scholarly suspicion that speaks to larger questions about the Templar's work. One of the most significant and controversial episodes in the Templar of Tyre's narrative is his account of the fall of Damascus to the Mongols in 1260. He claims both King Hetoum of Armenia and Bohemond VI of Antioch-Tripoli were present, and adds that the prince of Antioch ordered a Catholic mass to be sung in the great mosque, rang bells from the towers of the city's churches, and allowed his men to desecrate other mosques. The Templar claims that those serving under Bohemond were only too happy to oblige. This is an assertion that has long been taken at face value by modern scholars to suggest Hülegü's sympathies for Christianity (at least over Islam) and that the Franks of Acre missed a "golden opportunity" to ally themselves with the Ilkhan.[44]

As discussed in Chapter 2, Peter Jackson has challenged the veracity of this story, believing it to have been conditioned by hindsight, when the Templar of Tyre was writing in the early fourteenth century. In fact, Jackson has operated under the assumption that all the Templar of Tyre's treatment of the Mongols is irredeemably tainted by later attitudes; however, I see no compelling reason to make this assumption. Certainly there are positive evaluations of the Mongols, such as the following description of Hülegü: "he

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[43] Janet Shirley, *Crusader Syria in the Thirteenth Century: The Rothelin Continuation of the History of William of Tyre with part of the Eracles or Acre text* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), *Rothelin*, Ch.80.
[44] Peter Jackson "Crisis in the Holy Land," 482.

was a most valiant man, and much more enterprising than any of his brothers; he conquered more and did more great deeds than any of his brothers did…"[45] Yet these are balanced by harsher depictions of the Ilkhan in which he is shown to be cruel and deceitful. The Templar tells us that at the siege of Baghdad in 1258 the Ilkhan tricked the caliph, persuading him to leave the city walls and accept an offer of peace, then captured him and executed him by pouring molten gold down his throat, a symbolic gesture meant to signal the invaders' ire at the caliph's refusal to pay them tribute.[46] Joinville tells a similar tale in which the Ilkhan put the caliph into a cage, "denying him food for as long as it is possible to do so without killing a man." Eventually, Hülegü asked his prisoner if he was hungry; when the latter applied in the affirmative, the Ilkhan "had a great golden platter loaded with jewellery [sic], studded with precious stones, brought before the caliph," and bid him eat.[47] This seems to put the lie to—or at least problematize—Jackson's assertion that the Templar of Tyre carries any special brief for the Mongols.

The tenor and tone of the Templar of Tyre's writings on the Mongols is in line both with the letters sent to the West in the critical years of the late 1250s and again in the 1280s, and with the representations, stereotypes, and theories about the Mongols found in a variety of other Frankish sources. The impression given is that even with increasing contact the Franks continued to have difficulty deciding just what to make of them—both in a practical, diplomatic sense, as well as in a more conceptual sense. But for our purposes here, their treatment in the Templar of Tyre's account draws attention to the heterogeneity of that text—one that makes appeals to the audience to take it at face value, yet consistently offers tropes that, rather than factual (although they likely

[45] *Templare di Tiro*, 80-81; Crawford, 34.
[46] *Templare di Tiro*, 286-89; Crawford, 148-49.
[47] *Chronicles of Crusading*, Joinville, sections 586-87. Also see Crawford, 149, n.1.

contained factual elements) instead belonged to what Hans Jauss, in his study of audience and reception, evocatively calls a "horizon of the expectable."[48]

Anthony Bale, in the introduction to his translation of Mandeville's *Book of Marvels and Travels*, a work from the fourteenth century, describes Mandeville as "playfully unreliable."[49] I think this, too, would be an apt characterization for the Templar of Tyre, which, although by no means belonging to the genre of travel narratives of which Mandeville would be an early example, nevertheless contains something of the picaresque in its treatment of the Mongols. In fact, the notion of play—especially aristocratic or noble play—is a motif throughout the Templar's work. The Templar dilates on the ideas expressed in the *Auberge* by describing instances of chivalrous play in two major excurses is his narrative. As with his description of the Mongols, these are a departure both from the Templar's main narrative and his mostly local focus.

