Explaining the Puzzle of Weak Parties with Strong Legislative Leaders in Brazil: Towards a Theory of Clientelistic Party Discipline

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Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation, to my family, to my mentor, Marcus André Melo, and to Hannah, Claudia, and Femi, for their enduring support.

Abstract

Brazil has long been marked by a puzzle of contradicting institutional incentives, while the electoral arena promotes candidate-centered campaigns and personalism, the legislative arena promotes centralization of power in the hands of party leaders. These contradicting incentives have generated disagreements regarding the ability of legislative leaders to promote party discipline in Brazil. I argue that scholars have overlooked how clientelism and corruption can generate party discipline, by modifying legislators' goals and career opportunities. Clientelism makes position taking less salient which in turn decreases the incentives to buck the party whip. Additionally, vote buying enhances the role of brokers in credit claiming activities, weakening committees, and increasing leadership power. Finally, corruption provides incentives for secrecy and concentration of power, which also facilitates party discipline. Indeed, I find empirical evidence of party discipline in a boss dominated clientelistic party in Brazil. Importantly, I show how party discipline is observationally equivalent in cohesive mass-parties, as well as in boss dominated machines, making plain the importance of my theory to distinguish these different causal mechanisms. My theory can generalize and reveals the scope conditions of conventional theories of legislative behavior. This study opens new avenues for research regarding the interplay of machine politics and institutions, that will advance our general understanding of both party discipline and clientelism.

Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Chapter 1: Introduction

The motivating puzzle: weak parties with strong legislative leaders in Brazil

Brazil is a puzzle for scholars of legislative politics regarding the ability of legislative leaders to promote party discipline[1] (Amorim Neto, 2002). Party discipline refers to the act of promoting party unity using sanctions, positive or negative, or the threat thereof (see Krehbiel, 1993; McCarty et al., 2001; Andeweg & Thomassen, 2010). Most scholars of comparative politics contend that party discipline in explained by formal institutions. In their view, while party-centered rules promote discipline, candidate-centered rules do not.

On the one hand, in Argentina's closed-list proportional representation (PR) system, voters choose candidates from party lists, but party leaders choose the order in which candidates will be placed on that list, which determines their electoral fate. Under such rules candidates would run as teams, worrying about the party's collective reputation among voters (Jones, 2002). Individual legislators have no choice but to toe the party line, lest they be placed last on the party list come election time. Such a party-centered system would generate party discipline, according to this view.

[1] There is some terminological confusion regarding that concept that I must address. Party unity, the degree to which party members follow their leaders in roll call votes, is distinct from party discipline (Carey, 2008; Depauw & Martin, 2008; Bowler, Farrell & Katz, 1999; Andeweg & Thomassen, 2010). Party unity may be a result of party discipline but may also a product of ideological cohesion, unrewarded loyalty and division of labor (Andeweg & Thomassen, 2010). Party discipline refers to the act of promoting party unity using sanctions, positive or negative, or the threat thereof. Party discipline means that leaders *act* to achieve unity in roll call votes (Pearson, 2015) through the distribution of "sticks and carrots." Cohesion is distinct from discipline in that it usually conveys homogeneity of preferences, and a more cohesive party is likely to be more united independent of party discipline (Krehbiel, 1993). Finally, party influence (Smith, 2007) is a more general term that conveys all forms of leadership power, both positive and negative, direct or indirect.

On the other hand, scholars believe that Brazil's candidate-centered electoral system weakens the ability of leaders to enforce discipline, promoting personalism[2] (Mainwaring, 1999; Ames 2002a, 2002b). To them, parties in such systems are generally poorly organized in elections and not very important to legislators' careers (Samuels, 2003), and, therefore, leaders have little leverage over backbenchers. In Brazil's open-list PR system each deputy is elected based on their individual votes and as such they tend to organize their own campaigns. Such a system is purported to generate intra-party competition, as legislative candidates will seek to distinguish themselves from co-partisan candidates (Shugart & Carey, 1992; Carey & Shugart, 1995). That tendency dampens preference homogeneity and polarization within parties, further decreasing the ability of leaders to promote party discipline, by denying them a strong policy mandate.

Legislators in such systems are predicted to structure delegation by empowering committees and weakening leaders, what Aldrich (1995) calls the "committee-centered bargaining" intralegislative arrangement, designed to preserve individual policy independence. Under such conditions, party leaders will have little leverage over backbenchers, who are more concerned with pleasing their constituents through constituency service, "pork barrel" and position taking. In sum, according to this view, the Brazilian electoral arena generates parties that are weakly organized, decentralized, inchoate and personalistic, and as such, these parties would be unable to promote party discipline in the Chamber of Deputies.

[2] Personalism or the personal vote is defined as "the effect of a candidate's attributes and actions on his or her electoral success, net of aggregate partisan trends that affect partisans as members of their parties" (Allen, 2015, p. 74; see also Cain et al., 1987; Kitschelt, 2000).

Despite the prestige of that argument, many scholars have taken issue with this conventional wisdom (See for example Meneguello, 1998; Lyne, 1999, 2008a; Pereira & Mueller, 2000; 2003; Cheibub & Sin, 2020; Cheibub & Nalepa, 2020). Scholars in this "revisionist" camp focus instead on the incentives generated by the internal rules of Congress (Bowler, 2000). In the case of Brazil, Figueiredo and Limongi (1999) famously argued that the individualizing incentives of the electoral arena "stop at Congress' doorstep," and that, once in office, legislators face an environment in which party leaders concentrate enormous power. Confronted with such "tyrannical" leadership, backbenchers would have little choice but to submit to their will, according to this view. In sum, revisionist scholars contend that legislative leaders can promote party discipline because internal rules of the Chamber of Deputies make them powerful.

For more than two decades the Brazilian case has been characterized by this debate about contradicting institutional incentives (see Pereira & Mueller, 2003; Amorim Neto, 2002; Samuels & Desposato, 2008; Lyne, 2008a; Hagopian et al., 2009). The only lasting agreement is precisely this contradiction, and the puzzle it poses to conventional theories of party leadership, especially regarding party discipline.

I argue that in order to start solving this puzzle we must understand the role of clientelism and corruption in political parties. I argue that in a clientelistic machine dominated by a boss party discipline is possible, even in a candidate-centered system. While such a claim may seem obvious to some, it actually upends decades of consensus in comparative politics, both about the institutional determinants of party discipline, on the one hand, and the role of clientelism in political parties, on the other.

Most legislative scholars conflate clientelism with personalism, and therefore, see clientelism as generating the same individualizing effects on parties as personalism does, leading to weak legislative leaders unable to promote party discipline. However, I show that personalism and clientelism are analytically distinct, and that clientelism can lead to extremely centralized party organization. I argue that conventional theories, and the distinction between candidate-centered and party-centered elections, fail to explain clientelistic parties because they are built on the assumption that policy matters to voters. However, when clientelism is the pervasive such assumption is null and void.

I argue that clientelism alters goals and career incentives generating different trade-offs regarding the incentives to follow the party in roll call votes. My theory contends that when vote buying is pervasive, position taking ceases to be salient, making toeing the party line less costly. Moreover, clientelism makes "credit claiming" mediated by brokers, which decreases the need to insulate committees for that function, in turn strengthening party leaders. Finally, clientelism requires high levels of corruption, which provides unique incentives for hierarchy and secrecy, further centralizing power within the party. The key variable that explains the likelihood of *clientelistic* party disciple is the degree to which one faction or boss can dominate the party organization of a clientelistic machine, combined with access to resources. This leads us to my main hypothesis (**H1**), the **clientelistic party discipline hypothesis***: we should find evidence of discipline if a faction or boss dominates a clientelistic party at the national level*.

This dissertation seeks to advance this debate by conducting one of the most an extensive empirical analysis of party discipline in Brazil to date, covering the period from 1995 to 2018. I will also move forward this discussion by investigating different causal

mechanisms, examining four possible "carrots" leaders may use to promote discipline: committee assignments, rapporteur assignments, earmarks, and party-controlled campaign contributions. I have also made use of a variety of quantitative data to understand and classify Brazil's political parties, including surveys of legislators, electoral data, and randomized corruption audits. To complement such analysis, I conducted more than thirty-six interviews with federal deputies and their staff, to gain an insider's perspective into party politics. I have also researched the malfeasance scandals of all deputies that served during the period, consulting several hundreds of newspaper articles and court documents, cataloging more than five hundred of them. Taken together all this constitutes one of the most complete analysis of party discipline in Brazil to date.

Indeed, I do find evidence of discipline in a party that closely conforms to the ideal type of a "boss dominated clientelistic machine," the *Partido da República* (PR). Specifically, legislators who voted with the party more often tend to receive more party-controlled campaign money, and those results were substantive and robust. While the PR may be an exception to the rule, since most parties in Brazil show no evidence of party discipline, it clearly demonstrates the dangers of ignoring the effects of clientelism in political parties. This is true because I have also found evidence of party discipline in a party that conforms to the mass-bureaucratic ideal type, the Worker's Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores* – PT). In other words, party discipline is "observationally equivalent" in the PT and in the PR, but those parties could not be more distinct. While the PT is seen as ideologically cohesive, with a strong organization and a large following in the electorate (Samuels, 1999), the PR has none of those traits and is classified variously as a "party for rent," catch-all, clientelistic and personalistic. Therefore, we need good theory to parse out

observationally equivalent behavior in such disparate parties. That task is even more important because, as we shall see in the following, the relationship between clientelism, legislative behavior and institutions is riddled with confusion.

Clientelism, party discipline and institutions

The claim that party discipline may be a product of clientelism is not entirely new. For example, Kitschelt (2000) noted that, "roll call discipline may result even from clientelistic linkage building. Legislators are indifferent to policy programs and do as they are told by the party leadership as long as the resources needed to feed their clientelist networks keep flowing" (p. 870). Unfortunately, a theory of clientelistic discipline remains underdeveloped because scholars believe that clientelism leads to party discipline *if and only if* the electoral rule is party-centered, such as in Argentina, where party leaders possess *formal* powers in the electoral arena (Lyne, 2008a; Desposato, 2007). For example, according to Lyne (2008a), *only* when parties are "the key vehicles for competing to control the trumping resource (party-centered electoral law)" should clientelism generate party discipline (p. 83). She contends that the "new institutionalists' distinction between candidate-centered and party-centered systems provides the key to sorting out our expectations" of when clientelistic party discipline should occur.

That conclusion is in keeping with the conventional wisdom that discipline should only be present in party-centered systems, such as Argentina (Jones, 2002), and not in candidate-centered systems, such as Brazil (Ames, 2002b), regardless of the presence or absence clientelism. Therefore, scholars explicitly reject the thesis that clientelistic party

discipline could occur in candidate-centered systems, such as in Brazil. Clearly, the distinction between candidate-centered and party-centered systems is central to this debate.

One of the main problems with this line of reasoning is that the candidate-centered vs. party-centered distinction assumes that policy matters to voters. In fact, it is the saliency of position taking that provides the key incentives for backbenchers to check their legislative leaders in the first place. Because position taking is so important to voters, personalistic legislators build institutional checks on leadership to preserve their "policy independence." The rationale is that if leaders become too powerful, they could curtail legislators' ability to take independent position on issues, which could hurt their electoral survival. Clearly, the "personal vote" theory assumes that position taking is electorally salient and that plays a major role in the causal mechanism that produces party discipline, as I will explain in greater detail in chapter 2.

However, that logic doesn't hold when clientelism in present because position taking ceases to be electorally valuable, with important implications. The problem with applying that distinction between candidate vs. party-centered institutions is that vote buying turns the nature of democratic representation upside down, eviscerating position taking, responsiveness and accountability. Voters simply cannot constrain legislators on policy and sell their votes at the same time. Indeed, clientelism actually generates a form of "perverse accountability" (Stokes, 2005) in which voters are accountable to politicians, instead of the other way around. And if voters don't constrain politician, as the conventional wisdom assumes they do, then legislators are free to follow the party leader with little electoral consequence from constituents. As such, clientelism complicates

foundational assumptions of standard theories of political parties, particularly the distinction between candidate-centered and party-centered systems.

Indeed, theorizing about clientelistic party discipline remains immature precisely because the relationship between clientelism, formal institutions, and party organization is peppered with confusion. Despite the mountains of research on clientelism, we still know relatively little about how it affects institutions and parties in government. For example, as Taylor-Robinson (2006) notes, "the electoral systems and clientelism literatures rarely speak to each other" (p. 108), and, according to Stokes (2007), "our understanding of the relationship between clientelism and institutions—from macro institutions such as electoral systems to micro institutions such as ballot design—is in its infancy" (p. 20).

Among the most confusing aspects of this debate is the fact that many scholars in legislative studies assume that clientelism is equivalent to personalism and that both generate decentralized party organizations and no party discipline. For example, Bowler, Farrell & Katz (1999) use localism and clientelism as synonyms, contending that "cohesion is more difficult to maintain in systems characterized by high levels of localism or clientelism" (p. 12). Some even argue that personalism generates or is strongly associated clientelism and corruption (Ames, 2002b; Geddes & Neto, 1992; Shugart & Carey, 1992; Mello & Spektor, 2018; Chang & Golden, 2007; Kunicová & Rose-Ackerman, 2005; Persson et al., 2003). These scholars also believe that parties "with strong internal hierarchies are best able to deliver on policy promises" (Rosenbluth & Shapiro, 2018, p. 21; see also Lijphart, 2004, p. 101), which typically is the case in party-centered system. Therefore, many scholars conflate personalism with clientelism and presume a strong

association between candidate-centered systems, clientelism and low party discipline, on the one hand, and party-centered rules, cohesive parties, and high discipline, on the other.

While clientelism and classic personalism may be correlated (see for example Allen, 2015), they are conceptually distinct, and it is important to understand their separate and interactive effects on party discipline. As Lyne (2005) noted, many scholars "fail to distinguish" clientelism "from classic particularism, which is indirect, and distinct, from clientelism" (p. 212). And as Kitschelt (2000) argues "we should not put too much emphasis on personalism as an attribute of clientelist politics and impersonality as a defining criterion of programmatic politics. (...) Clientelism is also not the same thing as the more mild-mannered cousin of charismatic personalistic politics—the personal vote" (p. 852).

Clientelism is distinct from classic personalism because of *conditionality*, the threat that voters will lose access to goods and services if they do not support the clientelistic network (Stokes, 2005; Stokes et al., 2013; Lyne, 2008a; Kitschelt, 2000; Hicken, 2011), and that matters. Clientelism and classic personalism are two distinct voter-politician linkage strategies (Kitschelt, 2000) and predictions about party discipline based on one will not necessarily translate to the other. Therefore, it is important to understand how politicians organize to "solve the distinct collective action problems" associated with clientelism (Lyne, 2008a).

But the confusion regarding the effects of clientelism on party politics does not end there. Many scholars of clientelism err in the opposite direction of legislative scholars, assuming that "strong party organization" is a functional *requirement* of clientelism

(Brusco et al., 2004; Stokes, 2005; Magaloni et al., 2007). As Muñoz and Chirinos (2019) explains, "conventional wisdom among political scientists holds that (…) electoral clientelism requires well-organized national political machines" (p. 3). For Holland & Palmer-Rubin (2015) "the typical assumption is that clientelism depends on the existence of a party machine and dies along with that party" (p. 1188). Those scholars argue that clientelism is more efficient in party-centered systems because, under such rules, leaders have more control over brokers, and are better able to avoid broker defection (Novaes, 2018) and intra-party bidding wars (Lyne, 2008a). In fact, there are many high-profile cases of clientelism that combine with party-centered electoral systems or dominant parties, such as Argentina (Auyero, 2001; Stokes et al., 2013; Levitsky, 2003) and Venezuela from 1958-93 (Coppedge, 1994; Lyne, 2008a). Indeed, the association between clientelism and strong party organization is so prevalent in that literature that vote buying in candidate-centered systems is seen an important contemporary "puzzle" (Holland & Palmer-Rubin, 2015; Muñoz & Chirinos, 2019; Novaes, 2018).

Moreover, contrary to the received wisdom that associates clientelism with weak and decentralized parties, clientelistic parties can be centralized with extremely powerful leaders. One example is the *Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano* (PRE), in which, according to Freidenberg and Levitsky (2006):

> The locus of authority in the PRE is Bucaram, who remains the organization's supreme director despite his self-imposed exile in Panama. Bucaram's power is undisputed. As one Ecuadorian politician put it, Bucaram "is the owner of the PRE… All the others are his servants." (p. 192)

Such a description directly contradicts the association of personalism and clientelism with weak and decentralized parties. Another example of clientelism in combination with strong leadership is seen in the U.S. party machines of the 19th century. The advent of direct primaries in the U.S. (a candidate-centered rule) was largely a reaction to strong party bosses that firmly controlled nominations in "smoke filled rooms." In other words, a candidate-centered rule was adopted to limit the power of clientelistic bosses, personalism was used to counter boss power.

Those cases clearly illustrate that clientelism can be compatible with party-centered rules, strong leadership, and centralized party organization, and directly contradicts the widespread use of personalism and clientelism as synonymous, as if theoretical distinctions between them were irrelevant. If we accept the premise that clientelism can generate strong leaders, then it is not a far stretch to posit that such powerful bosses would be able to promote party discipline. But we must not take the point too far, and presume, as some scholars of clientelism do, that centralized and strong parties is a *functional requirement* of clientelism. Instead, we must understand "varieties of clientelism" under different conditions (Berenschot & Aspinall, 2020). But we have only started that important task, and this study adds to that endeavor.

In sum, scholars of legislative studies and those of clientelism have problematic views on the relationship between institutions, clientelism and party organization, and this is where theoretical development is most needed. Theorizing based on faulty assumptions will lead to error, therefore, in order to advance a general theory of party discipline we need to clarify how clientelism impacts discipline, and how formal institutions intervene

in that relationship. Brazil is a good test case for such a theory because it is the least likely institutional scenario for clientelistic party discipline to occur because it is a prototypical candidate-centered system, in which party discipline of any kind should not be present (Lyne, 2008a; Desposato, 2007). If we can find clientelistic based party discipline in Brazil, then we will have given the first step towards better understanding how clientelism affects delegation of power, independent and in interaction with formal institutions.

Clientelism in Brazil

For my argument to apply to the Brazilian case, it must be also true that clientelism is pervasive enough that at least *some* parties use it as their primary electoral strategy. Since this is axiomatic for my theory and because some scholars are skeptical of that claim, I must address this issue right away.

Lyne (2008a), for example, is among the skeptics, arguing that Brazil has reached a "programmatic equilibrium" in terms of linkage strategy. To her, parties in Brazil appeal to voters based on policy and performance, not clientelism (see also Hagopian et al., 2009). Moreover, other influential scholars of Brazilian politics such as Limongi & Figueiredo (2017) are also among the skeptics. They reason that since corruption and clientelism has negative electoral costs to the party brand, legislators will avoid them (p. 85). Other scholars reject clientelism as a concept altogether, arguing it is incompatible with modernity and rationality (Ames, 2002a), even though scholars of clientelism have long and strongly rebutted such claims, clarifying the compatibility. But given that level of skepticism, it's important to demonstrate that clientelism is electorally salient in Brazil. It

is also important to describe how clientelism occurs in practice, given the conceptual misconceptions mentioned above.

How pervasive is vote buying in Brazil? One survey of voters found that on average 28% of respondents admitted that they "witness or had knowledge" of vote buying in that election.[3] In some states that figure was much higher, for example, in Roraima and Alagoas they were 71% and 45%, respectively (*Tribunal Superior Eleitoral*, 2014). And, because of social desirability, the real figure could be even higher.[4] Moreover, according to LAPOP's American Barometer series, Brazil scores in the middle range of Latin American countries regarding the incidence of vote buying, worse than Venezuela and El Salvador. Based on their survey, 13% of respondents agreed that a "candidate or someone from a political party offered you something like a favor, food, or any other benefit or thing in return for your vote" (Faughnan & Zechmeister, 2011). These data suggest that clientelism is still a very important linkage strategy for many voters in Brazil (see also Desposato, 2007; Nichter, 2010; Speck, 2003), and that in some states it is the modal linkage strategy.

That pattern of relatively high levels of vote buying is found at the elite level too. For example, in one survey of federal deputies about 70% explicitly agreed that "voters demand clientelistic behavior" (Brazilian Legislative Survey, 2014). One candidate for council member I interviewed described how they were shocked by the extent and openness of vote buying, happening in the middle of the street in broad day light. While the practice

[3] *Tribunal Superior Eleitoral* 2014 (Federal Electoral Court). Checon Pesquisa/Borghi N=1964.

[4] Depending on wording we find different levels of vote buying. In a 2009 national survey about 12% of respondents admitted that they "voted for a candidate in exchange for money" or a "favor." In 2006, 22% of respondents affirmed that they "were engaged in vote buying" in the state of Paraná. In the state of Bahia, Nichter (2010) found that more than 87% (47 of 54 citizens) reported that vote buying "happens in their municipality" (p. 7).

is illegal, there was "no enforcement" and candidates blatantly "ignored the rules and the law," with no consequence. Indeed, they reported that "the vast majority of voters who approach" them would solicit "help" or "ask for money directly." Their lasting impression was that vote buying was a common practice and was even expected of candidates.[5]

Court data and news reporting also confirm a pattern of widespread corruption, which is closely associated with clientelism (Kitschelt, 2000). For example, according to Melo (2014) in 2008, "31 percent of senators, 37 percent of federal deputies, and 34 percent of state legislators faced charges in Brazil's criminal and audit courts," and in 2011 "a fifth of the members of the Brazilian congress were defendants in criminal cases in the Supreme Court" (p. 13). Moreover, Abramo (2004) shows that, from 2004 to 2005, the state of Paraíba alone prosecuted more than 200 politicians for vote buying. Therefore, we can conclude that corruption and clientelism are pervasive in Brazil, and that it is plausible that it could affect at *least* some political parties (in Chapter 5 we will see more evidence in that regard).

While those figures given us some idea of how widespread it is, what exactly does vote buying entail in practice? Clientelism typically involves a direct and conditional exchange of private goods or favors for votes, including cash, food, bricks, or a job. Another common vote buying strategy involves trading votes for access to public programs and services. While everyone may be formally entitled to those goods and services, in practice patrons illegally cut-off access to voters who do not support them and facilitate access to those who do. For example, one voter I interviewed recalled how much her family

[5] Personal interview Council Member candidate PDT #1

was severely impacted when she was cut off from a local milk distribution program, after she was seen walking with a rival political group in public. In another interview, voters explained that if they failed to support the incumbent mayor, they would suffer retaliation through the denial of access to the local school bus service, that was run by the mayor's brother. This humiliation was compounded by the fact that the community also had to pay an extra fee to use the bus service, which was illegal, and by the fact that the school bus was dangerous, in grave violation of basic safety regulation.[6] For low-income voters, vote buying has such an important effect on their livelihoods that it makes it difficult for them to refuse such bargains.

Because Brazil adopts the secret ballot, brokers are necessary to monitor and enforce vote buying deals. And because of the legal risk involved, deputies typically contract mayors, council members, and community leaders to act as their brokers. In exchange deputies are expected to bring federal resources to those districts or pay they them directly (Gingerich, 2014; Novaes, 2018, p. 87). Moreover, clientelistic brokers have several strategies to get around the secrecy of the ballot, so that they can retaliate against defectors. The first mechanism regards brokers' deep insertion into voters' social networks, which is necessary in order discover voters' real preferences (Stokes, 2007), as the milk distribution program mentioned above illustrates. A second strategy consists of simply deceiving voters to make them believe that the ballot is not secret, such as by illegally seizing voters electoral ID's and then lying that they give them access to the people's votes. A third and common strategy is to use publicly available vote counts at the neighborhood

[6] Anti-Corruption Action Research - Partnership between United Nations Development Program, Huairou Commission and *Espaço Feminista* (12/2011 – 2/2012)

level, and then punish brokers who fail to deliver the agreed upon number of votes. The logic is that those brokers can in turn punish voters individually. In the example of the bus service mentioned above, brokers have access to voting data at the neighborhood level and can use it to punish or reward the community if they come short on the expected number of votes. Therefore, while the vote is secret, politicians have creative workarounds to make clientelism enforceable.

At this point it's important to give some concrete examples of clientelistic legislators, so that the reader can know who I am referring to with that concept. Take, for example, former federal deputy *Chico das Verduras* (PRP- RR), who was caught red-handed buying votes in 2010. During that election, Chico was already in jail serving his sentence for prior vote buying charges when he was temporally released to campaign for public office, which illustrates the impunity in the judicial system. Upon his release an undercover police agent tailed him and eventually caught him red-handed buying votes in exchange for expedited driver licenses and a car raffle (D'Agostino, 2010). Even though he was literally in jail for vote buying charges, he nevertheless was elected with 5903 votes, and went on to serve in Congress for the entirety of his term, following the party whip in roll call votes 91% of the time. As such, Chico das Verduras illustrates the possibility of clientelistic deputies who engage directly in vote buying and that follow the party whip once in Congress. His voters are more interest in material benefits than his record of legislative accomplishments, making it "cheaper" to follow the party.

While the example above is certainly more benign, in many cases people are coerced to vote for the patron (Mares & Young, 2016) and risk retaliation if they don't comply. For example, in poor communities in Rio de Janeiro criminal organizations

threaten voters who don't support their preferred candidates and assassinate candidates who oppose them (Franco, 2018). Former federal deputy Hildebrando Pascoal also illustrates this type, as he was involved with drug trafficking and was caught trading votes for cocaine in 1999. He became notorious for dismembering a victim with a chainsaw, earning the codename: The Chainsaw deputy. Given such a reputation, voters would probably be cautious of double-crossing him, showing just how coercive vote buying can be.

These examples illustrate the undeniable fact that clientelism is an integral part of Brazilian politics. Certainly not all politicians and parties are involved in vote buying, but the empirical evidence displayed above makes it clear that many are. But even if critics concede these points, some may wonder: Who cares? Why does this matter?

Normative implications and Generalizability

Scholars argue that parties are the bedrock of democracy because they function as information shortcuts for voters, facilitating the task of evaluating which party is closer to voters' ideological "ideal point" (Downs, 1957). In fact, a party's role of "aggregating interests" is so central to scholars' understanding of parties that is woven into its very definition (see Ware, 1996). To satisfy such expectations parties must take distinctive and consistent positions on issues, uniting behind a common party platform. For example, if half of a party's legislators vote for legalizing abortion and the other half vote against it, voters cannot ascertain how the party stands on that issue and cannot punish or reward the party accordingly. Therefore, coherent, and cohesive parties improve democratic accountability and responsiveness because it allows voters to have information about the

expected future behavior of parties and support them accordingly (APSA 1950).

However, in order to achieve such cohesion legislators must coordinate collective action, and to facilitate that task, they must delegate power to leaders, who are tasked with the promotion of party discipline by using "sticks and carrots." But when leaders fail to enact such coordination, lawmaking becomes unpredictable and costly. When every legislator can be pivotal and legislative leaders can't deliver legislative votes in block, gridlock and cycling is likely to follow. Such a situation can create fiscal inefficiencies and even undermine the legitimacy of democracy itself, especially when coupled with corruption, economic crisis, and polarization, as the current historical moment in Brazil illustrates. Therefore, explaining party discipline is normatively important beyond a reasonable doubt.

