Shame, Respect and Well-Being: What Can We Learn from Early Chinese Philosophy?

A Dissertation

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Dedication

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Abstract

My dissertation aims to bring insights from early Chinese Philosophy into constructive dialogue with Western thought to enrich our philosophical understanding of two significant philosophical questions. First, what is the moral value of the feelings of respect and shame? Second, what are the necessary constituents of a well-lived life? I compare the predominant accounts of respect, shame, and well-being in the Western tradition with the Confucian and Daoist traditions on these topics. I show that a mutual understanding of both perspectives yields a more comprehensive picture of moral emotions and well-being. First, I propose an account of well-being inspired by an early Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi and compare it with the predominant accounts of well-being in Western philosophy. The comparison aims to demonstrate the prudential value of a good process of cultivating well-being, which tends to be ignored in Western theories that focus on achievements. On the moral value of shame, I provide a Confucian analysis of shame and compare it with the Aristotelian account. This comparison aims to challenge the view that shame feelings reflect a person's damaged self-esteem. Instead, by borrowing insights from the early Confucians, we can see that the disposition to feel shame has moral value in itself and is constitutive of our need to value ourselves in order to feel worthwhile. On the moral value of respect, I compare the Confucian account of respect with the Kantian account. For early Confucians, the notion of respect not only refers to intentional feelings (feelings directed at specific objects) but more frequently refers to a respectful frame of mind. I argue that a Confucian notion of respectfulness helps to extend Kantian respect beyond Kant's own target of rational agency to respect the elderly and people with mental illness whose rational capacities have been impaired.

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Chapter One: Introduction

My dissertation examines the nature of a good human life from the perspectives of Western and ancient Chinese philosophy. I argue that Confucian and Daoist perspectives on moral emotions and the importance of the process of life can fruitfully inform Western philosophical theories of shame, respect, and well-being. This chapter will provide an introduction to the study by discussing the background and the research problem, followed by the research aims, approaches, and questions, a brief summary of the structure of the three main chapters, and finally the significance of the comparative approach.

1. Background and Research Problem

There are rich discussions of the nature of a good human life in Western philosophy and, separately, in early Chinese philosophy. In both traditions, we find that possessing appropriate moral emotions and a sufficient quantity of prudential goods are significant to living a good human life. However, while Western theories aim to be universal, it is unfortunate that there was little constructive dialogue between Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy until recently. Moreover, the conversation so far has largely been limited to addressing arguments and conceptual possibilities that fall within the framework of Western philosophy.

There are several factors that may explain this phenomenon. First, most Western scholars find the technical terms used in early Chinese philosophy elusive. Second, the research and discourse in the field of early Chinese philosophy tends to focus on finding a comprehensive and consistent theory from a historical perspective. For instance, scholars who study Confucianism tend to focus on the similarities and differences among Confucius and his followers, such as Mencius, Xunzi,

and Zhu Xi.[1] This research approach does not lend itself to questions about what contributions early Chinese philosophy can bring to the contemporary discussion of moral emotions and well-being. More work is necessary to bridge the gap between Western and Chinese philosophy and to explore the potential for a constructive dialogue between the two.

Recently, the situation has been changing. More dialogue has been emerging in the field of comparative study of Chinese and Western philosophies. However, the current literature has two limitations. First, most discussions try to fit Confucianism and Daoism into the framework of Western theories like virtue ethics, utilitarianism and deontological ethics, rather than taking them on their own terms. One of the most fruitful outcomes is the dialogue concerning the relations between Western virtue ethics and the Confucian tradition.[2] Nevertheless, relatively little literature discusses the topics of moral psychology and well-being.[3] Secondly, despite the recent fruitful outcomes, the methodology used to explore the value of early Chinese philosophy is limited by the framework of Western philosophy. For instance, scholars often begin by studying early Chinese philosophy through the lens of prevalent Western well-being theories, which typically focus on concepts such as pleasure, desire satisfaction, happiness, value, and human capacities.

[1] Yong Huang (2010) discusses the similarities between Confucius and Mencius in their view about the motivation to be moral. More current works include John Berthrong (2013) "Xunzi and Zhu Xi", David Wong (2015) "Early Confucian Philosophy and the Development of Compassion", Justin Tiwald (2016) "Xunzi among the Chinese Neo-Confucians".

[2] Some current works include A. T. Nuyen (2007) "Confucian Ethics as Role-Based Ethics", Chenyang Li (2008) "Does Confucian Ethics Integrate Care Ethics and Justice Ethics? The Case of Mencius", Deborah Mower (2013) "Situationism and Confucian Virtue Ethics", Amy Olberding (2016) "Etiquette: A Confucian Contribution to Moral Philosophy".

[3] Some current works include Philip Ivanhoe (2013) "Happiness in Early Chinese Thought", Chris Fraser (2014) "Happiness in Classical Confucianism: Xunzi", Chris Fraser (2014) "Wandering the way: A Eudaimonistic Approach to the Zhuangzi", Justin Tiwald (2015) "Well-being and Daoism", Kim Richard (2015) "Well-being and Confucianism", Joel Daniels (2019) "Uncarved and Unconcerned: Zhuangzian Contentment in an Age of Happiness", Bryan Van Norden (2002) "The Emotion of Shame and the Virtue of Righteousness in Mencius", Sin Yee Chan (2006) "The Confucian Notion of *Jing* (Respect)", Pengbo Liu (2019) "Respect, *Jing*, and Person", Curie Virág (2017) "The Emotions in Early Chinese Philosophy".

Consequently, their research is constrained by these existing notions, and important concepts such as equanimity, life vitality and process of living are not given due consideration. I believe that this approach is not the most constructive way to start a dialogue as it undermines the unique insights of early Chinese philosophy. A better approach is not only to identify the similarities between Western and Chinese philosophy but also to uncover and appreciate distinctive ideas and arguments not fully imagined or developed in Western philosophy.

2. The Research Aims, Approaches, and Questions

My dissertation aims to bring insights from early Chinese Philosophy into a constructive dialogue with Western thought to enrich our philosophical understanding of moral emotions and well-being. To achieve this goal, I employ a three-step approach that unifies three topics in my dissertation. First, instead of aiming to fit Confucianism and Daoism into the framework of Western theories like virtue ethics, utilitarianism and deontological ethics, I explore their discussions of three specific aspects of a good human life: shame, respect, and well-being. I choose these topics as I believe that exploring them addresses significant gaps in the Western analytic tradition. Second, by analyzing the unique perspectives and characteristics of Confucianism and Daoism, I translate their valuable ideas into a more accessible format for contemporary readers and compare them with the predominant Western ideas of shame, respect, and well-being. Last, I propose a more comprehensive picture of moral emotions and well-being that arises from mutual understanding between these two traditions.

The research in my dissertation seeks to answer three specific questions:

Chapter two of my dissertation draws inspiration from Zhuangzi's discussion of well-being. While the western tradition tends to see a well-lived life as a container of goods, Zhuangzi sees

life as an ever-changing process. Engaging with Zhuangzi leads us to ask: "What is a good well-being process and what is the value cultivating it?"

According to a stereotype about the difference between Western and Eastern philosophy, the West is focused on achievement while the East is focused on the mindful appreciation of the life process. This stereotype is too simple, but there is some truth to it. The main theories of well-being in the philosophical literature, while they disagree about the intrinsic good, share the assumption that a well-lived life is the one that succeeds in achieving as much intrinsic good as possible. These theories take an action's "outcome" to be the most significant criterion for evaluating well-being. The problem with this approach is that it leads us to ignore the significant instrumental and intrinsic value of having a good process of living. Just as life unfolds through time, well-being is also cultivated over time. This means that there is "a process of living well" and, presumably, that process can be good or bad.

Chapter 3 of my dissertation draws inspiration from early Confucians' discussion of the moral value of shame and aims to answer the following question: What is the moral value of cultivating a well-functioning shame disposition and what social environment is required to achieve this goal?

The Confucian view emphasizes the disposition to feel shame. In this chapter, I provide a Confucian analysis of shame and compare it with the Western tradition that has moved on from Aristotle. I first introduce the account of Confucian shame by comparing Aristotelian and Confucian texts on shame. The Anglo-American philosophical tradition, heavily influenced by Aristotle, shares three features regarding the moral value of shame feelings. First, it holds that to reveal shame’s moral value, we should focus on the feeling of shame as opposed to the disposition to feel shame. Second, having the disposition to feel shame is not necessary for being a virtuous person. Third, the feeling of shame is the expression of the vulnerable self, and thus, its essential

phenomenological experience is a feeling of frustration, powerlessness, or fear. By contrast, the early Confucian philosophers take a different route to studying the nature of the shame experience, which focuses on the disposition to experience shame. In the Confucian tradition, the disposition to feel shame possesses intrinsic moral value and plays a significant role in the cultivation of the Confucian virtue of righteousness. The healthy function of the shame disposition allows a person to perceive a threat to her self-worth, which can function as a self-constraint in moral contexts. In addition, a person possesses the disposition to feel shame only if she recognizes that others' points of view can reflect some truth about her self-worth and has a humble attitude towards the external points of view. Thus, a well-functioning shame disposition goes hand in hand with the development of a proper sense of self-worth.

Chapter 4 of my dissertation draws inspiration from a Confucian analysis of the distinction between "having respect for" and the virtue of "being respectful" and aims to answer the following question: How can we effectively demonstrate respect for others in our daily lives by combining the attitude of "having respect for someone" with the cultivation of the virtue of "having a respectful state of mind"?

To answer this question, I propose a Confucian account of respect, focused on two major characteristics. First, in early Confucian texts, the notion of respect not only refers to an intentional feeling (a feeling directed at specific objects) but more frequently refers to a respectful state of mind. Respect as an intentional feeling is produced by the perceived value of the object while having a respectful state of mind is a character trait of the agent. I compare the Confucian notion of respectfulness with the Kantian notion of respect and demonstrate how a Confucian notion of respectfulness helps to extend Kantian respect beyond Kant's own target of rational agency to respect for the elderly and people with mental illness whose rational capacities have been impaired.

I show that Confucian respectfulness also provides a foundation for respectfully listening to an opinion that is drastically different from one's own beliefs. Second, both the early Confucians and Kant notice that the cultivation of a respectful state of mind needs to be achieved in practice. For early Confucians, ritual practices are an efficient way of cultivating respectfulness. For Kant, we should cultivate a respectful state of mind through the practice of virtue and aesthetic experience. A constructive dialogue between early Confucians and Kant enables us to see a more comprehensive picture of the cultivation of respectfulness as a moral virtue.

3. The Significance of the Comparative Approach

Comparative philosophy aims to bring together philosophical traditions that have developed in relative isolation from one another and engage them in global philosophical discourse (Wong, 2020). According to David Wong, there are two major benefits of comparative philosophy. "One benefit of comparative philosophy lies in the way that it forces reflection on the most deeply entrenched and otherwise unquestioned agendas and assumptions of one's own tradition. Another benefit at which its practitioners often aim is that the traditions actually interact and enrich one another" (Wong 2020: 2).

So, what meaningful comparisons can be made between Western and Chinese philosophy? In considering the relationship between Western and Chinese philosophy, my dissertation examines four pairs of comparative perspectives: the top-down versus the bottom-up perspective, the stable versus the fluid perspective, the individualist versus the relational perspective, and the "outside-in" versus the "inside-out" perspective. It is important to note that these comparative perspectives are not absolute contrasts but rather matters of degree. As emphasized by Wong, comparative perspectives are “not necessarily mutually exclusive, and both approaches may be employed at

different stages of inquiry or to different aspects of the subject matter. If there is a difference between the very broad and internally diverse traditions of East Asia and the West, it is one of the degree and frequency of dominance of one approach versus the other" (Wong 2020, 22). Moreover, it is worth noting that the four pairs of comparisons primarily contrast early Chinese philosophers with dominant moral theories such as utilitarianism and deontological theories. This is because ancient Western philosophers, such as Aristotle and the Stoics, share many similarities in their philosophical approach with early Chinese philosophers, such as Confucians and Daoists. Overall, the comparative analysis of Western and Chinese philosophy can offer valuable insights into the similarities and differences between these rich traditions of thought, and can help us to appreciate the diversity and complexity of human philosophical inquiry.

3.1 A top-down perspective versus a bottom-up perspective

The comparison between Western and Chinese philosophy can shed light on important differences in philosophical approaches. Western philosophical traditions, such as utilitarianism and deontological ethics, tend to adopt a top-down approach, seeking to discover universal principles or laws that govern right and wrong. On the other hand, early Chinese philosophy tends to take a bottom-up approach, starting with the unique features of a particular situation to determine what one is morally obligated to do.

This difference in approach has significant implications for the expression of ideas and the value placed on subjective experience. Western philosophy, with its emphasis on objectivity and the analytic approach, aims to provide systematic philosophical theories that capture universal principles. In contrast, Chinese philosophy values the subjective experience and individual interpretation of the world, often relying on stories and sayings to inspire its audience to adopt or

abandon a particular way of life. This distinction not only makes it difficult for Western scholars to appreciate the value of Chinese philosophy but also leads to doubts about whether Chinese thought qualifies as philosophy (Defoort 2001, Van Norden 2017).

Despite these differences, I believe that combining the top-down and bottom-up approaches is a valuable method for conducting philosophical inquiries. By adopting a holistic method that draws on both approaches, we can draw valuable comparisons between early Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy (4.2-4.4). These comparisons form the basis of the three major chapters of my dissertation.

It is worth noting, however, that the distinction between these two approaches is not always clear-cut, and there is significant overlap between Western and Chinese philosophical traditions. As such, it is important to approach these comparative analyses with a nuanced understanding of the philosophical ideas and cultural contexts in which they arise.

3.2 A stable perspective versus a fluid perspective

Taking a top-down perspective and aiming to arrive at universal principles, we tend to view ourselves and the objects of we observe as relatively stable entities. In contrast, taking a bottom-up perspective focuses on personal phenomenological experience, leading us to notice the ever-changing characteristics of ourselves and the process of achieving our goals. This comparison raises questions about the importance of having a good process of living, a point emphasized by the Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi.

From a stable perspective, lives are containers for things that are either good or bad. According to Western philosophy (particularly the utilitarianism tradition), a good life is defined either in terms of the output of our actions or in terms of the positive psychological attitudes towards those

outputs, or some combination, and this is what matters most for our well-being. On the other hand, from a fluid perspective, lives are a process that can go better or worse. In my dissertation, I argue that if we focus on the process of life, as suggested by Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi, we not only gain a better understanding of the intrinsic value of the dispositional states of well-being, but we also notice how feelings of engagement and attunement can make other good feelings possible for us in the process of life.

Moreover, the emphasis on viewing the self as a fully established and stable entity or as a fluid and evolving entity can also influence one's evaluation of shame feelings and shame dispositions. One significant difference between Aristotle's account of shame and that of Mencius is that Aristotle considers shame as playing an instrumental role only in the cultivation of young individuals and that it loses its importance once one becomes an adult or a virtuous person. Aristotle argues that a virtuous person will never do shameful actions, and therefore does not need shame to avoid such actions. On the other hand, Mencius regards shame as one of the four fundamental moral dispositions given by Heaven, with the growth of the disposition influenced by personal effort, environment, education, and social relations. And this disposition plays in indispensable role in the cultivation of the virtue of righteousness at all ages. Thus, even an adult can develop the capacity of righteousness, and a virtuous person needs to continually make an effort to perfect their moral character. As Eirik Harris notes, "While Aristotle conceives of praiseworthy dispositions as fixed character traits of individuals, traits that calcify as one reaches adulthood, Confucius allows praiseworthy dispositions a greater degree of plasticity by conceiving of them as relational functions rather than individual character traits" (Harris 2014).

This comparison highlights an apparent difference in the view of the "self" between Aristotelian and Confucian traditions. Generally, Aristotle's account of shame is based on a notion

of self that regards it as an entity with relatively stable characteristics. In contrast, the Mencian self is seen as an entity with fluid, ever-changing vital moral energy (i.e., "the flood-like" *qi* 浩然之气). Mencius suggests that a fully developed sense of shame depends on the cultivation of the "flood-like" *qi*. *Qi* is a kind of fluid energy found in the atmosphere and the human body, closely related to the kind and intensity of one's emotional reactions. Specifically, the flood-like *qi* (浩然之气) is a kind of vital moral energy, nourished by accumulating righteous deeds over a long period. Mencius believes that with such *qi* (气), one can maintain one's will and moral integrity in the face of danger, challenges, and conflicting desires. On this line of reasoning, the flood-like *qi* is closely related to one's moral integrity and continuously changes with respect to one's actions and interactions with the environment. This fluid notion of self is shared by Confucius and his followers.

In summary, by combining the stable perspective and fluid perspective, we can see that viewing the self as a stable entity tends to focus on the instrumental value and destructive facet of shame, while viewing the self as a fluid entity draws people's attention to the intrinsic value and constructive aspect of shame. In Bongrae Seok's view, "the Confucian self is an essentially fluid and formable self that needs meta-virtues like shame to grow and transform itself continually and consistently" (Seok 2017: 150).

3.3 An individualist perspective versus a relational perspective

When attempting to understand the world through universal principles, people tend to focus on the commonalities shared by individuals, such as the preference for pleasure over pain and the capacity for rationality. This approach is exemplified by both utilitarianism and deontological

ethics, which posit that moral principles apply universally and bind all individuals, irrespective of their social roles. However, with a focus on the particularities of personal experiences, individuals must view themselves in relation to their environment and others.[4] According to Wong (2020), Confucian and Daoist philosophies adopt a relational approach to personhood. Confucianism regards a person as essentially a social being, while Daoism views a person as essentially a being interacting with natural forces (Wong 2020: 22-23).

Combining individualist and relational perspectives can enrich our understanding of the moral value of shame dispositions. From an individualist viewpoint, shame expresses the vulnerable self and its essential phenomenological experience is characterized by frustration, powerlessness, or fear. Conversely, from a relational perspective, Mencius argues that, just as the healthy growth of a plant requires air, light, warmth, water, and nutrients, the healthy growth of a shame disposition necessitates appropriate social circumstances.

Therefore, by integrating both perspectives, we can appreciate that while the phenomenological experience of shame is painful and negative, the disposition to feel shame can have either positive or negative moral value for an individual, depending on the social environment in which they live.

3.4 The "outside-in" perspective versus the "inside-out" perspective

In the pursuit of universal principles, individuals often analyze the inherent nature of an object, such as the nature of virtues or respect, as guidance for their actions. By identifying these inherent qualities, individuals can derive universal principles that can be applied across different contexts and situations. On the other hand, to address personal life dilemmas, individuals tend to focus on

[4] Note that Aristotle acknowledges the importance of a good family and upbringing for the development of virtue.

the cultivation of the self in order to cope with the demands of the external world. This involves developing skills and mindset for navigating difficult situations and coping with adversity. Together, the analysis of inherent qualities and the cultivation of the self can provide individuals with a framework for addressing both universal and personal ethical dilemmas. By drawing on these two approaches, individuals can develop a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of ethics and moral decision-making. In my dissertation, I argue that combining the “outside-in” perspective and “inside-out” perspective can enrich our understanding of the nature of respect.

