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Looking Back at City Venture Corporation

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

This summer CURA published the final report of a project begun a decade ago: *City Venture Corporation: An Experiment in Urban Development Through Public/Private Partnership*. City Venture was the brainchild of William Norris, founder and until recently president of Control Data Corporation. Norris firmly believed that a private corporation could solve the problems of decaying inner cities and make a profit at the same time. City Venture Corporation was his attempt to prove this. CURA began monitoring the City Venture program in 1980 with intensive on-site visits for two years and annual updates thereafter.

The examination revolved around four key issues: City Venture's profit orientation, its holistic approach, its composition and style, and its effectiveness. What follows is excerpted from the text of CURA's final report, mostly from the concluding chapter. The report details the City Venture experience in seven cities: Toledo, Minneapolis, Philadelphia, St. Paul, Baltimore, Charleston, and Benton Harbor. For readers interested in the full picture, copies of the report are available free-of-charge and may be ordered on the publications order form at the end of this *CURA Reporter*.

—The Editor

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Praised or condemned, copied or avoided, the City Venture Corporation (CVC) was, it may be argued, the nation's most well-publicized example of a public-private partnership for urban redevelopment. Founded in 1978 as an off-shoot of Control Data Corporation, City Venture sought to use the expertise of its then fifteen consortium members—businesses, churches, and community organizations—to solve urban problems and to make a profit at the same time.

Since 1968, Control Data had sited plants in distressed inner-city areas and had concerned itself with employee welfare by providing such benefits as day care, counseling, and flexible hours. In addition, Control Data, at first primarily a research, development, and manufacturing firm of large-scale scientific computers, increasingly moved into software development and technical assistance operations. Control Data services and software for business development, education, health care, and energy conservation all became part of the CVC program. This is not to diminish the potential contributions of the other shareholders. Each consortium member offered technology and management expertise. The work of Bertrand Goldberg Associates in housing and the Dayton Hudson Corporation in neighborhood assistance are examples of this expertise.

The element that perhaps most distinguished CVC from previous public-private partnerships was the corporation's emphasis on the management of community development as profitable. William Norris brought to City Venture his philosophy that "we view the major, unmet needs of society as opportunities to pursue profitable business. This is, after all, the basic reason for the existence of business."

To distinguish its approach from other efforts to address urban problems, CVC emphasized that its leadership was rooted in the private sector and that the corporation's investors, while seeking a profit, were willing to accept a longer-than-normal term return on investment. CVC's intent was not to invest its own capital but to amplify the impact of federal resources by "packaging public programs with private resources" and developing a "private delivery system based on entrepreneurship." Its own revenues were to come from fees for initiating, planning, and managing a cooperative effort between various levels of government, business, labor, religious institutions, foundations, and community residents. In short, CVC was neither developer nor consultant; it packaged and managed existing resources in a community, and job creation was the heart of City Venture's strategy.

Between 1978 and 1983, City Venture Corporation courted eighteen cities with project proposals, winning contracts in fifteen. It met with neither unmitigated success nor unmitigated failure in its efforts to revitalize urban neighborhoods. From city to city, however, wide variations are apparent in City Venture's ability to organize an effective partnership with local actors and to successfully marshal the resources necessary to carry out its program.

The corporation was most successful in Toledo, where it joined a partnership of public and private entities that eventually invested $60 million in Warren Sherman, vastly affecting that neighborhood's physical and economic situation. Its biggest failure was, unquestionably, in Benton Harbor, where CVC failed to generate sufficient support from either the public or private sectors to fund the implementation of its program. In each of the other cities, struggles developed over funding, and competition arose with local city and community organizations, hindering the progress and limiting the success of CVC's activities. These wide-ranging experiences raise the obvious question: What were the ingredients in CVC's success or failure?



Before City Venture began, Control Data was experimenting with ways to make money while improving economic conditions in the inner city. Control Data's World Distribution Center, for example, was built in a poor area of St. Paul near Dale Street and Highway I-94. It provided part-time employment to people from the neighborhood. The printing and bindery operation was spun off and continues to be operated successfully by a local businessman. The bindery had been built by Control Data on nearby Selby Avenue even before the World Distribution Center was erected in 1978.

Holism

From the outset, CVC claimed that social problems could yield profit-making opportunities and that this goal was best pursued via a holistic strategy. What CVC meant by holism was never actually defined, but it is possible to discern some ways in which CVC considered itself holistic. One sense is operational. The sheer range of services, products, and approaches suggested in initial CVC statements implied that it was not simply interested in economic development or human services alone. In this sense, holism was little different from the more traditional language of comprehensive planning.

There is also a philosophical sense to holism that is a general characteristic of the private sector approach to urban problems. It is simply this: help for the "whole person" begins with a job generated by the private

Cover photo: Control Data's Business and Technology Center (BTC) in Toledo. Bricks in the courtyard were pavers from 13th Street. City Venture hired neighborhood people to move them when that street was being repaved.

sector. In its early projects, CVC attempted to surround those jobs with a network of human services in order to enhance the "climate of employability."

Holism is also a part of the entrepreneurial strategy that formed a second philosophical foundation for CVC: it is possible to make money in the pursuit of social betterment. The philosophy applies to the range of Control Data products and services involved in CVC projects—in particular, PLATO and the Business and Technology Centers (BTCs)*—and to contractual fees for CVC's services. CVC did not make a quick return on its capital investment, but this was in keeping with Norris's notion of patient capital.

* PLATO (Programmed Logic for Automated Teaching Operations) was a computerized teaching system that spanned a variety of subjects from basic skills training to accounting and finance. Business and Technology Centers were incubators for small businesses. They offered office or production space along with built in maintenance, receptionist, security, conference rooms, and access to a variety of other business and clerical services and to PLATO.

The Public-Private Partnership

Along with holism, the concept of the public-private partnership was closely associated with the CVC program. Instead of a triangular partnership between city government, a neighborhood, and CVC, it was more common for rather separate partnerships to be formed between CVC and the city (or its development agency), and CVC and the neighborhood. As conceived by CVC, these partnerships raise a range of questions.

It is not out of place to ask if there *are* advantages to private sector involvement. Can the private for-profit sector be more successful than the public sector in making distressed and non-marketable pieces of real estate targets for economic development? Is it better at providing adequate levels of human services? The answer is a resounding "it depends." Ironically, City Venture's success depended most of all on the cooperation of the city's economic and community development units that, in theory, it sought to supplant. It should be noted from the outset, of course, that real estate has become distressed and nonmarketable precisely because of a history of private sector disinvestment and inattention.

What the private sector presumably brings to an area is a different set of tools and orientations: a desire to turn a profit, marketing and accounting skills, and most importantly, the ability to mobilize large amounts of capital. In addition, fewer questions are raised about "why this neighborhood and not that" if the matter is left to the private sector.