Additionally, the normative implications of my theory and findings goes well beyond that generic point. Informed by the conventional wisdom, reformers have sought to increase the power of leaders in the hopes that it would generate more responsible and cohesive parties. For example, Rosenbluth and Shapiro (2018) explicitly suggest that parties with "strong internal hierarchies are best able to deliver on policy promises," because doing so would increase the value of the party's brand name. And Lijphart (2004) explicitly argues that "closed lists can encourage the formation and maintenance of strong and cohesive political parties" (p. 101).

While leadership-strengthening reforms may have that intended effect in some parties that already were "responsible," such as in the PT, in clientelistic parties it may have the oppositive effect, giving more power to corrupt party bosses, and may be contributing to the cartelization of the system. The problem is that strengthening party

bosses by legislative fiat will not change the incidence of clientelism, because poverty and impunity are its the main drivers. While parties continue to depend on clientelism to win elections, empowering leaders will not suddenly make them more responsible or cohesive.

Scholars miss the mark when they argue that candidate-centered rules lead to clientelism and corruption, while party-centered rules lead to good governance and responsible parties. For example, Rosenbluth & Shapiro (2018) argue that candidate-centered rules motivate politicians to "trade favors for votes, a recipe for endemic corruption" (p. 20). Meanwhile, party-centered rules are seen as promoting "strong" and "cohesive" political parties (Lijphart, 2004, p. 101), those that are "best able to deliver on policy promises" (Rosenbluth & Shapiro, 2018, p. 21).[7] However, the very theoretical distinction between candidate and party-centered systems assumes conventional linkage strategies, and therefore, such distinction is inadequate to understand parties that primarily rely on clientelism. The problem is that those scholars assume that party discipline and powerful leaders are always good for democracy. That assumption dangerously forgets the legacy of the Progressive movement in the U.S. that fought against powerful party bosses by instituting the candidate-centered system that persists today.

If we do not change our understanding of party discipline and clientelism, we will continue to incorrectly interpret corrupt bossism as a sign of normatively desirable "responsible party government." For example, on finding evidence of party discipline in Brazil, Lyne (2008a) concludes that Brazil has fully transitioned to "programmatic"

[7] Gingerich (2013) casts doubt on such association between candidate-centered rules and corruption. He argues that both types of party systems generate different incentives for corruption. For most scholars, corruption and clientelism is always caused by something else, and never a causal factor that affects political parties.

politics, that parties are disciplined because they care about their collective brand among voters. Hagopian et al. (2009) go so far as to argue that "parties are being transformed from loose patronage machines to programmatically coherent and distinctive groupings" (p. 361). But, as we will see, such a conclusion is untenable given what we know about the PR and other parties. It is critical that we do not confuse responsible parties with powerful machines bosses, lest our reforms will have severe unanticipated consequences. My contribution to the literature help avoids the grave mistake of seeing any evidence of party discipline as normatively desirable and as a trait of responsible and cohesive parties.

My theory also generates several practical policy implications, which I will address in detail in the concluding chapter. For example, closing the "temporary committee" loophole is an obvious place to start, since it allows bosses to completely dominate their parties, as we shall see, is the case of the PR. Moreover, my theory can also help explain the record-setting levels of fragmentation in the Brazilian party system today. As party bosses acquired more power over time, minority factions gained an incentive to create their own party, because in that new party they will be the majoritarian faction that accumulates all the power. So, instead of generating strong and responsible parties, such reforms may generate a plethora of small and centralized clientelistic machines.

Critics may point out that party discipline in clientelistic parties is an exception to the rule and that my theory only explains the behavior of a few small parties, that have been largely ignored by other scholars. However, such parties are no longer small, swollen by decades of corruption and impunity, neither are they irrelevant. For example, the PR not only nominated Lula's vice-president, but it is also the party of current incumbent president

Jair Bolsonaro. It controlled the billion-dollar budget of the Ministry of Transportation for more than a decade.

Clientelistic parties, belonging to what is known as the "big center" (*centrão*), dominate the Brazilian Congress today, occupying the most important agenda-setting offices. Moreover, in Jair Bolsonaro's ineffective presidency those parties have gained significant political clout. In the upcoming 2022 election, parties of the *centrão* will together control more than a billion reais (around US $180 million) in taxpayer money. Those parties are anything but irrelevant, and it is reasonable to argue that after Fernando Henrique Cardoso no president has governed without them. I believe I would be unwise to ignore these parties. I would also be unwise to continue to assume they are decentralized and unable to promote discipline, or that, any evidence of party discipline must be because ideological cohesion.

Finally, my theory applies well beyond the Brazilian case, as I believe it is generalizable to any party that relies on clientelism and bossism. If my theory applies to the unlikely case of candidate-centered Brazil, it is reasonable to assume it works elsewhere. In the concluding chapter, I will explore in detail how my theory may apply to the cases of Argentina and United States.

Outline of the Chapters

This dissertation will be organized as follows. In chapter 2, I will expand on the claims made in the introduction, reviewing in more detail the motivating puzzle of weak parties with strong party leaders, and the theories pertinent to that debate. In that chapter I

will explore the three main competing explanations of party discipline in Brazil.

In chapter 3 I will describe my own theory of clientelistic party discipline, showing how clientelism alters members' goals and career incentives, which in turn alters the cost and benefits of party discipline. In that chapter, I will defend the main assumptions and predictions of my theory and explain my party typology that separates classic personalism from clientelistic party machines. Such a classification scheme is necessary to distinguish the causal mechanisms that will produce observationally equivalent party discipline. We must be able to tell if a party is ideologically cohesive and responsible or a boss-dominated clientelistic machine, because if both can produce party discipline, then we must be able to tell which causal mechanism is at play.

In chapters 4 and 5, I will describe and classify the eight largest parties in the Brazilian Congress during the last three decades (*Partido dos Trabalhadores* - PT, *Partido Democrático Trabalhista* - PDT, *Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira* - PSDB, *Partido Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* - PMDB, *Democratas*- DEM, *Partido Progressista* - PP, *Partido da República* – PR, *Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro* - PTB). I will compare these parties based on qualitative evidence in Chapter 4 and across several quantitative indicators in Chapter 5, in order to gauge the degree to which they may conform to different party types, so that we can tell apart different causal mechanisms producing discipline.

In Chapter 6 I will test the effect of "following the party whip" on the distribution of *electoral* "carrots," such as campaign finance and pork barrel earmarks, and *policy* "carrots," namely committee appointments and rapporteur assignments (*relatorias)*, controlling for confounding variables. I hypothesize that we will find positive and

significant evidence of party discipline in centralized clientelistic parties, particularly regarding electorally salient resources. I confirm that hypothesis regarding campaign finance in the PR, and the results are robust and strong.

In chapter 7, I will conclude by contextualizing the main findings, discussing the generalizability and normative implications of my argument, and suggesting avenues for future research.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

There are two main camps that disagree about the presence of party discipline in Brazil. The conventional wisdom assumes that the candidate-centered electoral rule leads to personalistic and inchoate parties, that are unable to impose discipline. Conventional theory predicts that such incentives lead to an intralegislative institutional arrangement similar to the "committee-centered bargaining" leadership model (Aldrich, 1995), characteristic of the "textbook era" of the U.S. House of Representatives. In contrast, the revisionist camp argues that legislative parties do impose discipline because party leaders concentrate power in the Chamber of Deputies (Figueiredo & Limongi, 1999; Lyne, 2008a). Whatever incentives legislators bring from the electoral arena would be reversed once in Congress, where rank-and-file fall in line with their "tyrannical" leaders.

Both these camps place institutional incentives at the center of their theories. However, as we will see, institutions don't do a good job explaining variation in party behavior, and variation is precisely what the empirical analysis will reveal. Therefore, to account for such variation we need an intervening variable, and we gain that leverage by incorporating party organization into the theoretical framework. Along those lines, some scholars have argued that party organization can mediate and moderate institutional incentives (Samuels, 1999). Therefore, according to this view, only a strong party organization will lead to party discipline, and in Brazil, because of the personalistic incentives of the electoral arena, only a few parties can achieve that. As such, party

discipline would be an exception to the rule, present only in mass-parties that have strong organization, a significant following in the electorate and high levels of ideological cohesion.

Below we will review in more detail these different arguments, starting with the conventional wisdom.

The conventional wisdom hypothesis

Conventional theories about party discipline make important assumptions about legislators, particularly their electoral connection to voters, their goals, career incentives and opportunities. Indeed, those assumptions are the primary building blocks of those theories, with different goals and career incentives altering the structure of delegation within the party (Sinclair, 1998). Conventional theories of party discipline typically assume that parties relate to voters based on *non-conditional* appeals, such as constituency service and position taking.[8] Predictions about party discipline vary depending on the important of individual vis-à-vis the collective party reputation.

According to the conventional theories, backbenchers delegate power to leaders because they can better maintain and advance the party's collective reputation among voters, a "public good" affecting both their reelection and majority status. But doing so is subject to collective action dilemmas, and to curb individualistic behavior legislators delegate fiduciary powers to leaders (Cox & McCubbins, 1993, 2005), imbuing them with selective incentives and coercion mechanisms (Olson, 1965). In turn, legislative leaders

[8] In the core of their theories, they implicitly assume that legislators are honest and that voters care about policy. None of them use corruption and vote buying as their foundational assumptions.

promote party discipline because they internalize electoral externalities and collective party interests, for example, because they benefit more from majority status than any other member (Cox & McCubbins, 1993).

However, because of asymmetries of information and imperfect observability, there is always a risk that party leaders will maximize their own utility at the expense of their principals' best interests. Therefore, akin to Madison's dilemma (Cox & McCubbins, 1993, p. 103), legislators must simultaneously empower leaders, while also decreasing agency losses. To do so they design the structure of delegation to empower and check leader simultaneously through "contract design, monitoring and institutional checks" (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991). Periodic elections help ensure that leaders are accountable to the majority, but additional measures may be necessary. Institutional checks on party leaders counterbalance their power by empowering collective decision-making bodies, such as caucus organizations and committees. But investing in such institutional checks is only worthwhile when individual reputations trump the collective one. Different structures of delegation imply trade-offs between delegation and control, and legislators design delegation "contracts" according to the cost and benefits implied (Sinclair, 1998), which, in turn, depends on legislators' goals and career opportunities (Schlesinger, 1966, 1984).

Central to this argument is the varying saliency of the collective versus individual reputations of legislative accomplishments and performance. Many scholars believe that those vary according to institutional incentives, which is a cherished belief in comparative politics. On the one hand, if the *collective* party reputation is more salient (typically in party-centered systems), legislators will be more responsive to their leaders. In contrast, when individual candidates are more important in elections, then the prediction is that

parties will be weak and unable to promote party discipline. For example, Ames (2002b) contends that "the best predictor of the amount of bargaining likely to occur" between backbencher and leaders "is the structure of electoral rules, because these rules determine party leaders' control over the ballot" (p. 192).

Along these lines, Argentina is lauded as one of the main examples of strong party discipline in Latin America, and that is attributed to their electoral rule. For example, Jones (2002) argues that party discipline is comparatively high in Argentina because of their closed-list proportional representation (PR) system. In such a system, voters can only choose between party lists, not individual candidates, and party leaders determine the order of candidates on the party list. Because of such incentives scholars argue that leaders have influence over the rank-and-file legislators. This also means that voters reward parties collectively, and that individual legislators are subject to negative electoral party swings. Calvo (2014) illustrates this logic, arguing that Argentina is an example of a "legislative cartel," and that legislators who vote against their parties are "either depreciating the party label or voting against the preferences of the majority" (p. 197). Similarly, Jones and Hwang (2005) contend that in Argentina "electoral success in the province is affected by the national party's reputation" (Jones & Hwang, 2005, p. 276). In other words, party discipline in Argentina is assumed to be derived from their electoral rules which promotes the saliency of the party's reputation, while depreciating individual position taking. Despite the fact that clientelism is widespread in that country, the conventional wisdom ignores that fact and uncritically concludes that party discipline must be the result of normatively desirable, cohesive and responsible parties.

That situation is in stark contrast with candidate-centered systems, which make *personal* reputations more salient, as in Brazil and in the United States. The personal reputation is defined as "a combination of particularistic services, such as casework and pork barrel, and *policy interests of special concern locally*" (Shugart & Carey, 1992, p. 9 *emphasis added*). In candidate-centered systems, when the party leader and constituents disagree, legislators will be wary of antagonizing their own voters and will buck the party in their favor. In such a system "politicians need to evaluate the trade-off between the value of personal and party reputations" (Cox & McCubbins, 1993, p. 420). While the party's collective reputation still matters to voters, and while legislators are still subject to electoral party swings, the size of such swings are predicted to be much smaller than in party-centered systems, decreasing the need to cooperate with co-partisan, and increasing the need for independence, so they can follow the will of constituents.

Indeed, the importance of position taking and policy independent to this line of reasoning is underappreciated but is nevertheless quite evident. For example, the personal vote theory contends that position taking is the "most important single influence on general assessment of a congressman" (Cain et al., 1987, p. 160). In Aldrich's (1995) words, contemporary legislators are "motivated more by policy concerns than by the selective incentives of jobs, contracts, and the like typical of the machine age" (p. 160). And as Cain et al. (1987) put it "the difficulty of governing in the United States include problems of cohesion in the political parties, which are attributed in large part to the *differing constituencies to which party members consider themselves accountable*" (p. 200 *emphasis added*). Therefore, the conventional wisdom assumes that constituents punish legislators that are "out of step" with their positions on issues. Accordingly, in the U.S. legislators

who side with their parties tend to be punished by voters (Canes-Wrone et al., 2002; Carson et al., 2010). As such, legislators will always favor their constituents over party leaders because reelection is their bottom line, and campaigns are individualized.

If the collective party reputation matters little in elections, backbencher become less susceptible to negative electoral party swings, and thus they are less likely to empower party leaders to manage the party's collective reputation (Cox & McCubbins, 1995). As the "personal vote" (Cain et al., 1987) becomes more salient, backbenchers will seek a more particularistic and parochial form of representation, as opposed to one based on "group interests and national policy preferences" (Shugart & Carey, 1992, p. 168). Moreover, candidate-centered rules create intra-party competition, decreasing internal programmatic cohesion (Shugart and Carey, 1992), leading to less delegation of power to leaders, and less incentive to promote party discipline.[9]

Therefore, the rules of electoral competition is presumed to have important consequences for parties in government. For example, Cain et al. (1987) argue that in candidate-centered systems the personal vote will structure the legislative branch in a way that is "highly sensitive to the wishes and requirements of the ordinary member." Consequently, backbenchers will insulate committees against leadership interference so they can claim credit for committee activity (Cain et al., 1987; Mayhew, 1974, p. 60-61). Committees also serve as institutional checks on leaders (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991), giving legislators veto power over policymaking. In a candidate-centered system, leaders will typically adopt a leadership style based on bargaining, instead of trying to impose party

[9] Although Cheibub and Sin (2020) cast doubt on the argument that candidate-centered rules necessarily promote intra-party competition.

discipline. Therefore, the overwhelming consensus in the literature is that party discipline is lower or even absent in candidate-centered systems, while higher in party-centered systems.

According to this view, Brazil is an extreme case of personalism, therefore, it should show low levels of discipline (Mainwaring, 1999; Ames, 2002a, 2002b). For example, in terms of the strength of parties in the electoral arena, Shugart & Carey (1992) rank Brazil at the bottom of the scale. In fact, for many scholars, Brazil is a "poster child" for personalism and party weakness (Samuels & Desposato, 2008; Lamounier & Meneguello, 1986; Mainwaring, 1991; Ames, 2002a, 2002b; Carey & Shugart, 1995; Shugart & Carey, 1992). Since the country adopts an open-list proportional representation system, voters can cast ballots for individual candidates instead parties, and typically 90% of voters do so. Moreover, the number of personal votes each candidate receives determines their position on the party list, as such each candidate needs to maximize their own votes to be elected, greatly increasing intra-party competition, and purportedly leading to less cohesion in political parties.

While the electoral system is central to this debate, federalism and the separation of powers are also thought to contribute to party weakness. Scholars in comparative politics argue that separation of powers weakens party leadership because it engenders electoral and policy independence, increasing the importance of personal reputations. Electoral *separation of purpose* generates intra-party conflict, because incumbents from different branches of government "derive support from and respond to different set of voters"

(Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 123).[10] Under such conditions, backbenchers will likely be cross pressured by party leaders and constituents.

In contrast, in parliamentary regimes the electoral fate of the majority party and the Prime Minister are fused (Cox 1987). As Samuels and Shugart (2010) put it, in parliamentary regimes "a 'perfect correlation' exists between that party's votes for executive and legislative candidates" (p. 1). In England a vote for Members of Parliament (MP's) is an indirect vote for the Prime-Minister, and the cabinet takes the lead in policy. Whereas, in a presidential system like Brazil, the need for policy independence will create problems of coordination within parties, engendering trade-offs between delegation and control.

In addition to the effects of separation of powers, scholars have long noted how federalism also weakens parties as national organizations. This is true because federalism promotes organizational decentralization and because it empowers state and local actors (Abrúcio, 1998; Ames, 2002a, 2002b; Desposato, 2004; Mainwaring, 1997, 1999; Samuels, 2003; Abrúcio & Samuels, 1997; Samuels & Abrúcio, 2000; Mainwaring & Samuels, 1999). As such, federalism also alters career opportunities (Samuels, 2003), making executive branch positions at the local and state levels more desirable, since they offer greater clarity of responsibility (Tavits, 2007) and access to resources. In fact, almost one in every five federal deputies take a leave from office to try their luck in mayoral elections, that happen in between legislative elections. This, in turn, disrupts delegation of power in the legislature. After all, if many legislators desire a state-level position more than

[10] For example, in 2006 there was a negative correlation between votes for the PT's presidential candidate, Lula, and votes for the PT's federal deputies (Samuels & Shugart, 2010).

reelection to the Chamber, legislative leaders may have less leverage over them, and legislators will have little investment in institutional reforms to check leadership power.

In that regard, Brazil possesses a strong federalist structure characterized by symmetric bicameralism (Neiva, 2011), strong malapportionment in the Chamber and Senate (Ames, 2002a), and policy decentralization. In Brazil, local and state governments are responsible for a larger share of public spending compared to other Latin American countries (Desposato, 2004, p. 262; Mainwaring, 1999, p. 265; Samuels, 2003, p. 159-161; Lyne, 2008a). As Mainwaring (1999) notes, in "Brazil more than anywhere else in Latin America, states and *municípios* have the resources to make state-level political careers valuable" (p. 265). Therefore, many scholars emphasize how federalism weakens political parties as national organizations and dampens ideological cohesion by altering the career incentives of legislators.

In sum, according to the conventional wisdom, Brazil's candidate-centered electoral rule, separation of powers and strong federalism weaken political parties in the electoral arena. This weakness in elections carries over to the legislative arena, generating personalistic and ideologically heterogenous parties, and thus making party discipline unlikely. This generates a straightforward prediction, which I call the **conventional wisdom hypothesis (H2)**: *because of formal institutions that encourage personalism, there should be no evidence of party discipline in Brazil.*

The revisionist argument

Naturally, if this conventional wisdom was completely uncontested, there wouldn't be much of puzzle to solve. The problem with the above arguments is that *despite* the

candidate-centered nature of elections, in the Chamber of Deputies party leaders have remarkable formal powers. But if parties are weak in elections, why would deputies delegate power to party leaders in the legislative branch? After all, the conventional wisdom predicts that in such systems legislators prefer not to delegate extensive powers to leaders, while empowering committees to check them and increase policy independence and credit claiming.

Naturally, some degree of delegation to central authority should be expected in any busy legislative assembly because they operate within majoritarian institutions, and, therefore, legislators must cooperate to set the agenda (Cox, 2008) and to pass legislation (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000). However, what is paradoxical about the Brazilian case is the great extent of such delegation, especially given the weakness of parties in elections. This contradiction of institutional incentives is seen a major puzzle in Brazilian politics, and different authors disagree about the effects of these countervailing incentives on legislative behavior, particularly with respect to party discipline.

In contrast to the conventional wisdom, the revisionist camp highlights the highly centralized internal rules of the Chamber of Deputies and contends that because legislative leaders have such tremendous formal powers, party discipline should follow (Figueiredo & Limongi, 1999). According to this view, the individualizing incentives of the electoral arena "stop at the doorstep of Congress," and that, once elected, backbenchers have little option but to follow the lead of "tyrannical" leaders (Figueiredo & Limongi, 1999).

Comparing legislative institutions in Brazil, the U.S. and in England better illustrates this puzzle. According to Cain el al. (1987) in the U.S. "rules and practices have developed that allow routine access to and orderly accretion of power within" committees

and that access to them is "largely independent of party discipline" (p. 13). In England, in contrast, the governing authority is "concentrated in the front benches of the ruling party. There is a division of labor between front and backbenchers but relatively little division of labor within the backbenchers. Legislative success depends overwhelmingly on the favor of the front bench of the majority party. Overall, the organization of Parliament shows much less accommodation to the needs of the individual members" (p. 12).

Now compare those two descriptions to Samuels' (2003) portrayal of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies:

> The average deputy has little opportunity either to climb a career ladder or to build up his own institutional fiefdom within the legislature. The hierarchy of positions in the Brazilian Chamber has really only two rungs: top and bottom. A deputy who pushes his or her way to the top reaches a position of influence: most agenda-setting and decision-making powers are concentrated among party leaders and in the hands of members of the *Mesa Diretora*, a kind of legislative board of directors, over which the Chamber President (akin to the Speaker) presides. [....] If a deputy fails to reach the top rungs of the Chamber's leadership, he or she is left with everyone else at the bottom rung. (p. 43)

Given such characterization, the Brazilian Chamber appears to be much more similar to England than to the United States. However, this is inconsistent with the conventional wisdom, which predicts that the Brazilian Congress should resemble the U.S., namely, it should have strong committees and weak leaders, given that both countries have candidate-centered electoral institutions. Nevertheless, the Chamber of Deputies shows less "accommodation to the needs of the individual members", and committees have only

a “secondary and imprecise” role (Figueiredo & Limongi, 1996, p. 25). Additionally, in Brazil committees lack seniority norms (Samuels, 2003) electing new chairs every year, which disincentives specialization. Moreover, leaders can remove bills from committee and send them directly to the floor, circumventing the veto power of committees. They can also remove legislators from any committee at any time, entirely at their own discretion. This power, added to the ability to expel members from the party, gives party leaders remarkable influence over the policymaking process, while weakening the independence of committees. In sum, internal rules of the Chamber of Deputies strengthen leaders at the expense of committees and individual members, contrary to what the conventional wisdom predicts. Armed with such extensive powers, leaders would be able to impose party discipline, according to revisionist scholars.

However, within this camp there are disagreements regarding the causal mechanisms used to promote party discipline. Some scholars insist that discipline is the primary result of the internal Chamber rules (Figueiredo & Limongi, 1999), and, therefore, we should find evidence of party discipline particularly when testing mechanisms that are internal to the Chamber, such as committee and rapporteur assignments, which party leaders have strong formal control over. However, scholars disagree about party discipline involving resources that are beyond the formal control of legislative leaders, such as earmarks and party campaign contributions.

The disagreement emerges because most scholars in this camp also accepts the premise that parties in Brazil are weak in the electoral arena, and, therefore, legislative party leaders would have little influence over party campaign contributions, and they

should be allocated for reasons *other* than internal party unity in the Chamber. The same logic applies to earmarks, if internal rules are the main causal mechanism promoting discipline, then earmarks are irrelevant for this argument because legislative leaders do not formally control those resources either. Indeed, Figueiredo and Limongi (2008) explicitly argue that earmarks play only a minor role in promoting discipline, if any. In sum, if the version of the revisionist argument is correct, we should find evidence of party discipline in all of the selected parties when testing committees and rapporteur assignments, but not in relation to earmarks and party campaign contributions.

On the other hand, other revisionist scholars depart on this issue of earmarks and party discipline. For example, Pereira and Mueller (2003) argue that the *executive* branch uses earmarks to increase support for its agenda, using party leaders as intermediaries in that relationship (see also Raile et al., 2010). But if this is true then earmarks are more about following the *government* than following the party leader, so we must test for that possibility and try to separate it from party discipline. However, we must keep in mind that other scholars cast doubt on such a relationship. For example, Vasselai and Mignozzetti (2014) find no robust evidence of a relationship between support for the Government and receiving more earmarks, illustrating the unsettled nature of this debate about causal mechanisms.

Finally, a few scholars in the revisionist camp have also departed from the notion that party leaders are strong *only* in the legislative arena, believing they are strong in the electoral arena as well. For example, Lyne (2008a) argues that parties are strong in both arenas because programmatic politics is the new "equilibrium strategy" for parties at the

national level in Brazil, as opposed to clientelism. In her view, that ensures that parties are subject to negative electoral swings based on their "collective policy reputation" among voters. To minimize such electoral swings rank-and-file legislators would delegate power to leaders in the legislative branch, who are then able to discipline their members (Lyne, 2008a). In other words, according to this view, parties are important in elections because voters care about them (see also Hagopian et al., 2009). While this is a minority position, if it is correct, then we should find party discipline in all parties, including regarding earmarks and party campaign contributions.

In sum, as general matter the revisionist camp believes that powerful legislative leaders can promote party discipline, although there are disagreements about causal mechanisms. For some in this camp discipline follows from institutional rules internal to the Chamber of Deputies and to others discipline is derived from the importance of the party brand in elections. Despite those disagreements, this camp is in direct contrast with the conventional wisdom since it predicts party discipline across the board in all relevant parties. We can call this the **revisionist hypothesis (H3)**: *all parties should display evidence of party discipline in the Chamber of Deputies.*

The importance of party organization

There are obvious shortcomings with those two camps because of their focus on invariant institutional incentives. Since institutions affect all parties equally, if they really explain behavior, then all parties should behave in the same way. One glaring problem with such approach is that upon the very first inspection of legislative behavior we find great

variation across parties (Mainwaring, 1999; Carey, 2008). According to Carey (2008), in Brazil there is "substantial variation across parties" in terms of party unity scores (p. 110). And Mainwaring et al. (2018) characterize the Brazilian party system as "unevenly institutionalized," emphasizing variation. While the PT has been more consistently united in roll call votes at extremely high levels, other parties are usually less united and exhibit great variation over time, as we will see in chapter 6. This high degree of variation is at odds with explanations that focus on invariant institutional incentives.

Another problem with institutional based explanations is that they implicitly assume that formal delegation of power equates to actual power, in our case this is particularly relevant in the revisionist camp. But having a "whip" doesn't mean it's wise to use it. For example, former Speaker Boehner had the tools to promote party discipline, but a powerful ideological faction, the Freedom caucus, was ready to retaliate the use of any "sticks" against them. In fact, their disagreements culminated with Boehner's resignation, a rare event in U.S. politics.

Therefore, even formally powerful leaders will not dare use their powers against the will of the caucus, since, after all, leaders are agents (Sinclair, 1998), and they can be removed by a simple majority. Only when the majority in the caucus agrees with a course of action is that leaders will have a mandate to use sanctions. Therefore, the strength of party leaders is predicted to "ebb and flow" in candidate-centered systems, conditional on the polarization and sorting of constituents, which promotes ideological cohesion (Cooper & Brady, 1981). If all legislators receive the same policy mandate from constituents, leaders can use their delegated powers to achieve the party's common agenda. Party government is condition on the distribution of preferences, arising only when they are

homogenous within a party and polarized between them (Rohde, 1991; Aldrich, 1995; Aldrich & Rohde, 1998, 2000). However, if internal disagreements are high, leaders will be wary of using their powers, no matter how impressive they may be. Therefore, the variation in party unity we observe in Brazil could be attributed the distribution of preferences within and between parties, as conditional party government (CPG) predicts.