One of these instances of chivalrous play is his account of events in England related to Simon of Montfort's rebellion against Henry III. Simon successfully captured Henry's son, the Lord Edward, and held him hostage after the battle of Lewes on May 14 of 1264. The Templar of Tyre tells us that the Lord Edward was kept in luxurious conditions. In fact, Edward, we are told, "went out riding every day with the earl. And when he saw that the earl trusted him," he made his escape. However, this playfulness soon turns serious—according to the Templar of Tyre, when Edward later captured

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[48] Hans Robert Jauss, *Toward an Aesthetics of Reception*, trans. Timothy Bahti (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 79.

[49] See the introduction (ix-xxiii) of Sir John Mandeville, *The Book of Marvels and Travels*, trans. Anthony Bale (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). Also see Geraldine Heng, *Empire of Magic: Medieval Romance and the Politics of Cultural Fantasy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 6, 241-43 for the blending of fact and fiction in travel narratives.

Simon the following year at the Battle of Evesham he was disinclined to return the favor of mercy. At the urging of some of his knights, Edward had Simon beheaded and ordered his head to be placed on the battlefield to make it appears that he had been killed in combat rather than executed in cold blood.[50]

More in line with the dream of chivalrous, even playful, conduct by the nobility is the Templar's description of the rebellion of the Count of Flanders against Philip IV of France, highlighted by the Battle of Courtrai in 1302.[51] As with the events in England, the details here are far from accurate. In the Templar's telling, the rebellious count of Flanders was imprisoned by King Philip IV of France but "was allowed to ride out where it pleased him." The count "came before the king of France and begged him to let him go to Flanders to see his lands and his people, a thing which he greatly desired." The king asked him how he could be certain the count would return and the count replied he had nothing to offer beyond his word, which the king accepted as sufficient. Once in Flanders the count was "counseled…not to return again to prison, but he did not wish to take this advice, and rather kept his promise and his word." The Templar tells us he returned to the king of France and remained in prison at Poitoise until his death at the age of 100. Meanwhile, the French king made peace with Flanders and "although he had taken great harm, he did not retaliate against anyone."[52] The Templar's presentations of these events are narrative expansions of the events described in the *Auberge* and serve a similar

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[50] *Templare di Tiro*, 100-2; Crawford, 46-47. The Templar's understanding of the Battles of Lewes and Evesham diverge considerable from that of modern scholars. He also mistakenly refers to Simon of Montfort as the Early of Gloucester (rather than the Earl of Leicester, as he was). See John R. Maddicott, *Simon de Montfort* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 331-35.

[51] Again, the Templar's depiction of events is factually unreliable in light of modern scholarship. For the Battle of Courtrai/The Battle of the Golden Spurs, See David Nicholas, *Medieval Flanders* (New York: Longman, 1992), 190-98, 200, 202.

[52] *Templare di Tiro*, 312-17, Crawford 162-64.

ideological function. Although writing of Burgundy a century or more later, Johann Huizinga, the great cultural historian of the Late Middle Ages, could easily have been describing the Templar of Tyre and his chronicle:

> [This] historiography employed the fiction of the ideal of knighthood and thus traced everything back to a beautiful image of princely honor and knightly virtue, to a pretty game of noble rules that created the illusion of order.[53]

Once and Future

Through these vignettes the Templar foregrounds a notion of order and stability that is underwritten by the ideal of chivalry, while also detailing the gruesome consequences of that order breaking down or that ideal not being met. It was his fear that those breakdowns and failures to realize chivalrous ideals were becoming more and more common.[54] Jonathan Riley-Smith has claimed that the defining characteristic of the nobility of the Kingdom of Jerusalem was a pedantic legal formalism by which the nobility self-consciously acted out "parts based on cardboard exemplars of chivalry."[55] Their ideals of government were based on a founding myth and the legal and constitutional fiction of the kingdom's nobility finds its perfect analogue in the scene in the *Auberge* depicted by the Templar of Tyre.[56] Indeed, they belong to the same "timeless

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[53] Johan Huizinga, *The Autumn of the Middle Age*, trans. Rodney J. Payton and Ulrich Mammitzsch (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 72.
[54] Gilles Grivaud "Literature" in *Cyprus: Society and Culture, 1191-1374*, eds. Angel Nicolaou-Konnari and Chris Schabel (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 238-244.
[55] Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility,* 4.
[56] See Peter Edbury, *John of Ibelin and the Kingdom of Jerusalem* (Woodbridge, Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 1997).