Based on CVC's experience, it appears that there is nothing inherently unique about the private sector's management skills that give it an advantage over the public sector.

City Venture entered Philadelphia with proposals for a full range of holistic programs. Negotiations began in 1979 after a local businessman had contacted William Norris. City politics slowed the development of plans, but eventually, a five-year plan emerged for the area near Fairmont Park in West Philadelphia. Housing in this neighborhood was mostly row housing like that shown here. The city saw a need for fill-in housing on scattered vacant lots and for rehabilitation of existing housing. CVC's plan for a large-scale new housing development ran contrary to city policy and never materialized, but a number of activities were created in Philadelphia: among them were a Fair Break Learning Center, a child care center, a job bank, and seed capital funds for local business ventures.



Benton Harbor was a city in need of massive assistance. In 1980, City Venture was brought in at the suggestion of the local Chamber of Commerce. CVC proposed an ambitious holistic program. Part of the proposal was for the area north of Main Street, pictured here, where a newly created industrial park would generate 1,000 to 1,500 new jobs. Dilapidated buildings would be demolished. A seed and venture capital fund, rent subsidies, development of new business prospects, and a Control Data Business and Technology Center (BTC) would foster a new business climate. By 1982 CVC began implementing its plan, but local support, on which the project depended, never did materialize. The local business community was waiting for the city government to put its house in order, and the city government was waiting for support from the business community in order to do so. Caught in the middle, City Venture was immobilized and left Benton Harbor in early 1983.

In certain cases, CVC critical management skills were great, and the shining example is Toledo. In others, CVC came in for constant criticism for not living up to its advertised expertise. As it turned out, the essence of the public-private partnership was the ability to be a skillful, self-interested negotiator.

CVC did perform a catalytic role in getting groups together, in attracting public funds, in raising a neighborhood's visibility, and in removing some of the barriers to development. In this, CVC can be said to have been successful, whether it became a full partner in subsequent development or remained an observer.

Initial concerns that CVC as catalyst would become CVC as decision maker were allayed when the specter of government-by-contract never materialized. The question of whether it is good public policy for the public sector to hand over decision-making power on the use of public resources to the private for-profit sector was never seriously debated. At first, City Venture wanted unfettered development rights to an area and devised a system of funding that would have given complete discretion over the use of funds to CVC. But in every city, questions arose over this program, or its implications, and City Venture never ended up with that kind of power. The public sector never did hand over decision-making power.

Aspects of private control did occur in cities where CVC obtained contracts. CVC was always invited to a city. A city's initial acceptance of CVC may have led to an illusion of CVC's strength, but it is an understatement to say that CVC was closely watched.

The reluctance of the public sector to turn over control of an area, and the desire of City Venture to have it in the first place, indicate some inherent differences. In practical terms, the goals of the two sectors differed. Corporations want to manage areas in order to make money; governments want to manage areas for the general good. The corporate model suggests the need to control extraneous factors and to concentrate closely on product development; government, in the interests of promoting the general welfare, often seeks to make extraneous issues explicit and discussable. For example, CVC's statements about holism and partnership implied to many that CVC wanted the neighborhood to enter equally into the decision-making process. This generally did not occur, and part of the evolution of City Venture was that it had to become more fully explicit about its intentions for an area.

CVC's initial concept was blurry: it was difficult for anyone to know just exactly what CVC would do and to whom exactly it was accountable. Initially it was not accountable, as many private sector operations are to a group of expectant stockholders; therefore, CVC could take some risks and did not seek immediate profits. Yet profit was a long-term goal. As CVC moved into operation changes were necessary in its approach, in its marketing, and in the response of the local community to its efforts.

CVC in Operation

Many things changed in the way CVC did business after its inception, including the content of its programs, its organizational and management style, and its overarching philosophy. In its later statements the CVC language of holism was dropped. Urban design considerations disappeared first: plans after Minneapolis, Toledo, and Baltimore did not include them. Housing faded next: only in Toledo was any significant housing program undertaken. Finally, human services in a formal sense faded, even within project areas where programs had already begun.

City Venture generally moved away from target neighborhoods to citywide programs. It might be said that with the exception of Toledo, CVC's local project offices never had high visibility or great internal corporate decision-making power. Negotiations were most often conducted by

representatives from CVC's Minneapolis headquarters. Neighborhood offices did add legitimacy, however, and helped maintain rudimentary ties between CVC and its target neighborhood.

A variety of factors led to this change. Most local actors expected delivery on CVC's many commitments: when few were delivered, CVC ran into criticism. Part of the problem was related to the initial CVC model. Early statements and proposals contained a degree of boasting. Claims were often simply seen as marketing ploys: to "solve" society's unmet needs or to "create" 1,500 jobs in five years. For holism to be more than an assortment of programs and services it had to be stitched together by a master tailor into a larger fabric. CVC failed to fulfill this role.

In addition, City Venture did not have the luxury of etching it's programs on an empty neighborhood slate. Conflicts with local and city organizations flared up almost immediately in Baltimore and Philadelphia, resulting in the eclipse of CVC housing programs. Conflict occurred not only over competition for scarce resources and for program responsibility, but over simple input into the CVC process—the public policy issues mentioned above.

To the extent that CVC admitted to flaws in its initial model, it is an admission of the defects of that model combined with a dose of pragmatism. The model, in seeking too broad a role with too little accountability, was neither pragmatic nor workable as advertised. In some respects, CVC's blurring of public and private sector responsibilities was what provoked problems; later statements were more forthrightly corporate.

Roles within the Partnership

We can better expand on the points concerning CVC's operations by examining the structural and functional relationships between CVC and the various actors included in the public-private partnerships. Being a partner implies different things to different actors, and in some situations even the notion of partnership is inappropriate. There is far more to the notion of partnerships than simply acting in concert, and there is much to be gained in looking at the complexity encountered by CVC—the outsider—when it entered a local situation.

First, let us look at CVC's own role, or roles, which we might characterize as broker, catalyst, and planner. As a broker, CVC sought to magnify existing resources by putting the right resources, whether human or technical, to the problem. Most often, CVC was not able to act effectively in this way because of its limited local power base. Here again, Toledo is the exception. CVC was a better broker in Toledo because of the power and skill of the local project office and because of the degree of the local community's receptivity to CVC.