The conventional wisdom believes CPG does not happen in Brazil because electoral rules promote incentives against preference homogeneity, however, institutions are not destiny. Legislators can counteract the individualistic incentives of the electoral arena by investing in party organization (Samuels, 1999). It is through strong organization that they can control adverse selection, ensure ideological indoctrination, and coordinate electoral strategies to quell intra-party competition (Samuels, 1999). It is party organization that generates and maintains preference homogeneity, which in turn leads to strong party leaders, a strong caucus organization and party discipline. Counter to Krehbiel (1993), preference homogeneity cannot be analyzed independently of party action, as an exogenous factor. Given Brazil's at-large districts and the use of proportional representation, district polarization and sorting are highly unlikely. Whereas in the United States district are smaller and gerrymandering ensures homogeneity of preferences, in Brazil legislators can seek voters anywhere in their geographically large states. In Brazil homogeneity is produced through organizational capacity, through screening and indoctrination of candidates, and through disciplining in Congress.

Therefore, to understand variation in legislative behavior we must investigate party organization, with the assumption that it can vary across parties within the same political system. That variation is predicated on the differing goals parties have, the voters they cater

to, and their modal linkage strategy. And indeed, variation is what we find and in Brazil, as the Workers Party (PT) sets itself apart from the rest. They have a strong national organization, a substantial presence in the electorate and a high degree of ideological cohesion (Samuels, 1999; Samuels & Zucco, 2018; Hunter, 2007, 2010). Therefore, if party discipline is conditional on ideological cohesion, and that is produced by party organization, then we should find evidence of discipline in the PT.

As it turns out, counteracting the individualistic incentives of the electoral arena is a lot of work, and, for most parties, the payoff is too low for such an investment. Alas, while the PT is an *important* exception, nonetheless, it is *still* an exception. Most parties in Brazil are personalistic, catch-all and "parties for rent" (Desposato, 2006; Mainwaring et al., 2018). Since leaders are agents of the caucus, they will lack the mandate to pursue the party agenda in such parties, which is ill defined to begin with. Such leaders will lack the temerity to use their delegated powers over the objection of the caucus, no matter how "tyrannical" their powers may be, such awesome formal powers will be "paper tigers" if the party does not support their action. Therefore, as party organization is weak in most parties, preference homogeneity will tend be low, and, thus, in most parties we should find no evidence of discipline. Institutions matter but they do not determine party organization, there are exceptions and variation.

Therefore, in Brazil, conditional party government should be the exception, not the rule, and therefore, we should only find evidence of party discipline in "mass-bureaucratic" parties that are ideologically cohesive, polarized, and have strong party organization, such as the PT. We can call this **the conditional party government hypothesis (H4)**: *party discipline is conditional on strong organization and ideological cohesion*.

Conclusion

Even if taken at face value, these arguments leave many unanswered questions. If the PT is an exception, and most parties are poorly organized and lack cohesion, then why are leaders in the Chamber so powerful? If party discipline is only a function of formal leadership power, as the revisionist hypothesize, all parties should display similar evidence of party discipline, since all have access to the same resources. But that is not what I find in chapter 6. Neither do I find a complete absence of party discipline either, as the conventional wisdom would lead us to expect.

Instead, I find robust and substantive evidence of party discipline in an unlikely party, the PR, and none of the theories reviewed so far can offer a good explanation for that. Can H4 explain that result, is it because of preference homogeneity and strong party organization in the PR? As we shall see in chapters 4 and 5, that is highly unlikely. The PR doesn't resemble a mass-bureaucratic party in any shape or form, it's not as highly cohesive as the PT is, it lacks "strong" organization and has virtually no following in the electorate, and, as such, conditional party government is an extremely bad explanation for their behavior. Instead, Power and Rodrigues-Silveira (2018) classify that party as a clientelistic "party for rent" (p. 257). Given that classification, how can we explain party discipline in the PR?

In my view, the only reasonable explanation for party discipline in that party requires a theory that takes seriously the effects of boss domination, clientelism and corruption. To understand the puzzle of party discipline in the PR we must deduce the impacts of clientelism, corruption and bossism on the goals and careers incentives of

legislators, and then carry out the implications towards party organization and behavior. When we do so, we will recognize that party discipline in a boss dominated party machine is intuitive and familiar, and not the paradox that the conventional wisdom makes it out to be. Along those line we may be in better position to understand the puzzle of weak parties with strong legislative leaders in Brazil and contribute to a general understanding of party discipline. Conditional party government then becomes a theory that is specific to non-clientelistic parties and is silent about what happens beyond its scope conditions. Thus, my theory aims to give the first step towards understanding legislative behavior when clientelism is the main electoral connection. As I will suggest in the following chapter, there is more than one path to discipline, and we need to know which one is at work in any given party.

Chapter 3: A Theory of Clientelistic Party Discipline

In this chapter I will defend the necessary assumptions of my theory, and I will show how clientelism and corruption impacts deputies' goals and career opportunities, which, in turn, affects party organization, and the cost and benefits of toeing the party line. I will demonstrate why clientelism leads to a *sui generis* delegation structure that can generate party discipline, even in a candidate-centered system.

In a nutshell, I argue that clientelism makes private gain the overriding goal of legislators, at the expense of other goals such as good public policy, which has important but unappreciated consequences. Additionally, the lack of saliency of position taking makes toeing the party line less costly, and if voters are indifferent about policy, legislators will have little incentive to buck the party in roll call votes. Moreover, vote buying creates the need for discretionary resources, in other words, it makes corruption necessary. This greater importance of corruption in turn strengthens centralization of power in the party, given the need for secrecy and trust involved. Clientelism also makes post-Chamber careers more salient and reduces the incentives for reelection, giving such legislators shorter time horizons in the Chamber, favoring leadership accretion of power. Finally, the need for brokers changes the dynamics of credit claiming and advertising, making committees less important to deputies' careers, which also leads to stronger leaders. Stronger leaders in turn facilitate party discipline because it gives them control over resources and policymaking, particularly when they come to dominate the national party organization.

Parties and delegation of power to central leadership

As we have seen, conventional theories fail to incorporate clientelism to the core of their assumptions and even tend to conflate it with personalism, thus generating incorrect and incomplete predictions about such parties. When the "electoral connection" is incorrectly specified, it's reasonable to expect that the rest of that theoretical "edifice" will be unsound. Therefore, following the convention, my theory starts with first principles, namely career incentives and goals.

When discussing the goals legislators hold dear, scholars commonly rely on Fenno's (1973) typology, which focuses on three: good public policy, influence in the "House" and reelection. While scholars overwhelmingly focus only on those three, Fenno proposed two more: post-Chamber career and private gain. This is relevant because clientelism increases the saliency of some goals, while deemphasizing others, which important implications, as we shall see.

Moreover, the strategies used to achieve such goals are also important. The received wisdom assumes that legislators seeking reelection use three main strategies: position taking, credit claiming, and constituency service (Mayhew, 1974). As I will argue in the following, clientelism changes the importance and nature of those strategies, which in turn alters the cost and benefits of following the party whip, and the nature of party organization. Therefore, I argue that clientelism produces incentives that are distinct compared to the conventional wisdom and will be different from classic personalism. In the following, I will explain in more detail how clientelism affects those specific goals and strategies, and how that alters the nature of party discipline.

Good public policy and position taking

As I have already explored, a foundational assumption of the personal vote theory is that deputies benefit electorally from position taking (Cain et al., 1987, p. 160, 200; Aldrich, 1995, p. 160). Personalistic legislators generally they don't want to be forced to support a bill that is unpopular among their constituents, regardless of the "carrots" leaders may offer, because their electoral bottom line is at stake. As such, they have strong incentives to preserve their policy independence by building institutional checks on leadership power. This is the main distinguishing factor compared to clientelistic parties, in classic personalistic parties there is always a trade-off between delegation and control, because the policy positions of constituents matter in elections.

In contrast, clientelism implies that voters lose their ability to punish incumbents based on their voting record, altering the basic logic of legislative party discipline. As Mainwaring (1999) notes for the Brazilian case, "given low voter interest in policy issues and legislative work, only a minority of deputies can win an election primarily on such a basis" (p. 187). Even worst, if voters are being bought off, legislators have little reason to fear the electoral repercussions of their roll call votes. Therefore, the motivation to check party leaders decreases under clientelism, because "agency losses" in roll call votes become less relevant compared to classic personalism.

In clientelistic parties' ideological conflicts occur less often. Legislators will follow the party, so long they are adequately compensated. Therefore, for party discipline to arise in clientelistic parties, leaders must have the wherewithal to deliver those selective incentives. Given the need to compensate legislators, clientelistic parties will be more

likely to discipline their members when they are part of the governing coalition and control executive branch agencies, since those control the lion's share of resources. The analytical problem is that those parties are seldom ever in the opposition, making it hard to test that claim empirically. Moreover, party-controlled resources have increased in Brazil over time, especially party-controlled campaign money, facilitating the leader's job and reducing their dependence on the executive branch. Given the generally scarcity of resources available to legislators, party-controlled resources represent important leverage, especially given the emphasis on private gain and vote buying, and the deemphasis on position taking.

Moreover, party discipline does not arise in clientelistic parties from the conventionally assumed causal mechanism, namely from ideological agreement, because clientelistic parties, as their personalistic counterparts, will have low ideological cohesion compared to mass-parties, because they lack appropriate selection mechanisms and ideological indoctrination (Samuels, 1999). However, compared to classic personalism, conflict with leadership over policy issues will also decrease and be less salient. This engenders a distinct delegation structure compared to both classic personalism and mass-parties. Leaders will be more powerful than in personalistic catch-all parties, and, at the same time, collective organizations such as the caucus will be weaker, failing to check the party leader. While for the conventional wisdom, ideological cohesion and the electoral value of the party brand are the condition necessary for party discipline, for clientelistic party discipline, boss control and access to resources are the necessary conditions.

But beyond the low emphasis on position-taking, clientelism also favors party discipline because of its effects on constituency service and credit claiming. This situation also decreases the incentives to empower committees, which normally give legislators a

venue for policy specialization and serve as checks on leadership. Parties no longer adopt the organizational features predicted by classic personalism, typified in the committee-centered bargaining model (Aldrich, 1995), as committees are not insulated from leadership power. As the importance of committees decreases so does the power of party leaders increase, and more powerful leaders are better able to impose discipline and control policymaking, which, as see shall see, may be functional to clientelistic parties.

Clientelism, credit claiming and brokers

As mentioned before, scholars in the conventional wisdom camp predict that candidate-centered rules generate legislative organization characterized by weak leaders and powerful committees. Such scholars typically assume that legislators in personalistic parties empower committees and protect them from leadership encroachment because they are venues for legislative credit claiming (Mayhew, 1974). However, this is not what we find in Brazil, instead, committees enjoy no protection against the whims of legislative leaders, who can remove their members at any time and discharge bills from committees with comparative ease. This may be partially explained by the fact that for clientelistic parties committees are less important than in personalistic ones, given the different nature of credit claiming and the reliance on brokers for that activity in the former.

Under clientelism deputies delegate the task of credit claiming to brokers, which in turn decreases the utility of committees for that role. Brokers are necessary for effective vote buying because voters can defect from clientelistic bargains, thus politicians need to hire brokers to monitor voters and ensure compliance (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Stokes et al., 2013; Holland & Palmer-Rubin, 2015). This is especially true under democratic

competition and secret ballot because information on voter behavior is costly to obtain, usually requiring deep insertion into voters' social networks (Stokes, 2007; Holland & Palmer-Rubin, 2015; Nichter, 2008).

Consistent with the claim that clientelism is pervasive in Brazil, so should be the reliance on brokers, and, indeed, several authors have noted their importance. For example, conducting interviews in Brazil, Novaes (2018) noted that "a state party branch manager, produced a spreadsheet containing the names of brokers (most of whom were mayoral candidates), the number of votes these supporters promised before the election, and the money they received for the votes. According to this same branch manager, it would be very difficult to find a successful deputy without a similar spreadsheet with an explicit account of brokers, votes, and money transfers" (p. 87). Moreover, in many cases these transfers involve illegal resources. For example, Gingerich (2014) examined an analogous spreadsheet but involving a "large scale illicit campaign financing scheme," in which brokers were "bribed in an explicit attempt to sway their endorsements and/or rent their electoral machinery" (p. 273). In exchange for their support, federal deputies target earmarks to co-partisan mayors (Baião at al., 2018), who in exchange mobilize voters (Avelino et al., 2012).

Current theories of clientelistic party discipline fail to incorporate the role of brokers and to trace out their theoretical implications. For example, Desposato (2007) argues that when voters opt for clientelism credit claiming is "easy," since, according to him, voters only need to know which candidate delivered the goods. However, credit claiming is never this straightforward and unproblematic. Mayors may want to claim all

the credit for a public works project, even though legislators helped deliver the federal resources needed to finance it (Samuels, 2003). Brokers can even act opportunistically and keep the money intended to voters. The Brazilian case is distinct in this regard compared to, for example, Argentina. In that country, brokers and voters identify with a party and stick to it. In Brazil, in contrast, brokers and voters have no psychological connection with the party *per se*. Brokers may defect to another clientelistic network, and this typically happens if the party loses control of public office (Novaes, 2018).

Because brokers are not permanently attached to the party and because of the candidate-centered rules, scholars have argued that clientelistic parties in Brazil cannot generate strong discipline in government (Desposato, 2006; Lyne, 2008a). The problem with such reasoning it is not clear what difference party-centered rules makes regarding how clientelism and brokers works on the ground, beyond greater voter defection, because those relations are always personal. For example, Argentina has a party-centered system and brokers have enduring connections with a given party, but it is unclear what that more enduring attachment to a party really means since in Argentina local party branches are run as "independent personal clientelistic networks" (Auyero, 2001) and, according to some scholars, the national party organization "doesn't even exist" (Levitsky, 2003). If, even in Argentina, local party organizations are based on *personal* clientelistic networks, then it is not clear exactly how party-centered rules and high party identification matter to understand discipline. Yes, brokers will defect more and shop around in candidate-centered systems, but it is not clear what different that makes to parties in government. And it is less clear how this alters the nature of clientelism vis-à-vis the Brazilian case. Future research

will have to examine how party-centered vs. candidate-centered elections impact party organization and party discipline in clientelistic parties.

Regardless, if brokers are loyal to the party or not does not alter the fact that they perform credit claiming functions and, therefore, legislators lose the incentive to strengthen committees as credit claiming institutions. In fact, it is possible that because brokers can so easily "jump ship" when their party loses power, it is all the more important that legislators coordinate to maintain and expand the party's power and influence, least they have an ever-shrinking pool of brokers to make deals with. In a word, the potential of broker defection gives legislators a vested interest in advancing the party's collective power, in order to attract and maintain a vast network of brokers.

It is not the "brand" name of legislative achievement that unites legislators in common action. Instead, what matters is that the party increases its control over public office, attracting and maintaining a large army of brokers. Legislators in such parties may not like boss domination, but they do not oppose it because it facilitates coordination, so that they can leverage their party's numbers with the executive branch, extracting more resources to "feed" the clientelistic network of brokers. But for that leverage to work legislators must surrender some of their policy independence. Doing so is "cheap" for clientelistic parties because legislators eschew position taking. In contrast, in personalistic parties position taking still matters, so there is a trade-off between empowering leaders and retaining policy independence by investing in committee work. Moreover, in personalistic parties brokers are not as vital as in parties that depend primarily on clientelism, because monitoring and enforcement is not necessary. This give personalistic parties one less reason

to support strong leaders, instead preferring to check them and maintain their independence.

In sum, by altering the nature of credit claiming, clientelism leads to stronger parties in government compared to what is assumed in the conventional wisdom about candidate-centered systems. I argue that because clientelistic legislators delegate credit claiming to brokers, this alters balance of power within parties by changing the motivation to empower committees, which are traditional vehicles of credit claiming. When committees are weaker, they cannot serve as checks on leaders, effectively making the leaders more powerful. More powerful leaders are better able to take the lead on policy and impose discipline. Moreover, to maintain and expand the network of clientelistic brokers parties must maintain and increase their hold on political office and state resources. But in order to maximize party resources and power they must solve collective action dilemmas and increase cooperation. As such, clientelistic legislators let their party boss take the lead on policy. And again, this does not occur in personalistic parties because they do not rely as much on brokers, and because they are wary of surrendering policy independence, since constituents constrain them on policy.

Reelection, career opportunities and influence in the Chamber

I argue that clientelism also affects deputies' *career opportunities*, which carry important implications for the resulting structure of party organization (Schlesinger, 1984). Clientelism implies that "influence in the House" and reelection aren't very salient goals for most junior legislators. In fact, as Samuels (2003) shows, long-term careerism in the

Chamber of Deputies is conspicuously absent and turnover rates are extremely high,[11] which is in no doubt partially due to the effect of federalism (Samuels, 2003). However, I argue that clientelism strengthens that tendency, making sub-national careers even more appealing, because they have more direct control over resources for corruption and patronage than legislators typically do. Mayors are responsible for implementing policy, and therefore, can more easily claim credit for government action, and, moreover, there are more opportunities corruption at the implementation stage of policy.

The implication of this lack of careerism is that legislators will have short-time horizons, being less invested in protecting their own institutional power. Consequently, they will have little incentives to insulate committees from leadership encroachment or acquire expertise, favoring leadership accretion of power, which in turn facilitates party discipline. If clientelistic legislators do not care about long legislative careers and reelection, then they will have little incentives to check leadership power, in other words, they will not be invested in institutional reforms. Clearly, policy rookies with short time horizons that are more concerned with private gain are easier to discipline compared to career-minded and reelection-seeking legislators who are constrained by constituents on policy. Therefore, party discipline is possible in clientelistic parties but unlikely in classic personalism, where position taking still matters. Consequently, leaders in clientelistic

[11] Because of this problem, legislators have created the curious institution of the *suplente* (substitute legislator). When a federal deputy takes a leave of office, the candidate who is next on the party (or coalition) list will receive the vacant seat immediately. However, this is just a "place holder" position, as deputies can return to their office at any time, taking back their seats from substitutes.

parties will be less constrained, having an easier time whipping votes compared to their classic personalistic counterparts.

Private gain and corruption

For most scholars, corruption and clientelism is always caused by something else, and never a causal factor that directly affects political parties. For example, many contend that clientelism and corruption are a mere reflection of personalistic institutions. As Golden and Chang (2006) argue, "corruption and the search for the personal vote go hand in hand" (p. 134). Unfortunately, despite its obvious importance, most theories of legislative politics are silent on corruption and private gain as a motivating goal for legislators and how that may affect parties in government. While most scholars ignore its theoretical relevance, other goals are deemed central, such as reelection and maintaining a good reputation for policy achievements. While the importance of private gain and corruption in Brazil is painfully obvious for the lay public, in the theoretical arsenal of political science it doesn't even seem to compute. In fact, some of the main scholars of Brazilian politics write off the importance of corruption altogether. For example, Limongi and Figueiredo (2017) argue that corruption in Brazil is an ineffective and a short-lived strategy because it affects the party brand, and therefore, it has not only benefits, but also costs (p. 89). When reality so blatantly disagrees with our foundational assumptions, we need new theory.

Clientelism and corruption share an elective affinity, while corruption may occur in any type of party, it is entirely functional only in parties that depend on clientelism as their primary electoral strategy. Not only does vote buying insulate legislators from

accountability, but, moreover, vote buying itself enhances the importance of corruption, since it requires vast sums of *discretionary* resources to be distributed among voters. For Federal Deputies in Brazil discretionary funds are hard to come by, and corruption may be necessary to keep clientelistic networks afloat. In sum, clientelism needs corruption like fire needs air.

Clientelism gets in the way of voter accountability because if voters accept *quid pro quo* deals they forfeit their ability to punish corrupt politicians. In this situation, voters ignore corruption scandals so long as legislators deliver their end of the bargain. To some, clientelism may constitute a different type of accountability, in the sense of politician being accountable to voters if they fail to deliver material benefits (Kitschelt, 2000). But that is not equivalent to what we usually understand as accountability, in terms of "throwing the rascals out" and the focus on responsiveness to constituents. Clientelism insulates deputies from *policy-based* accountability, instead, generating a perverse form of accountability (Stokes, 2005). Brokers are useful precisely because they monitor voters and punish those that renege on their deals.

While a voter can hypothetically agree to sell their support but secretly vote for someone else, punishing the patron for their corruption scandals, if brokers catch them doing so, they will be punished. As these interactions play out over time, low-income voters in will prefer to comply with patrons, lest they risk losing access to important goods that significantly affect their livelihoods. Moreover, even if voters want to deny their vote to a corrupt patron but accept their handouts, punishing incumbents is a collective action, as their individual vote is insufficient to remove them from office. Lyne (2008a) argues that this generates a situation akin to the prisoner's dilemma, in which voters stick with their

corrupt patrons because they anticipate everyone else will do so. Because of this dearth of accountability in clientelistic parties, the benefits of corruption greatly outweigh the costs. When clientelism combines with corruption they generate new emerging properties.

The benefits from corruption in clientelistic parties are strengthened by Brazil's notorious impunity. Despite rejecting corruption in theory, in practice many voters support incumbents accused of corruption. Boas et al. (2019) show that corrupt mayors that "get things done" and deliver material benefits are reelected despite their checkered past. Similarly, Jucá et al. (2016) show that if legislators spend enough money in elections, scandals have no effect on their reelection odds. I believe that those patterns are explained by the fact that when parties rely primarily on clientelism as an electoral strategy, corruption will bring fewer costs than otherwise.

Take the case of Paulo Maluf, for example, the powerful former president of the PP, he illustrates how federal deputies may incur in very little cost by engaging in political corruption, while benefiting a lot. He was involved in so many corruption scandals during his long career that he became the mascot of Transparency International's 2014 anti-corruption campaign, dubbing him Mr. Kickback. In 2010 he was even included in Interpol's list of most wanted, on charges of international money laundering. In 2014, Maluf's net worth was 33 million, according to Forbes, making him the 5th richest politician in the country, although that estimate is based only on the publicly disclosed assets and is likely underestimated. For federal deputies such as Maluf, the cost of engaging in corruption is relatively small compared to what it to be gained, which is potentially millions of dollars. Without a doubt, many politicians see Maluf as a role model to be emulated,

seeing politics itself is a path for illegal enrichment. Political scientists will ignore this reality at the peril of being unable to explain legislators' motivations and behavior.

Moreover, for politicians with criminal liabilities like Paulo Maluf, winning a seat in Congress is necessary to evade or at least delay jail time. Deputies enjoy judicial immunities, and can only be trialed by the Supreme Court, which is notoriously sluggish in taking up cases involving politicians. That predicament attracts candidates involved in corruption to run for the Chamber of Deputies, since they want to evade prosecution in their own states. In fact, I believe "not going to jail" is a central motivating goal of politicians in Brazil that explains legislative behavior better than what is typically assumed by extant theories. For example, the decision to support Temer against Dilma at the time of her impeachment was predicated to some extent on the assurances that he would do a better job at protecting legislators from investigations in the context of the Car Wash scandal, that affected a significant part of Congress. For example, during Dilma's impeachment trial in the Senate more than 60% of Senators were facing malfeasance changes (Alessi, 2016). I believe that we cannot understand Dilma's impeachment without reference to the motivation of many congresspeople "not to go to jail."

Ignoring legislator's main motivation to run for office doesn't jibe with useful theory building. For Maluf and the hundreds of legislators facing criminal liability, extracting as much as possible while enjoying judicial immunities is the ultimate goal of running for office. Therefore, we should not assume that all legislators are honest and seek good public policy, nor that they primarily use position taking and constituency service to attract voters, as the conventional wisdom does. We should not assume that the party brand always matters to voters and parties. Instead, for many legislators in Brazil, private gain is

the most important goal, and to achieve such goal, vote buying, and corruption is the winning strategy.

Such claims directly contradict Limongi and Figueiredo (2017), who believe that the party brand always matters to voters and parties, still faithful as they are about applying the conventional wisdom to the Brazilian case. As such they believe that corruption has costs to political parties, and, therefore, parties would be wary to engage in such practice. It may be the case for some party types, but in clientelistic machines that logic doesn't apply. In conventional parties, corruption does indeed represent a trade-off between more resources in the short term, in exchange for a damaged reputation in the long run. While the collective reputation matters more in mass-parties and in party-centered systems, in personalistic parties that reputation still generates negative electoral swings that may make the difference in close races. To protect their reputation, parties will need to curb individualistic behavior and punish members who tarnish the party brand. Therefore, even catch-all personalistic parties may expel legislators who engage in corruption.

The contrast with clientelistic parties could not be more apparent. While non-clientelistic parties organize to face the adverse selection of corrupt candidates, clientelistic parties recruit candidates based on it. In contrast to conventional parties, clientelistic parties may actually gain from such corruption scandals. This is consistent with the fact that clientelistic parties in Brazil grew even as they were caught in ever more egregious corruption scandals, while "conventional" parties shrunk in size when involved in the same scandals. For example, as the PP involved itself in a litany of corruption scandals in the last decades, they were still also able to recruit more incumbents to their ranks, and today they are among the four largest party in the Chamber of Deputies. According to a

whistleblower, in 2005 the PP leadership actively recruited deputies using illegal resources from the *Mensalão* corruption scheme, offering one deputy one million Brazilian Reais, plus a thirty thousand monthly stipend, just to switch parties into the PP (*CPMI dos Correios*, p. 785).

While the PP grew fueled by corruption, in contrast, the same scandals eventually damaged the PT's collective reputation among voters. After investing in their brand name for decades, involvement in several corruption scandals "took a toll on the party's image as the standard bearer of ethics in politics" (Hunter, 2007, p. 467-468). The results of this process showed in the 2016 mayoral election, when the party suffered its worst loss in 12 years. Such was the damage to their reputation that half of incumbent federal deputies actively debated changing the party name or forming a new party, fearing the negative electoral party swing (Braga, 2016; Seabra, 2016). Moreover, catch-all parties also have to deal with members that tarnish their reputation, as we will see in chapter 4, sometimes those parties even expel members accused of corruption. Therefore, while corruption is an optimal strategy for clientelistic parties, making them grow, it can damage the collective reputation of conventional parties. In other words, the effect of corruption is mediated and moderated by linkage strategy.

Corruption also provides a pool of illegally resources that leaders can use to promote discipline directly. The PP is illustrative in this regard. In 2003, during the *Mensalão* scandal, the PP's party unity skyrocketed precisely when they began to receive illegal cash flows from the Workers' Party government. According to court proceedings, the PP only joined the governing coalition in the first-place *conditional on these illegal*

side payments (Brito, 2012).[12] But to do so effectively, party bosses must have monopoly over the streams of illegal resources, which also strengthens them. For example, during the *Mensalão* scandal, party leaders were the ones responsible for monitoring, whipping votes, and dolling out illegal cash, strategically, only when necessary to change key votes (CPMI *Correios*, 2006). This sort of leader-mediated corruption has been the norm, being present in all major scandals in the last decade, including for example, the *Mensalão*, the Car Wash scandal, the Bloodsuckers scandal, the Transportation Ministry scandal and the Tourism Ministry scandal, to mention just a few. Moreover, in 2014, Michel Temer allegedly assumed the presidency the PMDB so he could control the distribution of illegal funds (Barreto & Alencastro, 2016). This is one of the reasons why boss domination in clientelistic parties is functional to party discipline.