never never land" as Arthurian romance, efforts "to provide their menaced state with an ideal future" and "to defeat time."[57]

Even after fleeing to Cyprus the Templar continued to record the events of his time—he likely wrote his entire chronicle there, recording earlier events from memory or at most from notes.[58] Memory and forgetting have been described by Paul Ricoeur as "the median levels between time and narrative."[59] Memory had a privileged status in Frankish Syria and Cyprus. That notion has an especially strong resonance in considering a work of commemoration composed in the Latin East, where the nobility esteemed the quality of memory for the advantage it gave to pleaders in the High Court. The Old Lord of Beirut is praised by Philip of Novara for his "good memory" (*boune memoire*) and Bertrand of Jubail is praised by the Templar of Tyre for his "keen memory" (*bien menbrant*).[60] Philip of Novara seems to have learned his legal education through

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[57] Jackson, *Medieval Literature*, 82; Bianca Kühnel, "History in Thirteenth-Century Crusader Art," in *France and the Holy Land: Frankish Culture at the End of the Crusades*, ed. Daniel H. Weiss and Lisa Mahoney (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 181. It is worth noting the similar hypothesis offered by Ruiz for similar developments in Iberia, where he suggests these kinds of chivalrous games offered "a glimmer of hope to a land devastated by years of civil war and contentious regencies." See Ruiz, 54, 68, 74-75. Both interpretations owe a debt to the thesis of Johann Huizinga's *Autumn of the Middle Ages*. Representative of that thesis is the following passage, in which he describes the Burgundian nobility's enthusiasm for tournaments and elaborate chivalric games in the Late Middle Ages, amidst profound changes in economic, social, and political life as well as the conduct of war: "It is as if…[they] employed the fiction of knighthood as a corrective for the incomprehensibility their own time had for them. It was the only form that allowed for even an imperfect understanding of events. In reality, wars and politics in those days were extremely formless and seemed disconnected. War appeared in most instances as a chronic process of isolated campaigns scattered over large areas, diplomacy as a verbose and deficient instrument…" Huizinga, 72.

[58] See Crawford, 2-7.

[59] Paul Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting,* trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), preface, xv.

[60] Philip of Novara, *Guerra di Federico II in Oriente (1223-1242)*, ed. and trans. Silvio Melani (Naples: Liguori, 1994), 210-11; *The Wars of Frederick II Against the Ibelins in Syria and Cyprus*, trans. John L. La Monte (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936), 169-70; *Templare di Tiro*, 76-77; Crawford, 31. On memory and strength of character, the mnemonic prowess of the saints, and memory as a propaedeutic for "judgments (prudence or wisdom)" see

conversation with the master jurists of the prior generation, Ralph of Tiberias, who enjoined Philip to "remember" rather than study, and the Old Lord of Beirut himself. [61] We have also seen how John of Beirut's son, John of Arsur, proposed in the 1250s introducing a scribe, and therefore a written record, into the proceedings of both the Burgess Court and High Court of Jerusalem: opposition seems to have been nearly universal from the nobility.[62]

The fall of Acre, the key event in the Templar of Tyre's narrative, actually occurs in the middle, a fact that accomplishes an interesting rhetorical effect, making for a kind of "off-center center", and in some sense helping to keep the text open, defy closure, and allow the narrator and his audience to "gain some narrative purchase on the future and extend the present, but in a purely conceptual way, unadulterated, as it were, by narrative matter."[63] Yet even as he hopes to memorialize, to commemorate, and to preserve in amber Acre as it was, he introduces a frightening possibility: that Acre's fall is destined to be suffered again. He follows his account of the loss of the city with a poem comprised of 236 lines divided into fifty-nine quatrains. It begins:

> Because I witness many things changing
> From light to darkness
> In my own time,
> Before my very eyes,

Mary Carruthers, *The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture* (2nd Ed.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 11, 14, 195. Also see Elma Brenner, Meredith Cohen, and Mary Franklin-Brown, eds. *Memory and Commemoration in Medieval Culture* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2013) and Nicholas Paul and Suzanne Yeager, *Remembering the Crusades: Myth, Image, and Identity* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012).