CVC often referred to its ability to match appropriate resources to specific problems,



Symbolic of the transformation that occurred in Toledo is this fence outside St. Vincent's Hospital. Before City Venture entered the scene, the hospital had blockaded itself from the severely depressed neighborhood it stood in by erecting a ten foot concrete block wall. The collaboration fostered by CVC between hospital and neighborhood finally allowed most of the wall to be torn down and replaced by this wrought iron fence. In Toledo, City Venture realized its goal of making social investment profitable. Initiated into the city in 1979 by the president of Toledo's largest bank, who also chaired the city's economic planning council, CVC chose the Warren Sherman neighborhood, just west of downtown for its project area. The economic development strategy proposed by CVC had job creation at its center. The neighborhood was already committed to comparable goals and supported CVC. Nearly $60 million had been committed to Warren Sherman by the time CVC left in 1983.

but in considering the evidence, it is worth asking whether CVC's plans were ever swayed by the source of money available or, rather, if the existence of certain resources determined their application. Some have thought this was the case with the Fair Break program,* where CVC and Control Data offered an alternative to local Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) programs and depended on CETA money. With the reduction of that money, the Fair Break programs lost precedence in CVC plans. It is also possible to think of this in a general way in regard to CVC's contract fees. There appeared to be little relationship between the level of CVC service and the contract amount. It seemed that specific contract amounts were subject to local political variations and that, by the

* Fair Break taught specific job-related skills and included the use of PLATO.



City Venture did not succeed in Minneapolis. Contract agreements which began in 1979, were terminated in 1981 when CVC backed out of its Urban East project there. The BTC, near the central business district and across the street from the Metrodome, is the only tangible product of the project. The bitter debate that led to CVC's withdrawal damaged the company's local reputation and caused concern in other City Venture project cities. At issue was corporate control versus neighborhood empowerment. CVC saw itself as the proposer and ultimately the decision maker, with the neighborhoods in advisory roles. The neighborhoods saw themselves being treated as recipients, being done to, when what they wanted was to participate in the planning process and share in decision making.

time of the second contract, CVC most often had to reduce its asking price.

CVC not only claimed to assemble available resources, but to leverage new private commitments. This is crucial, since what set CVC apart from local public purpose developers like the Philadelphia Industrial Development Commission, Baltimore Economic Development Corporation, and Toledo Economic Planning Council, was its potential informal access to Fortune 500 firms. However, it was not markedly successful in attracting new business development.

As a planner, CVC had a varied role. Its Toledo plan was adopted as the neighborhood's urban renewal plan. But in other cities, CVC plans were derived from previous local efforts. This made life difficult for CVC at times, because again, there were questions about its delivering what it promised.

Often, CVC plans indicated that the most appropriate solution to social problems were Control Data products and services. We alluded earlier to CVC being less a consortium in practice than on paper, and, in fact, its fortunes were very closely tied to Control Data's. Why, then, was CVC a separate entity rather than a division of CDC, like Rural Venture? This issue concerned Control Data on one hand and the other stockholders in City Venture on the other. The relationship was actually a convenient one for Control Data. City Venture delivered Control Data into areas where it otherwise would not have been and found markets that Control Data otherwise would not have had. In addition, City Venture's separate status emphasized its experimental nature, though it is debatable whether this was part of the original conception or a subsequent evolution. Regardless, in creating CVC as a separate entity, Control Data was not gambling fully with it's prestige, as such, in seeking out these very different markets, and the separation helped protect Control Data from a certain amount of financial risk as well.

Let us also examine CVC's relationship with other area actors. The early CVC proposals stressed making specific neighborhoods targets for economic development, thereby implying a relationship with the neighborhood organizations. Important policy questions arise here. Was there any way to work out an *equal* partnership between CVC and neighborhoods that had been on the bottom of the economic and political spectrum? Could they ever understand each other?

CVC's preferred role was to see the neighborhoods as consumers of its services and as reactors to its proposals. Having a neighborhood as an equal partner was not one of CVC's goals. It is important to note that all of the neighborhoods CVC entered were previously organized, with the exception of Minneapolis, where the Elliot Park organization only covered part of the project area and a coalition of organizations was formed after CVC arrived. In Toledo,

Minneapolis, and Baltimore, the CVC projects followed other major downtown projects and entered local political climates where neighborhoods had been included in development projects. Where neighborhoods were not organized or were poorly organized, CVC attempted to do something about it. This effort backfired in Minneapolis, where the neighborhood coalition felt that there was no real partnership. But in Warren Sherman in Toledo and West Parkside in Philadelphia, where neighborhood leaders eventually became CVC employees, the attitude was to get the jobs for the neighborhood first and ask procedural questions later.

If, in terms of process, equality was not gained for the neighborhoods by CVC's presence, how successful was CVC in attracting investment into the areas? CVC itself was not a very great catalyst for investment. An exception to this was, again, Toledo, where in addition to getting jobs commitments, CVC was also supported by the city's major bank and its energetic CEO. An effort to get this kind of support in Philadelphia and Charleston was thwarted. In Baltimore, Commercial Credit was a significant presence, though this company was, of course, a Control Data subsidiary. In Charleston, City Venture's plans triggered a great deal of interest in one of the city's most blighted neighborhoods, though the funding came primarily from the public sector. And one of the major reasons that the project did not continue in Benton Harbor was CVC's inability to convince the locally based Whirlpool Corporation to become involved.

On the other hand, in concert with the local public and quasi-public sector, CVC helped to remove many of the psychological, if not physical, barriers to development. To a city, City Venture represented a sizable expenditure on a given area of town and usually signaled further public and private investment for the area. In this sense, the neighborhood rose on the city's agenda and benefited not only from increased capacity to further its own development, but also from greater visibility in city politics.

What about the quasi-public sector? These are the agencies with which CVC most often worked, and whether by design or by accident, the cities CVC operated in contain some of the most sophisticated development agencies in the country: the Baltimore Economic Development Corporation, Philadelphia Industrial Development Commission, Port Authority of St. Paul, the old Minneapolis Housing and Redevelopment Authority, and the Toledo Economic Planning Council. These agencies made a great deal of difference to CVC's success. In these cities CVC became something of an adjunct to a locally run project rather than the lead actor. The exception is perhaps Toledo, where the economic planning council was just getting started as CVC entered town. In the other cities, CVC ran into problems because of its hard sell and its implied denigration of local abilities.

One instructive conclusion is that CVC was more marketable and attractive in smaller size cities such as Toledo and Charleston, that had less well-developed planning, economic development, and social service agencies. In the larger cities like Baltimore and Philadelphia, CVC was limited to its role as industrial real estate consultant.

We might summarize the discussion about partnership by questioning the term *partnership* itself: is it the right term to describe the way the various actors interacted, or is what we are looking at more along the lines of a traditional negotiated agreement? On the one hand, partnership is apt: the initial function of the project advisory boards in getting a broad range of people to talk to each other; the attempt to package the resources of both the public and private sectors; and the obvious public relations value of the term for both the city, neighborhood, and CVC, are indicative of this point of view.

On the other hand, in operational terms, we have not witnessed so much a partnership as business as usual, which often requires negotiation to achieve a sort of consensus on the broad issues. If true partnerships may be said to have resulted from CVC's efforts, they developed in specific programs—for example, where CVC and St. Vincent's Hospital worked to bring a health clinic to Warren Sherman or where CVC and the city of Benton Harbor worked out a Project Pride clean-up campaign. These small partnerships left lasting imprints on the neighborhood, which the consistent talk about partnerships in a large sense never did.