Moreover, corruption produces incentives for centralization of power, akin to criminal organizations, in order to decrease the likelihood of whistleblowing. For individual party members, knowledge of corruption schemes can be an unnecessary liability, the less they know the better protected they are against prosecution. In turn, party bosses need to control corruption because that increases their influence over the party, and because the fewer people involved means a lower probability of getting caught. And since legislators frequently switch parties, leaders have all the more reason to keep knowledge of illegal operations restricted to their trusted lieutenants, lest they have to deal with disgruntled whistleblowers who have no loyalty to the party. In sum, when corruption is

[12] Starting in 2003, the executive branch gave cash to the party leaders of the PMDB, PP, PR and PTB in exchange for their support in Congress.

combined with clientelism the relationship between leaders and rank-and-file changes radically, favoring concentration of power and party discipline.

But if clientelism and corruption could be obtained without parties, it is likely that legislators in a candidate-centered system like Brazil would surely prefer that alternative. Therefore, the question that arises from the preceding reasoning is: what do parties do as organizations for clientelistic legislators that would lead them to submit themselves to party bosses?

What do clientelistic parties do for their members?

According to the conventional wisdom in political science, legislators delegate power to leaders because parties produce public goods that cannot be otherwise obtained, namely a "brand" that contains information about the party's performance and its history of legislative accomplishments (Cox & McCubbins, 1993, 2005). Legislators want a good brand reputation among voters because otherwise they may be vulnerable to negative electoral party swings. Moreover, legislators want to maintain a good party reputation so that they can obtain majority control in the legislative branch[13] (Pearson, 2015). But because of collective action dilemmas and the possibility of free riding, such good reputation is hard to achieve. Therefore, legislators must "tie their own hands" by delegating power to central agents, who have the responsibility of improving the brand

[13] Pearson (2015) argues that leadership in the US House balance their preoccupations, on the one hand, with policy control, to enhance the party collective brand name, and, on the other hand, with majority control. To achieve majority control leaders may need to sacrifice policy control, for example, by protecting members in competitive districts who vote against the party line, while punishing members from safe districts if they defect.

name by imposing sanction on free riders and distributing selective incentives to those that cooperate with leadership.

A similar logic needs to apply to clientelistic parties, in that sense that parties as organizations must be important to legislators. However, these parties are important not because of the party brand, but because there are certain resources that can only be obtained through the party. Otherwise, legislators would prefer to check the power of leaders to increase their autonomy and obtain resources individually. But if the party brand name is not important to clientelistic parties, what exactly do they deliver to legislators that cannot be obtained individually?

To begin answering that question we must again depart from first principles, in other words, the goals and strategies of legislators in clientelistic parties. As I argued above, they value private gain and political survival above all else and the achievement of such goals requires access to discretionary resources and a network of clientelistic brokers, the lack of which generates negative electoral party swings. Consequently, maximizing discretionary resources and expanding the broker network is the central motivation for collective action in such parties. Therefore, legislators in clientelistic parties tolerate the power of bosses because that facilitates the coordination necessary to increase access to certain resources that cannot be otherwise obtained, such as party-controlled party campaign contributions, for example. And as I will argue in the following, this plays out differently in clientelistic parties compared to conventional party types.

One primary function of clientelistic parties is to link legislators with brokers for vote buying operations. Clientelistic parties benefit from maximizing control over state and local office, such as mayoral positions, because mayors assist legislators as brokers. Parties

are necessary because in a candidate-centered system such as Brazil, brokers can always easily switch to a different party if resources dry up, preferring to belong to a party that is "winning" (Novaes, 2018). When contracting such unreliable brokers, legislators are likely to prefer brokers in their own party because they will have stronger ties with them and because of a shared interest in advancing party power, particularly when transactions involve illegal activities. While agency losses are still a problem, contracting brokers in the same party obviously increases the incentives for loyalty, given the possibility of repeated interaction and reputational concerns. Moreover, clientelistic parties facilitate deals between different office holders by reducing transaction costs and helping solve the commitment problems involved in the management of a vast network of brokers, patrons and clients at different levels and branches of government (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). Moreover, given that the need for secrecy is so essential in the illegal activity of vote buying, the possibility of whistleblowing or defection is always present. To reduce such dangers, contracting brokers within the party is a logic solution.

In sum, expanding such a network of brokers is in the interest of all legislators, and because they cannot achieve that outcome individually, they must cooperate with leaders to gain the benefits of collective coordination. If the party fails to coordinate it is likely to lose elections, and as opportunities for vote buying and deal-making shrink, the candidates will switch to a different party that is better positioned. Therefore, legislators in such parties have a vested interest in the collective power of the party. In sum, this is one of the reasons why clientelistic legislators tolerate boss domination, so that they can provide them with an ever-expanding network of brokers.

In the same way that clientelism requires a network of brokers, it also requires a vast sum of resources, especially of the discretionary kind. However, to increase the party's access to such resources individual legislators need to cooperate with each other. Many resources cannot be obtained individually including, for example, cabinet positions, positions in the Chamber, campaign donations from powerful interest groups, and party-controlled public campaign resources. Individual legislators cannot bargain directly with the executive branch to occupy a ministerial position, but they benefit when the party leader does. Access to these resources requires winning control over public office as a party, not as an individual, it requires that the party has enough seats in Congress and at other levels of governments to be able to leverage their political power. This gives clientelistic legislators another vested interest in increasing party power, which reinforces boss domination and facilitates party discipline.

Moreover, many resources are allocated to parties based on their collective electoral performance, giving parties an extra incentive for cooperation. For example, parties gain more public campaign funds the greater their number of seats in Congress. Maximizing seats in the Chamber of Deputies also increases access to positions in federal agencies and the access to influential positions inside the legislative branch itself. For example, the allocation of committee positions is proportional to the party's number of seats, and prime positions usually go to larger parties. Therefore, clientelistic legislators who want access to these resources will prefer to switch to a party with more power, and they become more powerful if a boss can coordinate party action, including in roll call votes.

While clientelistic backbenchers generally do not care about bills regarding national public goods, the executive branch *does* have a strong incentive to provide them

(Shugart & Carey, 1992). Therefore, towards that end the executive branch has an incentive to cooperate with powerful party leaders in Congress. Individual members will be invested in increasing the collective power of the party, to increase their potential access to resources that flow from having influence in the cabinet. And the more leaders can credibly enforce party discipline, the more they can extract from the executive branch, making roll call discipline functional to increasing party power.

Parties can also leverage their size and positions in the Chamber to attract campaign donations from interest groups. Many interest groups seek special regulation, subsidies, or government contracts from the federal government. Some sectors are almost entirely dependent on such public resources, while others, such as the construction sector, have a lot to gain from lobbying (Boas et al., 2014). Clientelistic party leaders can assist interest groups in pursuit of their policy goals, in exchange for campaign contributions and kickbacks. However, to attract and maintain such support parties needs to act in a coherent, predictable, and efficient fashion, which is somewhat of a challenge for an inchoate party, as clientelistic parties tend to be. Therefore, leaders need to control policymaking in Congress to "sell" their influence for the highest bidder in *quid pro quo* deals. The more leaders have influence over policymaking, the more leverage they have. The job of coordinating policy is facilitated by the fact that contrary to personalistic parties, clientelistic legislators eschew position taking. But, nevertheless, in clientelistic parties policy coordination is easier if a single faction or boss dominates the party.

While leaders can leverage their power to extract resources from the federal government and interest groups, individual legislators have little leverage. This is true, for example, because they can be removed from any committee at any time by their leaders,

and bills they are rapporteurs for can be discharged by them as well. Meanwhile, leaders have vast array of procedural and appointment powers inside Congress, and they can use their party's overall political influence (including outside the Chamber) to obtain more leverage. Leaders also have longer time horizons, expect to be long-term interlocutors with the government and interest groups, reducing uncertainty and transactions costs for stakeholders. Leaders also have more information about where legislators stand on issues and what they need in order change their positions, information which is costly to obtain. In clientelistic parties, leaders will serve as focal points around which policy-seeking actors will coalesce to obtain concessions. This is especially necessary given the acute coordination and collective action problems that result from heterogenous preferences and weak national organization, characteristic of clientelistic parties.

In sum, given that there are many resources that cannot be obtained individually, advancing party power is a goal shared by all legislators in clientelistic parties. Clientelistic parties, as teams of ambitious politicians, must maximize office-control and must coordinate policymaking to extract from the government and interest groups, and they do so more effectively and efficiently with a strong party boss at the helm. Party discipline and policy influence helps leaders in this pursuit.

Critics may point out that the desire for collective party power and resources are not exclusive to clientelistic parties, and, therefore, legislators in personalistic parties would also benefit from party discipline and leadership strength. However, the key difference is that in personalistic parties position taking and credit claiming are still important, and, therefore, incentives to delegate as described above are counteracted by

incentives to check leaders, in favor of policy independence. For example, in the U.S., legislators are constrained by constituents on issues, and their conflicts with the party leadership are defined in terms of such policy disagreements. For example, former Speaker Boehner was unable to use his sanctioning power effectively because he lacked a clear mandate from the caucus, that was split between different ideological factions. When controversial bills come up for a vote, that conflict may be irreconcilable, no matter how many "carrots" are being offered in return. Because individual position taking still matters to voters, personalistic legislators prefer to follow their constituents and remain in office, and, in order to protect their ability to do so, they want leaders with less power, not more.

In contrast, in clientelistic parties, legislators don't really care about policy, as long as they receive the resources needed to satisfy their real goals. While for personalistic parties delegating power represents a trade-off, because that means surrendering policy independence, in clientelistic parties, legislators have more to gain from strong bosses, because the cost of agency losses is less severe. Legislators in clientelistic parties are unlikely to have a shared interest in policymaking and caucus organizations will not check leaders. In other words, in clientelistic parties toeing the party line is cheap. Moreover, the arguments about having a vested interested in expanding the party's network of brokers also doesn't apply to other party types. Conventional parties rely on other forms of linkage with voters, including constituency service and position taking. Furthermore, non-clientelistic brokers operate under a completely different structure of goals and incentives. Only in clientelistic parties is the search for brokers so acute, and the partisanship of the brokers so important, given that illegal operation require trust and secrecy.

In a nutshell, increasing party power and discipline is functional to clientelistic parties, because it increases the credibility that leaders will "deliver policy" to interest groups and the federal government, making them better able to extract resources from them. Party bosses can also then use their control over such resources to promote party unity and further increase their leverage with the executive branch. This provides another incentive towards party discipline in clientelistic parties.

And again, while all party types want more resources, clientelistic parties don't have the same countervailing incentives to check leaders, providing a net gain from following the party whip. In clientelistic parties the only factor that gets in the way of party discipline is factional conflicts regarding the distribution of resources. But different from other party-types, factions will only represent different networks of ambitious politicians, more concerned with private gain than policy, and therefore, those conflicts are less severe than issues of public policy that arise in other party types, such as in the example of former Speaker Boehner.

In sum, in clientelistic parties, the more the boss can dominate the national party organization, the more likely they will be able to increase party leverage, and legislators understand that many resources cannot be obtained individually, giving them an interest in increasing collective party power, and making them tolerate boss domination. Legislators in such parties are willing to follow the boss on policy, so long that the party continues to "win" and to distribute resources that can only be obtained collectively.

Party leadership in clientelistic parties

According to the conventional theories of party discipline yet another assumption is necessary for party discipline to be present, leaders must have a personal incentive to do the extra work that is required of them to produce "public goods" for the party, namely maintaining the brand's reputation. In other words, they must be adequately compensated to balance the cost of leadership. For the conventional wisdom, leaders pay such costs because they gain more from majority status than any other member (Cox & McCubbins, 1993). For example, in the U.S. House of Representatives, the Speaker is a position of great power and influence, giving leaders an individual incentive to bear of costs of organizing the party and whipping votes. Analogously, for *clientelistic* discipline to work, leaders must obtain some similar "premium." Therefore, the question we must address is: do leaders in *clientelistic* parties benefit from doing the hard work that leadership requires?

In clientelistic parties the premium is not the perks of the office, but the control over corruption and the opportunities for private gain, as party leaders benefit personally from controlling the distribution of resources. For example, as Boas et al. (2014) argue, interest groups donate more campaign money to senior leadership expecting that they will reciprocate with greater access, government contracts, subsidies, and regulations. Moreover, Baião et al. (2018) show that leaders in the Chamber of Deputies receive more earmarks compared to rank-and-file. Leaders also receive kickbacks and control the distribution of illegal resources, ensuring their own political power and enriching themselves in the process. For example, the scandal involving Transportation Ministry in 2011 is illustrative in this regard, showing just how much control leaders can have over legal and illegal operations in the party (Sequeira, 2011). This is the *premium* that leaders

can gain for paying the cost of leadership, personal control of the party resources, particularly in clientelistic parties that are strong centralized in the hand of a boss. Moreover, as a party controls more positions in public office, leaders will proportionally increase their own power to extract private gain from the executive branch and interest groups. This gives party leaders a personal incentive to enhance the party power. However, when the party is more internally factionalized, a division of the spoils becomes necessary, and conflicts can emerge, undermining the ability of leaders to influence policymaking and decreasing the premium associated with leadership.

Nevertheless, while clientelistic party leaders can accumulate substantial authority over backbenchers, leaders are still agents and accountable to their principals. The main check backbenchers have against agency losses are elections and party switching. While presidents of parties are more difficult to remove, legislative leaders are elected by majority rule at the beginning of each new year, and they can be removed at any time. Therefore, legislative leaders must be careful not to upset backbenchers, while simultaneously using sticks and carrots to maximize the party leverage at the behest of the party president.

The challenge for leaders in clientelistic parties is to coordinate a steady flow of resources for *electioneering* and private gain, while simultaneously overcoming daunting collective action problems that befalls heterogeneous and organizationally weak parties. To overcome that challenge inequalities of power may become functional, and since most backbenchers are indifferent to position taking, party discipline is more worthwhile than in personalistic parties. When a single faction or boss can control the national party organization that has access to state resources, they can control party and enforce a corrupt version of party discipline, while benefiting from extra earmarks, campaign funds, and

greater influence over party-controlled resources. The key assumption is that party leaders in clientelistic parties personally benefit from advancing the collective party interest.

Party organization and clientelism

I argue that, when vote buying is the modal electoral strategy for most legislators in a given party, they will eschew both the collective reputations for policy accomplishments and individual position-taking, as well as delegate credit claiming to brokers. As discussed before, this departure from standard assumptions implies lower agency losses, and a weaker caucus organization. The implication is that, compared to classic personalism, clientelism will strengthen party leaders. Clientelism also affects party organization because of the emphasis in the private gain and corruption, which creates incentives for secrecy and concentration of power.

If a boss or faction comes to dominate the national party organization, backbenchers will come to depend on them for their political survival and private gain. Boss domination is far from being an impossibility in clientelistic parties, as some scholars suggest. For example, Speakers of the House like Joseph Cannon and Thomas Reed imposed their will through the lavish distribution of spoils and patronage. Indeed, the apex of party power in the U.S coincides precisely with the height of machine politics (Brown & Halaby, 1987, p. 598). Many scholars of clientelism even go so far as to assume that "strong party organization" is functional to vote buying. For example, Kitschelt (2000) argues that "clientelist parties often can handle the complexity of material resource flows only through heavy investments in the administrative infrastructure of multilevel political machines that reach from the summits of national politics down to the municipal level" (p. 849).

In the case of Brazil, boss domination is also a possibility. For example, Mainwaring (1999) notes that in Brazil "patronage and clientelism are used to *win control of the party machine*, to win votes, and to *build support for governing*" (p. 185 *emphasis added*). Moreover, he contends that "control of the party machine ensures control over all state-level nominations", and that patronage is "important in determining internal organizational control", and that "patronage is widely used to win the support of party delegates" and whoever "has the most delegates essentially controls the party" (p. 186).[14] Does this reality not affect the national party organization? I believe it does. But that image of strong party bosses is at odds with the view that many have of Brazilian parties and clientelism in general. Clientelism does not necessarily lead to weak leadership as many have assumed, and that distinguishes that type of party from their personalistic counterparts, as I will demonstrate that empirically in chapters 4 and 5.

Critics may point out that legislators always have the option of switching parties if their leaders are denying them resources, blunting leaders' power over them. However, it is still true that in their new party the same logic of deference to party leaders may apply. Many parties in Brazil are "for rent", but some of them have owners, without a good relationship with their leaders little can be achieved, and party switching is the only option. Joining a new party may guarantee each legislators a *minimal* access of resources, but any party-controlled resource above that minimum must be negotiated with. Legislators can switch parties all they want, but once they land in a party tightly controlled by a party boss,

[14] An important clarification is that Mainwaring (1999) was referring to parties at the state level, not the national level. However, I believe the same is true for the national level, at least for some parties, such as the PR.

such as the PR, they must cooperate with leadership to advance their control over scarce resources.

Clientelistic bosses will seek to build hierarchical and concentrated organizations because that facilitates their rule and is functional for individual members, who are not very interest in policy but are starved for discretionary resources that can only be obtained collectively. As these parties gain more resources, they attract more legislators. The fact that parties such as the PP and PR have continued to grow over the past decades despite recurring scandals of corruption suggest the success of that strategy. Their legislators may switch parties if they are dissatisfied with their share of the spoils, but in their new party the overall "war chest" may be smaller to share.

Clientelism also affects party organization through the imperative for political corruption and brokerage. Clientelism requires transactions between office holders at the local, state and national level. While federal deputies specialize in obtaining federal resources, mayors and other brokers transform such resources into discretionary cash for kickbacks and vote buying through corruption. Clientelistic parties facilitate those bargains by decreasing transaction costs and giving members a common interest in increasing party power. When parties are involved in corruption, they need to make sure someone trustworthy is in charge, both to protect information from leaking and to protect their members from liability. The less rank and file know about illegal schemes the better, facilitating concentration of power.

The organizational trait of boss dominated clientelistic parties is hierarchy at the top, combined with decentralized personal networks at the bottom. Indeed, the very definition of machine parties assumes hierarchical organizations. For example, Guterbock

(1980) defines party machines as "a *tight, hierarchical organization*, includes party agents at the grass roots level, and systematically distributes patronage among its members" (p. 3 *emphasis added*). Ames (2002a), describing parties in Brazil, comes close to what I term a boss dominated clientelistic party: a "governing machine based on two fundamental points: unity of the top leaders and division at the bottom, at the level of the bases" (p. 128). [15] As Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) argue, clientelism requires "building organizational *hierarchies* of exchange between electoral clients on the ground floor of the system, various levels of brokers organized in a *pyramidal fashion, and patrons at the top*" (p. 8 *emphasis added*). In all these definitions, hierarchical control is a dominant feature, while certain level of decentralized network exists at the bottom.

This organizational structure is analogous to the organization of the Sicilian Mafia lead by the Corleonesi faction in the 80's, centralized at the top but relying on personal networks at the bottom (Stille, 1995). Their hegemony was based on their control over heroin trafficking, which altered the relative balance of power that marked the Cosa Nostra in the prior period. Similarly, when a boss dominates access to resources in a clientelistic party, as Valdemar did in the Transportation Ministry, they are likely dominate the rest of the party, including party discipline, no matter how "personalistic" the organization is. The Sicilian mafia was as personalistic as an organization can be, run by families as it was, but even so asymmetries of power engendered hierarchy at the top. The same combination of

[15] Even though Ames (2002a) rejects clientelism out right because it "drag along intellectual baggage that is wrong or misleading", claiming that the "anthropologists' concept of clientelism travels poorly" (p. 24), in his empirical analysis of party organization he feels forced to use the language of machine-politics, and even admits to the possibility that party bosses can dominate their parties at the local level through patronage, noting for example that "ACM's power was most evident in his own party" (p. 90).

personal networks at the bottom coexisting a with strong boss at the top is possible political parties.

While boss control is a distinct possibility, there is no deterministic relationship between clientelism and centralization, in my view. My contribution is to show, counter to Lyne (2008a) and Desposato (2007) that boss domination is possible equilibrium, even in a candidate-centered system such as Brazil. Both in the case of the history of the Cosa Nostra and in the case of the U. S. during the machine-era we find powerful bosses at the helm of personalistic organizations, however, their reign is usually shorter than the period of balance of power and factional division. While clientelistic parties clearly can be centralized and hierarchical, is it also clear that not all such parties will be led by a single powerful boss. Like in the history of the Cosa Nostra, boss domination can ebb and flow depending on the relative balance of power with the organization.

Party ideal types

Scholars have long argued that party organization is important to explain legislative behavior (for example see Panebianco, 1988; Mainwaring, 1999; Levitsky, 2003). As argued before, Samuels (1999) suggests that party organization can moderate the individualizing incentives from the electoral arena. Doing so allows parties to coordinate elections, decrease intra-party competition and promote selection mechanisms that ensures ideologically compatible candidates are placed on the ballot. Therefore, we can depart from the assumption that formal institutions do not determine party organization, even though

they may create incentives to form certain types of parties. Formal institutions certainly aren't irrelevant, after all, the fact that strong party organization in Brazil is the exception to the rule (as we shall see in the next chapters) seems to confirm the personalistic incentives from the electoral arena.

But because institutions are not deterministic and party organization is shown to moderate their effects, my contribution is to show how clientelism generates a type of party organization also moderates and mediates the effect of institutions, which can be conducive to party discipline. While this clientelistic based form party discipline may be as exceptional as strong party organization in Brazil, any theory does well to clarify what the exceptions are and what causal mechanisms explain them. I argue that party discipline is observationally equivalent in responsible parties, as well as in boss dominated clientelistic machines. Therefore, we must differentiate these parties with precision, because only then will we be able to ascertain which causal mechanism is producing discipline, either ideological cohesion or clientelistic boss rule.

Distinguishing each party type will also have important normative implications and is very relevant for debates around political reform and cartelization of the political system. We must not assume that party discipline is always normatively desirable, lest we incorrectly classify a corrupt party machine as a responsible and cohesive mass-party.

If it is true that party discipline is possible in a boss dominated clientelistic machine, then the challenge is to distinguish this type of party from others in which party discipline should also exist. The test of party discipline itself can only tell us if it is present in a given party or not, it is silent on the causal mechanism that produced those results. Therefore,

accurately classifying parties as responsible or clientelistic is key to distinguish those district causal mechanisms that may produce discipline.

Moreover, having a clear typology is important because is it challenging to distinguish clientelistic parties from catch-all/personalistic parties, and many scholars see no distinction necessary. Consequently, it is important to measure personalism and clientelism separately to investigate their different effects. This is especially true in a candidate-centered system such as Brazil, that promotes the personal vote generally. Therefore, we must establish what are the empirical implication of my typology so that we can classify parties along two relevant dimensions, personalism, on the one hand, and clientelism, on the other.

To conceptually distinguish clientelistic parties from its alternatives it is useful to conceptualize the electoral arena as a market. Analogous to customers who have different incomes and preferences, and who tend to prefer different brands, voters differ in their levels of income and preferences as well, leading them to prefer different party types and brands, organized around different linkage strategies and ideologies. For example, voters become increasingly susceptible to clientelistic exchange as income goes down and access to regular market opportunities dwindle (Stokes et al., 2013; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). As income increases, however, ordinary voters tend to demand more non-conditional linkages, including pork barrel, case work and public policy.

It is this variation in voter demand that creates different types of parties, as parties must functionally adapt their organization to meet the different demands. Each party-type organizes itself around different primary goals and career incentives, seeking to attract

different types of voters and in turn demanding different types of party organization, both in the elections and in the legislature. I posit three different types of party organizations as pertinent for this study: clientelistic, personalistic catch-all[16] and mass-bureaucratic[17] (see Figure 3.1).

Figure 3. 1 Party Ideal Types



[16] Catch-all parties are defined by Kirchheimer (1990): "these parties recruited members, they did not, and in practical terms could not, restrict their appeal to particular classes, but rather had to make broader appeals, trying to catch support from all classes" (p. 12). "Abandoning attempts at the intellectual and moral *encadrement* of the masses, it is turning more fully to the electoral scene, trying to exchange effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and more immediate electoral success. The narrower political task and the immediate electoral goal differ sharply from the former all-embracing concerns; today the latter are seen as counter-productive since they deter segments of a potential nationwide clientele" (p. 52)

[17] Mass parties are defined as: "the recruiting of members is a fundamental activity, both from the political and the financial standpoints. In the first place, the party aims at the political education of the working class, at picking out from it an élite capable of taking over the government and the administration of the country: the members are therefore the very substance of the party, the stuff of its activity. Without members, the party would be like a teacher without pupils. Secondly, from the financial point of view, the party is essentially based upon the subscriptions paid by its members: the first duty of the branch is to ensure that they are regularly collected" (Duverger, 1990, p. 41) "Hence, party unity and discipline are not only practically advantageous, but are also normatively legitimate. This legitimacy depends, in turn, on direct popular involvement in the formulation of the party programme and, from an organizational perspective, this implies the need for an extensive membership organization of branches or cells in order to provide avenues for mass input into the party's policy-making process, as well as for the supremacy of the extra-parliamentary party, particularly as embodied in the party congress" (Katz & Mair, 1995, p. 7)

Following the convention, when parties offer mostly party-based programmatic politics, I classify such parties as mass-bureaucratic (Duverger, 1990).[18] When most legislators in a party focus on the individual delivery of pork barrel, constituency service and position-taking, such parties fall under the catch-all personalism rubric. While is it is possible to find catch-all parties that rank low on the personalism dimension, and we might call them party-centered/catch-all, those parties are unlikely to exist in a candidate-centered system, so I will ignore them here.

Finally, there are clientelistic machines, which can be both dominated by a boss/faction or be marked by balance of power between competing factions. Moreover, such parties can exist in both party-centered and candidate-centered systems. Indeed, several scholars use that distinction to classify different types of clientelistic parties. For example, Lyne (2008a) uses the exact same terminology as I do, arguing that the differences between these two types of clientelism is:

> Driven by how institutional rules determine who 'owns' the clientelist networks and maintains the reputation for delivering. With party-centered rules in which voters are allowed only a choice between different parties, the party will ''own'' the clientelist networks and will be the agent with the reputation for delivering. (p. 117)

[18] Another possible party type is the mass-populist party which is defined as "characterized by mass support from the urban working class and/or peasantry; a strong element of mobilization from above; a central role of leadership from the middle sector or elite, typically of a personalistic and/or charismatic nature; and an anti-status quo, nationalist ideology and program" (Collier & Collier, 1991, 788; cited in Levitsky & Burgess, 2003). I do not explore this type, since my focus is to explain legislative parties, and populism usually pertains to presidents. I will sidestep this relevant issue, leaving it for future research to address.

Additionally, Berenschot & Aspinall (2020) have a very similar typology, they term candidate-centered clientelism as "community-centered" clientelism, which they define it as being present when "party control over state resources is weak and politicians rely more on personal, nonparty networks" (p. 3).

In contrast, according to Lyne (2008a), in candidate-centered systems "individual politicians 'own' their own clientelist networks and maintain the reputation for delivering. Under these conditions, the party's most effective electoral strategy will be to free individual politicians to make their own decisions about legislative voting" (p. 118). Therefore, my classification in Figure 3.1 is supported by the extant literature on the topic.