[61] "*il meismes me conteit moult de chozes dou royaume de Jerusalem et des us et des assises, et disoit que de les retenisse*": "Livre de Philippe de Navarre," *Receuil des historiens des croisades*, *lois* 1, ed. M. Beugnot (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1841), 525; La Monte, 9.

[62] Hans E. Mayer, "Ibelin versus Ibelin: The Struggle for the Regency of Jerusalem 1253-1258," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 122 (1978): 33-34.

[63] For these ideas see Monika Otter "Prolixitas Temporum: Futurity in Medieval Historical Narratives" in *Reading Medieval Culture: Essays in Memory of Robert W. Hanning*, eds. Robert M. Stein and Sandra Pierson Prior (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 47-49.

I am overcome by the need
To put down my thoughts in rhyme—
Thoughts on the age and the season
In which have befallen so many ill things.

And let them not think it foolish
That a prud'homme should set to work
On occasion, and be involved
In shaping good arguments into poetry.

And concludes:

It was the most gentle country
Between here and Paris,
One which knew no discord
Only peace and love and concord.

They maintained bonds of affection,
And comported themselves with loyalty and faithfulness…

They were noble and open
Towards all men of good will,
And so their country was secure
And had no quarrel with anyone.

But they were torn apart by greed
Into great discord and argument
And so they were greatly diminished
And injured and brought down.

And so there was much hatred amongst them
And they treated each other badly.
There was no love lost between them,
Only faithfulness and bad behavior.

And so the land is lost... [64]

All of this could be about Acre but in fact is about Cyprus. Thus, even as Cyprus becomes a refuge for the nobility of Acre and a repository for the history, memory, and traditions of Frankish Syria—in short, even as it becomes a new Syria—it, too, in a sense is already lost. And this is not because of sultans or khans, nor even directly through the

[64] *Templare di Tiro*, 236-53; Crawford, 123-29.

design of God, but through the corrupting influence of money, the dissolution of the bonds between lords and vassals, and a decline in the chivalrous way of life that the Templar believes was epitomized by the Frankish nobility of the Kingdom of Jerusalem.

Conclusion

This dissertation has examined the Frankish nobility's diplomatic, military, and political actions along with the cultural and social attitudes that conditioned them. I have challenged the scholarly perception of Frankish helplessness and insignificance in the period c.1242-91, while demonstrating that, despite their position on the frontier of Latin Christendom, the nobility's abiding concern was not with Muslims or Islam, *per se*. They were more concerned with competing among themselves and with safeguarding their status as nobles against other elements of Frankish society (e.g. would-be kings, merchants, prelates, and women wielding power) than they were with guarding their collective interests as Franks.

This problematizes the assumption, pervasive in both scholarship and popular conception, that religion was the primary and nearly universal motivating identity of individuals and communities living in places with significant interfaith contact in the Middle Ages. More specifically, it breaks free of the historiographical trap of accomodationist versus segregationist models (including Ellenblum's nuanced revision) that casts Frankish activities as first and foremost shaped by encounter with a Muslim "other." The Frankish nobility were by no means assimilated to local ways, but this was not for lack of contact. Contact was constant and took a variety of forms—especially diplomacy and treaty-making. When observed without an *a priori* assumption that these treaties were defined by the ethno-religious differences of the contracting parties, they appear comparable to treaties and truces between any two parties competing over land, revenue, or trade routes, irrespective of religion.

I have also attempted to understand the years c.1242-91 by seeing them as best I could through the eyes of the Frankish nobility themselves. My method of doing so has been a close reading and consideration of the prose works of their contemporaries and confederates, Philip of Novara and the Templar of Tyre. The latter especially portrays a world that has already been lost at the time of his writing in the early fourteenth century—or at least one that he saw passing before his very eyes. But that lost world had not been lost to Islam. Indeed, new crusade plans were in the making, as were new plans for coordination with the Mongols (although the latter never came to pass). The second half of the Templar of Tyre's chronicle, written from his vantage point in Cyprus, suggests that many things were still possible in the future—including a return to the shores of Syria. But how could the chivalry of Cyprus ever roll back the tide of money, of merchants and mercenaries, that he saw rising? The Templar writes:

> And though we are all creatures
> Of God, still it is not right
> That all should have the same status.
> It was by the Will of God,
>
> That Abraham placed Ishmael
> Beneath the feet of Isaac, who though younger,
> Was begotten of the lady wife.
> Ishmael was considered a serf,
>
> For he was a bastard, born of a serf-girl.
> But now no one can maintain himself
> Unless he has money,
> For the sake of which men are brought down.