Stakeholder Analysis

In the City Venture partnership, each of the partners was also a stakeholder, with something to gain and something to lose if the project did not succeed. The financial burden was borne unevenly, partially by Control Data in its investment in the BTCs, but mostly by the city or other public entity that financed the CVC contracts. City Venture, itself, did not risk a large financial investment in order to leverage the other sources of funds. Nor was the corporation necessarily beholden to its stockholders to produce a profit from the venture. The cities had many options for investing their community and economic development funds; their risk in funding CVC was to gamble that this approach would be at least as successful as alternative investments would be. The target neighborhoods were at risk of losing valuable and scarce public investment if CVC's programs did not produce concrete benefits for the neighborhood.

In return for these risks, each of the stakeholders had goals that it hoped to achieve by participating in the partnership. Figure 1 illustrates the primary goals of each stakeholder. Strong similarities are apparent between Control Data and City Venture's goals, belaying the supposedly distant relationship between CVC and its parent corporation. CVC wished to prove that social investment could be profitable and to successfully market its tools of economic development. Since the tools that it was marketing were primarily Control Data products, CVC's goals for profit and marketing are directly correlated to Control Data's goals for profit and marketing. For example, Control Data was in the business of building BTCs, with or without City Venture's assistance. CVC's strategy involved getting the city to buy the BTC by financing its construction (or renovation) using UDAG (Urban Development Action Grant), industrial

Figure 1. Primary Goals of Each Group Participating in the Public-Private Partnership



City Venture entered Charleston in 1980 as the result of efforts by a local businessman who wanted to salvage the East Side neighborhood, one of the most blighted in the city. The key element in proposals for Charleston was jobs. The vacant American Tobacco Company, pictured here, was purchased and renovated to become a BTC. The success of the BTC created a halo effect in the neighborhood, drawing in more public and private investment. The project's influence even extended beyond the neighborhood. Charleston now has several business incubators similar to the BTC.

bond, or other industrial development monies. Similarly, CVC sold PLATO to cities as part of the job training package, using CETA (Comprehensive Employment and Training Act) or Jobs Training Partnership Act funds to pay the costs.

To the extent that CVC marketed concrete products, it succeeded fairly well, although any profits from the sale of BTCs or PLATO software went directly to Control Data rather than CVC. However, when CVC stepped into the arena of holistic planning, which is program-oriented rather than product-oriented, the flaw in the CVC concept became quite evident. CVC claimed that it had the critical management skill to orchestrate a comprehensive community revitalization plan. That claim was grounded in the diverse consortium membership that stood behind CVC and in William Norris's philosophy that private enterprise was equally or more capable than the public sector in addressing social issues. Neither footing proved to be very firm: the consortium membership, other than Control Data, played no active role in the CVC projects other than providing the initial capitalization. The success of each project depended on the expertise of the CVC staff.

The concept and model proposed by CVC demanded that CVC become integrated into the local power structure and gain legitimacy within it. Perhaps CVC underestimated the difficulty of achieving this goal, particularly in the larger cities. William Norris could easily gain an entree into the CEO power structure, but the onus of working within that structure fell on the shoulders of the project staff. The requirement that local CVC staff clear their decisions with the Minneapolis home office further diminished the project staff's ability to operate. Thus, the much touted superior expertise of the private sector was inhibited by being inexperienced in operating in the public, political arena.

The goals brought to the partnership by the city and the neighborhood were similarly related in that the neighborhood was the beneficiary of the city's goodwill. The partnership with City Venture did not require that the city modify its community development goals, it merely changed the means of attaining them. As outlined in Figure 1, the city's goals were to invest in high risk areas, affect disadvantaged city residents positively, and in the process, create a degree of neighborhood trust and involvement. The target neighborhood participated in this effort in pursuit of its own goals: jobs, job training, and an improved physical environment.

Both stakeholders had a range of other means available for pursuing these goals. Accepting CVC as a partner in this effort meant acknowledging that CVC brought

something unique or useful to the local situation. In most cases, the most desirable aspect of CVC was Control Data, the parent corporation and a Fortune 500 company with a reputation for building business incubators and other job-producing enterprises in disadvantaged neighborhoods. Beyond this, CVC's holistic program raised eyebrows or created conflict, but nowhere was it perceived as the primary objective in inviting CVC to the city. The greater the overlap with existing programs, the greater the conflict, as in Baltimore. By contrast, the more empty the local slate, the more successfully could CVC graft its program to the local scene.

Conclusions about the City Venture Experiment

City Venture abandoned its pursuit of a holistic method of improving neighborhood economic development and human services delivery. This was to have been a significantly new private sector approach to urban revitalization. Why was it set aside? Was there a problem with the initial concept or did factors external to CVC inevitably alter its approach?

To these essential questions, the answer appears to be: Though a worthy ideal, holism as advertised by CVC was unworkable when exposed to reality. Why?

Originally, CVC sought to develop the "climate of employability" by surrounding neighborhood residents with a variety of job-creation and job-retention programs. Holism, in this sense, was dropped as City Venture sought to work more strictly in the area of economic development. In addition, there was a move away from making specific neighborhoods targets for development and toward operating in the city at large. The reasons for these changes are many and complex.

There were operational problems with the model itself. Much of the rhetoric turns on the private sector's better management skills, but City Venture did not demonstrate greater skills than the public sector. The model also required wide-ranging control over an area's funding and development rights, a control which was never granted to CVC. Finally, the model rested on a consortium approach to development, but, in practice, only Control Data was active in CVC efforts.

In practice, the model ran into trouble partly because CVC was so good at marketing it. Local actors quickly found that CVC had difficulty translating strategic goals into specific programs. CVC's local project directors found the expectations raised by corporate promises difficult to fulfill. These were crucial problems, since CVC programs strongly depended on local cooperation. CVC programs often duplicated local efforts. Public-private partnerships as conceived on a large scale thus became less important than the small partnerships that were formed to solve specific problems.

Ultimately, the decision about whether CVC was worthwhile was a local political decision that hinged on context as well as performance and other factors, such as whether a Control Data plant followed in City Venture's wake. The assessment of worth required a time frame longer than contract arrangements and longer than the political process was accustomed to dealing with when evaluating a program. In Charleston, where CVC presented minimal overlap with existing programs, the city agreed that it got more than its money's worth, and despite the million-dollar price tag for the CVC contracts, it was cheaper than hiring city personnel to accomplish the same tasks. In more highly segmented settings, where the community was more complex both politically and administratively, it is questionable whether an outside entity like CVC could ever have orchestrated a local partnership more effectively than the local actors themselves.