Another party type is the responsible mass-party. In such a party legislators will value their collective programmatic reputation, and they should delegate more power to leaders, but at the same time empower caucus organizations to constrain the leader to the will of the majority. In Brazil's candidate-centered system, responsible parties must invest in organization to overcome personalistic electoral incentives (Samuels, 1999). Additionally, given party organization prowess, broad agreement among legislators is built from the ground up, and therefore, we should find high and consistent levels party unity scores, irrespective if they are in government or in the opposition. Such elevated and reliable degree of party unity is a reflection not just of party discipline, but also the result of the broad agreement that exists in the party, as well as institutional routines that increase consensus over conflict. For example, any disagreement are discussed in caucus meetings, but when voting on the floor the party prefers to show a unified front despite those disagreements.

Because party brands have value, responsible parties tend to draw more support from voters who to cast their ballots for the party label, instead of for individual candidates (in Brazil both types of votes are allowed). More ballots cast for the party label has the effect of decreasing the need for intra-party competition (Samuels, 1999). Even if the vast majority of voters cast their ballots for candidates, not parties, the former should be concentrated in mass-bureaucratic parties. Moreover, mass-bureaucratic parties will have more party identifiers in the electorate. This is a direct result of their brand building strategy. But parties must cultivate such behavior among their supporters, and for other parties that strategy just doesn't pay off.

In a catch-all personalistic party, the empirical implications are quite distinct. Here, the party brand name has less importance to voters or legislators, instead it is individual reputations for performance and legislative accomplishments that really matters. Legislators seek to distinguish themselves from other candidates in their own party (Shugart & Carey, 1992). As the incentives to care for the collective brand decrease so do the incentives to build strong party organization, and the function of ideological screening and indoctrination is largely ignored. As they focus on personal appeals, and since they lack strong party organization, such parties will lack an "ideological glue" and preferences will tend to be heterogeneous. Without a common agenda, backbenchers will have little incentive to strengthen leadership power, who in turn focus on bargaining factional conflicts. Therefore, party leaders will also lack a broad mandate to impose the party will, even if they formally have strong powers.

Because individual reputations for legislative accomplishments trump the collective reputation, classic personalistic parties will be more loyal to constituents than to the party leader. Consequently, these parties do not invest in increasing the number of party identifiers or party-label votes, as legislators prefer voters that are personally loyalty to them, because should they ever switch to another party, they want to bring their supporters with them. Personalistic parties corresponds closely to Aldrich's (1995) concept of committee-centered intralegislative arrangement, a leadership style focuses on bargaining that resembles the "textbook era" of the U.S. House of Representatives. Legislators in such parties prefer legislative independence, lest they be forced to vote against the will of their constituents. Therefore, they should rank lower on all measures of the "personalistic dimension," they should prefer less delegation of power to leaders and they show less electoral dependency on the party label.

Finally, clientelistic parties rely on corruption, vote buying and patronage to gain public office more than any other party, therefore, we should find higher levels of clientelism and corruption in such parties compared to the others. These parties deemphasize both collective and individual *policy-based* linkages but strongly value private-gain. For these parties, corruption scandals don't affect the party brand, in fact, these parties should become more powerful as they are caught in recurrent corruption scandal, because they benefit from the extra resources obtained through corruption without losing their core supporters.

In clientelistic parties legislators are unconstrained by constituents, and as such they have little reason to defect from the party line. While a party boss may control the national

organization, they do not have the institutional capacity to screen and indoctrinate supporters and candidates. They seldom would desire such capacity, because party members wouldn't be able to agree on which ideology the party would push onto new members. As such, preferences will tend to be heterogeneous, and in this regard, they are similar to the personalistic ideal type. Clientelistic legislators do not delegate as much power to leaders as in mass-parties, but, on the other hand, caucus and other collective organization are also too weak to constrain leaders, as they do in mass-parties. Therefore, caucus organization will have a secondary role in clientelistic parties, meeting less frequently and placing less constrains on leaders. While heterogeneity of preferences may be high in clientelistic parties, the low payoff of position taking makes ideological disagreements less contentious, which makes it cheaper to follow the party. Moreover, because they still need to run individualized campaigns and may switch parties if convenient, they have little interest in formal delegation of power. Moreover, we should find virtually no identifiers in the electorate and all ballots should be cast on candidates, not the party label. But they also will be more willing to follow the party whip compared to personalistic parties, since voters also don't constrain legislators on policy issues.

At this point we need to be even more precise on how clientelistic based organizations are distinct from classic personalism, given some similarities, and the widespread confusion on this point in the extant literature. While there may be an association or elective affinity between personalism and clientelism, we cannot conflate the two, as many scholars do. My point is to analytically separate concepts that are not synonymous. For example, we should not place to much analytical weight on the fact that

clientelism typically happens within personal networks, that does not make it equivalent to personalism. Personal connections, loosely defined, is an important aspect of clientelism in Brazil as it is in Argentina, broadly considered an example of a strong and institutionalized party-centered system in Latin America (Jones, 2002). Despite their party-centered electoral rule, personal connections are the modal mechanism by which most voters associate with parties. Party organization is extremely weak and is usually captured by local notables and their clientelistic networks, particularly in the provinces (Auyero, 2001; Levitsky, 2003; Jones & Hwang, 2005). In sum, clientelistic parties in Brazil rely on personal networks, as clientelistic parties in Argentinian do as well, despite the differences in electoral rule and in party identification.

The important point is that the party structure in clientelistic parties is distinct from the "personal vote theory" (Cain et al., 1987). The main difference between a personalistic party and a clientelistic one is that in first individuals depend on position taking in the first, giving them a greater interest in checking the power of the leadership. They will prefer a leadership style that focuses on negotiation rather than based on discipline.

Moreover, the different electoral connections imply that in personalistic parties the collective party brand name is still a liability. Since voters are not being bought, they can still hold elected officials accountable if the party involves itself in severe corruption scandals. While the size of the electoral swing may be smaller in personalistic parties compared to mass-parties, it may make the different in close races. Candidates in such parties hide their party from advertisements and constantly rebrand because voters may have come to associate their brand with corruption, given recurrent scandals. This has

implications to party behavior, for example, in personalistic parties, leaders will be more willing to expel members caught in corruption scandals than compared to clientelistic ones. Moreover, personalistic parties will be less likely to join the coalition government if the President is from a party that defends an ideology that is completely at odds with that of the party. Clientelistic parties, in contrast, will seldom expel members because of scandals and will always prefer to be part of the governing coalition. [19] Finally, in clientelistic parties, power will be more concentrated than in personalistic parties, because there are fewer incentives to check leaders, for example, by empowering committees or the caucus.

In a nutshell, if a party displays evidence of discipline, we must first rule out the possibility that discipline is being produced by conditional party government and strong party organization. As we will see in the next chapters, in Brazil only PT has a party organization strong enough to "fit the bill" of conditional party government. Therefore, if a party shows evidence of party discipline but does not resemble in PT in any other aspect, we must investigate the possibility of clientelistic party discipline. If that party also has extreme values on our measures of corruption and clientelism but has none of the other traits of responsible parties, then the only plausible explanation is that bossism and clientelism is producing party discipline. Otherwise, the received wisdom has no explanation, because according to them, clientelism should never generate party discipline, and at the very least, not in a candidate-centered system like Brazil.

[19] Membership to the governing coalition play a small role in my theory because in practice clientelistic parties are almost never in the opposition, therefore, there is very little variation to explore empirically.

Conclusion

In sum, we should expect some level of party discipline both in the responsible parties and in clientelistic ones. In the case of clientelistic parties, party discipline should occur particularly when one faction dominates the party national organization and when the party has access to resources. Therefore, party type is a critical intervening variable that separates otherwise observationally equivalent results. Given its critical importance we need to closely examine party type empirically so that we can classify parties along the two dimensions described above, which is the topic of the next two chapters.

Chapter 4: Classifying Parties in Brazil using qualitative data

Introduction:

This chapter has the purpose of introducing the main "cast of characters" in our story, describing each of the largest and most significant Brazilian parties in the last three decades. My aim is to help the reader classify the parties within the typology described in the previous chapter, focusing on three party types: catch all personalistic, mass bureaucratic and candidate-centered clientelistic. In this chapter I will specifically focus on each party's history, symbols, ideology, and organization. The evidence is drawn from interviews conducted by the author, newspaper reports and secondary literature. With these "priors" about each party, readers will be in a better position to evaluate and "triangulate" the quantitative data about them in the next chapter. If the qualitative evidence presented in this chapter is corroborated by the quantitative data presented in the next chapter, we can have more confidence that we are correctly classifying these parties.

Workers Party - *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (PT)

The PT has long been considered the most institutionalized, organized, and cohesive party in Brazil. It was founded officially in 1980, although it had already begun to organize during the 70's, in opposition to the right-wing military regime of the time. Since their inception, it was closely associated with grassroots social movements and labor unions (Samuels & Zucco, 2018). According to Samuels (2004), it was formed by a

"hodgepodge of Marxists of all shades of red, liberation theology–oriented Catholic base community activists, moderate intellectuals, and union and social movement leaders" (p. 1002).

One of its main symbols is former president Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, or Lula. Undoubtably, the party's popularity increased because of Lula, who's government promoted economy growth and popular social programs, that lifted millions of Brazilians out of poverty. Indeed, Lula's popularity was so great that in 2009 President Obama famously stated that he was "the most popular politician on Earth." Despite his influential charisma, the PT is not considered a "mass populist" party (Levitsky, 2001), which have among its defining characteristics "personalistic, charismatic leadership and a relative lack for formal institutionalization." Instead, it is better classified as "mass-bureaucratic" (Samuels, 2004, p. 1001), given its strong party organization and institutionalized internal practices.

In terms of ideology, initially, in the late 80' and 90', the PT adopted a strong and clear socialist stance, but over time they have moderated that position (Samuels & Lucas, 2010). In part this was due to former President Lula's rise to power in 2002, when he purposefully distanced himself from the party's socialist ideology for electoral expediency (Samuels & Shugart, 2010). Nevertheless, the party is still strongly identified with the left (Hunter, 2007; Samuels & Lucas, 2010) and is still one of the most ideologically cohesive party in Brazil. Commenting on evidence of ideological cohesion, Samuels and Lucas (2010) argue that "the Brazilian party system has consolidated into the 'PT and the rest'"

(p. 53). While the PT is clearly ideologically distinguishable and to the left of other parties, the "rest" is "fundamentally indistinguishable from one another" (Samuels & Lucas, 2010, p. 49). Indeed, when I asked about ideological coherence to a PT federal deputy, they remarked: "I think we have a very high degree of ideological convergence. If I were to measure it on a scale from one to ten, I would say that we are close to an eight or nine."[20]

In terms of party organization, Mainwaring et al. (2018) describes this party as the "best organized party in Brazilian history," identifying it as a mass-party. Samuels (2004) converges on the same opinion, arguing that the PT "fits Katz and Mair's (1995) description of a 'mass' party perfectly" (p. 1000). Moreover, Hunter (2007) argues that the PT conforms well to "Shefter's conception of an externally mobilized party" (p. 447), to the same effect. As Samuels (1999) argues, their investment in party organization is the key factor explaining their behavior, particularly how they managed to circumvent the personalistic incentives of the electoral system, while placing an emphasis on ideological screening, and indoctrination. As a legislative party, the PT was long been characterized by the highest levels of party unity, both in the opposition and in government, separating it in that regard from other parties (Hunter, 2007).

As we shall explore in more detail in next chapter, the PT also has the highest number of followers in the electorate by far, around 30% at its peak in 2012 (Samuels & Zucco, 2018, p. 32). Part of its success in mobilizing identifiers is due to their close and strong links to labor unions, social movements, and civil society organizations (Samuels &

[20] Personal interview (PT Federal Deputy #2)

Zucco, 2018), including, for example, the *Central Única dos Trabalhadores* (CUT) and *Movimento dos Sem Terra* (MST).[21] Such close and organic ties with organized civil society has been a distinguishing trait of the PT (Samuels & Zucco, 2018).

Despite its success, since 2003 the Workers Party has been continuously involved in corruption scandals, and there is some evidence that they "diversified electoral strategies" to some extent. For example, as Hunter (2007) points out, the PT has been relying more on personalistic and clientelistic strategies since taking control of the Presidential office in 2002. Ribeiro (2010) also points out how its party organization has become increasingly dominated by the hegemonic faction in recent years, with the aim of winning the presidency. Nonetheless, such changes are unlikely to radically alter the PT's party organization, especially in the legislative branch. Hunter (2007) argues that even while the party did increase their personalistic and clientelistic linkage strategies over the years, its strong party organization also made the party somewhat resilient to change. Additionally, Ribeiro (2010) contends that despite changes it has still preserved internal democracy to a larger extent than probably any other party. The PT still has the largest following, is the most organized, ideologically distinctive and cohesive party in Brazil.

Nevertheless, those changes did have some noticeable impacts, particularly for the party in the electorate. For example, Samuels and Zucco (2018) show how identification with the PT has decreased over time and how the PT adopted a more flexible coalition building strategy. Corruption scandals have also affected the party, take, for example, the

[21] CUT is the largest union in the country and the MST is a squatter movement that seeks agrarian reform and land redistribution.

fact that in the 2016 municipal elections, the party suffered its worst defeat in 12 years. That loss in prestige is a telltale sign that the collective reputation of the party matters to voters, their losses can be linked to their success in promoting their brand, and they are in that sense a "victim of their own success" (Samuels & Zucco, 2018).

If we needed a base line or reference point by with which to classify Brazilian parties, none is better than the PT. This is the party that most closely conforms to the ideal of a mass-party and allows us to test the conditional party government hypothesis (**H4**). Therefore, we can only apply the conditional party government theory to other parties if those parties are similar to the PT. But, as we shall see in this chapter and the next, no other party comes close to the PT in terms of resembling a mass-party.

Brazilian Democratic Movement Party - *Partido Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* (PMDB)

Founded in 1966, the PMDB is the oldest party still in existence today, owing to the fact that the PMDB was the only opposition party allowed during the military regime. The PMDB has consistently been one of the largest parties in Brazil, playing a pivotal role in the legislative branch. In 1986 it obtained the majority of seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and while their power has declined significantly since, they have always been among the largest parties in the Chamber. One of the most well-known symbols in the early days of the party was Ulisses Guimarães, known for his defense of democracy during the

military dictatorship. He also presided over the constitutional convention of 1988, demonstrating his political clout.

The PMDB has a tradition of centrism and ideological heterogeneity that has endured since its founding. Initially, it was an umbrella party that was composed by a variety of political groups, that only had in common their opposition the military regime. According to Mainwaring (1999) in the early days the party "included everything from clandestine leftist organizations (including the two communist parties) to conservatives, but the social democratic current was arguably the strongest" (p. 91). During the 80's it was "one of the ideologically most diffuse parties in the world" (Mainwaring, 1999, p. 161). For example, their party program in 1996 focused on the issue of "expanding and defending democracy" (Abreu et al., 2010), which is quite vague ideologically. In Congress there is also little signs of unity or solidarity, according to one deputy: "the standard here is everyone for themselves" (Mainwaring, 1999, p. 163). As such, the PMDB has been classified as a catch-all, centrist (Mainwaring et al., 2018), and ideologically heterogenous (Power & Rodrigues-Silveira, 2018).

On the topic of ideological cohesion and party unity in roll call votes, one PMDB staff remarked:

> In the last years, there has been a tendency towards unity. But we must have in mind the party's history. Since its founding it's a history of being an umbrella that embraces several tendencies but having unity in their position against the military dictatorship, in the past. Therefore, diversity is at the essence of the PMDB. But it

knows how to thrive in diversity. Within the PMDB there are several tendencies, several different ideas, that is normal and is part of the party's history, and it continues today. Not everyone thinks the same way. However, on the big salient issues the PMDB has always tried to reconcile and meet and debate internally, so that we could arrive at a unified position on those most important national topics debated in the Chamber. So, you can talk about a consensus within a dissensus. The PMDB has always been able to deal with that confluence, working its internal differences so it could have a unique external position, so to say. There were few times of disagreements, usually because one issue could hurt a particular legislator that couldn't follow the party recommendation, but generally they do follow it.[22]

Their party organization is classified as decentralized (Mainwaring et al., 2018) and is seen as weak and dysfunctional. For example, according to Mainwaring (1999), one of the members of the PMDB's National Executive Party Committee in the 90's stated that "we don't decide anything; we merely approve deliberations already made in informal meetings," noting that the National Committee was "fraught with internal conflicts, became paralyzed through inactivity" (p. 154). Additionally, according to a party leader, they avoided meeting because "internal divisions would become exacerbated if party organs debated polemical policy questions" (Mainwaring, 1999, p. 155).

As one staff member remarked:

[22] Personal interview PMDB staff #1

> what I perceived in my time here is that the state party directorates have a lot of freedom. If you conduct a historical analysis, you will see that the state directorates always had more freedom to ally with whatever party they wanted, independent of the national coalition strategy, because they know better the local political situation.[23]

This decentralization is not, however, necessarily associated to internal democracy, instead, Mainwaring (1999) argues that the organization of Brazil's catch-all parties are "oligarchical; at most, a handful of leaders generally dominate the state-level parties" (p.160). In fact, there is also some evidence bossism at the national level in recent years. For example, take Michel Temer's control over the party starting around 2014. According to a plea bargain, Michel Temer became president of the party in 2014 precisely to manage a large amount of illegal campaign money originating from a complex corruption scheme involving multiple parties and business (Alencastro & Barretto, 2016). Moreover, Temer was formally charged for being the head of a criminal organization within the party (Odilla, 2017). According to the prosecutor of that case, Temer "gave the necessary stability and security to the criminal conspiracy, being at the same time the pilar of the organization and its top." When asked about the distribution of power between legislators, the caucus, and the leaders in the PMDB, one deputy remarked: "I think that in the PMDB the leaders have a lot of influence over the party."[24]

[23] *Ibid*.
[24] Personal interview PMDB staff #1

Moreover, when I asked a staff member "who were the recent party leaders with the most influence at the national level," they answered the following:

> The PMDB had several important leaders. The former president Michel Temer always was a very strong leader at the national level in the most recent history of the party. Going back in time, Ulisses Guimarães was always an icon of the party. But during the most recent times, Temer is one of the major leaders, who presided the party for a long time. The others just don't have the same level of national influence as he does.[25]

Nevertheless, while no doubt there is some evidence pointing towards concentration of power, that process is not as extensive as in other parties. For example, the party split on the issue of Dilma's impeachment, and there were several public conflicts within the caucus, with legislative leaders being replaced more than once in a short time span. But ultimately Temer emerged victorious in that struggle, somewhat consolidating power afterwards. Therefore, there is some evidence of centralization in the PMDB at the national level, but it coexists with organizational weakness, heterogeneity, and low party identification in the electorate. Moreover, as we will see in the next chapter, boss domination of the party organization in the PMDB is less extensive than in the PR or PTB, for example.

Regarding party discipline, not even a powerful leader will be able to impose strict discipline in such a heterogenous party. As one federal deputy remarked, following the

[25] *Ibid.*

party leader "depends a lot on the profile of each deputy. Some are more obedient or subservient, but they follow the leader. And there are also those who are more independent."[26] On the issue of sanctions, the same legislator remarked that: "Obviously, if there is a leader in the party and the deputy doesn't follow the leader there is always a discomfort. But it depends on the profile of each deputy."[27] This testimony does not give us the image of high levels of consensus or "ironclad" discipline. Therefore, the PMDB seems to have elements of catch-all personalism and after 2014 it seems to combine them with some elements of bossism.

Brazilian Social Democratic Party - *Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira* (PSDB)

The PSDB was born inside Congress, as a splinter cell of the PMDB in the late 80's. Although they portrayed themselves as to the left of the PMDB, Roma (2002) argues that the reason for the split was more about factional conflicts and disputes over resources then principled ideological disagreements. Moreover, since its birth, the PSDB was conceived as a vehicle for presidential ambitions, given that the dispute in the PMDB for a place on the presidential ballot was crowded during the late 80's, creating a new party was easier than fighting established factions inside the PMDB. Also, according to Roma (2002), at the onset, the party had little organic connections with labor unions or social movements. As a party borne out of parliament, it's closer the ideal type of cadre or elite

[26] Personal interview PMDB federal deputy #1
[27] *Ibid.*

party than a mass-party, and their primary loyal supporters come disproportionally from middle class and wealthy individuals in São Paulo.

The main symbol of the party is Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), who was the President of Brazil from 1995 to 2002, and who is a distinguished sociologist, known for his work on dependency theory. This intellectual pedigree no doubt contributes to the imaginary of the party. FHC was also widely acknowledged for controlling hyperinflation and securing macroeconomic stability. Another important figure in the party is José Serra, who also has an academic pedigree, and was governor of São Paulo, the richest and most populous state in the country. There is also Aécio Neves, former governor of Minas Gerais, who was a presidential contender in 2014 and was the president of the party from 2013 to 2017. His career, however, was marked by scandals, and that may have affected the party brand. Most recently João Doria, governor of São Paulo, has shown his ambition of being the standard-bearer of the party. He portrays himself as a programmatic, center-right and competent politician, who "gets things done." He is currently engaged in factional disputes in his attempt to exert a greater control over the party, with some success.

Mainwaring et al. (2018) classifies this party as being "originally" a "western European-style social democratic party" (p. 198). Indeed, the PSDB initially defined itself as such, blending a neoliberal macroeconomic policy agenda with some more progressive views, such as reducing inequality and advancing agrarian reform. According to Roma (2002), such a left-leaning tinge was "explicitly manifest" in the party's mobilization and

the ideological indoctrination of its militants, particularly in the early years of its foundation (p. 74).

Nevertheless, it has clearly moved to the right of the political spectrum given its early and enduring alliances with right-wing parties, namely the DEM, the PTB and PP, (Power & Rodrigues-Silveira, 2018, p. 258; Roma, 2002). Such alliances solidified the neoliberal nature of the party's program and endures to this day. Another piece of evidence of that shift to the right is that in the 90's, as the party grew, most of new candidates joining the party originated from right-wing parties (Roma, 2002). Moreover, many senior party members identified as conservative and pro-market, a "considerable number" were linked to the preexisting right-wing military regime (Roma, 2002, p. 84). According to Power and Rodrigues-Silveira (2018) they:

> First moved rightward for programmatic reasons, as a champion of neoliberal reforms in the 1990s. By the time of the second Cardoso government (1999–2002), it was already perceived as a center-right party, and its reputation shifted even further right after the political polarization of 2013–2016 and the impeachment of PT's president Dilma Rousseff. (p. 256)

In sum, the pro-market ideology is the enduring ideological trait of the PSDB. Despite those considerations, according to Samuels and Lucas (2010), the PSDB is ideologically indistinguishable from other parties such as the PMDB and the DEM.

The PSDB has been very competitive in presidential election. The party's desire to control the presidency may even provide incentives to improve their collective brand among voters (Guarnieri, 2011). As one deputy contended:

> the parties that have viable candidates for the presidential office usually show concern with their local alliances. (…) Since the PSDB always runs a competitive candidate for president, the presidential election is always a priority for the party. When it's the priority, the party tries to have some coherence in its alliances, so that they don't hurt the chances of the presidential candidate.[28]

In terms of their mobilization strategy and their following in the electorate, while it doesn't have as large a following as the PT, it does have a small but loyalty membership particularly in the state of São Paulo, where it has dominated state politics for decades. However, according to Roma (2002) their militants have little influence in the party, he argues that the PSDB was a weak, decentralized party organization structured around the independent decision of leaders. While the party is centralized at the national level, it's decentralization at the local level, giving them more freedom to nominate candidates and form local alliances (Roma, 2002). This allows the party electoral flexibility at the local level, while preserving the power of national leaders to define the national strategy without interference from local leaders. Both levels seem to exist in relative independence. For example, the national level didn't receive basic documents from the lower levels, such as the proceeding of meetings or the list of candidates who joined the party, while the local

[28] Personal interview with PSDB Federal Deputy (#2)

levels seldom communicated with the national level, according to Roma (2002, p. 79). In sum, the main decisions are made by elites within the party, be it at the national or local level, and the party has a low degree of internal democracy, as registered voters have little influence and no veto power.

The coalition national strategy of the party is also revealing. The fact that the PSDB remained in the opposition during the PT presidency from 2002 to 2016 means that there was an obvious reputational cost to be considered. Their neoliberal agenda was simply too much at odds with the PT's brand. Therefore, an alliance with the PT would undermine their reputation as an alternative to them at the national level and as ideologically to their right. Such as alliance would also undermine the presidential ambitions of senior members, especially current or former governors of São Paulo who are the typical contenders for presidential office, and who also have influence within the party. Therefore, by forgoing an alliance with the PT, the party made a clear move that is constrained by reputational concerns. Being so competitive in presidential races gives an extra incentive to safeguard their collective brand.

Another revealing piece of information is the fact that the PSDB's reputation seems to have suffered over time as they involved themselves in corruption scandals. The party's standard-bearer and presidential candidate, Aécio Neves, was involved in several scandals, for example, including the revelation of a recording in which he was caught requesting R$ 2 million from a businessperson during a sting operation. Some party members fought to expel Aécio Neves, but such efforts didn't materialize. Likely because of their tarnished

reputation, in 2018 the party had a meager electoral performance. Nevertheless, consistent with the interpretation that the party is concerned with their reputation, the party did expelled members involved in corruption scandals, such as deputy Domiciano Cabral in 2006.

Finally, regarding their internal dynamics inside Congress, interviews with federal deputies help shed light on that issue. Some deputies noted how the party's legislative leadership is decentralized and democratic. One deputy contented that:

> In our party we don't have a leader who imposes, we have a democratic leader. Guided by what they see as good for the party, they start by hearing people, draw up their conclusions, and try to place the party in a position that is coherent with its history.[29]

Another deputy highlighted the importance of individual preferences over collective decisions. They argued that:

> Influence in the party is individual. The current situation makes that very clear; the individual opinion has primacy over the collective. Sometimes, the individual opinion may aggregate and become a majoritarian opinion, but in the moments when there are disagreements it's very clear that individual opinions are what matter.[30]

[29] Personal interview PSDB federal deputy #1
[30] Personal interview PSDB federal deputy #2

Because of such disagreements in the caucus, deputies reported that it was important to debate issues extensively, especially salient bills. On such bills there seems to be a lot of internal debate to define the party's position.

One deputy recalled that:

> Take for example, the labor reform bill (*terceirização*), the leader didn't know what the average preference for the bill was, and as leaders, if you recommend a vote against the preferences of the caucus you start to lose authority and power, you generate a counter-intuitive result: you can't be the leader of just yourself, you must have support [form the caucus]. So, we had about 3 or 4 meeting about that topic, each legislator spoke, defended their point of view and in the end, there was a vote to decide what the party's position would be. In that case, voting led to a draw and, if I'm not mistaken, in one of the votes for that bill the leader didn't issue a vote recommendation at all, freeing legislators to vote as they wanted.[31]

Another federal deputy agreed with the need for extensive debate in the face of disagreements in the caucus, remarking that: "in the PSDB we debate a lot the topics. Either in the leadership meeting or in the caucus meeting, we want to know each member's position and conduct internal voting on topics."[32] Another deputy gave a more concrete example of such discussions:

[31] Personal interview PSDB federal deputy #3
[32] *Ibid.*

> Today our leader had lunch with the caucus, where he asked about the pension reform bill and all the other reforms on the agenda. Then he reported, if I'm not mistaken, that we meet nine times to debate the pension reform and seven times regarding the labor reforms.[33]

While the need to debate important bills is clear, deputies also expressed how in a busy Congress not all bills can be extensively debated because of time constrains. As a deputy remarked: "there is such a high volume of bills that sometimes these bills are placed on the agenda overnight, in an improvised fashion, that is difficult to meet about that topic beforehand."[34] In those cases and regarding more ordinary bills, the leadership seems to have more sway.