In the Western philosophical tradition, the nature of respect is often explored based on the nature of the object being respected. This approach establishes that an object's inherent properties determine its worthiness of respect and thus determine the nature of respect that should be given. As Pengbo Liu suggests, the Western tradition primarily focuses on the "outside-in" model of respect. According to this model, respect is simply a response to certain inherent properties of an object (Liu 2019: 47).

While the "outside-in" model of respect does help deepen our understanding of the nature of respect, it falls short when it comes to determining the respect-worthiness of different types of objects. For example, it is widely acknowledged that all individuals, irrespective of their gender, race, or achievements, deserve equal respect. Nevertheless, it is challenging to identify the common features that ground the equal respect owed to each person.

To overcome the limitations of the "outside-in" model, Sin Yee Chan (2006) and Liu (2019) point to the classical Confucian concept of *jing* (敬), which is similar to the Western notion of respect but also highlights the importance of having a respectful state of mind. In Liu's terminology, this state of mind is an "inside-out" model of respect. Respectfulness as a state of mind is not

directly linked to the respect-worthy properties of external objects but rather is a character trait of the agent.

In my dissertation, I argue that a more comprehensive understanding of respect's role as a moral incentive can be achieved by combining the "outside-in" and "inside-out" perspectives. The first stage involves perceiving the authority of the moral law and willingly submitting to its commands by intentionally feeling respect for the moral law. In the second stage, we develop a sense of our place in the world through ritual practice, the practice of virtue, and aesthetic experience, which enables us to be both humble and elevated. In the third stage, we gradually cultivate a respectful state of mind that constitutes our character. Finally, in the fourth stage, under the influence of the respectful state of mind, we can better respect individuals in challenging moral contexts because we adopt a humble and serious attitude towards discovering the unique value of others.

As noted above, the difference between Western and Chinese philosophy is more a matter of degree than an absolute contrast. The comparative perspectives discussed above are not exclusive to either Chinese or Western philosophy, but rather differ in terms of their degree of dominance in each philosophical tradition. The ultimate goal of my dissertation is to demonstrate that, by examining the similarities and differences between these rich traditions of thought, we can deepen our appreciation for the diversity and complexity of human philosophical inquiry.

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Chapter Two: Zhuangzi on a Good Process of Living a Good Life

1. Introduction

According to a stereotype about the differences between Western and Eastern philosophy, the West prioritizes achievement while the East emphasizes mindful appreciation of the process. While this stereotype is oversimplified, there is some truth to it. In terms of what constitutes a good life, Western philosophy generally regards either the outcomes of our actions or our positive psychological states toward those outcomes as the most crucial factors for our well-being. However, if we focus on the process of life, we can gain a better understanding of the intrinsic value of dispositional states of well-being and appreciate how engagement and attunement can foster other positive emotions in the process of life. In this paper, I aim to demonstrate how my interpretation of Zhuangzi, an early Daoist philosopher, can offer valuable insights into the importance of cultivating a good process of well-being.

Zhuangzi has a valuable discussion about the importance of the quality of the process of life and why attitudes toward life that are not goal-oriented are important to cultivate a good process of life. In this paper, I aim to connect Zhuangzi's advice on life with Western philosophy's well-being discourse. Specifically, I will explore what Zhuangzi deems a good process for living a good

life, the benefits of cultivating a good process, and how attitudes towards goals influence this process.

In the philosophical literature, three major theories of well-being have been proposed: hedonism, the desire fulfillment theory, and the objective list theory. These "big three" theories differ in the intrinsic goods they identify as necessary for well-being, such as pleasure, desire satisfaction, or a list of objective goods. However, they share a similar approach to evaluating well-being, often focusing on the state of well-being at a given moment or overall well-being as the sum of those moments. These theories tend to overlook the importance of the process of living well. There is a clear distinction between the successful obtaining of the good and the failure to obtain the good on this line of reasoning. A well-lived life is the one that succeeds in achieving as much non-instrumental good as possible. Moreover, if we take the project of living a good life to depend on "successful outcomes," we naturally hold an attached attitude toward those goods. The attached attitude reflects that we put a high psychological investment in achieving specific goals. That is, we take our goals as highly significant for living a good life and tend to feel frustrated if we fail to achieve them.

The problem with this approach is that it leads us to ignore the significant instrumental value and intrinsic value of having a good process for cultivating well-being. Just as life is lived through time, well-being is also cultivated over time. This means that there is "a process of living well" and, presumably, that process can be better or worse. In sum, the dynamic feature of life is reflected by the quality of the process. However, this dynamic feature of well-being is overlooked by the prominent well-being theories.

The first part of this paper will center on three related questions: (1) What is a good process for cultivating well-being? (2) What value does a good process of well-being cultivation have? (3)

Why is an attached attitude toward the good bad for us? The answers to the first two questions will lead to the answer to the third question. By focusing on these three questions, I aim to demonstrate that a Zhuangzi-inspired theory of well-being provides a valuable perspective on cultivating a good process of life.

In the second part of the paper, I delve into avoiding the negative influence of holding an attached attitude to the good. In other words, as a goal-driven creature, how should we mitigate the high psychological investment we put into achieving the goal? Zhuangzi suggests that we can do so by viewing well-being as an ever-changing process and viewing our goals from a "heavenly perspective." By doing so, we can balance our attached and detached attitudes during the process of pursuing certain goals, thereby cultivating a good process for living a good life.

2. A Good Process of Living a Good Life

A good process for cultivating well-being has rarely been discussed in the literature of well-being. As suggested by Søren Harnow Klausen, "Extant accounts of happiness and well-being have been insufficiently attentive to the fact that human lives have important structural and dynamic features" (Klausen 2019: 88). More specifically, "it remains insensitive to the fact that human lives – and human well-being – unfold over time. Lives are not mere containers for things that are good and bad. They are lived – or 'go'– better or worse; the specific way in which an individual instantiates a certain factor also matters for her well-being" (Klausen 2018: 5). As I will argue, whether a person's life is playing out in a good way cannot be fully captured by how many goals she actually achieves in her life. A good process is not equivalent to a fruitful outcome.

To better understand what a good process for cultivating well-being amounts to, we can borrow some insights from Zhuangzi about a good process of life. In Zhuangzi's view, the most salient feature of life is being an ever-changing process. He says,

> Life, death, preservation, loss, failure, success, poverty, riches, worthiness, unworthiness, slander, fame, hunger, thirst, cold, heat—these are the alternations of the world, the workings of fate. Day and night, they change place before us, and wisdom cannot spy out their resources (Zhuangzi, 5/15-16).

Zhuangzi applies the notion of "wandering at ease" (*xiao yao you* 逍遙遊) to represent a good process of living a good life.[5] He describes a man named Wang Tai (王駘) who had had his foot cut off as a penalty for some offense but still had many followers gathered around him to hear his teachings. Zhuangzi explains that this is because of Wang Tai's unique way of using his mind (Zhuangzi 5/1–13).

> Life and death are great affairs, and yet they are no change to him. Though heaven and earth flop over and fall down, it is no loss to him. He sees clearly into what has no falsehood and does not shift with things. He takes it as fate that things should change, and he holds fast to the source (Zhuangzi 5/5–8).

Moreover, "A man like this doesn't know what his ears or eyes should approve—he lets his mind play in the harmony of virtue. As for things, he sees them as one and does not see their loss" (Zhuangzi 5/5–8). We can get from this story that a person who can freely and easily wander in his life has an overall favorable mental state through the change of his life and has a firm disposition toward a promising future even in adverse life situations.

So, what is a good process for cultivating well-being? Inspired by Zhuangzi, I believe that a good process of well-being cultivation must include two aspects: a firm disposition toward a

[5] Fraser also emphasizes that the notion of "wandering" is the key to understand Zhuangzi's normative view of human flourishing. In his view, wandering through the endless process of alternation in one's life represents an ideal mode of activity (Fraser 2014: 551). While in my account, "wandering at ease" in one's life is represents the ideal state of having a good process of life.

promising future and favorable mental states toward the process. First, a good process of well-being cultivation is firmly disposed toward a promising future. A person who is likely to form goals that suit her individual nature and likely achieve these goals has a firm disposition toward a bright future. Second, in a good process for bringing about well-being, a person will have a positive mental state toward the process. She will feel energetic (the opposite of depressed) and engaged in the process. Also, she will feel at home in this process and carefree (the opposite of feeling alienated and stressed). The structure of the determinant factors of a good process to bring about well-being is demonstrated in Figure 1.



Figure 1 The structure of the determinant factors of a good process to bring about well-being.

2.1 A Firm Disposition Toward a Promising Future

When a person's life process unfolds with a firm disposition toward a promising future, we tend to say that their life is playing out well. To have a firm disposition toward living a promising life means that it is likely for a person to choose the proper goals that suit her the most, and it is likely for a person to achieve the goals she pursues.

A person's life includes two intertwined aspects —the becoming of self and the realization of self. From the perspective of self-formation, the focus is on acquiring values and choosing between ends. For example, during the early stages of life, a child's values are mostly undetermined, and

their primary task is to form a set of values that are appropriate for their "individual nature".[6] Also, the process of forming the self goes through our entire life, including the stage of adulthood, [7] while the significance of the forming of self becomes less significant compared with the realization of the self. After a person cultivates a relatively stable personality, his central task becomes realizing and fulfilling one's goals and values. The process of self-formation and the process of self-realization are present at all times throughout one's life. Thus, having a firm disposition toward living a good life also includes a firm disposition toward choosing proper goals and a firm disposition toward goal fulfillment.[8]

2.1.1 A Firm Disposition toward Forming Proper Goals

Having a firm disposition toward forming proper goals means having a firm disposition toward forming values and ends that suit one's individual nature. Various factors can influence a person's disposition to form proper goals, such as having a sense of self-worth, open-mindedness, and the interplay between oneself and the external environment.

For instance, a person with sufficient self-respect is more likely to form proper goals and cultivate a stable value system[9],whereas a person with low self-respect may have goals that reflect a desire to please others or fit in with their environment, rather than something they genuinely care about. Thus, a person with sufficient self-respect has a firmer disposition toward forming proper ends than a person with low self-respect. Similarly, a person who is open-minded is more likely to

[6] I borrow the notion of "individual nature" from Daniel Haybron. Haybron (2008)
[7] Agnes Callard (2018) discusses the process of value acquisition for an adult.
[8] This definition of the dispositional states of well-being is broader than Raibley's definition. Raibley's definition of the dispositional states of well-being focuses on a firm disposition toward achieving the goals but pays less attention to the disposition of choosing proper goals. Raibley (2013)
[9] According to Rawls, self-respect has two aspects. It includes a person's sense of his own value, his secure conviction that his conception of his good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out. It also implies a confidence in one's ability, so far as it is within one's power, to fulfill one's intentions. Rawls (2009)

recognize and appreciate new values, while a close-minded person may cling to a fixed set of beliefs without considering other possibilities. In this case, presumably, a person with open-mindedness has a firmer disposition toward forming values that suit her the most.

Moreover, external factors such as social and family environments also play a crucial role in shaping a person's values and goals. For example, a person living in a free, open, and diverse society is likely to have more opportunities and options to choose from, leading to a firmer disposition toward forming proper ends. In contrast, a person living in an oppressed, closed, and culturally homogeneous community may face restrictions and limitations on their choices, hindering their ability to form proper goals.

2.1.2 A Firm Disposition toward Goal-fulfillment

A firm disposition toward goal-fulfillment involves two aspects. First, it is a disposition to achieve more occurrent states of prudential good in a given situation. For instance, a person's mood is a determining factor in the disposition to obtain prudential goods. A person with a peaceful and relaxed mental state is more likely to engage in an activity and obtain more enjoyment from this activity than another person who feels stressed and alienated while participating in an activity.

Second, a firm disposition toward goal-fulfillment is a disposition to generate new sources of prudential good when the external world threatens one’s current source of the prudential good. For example, when a loved one passes away or when someone loses their job due to an unexpected life crisis, a person with a firm disposition toward goal-fulfillment is more likely to adapt and find new sources of prudential good. From this perspective, a person is better off when her well-being is less vulnerable and more resilient. In Chapter 5, “The Sign of Virtue Complete” (De Chong Fu 德充符), Zhuangzi describes a person of virtue as having a more resilient life because “they know

what they can't do anything about and to be content with it as one though it were fated (*ming* 命)" (Zhuangzi 5/11–12).

In sum, a person's life has a firm disposition toward goal-fulfillment when she is more likely to obtain more occurrent good from an event and more likely to fulfill her goals even in adverse circumstances than others who do not possess a firm disposition toward goal-fulfillment.

2.2 The Positive Mental States Toward the Process of Life

The second dimension of living a good life involves having an overall positive mental state during the unfolding process of life. Such a mental state is crucial for cultivating well-being since it provides the background against which all events in one's life take place. More specifically, this mental background reflects the relationship between the agent and the process, indicating whether the person is in harmony with the process or feels disengaged and alienated from it. In Chapter 21, Zhuangzi depicts the harmonious state between a person and his process of life as "letting my mind wander in the Beginning of things" (Zhuangzi 21/24-38). He notices that animals and other creatures seem to always engage with the process of their lives.

So, what constitutes a good mental background for the process of cultivating well-being? It is our attitude directed at life overall, which is different from the intentional feelings we have about a particular moment of success or failure. For example, a person might feel frustrated due to a mistake she made at the moment, but at the same time, she might still feel engaged in her life and holds a hopeful attitude toward the future. In this case, the overall mental state is a description of her state of being, while a feeling of frustration is a description of her momentary feeling. Thus, we can summarize that the overall positive mental state during the unfolding process of life is a person's optimal state of being.

2.2.1 Engagement and Attunement

Zhuangzi describes two aspects of the optimal state of being that share many similarities with two of the three dimensions of happiness proposed by Danial Haybron - engagement and attunement (Haybron 2013: 20-24). The resonance between Zhuangzi's and Haybron's characterizations of the optimal state of being arises from three reasons.

First, both believe that a human being's emotional life goes beyond the sum of momentary feelings. According to Haybron, human emotional life has a "profound, pervasive and persistent" aspect that cannot be fully captured by momentary feelings (Haybron 2013: 18). Similarly, in Zhuangzi's view, we can hold an inborn state of harmony so that "joy, anger, grief, and happiness can never enter your breast" (Zhuangzi 21/31-33).

Second, they both assert that one's state of being plays a significant role in the cultivation of well-being. For Haybron, having an optimal state of being equates to authentic happiness, which has intrinsic prudential value as an aspect of self-fulfillment (Haybron 2008: 37). Similarly, for Zhuangzi, the optimal state of being has significant prudential value as a mental backdrop that enables all other good experiences to happen. It is the mental state one possesses while freely wandering at ease in one's life.

Most importantly, they both emphasize that having the optimal state of being does not presuppose the achievement of goals or fulfillment of desires. According to Haybron, "self-fulfillment is not simply a matter of living up to our ideals, achieving our goals, etc., but also of living in accordance with our emotional natures" (Haybron 2008: 36). In Zhuangzi's view, an overly attached attitude toward goal-fulfillment impedes the cultivation of the mental state of engagement and attunement. This point will be revisited in the following section.

To make Zhuangzi's description more accessible to modern readers, I will introduce Zhuangzi's view on the optimal state of being by referring to Haybron's definition of authentic happiness.

2.2.2 The State of Engagement

In Haybron's view, one dimension of happiness "concerns your engagement with your life: not bored, listless, and withdrawn, but energetic, interested, and engaged" (Haybron 2013: 20). Moreover, there are two forms of engagement. "The first of these centers on states of energy or vitality: what we might call the exuberance-depression axis" (Haybron 2013: 20). And the second form of engagement is the state of flow as a pleasant and optimal experience, identified by psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (Csikszentmihalyi 1990: 3). A person experiences the state of flow when she is fully engaged in an activity and loses all sense of self-awareness.

Zhuangzi's description of the optimal experience in the process of life corresponds nicely with Haybron's discussion of the engagement dimension of happiness. Zhuangzi describes the first aspect of the optimal experience in the unfolding of life process as "keeping the innate power being whole (*cai quan* 才全)" (Zhuangzi 5/14-16). In his view, "life vitality" (*ming* 命) is an energetic mental state which enables the life process to move forward. He believes that life vitality is the innate power that allows the seed to become a tree (Zhuangzi 5/8-9). Similarly, a person's life vitality is the innate power to enable a person to become the person she aspires to become. A life with plenty of life vitality manifests as an exuberant state of being. What Zhuangzi is saying is that a person with sufficient life vitality is someone who has a deep interest in her life and holds a hopeful attitude toward the future.[10]

[10] Although all life-forms receive their vitality (*ming* 命) from Heaven, it is only Shun who got it straight and full (Zhuangzi 5/8-10).

Moreover, Zhuangzi also thinks that by being fully absorbed in the process and by “forgetting" the goal, a person can experience the flow moment, which is also an optimal experience. One of the most famous stories on the performance of "nonaction” (*wu wei* 无为, a state similar to flow) in the Zhuangzi is about a ceremonial butcher’s outstanding skill (Zhuangzi 3/2–12). In this story, Zhuangzi describes how a ceremonial butcher possesses high skills for cutting up oxen. While cutting up oxen, the butcher’s movements are as graceful as a ritual dance. And since he can also cut into spaces between two bones of the oxen, the blade of his knife has gone nineteen years without dulling. When asked how he can do that, the butcher answered, "I encounter it [the ox] with the spirit rather than scrutinizing it with the eyes. My understanding consciousness, beholden to its specific purposes, comes to a halt, and thus the promptings of the spirit begin to flow" (Zhuangzi 3/4). In Zhuangzi's view, the prudential value of practicing "nonaction" (*wu wei* 无为) is two-fold. First, being in the zone itself is a positive experience, which partly constitutes a good favorable mental background. While placing nonaction, one can become fully absorbed in the process and enjoy the pleasurableness of integrating one's feelings, intentions, and senses in the process. Second, this positive experience can also foster "life vitality" (*ming* 命) and provide innate power to deal with the difficult tasks in our lives. In Zhuangzi's view, the performance of "nonaction" (*wu wei* 无为) will not deplete a person's energy, but instead will cultivate life vitality.

Thus, we can summarize that the first dimension of the optimal experience one can experience in the process of life is the mental state of possessing sufficient life vitality and the experience of being in the zone.