Thomas Anding, associate director of CURA, led CURA staff on the City Venture project. Three of the staff were graduate students at the time of the project: Bouman, Smith, and Stadum. Mark Bouman is now an associate professor at Chicago State University where he teaches geography. Rebecca Smith is a former assistant professor of geography at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, now an entrepreneur on Cape Cod. Beverly Stadum is an assistant professor at St. Cloud State University where she teaches social work and women's history. Edward Duren, Jr., former coordinator of minority programs for CURA and director of the W. Harry Davis Foundation, is now a private consultant in St. Paul. Barbara Lukermann is a senior fellow at the Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs and a member of the graduate planning faculty at the Institute. Warner Shippee is CURA's coordinator for housing studies. He is a past executive director of the St. Paul Housing and Redevelopment Authority and has held numerous positions in public and nonprofit agencies concerned with housing and community development.

Wage Justice Wins Award

In 1984, one of CURA's interactive research grants allowed Sara Evans and Barbara Nelson to begin what became known as the Minnesota Comparable Worth Research Project. Their book—*Wage Justice: Comparable Worth and the Paradox of Technocratic Reform*—was published last year by the University of Chicago Press. This fall it has been given top honors by the national Policy Studies Organization as the best policy studies book published in 1989.

Besides CURA and the Office of the Vice President for Academic Affairs at the University of Minnesota, who jointly sponsor and award the interactive research grants, a number of other organizations helped fund the comparable worth project. At the University of Minnesota, funding came from the Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, the Center for Conflict and Change, and the Graduate School. Outside the University, the project was supported by the Northwest Area Foundation, the National Academy of Sciences, and the W.K. Kellogg National Fellowship Program.

New CURA Publications

City Venture Corporation: An Experiment in Urban Development through Public/Private Partnerships. Thomas Anding, Mark Boumann, Edward Duren, Jr., Barbara Lukermann, Warner Shippee, Rebecca Smith, and Beverly Stadum. 1990. CURA 90-7. 170 pp. Free.

A summary of this report is presented in this issue of the CURA Reporter on pp. 1-9.

Deepening Dilemmas on the Duschee. Thomas L. Anding, executive producer. Thomas R. Peek, script writer. Evan Fulton and John R. Gilkeson, videographers. CURA 1990. Video. 1/2 inch VHS. 30 minutes. Color. Free.

A description of this, CURA's second video production, appears on page 15 of this CURA Reporter.

Prospective Determination of Noninvasive Clinical Correlates of Dehydration in Hospitalized Elderly. Ruth D. Lindquist and Cynthia Gross. All-University Council on Aging. Faculty Research Reports, Report No. 1. May 1990. CURA 90-8. 5 pp. Free.

First in a series of publications on age-related research conducted by University of Minnesota faculty, this work identifies the symptoms of dehydration in an elderly population. Trained research nurse clinicians examined twenty subjects aged sixty-five and older in emergency room settings. The pilot project initiated an expanded study to develop a noninvasive clinical scale for assessing dehydration in the elderly.

Who's Organizing the Twin Cities? Frederick W. Smith and Jack Whitehurst. 1990. CURA 90-9. 26 pp. Free.

Neighborhood organizations face a tide of rising expectations that have, in many cases, transformed the position of "neighborhood organizer" from a part-time volunteer job to an ever-more demanding full-time paid job. This monograph reports on a survey conducted in September 1989 of neighborhood organizers in the Twin Cities. It provides a portrait of who is out there organizing, gives initial data on how to increase training opportunities and job satisfaction for current organizers, and examines ways to attract and prepare new people for this work.

Courses on Aging, University of Minnesota, 1990-91. All-University Council on Aging, 1990. CURA 90-10. 35 pp. Free.

The University of Minnesota offers many courses related to aging. This is a listing of those courses in which aging is a primary focus. Courses are listed by campus (Twin Cities and the coordinate campuses) and by department. Listings are complete with course name, number, quarter offered, teacher, credits granted, prerequisites, and course description. Only the time and place are not given. Contact persons and phone numbers are listed for each department.

Courses on the Environment: A Student Guide to University of Minnesota Courses on Environmental Issues on the Twin Cities Campus, 1990-91. 1990. CURA 90-11. 52 pp. Free.

Courses relating to environmental studies at the University of Minnesota are listed by subject area and by department. Course descriptions are included. This publication is intended to be a guide for faculty and students and is supplemental to official University bulletins. An additional section describes special centers, services, and libraries that deal with the environment.

Courses in Survey Research, University of Minnesota, 1990-91. Minnesota Center for Survey Research. 20 pp. Free.

Many departments at the University offer courses that address methods of survey research. Those where at least 25 percent of the primary focus is on survey research are listed here. Listings are alphabetical by department and include course descriptions, teachers, quarters when the class will be offered, prerequisites, and the percent of the class devoted to survey research. Only classes on the Twin Cities campuses of the University are covered.

CURA publications may be ordered by phone (612/625-1551) or on the CURA Publications Order Form included in this CURA Reporter.

More Working Papers on Economic Development

Four working papers have recently been published by the State and Regional Research Center, one of CURA's special programs:

- **Impact of Branch Banking on Commercial Credit in Nonmetropolitan Areas**, Working Paper 89-01, by Julia Friedman and Margaret Schultz.
- **A Comparative Study of the Costs of Administration in Public and Private Elementary Schools**, Working Paper 89-02, by Sister Marie Herbert Seiter, CSJ.
- **Regional Consumer Price Comparisons with Specific Applications to Minnesota**, Working Paper 89-03, by Brenda K. Burk and Glenn L. Nelson.
- **Rural Community Viability—An Overview**, Working Paper 90-01, by Thomas F. Stinson.

The State and Regional Research Center was begun in 1985 as a way of facilitating research on regional economic development issues. The center sponsors the Minnesota Development Policy Workshop, which meets weekly during the school year at the University of Minnesota and serves as a forum for the discussion of research proposals, research in progress, and findings from completed projects. These four working papers continue a series of papers published by the center as research from a number of grants is completed. The papers are available free-of-charge by writing: Publications, State and Regional Research Center, 130 Classroom Office Building, University of Minnesota, St. Paul, MN 55108.

Youth in the Iron Mining Districts of Minnesota and Sweden: Their Attitudes, Perceptions, and Aspirations

by J. Clark Laundergan, Kerstin Hägg, Maria Bolander, and Sheldon Johnson

By 1980, the world demand for steel had dropped, causing a great reduction in iron mining and the processing of iron ore. The economic impacts of this change have been examined, but little has been done to assess the social implications. To begin that assessment we surveyed the youth of two iron mining areas: northern Minnesota's Iron Range and Sweden's Norrbotten, the most northern region of that country. Both areas have experienced similar population declines and patterns of unemployment. How has this affected the youth growing up in these iron mining communities? Have their aspirations been stunted or stimulated? What are the similarities and differences in attitudes, perceptions, and aspirations between the youth of these two different cultures who are experiencing a similar change in economic environment?