As one deputy expressed:

> The leadership vote recommendation is the northern star that orients the caucus in roll call votes. Theoretically, if you are constantly disagreeing with your party, you must face the fact that you are probably in the wrong party. Disagreements about some specific issues are natural and are part of democracy. But, if you are constantly disagreeing with the decisions of the caucus, that really tells you that you are in the wrong place, in the wrong party, that you should find another way. There isn't an explicit rule about those who vote against the party, what happens in practice, because of the respect to colleges and the leader, is that the legislators that

[33] Personal interview PSDB federal deputy #1
[34] Personal interview PSDB federal deputy #3

plan to vote against the party must let them know beforehand. So, normally, things proceed on a case-to-case basis, considering each legislator's background and history of defending certain issues."[35]

In sum, there is some evidence that the PSDB does care about its collective reputation among voters and the party does have a small but loyal following among voters. Together with their presidential ambition the party seems to be somewhat constrained ideologically. However, this is not a mass-party, and internal democracy is low. There seems to be a division of labor between the national leaders, and the local ones, but centralization and not democracy is the defining trait at both levels. In PSDB in Congress seems to be more horizontal, majoritarian, and focused on the caucus as the main decision-making body. This seems to approximate the PSDB more to a catch-all personalistic party, but as far as they go in Brazil, this party seems to have some elements of ideological constrain and place more value into their collective brand than most.

Democratic Labor Party - *Partido Democrático Trabalhista* (PDT)

The PDT was founded in 1979 by Leonel Brizola, known for his stanch opposition to the right-wing military regime, his defense of progressive labor reforms and of unions. The party has historically had a particularly strong presence in Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul, where Brizola was governor. During its initial years the party was divided

[35] Personal interview PSDB federal deputy #2

into two main tendencies: one that favored a more social democratic pro-labor stance associated with Getúlio Vargas; and another more explicitly socialist. In its founding programmatic document, the party defended democracy, nationalism and socialism. The party is affiliated with Socialist International to this day.

In more recent years, however, the party has moved away from the socialist rhetoric, identifying more as a social democratic labor party, against neoliberal policy, in favor of the reduction of inequality, in defense of social justice, and more strongly associated with Getúlio Vargas's less radical brand of pro-labor politics. The socialism and communist factions are a minority within the party today, as evinced by the fact that their most recent party manifestos don't mention socialism or communism at all. Asked about the ideological cohesion of the party, one deputy answered that it was only "partially" homogenous. According to Mainwaring et al. (2018) the PDT is ideologically associated with the center-left.

The party's alliance strategy shows a higher level of ideological constrain compared to most Brazilian parties. The party has repeatedly allied with the PT and with communist parties at the national level, as well as at the state level, and only participated in the PT government, staying in the opposition for the majority of its history. However, in recent years they have started to diversify their alliance partners, especially at the state and local levels.

In terms of party organization, the party was strongly dominated by the leadership of Leonel Brizola, who was seen as using the party as a vehicle for his presidential

ambitions (Abreu et al., 2010). After his death, Carlos Lupi has taken his place as a dominant leader and has been president of the party since 2004. As we shall see in more detail in the next chapter, Lupi seems to also have a strong control over the national party organization. According to an interview with one federal deputy: "party presidents are very important; they have a lot of influence over the caucus because they have command over their parties. It is a very important office, that also concentrates a lot of power."[36] Moreover, according to the same source, the president of the PDT has tight control over the distribution of party-controlled campaign funds. According to this deputy, the president allocates resources and makes decision based on "personal relationships." Those that lead the state party organizations are typically deputies that have the president's personal trust. That deputy also described the party as a "presidential party, in which there is a very vertical structure of command." According to this deputy:

> The power of command is very personalistic, very personified in the president of the party, because they influence the composition of the state party [temporary] committees. Therefore, the decision that they take is motivated by the decision of the party president. The same thing applies to the electoral fund, that now is in the billions. My perception is that those funds are allocated based on personal connections with the party president, a relationship of trust. There are deputies that defend the party program, but those legislators are not always contemplated with

[36] Personal interview PDT federal deputy #1

resources. However, those that have the personal trust of the party president, they are the ones that are contemplated with resources.[37]

Therefore, the PDT seems to combine two leading elements, one programmatic associated with labor and another personalistic, evinced by the influence of the party president. Compatible with that characterization, Mainwaring (1999) argues for a mixed classification of the party. He argues that most Brazilian parties are "catchall," except "perhaps" the PDT, which in "many ways" resembles a catchall party but is "more disciplined" (p. 19-20). Consistent with that interpretation, party leaders have expelled members who voted against the party line both recently and in the past. Moreover, Ames (2002b) finds that this party has statistically significant evidence party discipline in his analysis (p. 208). However, Mainwaring (1999) also argues that while the party was social democratic in orientation it was "populist and personalistic in style" and that in terms of "party organization and internal dynamics; on a number of dimensions the PDT stands in an intermediate position" (p. 137). Therefore, the PDT does seem to occupy a middle ground, combining elements of a mass-party but with a strong tinge of catch-all personalism.

Democrats - *Democratas* (PFL-DEM)

[37] Personal interview PSDB federal deputy #1

Until 2003 the Democrats was named the Party of the Liberal Front (*Partido da Frente Liberal* - PFL). The DEM was founded in 1985, as a splinter cell of the old PDS, the former ARENA, the party that supported the right-wing military regime. The main reason for the creation of the party was presidential ambition, surrounding conflicts over which candidate would run on the PDS ballot in the 1985 indirect presidential election (Abreu et al., 2010). The PFL was created by governors, especially from the Northeast, which according to Power and Rodrigues-Silveira (2018) is a "historical stronghold of conservative machines" (p. 259). The party continued having a strong base in that region during the 90's, however, by the 2018 election, the share of deputies from the Northeast had greatly diminished, to only 9%.

Ideologically, during its founding it was perceived as the more "soft-line faction" in the PDS, willing to "distance itself from the generals and engage in negotiations" with opposition parties (Power & Rodrigues-Silveira, 2018). For a while, it was considered Brazil's "principal conservative party," and the "leading party of the Brazilian right for the next two decades" (Power & Rodrigues-Silveira, 2018). During the 90's they attempted to rebrand, departing from their earlier stance that combined state-led development with social conservatism, to a more neoliberal agenda, with enthusiastic support for FHC's neoliberal reforms. In their first manifesto they emphasized topics such as economic and political reforms, based on the ideals of individualism, free markets, and the defense of a smaller federal government (Tarouco, 1999). Mainwaring (1999) considered the PFL/DEM to be a catch-all party, while (Mainwaring, et al., 2018) classified it as a clientelistic.

In terms of party organization, it is usually characterized to be weak and divided between different factions. Evidence of that can be seen in the fact that on one occasion many state and local party committees didn't even support the presidential candidate pushed by the national directorate. Party campaigns are "entirely controlled by individual candidates" and "state and local organizations reign supreme" (Mainwaring, 1999, p. 155). Moreover, according to Mainwaring (1999), while the national conventions have important functions on paper, such as "establishing the party program" and "deciding electoral coalitions", but they "in practice do not exercise these powers" (p. 154). In an "unusual situation indicative of the weakness of the national party leadership", during the constitutional congress the president of the party favored joining the opposition against the Sarney government but did not prevail (Mainwaring, 1999, p. 155).

However, during the 90's the party was strongly dominated by Antônio Carlos Magalhães (ACM). According to Ames (2002a), he had an "extraordinary influence, both in Bahia and nationally" (p. 131), which was based on his ability to "co-opt and conciliate potential foes and to manipulate the levers of traditional patronage cum pork" (p. 131). Indeed, he was so powerful that he was "one of the few state leaders in recent Brazilian history who has leveraged regional influence into national predominance before holding national office" (p. 118) and could also "influence" PFL deputies "in the direction of cooperation" (Ames, 2002a, p. 220). However, after his death in 2007 the party became more decentralized since no other faction was able to reach the same level of influence that ACM had.

The coalition strategy of the DEM is also revealing. While it supported all governments before 2002, they remained in the opposition to the PT and were a consistently close partner with the PSDB over the years. Notably, its decision not to join the PT's coalition is telling and sets it apart from other catch-all and clientelistic parties. For example, Power and Rodrigues-Silveira (2018) classify many Brazilian parties as "clientelistic", "parties of power", that rely "heavily on state largesse and the exchange of favors", are "uninterested (if not downright allergic to) programmatic politics" but they curiously don't include the DEM in that category. Instead, they claim that the DEM is one of the "clearest partisan vehicles" for the economic right, which is committed to an agenda of "state shrinking and pro-market reforms" (p. 263).

Therefore, while the Democrats are sometimes classified as clientelistic (Mainwaring et al., 2018), it also displays aspects of catch-all/personalism, namely a small but non-zero concern for the party's collective reputation among voters. For example, the PFL expelled deputy Hidelbrando Pascoal, when he was involved in severe malfeasance charges. In 2006 the party expelled deputy Almir Moura involved in the ambulances scandal. The party also expelled former Senator Demóstenes Torres and deputy Edmas Moreira. More recently they expelled state legislator Arthur do Val, for going against the party in roll call vote. In a purely clientelistic party, no such incentive to expel such members exists, because corruption scandals should not generate negative electoral swings. This repeated behavior of expelling members caught in corruption scandals is telltale sign that the brand name matters more than in a pure clientelistic party. Moreover, the fact that the party didn't join the Workers Party coalition also suggests some level of ideological

constrain. Nevertheless, it's strong association with party machines in the Northeast and repeated scandals places the party closer to the clientelism ideal type, particularly in its early days. Therefore, the party likely combines elements of catch-all personalism with clientelism.

Progressive Party - *Partido Progressista* (PPB-PP)

The Progressive Party was founded in 1995, under the name of PPB (*Partido Progressista Brasileiro*) born from a fusion of two parties, the PPR (*Partido Progressista Reformador*) and the PP (*Partido Progressista*). Those two parties were themselves created from earlier fusions, of particular interest is the PPR, which as the result of the fusion between PDS (*Partido Democrático Social*) and the PDC (*Partido Democrata Cristão*). As mentioned, the PDS was the direct heir of the ARENA, the party that officially supported the right-wing military regime, and the PDS was formed by the most conservative faction within the ARENA. It is also noteworthy the party's constant rebranding. In 2003 they changed their name from PPB to just PP (*Partido Progressista*), and in 2018 they again changed their name to *Progressistas*. That rebranding may be motivated by the recurrent scandals that may have given the brand a poor reputation among voters.

One important leader of the PPR, the PDS and later the PP, was Paulo Maluf, and it's still strongly identified with his leadership. He was the main party national leadership

until 2003, when he was removed from the presidency of the party at the age of 72. His removal demonstrates how influential in the party he really had in the prior period. For example, a fellow party member commenting on the event of his removal stated that the party "no longer belonged to only one person" (Bragon, 2003). This suggests that Maluf had a tight control over the party, but that after his removal it likely became more competitive, with different factions sharing power. Consistent with that later interpretation, Ribeiro et al. (2018) shows that the PP has a stronger party organization and is more internally democratic than the PR, our more typical example of a clientelistic boss party.

In terms of ideology, Mainwaring et al. (2018) consider this party to be conservative. Nevertheless, despite their clear conservative lineage going back to the military regime, over time that brand has been eroded. Part of this may be due to their support for the PT's government and another may be due to their recruitment practices, which seems to focus less on ideological compatibility and more on electoral expediency and corruption. As mentioned before, on one occasion they offered illegal resources to recruit incumbent legislators.

One federal deputy from the PP explained their ideological composition in the following manner:

> I don't have a programmatic agenda that will guarantee today how the PP will vote. So much so, that a year ago the party was with the PT and now we are not. Theoretically that would be a big change, both pragmatically and programmatically, because what one government defended the other does not. But

> the party is as comfortable in this government as it was in the prior one. First thing, we don't have a lot of programmatic unity. Deputies are elected to the PP because of electoral expediency and not because of the party's programmatic identity. For example, I cannot be more distant from Jair Bolsonaro in terms of ideology. But we were in the same party until a short while ago. I had a discussion with him because he proposed to "solve" the homosexual "issue" by "beating them up." Can you believe it? So, our differences were that big. I respected his right to have his own positions on issues, and although I disagree with him, there are 15 million Brazilians that will vote for him, that think like him. So, our arrangement is not programmatic, it's not ideological. Our arrangements are pragmatic. It's not tit-for-tat, it's pragmatism.[38]

In terms of party organization, asked about the relative power of leaders, caucus and individuals, the same deputy reported that: "the leader has a determinant role" and that "leadership power is very monocratic." The party was initially more decentralized but has become more centralized over time (Almeida, 2004). One suggestive piece of evidence of that can be seen when the party was formally charged with criminal conspiracy charges. For example, the prosecutor involved in the case argued that its internal structure was "hierarchical and vertical, with strategic centers of command, control and decision making" (D'Agostino & Oliveira, 2019).

[38] Personal interview PP federal deputy #1

The PP is also one of the most corrupt parties in Brazil. For example, almost half of its members in Congress were accused or investigated during the Car Wash scandal. In the Ambulances Scandal, 13 of its deputies were involved, corresponding to about 40 percent of the party's share of deputies in the Chamber. In the Monthly allowances scandal, the party also leads the pack in terms of the number members accused of participating in that scandal. According to one Supreme Court Justice, the party only agreed to join the governing coalition in 2003 because of the promise of illegal resources (Brito, 2012). Even more tellingly, it also recruited new members using illegal resources. Despite repeated involvement in corruption scandals, the size of the party increased over time, and is one of the biggest parties in Congress today.

Moreover, no other politician in Brazil is more famously corrupt then Maluf, its long-time party president. His corruption scandals are so legendary that according to Transparency International, Brazilians even created a verb in his homage, *Malufar*, which in Portuguese means "to steal public money." This association with Paulo Maluf also contributes to linking the party with corruption in the minds of voters. Any candidate who runs for office under the PP may be negatively associated with Maluf in the press. Therefore, this party should attract candidates who can ignore the negative consequences of this party's reputation. In sum, this party seems closer to the clientelistic ideal type, although after Maluf's departure it they may have become less boss dominated than in the prior period.

Brazilian Labor Party - *Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro* (PTB)

The PTB was founded officially in 1980 by Ivete Vargas, who was the great-niece of Getúlio Vargas, founder of the old PTB, that was disbanded by the military dictatorship in 1965. The new PTB was born into controversy surrounding a fight for the party name. Another political group, led by Leonel Brizola, disputed ownership over the PTB label, associated with Getúlio Vargas, who was still very popular among voters. Brizola's groups accused the new PTB of serving to "disorganize the opposition" and the left, hijacking a party label strongly associated with labor and popular among voters, for the benefit of politicians with little organic ties to unions or labor movements (Abreu et al., 2010).

In its more recent history, the party is symbolically associated with its long-time leader Roberto Jefferson. He gained notoriety for whistleblowing the Monthly Allowances scandal, a corruption scheme to buy legislative votes in Congress, which implicated him directly. In June of 2005, Roberto Jefferson abruptly switched from denying any involvement to whistleblowing the entire scheme, in a dramatic televised attempt to control the narrative and shift attention away from himself. In 2012 he was found guilty on charges of corruption and money laundering for his participation in the scandal, leading to a 7-year prison sentence, of which he only served 14 months. After leaving prison in 2016 he returned to occupy the presidency of the PTB almost immediately. Note, moreover, that he placed his daughter as president of the party while he was behind bars, demonstrating his influence in the party.

In terms of ideology, despite having the word labor in its name, they seem to embrace any ideology that is convenient to their political success. In one of its founding manifestos the party espoused to defend "all segments of Brazilian society, including the national business class" (Abreu et al., 2010), which strongly resembles the definition of a catch-all party. Such a stance arguably does not help distinguish the party ideologically. Mainwaring (1999) described the party as very heterogeneous and as ideologically center-right. Recently, however, the party has embraced a more conservative movement lead by current president Bolsonaro, in a bid to recruit him and his voters to the party. For example, the party has now embraced privatization, even though the main symbol of the party is Getúlio Vargas, well known for his nationalist agenda and the creation of public utilities such as Petrobras (Pitombo, 2021).

The PTB is also classified as a "party of power" (Power & Rodrigues-Silveria, 2018; Mainwaring et al., 2018), which is buttressed by the fact that it participated in almost all governments since democratization in the late 80's. The party was a strong ally and defended publicly governments of completely different ideological leaning, such as the Collor government, as well as the Lula's administration. As evidence of such an attitude, in 2004 party president Roberto Jefferson admitted that his objective at the time was to become the most loyal coalition partner of the Worker's Party government, so that they could nominate the vice president slot, and control more cabinet positions. In exchange for their votes in Congress, the government would retribute with more earmarks and patronage positions that would help the PTB increase its presence in the Chamber of Deputies (Alencar, 2004). Therefore, its interest in joining the PT was clear, and it was not

ideological compatibility. The party is also classified as a "clientelistic party for rent" and as a "repository for opportunistic center-right politicians wishing to support Lula" (Power & Rodrigues-Silveria, 2018, p. 257). According to Power and Rodrigues-Silveria (2018) the PTB is a forerunner example of "small center-right parties" that are "non-programmatic and opportunistic", that were successful in "extracting benefits from presidents" (p. 256).

In terms of party organization, the PTB is characterized by an increasing concentration of power in the hand of long-time leader Roberto Jefferson. In a recent bid to attract Bolsonaro supporters, he dissolved several municipal and state directorates, because their alliances were incompatible with the party's national support for Bolsonaro. Commenting on these clashes, a long-time party leader in São Paulo argued that Roberto Jefferson "had become a dictator, of an incredible radicalism" (Carneiro, 2020). At the municipal level, he had prohibited alliances with certain parties that were opposition to Bolsonaro at the national level. According to the same party leader such "small cities have peculiarities; they don't have ideology. People want to know who will pave the streets and take care of people's health" (Carneiro, 2020). Coalition rules imposed by Jefferson created difficulties for articulating local alliances. Nevertheless, this pattern seems like a break with the past, when the party organization was more decentralized and gave local party organization more leeway.

Commenting specifically about the PTB party organization in the Chamber of Deputies, one legislator remarked that:

> You can have one or another leader that ends up imposing their will independent of the caucus consensus, but what is more prevalent is a democratic approach to leadership. The leader that creates conflicts may end up worst off when they try to run for leadership reelection.[39]

According to them, the party rarely issued binding recommendations, and punishment for bucking the party line "doesn't happen." They also contended that they depend on the leaders for desirable committee positions, and that meant that legislators must "promote harmony with the leader."[40] Therefore, while power may be increasingly concentrated outside of Congress, the caucus seems to have more independence, while still recognizing the need to "harmonize" this leadership. In sum, many aspects of the party closely resemble what I have called boss dominated clientelistic machine.

Party of the Republic - *Partido da República (PL-PR)*

The Party of the Republic was founded in 1985 under the name Liberal Party (*Partido Liberal*) by incumbent federal deputy Álvaro Vale, who was the president of the party until 2000, and who had belonged to the old ARENA, the official party that supported the military regime. One of the reasons for the creation of the PR was to be used as a vehicle to promote his candidacy to as Mayor of Rio de Janeiro (Abreu et al., 2010).

[39] Personal Interview PTB federal deputy #1
[40] *Ibid.*

The party changed its name several times, from Liberal Party (PL) to Party of the Republic (PR) in 2006 and then back to Liberal Party in 2019. They also fused with other parties several times, in 2003 with the PST (*Partido Social Trabalhista*) and PGT (*Partido Geral dos Trabalhadores*), and in 2006 with the PRONA (*Partido de Reedificação da Ordem Nacional*), the party associated with former presidential candidate Enéas Carneiro. These fusions were necessary because of the relatively small size of the party at the time and given the fact that the electoral laws imposed an electoral threshold to curb fragmentation. However, over time the party has grown in the Chamber of Deputies, from the 9th largest party in 1998, hovering around six and seventh place, and then finally reaching their current third place.

In their initially programmatic manifestos they defended liberalism, emphasizing the role of business and private propriety. Compatible with that description the party was supported by business groups in its early years. Moreover, in 1989 the party launched a presidential campaign with a platform of privatization and market reforms (Abreu et al., 2010). While the PR is generally considered a right-wing party, Power and Rodrigues-Silveira (2018) describe them as "originally a programmatic Thatcherite party, but quickly became a nondescript party for rent" (p. 257), while Mainwaring et al. (2018) classify the party as "center-right." Despite their conservative credentials, the party participated in all governments since democratization, except for the FHC government, which it also supported to some extent. They nominated Lula's running mate, officially allying with the left-wing PT government in 2002. This alliance strategy strongly suggests an absence of

ideological constrain. Instead, I believe this party is better characterized as a party of power, that wants to remain in government, no matter who is in power.

Interviews with federal deputies and staff confirms the characterization as a "nondescript party." One deputy claimed that:

> The party is very diverse regarding the ideological position, very diverse. You have people with completely different values. (…) So that is the characteristic of the party, it is a very mixed from the ideological point of view but very united behind the party president, Valdemar Costa Neto.[41]

Despite heterogeneity, one party staff member confirmed that the party "knows that their strength lies in their union and the leader has that role. We don't retaliate against deputies; we know they have their own position on certain issues."[42] At the same time, one deputy remarked that "obviously roll call party unity inside the Chamber is an important element to define the level of prestige and support you have within the party. But, on the other hand, the PR gives a lot of freedom to deputies."[43]

The PR has a concentrated party organization at the national level, as Valdemar Costa Neto commands the party with little challenge. One example of that was when Valdemar was jailed for involvement in the Monthly Allowances scandal. Despite being physically in prison, he continued commanding the party from behind bars. Staff members

[41] Personal interview PR federal deputy #1
[42] Personal interview PR staff #1
[43] Personal interview PR federal deputy #1

and allies would have meetings in his prison cell to receive his instructions (Valadares et al., 2013). Moreover, he was reelected as leader of the party in the Chamber of Deputies eleven times and has also been the president of the party since 2000.

This extreme concentration of power is also confirmed by interviews with federal deputies. One of them noted that:

> The PR has a unifying nucleus that is the profound leadership of the party's president, Valdemar Costa Neto. The caucus has little participation in the decision-making process, decision making is very concentrated in the leadership of the president, who has the trust and the respect of basically all within the party. (…) The participation of the caucus in decisions, as a collective, is very residual.[44]

A staff member from the party confirms that diagnosis:

> The party follows the line of the president. The main leader is Valdemar. We have no doubt about that. He is the main leader of the party. He is a person that is very dear to all deputies and he has a vision as a leader that is remarkable.[45]

Regarding the decision on how to allocate party resources, another staff remarked that it "is a decision made by the national party organization, the president of the party"[46]

[44] Ibid.
[45] Personal interview PR staff #2
[46] Personal interview PR staff #1

Another example of Valdemar's dominance in the party was the scandal involving the Transportation Ministry, during President Dilma's term in office, in 2011. His control over the Ministry was so awesome that he had his own office and staff in the building. According to a report, every contract made by the billion-dollar Ministry had to be personally approved by him. He also requested a 2 to 4 percent kickback on every single contract, designed to shore up the party's campaign war chest (Sequeira, 2011). This shows not only how much control he had over patronage and how he single-handedly commanded the party, but also illustrates how controlling a Ministry give access to scarce resources, which can be used to promote party discipline. If any rank-and-file member wanted to obtain resources from the Transportation Ministry, they no doubt needed the blessing of the party boss, which further concentrated his power within the party.

Power and Rodrigues-Silveira (2018) classify the PL-PR was a clientelistic party. Not only was this party involved in several corruption scandals, but the PR also actively and explicitly recruited new members with the promise of illegal resources originated in the Monthly allowance scandal (Valente & Salomon, 2005). As those examples illustrate, the PR is the best case of what I call a boss dominated clientelistic party.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have reviewed secondary sources, newspaper reports and my own interviews with federal deputies to classify eight Brazilian parties along the typology

described in chapter 3. While a few parties seem to closely conform to those ideal types, unsurprisingly, most of the other parties combine different elements and are better classified as hybrid, in my view. Such a situation is quite expected and natural, after all, parties are complex organizations and are moving targets. As Katz and Mair (1995) argue:

> Contemporary parties are not necessarily wholly cartel parties any more than parties of previous generations were wholly elite parties, or wholly mass parties, or wholly catch-all parties. Rather, all of these models represent heuristically convenient polar types, to which individual parties may approximate more or less closely at any given time. (p. 19)

I agree, and the same logic applies to my typology as well.

Nonetheless, we can test the validity of competing theories at the extremes, in those parties that more closely approximate our ideal types. In the case of Brazil, the PT represent the mass-party type more closely than any other, and on that issue that is wide consensus in the literature. Therefore, that party allows us to test the conditional party government hypothesis (**H4**), because the PT is high institutionalized, polarized and cohesive. By the same token, the PR and the PTB more closely approximate the ideal of a boss-dominated clientelistic machine. Those two parties allow us to test the clientelistic party discipline hypothesis (**H1**).

Other parties also approximate the clientelistic ideal type, but not necessarily the boss domination aspect, while others are more hybrid in nature. For example, the PP,

PMDB and PFL all display some evidence of clientelism, however, those parties are not as strongly dominated by a boss as the PR and PTB. The PP had a strong boss until 2003, when Maluf stepped down from the presidency of the party, and after that it seems to have become more divided between competing factions. By the same token, the PMDB has decentralized during most of its history but becomes more concentrated when Temer takes control of the presidency of the party in 2014 and assumes the presidency of the Republic in 2016, giving him access to a vast array of legal and illegal resource to dole out for discipline. But none of those parties are as concentrated as the PR and PTB, and data on party organization shown in the next chapter confirms that fact. Finally, the DEM is also sometimes classified as clientelistic but is decidedly more decentralized than concentrated. Moreover, the Democrats also seems to combine elements of catch-all personalism. For example, their recurrent expulsion of politicians involved in scandals and their unwillingness to participate in the PT coalition government are not typical behavior expected from clientelistic parties, while consistent with personalistic parties in which the party brand can be an electoral liability.

The PDT also seems to occupy a middle ground, combining a tinge of mass-party with stronger features of personalism. While their coalition strategy demonstrates ideological constrain, and they are more than willing to stay in the opposition to right-wing governing coalitions, their party organization has less internal democracy and is centered on the personal connections of the party president. Finally, the PSDB seems closer to a catch-all personalistic party. Their more coherent coalition strategy evinces ideological constrain and reputational concerns, which is linked to presidential ambitions. Moreover,

they have a larger and more loyal following in the electorate than most other parties except for the PT, albeit it's concentrated within the middle class and elite of São Paulo.

In the next chapters I will review an extensive array of quantitative evidence from surveys and observational data that allows us to triangulate the information provided here, giving us more confidence to establish if the conclusions drawn from this chapter are valid and reliable.

Chapter 5: Classifying Parties Using Quantitative Data

In this chapter I will present quantitative data on the eight parties selected for this analysis, so that I can classify them based on the ideal types mentioned in previous chapters. I will focus on two independent dimensions, one that attempts to capture the empirical implications of personalism, and another that covers clientelism.[47] I will first display several variables related to the two dimensions, combine them to form two composite indicators and then locate the parties along those two relevant dimensions.