2.2.3 The State of Attunement

According to Zhuangzi, the second constitutive part of the optimal experience in the process of life is the experience of "freely wandering at ease in one's life." When asked about what the state of "wandering at ease" is, Zhuangzi answers,

> Beasts that feed on grass do not fret over a change of pasture; creatures that live in water do not fret over a change of stream. They accept the minor shift as long as the all-important constant is not lost. [Be like them,] and the joy, anger, grief, and happiness can never enter your breast.[11] In this world, the ten thousand things come together in One, and if you can find that One and become identical with it, then your four limbs and hundred joints will become dust and sweeping; life and death, beginning and end, will be mere day and night, and nothing whatever can confound you—certainly not the trifles of gain or loss, good and bad fortune! (Zhuangzi 21/31-33)

From this passage, we can gain insight into what Zhuangzi means by "wandering at ease." It is similar to what Haybron proposed as the attunement aspect of happiness, where "a person relaxes and blossoms, living as seems natural to her, without inhibition" (Zhuangzi 21/31-33). Haybron divided the state of attunement into three fundamental aspects, which nicely correspond to the three features in Zhuangzi's description of the state of "wandering at ease."

First, it is a state of inner calm. In Zhuangzi's description, with the mental state of freely wandering at ease, none of the changes in life, such as "gain and loss, good and bad fortune, and even life and death," can disturb the inner calm of the person (Zhuangzi 5:15-17). In other words, the feeling of pleasure and pain may come and go, but they cannot disturb the mind's tranquility.

Second, the person possesses a confident emotional state. In Haybron's view, a person having a confident emotional state feels wholly at home in her body and life (Haybron 2013:23). Zhuangzi describes this feeling as self-identification with the whole changing process and viewing the world from the whole changing process's perspective. Zhuangzi says,

> Death and life, surviving and perishing, failure and success, poverty and wealth, superiority and inferiority, disgrace and honor, hunger and thirst, cold and heat—these are the

[11] In this passage, the term "happiness" is better understood as the feeling of pleasure instead of the overarching meaning of "happiness" as used by Haybron.

> transformations of events, the proceedings of fate. Day and night they come to us, one replacing another, and yet our understanding can never compass what it is that begins them. So there is no need to let them disrupt our harmony, and we must deny them entrance into our Numinous Reservoir [*ling fu* 靈府]. That is what allows the joy of its harmony to open into all things without thereby losing its fullness, what keeps flowing on day and night without ceasing, taking part everywhere as the springtime of each being. Connecting up with this, your own mind becomes the site of the life-giving time. This is what is called keeping the innate powers whole. (Zhuangzi 5:15-17; emphasis mine)

In this passage, Zhuangzi describes how by identifying with the ever-changing process (i.e., by connecting up with the process), a person can view the change of loss and gain in her personal life from a new perspective. Personal gain and loss start to seem less significant as part of an unceasingly changing process, and thus, a person feels less concerned about the loss and failure in their life.

The third aspect of Haybron's analysis of attunement is "the feeling of being carefree or 'uncompressed'" (Haybron 2013: 22). In Zhuangzi's view, with the attunement mental state, a person feels at home as if a fish in the water (Zhuangzi 21/31-33). The feeling of attunement is also a sense of harmony with the external environment and others. Therefore, we can summarize that the second dimension of the optimal experience in the changing process of life is to possess inner calm, confidence, and carefreeness.

From our discussion in this section, we can tell that Zhuangzi's discussion of the overly positive mental background during the unfolding process of life shares many similarities with Haybron's theory of happiness. However, we should also notice their differences. For Haybron, the mood of engagement and attunement are intentional mental states; they are an "emotional evaluation of your life" (Haybron 2013: 19). In contrast, in Zhuangzi's view, the states of engagement and attunement are not intentional states, such as good moods about life, but are better characterized as a kind of experiential backdrop of the unfolding process of life. Matthew Ratcliffe calls these feelings "existential feelings." In his view, "[Existential feelings] are neither intentional

nor non-intentional. Rather, they are what I call 'pre-intentional': they comprise an experiential backdrop that determines which kinds of intentional state are intelligible possibilities for a person" (Ratcliffe 2013: 600). For instance, a person who feels alienated from her life cannot experience a certain kind of joy and pleasure. A person who feels disengaged with life cannot experience the feeling of vitality and aliveness. Zhuangzi believes that engagement and attunement are the existential backdrops of other emotions, but he does not emphasize their constitutive role in happiness. In other words, Zhuangzi does not take the feeling of engagement and attunement with the process of life as components of happiness but rather take them as grounds of all kinds of good experience.

3. The Value of a Good Process of Life

Now that we have an understanding of what a good process entails according to Zhuangzi, we can explore its value. First, a reliable process of cultivating well-being has instrumental value. When a person has a firm disposition to form and achieve proper goals, their process of well-being cultivation is more reliable than those who lack this disposition. This reliable process is instrumentally good for us because it increases the likelihood of achieving prudential goods. Additionally, the positive existential feelings experienced during the process of life are instrumentally good because they make other good feelings available to us.

Furthermore, a good process of life is also intrinsically valuable. Some philosophers, such as Raibley and Klausen, argue that a firm disposition to live a good life is non-instrumentally good for us. Raibley argues that "it is not just the realization of one's value that is instrumentally good for one, but that the disposition to realize one's value is also non-instrumentally good for one" (Raibley 2013: 484). In other words, it is good for you, for its own sake, to have a firm disposition

toward living a good life. For example, consider two individuals, person A and person B. Person A lives a flourishing life and has a firm disposition to live a good life, while person B is doing well but purely by luck. It is evident that person A's life is better than person B's, as they possess a more reliable process of achieving prudential good. In Raibley's view, emphasizing the non-instrumental value of dispositional good does not mean that we have to deny the existence of "lucky flourishers," but this account "is incompatible with individuals being superlatively well-off— that is, at the very top of the welfare scale—merely through luck" (Raibley 2013: 486). In this sense, the value of a good process of life is not reducible to the value of the achievement of goals.

The intrinsic value of having a firm disposition toward a promising life is easily seen when we consider the well-being of children. We generally believe that certain things are good for children, such as having loving parents, access to education, and sufficient time to play. However, these things are not good for children simply because of their desires or because they bring pleasure. For example, a five-year-old may not desire to go to school and receive an education, but we still believe it is good for them. Similarly, eating too many candies and playing video games all day long may bring pleasure to a child, but we consider it bad for their well-being.

When parents consider what is good for their children, they focus (at least implicitly) on cultivating a firm disposition for living a good life. This is because childhood is the period for a child to become their true self. This belief leads parents to focus on cultivating a firm disposition of life that allows a child to become the person they aspire to be. Concentrating on the dispositional aspect of well-being can help us better understand what benefits a child. On this line of reasoning, it is good for children to have loving parents, access to education, and sufficient time to play because these components contribute to cultivating a firm disposition toward living a good life. In

contrast, eating too many candies and playing video games all day long are bad for children because they are detrimental to cultivating a firm disposition to live a good life.

Moreover, we can further consider the other aspect of a good process of life, i.e., having an overall positive mental backdrop during the unfolding process of life. As we discussed in Section 2.2, Zhuangzi's discussion on the overall positive mental backdrop during the unfolding process of life shares many similarities with Haybron's theory of happiness but has a different focus. For Zhuangzi, the prudential value of feeling engaged and attuned in one's life consists in their role in positively shaping other feelings. As pointed out by Ratcliffe, existential feelings "shape all experience, thought and activity, insofar as they determine what kinds of intentional state are amongst one's possibility" (Ratcliffe 2012: 31-32). For instance, a person's feeling of engagement will shape many of her other feelings and thoughts. She will tend to feel hopeful when confronting adversities and feel less fearful about future challenges. In contrast, a person who is estranged and alienated from her own life is less likely to feel various positive feelings such as the joy of belonging and the joy of being in control of one's life. These good feelings are beyond her capacity to experience because she does not possess the existential background of feeling at home in her life. Thus, the feelings of engagement and attunement are prudentially valuable not only because they are positive emotional evaluations of life (as suggested by Haybron) but also because they constitute a good process of having positive experiences. Haybron's theory of happiness and hedonism focuses on the goodness when we experience happiness, while Zhuangzi takes the feeling of engagement and attunement as a ground for various happy feelings.

From the above discussion, we can see that the value of a good process of life is not reducible to the value of achieving goals. So far, we have discussed what a good process of life is and what

value it has. Once we accept the above two claims, in the next section, I will argue that always having an attached attitude to the good will hinder the cultivation of a good life process.

4. The Attitude toward the Good and Its Influence

In this section, I will first define an attached attitude toward the good and demonstrate that merely holding an attached attitude toward the good makes the process of well-being cultivation into a vulnerable project. Also, it leads a person to miss out on some optimal mental experiences, such as states of engagement and attunement.

4.1 What is an attached attitude to the good?

The predominant well-being theories rarely discuss whether the attitude towards the prudential goods is relevant to our well-being, and they implicitly adopt the view that our attitude toward the prudential goods is always attached. However, an attached attitude to the good is just one particular way of relating to the good.[12] Holding an attached attitude towards the good means that we evaluate our well-being based solely on the achievement of the prudential good. Therefore, holding an attached attitude towards the good implies that we consider the outcome of our actions significant, and our psychological investment towards the success of our goals is significant.

Desire fulfillment theory is, by definition, a goal-directed theory and thus places a significant amount of weight on the outcome of one's actions. According to this theory, what is prudentially good for us is the fulfillment of our desire. To desire something is to set this thing as one's goal and to intend to make the goal happen. The goal-directed way of relating to the goods encourages the development of an attached attitude.

[12] One thing that needs to be clarified is that I do not argue that the predominant theories of well-being *necessarily* endorse an attached attitude toward the good. The above argument only aims to show that the predominant theories of well-being lack a discussion on this issue and implicitly adopt the view that our attitude toward the prudential goods is always an attached attitude since they lack a discussion on what an alternative way of relating to the good can be.

While the focus on the end-state of one's action is less obvious for hedonism and objective list theory of well-being, a closer examination reveals that they share a similar attitude towards the goods. For hedonism, the only intrinsic good is pleasure and the absence of pain. Hedonists realize that we cannot set pursuing pleasure as our goal because of "the paradox of happiness." In essence, the paradox of happiness states that if you strive for happiness by direct means, you end up less happy than if you forget about happiness and focus on other goals. However, the paradox of happiness only limits the way we pursue happiness or pleasure but does not restrict people's whole-hearted attached attitude towards happiness or pleasure. In other words, on the way to pursue well-being, a hedonist should try to forget about pleasure and focus on the goals that can bring her pleasure. However, her implicit attitude toward pleasure is still attached. Zhuangzi's discussion of good mental states, on the other hand, focuses on their role in making various good feelings available, and not solely on the attainment of the end-state. Similarly, for objective list theory, most of the objective goods on the list are the end-state of one's action or character, such as knowledge, virtue, and autonomy, and it is implicit that our attitude towards these states is naturally an attached attitude.

4.2 Why is an attached attitude to the good bad for us?

In Zhuangzi’s view, the way we relate to the good is especially significant in terms of cultivating a good process of living. He believes that merely holding an attached attitude to the good will result in two negative effects regarding having a good process of well-being cultivation.

First, the way we relate to the good is crucial to the degree of resilience in the face of unexpected changes in one's life. If we take the obtaining of pleasure or the fulfillment of our desires as the only possible way to live a good life, when people encounter changes and unexpected challenges, they might take the failure as overwhelming and even lose motivation to keep pursuing

other paths for living a good life. Thus, the attached attitude to the good makes the pursuit of well-being a vulnerable project.

Second, merely holding an attached attitude toward the good might lead a person to miss out on some of the optimal experiences, such as a state of engagement and attunement. As we discussed in Section 2.2, being in the zone and the experience of flow are one dimension of the state of engagement. According to Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, "flow" is "the state in which people are so involved in an activity that nothing else seems to matter; the experience itself is so enjoyable that people will do it even at great cost, for the sheer sake of doing it" (Csikszentmihalyi 1990: 4). However, it is difficult for a person to enjoy the experience of flow if most of her focus is occupied by the emotional investment in doing the project. In other words, if a person cares too much about the failure of doing a project, it will be hard for her to be fully engaged in the process and enjoy it.

Moreover, holding an attached attitude toward the good is not the best way to cultivate the mental state of attunement. As discussed in Section 2.2, the three basic aspects of the attunement states include "inner calm, confidence and feeling carefree or being uncompressed" (Haybron 2013: 23). If a person has too much emotional investment in the goals, she will experience more anxiety, stress, and insecurity. Not being able to view the value of our goals from a broader perspective reduces the possibility of forming new values or fulfilling one's values in different ways. The feeling of anxiety, stress, and insecurity are unpleasant experiences and incompatible with the cultivation of the mental state of attunement. Zhuangzi also believes that a person whose life has a good process of cultivating well-being will not "involve himself in anxious calculations about bringing good fortune to himself" (Zhuangzi 1/7). The state of being carefree and uncompressed is the opposite of being anxious, stressed, and insecure.

I have shown that having an attached attitude toward the good can be bad for us. To summarize, the structure of the argument is as follows:

P1. A good process of life contributes to well-being in a fundamental way, which is irreducible to the contribution of the achievement of some other prudential good.

P2. Always having an attached attitude to the good hinders the cultivation of a good process of life by making the pursuit of well-being a vulnerable project and leading us to miss out on the state of being engaged and attuned in one's life.

C. Thus, we should avoid the negative influence of holding an attached attitude to the good.

5. What Should We do, and How Does it Benefit Us?

Before we discuss how to overcome the negative influence of an attached attitude towards the good, we must first consider what causes this attitude. I believe that we tend to have an attached attitude towards the good because we implicitly assume that the prudential good can only be achieved by the end result of an action, i.e., the outcome, and overlook the prudential value of a good process. However, if we can see the intrinsic value of having a good process for cultivating well-being, we can recognize an alternative way of relating to the good.

5.1 An alternative attitude to the good

Human beings are inherently goal-driven, and our natural inclination is to have an attached attitude towards the object of our desire. However, Zhuangzi argues that having an attached attitude towards the good is not the only way we can relate to it. He suggests that we can also relate to the good by "forgetting" the goal and being fully engaged in the process that produces the prudential good. To cultivate a good process of life, a person needs to strike a balance between an attached attitude and a detached attitude. But what does a detached attitude towards the good entail?

According to Zhuangzi, the possibility of relating to the good with a detached attitude grounds on an innate capacity possessed by human beings. The innate capacity is to evaluate the value of prudential good from a "heavenly perspective."[13] A human point of view represents our attached attitude towards the external world, while the heavenly point of view reflects a detached attitude to viewing the world. Tiwald names the combination of these two perspectives "philosophical double vision" (Tiwald 2015: 62). As he points out,

> The first and most familiar perspective is human, and it is characterized by distinctions of value, epistemic confidence, and value absolutism. From this perspective, some ways of life, practices, and states of affairs appear to be clearly and decidedly better than others. We "know" with confidence that it is better, ceteris paribus, to be successful than a failure, that being alive is preferable to being dead, that cheating on tests is wrong. Moreover, some things are good for everyone and good because they are grounded in facts that are true from all perspectives. And these goods are primarily found in conventional human society, having to do with things like achievement in one's profession, performing civic duties, and caring for family members (Tiwald 2015: 61).

From a human perspective, we tend to identify ourselves with our feelings, desires, goals, and values. We are confident about what is good for us, and we view prudential goods in an attached way, believing that the more we have, the better. Once we identify the intrinsic goods, we take obtaining those goods as the ultimate standard for living a good life.

Zhuangzi fully acknowledges that we all share the human perspective and reminds us that human beings can also hold a heavenly point of view to evaluate the significance of one's goals. Intuitively, human beings can think of themselves from a cosmic perspective, i.e., to step into the whole universe's shoes and make an evaluation.[14] From this perspective, we need to push our personal experience, powers of imagination to their limits and view the world not as an individual

[13] Taking the heavenly perspective does not require a literal belief in heaven conceived by a particular religious tradition. The term "heaven" is translated from the Chinese character "天" (Tian), which literally means sky. "Heaven" is thus better understood as "the whole nature" or as "some power that beyond us."

[14] Fraser (2014: 546)) also points out that "by identifying with the cosmos as a whole, we can come to see gain and loss, even life and death, as minor, trivial changes that leave us emotionally unperturbed, just as the flow of water down a stream leaves the creatures living in it undisturbed."

participator but as an observer from a panoramic angle. For example, a person can ask the question: What are the values of my achievement of becoming a famous novelist from the perspective of the whole universe? Even my achievement seems to be of significant value to me; it loses its significance from a heavenly point of view. Viewing the world from a heavenly perspective loosens our attachment to any fixed goals and leaves room for considering the picture of a good life with more flexibility.

Stoicism is also well known for advocating detachment, but there are two significant differences between Stoic detachment and the detachment attitude of Zhuangzi. First, both Zhuangzi and the Stoics recognize that passions are liable to excess, but they respond to this fact differently. They both notice that the passion for love leaves one prone to hate and disappointment. And attachment to the external world, from attachment to loved ones to the value of life, makes one vulnerable to the chances of loss. According to the most common interpretation, Stoicism recommends eliminating emotional attachment to the external world.[15] While Zhuangzi suggests that one fact about life that we should accept is the unavoidability of engagement. Zhuangzi says,

> Confucius said, "In the world, there are two great decrees: one is fate and the other is duty. That a son should love his parents is fate—you cannot erase this from his heart. That a subject should serve his ruler is a duty—there is no place he can go and be without his ruler, no place he can escape to between heaven and earth. These are called the great decrees. (Zhuangzi 4/13-14).

From this passage, we can tell that Zhuangzi fully acknowledges and accepts that some emotional attachments are unavoidable for human beings.[16] Thus, his suggestion for detachment does not imply the elimination of attachment feelings but relies on a balance between the attached and detached attitude.

[15] Martha Nussbaum (2013) gives this interpretation.
[16] Wong (2006: 13) also points out that Zhuangzi's endorsement of the detached attitude is compatible with the full acceptance of filial love.

The second difference is that Stoicism takes our negative emotions as an utterly negative thing and uses detachment as a tool to avoid the pain of loss and grief. According to Epictetus, Death and pain are not frightening. It is the fear of pain and death we need to avoid. That is, death is a merely natural thing, but our judgments about it make it fearful. Thus, the way to avoid the painful and fearful feeling in the face of death is to hold a detached attitude to life and see that nothing is good or bad in itself. In contrast, in Zhuangzi's view, loss and painful emotions are a neutral and natural fact of the universe. By accepting the inevitability of loss and change, a person can find new meanings and even obtain life vitality from the loss and painful emotions. For example, a parent who has to face his child's death can either be overwhelmed by the tremendous pain or let the pain go through his body and then direct his energy to charities that benefit more poor children. In this case, the parent's loss of the loved one and the accompanying painful experience have been transformed into a motivational force for her to love and take care of other children who need love. Whereas to follow Epictetus's suggestion, the parents should judge that there is nothing good or bad about their loss of the child and their detached attitude can save them from the painful feeling from their loss. This is the part of Stoicism that many people find absurd, and it is not what Zhuangzi would recommend.