Where is the malice, the cry for revenge on the infidel? Even after the loss of Syria, for the Templar of Tyre Ishmael is odious not beause of the religion of his progeny but because he was a serf, "bastard, born of a serf-girl." The Templar continues:

> Everything is upside down now.

> Men who are of the most base origins
> Advance rapidly, provided
> That they have money beyond measure.
>
> So help me God, this grieves me.
> Now you have read my verses:
> How great sin there is, and how many ills
> When the ass becomes the horse.[1]

None of this is to suggest that Latin Christianity was irrelevant to the Frankish nobility. Certainly it was a fundamental element of their identity. But it also was not threatened, and therefore not the most operational element of their identity. The Mamluks threatened their lands and at times even their lives—but it was only other Franks that could imperil their most basic sense of self. Thus, in the final analysis, it must be said that the Frankish nobility were more concerned with protecting and expressing their interests and identity as Frankish *nobility* than they were with protecting and expressing their interests and identity as *Frankish* nobility. This, of course, had profound consequences for the fate of the Kingdom of Jerusalem.

[1] *Templare di Tiro*, 236-53; Crawford, 123-29.

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Appendix A

Timeline of Major Military and Political Events Preceding the Fall of Acre

1242	Ejection of Richard Filangieri and Hohenstaufen agents from Tyre (i.e. the end of the War of the Lombards)
1244	Frankish-Damascene army defeated by Egyptian-Khwarazmian army at La Forbie (Harbiyya), near Gaza
1249-50	Louis IX's crusade to Egypt
1250	Overthrow of Ayyubid regime in Cairo by an uprising of *mamluks*
1250-54	Louis IX's sojourn in the Kingdom of Jerusalem
1256-61	The War of St. Sabas
1258	Execution of the 'Abbasid Caliph at Baghdad by the Ilkhan Hülegü
1260	Ilkhanids seize Damascus; Ilkhanids defeated at the Battle of 'Ayn Jalut by Mamluk army; Mamluk sultan Qutuz murdered; Baybars becomes sultan

1261	Death of Plaisance of Antioch
1264	Triumph of Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan over Hugh of Brienne for Jerusalemite regency
1265	Fall of Caesarea and Arsur
1266	Fall of Templar castle of Safad
1267	Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan succeeds to Cypriot throne as Hugh III
1268	Fall of Jaffa and Antioch; Hugh III of Cyprus recognized as Conradin Hohenstaufen's regent and heir to Jerusalemite throne; Conradin defeated by Charles of Anjou at the Battle of Tagliacozza and executed.
1269	Hugh III of Cyprus crowned at Tyre as Hugh III of Jerusalem
1270	Louis IX's second crusade arrives at Tunis; death of Louis; assassination of Philip of Montfort, Lord of Tyre
1270-71	The Lord Edward of England in the Kingdom of Jerusalem

1271	Fall of Hospitaller's castle of Crac des Chevaliers; Fall of Templar's castle of Gibelcar; Fall of Teutonic Knights' castle of Montfort
1272	Maria of Antioch brings suit over her claim to the crown of Jerusalem to Pope Gregory X
1274	Second Council of Lyons
1277	Death of Baybars; Charles of Anjou purchases Maria of Antioch's claim to the crown of Jerusalem and sends Roger of San Severino to Acre; Bohemond VII, still a minor, succeeds his father in the County of Tripoli
1281	Defeat of Ilkhanids at the First Battle of Homs by the Mamluk army of Sultan Qalawun
1282	Out break of the Sicilian Vespers in Palermo
1283	Execution of Guy II Embriaco, lord of Jubail on the orders of Bohemond VII, titular prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli
1284	Death of Hugh III of Cyprus and Jerusalem
1285	Capture of Hospitaller'd castle of Margat by Qalawun; death of Charles of Anjou