The Survey of Youth

In May of 1988, questionnaires were distributed to senior high school students in required social studies classes at Minnesota schools in Virginia, Mountain Iron-Buhl, and Biwabik. They were completed during class time.

Classes were chosen or volunteered by school administrators and teachers. There was no random sampling, this was a convenience sample. A total of 219 usable questionnaires were returned. Based on school size, Virginia High School is somewhat over-represented and Biwabik Horace-Mann School is under-represented.

In 1989, one year after the Minnesota survey, the same questionnaire (translated into Swedish) was distributed to students at *gymnasieskolan* (high schools) in Malmberget and Kiruna. The same convenience sample procedure was used for the Swedish schools. A total of 328 usable questionnaires were returned. Relative to school size, both schools are represented in proportion to their size. The Swedish translation of the questionnaire was pretested in a *gymnasieskolan* classroom in Umeå, Sweden to assure that it was understandable to Swedish students. Considerable caution was exercised to prevent any biasing due to language differences.

Who Answered the Survey?

The Swedish and United States youth were, on average, the same age—seventeen. More males responded in Sweden (55 percent) than in Minnesota (46 percent). The families they came from were larger in Minnesota (a mean size of 4.5 people) than in Sweden (3.7 people). Over half of the Swedish youth did not report their household income, but those who did reported that about 20 percent of their families were earning the equivalent of $20,000 (U.S.) or less a year, 17 percent were earning $20,000 to $40,000 and 64 percent were earning over $40,000. Minnesota youth reported that 15 percent of their families were earning $20,000 or less, and 51 percent earning $20,000 to $40,000, and about a third earning over $40,000 a year.*

Differences between American and Swedish schools need to be noted. Although the *gymnasieskolan* is not compulsory in Sweden, about 90 percent of the youth continue their studies there after comprehensive school. Students may take either a theoretical or a more vocational study track. Fifty-three percent of the students in the survey were enrolled in the theoretical track which requires three to four years of study instead of two years for the vocational track. Vocational preparation in *gymnasieskolan* is comparable to that of vocational-technical schools in the United States.

Swedish students pay no school fees, receive free lunch, and are awarded a small monthly grant of about 500 Swedish crowns ($80.00 U.S. currency) to pay expenses. An

* Overall the cost of living is higher in Sweden than in the United States.

additional allowance from the municipality is available for youth who live outside of their parents' home while attending school. Unemployed youth not attending school are a greater burden on their families because they do not receive similar grants. Not many youth, however, are among the unemployed. If they leave school they are given the opportunity to join *Uppfoljningen,* a program for studying the basics, receiving counseling, and trying different jobs to help them find permanent jobs or choose further education.

Perceptions of the Economic Situation

The students were asked to compare their family's present financial condition with what it had been two years before. Forty percent of the American students thought it was the same, 40 percent thought it was better, and 20 percent thought it was worse. In contrast, more of the Swedish students, 53 percent, judged their family situation to be the same. Thirty-two percent thought it was better, and 16 percent thought it worse. The pattern of differences between Swedish and American students was more pronounced when they were asked the same question about their community. About one-third of the American students allocated their responses to each category (better, worse, and the same). In contrast, 63 percent of the Swedish students judged community financial conditions to be the same, 23 percent better and only 14 percent found them worse. It could be that these data on financial conditions of households and communities are not comparable because the Minnesota survey was conducted in 1988 and the Swedish in 1989. Or perhaps the availability of government subsidies in Sweden makes the financial picture look better there.

Minnesota students were more likely to see economic conditions as affecting their chance to get an education for the kind of job they wanted. Sixty percent of the Minnesota students anticipated there would be "some effect" or "much effect" while only 36 percent of the Swedish students anticipated this.

Opinions on Social Problems

An open-ended question asked: "What are the four most important social problems in your community? (please list)." Unemployment was listed first by 43 percent of the Minnesota youth (Table 1). The Swedes identifying unemployment only 25.7 percent of the time. Part of the difference may be accounted for by the Swedish government's policy of maintaining unemployment rates at about 2 percent, thus lessening the personal impact of structural unemployment. This policy is implemented by providing subsidies to encourage small companies, retraining programs, relocation programs, and early retirement. On the Minnesota Iron Range, workers received unemployment benefits for a limited time immediately following the iron mine and taconite plant closings, but there was no comprehensive response to the loss of employment. Private companies operating the mining businesses responded differently to drop in demand. Some filed for bankruptcy, thereby endangering employee pensions, while others restructured and down-scaled their operations.

Table 1. The Most Important Social Problem (In percents)

	Minnesota (n = 172)	Sweden (n = 269)
Unemployment	43.0	25.7
Drug Abuse	27.9	27.5
Youth Problems	2.3	7.4
Other Economics	4.7	4.1
School Consolidation, Closing	12.2	—
Housing	—	21.2
Family Problems, Child Abuse	1.2	—
Crime	2.3	10.0
Miscellaneous	6.4	4.1

Alcohol and drug abuse was identified as a problem of similar dimensions of both the Swedish and American iron ranges. Twenty-eight percent of both Americans and Swedes listed it first. For the Swedes, alcohol and drug problems were at the top of their community problem list. Alcohol policies on the Minnesota Iron Range may be characterized as permissive, with a high proportion of bars and off-sale liquor outlets per capita. Sales of alcoholic beverages are closely controlled by the Swedish government with state monopoly sales locations, *Systembolaget,* limiting their business to weekday hours between 900 and 1800. Mood-altering drugs other than alcohol are illegal in both countries and represent a comparatively small portion of the alcohol and drug problem. Both countries appear to have a greater tolerance for alcohol abuse than for drug abuse.

Many of the students in Malmberget and Kiruna, Sweden rent apartments in town during the time that they are attending school rather than living in their parents' household located some distances from town. The students on the Minnesota Iron Range attend smaller high schools that are scattered throughout the region and ride buses an hour or more both to and from school. No concerns were expressed by the American students about their long bus rides, although school consolidations and closings were identified as a problem, especially by students at the Mountain Iron-Buhl

The Center for Community and Regional Research

The study on youth in iron mining districts originated in the Center for Community and Regional Research on the Duluth campus of the University of Minnesota. This center was established in 1986 to provide opportunities for faculty and students in the social sciences to work with community agencies on research projects of local and regional significance. The center is based within the College of Liberal Arts. The mission of the Center for Community and Regional Research is educational. It enables students to become actively involved in their community, learning specific research skills and general principles of social planning and evaluation. Faculty learn, help students learn, and expand the knowledge of the community. Faculty benefit by receiving funding for projects which provide research opportunities for them. Public agencies benefit through research on specific issues and problems important to them. Students gain through practical learning experiences not attainable in regular classroom situations. In this way, a cooperative effort benefits both the university and the community.