5.2 The prudential good of striking a balance between two attitudes

The prudential value of striking a balance between an attached and detached attitude is two-fold. It contributes to cultivating a firm disposition toward living a promising life and contributes to the cultivation of the mental states of engagement and attunement.

When we strike a balance between the attached and detached attitude towards our goals, we can view their significance from a broader perspective, considering life's path as indeterminate. Keeping a flexible attitude towards the good can liberate us from overwhelming failure since there

is no fixed path to a good life. It just opens a new and worthwhile path to explore when changes emerge.

To experience the state of flow, we need to balance attached and detached attitudes towards the good. As Tiwald points out, to experience the state of flow “draws on both the heavenly and the human perspectives because it takes up essentially conventional human aims, yet allow us to see those aims as having no stakes worth worrying about” (Tiwald 2015: 64).

Furthermore, if we balance an attached attitude with a detached attitude (or the heavenly perspective), we are more likely to cultivate a mental state of attunement. According to Tiwald, the most apparent prudential benefit of applying "philosophical double vision" is to obtain "peace of mind." From the heavenly point of view, our goals and values seem to be less significant, enabling us to face changes and failures in our lives with less regret and angst (Tiwald 2015: 62). This "philosophical double vision" directly contributes to the cultivation of tranquility of mind. Additionally, through the heavenly perspective of viewing the external world, Zhuangzi invites us to step into the shoes of the universe and "seeing things as belonging to a unified whole” (Tiwald 2015:63). By seeing things from the heavenly perspective, we do not only take the external world as a means to achieve our goals, but we also consider ourselves as part of a unified process. This perspective expands our spirit and cultivates the feeling of being carefree and uncompressed.

6. Conclusion

My goal in this chapter has been to demonstrate an overlooked perspective for evaluating well-being, which is the importance of having a good process of living a good life. Based on this premise, I argue that always having an attached attitude towards the good can hinder the cultivation of a good process of life, making the pursuit of well-being a vulnerable project that can lead us to miss out on the state of being engaged and attuned in our lives. Therefore, to avoid the negative

influence of holding an attached attitude, we need to strike a balance between an attached and detached attitude, in the sense of Zhuangzi's philosophy. The detached attitude is inspired by Zhuangzi's discussion of "free wandering at ease," a state that results from our self-identification as part of the process, i.e., the whole universe. Based on this discussion, my aim is to demonstrate that a Zhuangzi-inspired theory of well-being provides a valuable perspective to think about well-being. Evaluating the prudential value of life events or attitudes by considering whether they play positive or detrimental roles in the cultivation of a promising process of life is a useful way to assess our well-being.

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Chapter Three: A Confucian Analysis of the Moral Value of Shame Dispositions

1. Introduction

For Aristotle, “shame is more like a feeling than a state of character” (Nicomachean Ethics 1128b10-13). Aristotle’s discussion of shame focuses on how shame feels (i.e., shame feelings) instead of the disposition to feel shame (i.e., shame disposition). This approach to studying the shame experience led Aristotle to evaluate the moral value of shame primarily based on the value of shame feelings rather than the value of shame dispositions. Aristotle characterizes shame feelings as a burning and painful sensation that arises from realizing one's failure to live up to one's own ideals or the expectations of others.

The Anglo-American analytical philosophy tradition, influenced by ancient Greek philosophers like Aristotle, emphasizes the examination of shame feelings rather than shame dispositions to determine the moral value of the shame experience. This tradition inherits three features from the Aristotelian account of shame. First, it suggests that exploring the nature of shame feelings is necessary to reveal the moral value of a shame experience, rather than examining the nature of shame dispositions. Second, even if the shame disposition offers some instrumental moral value, it does not represent a person's excellence.[17] Third, the feeling of shame is an expression of vulnerability, and its essential phenomenological experience is a feeling of frustration resulting from one's failure to meet certain ideals (Rawls 2003: 388))[18] or a feeling of powerlessness (William 1993: 220; Thomason 2018: 120-121).[19]

However, this approach of evaluating the moral value of a shame experience and characterizing shame feelings presents challenges. First, basing the moral value of a shame disposition solely on the conceptual analysis of shame feelings may underestimate its value due to the unpleasantness of shame feelings and the desire to avoid them. If shame feelings are unpleasant and reflect vulnerability and imperfection, then the disposition to feel shame may have limited value compared to other virtues.

Second, placing a feeling of frustration or powerlessness at the core of shame feelings fails to capture the richness of shame experiences. For instance, characterizing shame feelings essentially as feelings of frustration cannot explain two distinct shame experiences—shame caused by flattery

[17] Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni (2012) and Krista Thomason (2018) give serious consideration to the moral value of a shame disposition.
[18] In Rawls' view, when we experience shame, we suffer a blow to our self-esteem (Rawls 2003: 388).
[19] William argues that "the root of shame lies in exposure in a more general sense, in being at a disadvantage: in what I shall call, in a very general sense, a loss of power" (William 1993: 220). Thomason states, "Even though there are other ways to assert one's agency, acts of violence are especially tempting responses to shame because the lack of control we experience in shame makes us feel powerless" (Thomason 2018: 120-121).

and violent reactions associated with shame (Thomason 2018: 56-65), whereas characterizing shame feelings essentially as a tension between one's self-concept and one's identity, as proposed by Krista Thomason (2018), cannot explain shame feelings in young children.

On the other hand, the early Confucian philosophers take a different approach to studying the nature of shame experiences. Rather than defining a shame disposition based on the conceptual analysis of shame feelings, they explore the preconditions for possessing a shame disposition, independent of a unified notion of shame feelings. In the Confucian tradition, the moral value of a shame disposition extends beyond its ability to restrict immoral actions or motivate self-improvement, and includes its constitutive role of the Confucian virtue of *yi* (義), conventionally translated as "righteousness." Moreover, exploring the necessary preconditions for a shame disposition reveals an under-discussed but significant element of shame feelings: to feel shame is to experience a feeling of alarm evoked by perceiving a threat to one's self-worth and the readiness to act against the threat.

In this chapter, I compare the Aristotelian and Confucian accounts of shame to demonstrate that the Confucian account better account for the moral value of a shame disposition and the richness of shame experiences. In the next section, I summarize three features of the Aristotelian account of shame. Further, I analyze why the Aristotelian account fails to fully encapsulate the moral value of a shame disposition and the value of shame feelings. In the third section, I introduce a Confucian account of a shame disposition and two preconditions of a shame disposition. Further, I demonstrate why the Confucian account of shame better captures the richness of shame experiences and explains the moral value of shame disposition.

2. Three Features of the Aristotelian Account of Shame

2.1 Aristotle: Why is shame not a virtue?

In this section, I summarize three features of the Aristotelian account of shame, employing them to demonstrate why Aristotle believes that shame has no intrinsic connection with moral virtue. I compare these features with a Confucian account of shame in the following sections.

Aristotle's focus is on shame feelings rather than a shame disposition. According to Aristotle, "shame is more like a feeling than a state of character" (Nicomachean Ethics 1128b10-13). A feeling of shame is an affective phenomenon that occurs at a specific time, for a particular duration, and with unique phenomenological content. A shame disposition is a tendency to feel shame in certain circumstances.[20] Aristotle recognizes the distinction between shame dispositions and shame feelings while evaluating the moral value of shame primarily based on the value of shame episodes. In his view, "if not feeling shame and disgrace at doing disgraceful action is bad, that does not make it good for someone to do that and then feel shame" (Nicomachean Ethics 1128b30-35). Lacking a disposition to feel shame is negative, although a shame disposition is not a stable moral tendency that represents the excellence of personal character because shame feelings are essentially feelings of frustration and fear.

Thus, to determine the moral value of shame, we must understand the nature of shame feelings in Aristotle's account. For Aristotle, shame is "a kind of fear of disrepute, and it has an effect like that produced by the fear of something horrible" (Nicomachean Ethics 1128b10-13). People who

[20] According to Van Norden, we can distinguish between a sense of shame in both a narrower and broader sense. In a narrower sense, a sense of shame is a disposition to feel shame in situations that people recognize as shameful for themselves or for those with whom they identify. In a broader sense, a sense of shame is a disposition to recognize when actions or situations are shameful (whether for oneself or others and whether past, present, future, or hypothetical) and to have appropriate emotional and behavioral reactions to this recognition (Van Norden 2002: 51-52).

confront shame believe that their self-image is endangered and fear the horrible consequence mentioned by Aristotle. Thus, for Aristotle, "shame is an emotional reaction to one's vulnerable self" (Seok 2017: 51), and this emotional reaction is characterized as feelings of frustration, powerlessness, and fear.

Additionally, Aristotle describes shame as the fear of negative outcomes, such as a poor reputation (Nicomachean Ethics 115a12). Consequently, he argues that shame, at best, is instrumental as self-constraint for youth but not for fully virtuous people. In his view, "[Shame] is appropriate not to every age, but only to youth, for we think that young people should be properly disposed to feel shame because they live by feeling and so make many errors, but are restrained by shame" (Nicomachean Ethics 1128b18-22). However, he maintains that the virtuous do not feel shame, and this shamelessness is morally praiseworthy because fully virtuous people have few actions of which to be ashamed (Nicomachean Ethics 1128b23-33). Machelle Mason characterizes this as "admirable shamelessness" (Mason 2009: 404) because it is understood as a positive state free of shame feelings resulting from one's virtuous character.[21]

In summary, the Aristotelian account of shame has three basic claims. First, to reveal the moral value of shame experiences, we should focus on shame feelings instead of a shame disposition. Second, even a shame disposition has an instrumental moral value, it does not represent the excellence of a person. Third, shame feelings are characterized as an expression of vulnerability,

[21] In another passage, Aristotle acknowledges the value of a sense of shame for a decent man. He says,

> There are some evils, such as disrepute, which are proper and right for him (the courageous man) to fear: a man who fears disrepute is decent and has a sense of shame, a man who does not fear is shameless. (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1115a12-15).

Nevertheless, he considers the feeling of fear to be a necessary component in a sense of shame, which is different than the Confucian account presented in this paper.

and thus, these essential phenomenological experiences involve feelings of frustration, powerlessness, or fear.[22]

2.2 Challenges faced by the Aristotelian account of shame

In this section, I analyze two challenges presented by the Aristotelian account of shame.

2.2.1 The risk of overlooking the moral value of shame dispositions

The first problem is that Aristotle's emphasis on the conceptual analysis of shame feelings fails to fully account for the moral value of shame dispositions. While shame feelings can be among the most unpleasant emotions, as noted by Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni, we may try our best to avoid them (Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni 2012: 11). However, the absence of shame dispositions—i.e., shamelessness—carries strong negative connotations (11). Thus, even in a fully virtuous life where there may be no proper reasons for shame feelings, a shame disposition can still hold moral value for fully virtuous people.

In contemporary literature, philosophers employ two approaches to address the dichotomy between the moral values of shame feelings and shame dispositions. The first approach distinguishes between proper and improper shame, whereby only the disposition to feel proper shame is considered morally valuable. This approach holds that there is no dichotomy between the moral value of shame feelings and shame dispositions. Some philosophers categorize shame into different types, such as heteronomous and autonomous shame (Mason 2009), natural shame, and moral shame (Taylor 1985; Rawls 2003), contending that only autonomous and moral shame are

[22] As Cua (2003) notes, Aristotle's understanding of shame involves the following three aspects:

> (1) shame as a feeling of pain or uneasiness (2) that arises out of one's consciousness of having done bad things, evils, or misdeeds—-the grounds for experiencing shame, and (3) the "conditions" that occasion the shame experience or "the eyes of others." These others are those (a) whom we admire, (b) who admire us, (c) by whom we wish to be admired, or (d) from whom we desire some service that we shall not obtain if we forfeit their good opinion. (Cua 2003: 152)

properly focused shame feelings. Accordingly, the disposition to feel "proper shame" is considered morally valuable. Additionally, Mason argues that properly focused shame is an autonomous shame that arises when we hold ourselves responsible for our failures and respond to a legitimate norm (Mason 2009: 418). Conversely, a woman's shame about the shape of her nose is not properly focused, as she is neither responsible for her appearance nor responding to a legitimate norm of having a "beautiful" face.

However, proponents of the first approach risk underestimating the moral value of a shame disposition due to the unpleasantness of shame feelings and the desire to avoid them. Moreover, as Calhoun notes, basing the appropriate conditions for shame feelings on their moral value characterizes victims of injustice, who are prone to experience improperly focused shame as a "diminished capacity for moral agency" (Calhoun 2004: 128). In this view, a person who tends to have improper shame is considered "captive to the opinions of others" (Mason 2009: 412) and is thus a morally immature person.

Philosophers who prefer the second approach offer no distinction between proper and improper shame, arguing instead that although shame feelings are unpleasant, they do not undermine the moral value of a shame disposition. Thomason employs the second approach. Her definition of shame feelings focuses on the feeling of powerlessness in the shame experience. In her view, shame is "a tension between our identities and our self-conceptions. I feel shame when I feel that some aspect of my identity overshadows my own sense of myself" (Thomason 2018: 149). Consequently, Thomason argues that "there is no value or object that shame tracks or responds to and thus there is no independent standard for proper shame (Thomason 2018: 171). Essentially, shame is the tension between my imposed self-identity and my accepted self-concept. There is no standard to determine whether the tension I feel is proper and thus no standard to decide whether

the cause of my shame is truly shameful. According to Thomason, the moral value of a shame disposition manifests as it reorganizes my perception of others' perspectives about who I am, and it represents that I accept the limitations of my own self-concept (Thomason 2018: 158).

Advocates of the second approach cannot account for the distinction between proper and improper shame dispositions. By Thomason's account, if people are not shameless and are therefore capable of feeling shame, then they possess well-functioning shame dispositions that signal a moral commitment to humility and a recognition of the authority of external perspectives. However, in our daily lives, we can evaluate the properness of a person's shame disposition. We may say to our friends. "We should try to overcome our tendency to feel shame about our appearance. Our appearance is not really shameful." We may also say to others, "You should be able to feel shame about your betrayal of your friends. What you have done is shameful." Since Thomason denies the distinction between an action's shamefulness and the lack thereof, she cannot account for the distinction between a proper and an improper disposition to feel shame.

Furthermore, Thomason fails to appreciate the moral value of imperviousness to shame in certain circumstances. As Mason notes, in some instances, imperviousness to shame is admirable. For example, we applaud people who successfully resist having a false concept of the proper objects of shame imposed on them (Mason 2009: 404). The ability to hold autonomous judgment of oneself despite social pressure is an admirable personal characteristic related to a shame disposition. However, since Thomason posits that there is no distinction between proper and improper shame feelings, her account cannot predict whether a virtuous person will react differently to shame elicitors.

Despite their differences, both approaches address the moral value of shame dispositions based on conceptual analyses of shame feelings. In the following discussion of Confucian accounts of

shame, I demonstrate that focusing solely on the unpleasantness of shame experiences, regardless of feelings of frustration or powerlessness, leads one to overlook an important precondition for possessing a shame disposition. In other words, one's tendency to feel shame stems from the value one assigns to self-worth.

2.2.2 The inability to capture the richness of shame experiences

The second problem with the Aristotelian account of shame is that placing feelings of frustration or powerlessness at the center of shame feeling fails to fully express the richness of the shame experience.

The predominant account of shame in the Anglo-American analytical philosophy tradition of shame essentially characterizes the experience as feelings of frustration in response to the failure to achieve specific ideals (Rawls 1971; Taylor 1985; Mason 2009) or the failure to attain certain public norms and expectations (Gibbard 1990; Keltner 1995; Maibom 2010).[23] This account, referred to as the standards account of shame, treats a person's sense of failure to meet standards as central to shame feelings. However, those who employ this conceptual analysis of shame cannot explain two distinct shame experiences: shame caused by flattery and violent reactions associated with shame (Thomason 2018).

The first challenge to this viewpoint is illustrated in shame feelings elicited by flattering remarks. Max Scheler (1987) provides a fitting example: a nude model initially feels at ease during the painting process but immediately experiences shame when the artist compliments her as a sexy person. The Aristotelian account fails to explain how a flattering remark causes the model to realize that she falls short of any self-accepted standards or social norms. Moreover, if we recall our own

[23] As pointed out by Heidi Maibom, the most predominant account of shame in the Anglo-American analytical philosophy tradition characterize shame as essentially "a painful emotion concerned with the failure to live up to certain standards, norms and ideals" (Maibom 2010, 566).

shame experiences triggered by flattering remarks, we may find it difficult to articulate them in words. Nevertheless, these feelings do not seem to stem from frustration caused by failure, regardless of the nature of the failure.[24]

Secondly, numerous psychological studies reveal that violence can be a tempting response to shame (Tangney et al., 1992; Tangney et al., 2014). However, the standard account of shame cannot account for why people react violently in certain shame experiences. Thomason agrees that people's violent responses to shame pose a problem for the standard account of shame. If shame is the painful realization of one's failure to meet certain ideals, then the natural way to alleviate shame is to strive for self-improvement. Violence cannot offset the failure to meet one's personal ideals, nor does it enable individuals to conform to social norms (Thomason, 2018: 56).

Taylor (1985) replies to the second challenge by highlighting that shame-induced violence may be a product of an honor culture. However, this argument seems to be insufficient for two reasons. First, it cannot explain the shame-induced violence that occurs outside of an honor culture (Kurth and Nelson 2022). Second, it cannot justify shame-induced violence that targets a stranger or innocent bystander instead of the shamer. Although honor cultures value revenge to protect one's honor, they encourage a public challenge to the shamer instead of enacting revenge on innocent bystanders. Thus, appealing to the influence of the honor culture cannot contribute to explanations of shame-elicited violence in the standard account of shame.

To avoid these issues, Thomason proposes a tension account of shame. In her view, "when we feel shame, we feel a tension between our self-conception and our identity. More specifically, we

[24] Additionally, as Calhoun notes, it is problematic to characterize women's shame as a sense of failure because of their biological sex (Calhoun 2004: 137). In Calhoun's view, feeling ashamed of one's biological sex does not entail that a woman agrees with her shamer's contempt or that she considers her biological sex as a failure to meet certain norms (Calhoun 2004: 137).

feel that some feature of our identity eclipses, overshadows, or defines our self-conception" (Thomason 2015: 13). In this definition of shame, self-concept is a voluntary self-understanding or one's chosen identity. A person's self-conception can be multifaceted. For instance, a person may consider herself to be a mother, a teacher, and an animal lover. Conversely, the concept of identity refers to non-voluntary identities—that is, one's imposed identities. For instance, another person may identify me as a woman and an Asian, but I may not allow these identities to define who I am. In Thomason's view, some imposed identities overshadow chosen identities during shame episodes and create tension between chosen and imposed identities. She further characterizes this tension as a feeling of powerlessness to define oneself or a sense of losing control over one's self-identity (Thomason 2015: 13).