Those two dimensions are theoretically independent of each other, and the real problem is when scholars conflate one with the other. While there may be an elective affinity between personalism and clientelism, and that is an important question to be investigated by future research, my findings highlight the relevance of analyzing them separately and interactively. The important point is that the conventional wisdom argues that we should not find evidence of party discipline in personalistic parties, especially in combination with clientelism. Specifically, scholars such as Lyne (2008a) and Desposato (2007) explicitly claim that clientelism does not lead to party discipline in candidate-centered systems, such as Brazil, where they assume parties will be decentralized and with weak leadership. Therefore, if I show evidence of party discipline in parties that rank high on the personalistic and clientelism scales, received wisdom has no explanation for that result, while my theory does, it is evidence of clientelistic party discipline. In the presence

[47] Note that while I term one of the dimensions "personalism" that measure is more precisely defined as the empirical implications of personalism, which include delegation of power and the relevance of parties in elections. In other words, delegation of power is not personalism in itself, but an empirical implication of it. I use that term for the sake of simplicity and consistency.

of high levels of clientelism, the personal vote theory and conventional assumption about personalism no longer hold.

As discussed in chapter 3, each party type yields different empirical expectations. Mass-bureaucratic parties should place emphasis on building party organization, and as the result of that effort we should see a higher number of voters that identify with the party. In personalistic parties such identifiers are less important than having a personal following, which legislators can bring with them when they switch parties. Mass-parties also invest scarce resources in augmenting their collective brand, therefore, since legislators are ideologically indoctrinated, their supporters can use the party label as a shortcut for the ideology of their candidates. Because all candidates running under the party share the same policy platform, voters can cast ballots for the party label instead of for individual candidates, which has the added benefit of reducing intra-party competition. As such, the percentage of ballots cast on the party label should be lower in personalistic parties and higher in mass-bureaucratic ones, as opposed to those that are cast to individual candidates.

Another clear empirical expectation regards ideological cohesion, or preference homogeneity. On the one hand, mass-parties are typically very cohesive and homogeneous, since they invest scarce resources in candidate selection and indoctrination. On the other hand, classic personalistic parties usually lack preference homogeneity, and ideological disagreements are dealt with through weak leadership, giving individuals the freedom to vote and campaign as they please, following their constituents' preferences, not those of

the party. Therefore, responsible parties should take clear and consistent positions on issues, while personalistic parties should show more variation in preferences.

In terms of party organization and delegation, expectations about the personalistic dimension are also clear. Personalistic parties would place a lower importance on party organization in elections and should favor leaders with less power. Personalistic parties should favor decentralization, policy independence and should preserve their ability to switch parties without consequence, and mass parties should favor the opposite, more delegation. Personalistic parties should prefer rules that give individuals more autonomy, for example, they should prefer maintaining the current open-list PR electoral rule in Brazil, because open lists allow more freedom for candidates. Meanwhile, mass-parties will prefer closed-list PR, since it favors delegation of power and is purported to generate more cohesive parties. Personalistic parties should generally be opposed to delegation of power to central leadership, mass-parties should favor it.

The clientelistic dimension is straightforward in its predictions, all else equal, clientelistic parties should exhibit more corruption, malfeasance and vote buying. As I have already mentioned, there is a strong consensus among scholars of clientelism that corruption is the best proxy for it (Kitschelt, 2000; Hicken, 2011). By the same token malfeasance scandals are a proxy for corruption and should be correlated with it, and with clientelism. The general logic is that clientelistic parties have less to worry about their brand as a liability, therefore, deputies with malfeasance scandals will tend to sort into those parties in which they will not be expelled or removed from the spotlight because of

their complications with the law. In sum, I will combine indicators of corruption, malfeasance and vote buying to form a composite indicator of clientelism that is more valid and reliable than any single measure. Finally, boss lead clientelistic machines should also be characterized by concentration of power in the hands of the boss. Extreme concentration allows us to distinguish the catch-all personalistic type from the clientelistic boss dominated one, since no scholar has argued that personalistic parties should be extremely concentrated, while in clientelistic parties it is a possible equilibrium.

But before I review all the relevant data on party type, I must first engage the topic of party size and selection. While the parties I have selected to analyze were chosen because they are the largest in the system during the period considered, they are all tiny by comparative standards, which highlights Brazil's extreme fragmentation. Figure 5.1 displays the relevant data on party size. Note that even the PT only reaches about 18% of seats in the Chamber around 2002. Most parties have lost seats over time, except for the PR, that has grown, and the PDT, that has remained about the same size during this period.

Figure 5. 1 Party's Number of Seats in the Chamber of Deputies 1998-2018



It is also important to note that Figure 5.1 slightly undercounts the size of some parties, because that data represents the number of seats of each party *at the time of elections*, however, legislators switch in and out of parties after that. For example, while in 2018 the PR elected only 33 legislators, in 2021 that number had increased to 43, moving the party from the sixth largest to the third. Therefore, that figure slightly undercounts the growth of the PR. Still, the fact that third largest party in the Chamber today holds only about 8% of seats is concerning. Since this is tiny by comparative standards, it just reinforces the striking fragmentation of the system. Nevertheless, these are the largest and most relevant parties in Brazil. Their small size is an asset more than a curse for this analysis, since the low number of observations it generates allow for a more conservative test of party discipline in chapter 6, given that smaller samples tend to generate larger standard errors in regression coefficients.

In the following I will display data that allow us to distinguish different party types and test competing explanations for discipline, and analytically separate observationally equivalent legislative behavior. First, I will review evidence on the personalistic-responsible dimension.

The Personalistic-Party Centered Dimension

I will start by reviewing data on ideology. If all deputies cluster themselves on the same side of the scale, that party is more cohesive and polarized. Therefore, such a party will conform to one of the expectations of conditional party government (**H4**), which requires not only preference homogeneity, but also polarization of preferences between parties. In a two-party system the average ideal point distance from one party to the other is enough to establish polarization, but in a multiparty system such as Brazil, polarization is better captured by clustering around the poles of the ideological distribution within a party. One reasonable and direct measure of ideology comes from a survey question about the ideological self-placement of deputies, from the Brazilian Legislative Survey (BLS) dataset. Legislators were asked to classify themselves on a 10-point scale that goes from the extreme left (1) to the extreme right (10). Figure 5.2 shows the ideological distribution of parties according to that data.

Figure 5. 2 Ideological self-placement of Federal Deputies from 2001 to 2017



Note. Source Brazilian Legislative Survey (BLS) 2018. Data from 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013 and 2017.

As we can see, the PTB and PMDB resemble a normal distribution, with clustering in the center, not polarization. The PR also shows a strong centrist position, with a high degree of concentration in the center, and a few deputies falling on both side of the ideological spectrum. We can also see from Figure 5.2 that the PR has a higher standard deviation compared to the PT, suggesting the latter is more cohesive than the former. Moreover, while the PT is clustered on the left of the scale, the PR is more clustered around the middle, the PT is more distinguishable and polarized ideologically than the second. Therefore, based on this data, if the PT is our best example of a cohesive and polarized

party in Brazil, then the PR does not resemble it. The PR is closer the PTB and the PP much more than the PT or the PDT.

That story is also clear from the averages, while the PT scores a 2.5 and is closer to the left, the PR is much more centrist, with an average of 5.2. The party that comes closest to resemble the PT is the PDT, but the latter is both less polarized and less cohesive than the former, as the average and the standard deviation demonstrate. Moreover, we must keep in mind that many legislators may choose to place themselves on the middle of the ideological scale not because they are true centrists, but because it is an "easy way out" for deputies that have little concern for ideological principles and instead focus on clientelism and corruption. In other words, describing themselves as centrist helps clientelistic legislators "save face." In sum, when asked about ideological self-placement, the PR seem closer to the PMDB, a heterogenous party, than the PT, a more cohesive and polarized party.

This general portrait is consistent with prior studies on this topic. For example, Samuels and Lucas (2010) analyze a large array of survey questions from the BLS dataset to ascertain the level of ideological cohesion in different Brazilian parties and their consistency over time. They go beyond the question of self-placement, analyzing the positions of legislators on substantive issues instead. According to them, the Brazilian party system is "most accurately described as one that pits the PT versus the inchoate rest" (p. 62) and that in "PMDB, PFL, and PSDB legislators do not believe that they belong to 'programmatic' parties" (p. 59). Finally, they note "that the difference between the PT and

'the rest' is diminishing" (p. 53). Therefore, an extensive, and systematic analysis of ideology in Brazilian parties seems to confirm what I find in Figure 3.1.

Additionally, the other data displayed below will converge on that interpretation. For example, if the PR were a cohesive and responsible party, they should also have a high number of party identifiers in the electorate, which is a staple of strongly organized mass-parties. But alas, that is not what we will find. Table 5.1 shows the percentage of party identifiers for the same eight parties over time.

Table 5. 1 Party Identification in Brazil

Year	PT	PSDB	PDT	PMDB	PFL/DEM	PPB/PP	PL/PR	PTB
1994	15.9	3.2	2.5	17.7	3	1.7	0.3	0.6
1998	13	4.5	2.3	11.7	5	1.9	0.2	1.1
2002	19	3.4	2.3	11.3	5.6	1.2	0.5	2.1
2006	19.2	5.9	1.7	8.7	2.7	0.9	0.7	1
2010	20.7	5.4	0.9	5.7	0.6	0.4	0.1	0.6
2014	22.5	4.3	0.7	4.3	0.2	0.2	0	0.4
2018	20.9	3.9	1.3	2.7	0.2	0.4	0.1	0.2

Note. Source Datafolha

Table 5.1 confirms that only the PT has a significant following in the electorate, around 22% of respondents identified with the party in 2014. Moreover, while not shown in that table, in 2012 that figure reached 30% (Samuels & Zucco, 2018, p. 32). In a very distant second place comes the PSDB and then the PMDB, confirming the exceptionalism of the PT. The PMDB had some support among the public in the early years, likely due to their association with democratization in the 90's in the minds of voters, but since they have lost that appeal. Finally, on the other end of the scale is the PR, which doesn't achieve even a single percentage point in 2014. If party identifiers in the electorate counts as

evidence of mass-bureaucratic parties, the PR certainly fails that test. In sum, so far, we have established that the PR is heterogenous and centrist and it has virtually no followers in the electorate, making it a poor candidate for the conditional party government theory.

Another indicator of party type regards the number of ballots cast on the party, instead of those cast on candidates. While ballots cast to the party does increases the overall number of seats available to the party in Congress, the personal votes of each candidate define their order in the party list, those with more personal votes receive the seats allocated to the party first. Therefore, personalistic parties should strongly prefer that their voters cast ballots to candidates, and not party labels. Table 5.2 presents data on the percentage of ballots cast on the party versus on candidates for each party. As we can see, while the PT, PSDB and PDT all seem to have relied more on this strategy, the rest seldom does. Moreover, I also find that even those parties have relied less on this strategy in recent years, for example, while in 1998 the PT's party label vote share was 26%, in 2014 it dropped to 12%. While some readers may consider this evidence indirect or lacking, the several other indicators of party type shown below present a story that is largely consistent with these data.

Table 5. 2 Party Label Votes % (1998 – 2014)

PT	PSDB	PDT	PMDB	PFL/DEM	PPB/PP	PTB	PL/PR
0.17	0.15	0.13	0.06	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.04

Note. Source TSE. Data from years: 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014

The next six indicators of party type all come from the Brazilian Legislative Survey (BLS), tapping into the empirical implications of the underlying construct of personalism, particularly regarding the preference to delegate power to party leaders and the importance of parties in elections and in government. These six survey questions are later aggregated to form a composite indicator of personalism, given that composite indicators tend to be more reliable than individual survey questions.

The first survey question that taps into personalism asked federal deputies if the "party or personal efforts are more important towards their electoral success." That question seems to refer quite directly to the importance of parties in elections, and the strength of party organization. Personalistic parties should answer that personal efforts are more important, and mass-parties should answer in the opposite direction. Table 5.3 shows these data, largely confirming our expectations and consistent with the data shown before. While the PT is in the lead in terms of the "importance of party efforts in elections" by a large margin, the PR leads the rear, closer to the personalistic extreme of the continuum. Indeed, while in the PT 53% of deputies claimed that party efforts were more important, in the PR only 6% of them did.

Table 5. 3 Importance of Party vs Personal Efforts in Elections?

	PT	PSDB	PDT	PMDB	PFL/DEM	PPB/PP	PTB	PL/PR
Party efforts	53.38	7.73	10.45	17.49	8.81	4.12	5.77	6.25
Personal efforts	33.11	86.08	82.09	68.06	87.05	88.66	86.54	93.75
N	148	194	67	263	193	97	52	48

Note. Source BLS (2018). Data from 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013 and 2017. "No Answer" suppressed from output.

Another survey item that gets at the empirical implications of "personalism" regards preferences for different electoral rules. One question that taps into that preference regards changing the electoral system from the current open-list PR to a closed-list version of proportional representation. In the latter, votes are cast on the party list only, and party leaders typically define the order of candidates on that list, and as such the electoral fates of candidates are tied to their relationships with leaders. Recall from earlier chapters that scholars place great emphasis on this distinction between different electoral rules, arguing that closed-lists favors strong and cohesive parties, while open-lists favors personalism. Indeed, personalistic parties prefer rules that gives legislators more independence, that privilege their personal connection with voters, therefore, in this case they will prefer to maintain the current open-list system.

Table 5.4 below shows the average distribution of preferences for closed-list vs. open-list PR by party.

Table 5. 4 Preference for Closed or Open List Proportional Representation

	PT	PSDB	PDT	PMDB	PFL/DEM	PPB/PP	PTB	PL/PR
Open list	46.62	60.82	73.13	65.78	63.21	72.16	75	83.33
Closed list	50.68	32.99	22.39	30.04	33.68	26.8	21.15	14.58
N	148	194	67	263	193	97	52	48

Note: Source BLS 2018. Data from: 1990, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013 and 2017. "No Answer" suppressed

What we can see from this data is that the PT is the party that most prefers the closed-list rule, a telltale sign that those deputies are willing to delegate power to leaders.

At the same time, PR is located at the other extreme end on the scale, with the lowest support for the closed-list system, therefore, closer to the personalistic end of the spectrum.

The next question is about party discipline and the use of "binding vote recommendations." When parties use that instrument, they explicitly signal to rank-and-file that failure to follow the party whip will result in negative consequences. This is not commonly used by most parties and is generally reserved to important votes. But the logic of the question is one of delegation, personalistic parties would be more reluctant to use these binding recommendations, preferring the policy independence to follow their constituents. Mass-bureaucratic parties should be more willing to delegate power to central leadership.

Table 5.5 shows the average response of each party to the question of using binding vote recommendations. [48]

Table 5. 5 Should Parties Issue Binding Vote Recommendations and Impose Party Discipline?

	PT	PSDB	PDT	PMDB	PFL/DEM	PPB/PP	PTB	PL/PR
No	15.54	28.87	32.84	31.94	38.86	28.87	44.23	45.83
Yes	81.76	64.43	62.69	63.5	56.99	68.04	53.85	54.17
N	148	194	67	263	193	97	52	48

Note. Source BLS 2018. Data from: 1990, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013 and 2017. "No Answer" suppressed.

What we see from that data should be a familiar story by now, while the PT has a strong preference for delegation of power to central leadership, the PR is on the other

[48] The exact wording of the question in Portuguese is the following: *"O Sr. (Sra.) acha correto o partido fechar questão e usar o recurso da fidelidade partidária?"*

extreme of that scale, preferring policy independence, as is expected from a personalistic party. The PR has the highest number of deputies who answered "no" to the question of supporting binding vote recommendations, at 45%. In contrast, 81% of PT legislators believe that party leaders should use that forceful instrument.

The next question also taps into the issue of delegation of power to leaders, asking about their ability to expel members from the party, which is the ultimate expression of party power. Obviously, personalistic parties should be against the use of expulsion, while mass-bureaucratic parties should favor this kind of delegation of power. According to Table 5.6, the PT again takes an extreme position in favoring delegation of power, with 73% of their federal deputies agreeing that leaders should be able to expel members who voted against the party in roll call votes. And again, the PR ranks lowest in their preference for delegation of power, with only 20% of legislators in that party agreeing that leaders should have that power.

Table 5. 6 Should Parties be Able to Expel Members Who Vote Against the Party's Determinations?

	PT	PSDB	PDT	PMDB	PFL/DEM	PPB/PP	PTB	PL/PR
Agree	73.65	45.88	40.3	37.26	38.86	40.38	44.74	20.83
Disagree	14.86	31.44	29.85	30.8	35.23	40.38	50	58.33
NA	4.73	19.07	25.37	28.9	23.32	15.46	15.38	18.75
N	148	194	67	171	193	97	52	32

Note. Source BLS 2018. Data from years: 1990, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013 and 2017.

The next question also covers the topic of the balance of power between parties and individuals, but now regarding party switching. This question is very salient because party switching is very common in Brazil and there were several judicial and legislative battles

over that issue during recent years. The underlying controversy regards "to who the mandate belongs to": is it the party or the candidate? If a legislators switches parties after elections, do they lose their seat in Congress? Should the seat remain with the party, who can then place another candidate from their ranks?

Regardless of which side we fall on this controversy, Table 5.7 asks legislators directly if they should be removed from office if they switch parties after elections. An affirmative answer to such a question clearly reveals a preference for delegation of power. Table 5.7 again shows a familiar story at the extremes: the PT as an outlier in the direction of more delegation, and in the opposite end of the spectrum we find the PR, which scores the highest in the "strongly disagree" category.

Table 5. 7 Should Deputies be Removed from Office if They Switch Parties After Elections?

	PT	PSDB	PDT	PMDB	PFL/DEM	PPB/PP	PTB	PL/PR
Strongly agree	67.82	46.6	29.41	45.79	34.65	39.47	25.93	20
Somewhat agree	22.99	29.13	41.18	30.84	30.69	21.05	25.93	10
Somewhat disagree	5.75	13.59	23.53	13.08	14.85	21.05	37.04	20
Strongly disagree	2.3	8.74	5.88	9.35	16.83	15.79	11.11	50
N	87	103	17	107	101	38	27	20

Note. Source BLS 2018. Data from years: 1990, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017. No answer suppressed.

The last question taps into the issue of policy independence. In Table 5.8 I show data on the following question: "should legislators vote with their party or according to personal beliefs." As we can see, the PT is again an outlier, with 85% of deputies answering that they should vote according to the party, while at the other end of the scale is the PR, with only 27% responding that way.

Table 5. 8 Should legislators vote with their party or according to their personal beliefs?

	PT	PSDB	PDT	PMDB	PFL/DEM	PPB/PP	PTB	PL/PR
According to the party	85.14	54.12	50.75	46.77	41.97	44.33	36.54	27.08
According to your own beliefs	8.78	38.66	46.27	42.21	49.74	53.61	53.85	68.75
N	148	194	60	263	193	97	52	48

Note. Source BLS 2018. Data from years: 1990, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013 and 2017. No answer suppressed.

In sum, across the six survey questions presented above we find basically the same pattern: the PT is a clear outlier, ranking low on the personalism scale, while at the other extreme of the scale we consistently find the PR, and, therefore, that party is closer to the personalistic ideal type. The other cases present more variation in their relative positions, especially the PDT and the PMDB. Meanwhile, the DEM, PP and PTB are generally closer to the personalistic end of the spectrum.

Finally, in Figure 5.3 I present a composite indicator that measures the empirical implications of personalism by combining the six preceding variables. I first recoded them so that they are in the same direction, with higher values indicating more personalism, and then added them up. The Cronbach alpha of the indicator is .7, confirming an acceptable level of reliability.

Figure 5. 3 Personalism Composite Indicator



Note. Source BLS 2018 Note: Means and standard deviations (in parenthesis) are presented. This composite indicator uses data from tables 5.3 through 5.8.

What we see in Figure 5.3 is again a familiar story at the extremes, the PT ranks the lowest in terms of personalism, while the PR ranks the highest in that regard. While the PT has an average score of 1.2 on the "personalism" scale, the PR ranks at 3.9 (out of 6). Therefore, in terms of the personalism dimension the PT and the PR are clearly very different parties. If the PR was truly an ideologically cohesive and responsible mass-party, we should find evidence that it's similar to the PT across multiple indicators. But that party is invariably at the other extreme of the scale compared to the PT. It is less ideological homogenous than the PT, is less polarized, has less of a following in the electorate, depends

less on ballots cast on the party and is more in favor of policy independence. They typically do not dependent on the party in elections and are against empowering leaders.

While I'm not aware of a single scholar who directly suggests that the PR is a responsible, cohesive, or a mass-party, the data reviewed so far clearly puts such an absurd hypothetical claim to rest. In other words, it is extremely unlikely that the conditional party government thesis applies to that party, and, therefore, any evidence of party discipline in that party cannot be explained using that theory. We now turn to the second dimension of interest: clientelism.

The Clientelism Dimension

If my theory is correct, we should find evidence of party discipline in parties that are highly dependent on clientelism and corruption, and that are dominated by a party boss. In the following, I will display data that tries to capture that underlying theoretical construct and its empirical implications, locating each party along that dimension. Parties at the extreme end of the scale are our best candidates to test my theory of clientelistic party discipline (**H1**).

Unfortunately, however, clientelism is one of those variables that are inherently hard to measure, given that it's a felony. Nonetheless, below I display the best data that I am aware of. My composite indicator of clientelism is measured using three variables: questions about voting buying in BLS dataset, observational data on malfeasance scandals in the Congress, and, finally, randomized corruption audits of mayors. But before I present

to those measures, first I will present two proxy variables that should be correlated with clientelism that are not part of that scale. If I find the same consistent story across all these different indicators and proxies, that will booster our confidence that they are measuring what they are supposed to.

One of the empirical implications we should expect to find in clientelistic parties is the low value of position taking, as argued in chapter 3. In classic personalistic parties, individual position taking should be salient, while in clientelistic parties it should not. In personalistic parties, legislators want to take independent positions on issues, so they can follow the preference of their constituents. One way of taking positions and showing due diligence in favor of constituents is to write and sponsor legislation. In clientelistic parties, to the contrary, sponsoring and moving bills along the "sausage-making" legislative process is largely irrelevant to their voters, who are more concerned with material favors and cash handouts. Therefore, we should find that legislators in clientelistic parties are less invested in legislating compared to conventional parties. The next two tables show data regarding how often deputies sponsored bills and amendments, based on questions from the BLS dataset.

The first question asks about how often legislators introduced bills in the past year. As we can see from Table 5.9, the PT has the highest percentage of deputies claiming that they sometimes or frequently introduced bills in the last 12 months. On the other extreme of the scale, the PR is the party with the highest response rate in the "never" category. Comparing PR to the PT, in the first, 8% of deputies answered that they never sponsored a

single bill in the last 12 months, while in the PT that figure is less than 1%. Therefore, we find the PT is more invested in policy than the PR.

Table 5. 9 In the last 12 months how often did you introduce bills?

	PT	PSDB	PDT	PMDB	PFL/DEM	PPB/PP	PTB	PL/PR
Frequently	53.15	35.67	56	36.94	35.06	39.58	40.48	47.06
Sometimes	37.84	49.04	32	40.54	44.83	47.92	45.24	35.29
Rarely	7.21	12.1	8	13.96	15.52	12.5	11.9	8.82
Never	0.9	1.91	2	5.41	2.3	0	0	8.82
NA	0.9	1.27	2	3.15	2.3	0	2.38	0
N	111	157	50	222	174	48	42	34

Note. Source BLS 2018. Data from: 1990, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005

The next question is also a proxy of the value of position-taking, asking about how often legislators introduced amendments to legislation. If legislators were very concerned with position taking, they would try to introduce amendments that steer bill in the direction preferred by their constituents. In contrast, in clientelistic parties such legislative activities are largely irrelevant since position taking has a low electoral value. Here the evidence is even more supportive of my argument then table 5.9.

In table 5.10 we find a familiar story, with the PT and PR at opposite ends of the spectrum. In the PR more than 28% of legislators answered that they “never” or “rarely” sponsor amendments to bills. On the other side of the scale, the PT has a high percentage of responses in the combined categories of “frequently” and “sometimes,” and it has a low response rate in the category of “never.” While there is movement in the middle, this data largely confirms the “story of the data” at the extremes, the PR is among the parties least interested in sponsoring legislation, while the PT is the opposite.

Table 5. 10 In the Last 12 Months, How Often Did You Introduce Amendments to Someone else's Bill?

	PT	PSDB	PDT	PMDB	PFL/DEM	PPB/PP	PTB	PL/PR
Frequently	38.74	27.39	30	25.68	31.03	29.17	40.48	26.47
Sometimes	45.95	50.96	38	41.89	43.1	54.17	38.1	38.24
Rarely	13.51	16.56	26	20.72	17.24	10.42	14.29	23.53
Never	0	1.91	4	7.66	5.75	2.08	4.76	5.88
NA	1.8	3.18	2	4.05	2.87	4.17	2.38	5.88
N	111	157	50	222	174	48	42	34

Note. Source BLS 2018 Data from years: 1990, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005

After confirming my expectations with proxies, now we can turn to more direct measures of clientelism. In Table 5.11 I show one the most direct indicators of clientelism in legislative parties available, that comes from the BLS dataset. That survey question asked if legislators agree that "voters demand clientelistic behavior." The wording of the question is designed to consider social desirability. Asking legislators directly if they themselves "engage in clientelism" would likely yield insincere answers, especially considering that deputies who answer positively would be admitting to a felony. Instead, this question sidesteps that issue by asking about the prevalence of clientelism as demanded by voters. While critics may argue that high demand for clientelism doesn't mean that legislators engage in it, it stands to reason that clientelistic legislators would be more willing to answer in the affirmative. Legislators who engage in clientelism are more likely to blame such a practice on voters.

Table 5.11 shows that data. Again, the party that ranks the lowest on this question is the PT, at 68%, while the PR is at the other extreme, with 76% of deputies in that party agreeing that "voters demand clientelism." The high baseline even in the PT also shows

just how prevalent that behavior is in Brazil. Additionally, we should note that in 2017 the PR has its lowest percentage of answers in the "agree" category in the time series, suggesting social desirability was more in play during that year.[49] Investigating the data more closely reveals that 2017 was an outlier for the PR, in all previous waves of the BLS their response to that question was above 75%, but it drops to 57% in 2017. The percentage of valid answers in the "yes" category in the PR was the following: 100% in 1997, 100% in 2001, 75% in 2005, 75% in 2009, 85% in 2013 and 57% in 2017. If I exclude that year from the dataset, the PR takes the lead regarding agreeing that "voters demand clientelistic behavior."

Table 5. 11 "Do you agree that voters demand clientelistic behavior?"

	PT	PSDB	PDT	PMDB	PFL/DEM	PPB/PP	PTB	PL/PR
Agree	68.75	69.17	74.19	77.94	79.82	76	85.71	76.47
Disagree	31.25	30.83	25.81	22.06	20.18	24	14.29	23.53
N	112	133	31	136	114	50	35	34

Note. Source BLS 2018. Data from years: 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013 and 2017. No answer suppressed.