1286	Arrival of Henry II of Cyprus in Syria; coronation at Tyre as king of Jerusalem
1287	Death of Bohemond VII
1288	Establishment of a Commune of Tripoli under Bartholomew Embriaco
1289	Qalawun conquers Tripoli
1290	Murder of Muslim merchants at Acre by newly arrived crusaders from the west provides *casus belli* for Qalawun to move against Acre
1291	Acre and remaining Frankish possessions in Syria conquered by Qalawun's son and successor, al-Ashraf Khalil

Appendix B

Key Players

House of Antioch-Tripoli

Maria of Antioch	Claimant to the Crown of Jerusalem through her grandmother Isabella I; passed over by the High Court in favor of Hugh III in 1268; sold her claim to Charles of Anjou in 1277
Bohemond VII	Titular prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli, 1275-1287; suppressed the revolt of Guy II Embriaco, lord of Jubail, in 1283; died without issue
Sibylla of Armenia	Mother of Bohemond VII

House of Embriaco

Bartholomew Embriaco of Jubail	Leader of the short-lived Commune of Tripoli (1288-89); died at the Fall of Tripoli in 1289
Bertrand Embriaco of Jubail	Rebelled against his lord, Prince Bohemond VI, who arranged for his murder because of a dispute stemming from the war of St. Sabas (1256-61)
Guy II Embriaco of Jubail	Led a rebellion against Bohemond VII between 1277 and his capture and execution in 1283

House of Ibelin

John of Ibelin, Old Lord of Beirut	Leader of the rebellion in Cyprus against Frederick II; father of John of Arsur
John of Ibelin, Lord of Arsur	A key actor in the political strife of the 1250s; fourth son of the Old Lord of Beirut

John of Ibelin, Count of Jaffa	Also a key actor in the political strife of the 1250s; a rival to his cousin and namesake, John of Arsur; a nephew of the Old Lord
House of Lusignan	
Hugh II	King of Cyprus from infancy and regent of Jerusalem from 1258; died in 1267 without issue
Hugh III (Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan)	King of Cyprus from 1267 and King of Jerusalem from 1269, although opposed from 1277 until his death in 1284 by Charles of Anjou
Henry II	King of both Cyprus and Jerusalem from 1286
House of Montfort	
Philip of Montfort	Lord of Tyre; a key political figure in the kingdom from the 1240s until his assassination in 1270 at the command of Sultan Baybars
John of Montfort	Philip's son and successor as lord of Tyre; married Margaret of Antioch-Lusignan, whom the Templar of Tyre served
Mamluks and Mongols	
al-Ashraf Khalil	Son of Qalawun; successfully besieged Acre in May, 1291 and subsequently conquered the Kingdom of Jerusalem
Baybars	A key military leader under the Mamluk sultan Qutuz at the victory over the Mongols at 'Ayn Jalut; head of the *Bahri* regiment of *mamluks*; murdered and succeeded Qutuz as sultan in 1260; reigned until 1277
Qalawun	Usurped rule over the Mamluk sultanate from Baybars's young son in 1277; defeated the Mongols at the Battle of Homs in 1281; conquered Tripoli in 1289; prepared the way for the conquest of Acre by his son and successor, al-Ashraf Khalil, in 1291

Hülegü	A grandson of Ghenghis Khan; Ilkhan of Persia until his death in 1265; toppled the ‘Abbasid regime at Baghdad and executed the Caliph in 1258
Kitbogha	Hülegü’s chief lieutenant in Syria and leader at ‘Ayn Jalut; executed by the Mamluks after the battle

Other Key Players

William of Beaujeu	Master of the Order of the Temple from 1273 to 1291; died at the siege of Acre; the Templar of Tyre was his personal secretary
Hugh of Brienne	A cousin of Hugh II of Cyprus and Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan; defeated in his claim to the Jerusalemite regency for Hugh II by Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan in 1264
Richard Filangieri	Frederick II’s lieutenant in the Kingdom of Jerusalem until the Hohenstaufen were finally ousted in 1243
Roger of San Severino	Charles of Anjou’s vassal regent in the Kingdom of Jerusalem from 1277 to 1282
Geoffrey of Sergines	Head of the French regiment at Acre from 1254 until his death in 1269; served in various other offices in the government of the kingdom