Thomason's tension account of shame offers several advantages compared with the failure account of shame. It provides a better explanation for Scheler's nude model example: according to Thomason, the model feels ashamed when the artist compliments her because the compliments impose an identity as a sexually attractive person, which overshadows her self-conception as a professional model. She feels a loss of control over her self-definition when the artist compliments her appearance (Thomason 2018: 154-155).

In addition, Thomason argues that violent reactions to shame can be seen as an attempt to regain control over one's self-concept. She suggests,

> If I do something violent and others respond to me with resentment, they see me as an agent and not as the possessor of some shameful feature. If others see me as an agent, then because my agency is a large part of my self-conception, they are now seeing me in terms of how I see myself. Becoming the object of resentment by doing something violent helps us to regain the feeling of control we lose in shame because we once again feel that our self-conception determines who we are. (Thomason 2015: 18-19)

While this explanation may seem plausible at first, it may be over-intellectualized upon further exploration. It is hard to see why responding to shame with violence allows people to regain the feeling of control over their accepted identity unless being a violent person is part of their accepted identity. If I do not self-identify as a violent person but invite the shamer to see me as a violent person, then my violent response once again results in the loss of control over accepted practical identities.

Thomason replies to this objection by claiming that violence as a response to shame is an attempt to reassert agency. She argues,

> If I do something violent and others respond to me with resentment, they see me as an agent and not as the possessor of some shameful feature. If others see me as an agent, then because my agency is a large part of my self-conception, they are now seeing me in terms of how I see myself. (Thomason 2018: 120)

However, this explanation may be over-intellectualized. While using violence to elicit others' resentment as a way to reassert one's agency may explain violence towards the shamer, it fails to capture the spontaneity of the response to shame. More natural explanations for violent reactions associated with shame feelings that better express the spontaneity and impulsivity of shame experiences include the feeling of fear or perceiving a threat.[25]

Furthermore, Thomason's account of shame may exclude young children as possible subjects of shame experiences due to its over-intellectualized nature, as young children do not yet possess sophisticated self-concepts. However, recent research by Schalkwijk suggests that shame can emerge before the age of two and is primarily associated with the quality of the relationship between the child and their parents, rather than sexuality as previously thought in psychoanalytic

[25] Kurth and Nelson (2022) also note that Thomason's account of shame is over-intellectualized. They suggest,

> If violence in response to shame is as sophisticated as Thomason takes it to be, here too it seems that the person responding to shame would be able to realize that there are better ways to take control of her identity than violence. (Kurth and Nelson 2022)

theories. This suggests that shame development is also related to attachment and mentalization (Schalkwijk 2014: 104-105). Therefore, it is implausible to explain the initial shame experiences of two-year-olds through their self-concept or understanding of self-identity.

While Thomason may deny that two-year-olds experience complete shame feelings, it is important to acknowledge the significance of proto-shame feelings in early childhood development. These feelings can teach us that the emotional development from childhood to adulthood is a gradual process, and that full-fledged shame feelings do not suddenly emerge once an individual possesses a developed self-concept and understanding of self-identification. A child's proto-shame feelings, as the sprouts of complete shame feelings, can teach us that an essential but underappreciated element of shame feelings is overlooked by the tension account of shame.

The second challenge to Thomason's tension account of shame stems from her claim that there is no independent standard for determining what constitutes "proper" shame (Thomason 2018: 170). We determine whether a person's fear is appropriate by assessing whether the object of fear is dangerous. Similarly, we evaluate whether a person's resentment is justifiable by examining whether the object of resentment has wronged the person. However, Thomason contends that shame is a different kind of emotion since "there is no value or object that shame tracks or responds to" (Thomason 2018: 171). Therefore, the feeling of shame is essentially the tension between one's accepted and imposed identities. As a result, "shame is about how we experience ourselves rather than how we experience features of the world" (Thomason 2018: 171).

Nevertheless, claiming that shame has no appropriate conditions does not align with our actual experiences of shame. In everyday life, people often say that we should not feel ashamed of our gender, race, or appearance. According to Thomason, "The claim that my nose is not properly shameful is really a claim that it is unhealthy or unfair to 'beat myself up' over something I cannot

control or something that is not a moral failing" (Thomason 2018: 172). However, this explanation does not correspond to the way we experience shame. When we state that "X is not really shameful," we are not only suggesting that the associated shame feelings are unhealthy or unfair, but we are also conveying that X should not be a source of shame. A proper conceptual analysis of shame should reflect our actual experiences of the emotion instead of assuming that people are merely misusing the language of "X is shameful."

I do not intend to present a comprehensive argument against the Aristotelian account of shame or the Anglo-American philosophical tradition influenced by it. However, I hope that these challenges will encourage us to consider alternative ways of assessing the moral value of a shame disposition and the essential components of shame feelings.

3. The Moral Value of a Sense of Shame and Its Relationship with the Virtues

In this section, I present an account of shame that is inspired by the early Confucian perspective on the emotion. I draw upon the *Analects* and *Mencius*, two important texts in Confucian philosophy, as my primary sources. Moreover, the Confucian account of shame I develop here extends beyond their discussion of shame but shares the crucial spirit of their discussion.

In contrast to the Aristotelian approach, the Confucian account of shame begins by examining the nature of the shame disposition itself and then proceeds to explore the necessary components of shame feelings. This approach provides a more nuanced understanding of the moral value of a shame disposition and sheds light on certain aspects of shame feelings that are often overlooked.

3.1 What is a sense of shame?

Mencius utilizes an agricultural metaphor to indicate humans' innate tendencies to become virtuous. In Mencius' view, the heart (*xin* 心) has four innate tendencies, which are also the

"sprouts" or "beginnings" (*duan* 端) of the four major virtues.[26] The four innate inclinations include senses of "pity and compassion" (*ce yin zhi xin* 惻隱之心), "shame and aversion" (*xiu wu zhi xin* 羞惡之心), "courtesy and respect or deference" (*ci rang zhi xin* 辭讓之心), and a sense of "right and wrong" (*shi fei zhi xin* 是非之心) (Mencius 2A6). He suggests that "the heart of compassion is the sprout of benevolence, the heart of shame is the sprout of righteousness, the heart of deference is the sprout of propriety, and the heart of right and wrong is the sprout of wisdom" (Mencius 6A6). Sprouts refer to the virtues in their early or initial stages of development.

According to Mencius, the shame disposition reveals more about the nature of shame than a mere feeling of shame. What is the sense of shame? In Mencius' account, a sense of shame is based on innate dispositions in response to the unbearableness of the threats to one's self-worth. As Mencius states, "People all have things that they will not bear. To extend this reaction to that which they will bear is benevolence. People all have things that they will not do. To extend this reaction to that which they will do is righteousness" (Mencius 7B3).

To explain his sense of unbearableness, Mencius utilizes a story to highlight the innate connection between contempt and a shame disposition. He says,

> A basket of food and a bowl of soup—if one gets them then one will live; if one doesn't get them then one will die. But if they're given with contempt, then even a homeless person will not accept them. If they are trampled upon, then even a beggar won't take them". (Mencius 6A10)

This passage explains that people tend to feel shame in the face of others' contemptuous reactions. As Mason notes, "Shame, we might say, is a first-person analogue of contempt just as guilt is a

[26] Mencius also utilizes other terms in addition to *duan* (端) to mean *sprout*, including *miao* 苗 (Mencius 2A2), *nie* 孽(6A8), and *meng* 萌 (6A8, 6A9).

first-person analogue of resentment" (Mason 2009: 410). We have an innate tendency to feel shame when confronted by others' contempt, which motivates us to act to escape the intolerable situation. Thus, on my interpretation, Mencius believes that a sense of shame builds on our innate tendency to feel that certain perceived threats to our self-worth are unbearable. Homeless people feel that the food offered with contempt is not worth eating because they deserve better treatment, which demonstrates that a sense of shame is the sensitivity to threats to one's worthiness and stems from attitudes that value self-worth.

Moreover, Mencius stresses that a sense of shame, as the sprout of righteousness, is an actively developing moral disposition. In his view, righteousness is an ethical capacity that gradually develops from our innate attitude toward what we consider intolerable. Essentially, the virtue of righteousness involves the ethical capacity to allow a proper sense of shame in a specific situation, as well as an "unmoving heart" or "unperturbed heart" (*bu dong xin* 不動心) (Mencius 2A2) in front of the unwarranted external threat to self-worth. Righteous people possess the moral conscience to see themselves from a psychological distance, the appropriate understanding of the legitimate source of their self-worth, and the moral integrity to remain unmoved despite unwarranted threats to their self-worth. The relationship between a sense of shame and the virtue of righteousness is further explored in Section 3.3.

In my interpretation, the Confucian sense of shame combines a valuing attitude towards one's self-worth with a perception-like experience of seeing threats to it. People are disposed to feel shame when they meet two criteria. First, they must possess a valuing attitude towards their self-worth. This attitude can be unconscious, and their understanding of self-worth can be minimal. If people view themselves as proper objects of love or respect, then we say they possess an understanding of their self-worth. For instance, children value their self-worth if they have a basic

sense that their parents love them and that they are proper objects of this love. Additionally, people can evaluate their self-worth based on the behaviors of those with whom they closely identify, such as family members. Second, they must have a perception-like experience of seeing a threat to their self-worth. Hence, they become shameless if they lack even a slightly valuing attitude towards their self-worth or if they are unable to perceive a threat to it in a given situation. The following two cases illustrate these points separately.

The first case highlights that the absence of a valuing attitude toward one's self-worth leads to a lack of tendency to feel shame. This is exemplified in Zhoushi Chen's novel, *White Deer Plain*, through the tragic character of Xiao-er Tian. As a teenager, she was sold by her father to a man who was old enough to be her grandfather; she became his concubine. Xiao-er cannot fully value her self-worth and has no hope of changing this situation because, as a woman, she has few choices other than accepting the place arranged for her by her family. Consequently, she is not ashamed of her situation. She does not hide from others' eyes and even smiles at them when they stare. Desperately unhappy, she has an affair with Heiwa, the family's young hired hand, which is quickly discovered by her master. Heiwa is sent away, and Xiao-er is sent home in disgrace. Heiwa finds Xiao-er and takes her to his village, where she is denied the honor of worshipping at the village shrine and is shunned by decent folks. Xiao-er now feels ashamed when others stare at her. Heiwa's love eventually allows her to realize her self-worth as a person who deserves love and to see a possible life of dignity (Chen 2017).

By introducing this case, I intend to illustrate that, on the one hand, shame feelings tend to damage our sense of self-worth, which has been widely discussed in the literature regarding shame (Manion 2010: 28). On the other hand, a shame disposition presupposes that people have valuing attitudes toward their self-worth. In this sense, possessing a shame disposition signifies that people

have a sense of self-worth (regardless of whether they fully understand or realize it) and are willing to strive to protect it.

I borrow the second case from Mason, who employs the Toads from Graham Greene's novel *Doctor Fischer of Geneva or the Bomb Party* (Greene 1980: 10) as a paradigm of shamelessness. Dr. Fischer has a group of acquaintances called the "Toads." And "each of the five Toads has settled in Geneva either to escape paying taxes in their own country or to take advantage of otherwise favorable cantonal conditions" (Mason 2009: 409). For the sake of securing some expensive favor from the host of their dinner, the "Toads" allow Dr. Fischer to humiliate them during the dinner. They "will allow their finger to be crushed in the claws of live lobsters as they catch and cook their meal, or don bibs and eat cold porridge, or withstand the criticism, however true, that they would have sat down with Hitler in expectation of favors" (Mason 2009: 409).

In Mason's view, the Toads' shamelessness is a moral fault because it is a form of moral evasion (Mason 2009). "To be shameless in the manner of the Toads is, in large part, to regard oneself as beyond the reach of any ideals of character appraisal" (427). If we apply the Confucian understanding of a sense of shame, then the Toads' shamelessness is essentially a lack of a shame disposition. The Toads do not possess shame dispositions because they are incapable of perceiving threats to their self-worth in a shameful situation. Many reasons cause people to fail to see danger; similarly, various reasons cause people to be unable to perceive threats to their self-worth. For instance, arrogant people may be insensitive to others' contempt because they cannot seriously consider another person's opinion; thus, their arrogance results in their inability to perceive the threat to their self-worth.

Based on these two cases, I argue that having a disposition towards shame presupposes two capacities of the agent: a sense of self-worth and an ability to perceive a threat to that self-worth.

In the following, I will discuss the theoretical advantages of approaching the nature of shame from the perspective of a shame disposition. This approach can reveal an overlooked component of shame that receives insufficient attention in contemporary literature. Additionally, it allows for a better understanding of the moral value of a shame disposition based on the aforementioned preconditions.

3.2 An overlooked component of shame feelings

The Confucian analysis of the shame disposition also illuminates an overlooked but essential component of shame feelings. If we accept that the ability to feel shame requires people to possess valuing attitudes toward their self-worth and to perceive threats to their self-worth, we notice an overlooked component in shame feelings in addition to feelings of frustration and powerlessness—that is, the feeling of alarm.

According to this analysis, shame is not essentially a feeling of frustration or powerlessness but rather includes a feeling of alarm or the feeling of unbearableness. When a person experiences shame, she does not necessarily feel defeated by the failure to meet certain ideals or social standards but feels endangered and ready to fend off or repair the potential loss of self-worth. The feeling of alarm and uneasiness are necessary components of shame feelings.

Moreover, the feeling of alarm is related to other painful feelings, and the degree of painfulness (i.e., the degree of frustration, powerlessness, and fear) varies depending on various circumstances. For instance, if a person can see a way of remedying and preserving her self-worth, the feeling of shame will become less painful and less destructive. Otherwise, the feeling of alarm will evolve into an anxious feeling produced by the fear of losing one's self-worth and the desire to avoid such loss.

The Confucian analysis of a shame disposition recognizes that shame is inherently a painful or unpleasant emotion. Rather, it emphasizes that the painful feeling of shame can sometimes be managed. As early Confucians noted, the painfulness of shame feelings can be reduced by developing other virtues, such as bravery, benevolence, or wisdom.

However, this analysis also explains why certain groups of people tend to suffer more from the painfulness of shame feelings. For instance, people with depression find shame feelings to be intolerable because, in their shame experience, they perceive a threat to their self-worth and experience the feeling of alarm, but they feel that preserving their self-worth is impossible because of their psychological condition. The inability to stop the alarm causes increased painfulness in their shame experience.

By including a feeling of alarm as an essential component of shame feelings, we can better explain the richness of shame experiences in four areas—shame feelings caused by appraisals, the violent reaction to shame, the experience of children's shame, and the spontaneity of shame.

First, this account explains why we can experience shame caused by flattery: flattery can lead us to see a threat to our self-worth. Mencius offers an example stating that "a gentleman should be ashamed if his reputation transcends his true merits" (Mencius 4B18). This suggests that if people's reputations exceed their true merits, then this may demonstrate that their behavioral patterns lack humility, which should provoke shame if people value their personal character as being humble. In Scheler's case, the nude model feels ashamed when the artist calls her sexy because the compliment's content threatens the self-worth she has built around her identity as a professional model. However, her shame feeling does not necessarily amount to a feeling of frustration or powerlessness; rather, it is more appropriately described as a feeling of alarm and unbearableness. If the model also believes that she cannot preserve her self-worth because she lives in a male-

dominated society, then the feeling of alarm may become a feeling of powerlessness. Conversely, if the model recognizes that the artist should not evaluate women based on their bodily features but should instead assess their professionalism, then she may perceive that her self-worth is not threatened by a morally false belief and thus may feel less pain in this shame experience.

Second, people instinctually react when confronting a threat. Thus, a violent reaction associated with shame is natural if we focus on the feeling of alarm in the shame experience. However, we should also notice that not everyone has the same disposition towards violence in the face of threats. As Mencius and Confucius suggest, as we develop other virtues, such as benevolence, our tendency to react violently in shame experiences becomes more manageable.

Third, this account better explains the shame feelings of young children. Even without a full-fledged understanding of the various aspects of self-identity and self-concept, young children can feel shame. As mentioned previously, a valuing attitude toward self-worth only requires a basic sense of being worthy of love and respect or even a genuine interest in oneself, as is the case with children. In interactions with their parents, children may perceive a parent's look of rejection to be a threat to their position as a proper subject of love. As Elison suggests, if we believe the universal antecedent of shame to be “devaluation of self” (Elison 2005: 27), "infant studies using manipulations such as the still face paradigm, abrupt withdrawal of the mother, or image distortion become relevant to the study of shame, as they all involve social disruption" (Elison 2005: 27).

Fourth, compared with the account proposed by Thomason, including a feeling of alarm as an essential component of shame feelings better explains the spontaneity and impulsive features of shame experiences. Feeling shame is experiencing a sense of alarm and the readiness to act against the threat. Perceiving a threat to one's self-worth can occur subconsciously, similar to how we

perceive danger. Thus, the feeling of alarm corresponds well with the spontaneity of shame feelings.

3.3 The moral value of the shame disposition

The Anglo-American analytical philosophy tradition tends to focus on the moral value of shame feelings. If shame feelings are morally valuable, then the tendency to feel shame is also morally valuable. However, the discussion of the moral value of shame feelings is complicated because shame feelings have two sides, as Tangney, Stuewig, and Martinez emphasize. The first aspect is a destructive element, which comprises a defensive pathway to blame others and evade responsibility. The second factor is constructive, as it motivates positive changes in the future and prosocial behaviors (Tangney, Stuewig, and Martinez 2014). Furthermore, Aristotle argues that the painfulness of shame feelings is an instrumentally valuable form of self-constraint. Essentially, the discussion regarding the moral value of shame feelings primarily focuses on either the motivational role of shame in self-improvement (Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni 2012: 184) or the instrumental value of shame in self-constraint. However, Thomason notes, the approach of dividing shame into different aspects defends the moral value of only "certain kinds of shame" (Thomason 2018: 144). Thus, only morally proper shame is morally valuable (144). This approach ignores the question of whether the moral goodness of shame feelings overrides the destructive effect from the dark side of shame. Studying the moral value of shame by focusing only on shame feelings can, at best, demonstrate that "shame feeling is sometimes morally valuable" (144).

Thomason is an exception in seriously considering the moral value of a shame disposition. In her view,

> A liability to shame means that we can have our self-conceptions shaken. I can be confronted by some aspect of myself that I do not necessarily identify with or that I do not

> necessarily see as making up a part of who I am, and I can feel defined by it. (Thomason 2018: 151)

This liability is morally valuable because it "is something we need before we can internalize another point of view, and before we take the demands of our social world seriously" (Thomason 2018, 153). Additionally, the liability to feel shame indicates that we accept the limits of our self-concept and thus signals a moral commitment to humility (Thomason 2018: 158).