Base funding for the research center in Duluth is provided by CURA. Typically, the center will support up to half the cost of community research projects. Projects must involve students and applications for funding must be made by a faculty or staff supervisor at the University of Minnesota, Duluth. Details about the kinds of projects that are eligible may be obtained from the director, Graham A. Tobin.

Table 2. Occupational Preferences (in percents)

	Minnesota (n=206)	Sweden (n=281)
Communications Administration	3.4	8.9
Management, Business	20.4	15.3
Law Enforcement	3.9	2.8
Teaching	9.2	11.7
Construction	11.7	7.1
Mechanic	7.8	6.0
Navy, Army	1.0	.7
Health Professional	11.7	3.6
Engineer	6.3	13.2
Undecided	7.3	11.0
Other	17.5	19.6

Table 3. Personal Goals (in percents)

	Minnesota (n=181)	Sweden (n=291)
Making Lots of Money	20.4	4.1
Successful Career, Employed	22.7	4.5
Financially Secure	22.1	21.3
Employed, Married	12.2	21.6
College, Employed	5.0	3.9
Specific Career	11.6	9.3
Don't Know "It will go as it goes."	1.7	5.8
Successful, Healthy	2.2	10.3
Other, Awesome	2.2	—
World Travel	—	14.8
Environment, Peace	—	4.5

school. The problem for the Swedish students had to do with available housing in their school town during the academic year. Expression of frustration about the housing situation indicated a deep concern by those who were affected by the shortage, inadequacy, and cost of living space.

The second social problem most often listed by Minnesota students was alcohol and drug abuse (37 percent). It was listed high by Swedish students, too (20 percent) and this priority continued into the third most often mentioned problem. Swedish students were also concerned about crime and a lack of activities (diversions) for youth. Their rating of housing difficulties continued into second and third place as well.

Personal Plans and Aspirations

Only 6 percent of the American students said they will continue living on the iron range after completing their education, whereas 31 percent of the Swedish students plan to remain on the iron range. About one-third of both American and Swedish students were undecided about where they would reside. The United States is so large and its residents so mobile that the finding that 62 percent of the Minnesota students expect to relocate is not surprising. The slogan *Vi flytt' int'*, commonly stated and displayed in the north of Sweden, conveys the stand *We don't move.* However, a third of the Swedish students saw themselves leaving the iron range for the south of Sweden where they believe there are more employment opportunities.

A smaller proportion of the Swedish students identified college in their education plans (35.3 percent) than Minnesota students (72.4 percent). Swedish students have the option of receiving additional education at the folk high school or through company technical training and 57 percent chose this option. The low unemployment rate and the demand for Swedish workers are other factors that certainly affect educational plans in Sweden.

What occupations did these youth want? Swedish students showed more interest in engineering and less in management and construction than Minnesota students (Table 2). The "other" category for the Swedes was less diverse than for the Americans. Pilot was mentioned fourteen times, tour guide fifteen times and specific professions like architect and economist twenty-three times. Part of the specificity of Swedish responses relates to the options *gymnasieskolan* have for creating specific courses of study locally in addition to the standard curriculum found in all Swedish schools. The other part of the specificity reflects the separate and specialized tracts of study in Swedish schools that contrast with the general program of study commonly found in schools in the United States.

Swedish students are less likely to talk with their parents about their career plans than are American students. Twenty-three percent of the Swedish students indicated they would not talk to their parents about career plans, whereas only 8.3 percent of the Minnesota students gave this response. This independence is also noted in the entrepreneurial spirit expressed by the Swedish youth. One-third of the Swedish students were thinking about starting a business, contrasted with 19 percent of the Minnesota students. The availability of government subsidies to encourage new business in Sweden may account for part of this difference. Of those thinking about starting a business, American students were more decided (91.5 percent) on what type of business it would be; 35 percent of the Swedish students were undecided.

Most of the youth plan to marry in their twenties, but Swedish youth show a slight tendency to plan marrying later. About 60 percent of the youth plan to have one or two children, but American youth favor slightly smaller family sizes and 18 percent want no children at all (compared with 4 percent for the Swedes).

The students were asked to comment on their personal goals and what they would like their life to be like in ten years. American students are more oriented to making lots of money, few mentioned happiness, health, world peace, and the environment as did the Swedish students (Table 3). World travel was a goal for 15 percent of the Swedish students, but none of the Americans. These differences reflect societal, cultural, and geographic differences. Sweden has a socialized system of government with a capitalistic economic system. It is a small country, aware of its neighbors and the rest of the world. Many of its people have traveled in the eastern block countries and central Europe. The dominant institution in the United States is clearly economics, with a very competitive "bottom line" mentality dominating all aspects of life. Because of its size and location it is easier for the United States to maintain a kind of isolationism. An example of this isolationism is that although Canada is just 100 miles north of the Minnesota Iron Range, it has little impact on the lives of mining area residents.

Responses to Twenty-five Statements

An elaboration of the sociocultural differences between Sweden and the United States is found in the responses to twenty-five statements about family, economics, education and general attitudes which we asked students to respond to.* Table 4 shows answers to ten of these statements, presenting the items of greatest difference and similarity. The areas of most disagreement (the first three statements) are all concerned with economics and income attitudes. Note that for the first two statements, on strikes and property, there was a high percentage of Minnesota students who had no opinion. The other areas of disagreement deal with education, government, and family. With all of these statements, Swedish students agreed much more often than Minnesota students. Where Minnesota and Swedish students agreed, it is only in the statement on savings spent on education that there is strong agreement; the other statements reflect a fairly large percent of youth with no opinion.

* Thirteen of the statements were taken from the Rundquist-Sletto Minnesota survey of opinions, developed in the 1930s. The rest were modified items in the Minnesota Survey of Opinions or were new but influenced by those items.

Conclusions

It seems clear from comparing the two surveys, Minnesota and Norrbotten, that Swedish youth find the decline in the steel industry to be less serious than Minnesota youth. Minnesota youth have felt a lasting impact from the economic downturn on both family and community. Many believe it may affect their chances to get an education and most expect to move away from the iron range, whereas almost a third of the Swedish youth plan to continue living there. These differences are to be expected given *trygghet* or the assurance of economic security, a theme that has been the hallmark of the Social Democratic Party during its long dominance in Sweden.

American youth are more passive or disinterested and less collectively oriented in their attitudes toward economies and income than Swedish youth. In Minnesota, the iron range is characterized as a labor union stronghold, yet the youth of that area showed a very low level of agreement with the statement "A person should strike in order to secure greater returns for labor." The individualistic bias of the American students, shown in their responses to this and other statements, and their passivity, shown by their large number of "no opinion" responses, show a clear contrast to the more collectively-oriented Swedes.