I agree with Thomason's analysis of the non-instrumental value of a shame disposition, which is consistent with the Confucian account of shame. The early Confucians believed that a shame disposition includes the capacity to perceive a threat to one's self-worth, which arises from the way people perceive and judge us. This recognition of others' perspectives as a source of authority to question our self-worth is essential for a person to perceive a threat to their self-worth and reflects a moral commitment to humility. Failure to recognize others' viewpoints and a sense of arrogance can lead to an inability to perceive a threat to one's self-worth.

However, Thomason's analysis of the moral value of a shame disposition falls short of early Confucians' beliefs, which emphasize the relationship between a sense of shame and moral virtues. This perspective broadens our discussion on the moral value of a shame disposition. The Confucian account of shame allows us to distinguish between proper and improper shame feelings, without basing moral value on the appropriateness of shame feelings. In the Confucian account, shame represents not only a tension within oneself (as in Thomason's account) but also a way of seeing one’s place in the world. Specifically, shame represents a perception of a threat to one’s self-worth. Thus, the appropriateness of shame is determined by the correctness of its representational content. Proper shame feelings indicate an accurate perception of the threat to one’s self-worth. If the object of shame is not a true threat to one's self-worth, then the object of shame is not truly shameful.

Thus, when people say that the scar on one's face is not shameful, they mean that they believe that the scar is not a true threat to one's self-worth. In other words, the scar should not threaten one's beliefs about self-worth. A similar meaning is conveyed when a person says, “I know that I should not fear the spider because it is not really dangerous.” Furthermore, we can evaluate the appropriateness of shame feelings by their intensity. If my shame feelings are excessive or insufficient, then the “size” of my shame feelings does not fit the experience. For instance, an overwhelmingly painful feeling of shame caused by an innocent mistake is not fitting. As a perception of the color green represents green objects, shame should reflect a true threat to one’s self-worth.

Confucius provides several examples to illustrate the difference between proper and improper shame feelings. He suggests that people should not feel shame about their clothing or food (Analects 4.9) or about seeking knowledge from those of lower social status (Analects 5.15). Instead, they should feel ashamed of failing to keep their promises (Analects 4.22) or of enjoying wealth and status while residing in a disorderly state (Analects 8.13). As such, we can see that the distinction between proper and improper shame feelings is rooted in the factors that contribute to a person's sense of self-worth. According to Confucius, one's clothing or food should not threaten one's self-worth, but lacking integrity or virtue is a genuine threat.

This distinction between proper and improper shame feelings allows us to understand that people with well-functioning (or proper) dispositions to feel shame are prone to have proper shame feelings. Their shame feelings are more likely to monitor threats to their self-worth, and the intensity of their feelings is proportional to the threat. In my view, having a proper shame disposition is a crucial component of cultivating the Confucian virtue of righteousness.

The original meaning of righteousness in ancient Chinese refers to appropriateness (Van Norden 2002: 48). If we say that a sense of shame reflects our natural and untrained tendency to protect our self-worth, then the virtue of righteousness is a well-developed sense of shame. The virtue of righteousness is the ethical capacity to enable a proper sense of shame in a specific situation; it also consists of an "unmoving heart" in front of the unwarranted external threat to self-worth.

Early Confucian writings feature in-depth discussions of properly focused shame and unwarranted external threats to our self-worth. Mencius says, "When a scholar stands in a prince's court, and his principles are not carried into practice, it is a shame to him" (Mencius 5B14). In this case, it is proper to feel shame when people fail to fulfill their political duties as scholars. The properness comes from the fact that our social and moral character is a proper source of our self-worth.

Moreover, Confucians praise a virtuous person's capacity to resist the unwarranted external threat to self-worth. Confucius argues that a virtuous person should follow the Dao (the virtuous way of living), even if doing so results in suffering; a virtuous person should not be ashamed of poor food and clothes in this context (Analects 4.9). The difference between shame regarding poor food and shame for failing to fulfill one's duty as a scholar lies in whether these threats to self-worth are legitimate sources of self-worth. The ability to hold autonomous judgment of oneself despite social pressure is another aspect of the manifestation of righteousness. Early Confucian philosophers call this capacity "an unmoving heart" (Mencius 2A2).

To summarize, the Confucian virtue of righteousness consists of three interconnected components. First, individuals must possess a self-reflective moral conscience that enables them to perceive threats to their self-worth from a psychological distance. Second, they must have an

appropriate understanding of the legitimate sources of self-worth to differentiate between proper and improper shame feelings. Third, individuals must have moral integrity, which allows them to maintain an "unmoving heart" when faced with unwarranted threats to their self-worth.

The moral value of a shame disposition is not solely determined by the appropriateness of shame feelings but also by its role in cultivating the virtue of righteousness. A brutal sense of shame cannot distinguish between proper and improper shame feelings. However, the two competing aspects of shame - valuing oneself and perceiving threats to one's self-worth - provide an opportunity to cultivate righteousness.

A sense of shame necessarily involves a feeling of alarm because it forces us to recognize the existence of the vulnerable and endangered self. By facing a threat to our self-worth, our valuing attitude toward our self-worth requires us to act to preserve it. Thus, we spontaneously prepare to stop the sense of alarm. This disposition enables us to determine what matters to our self-worth and which actions are inappropriate to uphold it. We may need to learn from our mistakes. Hiding from others or resorting to violent actions may temporarily reduce the painful feeling of losing control over how we define ourselves, but it cannot genuinely stop the alarm of a threat to our self-worth. Refining a brutal sense of shame into the virtue of righteousness is the only way to escape from shame. This transformation process leads to the development of a virtuously mature individual. Therefore, a sense of shame is indispensable in cultivating the virtue of righteousness.

Possessing the virtue of righteousness requires us to better understand what matters to our self-worth and acquire the moral strength to strive to protect it. A brutal sense of shame invites us to reflect on what matters to our self-worth and experience the painful feelings that result from a threat to losing it. Thus, without a sense of shame, a person lacks sensitivity to their own worthiness. Although shame feelings may diminish our self-worth, a shame disposition is essential to our

commitment to valuing it. Mencius eloquently states that “a person without any sense of shame is no longer a human being” and “we should be ashamed of being shameless” (Mencius 7A6).

Some may argue that achieving the virtue of righteousness through shame feelings is dangerous, given the dark and destructive face of shame. However, early Confucians argue that the healthy growth of the shame disposition is typically associated with the growth of other virtues. By cultivating other virtues, we can transform a brutal sense of shame into the virtue of righteousness without suffering from the destructive effects of shame feelings. For instance, Mencius suggests that "the entire absence of propriety and righteousness will ensue from the want of benevolence and wisdom" (Mencius 2A7). In other words, the most effective way to avoid disgraceful behavior is to practice benevolence and seek wisdom. Since self-interest is a primary cause of shameful actions, Mencius maintains that appropriately loving and respecting others can help us avoid disgraceful situations. Furthermore, cultivating benevolence enhances our ability to reflect on our mistakes and take responsibility for them instead of projecting blame outward. He claims,

> The man who would be benevolent is like the archer. The archer adjusts himself and then shoots. If he misses, he does not murmur against those who surpass himself. He simply turns around and seeks the cause of his failure in himself. (Mencius 2A7)

Thus, with benevolence as an ethical capacity, the virtuous person is better equipped to manage the defensive responses of shame and constructively utilize the pain of shame.

4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I summarized three features of the Aristotelian account of shame and compared them with the Confucian account of shame dispositions. Based on this comparison, I demonstrated that the Confucian account better captures the moral value of shame dispositions and the value of shame experiences. Switching our approach to study the moral value of shame dispositions before we analyze the essential features of shame feelings would allow us to avoid the risk of

underestimating the moral value of shame dispositions. Moreover, studying the necessary components of shame dispositions can illuminate an easily overlooked component of shame feelings: the feeling of alarm. By considering this component, we can better explain the richness of shame experiences.

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Chapter Four: “Having Respect for” and “Being Respectful”

A Comparison Between the Kantian Conception and the Confucian Conception of Respect

1. Introduction

The notion of respect is central to many moral requirements in daily life. People teach their children to respect their parents, teachers, other people, and moral rules in general. Due to the fundamental role of respect in many moral theories, philosophers throughout history have worked on unpacking the nature of respect as a moral feeling and its role in moral motivation.

In the Western philosophical tradition, there is a tendency to explore the nature of respect based on the nature of the object of respect. In short, it is the nature of objects that determines their respect-worthiness and thus determines the nature of respect. As Pengbo Liu indicates, the Western tradition focuses on the “outside-in” model of respect. In this model, respect is “a response to certain properties inherent in that object” (Liu 2019: 47). Following this line of reasoning, to study the nature of respect, we must categorize respect based on the nature of its object. For instance, Darwall (1977) distinguishes two types of respect: recognition respect and appraisal respect. On the one hand, recognition respect is owed to any object with respect-worthy status; for example, we owe respect to laws simply by recognizing that we should weigh them appropriately in terms of their status. Appraisal respect, on the other hand, is earned by persons who manifest excellence of character. For instance, we owe respect to excellent philosophers, athletes, and so on.

While the “outside-in” model of respect significantly deepens our understanding of the nature of respect, problems arise when we try to pin down the respect-worthiness of different kinds of objects, especially for recognition respect. For instance, it is widely accepted that all persons deserve equal respect regardless of their gender, race, or accomplishments. However, it is unclear what characteristics of persons grant respect-worthiness. It appears to be difficult to find the

common feature shared by each person that grounds the equal respect owed to them.[27] Further, even if we established the common ground of respect for persons, we would face the challenge of transforming our knowledge of respect for persons into the practice of respect for individuals, who have numerous weaknesses and differ in the degree to which they exemplify the identified common feature. It is morally necessary that we respectfully listen to others' opinions even if we disagree with their views; we should also respectfully love the one we love. The people with whom we interact in our daily lives are not "abstract" persons who possess only respect-worthy properties, such as rational capacities or autonomy. Thus, even if we could find the common feature that grounds the equal respect owed to each person, the question that would remain is how we should respectfully approach individuals in daily life.

To address the difficulties encountered by the outside-in model of respect, Sin Yee Chan (2006) and Liu (2019) both note that insight can be gained from the classical Confucian notion of *jing* 敬. *Jing* 敬 has a meaning similar to the Western notion of respect, but it also emphasizes the value of having a respectful state of mind.[28] In Liu's terminology (Liu 2019), respectfulness as a state of mind is an "inside-out" model of respect. Having a respectful state of mind is not directly generated by the respect-worthy properties of external objects but rather "as an expression of the appropriate way of positioning the self in relation to others" (Liu 2019: 43). The disposition to have a respectful state of mind can often be a character trait of the agent.

[27]As Robin Dillon notes, "candidate qualities include the ability to be moved by considerations of moral obligation, the ability to value appropriately, the ability to reason, and the ability to engage in reciprocal relationships" (Dillon, 2021).

[28] Kant also describes what a respectful state of mind looks like in his work, but he does not make it clear whether a respectful state of mind plays a distinctive role in his moral philosophy.

Both Chan and Liu argue that *jing* 敬, the Confucian conception of respect, has significant theoretical and practical value for obtaining an adequate understanding of the role of respect in moral life. However, their discussions primarily focus on the distinction between Western and Eastern views of respect. In this paper, I will focus on revealing the theoretical and practical value of combining the two perspectives on respect. I aim to demonstrate that by borrowing insight from each side, we will gain a deeper understanding of the nature of respect and what it requires in terms of proper treatment of other individuals.

To achieve this goal, I will compare the Kantian notion of respect with the Confucian notion of respect.[29] The ultimate goal of this comparison is not only to demonstrate the differences but also to show that by borrowing insight from the Confucian notion of respect, we can gain a deeper understanding of the Kantian notion of respect and make better sense of Kant's perplexing claims about the nature of respect and its role as a moral incentive. In Section 2, I introduce the basic features of the Kantian conception of respect and analyze the problems encountered by affectivist and intellectualist interpretations of this concept. Then, in Section 3, I introduce my interpretation of the Confucian perceptual account of emotion and explain how it helps to enrich the Kantian conception of respect. In Section 4, I address the problem of filling the gap between respect for persons and respect for individuals faced by the Kantian account of respect for persons. I aim to demonstrate that only by combining respect for the moral law (as in the Kantian conception of respect) and a respectful state of mind (as in the Confucian conception of respect) can we obtain a more nuanced picture of respect for individuals in our daily lives.

[29] I choose the Kantian notion of respect as a representative of the Western view of respect because the Kantian account of respect is one of the most influential positions in moral philosophy. Most contemporary discussions of the moral value of respect rely on, develop or challenge some aspect of the Kantian notion of respect.

2. A Perceptual Account of Respect as an Intentional Feeling

2.1 The Affectivist and Intellectualist Interpretations of Kantian Respect

According to Kant, respect for the moral law is morality itself subjectively considered as an incentive (KpV 5:76). There are two major ways of interpreting the role of respect in Kantian moral motivation. Most secondary literature on this topic falls into either the intellectualist view or the affectivist view.[30]

The intellectualist view holds that respect for the moral law is an intellectual recognition of the authority of the moral law, which is sufficient to generate moral actions. Respect as an intellectual recognition of the authority of the moral law provides us an all-sufficient reason to act. For instance, according to Uriah Kriegel and Mark Timmons (2021), Kantian respect for the moral law and respect for persons is a special case of recognition respect as proposed by Stephen Darwall (1997). Darwall distinguishes between recognition respect and appraisal respect. He suggests that appraisal respect is an attitude of positive appraisal of a person or their merits, which are the features of persons who manifest excellence of character. In contrast, in one's practical deliberations, recognition respect is the disposition to appropriately weigh or consider some facts about the object and to regulate one's conduct by constraints derived from those facts (Darwall 1997: 38). Many commentators, including Baron (1997) and Drummond (2006), among others, have endorsed the consideration of Kantian respect for the moral law as a form of recognition respect.

In this interpretation, the affective aspect of a feeling of respect plays a limited role in the process of moral motivation. The affective aspect of respect is merely the byproduct of the process

[30] Two exceptions include Jeanine Grenberg's phenomenological approach to account for the role of the feeling of respect in the Kantian picture (2013), and Owen Ware's two-perspective view to interpret the relationship between the recognition of the authority of moral law and a feeling of respect for moral law (2014).

of motivation, and a feeling of respect thus occurs temporally after the motivational influence of our recognition of the moral law's authority. For instance, Andrews Reath suggests that "the feeling of respect is an emotion that is the effect of, and follows from, the determination of the will by Moral Law, when the latter limits the inclination" (Reath 1989: 288). Reath holds that if we introduce any motivational factor beyond the recognition of the validity of the moral law, such a view would undermine the central claim of Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*; that is, pure reason is practical (Reath 1989).

However, the intellectualist interpretation fails to fully account for the value of the affective aspect of respect. In the *Groundwork*, Kant clearly states that "respect is a feeling" (G 4:402), and he consistently refers to respect as a feeling throughout the texts. In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant says that a feeling of respect "must ... be regarded as a subjective ground of activity" (KpV 5:79). In the *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, he states that,

> This susceptibility to simple respect for the moral law within us would thus be the moral feeling, which by itself does not yet constitute an end of the natural predisposition but only insofar as it is an incentive of the power of choice. (RGV 6:28)

Passages such as these indicate that Kant allows a positive role for the affective aspect of respect as a moral incentive. However, to characterize respect as the recognition of the moral law fails to capture how respect can serve as "morality itself subjectively considered as an incentive" (KpV 5:76). Moreover, if we take respect for the moral law as simply recognition of the authority of the moral law, it is difficult to recognize how respect for the moral law adds to our susceptibility to the command of moral law.

By contrast, the affectivist view maintains that other than the intellectual aspect of respect, there is also an affective component of respect, which plays a positive role as the cause of moral motivation in the Kantian moral picture. McCarty maintains that

> Affectivists need not deny that Kantian moral motivation initially arises from an intellectual recognition of the moral law. Contrary to intellectualists, however, they maintain that it also depends on a peculiar moral feeling of respect for the law, one consequent to the initial recognition or moral judgment the intellectualists emphasize exclusively. (McCarty 1993: 423)

However, affectivists face the difficulty of finding an appropriate place for respect in the motivational process of performing a moral action without undermining the central claim that pure reason can be practical. McCarty answers this question by suggesting that there are two stages involved in the process of moral motivation:

> In Kant's settled view, then, the moral-motivational sequence always includes inciting moral feelings resulting from the comparison of possible action to the moral law. The moral law determines the will directly, and then follows the feeling of respect, which subsequently determines the choice to act accordingly. (McCarty 1993: 428)

In this account, there is a temporal causal sequence in moral motivation. That is, the moral law first objectively determines the will directly and then produces the feeling of respect, and that is the means the moral law uses to subjectively determine our moral choice.

However, to justify this interpretation, McCarty must provide a sufficient account of the difference between the objective determination of the will and the subjective determination of the choice and how these two stages relate to each other. In other words, why do we need to appeal to a feeling of respect to turn the objective determination of the will into a subjective determination of choice? Kant does not clearly indicate that the objective determination of the will and the subjective determination of the choice are two distinct stages in moral psychology. Instead, he holds that "the objective determining ground must at the same time be the exclusive and subjectively sufficient determining ground of action" (KpV 5:72).

In addition, the two-stage moral-motivational sequence is counterintuitive, according to our daily experience of making a moral decision. Before every moral action we take, it does not usually

seem that we first recognize the moral principle and then this cognitive recognition produces a feeling of respect and finally inspires a type of moral feeling.

In the next section, I will argue that a Confucian account of respect can help us better understand Kant's perplexing claims about respect as an *a priori* intellectual feeling without making a distinction between intellectual and affective aspects of respect.

2.2 A Confucian Perceptual Account of Respect

Perceptual accounts of emotion have gained support from philosophers including Peter Goldie (2000), Robert Roberts (2003), Sabine Döring (2003), Jesse Prinz (2007), Christine Tappolet (2012), and Michael Milona and Katie Stockdale (2018). In the perceptual account of emotions, emotions involve representational content that is not propositional. Perceptual accounts of emotion take emotions to be relevantly analogous to sensory perception.[31] According to Tappolet (2012), emotions are perceptual experiences of evaluative properties (i.e., values) like dangerousness (fear) or slights (anger). In other words, emotions are felt evaluations of the world through a perception-like experience. In a perceptual account of emotions, the feeling of fear involves a perceptual experience of the object of fear as dangerous, and the feeling of hope involves a perceptual experience of the object of hope as encouraging (Milona and Stockdale 2018: 216).

A perceptual account of emotion fits well with the Confucian account of emotion because it better captures the unity between feelings and cognition. For most ancient Chinese philosophers, the faculties of *qing* 情 and *si* 思 were thought to be located in the *xin* 心, which is translated as

[31] For instance, Tappolet (2016) points out that (a) both emotions and perceptions have salient phenomenal properties, (b) both are elicited automatically by real or imagined objects, (c) both have correctness conditions because they represent the world as being a certain way, and (d) both play the epistemic role of providing defeasible reasons for belief.

heart or heart-mind. I suggest that one crucial function of the heart is to perceive the value of an object through particular feelings.

For Mencius, the heart has four innate tendencies, which are also the *duan* 端 of four major virtues—*ren* 仁, *yi* 義, *li* 礼, and *zhi* 智. The four innate sprouts of virtue include the sense of "compassion," "shame," "respect," and "right and wrong." Mencius suggests,

> The heart of compassion is the sprout of benevolence, the heart of shame is the sprout of righteousness, the heart of respect is the sprout of propriety, and the heart of right and wrong is the sprout of wisdom. We inherently have them. It is simply that we do not reflect upon them. Hence, it is said, "Seek it and you will get it. Abandon it and you will lose it." [Mencius 6A6]

In this passage, compassion, shame, respect, and the sense of right and wrong are all functions of the heart. If the heart's function is to perceive values through feelings, then to have a sense of compassion for X is to perceive X as demanding one's care. To have a sense of shame for X is to perceive X as threatening one's self-worth. To have a sense of right and wrong is to perceive X as embodying a distinction between positive and negative values. Following this line of reasoning, for the Confucian account of respect, to respect X is to perceive X as demanding serious regard.

Based on the common features shared by early Confucian characterizations of feelings, I suggest that a perceptual account of emotion can help capture two common elements of Confucian respect. The perceptual account of respect can also help us better understand the distinction and unity between two kinds of respect in the Confucian picture.

First, the notion of *jing* 敬 is commonly paired with the notion of *wei* 畏 (fear, awe) to characterize a feeling of *jingwei* 敬畏 (respect). Confucius notes that we should *wei* 畏 "the younger generation" (Analects 9:23). He says that we "should look upon the younger generation with wei 畏 because how are we to know that those who come after us will not prove our equals?"

(9: 23). Mencius suggests that the objects of *jingwei* 敬畏 include "heaven" (Mencius 3:2). And Xunzi points out that the objects of *jingwei* also include one's enemy (55/15/56), persons without virtue (51/13/38) and laws and commands (61/16/72).

Objects provoking a feeling of *jingwei* 敬畏 have the power to threaten one's safety or status (such as an enemy, the younger generation, or a person without virtues) or hold the power of executive punishment over us (such as the Moral Law and Heaven). According to a perceptual account of respect, a person has a feeling of *jingwei* 敬畏 when they perceive the power of an object as demanding their serious regard, because they perceive the power of the object as dangerous or threatening. In this sense, we have a fearful respect for nature, our enemies, traffic laws, and so on.

The feeling of *jingwei* 敬畏 refers to the same feeling of "Respekt" characterized by Feinberg (1975). For Feinberg, "respekt" is the "uneasy and watchful attitude that has the element of fear in it" (1975: 1). He says, for the feeling of "respekt", "the characteristic objects of the attitude are dangerous things; and the typical human characteristic held to be worthy of it is power" (1975: 1). As Feinberg highlights, Kant rarely speaks of "Respekt" when he uses the term "Achtung" (1975: 1). In addition, the early Confucians view the feeling of respect with a fearful element as having less moral value. Xunzi says that

> There is a *dao* of *jing*'ing the people: For the virtuous, one honors and *jings* them; for the wicked, one fears and *jings* them. For the virtuous, one gets close to them and *jings* them, for the wicked, one stays at a distance and *jings* them. The *jing* is one, the sentiment is two. (51/12/39-41)

In contrast, respect for the moral law is the respect triggered by values instead of elicited by a fear of others' power.

The second type of respect for early Confucians is respect triggered by values. It is typically translated as *zunjing* 尊敬 or *gongjing* 恭敬 in Modern Chinese. In this sense, Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi regard a variety of objects as objects of respect. The object of respect can be one's duty. Confucius said that "in serving one's lord, one should *jing* 敬 one's duties and consider one's pay of secondary importance" (Analects 15: 38). Aside from respect for one's duties, early Confucians also discuss respect for socially superior persons, such as parents (Analects 4: 18), one's master (Mencius 4B:31), a ruler (Analects 2:20), an honored person (Xunzi 96/27/ 16), an elder brother (Mencius 6A: 5), seniors (Mencius 6A:5), ancestors (Mencius 6A: 5), and spirits (Analects 6:22). Moreover, according to Xunzi, we should also show respect for a variety of inanimate objects or values such as refinement (文; 7Z; 2/1/9), the old laws (43/11/35), integrity (43/11/139), plans (55/15/5), days and hours (61/16/72), the virtue of rightness (43/11/139), the beginning (72/19/43), laws and commands (94/25/42), and roles (42/11/112).

As Sin Yee Chan indicates, despite the wide variety of objects of respect triggered by values, two elements constitute this kind of respect: "a serious consciousness" and "an appreciation of the worth of the object" (Chan 2006: 232). Respect in this sense is frequently characterized as the opposite of being sloppy (*bugou* 不苟; 45/12/19) and the opposite of being slack (*daiman* 怠慢; 55/15/54; 72/19/44). One's duties, one's ancestors, or one's plans all require respect to be taken seriously. Second, the source *of* jing 敬 is always the appreciation of the worth of the object instead of concern for one's self-interest. For instance, Mencius says that "in making friends with someone you do so because of his virtue, and you must not rely on any advantages you may possess" (Mencius 5B:3).

Respect in the sense of *zunjing* 尊敬 or *gongjing* 恭敬 is similar to Finberg's characterization of respect as "observantia." According to Feinberg,

> The newly moralized kind of respect (*observantia*) is the old animal thing (*respekt*) purged of the element of fear; but what still remains of the old attitude…is the perception of an object with something like power over us, not the old physical power merely, but a legitimatized "moral power"; not the ability to make demands backed up by force, but the ability to make claims backed up by reasons. (Feinberg 1975: 2)

In this sense, our respect for the moral law is a perception of the value of the moral law as demanding our serious regard and, at the same time, our willingness to subordinate to the demand (instead of submission to the demand out of fear of negative consequences).

A perceptual account of respect includes two interrelated elements. First, respect is essentially a perception of value. The notion of value should be understood in a general sense, which includes importance, worth, authority, status, or power. Second, the phenomenological experience of respect includes the demand for regard and a willingness to obey the demand. In this interpretation, for early Confucians, to respect X (in the sense of *gongjing* 恭敬) is to perceive the value of X as demanding serious regard and to be willingly subordinate to the demand. A person respects X when they actively endorse and submit to the value of X.

In the following section, I will apply a Confucian (perceptual) account of respect to understand Kant's claims about the nature of respect for the moral law and its role as a moral incentive.

3. Kantian Respect as a Perception of Value

3.1 A Perceptual Interpretation of Kantian Respect

In this section, I will demonstrate that by borrowing insights from the Confucian account of respect, we can better comprehend Kant's claims about respect and explore its role as a moral incentive (G 4:402).

In the Confucian account of respect, to respect X is to perceive the value of X as demanding serious regard and to be willingly subordinate to the demand. If we use this perceptual account to interpret Kantian respect, then the feeling of respect for the moral law is both a perception of the value of moral law as demanding serious regard and a willingness to be subordinate to the demand. Thus, in this interpretation, the feeling of respect for moral law necessarily involves a particular perceptual experience produced by the value of the moral law.

By this account, a feeling of respect is constitutive of a perceptual experience of value that goes beyond intellectual cognizance of the value of the object. Thus, this interpretation can avoid the problem facing the intellectualist view of respect. The feeling of respect for moral law has an affective aspect, which is a perception-like experience.

Moreover, in this perceptual interpretation of Kantian respect, there is no distinction between "recognition respect" and "appraisal respect." Both forms of respect are perceptions of value. The difference merely results from the perception of different kinds of value. In a perceptual account of respect, so-called recognition respect is the perception of the value of having a certain status, while appraisal respect is the perception of the excellence of an object. Both types of value demand our serious regard and presuppose our endorsement of their worthiness.

In addition, to characterize a feeling of respect as a perception of value does not mean characterizing the recognition of the value of moral law and a feeling of respect as occurring in a temporal causal sequence (as indicated by the affectivist view of respect). In the *Groundwork*, Kant states that

> an action from duty is to put aside entirely the influence of inclination and with it every object of the will; hence there is left for the will nothing that could determine it except objectively the law and subjectively pure respect for this practical law. (G 4:401)

He repeats the same point in the *Critique of Practical Reason*: "The concept of duty, therefore, requires of the action objective accord with the law but requires of the maxim of the action subjective respect for the law, as the sole way of determining the will by the law" (KpV 5:81). The challenge the affectivist view of respect faces is that Kant also claims that "the objective determining ground must at the same time be the exclusive and subjectively sufficient determining ground of action" (KpV 5:72). In other words, "immediate determination of the will by means of the law and consciousness of this is called respect" (G 4:402). The affectivist view of respect fails to account for the simultaneity of the objective determination of the will by moral law and the subjective respect for the law.

However, according to a perceptual account of respect, respect is a perception of value and a resulting phenomenological experience of the bindingness of moral law. In this account, the objective determination of the will by the moral law occurs at the same time as the subjective determination of choice through a feeling of respect.

A perceptual view of respect can also account for what Kant means by characterizing respect for moral law as an *a priori* intellectual feeling. In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant suggests that "respect for the moral law is a feeling that is produced by an intellectual ground, and this feeling is the only one that we can cognize completely *a priori* and the necessity of which we can have insight into" (KpV 5:73). In Kant's terminology, *a priori* means "independent of all experience and even of all impressions of the senses" (KrV B2). In the perceptual view of respect, what Kant means by an *a priori* feeling is that human beings have an *a priori* predisposition to perceive the authority of moral law through a feeling of respect. For example, if I am considering following the maxim that whenever I need money, I will make a false promise to another person to persuade them to lend me money, no matter how strong my desire is, I can immediately perceive

the bindingness of the moral law from within, through a feeling of respect for the moral law. Even if I eventually still act on the maxim, the perception of the authority of the moral law and a feeling of bindingness still exist in the background of my moral consciousness. In this sense, Kant says that "respect is a tribute that we cannot refuse to pay to merit, whether we want or not; we may indeed withhold it outwardly we still cannot help feeling it inwardly" (KpV 5:77).[32] A perception of the value of moral law and its resulting phenomenological experience of bindingness and willing subordination are *a priori* in the sense that it exists in advance of anyone's particular psychological constitution. In this sense, Kant states that

> what we shall have to show a priori is, therefore, not the ground from which the moral law in itself supplies an incentive but rather what it effects (or, to put it better, must effect) in the mind insofar as it is an incentive. (KpV 5:73)

According to Kant, we can never know why "respect for the law is morality itself regarded subjectively as an incentive" (KpV 5:76). Instead,

> how a law can be of itself and immediately a determining ground of will (though this is what is essential in all morality) is for human reason an insoluble problem and identical with that of how a free will is possible. (KpV 5:72)

In Kant's view, the answer to this question is beyond the boundary of reason (KrV A541/B565). However, we can only access the relationship between respect for the moral law and the authority of moral law in practice. Kant claims that the feeling of respect for the moral law is "practically

[32] Some might argue that there exist people who fail to have respect for the moral law, such as a psychopath. If different people perceive the value of the moral law differently, this interpretation inevitably falls into moral relativism. Kant acknowledges that there exist people who might fail to have respect for the moral law. In Kant's view, people who lack the feeling of respect for the moral law and other moral feelings will become "morally dead". Kant says, "No human being is entirely without moral feeling, for were he completely lacking in receptivity to it he would be morally dead; and if (to speak in medical terms) the moral vital force could no longer excite this feeling, then humanity would dissolve into mere animality and be mixed irretrievably with the mass of other natural beings" (6:400). However, even if different people might perceive the value of the moral law differently, this account does not fall into moral relativism. That is because for Kant the objective ground for morality is the value of the moral law itself instead of the feeling of respect. The feeling of respect as an *a priori* intellectual feeling is the subjective "window" to perceive the authority of moral law but is not the objective ground for the moral law and does not determine the value of the moral law. Thus, a perceptual account of emotion allows us to say that failing to perceive the value of the moral law is a moral deficiency.

effected" (KpV 5:76). More specifically, by taking a practical perspective, "what I cognize immediately as a law for me I cognize with respect, which signifies merely consciousness of the subordination of my will to a law without the mediation of other influences on my sense" (G 4:401). Thus, from a practical perceptive, a feeling of respect is a way that we experience the consciousness of moral law as a direct determination of the will.

Moreover, a perceptual view of respect can help us better understand what is for Kant the nature of respect as an intellectual feeling. Kant holds that

> respect is a feeling, it is not one received by influence; it is, instead, a feeling self-wrought by means of a rational concept and therefore specifically different from all feelings of the first kind, which can be reduced to inclination or fear. (G 4:402)

According to a perceptual view of respect, respect for the moral law is a perception of the authority of the moral law as demanding serious regard. This interpretation fits well with Kant's claim that "respect is properly the representation of a worth that infringes upon my self-love" (G 4:402, footnote). Since the perception of value is grounded on the authority of the moral law itself instead of being influenced by an external object, respect for the moral law is an intellectual feeling.

3.2 The First Role of Respect as a Moral Incentive

If we adopt the above interpretation that takes Kantian respect as a perception of the moral authority, we can see why Kant believes that respect for the moral law as the subjective ground of choice can promote our receptiveness to the command of moral law.

In a perceptual interpretation of Kantian respect, respect is a perception of the authority of the moral law. A perceptual experience can promote our susceptibility to the command of the moral law by enabling human beings to phenomenally experience the bindingness of the moral law.[33]

[33] It is to be noted that, in a perceptual interpretation of Kantian respect, the feeling of respect does not determine the value of the moral law but rather serves as the subjective ground for human beings to phenomenally experience the bindingness of the moral law. In other words, it is not the case that only through the feelings of respect can the moral

For rational animals, there is a gap between "recognizing something as a reason" and "the receptiveness of such a consideration." Thomas Scanlon offers one example. Suppose I always recognize the dangers of driving while intoxicated, and such a consideration provides me a strong reason not to drink before driving. However, my response or the effect of this consideration on my subsequent actions may be different before and after I see an accident caused by a drunk driver. (Scanlon 1998: 34). In Scanlon's view, the thing that leads to a change of motivational effect is the degree to which my conviction regarding the badness of drunk driving is vividly in mind at the time of action (Scanlon 1998: 34). That is, with the same beliefs and pathological desires, a change in one's phenomenal experience of the belief can lead to a change in one's receptiveness to it. Thus, a perceptual experience that is integral to a feeling of respect promotes receptiveness to the command of the moral law. A person who can not only recognize the authority of moral law but also perceive it as demanding serious regard has a higher receptiveness to the command of moral law.

Without a feeling of respect, the moral law's command is alienated from the agent on a subjective level, for example, an external command emanating from outside rather than from within agents themselves. In contrast, a feeling of respect, as an intelligent moral feeling, combines the sensible and rational parts of the human being into a whole. It has a pure rational grounding and enables human beings to phenomenally experience the bindingness of the moral law. In this way, a feeling of respect enables one to perceive that moral abidingness stems from our rational capacity itself and makes one more likely to adopt the maxim formed in accord with the categorical imperative. It phenomenally demonstrates that the moral law is not a principle existing

law be confirmed as valuable. The moral law has objective value by itself but through a feeling of respect, a person tends to have a higher receptiveness to the command of the moral law.

independently of our will, but rather one embodied in the heart of human beings as a predisposition to the good.

4. From a Feeling of Respect to a Respectful State of Mind

As argued above, a perceptual interpretation of Kantian respect can help us better understand the nature of respect as an intentional feeling and its role in promoting our receptiveness to the command of the moral law. However, merely considering respect as an intentional feeling cannot help us comprehend how an episodic feeling can directly lessen our pathologically affected predispositions.

First, a feeling of respect for the moral law is an episode of feeling that lasts a short time, while a disposition of action is a manifestation of character. It seems more natural to imagine that one disposition of action lessens another disposition of action than that a feeling lessens a disposition of the action.

Second, under the influence of the disposition of self-love and self-conceit, it is challenging for us to perceive the authority of the moral law, and we hence have more difficulties feeling respect for the moral law. Thus, how can a feeling of respect lessen our pathologically influenced disposition of action when these dispositions themselves impede us from feeling respect for the moral law?

To answer this question, we can borrow insights from the early Confucians' discussion of the distinction between respect as an intentional feeling and respectfulness as a state of mind.

4.1 A Respectful State of Mind in the Confucian Picture

Chan identifies that, in early Confucian texts, the notion of *jing* 敬 refers not only to an intentional feeling but also more frequently to a frame of mind of being serious (Chan 2006: 230). For instance, Confucius says that a virtuous person "cultivates himself and thereby achieves *jing*

敬 (respectfulness)" (Analects 14: 42). Confucius also suggests that there are nine things a gentleman should turn his thought to. One is to "be *jing* 敬 when he performs his duties" (Analects 16:10). Confucius also suggests that "a gentleman is respectful and free of errors. He is reverent and ritually proper in his dealings with others. In this way, everyone within the Four Seas is his brother" (Analects 12:5). In these passages, *jing* 敬 is a state of mind that can be cultivated, achieved, and inhabited when one performs one's duties.

According to Chan, there is a distinction between respect as an intentional feeling and as a frame of mind—they are two modes of consciousness (Chan 2006: 230). On the one hand, "an intentional state is directed at specific objects and the descriptions under which the objects are viewed as essential to the identification of the mental state" (230). In this sense, either my respect for the moral law or my respect for a great philosopher is an intentional feeling, which is produced by the perceived value of different objects.

On the other hand,

> [A] frame of mind need not be directed at a specific object. It is a general condition of the mind where a pervasive attitude dominates. And when a person is in a certain frame of mind, the mind tends to project the dominant attitude toward any object it encounters and to tone other psychological states such as perceptions and judgments. (Chan 2006: 230)

For instance, when the feeling of anxiety about one's job (as an intentional feeling) dominates one's consciousness, it results in an anxious frame of mind. Having an anxious state of mind, one seems to be nervous about everything and tends to judge the things they encounter as worrisome. In Chan's view, despite the fluidity between the change of the two modes of consciousness, "a frame of mind is more related to the character of a person if it has lasting duration, while an intentional state pertains more directly to a person's behavior" (230).