World awareness (concern about peace, environment, health and happiness) and interests in travel are more commonly held goals among the Swedish youth. These ideas are integrated into the curriculum throughout the years of formal education. American youth are primarily interested in money and financial success ("the American Dream"). A Swedish student's dream found no parallel among the Minnesota students:

> I want to be healthy, live close to nature. I hope the world is better; environmental pollution and rearmament has changed for the better. I wish to have nice work, varied, stimulating and fun. Most of all, I want my girlfriend and me to live together happily.

Although the Swedes approach life with a more cooperative or collective orientation and rely more heavily on government services than Americans, they also possess a personal independence that is conditioned by the norms of social relationships. Persons are entitled to privacy, uniqueness and individuality but are expected to follow a disciplined way of life. Americans, on the other hand, encourage individuality but witness considerable conformity as the product of powerful mass media and marketing forces.



Table 4. Responses to Selected Statements (In percents)

		Agreed	Disagreed	No Opinion
Statements Where There was Most Disagreement				
A person should strike in order to secure greater returns for labor.	Minnesota	17.7	31.2	51.2
	Sweden	77.2	9.5	13.2
Poverty is chiefly the result of injustice in the distribution of wealth.	Minnesota	28.4	25.6	46.0
	Sweden	69.4	15.4	15.1
Most people can earn a comfortable living on the Iron Range.	Minnesota	31.3	48.6	20.1
	Sweden	68.0	9.2	22.2
Most jobs require more education than is necessary to do the jobs well.	Minnesota	39.9	30.5	29.6
	Sweden	69.3	9.3	21.4
The government ought to guarantee a living for those who cannot find work.	Minnesota	28.1	41.5	30.4
	Sweden	56.3	22.2	21.6
The joys of family life are overrated.	Minnesota	20.3	51.2	28.6
	Sweden	48.0	21.8	30.2
Statements Where There Was Agreement				
Family ties are strengthened when times are hard.	Minnesota	46.5	22.1	31.5
	Sweden	49.2	14.8	36.0
Mothers should not work outside the home if they have very young children.	Minnesota	34.1	40.1	25.8
	Sweden	30.4	49.4	20.2
Savings spent on education after high school are wisely invested.	Minnesota	76.4	9.3	14.4
	Sweden	70.9	14.1	15.0
Little progress can be made in the solution of social problems without sweeping economic changes.	Minnesota	31.1	18.9	50.0
	Sweden	36.7	14.9	48.1

More detailed analysis of the survey data reported here will further explore some of the contrasts between American and Swedish youth from iron mining areas. The limitations of the data base will certainly not permit societal level comparisons or even community-wide comparisons. It will, however, be possible to better understand some of the factors influencing the lives of youth from similar economic environments but different cultures.

J. Clark Laundergan is a professor of sociology at the University of Minnesota, Duluth where he teaches courses in the sociology of community and community research and serves as director of the campus Center for Addiction Studies.

Kerstin Hägg is a Ph.D. candidate in sociology at Umeå University and is researching the construction of social life and the role of women on the Swedish Iron Range. Martha Bolander, who holds a doctorate in Scandinavian languages, taught Swedish language and culture at the University of Minnesota, Duluth for the past two years and has returned to teaching and research posts at Umeå University and Stockholm University. Sheldon Johnson is a graduate student in urban and regional studies and geography at Mankato State University and an associate evaluator for Northeastern Minnesota Initiative Fund grants and loans. Their article is a summary version of a paper presented at the Midwest Sociological Society Meetings in Chicago in April 1990. For a copy of the full paper contact J. Clark Laundergan, Sociology-Anthropology Department, University of Minnesota, Duluth, Duluth, MN 55812 or phone 218/726-7551.

Deepening Dilemmas on the Duschee

The spring of 1990 saw the release of CURA's second video effort *Deepening Dilemmas on the Duschee*. As a sequel to the 1987 production *Dilemma on the Duschee*, this second video returns to the Duschee Creek Watershed in southeastern Minnesota to find out how policy makers and farmers are working through the maze of issues connected with agricultural practices and groundwater contamination. Since 1987 efforts to protect groundwater there have shifted from the laboratory into the social and political arena, deepening the dilemmas local farmers and policy makers face.

Farmers—long influenced by government programs, extension service research, economic variations and environmental threats—have adapted by manipulating field conditions and crop yields with agricultural chemicals. Now, public awareness of groundwater pollution has prompted policy action which threatens to restrict the use of chemicals. What will be the consequences, both beneficial and detrimental, to farmers, to agriculture, and to society at large of this pending policy change? The thirty-minute video, shot on location in Fillmore County, Minnesota, examines these questions through interviews with local farmers and officials, as well as representatives of state and federal government.

Deepening Dilemmas is available free of charge from the Center for Urban and Regional Affairs at the University of Minnesota. Use the publications order form in this *CURA Reporter* or phone 612/625-1551 to order a copy. Also available is the original Duschee Creek video *Dilemma on the Duschee*. Copies of the video are also available from the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources' video lending library. These educational tapes provide a comprehensive study of a complex and very immediate problem in a format which is accessible to a wide variety of audiences.

Photos on pages 1 and 5 by Rey Boezi.

Photos on pages 2 and 6 by Robert Friedman.

Photos on pages 3, 4, and 8 by Edward Duren, Jr.

Photos on pages 11 and 14 by Ken Moran.

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New CURA Publications

- ☐ **City Venture Corporation: An Experiment in Urban Development through Public/Private Partnerships.** Thomas Anding, et al. 1990. CURA 90-7. 170 pp. Free.
- ☐ **Deepening Dilemmas on the Duschee.** Thomas Anding, et al. CURA 1990. Video. 1/2" VHS. 30 minutes. Color. Free.
- ☐ **Prospective Determination of Noninvasive Clinical Correlates of Dehydration in Hospitalized Elderly.** Ruth D. Lindquist and Cynthia Gross. All-University Council on Aging. Faculty Research Reports, Report No. 1. May 1990. CURA 90-8. 5 pp. Free.
- ☐ **Who's Organizing the Twin Cities?** Frederick W. Smith and Jack Whitehurst. 1990. CURA 90-9. 26 pp. Free.
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Other Recent CURA Publications

- ☐ **Building a Strategy for Marketing Minnesota's Secondary Materials. Volume II: A Blueprint for Action.** Thomas R. Peek. 1990. CURA 90-5. 66 pp. Free.
- ☐ **Community Reinvestment in the City of St. Paul: Are Residents and Businesses Receiving the Financial Services They Need?** William J. Craig, et al. 1990. CURA 90-3. 132 pp. Free.
- ☐ **Dilemmas on the Duschee.** Thomas L. Anding, et al. CURA 1987. Video. 1/2 inch VHS. 32 minutes. Color. Free.

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CURA reporter

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The Center for Urban and Regional Affairs was established to help make the University of Minnesota more responsive to the needs of the larger community and to increase the constructive interaction between faculty and students, on the one hand, and those dealing directly with major public problems, on the other hand.

The **CURA Reporter** is published five times during the year to provide information about what CURA projects are doing.

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