Similarly, Pengbo Liu (2019) characterizes the distinction between the Kantian notion of "respect for X" and the Confucian notion of *jing* 敬 as a state of mind as the distinction between the "outside-in" model of respect and the "inside-out" model of respect. In Liu's view, Kantian respect for people is an outside-in model of respect, where

> respect for an object is, first and foremost, a response to certain properties inherent in that object. It is in virtue of such properties that an entity acquires a special kind of value, status, or authority to which proper respect is due. This outside-in mode of respect is an intentional feeling. (Liu 2019: 47)

Following Chan, Liu notes that the Confucian *jing* 敬 as a state of mind is an inside-out model of respect. Liu suggests that

> respect, as a morally appropriate or even sometimes required attitude, is not generated or demanded by the respect-worthy properties of external objects, but as an expression of the appropriate way of positioning the self in relation to others. In other words, respect is a manifestation of a general attitude or disposition that pertains to one's way of interacting with the world at large. (Liu 2019: 48)

Chan's and Liu's characterization of *jing* 敬 as a frame of mind and as a manifestation of a general attitude or disposition, respectively, share the same feature: recognizing *jing* 敬 as a manifestation of an agent's character rather than a response to the respect-worthiness of an object. However, it is unclear whether we should understand respectfulness as a frame of mind or as a manifestation of an attitude.

I suggest that the state of mind of being respectful comprises two components. The first component is a particular phenomenological experience, which Matthew Ratcliffe calls an "existential feeling." According to Ratcliffe, existential feelings constitute "a sense of finding oneself in the world, which determines the shape of all experience and thought" (Ratcliffe 2013: 600). Regarding the feeling of hope, for example, Ratcliffe distinguishes between "I hope that p" as an intentional state and "being hopeful as a pre-intentional orientation or existential feeling."

He argues that it is possible to lose all intentional states of hope and yet retain the pre-intentional orientation of feeling hopeful. Having the existential feeling of being hopeful, a person experiences their way of being in the world as encouraging and promising (Milona and Stockdale 2018). Similarly, the Confucian account of respect also makes a distinction between "I respect X" and "the state of mind of being respectful." The feeling of respect for the moral law is an intentional feeling, while the existential feeling of being respectful is a state of mind, which includes how we find ourselves in the moral world.

Now the question is as follows: what does a respectful state of mind consist of phenomenologically? To respect X, two preconditions are required. First, one must be aware of one's limitations and the difficulty of obtaining a particular value. Taking a value seriously is grounded in the awareness that this particular value is challenging to obtain because of limitations to one's capacities. We respect the moral law with the awareness that it is difficult to always follow it due to our animal nature. We respect a person with certain moral virtues because we are aware that moral virtues are difficult to obtain due to the limitations of our characters. We respect an enemy because we are aware that the formidable power the enemy holds is hard to obtain in our current situations. Thus, the experience of humility and modesty is integral to a feeling of respect.

Moreover, as mentioned earlier, respect (triggered by value instead of power) requires one's endorsement of the value of the object. Even if a person realizes that their enemy has formidable power that is challenging to obtain, the person might *jingwei* 敬畏 (fearfully respect) their enemy without any respect triggered by value. Only if a person endorsed the value in their enemy would they be able to respect their enemy in the moral sense. Similarly, a person can constrain their behavior according to traffic laws because of the fear of punishment but have no respect for the laws if they do not endorse the value of following them.

The two preconditions for having a feeling of respect reveal to us that, to remain in a respectful state of mind, a person must find themself in both a humble position in the world (with the awareness that there exist values beyond one's self-interest) and an elevated position by being willingly subordinated to the command of value beyond self-interest.

According to Xunzi, cultivating a state of being respectful entails sensibly experiencing one's place in the world. He suggests that the practice of funeral rites is a way to cultivate a respectful state of mind. He says that the standard practice of funeral rites requires that "one moves the corpse gradually further away, and over a long time one gradually returns to one's regular routine" (Xunzi, trans. Hutton, 209), adding that "the reason that one moves the corpse gradually further away is to pursue respectfulness" (Xunzi, trans. Hutton 209). He suggests,

> If one does not ornament the dead, then one will come to feel disgusted at them, and if one feels disgusted, then one will not feel sad. If one keeps them close, then one will become casual with them, and if one becomes casual with them, then one will grow tired of them. If one grows tired of them, then one will forget one's place, and if one forgets one's place, then one will not be respectful. (Xunzi, trans. Hutton, 209)

In this passage, Xunzi argues that the purpose of funeral rites is to pursue a state of being respectful. Treating the dead respectfully reminds us of our "place" in relation to life and death. The respect shown for the dead reminds us of the value of the life we possess and our limitations in the face of death. As a result, a person cultivates a respectful state of mind through the humble realization that one cannot change the fate of death, along with an elevated realization that they are a living person.

The second component of the state of mind of being respectful is a disposition to feel respect for others in concrete situations. As Ratcliffe notes, our existential feelings determine the shape and structure of other feelings. For instance, a person with a hopeful existential feeling is more disposed to feel hope for a particular outcome, such as the hope of finding a rewarding job or a loving partner. In sum, being respectful is different from the feeling of respect since it is not an

intentional feeling that relates to an object. As an existential feeling, being respectful is a state of mind that is composed of a humble and elevated phenomenological experience and a firm disposition to show respect for others in concrete situations.

4.2 The Second Role of Respect as a Moral Incentive

A person can do better or worse in terms of showing respect for others in difficult moral contexts. For instance, it is difficult to respectfully listen to others' opinions in the context of disagreement (Barry 2020). Additionally, it is difficult to respectfully love a friend when the desire to promote their well-being runs counter to the demand to respect a boundary in a close relationship.

Kant holds that two major obstacles can intervene in the process of generating a feeling of respect. The first is the propensity for self-conceit, and the second is the propensity for self-love. Kant considers both self-love and self-conceit as propensities of choice that all human beings possess:

> This propensity to make oneself as having subjective determining grounds of choice into the objective determining ground of the will in general can be called self-love; and if self-love makes itself lawgiving and the unconditional practical principle, it can be called self-conceit. (KpV 5:74)

To live under the domination of self-conceit and self-love is to live under the domination of the propensity for the "pathologically determinable self" (KpV 5:74), which makes it hard for us to respect others in concrete moral contexts.

First, self-conceit can make us unable to perceive our limitations in terms of the capacity to evaluate various values. For instance, confirmation bias is an obstacle to respectfully listening to others' opinions in the context of disagreement. Confirmation bias is the tendency to interpret new evidence as confirmation of one's existing beliefs. The existence of confirmation bias makes it

difficult to perceive the epistemic value in others' reasoning. As a result, it is hard to respectfully listen to and address an opinion that is drastically different from one's own beliefs.

Second, it is challenging to take moral command seriously when a person is actively pursuing other values. The disposition of self-love makes us more likely to prioritize our self-interest when making choices. For instance, when our minds are dominated by the pursuit of economic benefits, we are less likely to perceive the value of the natural world as demanding serious concern.

However, a respectful state of mind can engage directly with the pathological propensities of human beings. Remaining in a respectful state of mind, a person finds themself in both a humble position in the world (with the awareness that there exist values beyond one's self-interest) and an elevated position through their willing subordination to the command of value beyond self-interest. With this state of mind, a person is more likely to resist the influence of the disposition of self-conceit and self-love and takes a serious and attentive attitude toward exploring the value of an encountered object.

Introducing a respectful state of mind into the Kantian picture is consistent with the spirit of Kantian respect. According to Kant, when we contemplate the authority of moral law, we feel a humiliation, which "takes place only relative to the purity of the law" and accordingly causes "the lowering of pretensions to moral self-esteem," while, at the same time, we also have "an elevation of the moral esteem" and accordingly have "a feeling that is positive in its intellectual cause" (KpV 5:79-80). The moral law consequently

> lets us discover the sublimity of our own supersensible existence and subjectively effects respect for their higher vocation in human beings, who are at the same time conscious of their sensible existence and of the dependence, connected with it, on their pathologically affected nature. (KpV 5:89).

In the following passage, Kant suggests that the contemplation of the authority of moral law can lead us to find our "supersensible existence" and "sensible existence" in the moral world and thus reveal our position in the moral world. He writes,

> Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more often and more steadily one reflects on them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me. The first begins from the place I occupy in the external world of sense…. The second begins from my invisible self, my personality, and presents me in a world which has true infinity but which can be discovered only by the understanding, and I cognize that my connection with that world (and thereby with all those visible worlds as well) is not merely contingent, as in the first case, but universal and necessary. (KpV 5:162)

These passages indicate that contemplation of the moral law aims to allow human beings to directly experience their position in the world as both humble and elevated, which is exactly the phenomenological content of having a respectful state of mind. If Kant implicitly acknowledges the value of having a respectful state of mind (in Confucian terminology), then we can easily consider the second role of respect as a moral incentive; that is, respectfulness as a state of mind can suppress and interact with the pathologically affected propensities of choice by infringing upon self-love and humiliating self-conceit. Respect as a state of mind directly "speaks" to and interacts with the "pathologically determinable self" whenever one is about to form a maxim of action.

4.3 The Cultivation of Respectfulness

Both the early Confucians and Kant note that the cultivation of a respectful state of mind must be achieved through practice.

For the early Confucians, the practice of *li* 禮 is the way to cultivate respectfulness. Mencius suggests that "the man who has ren 仁 loves others, and the man who has li 礼 jings 敬 others" (Mencius 4B: 28). Xunzi also suggests that,

> [ritual] cuts off what is too long and extends what is too short. It subtracts from what is excessive and adds to what is insufficient. It achieves proper form for love and respect, and it brings to perfection the beauty of carrying out *yi* 義. (Xunzi, trans Hutton, 209)

According to Kant, the human being should cultivate virtue (as moral strength), and "the way to acquire it is to enhance the moral incentive (the thought of the law), both by contemplating the dignity of the pure rational law in us (*contemplatione*) and by practicing virtue (*exercition*)" (6:398).

To cultivate a respectful state of mind, one must do so in concrete moral practice. For Confucians, by following patterned ritual practices, we can directly experience a humble and elevated position in the world through the way we treat our parents, the way we treat the dead, and even the way we express greetings. For Kant, by practicing virtue, one can directly experience the conflict between the sensible self and the rational self and, correspondingly, directly experience both the limitations of being a rational animal and the honor of being able to transcend the pathologically determined self through subordination to moral command.

Moreover, in the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant states that the feeling of the "dynamic sublime" (CJ 5: 261) can be considered the sensible representation of morality. He suggests, on the one hand, that a feeling of the dynamic sublime reveals our "physical incapacity" to withstand the power of nature (CJ 5: 261). In the face of fearful and threatening seas and mountains, human beings experience limitations to their power and thus develop a humble attitude through a feeling of the sublime. On the other hand, Kant says, towering mountains and stormy seas, "elevate the strength of the soul above its usual mean and discover within us a faculty of resistance of quite another kind from that which may be assailed and endangered by external nature" (CJ 5: 261-261). That is, through a feeling of the sublime, human beings can experience the sublimity of their own vacation over nature (CJ 5: 261). Thus, aesthetic experience is also a way of cultivating a respectful

state of mind, since it allows us to directly experience the elevated force of our capacity for autonomy and our humble position in the world.

Now that we have discussed the two modes of respect, we have a complete picture of the role that respect plays as a moral incentive. In the first stage, we perceive the authority of the moral law and are willing to subordinate ourselves to its command via an intentional feeling of respect for the moral law. Then, in the second stage, through ritual practice, the practice of virtue, and aesthetic experience, we develop a sense of our place in the world (being both humble and elevated). In the third stage, we gradually cultivate a respectful state of mind, which constitutes our character. Finally, in the fourth stage, under the influence of a respectful state of mind, we can better respect individuals in difficult moral contexts because we have a humble and serious attitude toward discovering the unique value of others.

Respect for the moral law → Virtue, ritual practices, and aesthetic feelings

→ Respectful state of mind→ Respect for individuals

With this picture, we can better understand the Kantian suggestion of how to respectfully listen to others' opinions in the context of disagreement. According to Kant, we have

> a duty to respect a human being even in the logical use of his reason, a duty not to censure his errors by calling them absurdities, poor judgment, and so forth, but rather to suppose that his judgment must yet contain some truth and to seek this out, uncovering, at the same time, the deceptive illusion (the subjective ground that determined his judgment which, by an oversight, he took for objective), and so, by explaining to him the possibility of his having erred, to preserve his respect for his own understanding. (6: 464)

This passage suggests that to respect individuals with errors in their judgment, we must approach them with a respectful state of mind. This respectful state of mind reminds us that we occupy an equal place in the world, and we should thus not treat others with complete contempt. Moreover,

we must take a humble and serious attitude toward discovering the unique value of others by first "seeking out" the truth in others' arguments. Finally, the respectful state of mind also orients us toward seeking the truth and addressing errors in reasoning in a respectful way. In sum, Kantian respect for persons can be transferred to respect for individuals with the bridge of a respectful state of mind.

5. Conclusion

In this paper, I first argued that merely focusing on the affective or intellectual aspect of respect cannot fully capture the nature of respect as an *a priori* intellectual feeling in the Kantian picture. Moreover, a limited understanding of the nature of respect hinders our understanding of the role that respect for the moral law plays as a moral incentive.

By borrowing insight from the Confucian perspective, I demonstrated that a perceptual account of respect fits well with Kant's characterization of respect as "the representation of a worth that infringes upon my self-love" (4:402, footnote). In this interpretation, to have respect for the moral law is to perceive the authority of the moral law as demanding our serious regard and to be willingly subordinated to this demand.

On these grounds, I argued that placing the perception of value at the center of Kantian respect for the moral law can help us better explain the first role that respect for the moral law plays as a moral incentive. That is, respect for the moral law as the subjective ground of this choice can promote our receptiveness to the command of moral law. Respect for the moral law can promote receptiveness to moral command because it enables human beings to phenomenally experience the bindingness of the moral law through a perceptual experience.

Further, I argued that the Confucian account of respect not only considers respect as an intentional feeling but also emphasizes the value of having a respectful state of mind. This state of

mind concerns how we find ourselves in the moral world. In a respectful state of mind, a person finds themself in a humble position in the world (with the awareness that there exist values beyond self-interest) as well as in an elevated position, by being willingly subordinated to the command of value beyond self-interest.

By introducing respectfulness as a state of mind into the Kantian picture, I aimed to demonstrate that in various places, Kant implicitly adopts and discusses the value of having a respectful state of mind. For Kant, the value of this state of mind is in reducing the propensity for self-love and self-conceit, which is also the second role that respect for the moral law plays as a moral incentive.

In summary, it is an incomplete understanding to characterize Kantian respect for the moral law as mere cognition or a feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Kantian respect for the moral law is essentially a perception of the authority of the moral law, its corresponding phenomenological experience of the bindingness of the moral law, and our subordination to this bindingness. It is through this unique perceptual experience that we become subjectively more susceptible to the influence of the moral law.

Finally, Kantian respect for the moral law includes the aspect of cultivating a respectful state of mind. By contemplating the moral law and practicing virtue, a person repeatedly confirms and experiences their place in the moral world as both humble and elevated. A respectful state of mind helps us reduce the influence of the pathologically determined self and paves the way for respecting individuals in difficult contexts.

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Conclusion

My dissertation aims to integrate insights from early Chinese philosophy with Western thought in a constructive dialogue, enriching our philosophical understanding of two significant questions: What is the moral value of the feelings of respect and shame? And what are the necessary constituents of a well-lived life? To address these questions, I compare the predominant Western accounts of respect, shame, and well-being with those found in the Confucian and Daoist traditions. By examining both perspectives, I demonstrate that a mutual understanding of these topics can yield a more comprehensive picture of moral emotions and well-being. In this conclusion, I will summarize the main conclusions and point to related future projects and work that has grown from the dissertation.

In Chapter two, I developed a theory of well-being inspired by Zhuangzi, which emphasizes the importance of the quality of the process of life. I explored what Zhuangzi considers to be a good process of living a good life, the value of having a good process, and how our attitudes towards the goal affect the cultivation of a good process. By addressing these three questions, I aim to demonstrate that a Zhuangzi-inspired theory of well-being provides valuable insights into the cultivation of a good process of life. Additionally, I argue that having an attached attitude towards goods negatively impacts the cultivation of a good process. To avoid this negative influence, a Zhuangzi-inspired theory of well-being suggests that we view well-being as an ever-changing process and approach our goals from a heavenly perspective.

In my related research, I apply the notion of the process of living a good life to the study of children's well-being. I argue that a good process that enables a child to become their true self cannot be reduced to the number of achievements they have attained during childhood. By focusing on the dispositional aspect of well-being, we can better understand what is beneficial for a child.

Furthermore, viewing well-being from a dynamic perspective offers a fresh outlook on differentiating between synchronic and diachronic goods and discussing the transition between instrumental and intrinsic goods. Thus, exploring what constitutes a good process of living a good life can contribute to a holistic understanding of well-being. In my related research, I use the dynamic perspective to analyze the significance of the shape of a life hypothesis and examining how momentary well-being and lifetime well-being are connected.

In Chapter three, I argued that analyzing the essential features of shame dispositions before studying the moral value of shame feelings can help us avoid underestimating the moral value of shame dispositions. Moreover, studying the necessary components of shame dispositions can shed light on an often overlooked component of shame feelings: the feeling of alarm. By considering this component, we can better explain the richness of shame experiences.

The Confucian perspective on the value of shame disposition allows us to understand how the social environment influences the healthy development of the disposition to feel shame. Based on this discussion, in a related paper, I examine how rethinking the necessary conditions for cultivating a healthy shame disposition reveals that marginalized groups face affective injustice concerning their "enduring shame experiences." The enduring shame experience, in which people feel that their way of being in the world is shameful, has unique phenomenological features. It differs from shame episodes or dispositions to feel shame and can occur without an awareness of standards or failures. Focusing on the disposition to feel shame (rather than the feeling itself) can reveal that the negative impact of experiencing enduring shame goes beyond the pain of the feeling. Enduring shame indicates dysfunction of the shame disposition resulting from living under oppression. The different phenomenology of shame experiences reveals an unfair distribution of benefits and burdens associated with shame disposition among different groups of people.

In Chapter four, I argue that the Western philosophical tradition tends to explore the nature of respect based on the object of respect, while the classical Confucian notion of *jing* (敬) emphasizes the value of having a respectful state of mind. While Sin Yen Chan (2006) and Liu (2019) have previously discussed the distinction between Western and Eastern views of respect, I aim to demonstrate that by borrowing insights from each side, we will gain a deeper understanding of the nature of respect and what it requires in terms of proper treatment of other individuals.

In future work, I plan to demonstrate how treating respectfulness as a virtue instead of an episodic feeling offers practical guidance on how to communicate respectfully on the internet or in other public circumstances when encountering differing opinions. Borrowing insights from Kant and early Confucians, I will provide an account of what respectful listening entails in modern society.

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