Another question from the BLS dataset that gets at the concept of clientelism is shown in Table 5.12. Now the question is framed slightly differently, asking if legislator agree that "voters write letters asking for material favors." The PT again ranks among the lowest, while the PR is at the very end of the scale. For example, the PT has the largest number of respondents who claim that voters "never" asked for material favors. On the other extreme of the scale, the PR has the highest percentage of respondents claiming that

[49] This wave of the survey happened in the context of the Lava Jato scandal, which was at that time in full swing. For example, in April of that year Supreme Court Justice Edson Fachin implicates 24 senators and 39 federal deputies in the scandal.

they “frequently” received such requests. Unfortunately, this question was only asked in one wave of the BLS, and therefore, such a low number of observations is more subject to random error and noise, while also being less representative of the party across time. Nevertheless, the data presented in Table 5.12 is consistent with table 5.11 and is in line with my expectations. Therefore, Table 5.12 can be thought as a reliability check on the prior data. If we ask the question slightly differently, do we obtain a similar pattern? The answer seems to be yes. While 75% of deputies in the PR answered that voters asked for “material favors”, in the PT that number falls to 39%. And while that specific category is less frequent in the PDT, the other categories place the PT back at the end of the scale. For example, the deputies in the PT answered the question in the “sometimes” category less often than the PDT, 30% compared to 75%, and they rank higher on the “rarely” and “never” categories as well. In sum, according to this data the PR ranks among the highest on this indicator of clientelism, while the PT the lowest.

Table 5. 12 “How often do your voters write letters asking you for material favors?”

	PT	PSDB	PDT	PMDB	PFL/DEM	PPB/PP	PTB	PL/PR
Frequently	39.13	48	25	54.55	63.16	66.67	60	75
Sometimes	30.43	28	75	18.18	26.32	0	40	12.5
Rarely	21.74	20	0	22.73	10.53	33.33	0	12.5
Never	8.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NA	0	4	0	4.55	0	0	0	0
Total	23	25	4	22	19	3	5	8

Note. Source BLS 2018. Data from the 2009 wave only.

My next two measures are proxies of clientelism that serve as additional reliability checks. As already discussed, corruption is the most accepted proxy of clientelism in the expert literature (Kitschelt, 2000; Hicken, 2011). For example, in a more recent review of

this literature, Hicken (2011) argues that "expectations/assumptions about the association between clientelism and corruption are so strong that some propose using indicators of corruption as a proxy for the level of clientelism" and that "these expectations are borne out in several recent studies" (p. 303). Therefore, in the absence of better data, I also make use of indicators of corruption to measure the empirical implications of the underlying theoretical construct of "clientelistic parties." The two next variables attempt to do exactly that, starting with data on severe malfeasance scandals in the Chamber of Deputies.

While severe malfeasance does include corruption and vote buying, critics may point out that it is a broader concept, including crimes such as money laundering, tax fraud, illegal logging and even homicide. However, the logic in using such a proxy is straightforward: legislators who, for example, commit tax fraud or money laundering should gravitate towards clientelistic parties, in which such scandals have little electoral consequences to the party brand. Naturally, legislators with scandals exist in all parties, but legislators with malfeasance scandals are less likely to be expelled or sanctioned in clientelistic parties. Therefore, such parties are more likely to recruit and retain legislators accused of severe malfeasance. The more clientelistic a party, the more likely they will accept among their ranks legislators accused of severe malfeasance.

Table 5.13 shows the percentage of federal deputies that were implicated in severe malfeasance scandals, by party. I compiled this data by researching national newspapers and it includes only severe malfeasance scandals attributed to federal deputies[50]. The data

[50] For details in the coding procedure see Jucá et al. (2016). In this analysis I extended that dataset to include the more recent period.

in Table 5.13 largely confirms the "story of the data" so far, the PR ranks at the extreme end of the malfeasance scale, while the PT ranks among the lowest in that regard.

Table 5. 13 Percentage of Federal Deputies Charged of Severe Malfeasance per Party (1995 – 2018)

PT	PSDB	PDT	PMDB	PFL/DEM	PPB/PP	PTB	PL/PR
18.1	15.1	15.2	22.6	20.3	31.5	32.8	32.6

Note. Data collected from national news (for the operationalization see Jucá et al. 2016).

Finally, our last proxy of clientelism in political parties has many advantages over the preceding ones, since comes from randomized audits of municipalities (counties) performed by an independent federal agency, the *Controladoria Geral da União* (CGU). These audits were performed by professionals and the selection of the municipalities was completely randomized, so that in theory all parties have an equal "shake" in being selected. Therefore, this data is not subject to social desirability as survey questions are, nor is it subjective to biases, as observational data on malfeasance is. Another advantage of this data is that it pertains directly to corruption, the best proxy of clientelism, according to experts on the topic. Finally, because a lot of corruption and vote buying is delegated to mayors, it is more likely that we will find evidence of corruption in political parties in that level of government.

Table 5.14 shows the percentage of municipalities in which the random audits found evidence of severe corruption by party, according to Ferraz and Finan's (2011) classification of corruption. Again, we find a familiar story at the extremes, with some variation in the middle. The PT has the lowest level of corruption according to this data,

and the PR has the highest. Note that while the baseline is quite high even for the PT, in the PR corruption was found in 80% of the municipalities they controlled, a very high level, no doubt.

Table 5. 14 Counties with random audits finding severe corruption by party (%)

PT	PSDB	PDT	PMDB	PPB/PP	PTB	PL/PR
61.54	76.09	62.96	78.7	74	75	80.95

Note. Source Ferraz & Finan (2011); CGU. PFL/DEM is missing from the dataset.

Therefore, across four different measures of clientelism we find the same parties at the extremes of the scales, with the PR is always at the high end on the clientelism scale, together with the PTB.

Next, I combine the previous measures of clientelism, malfeasance and corruption. While there may be random error and noise in individual variables, composite indicators tend to cancel out such errors. Specifically, this composite indicator takes the averages from the data present in tables 5.11, 5,12, 5.13 and 5.14.

Table 5.15 displays that data and confirms the general story we have seen so far: while there is some variation in the middle of the scale, the PT ranks the lowest and the PR ranks among the highest in terms of clientelism, corruption and malfeasance, together with the PTB, and close behind them we find the PP and the PMDB. This largely confirms the information provided in the previous chapters. Additionally, we should note that because of missing data on the DEM in the Ferraz & Finan (2011) dataset, that party ranks lower on this scale than I likely should.

Table 5. 15 Clientelism and Corruption Composite indicator

PT	PSDB	PDT	PMDB	PFL/DEM	PPB/PP	PTB	PL/PR
0.49	0.54	0.53	0.61	0.55	0.62	0.67	0.65

Note. Source Ferraz & Finan (2011); CGU; BLS 2018; Newspaper data compiled by author (see Jucá 2016). Since the PFL/DEM is missing from the Ferraz & Finan (2011) dataset, I imputed that value by taking the average of the other variables that compose the index.

Next, I will combine the two relevant dimensions so that we can locate the parties across the typology presented in Figure 3.1. Therefore, in the top right corner we should locate parties that are both highly personalistic and score high on the clientelism dimension. Figure 5.4 shows that data, with the horizontal axis displaying my composite indicator of clientelism (Table 5.15) and the vertical axis showing the normalized composite indicator of personalism (Figure 5.3). As we should expect by now, the PR is clearly located in that top right quadrant. Meanwhile, the PT is on the opposite end, showing the lowest scores on both the clientelism and the personalism scales.

Figure 5. 4 Scatterplot of Composite Indicators of Clientelism and Personalism



In sum, any suggestion that the PT and the PR are similar or that the PR should be classified as responsible and ideologically cohesive is strongly contradicted by an extensive array of empirical data presented so far. If the PT is cohesive mass-party with strong organization, then clearly the PR should not be classified in the same way, casting doubt that the conditional party government theory can be applied to the PR.

Party organization and centralization

A final indicator of party type taps directly into the issue of centralization/decentralization of party organization. As I discussed before, the conventional wisdom believes that clientelistic parties, like their personalistic counterparts, are irreparably decentralized and horizontal in their power structure. Because of such beliefs, and because Brazil has a candidate-centered electoral rule, scholars such as Lyne (2008a) and Desposato (2007) explicitly argue that in Brazil clientelistic parties cannot be centralized, because that is a feature exclusive of party-centered systems. However, what I expect is the exact opposite, at least some clientelistic parties may be dominated by a boss who concentrates enormous power. Indeed, these bosses can become even more powerful compared to leaders of mass-parties because collective organizations cannot check their power.

Luckily there is a variable that directly taps into the level of centralization of parties in Brazil, namely the percentage of temporary vs. permanent committees at the municipal level. Both permanent and temporary municipal committees select the delegates that will

serve in the state committee, and those will select delegates to the national committee, who in turn elect the president of the party and the national executive committee. The difference between permanent and temporary committees is that, on the one hand, permanent committees elect their own members, and, as such, parties with more of them have greater internal democracy. On the other hand, members of temporary committees are selected by the national executive committee, in practice dominating the party organization through that expedient (see Guarnieri, 2011, p. 241). In parties where the president of the party accumulates power, they are the ones who dominates such appointments, effectively controlling the party at all levels. While these committees were intended to be indeed temporary, through a loophole in the rules they have become semi-permanent features of political parties, and in 2019 Congress passed a bill that extended the use of temporary committees to 8 years.

Therefore, the ration of temporary to permanent committees gives us a "window" into the distribution of power within a given party, those with a more temporary committees are more concentrated. Thus, with this data we can test my contention that clientelistic parties *can* be extremely concentrated, contrary to what the received wisdom believes.

Table 5.16 shows the percentage of temporary to permanent committees at the municipal level. **[51]** We can clearly see that the PR, PTB and PP are the most concentrated parties, especially the first two. In the PR, the boss has virtually complete domination over 92% the party organization. On the other extreme of the scale, we find that the PT and the

[51] These data reproduce Guarnieri's (2011) analysis, updating it to the most recent data available and expanding it to include all states.

PMDB with a greatest level of internal democracy, although we should note the distance between the PT and the "rest." We also confirm the interview evidence that the PDT is more concentrated in the hands of its president than one would expect from a mass-bureaucratic party, putting it farther away from that ideal-type. If the PT is the benchmark of a mass-party, then the PDT is much more concentrated by comparison.

Table 5. 16 Permanent and Temporary Committees at the County Level

	PT	PSDB	PDT	PMDB	PFL/DEM	PPB/PP	PTB	PL/PR
Temporary Committees (%)	13.91	45.25	60.73	25.08	71.24	75.39	83.69	91.99
N	3,860	2,990	1,790	2,779	2,232	3,226	1,392	3,307

Note. Source *Tribunal Superior Eleitoral* 2021 (TSE)

Using this type of data, Guarnieri (2011) classified the PTB and PP as "monocratic", meaning that "leadership is in the hand of only one group that has the absolute majority of votes and absolute control over partisan decision making" (p. 246). Indeed, that is what I mean when I use the term boss domination. While Guarnieri's (2011) analysis does not include the PR, according to my data, the PR is even more concentrated than those parties, and as such it should also be classified as "monocratic." What for him is monocratic, I call boss dominated. Nevertheless, what is clearly *not* evident in the data is the purported association between clientelism, personalism and decentralization that the conventional wisdom argues. Quite to the contrary, the higher the level of clientelism the higher the level of concentration of power, as the PTB and PR illustrate, although that correlation is not statistically significant. Additionally, the correlation between "personalism" and the percentage of temporary committees is .81, significant at .001 level.

This data should give pause to scholars who believe clientelistic and personalistic parties are always decentralized. How can a party that ranks so high on the personalism scale also rank so high on concentration of power? The answer is clientelism.

Finally, the last row of Table 5.16 I shows how the party organization is territorially widespread, in other words, the number of municipalities in which they have a permanent or temporary committee. Comparing the PT and the PR we can see how the organizational scope of the PR is almost as large as the PT, which is an impressive finding in itself. The big difference between the PT and the PR is that there is internal democracy in one while there is virtually complete boss domination in the other. Another interesting data is that the PTB also shows a high percentage of temporary committees, but it is present in less than half of municipalities compared to the PR. While the PTB is a smaller party, the PR has national reach.

Conclusion

By comparing parties in Brazil over time in this chapter, I have showed that only the PT is a clear example of a cohesive mass-party, with a strong organization and following the electorate. In contrast, the PR is invariably at the other end of the scale compared to the PT on all measures. Using an indicator of ideological self-placement, the PR appear less cohesive than the PT, and resembles more closely the centrist and heterogeneous PMDB. Regarding preferences for delegation, the PR is at the extreme of the personalism scale, while the PT is located at is at the opposite end of that scale. The

distinguishing feature of the PR is that they rely on clientelism and corruption more than almost any other party, and, therefore, they are closer to the clientelistic party ideal type. They also display an extremely concentrated party organization, in which the president has complete domination. In fact, the data present in this chapters confirms the expert assessments and interviews reviewed in chapter 4, that classify the PR as a clientelistic "party for rent" that is dominated by a boss. The important point from this chapter is that the PR is not a mass-party, it is not cohesive and polarized, instead, it is highly personalistic and highly clientelistic. Therefore, any reasonable scholars should be very skeptical that conditional party discipline applies to the PR.

In the next chapter I will investigate empirical evidence of party discipline in these eight parties.

Chapter 6: Party Discipline in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies (1995-2018)

Introduction

The empirical test of my theory involves finding evidence of discipline in parties that approximate the clientelistic ideal type and that are dominated by a boss, such as the PR and the PTB. To do so, I will regress resources (dependent variable) on how often legislators followed the party leader's vote recommendation (independent variable) in the previous year, running separate models for each of the eight largest parties in Brazil, from 1995 to 2018. Evidence of party discipline will be shown by a positive and statistically significant coefficient, representing how much more resources on average a deputy will receive next year for every one-point increase in the independent variable, *ceteris paribus*.

Moreover, by comparing different parties over time I can tease out the causal mechanism involved. The problem is that we don't know if discipline is the result of conditional party government, or if it's a sign of boss domination in a clientelistic machine. In other words, party discipline is observational equivalent in two very distinct parties. If I can confirm evidence of party discipline in parties such as the PR and PTB, then we will have found evidence in support of my working hypothesis about clientelistic party discipline. As I tried to suggest in the previous chapters, given what we know about those parties it is highly unlikely that conditional party government applies to them. This gives us a way to differentiate district causal mechanisms based on distinct party types.

Scholars also disagree about *how* leaders promote party discipline in Brazil (Lyne, 2008a; Amorim Neto, 2002; Samuels & Desposato, 2008). Therefore, my contribution is

also to test several of the possible "bargaining chips" leaders could hypothetically use to promote discipline. As such, I will test four different "carrots," namely: *Committee Assignments, Rapporteur Assignments, Earmarks, and Party-controlled Campaign Contributions*. In the following I will describe those variables in detail.

Dependent Variables

Earmarks

Every calendar year legislators can propose earmarks to the federal budget, enabling them to send federal resources to their districts. If earmarks are used to promote party discipline, then we should find that the more legislators follow the party's recommendation in roll call votes, the more earmarks they will subsequently receive, *ceteris paribus*. For that to occur two assumptions are necessary: that (1) party leaders can influence the distribution of earmarks and (2) legislators value earmarks. If leaders can't influence earmarks and deputies are indifferent to them, then leaders can't use them effectively to promote discipline. Therefore, I will address the face validity of those assumptions.

Do party leaders have some form of influence over the distribution of earmarks? On that topic we find disagreement in the literature. On the one hand, some argue that legislative leaders influence the spending of these resources because they are the ones who are charged to negotiate with the executive branch on the party's behalf, giving them greater access (Pereira & Mueller, 2003). On the other hand, other scholars argue that

presidents negotiate individually with backbenchers (Ames, 2002a), and if this is true, party leaders would have little influence over earmarks.

I believe that presidents utilize this individualized "retail" strategy only at the margins, and in very salient votes, while legislative party leaders seem to play a more routine role in whipping votes. One of the reasons for that is that there is not enough time for presidents so meet with many legislators to negotiate each bill. When such individualized meetings do happen, they are so rare that they make national headlines. For example, in 2017 when President Michel Temer was facing impeachment changes, he lobbied Congress by meeting with 82 deputies, but over the span of two weeks. Obviously, such a strategy can't be used to pass routine lawmaking and must be reserved to only the most important bills, or the presidential agenda would be completely paralyzed.

Moreover, as the one federal deputy noted:

> [the relationship between the legislator and the government] is much more mediated by leadership. This is true except for those bills in which things are very disorganized, only then does the government operate in retail mode [as opposed to wholesale]. Targeting individuals is more complicated politically and is a lot more work. Why would you have to talk to 500 plus deputies, if instead you can talk to 20. In general, the government prefers to work through party leaders.[52]

Moreover, party leaders know which legislator to target and how much resources are needed to flip a given vote, since they have more information about their co-partisans compared to the executive branch. In practice the leader of the government coordinates

[52] *Ibid.*

closely with party leaders. In my view, the claim that party leaders influence the distribution of earmarks is plausible, especially if they are part of the coalition government.

Furthermore, that claim is even more plausible when the party controls a cabinet position or federal agency, because Ministers share spending authority with the executive branch (see for example Batista, 2015; Baião et al., 2018; Boas et al., 2014). While presidents control the broader allocation of federal resources, ministers can control the pace and order in which earmarks are delivered, given that several bureaucratic procedures must occur within the Ministry to that effect. Since ministers and agency heads are appointed by party leaders, this could give them influence over the disbursement of earmarks within the jurisdiction they control. Proof of that influence is abundantly clear in some cases when party leaders have had tyrannic control their Ministry they occupied. This is the case with the PR leader, Valdemar Costa Neto, exemplified by his decade long dominance over the Transportation Ministry. [53] Moreover, there is statistical evidence showing that earmarks are more likely to be appropriated if the party controls the Ministry (Batista, 2015; Baião et al., 2018). Therefore, party control over cabinet positions show one mechanism by which leaders could influence the distribution of earmarks.

[53] Valdemar personally appointed positions in the Ministry during both Lula, Dilma, and Temer governments. His control over the Transportation Ministry was so complete that he had *de facto* veto power over all government contracts and allegedly demanded in person a 4% kickback on every public works contract under the ministry's purview (Pereira, 2011; Sequeira, 2011). His behavior was so outrageous that it led the Transportation Ministry to overspend its budget by 38% in one year. President Dilma, at the time, was reportedly so concerned with the blatant corruption in the Ministry that, in a meeting, complained that the minister was "out of control" and that, if they were left unchecked, they would 'destroy her government'" (Pereira, 2011). Yet, even after President Dilma fired the Minister and sixteen political appointees in the wake of the scandal, Valdemar's influence did not waiver, appointing new personnel, and his influence continued in her government and in the one to followed.

In my own interviews with federal deputies, I confirmed the important role of co-partisan Ministers. One deputy asserted that, when they want to make sure their earmarks are delivered, access to the Minister is key. Others affirmed that party leaders have a salient role to play in the distribution of earmarks. For example, one federal deputy remarked that:

> a leader does the mediation between the position of the caucus and the position of the government, assuming the party is part of the coalition government. You have this role that the leader can perform of bringing to the government the demands of the legislators and making sure they are met. So, say that you want resources for your district, for example, a public works project, the leader can play that role [facilitating the disbursement of those resources].[54]

Additionally, I asked a legislative aid in the government leadership team: "When the government want to pass a bill into law, does it pressure deputies individually or through the leaders? Or both?" Their answer was quite clear: "Always through the party leaders."[55] Therefore, at the very least it is plausible that party leaders can use their access to the federal government to influence the disbursement of earmarks, and, therefore, it is important to test this possible causal mechanism of party discipline.

But even if leaders exert such influence, earmarks must also be highly desired by deputies for it to be an effective bargaining chip to increase discipline. When asked about this question in the Brazilian Legislative Survey (2013), 69% of federal deputies answered that earmarks were "very important to their future electoral success." That importance is even higher in the parties classified closer to the clientelistic ideal type. For example, in

[54] Federal Deputy from Progressive Party (PP#1).
[55] Personal interview with government leadership staff #1.

the PP 80% of interviewed legislators considered earmarks to be very important, and in the PR, this goes up to an impressive 93%. By comparison, when asked about the importance of ideological principles to their electoral success, on average, only 42% answered that it was *very important*. This gives a crude measure of how much deputies value earmarks.

Another way to demonstrate the importance of earmarks is to show its effect on re-election odds, the empirics of which is controversial. On the one hand, some scholars find evidence that earmarks do influence the electoral fate of deputies (Pereira & Rennó, 2001; Pereira & Mueller, 2003). On the other hand, Samuels (2000, 2003) casts doubt on such claims, arguing that credit claiming is complicated by the need to share credit with mayors and other brokers, who have the advantage of closer proximity to voters, making credit claiming based on earmarks inefficient for deputies. Other scholars are also skeptical of the importance of earmarks. Figueiredo and Limongi (1999; 2008) argue that individual earmarks are of little consequence to legislators, given their small weight in overall budget. Additionally, Samuels (2003) has noted that individual earmarks are less important than earmarks sponsored by state delegations, and that the approval of such earmarks are not institutionally "organized" around party (Samuels & Desposato, 2008).

Nevertheless, Samuels (2000) also argues that earmarks have an indirect effect on legislators' political careers, through an increase in the campaign war chest. Therefore, even if the effect of earmarks on elections is indirect, it may still be desired by legislators. In the appendix to this chapter, I provide a test of the electoral effect of earmarks, confirming a null effect. If earmarks do help legislators in elections, I have not been able to detect that effect.

Moreover, even if they have no effect in elections, legislators may still desire earmarks because they fulfill other goals, such as private gain. Earmarks could be desirable because deputies can extract kickbacks from them, that can increase their personal wealth. While not all earmarks are used for corrupt purposes, several scandals in Brazil illustrate how common that practice is, as illustrated by the Bloodsuckers scandal, for example.[56] There is also systematic evidence that earmarks are used in pursuit of private gain. For example, Sodré and Alves (2010) show that cities that received more earmarks were also more likely to be caught engaging in malfeasance scandals, using a dataset of randomized audits performed by a federal oversight agency (CGU). Therefore, we must remember that even if earmarks have no effect in elections, they can be used for private gain, and therefore, may be valued by deputies for that reason, independent of their electoral effects.

In fact, using the BLS dataset I find a .17 positive correlation between the importance of earmarks to legislators and the clientelism variable, which asks how often voters demand clientelism, significant at conventional levels. When the question is framed as voters' demand for a "material favor" (seen in Table 5.12)[57] the correlation with the electoral importance of earmarks goes up to .33, statistically significant at the .001 level. The fact that earmarks are more relevant to legislators in parties that score higher in the clientelism dimension is suggestive of the importance of earmarks as private gain.

[56] The Bloodsucker scandal involved the Health Ministry and was one of the largest scandals to affect Congress. Following a Congressional Investigation sixty-nine deputies were formally accused of participating in the corruption scheme, corresponding to about 13 percent of the entire Chamber of Deputies, caught in a single scandal involving earmarks. According to investigators, a criminal organization inside the Health Ministry negotiated with deputies and their staff to direct earmarks to corrupt mayors, who would facilitate the embezzlement of millions of dollars through fraudulent contractor bids.

[57] The question wording is: "How often do your voters write letters asking you for material favors?"

While addressing assumptions is important, the actual question under focus is: do legislators who toe the party line receive more earmarks? In that regard, past empirical research is mixed. For example, Ames (2002a, 2002b) finds evidence of party discipline, but for only in the PT[58] and PDT. In the opposite direction, Lyne (2008a) found statistical evidence of party discipline in all major parties tested, except for the DEM. Finally, Desposato and Samuels (2008), find mixed results regarding evidence of party discipline related to earmarks, finding positive evidence only when excluding government discipline from the regression specification. Therefore, we have little prior consensus about which parties, if any, should show evidence of party discipline. One problem with prior tests is that they all test the relationship in slightly different ways. As such, the next logical question then becomes, how do we measure earmarks?

To measure earmarks, I use the appropriation category of *empenhado*, as most scholars have done. That category denotes that the appropriation is scheduled for payment and is considered a debt officially recognized by the federal government. The average amount of earmarks each federal deputy received in a year was about nine hundred thousand Brazilian Reais (adjusted for inflation), and about 75% of the sample failed to obtain a single dime in earmarks, while legislators in the 90% percentile of the distribution were able to get about three million in earmarks, showing a highly skewed distribution.[59] While this may not seem like a lot of money to some (the US Dollar is worth about 5.5 Reais in April 2021), we should remember that deputies have no other significant and stable

[58] In his study of party discipline in Brazil the level of party unity in the PT was so high it was removed from the analysis because of lack of variation (Ames, 2002a, p. 212).
[59] We only have trustworthy information starting in 2003, limiting the representativeness of the data.

source of (legal) resources that they can send to their constituents. Starved for resources, earmarks may constitute an important source of political leverage for the average federal deputy.

If earmarks are one of the causal mechanisms by which party leaders promote discipline, then we should find a positive and statistically significant relationship between the percentage of bills in which legislators follow their party leader and the earmarks legislators receive in the following year, ceteris paribus.

Party Campaign contributions

Party campaign contributions is an obvious possible carrot that leaders could use to promote discipline. While the effect of other resources on legislators' careers may be controversial, money in elections is not. We can more safely assume that it's a very desirable resource for legislators, who undoubtedly will always want more cash in their campaigns then less. In Brazil, legislators that spend more are more likely to be re-elected (see Samuels, 2000; Pereira & Rennó, 2001), and above a certain threshold of spending they can turn void any negative electoral effect of malfeasance scandals (Jucá et al., 2016).

While we have some prior knowledge about the general effect of campaign spending on re-election in Brazil, campaign contributions *specifically from the party* have never been tested, to the best of my knowledge. This is likely because most scholars assume that parties are weak in elections, given the theoretical priors of the conventional wisdom, and therefore, party-based campaign contributions are just assumed to be irrelevant. After all, the very core of the discussion of personalism is that parties don't matter in elections, and therefore, they would have little leverage over legislators. In other words, because of

theoretical priors, scholars have largely ignored how *party-controlled* campaign contributions could affect legislative careers and behavior in Brazil.

This is extremely problematic because, over time, party campaign contributions have increased dramatically. While in the early 90's it would be correct to argue that party campaign contributions were largely irrelevant for a typical legislator, today the opposite is true. For example, in the 2000 election the size of the party "war chest" (total party-controlled funds for campaigns) was around R$ 70 million, increasing to R$ 738 million in 2016, to 1.7 billion in 2018, and will be at least 4.9 billion in 2022. Public party-controlled campaign money has become more important with the passing of the 2015 campaign finance reform, which imposed stringent limitations on campaign funding from private sources. According to my interviews, party-controlled campaign money now constitutes a crucial source of funding for political campaigns. As such, they have become an *essential* resource to legislators since all other sources are extremely limited, particularly in and after the 2018 election, after to 2015 reform takes effect. Indeed, in my own test, I find that party campaign contribution increases the likelihood that legislators will be reelected (results in Table 8.1 in the Appendix). The magnitude that effect is substantial, moving from the 50^{th} to 90^{th} percentile of the *Party Campaign Contributions* variable results in a 13% average increase in reelection odds, at the conventional levels of statistical significance, *ceteris paribus*.

But for party campaign contributions to be used to promote party discipline it must also be true that party leaders must be able to control these resources. The question then becomes, who controls party campaign finance in Brazil? The conventional wisdom would argue that only *local* party leaders control whose resources, because the party organization

is weak and decentralized, impeding national leaders to use these resources as a reward for party unity in roll call votes.

However, in chapter 5 we have seen that some parties such as the PTB and PR are extremely centralized, and that party bosses control the entire party organization using temporary committees, which is corroborated by interviews and secondary sources. In such parties, party campaign contributions are under the control of the national party leader, and they can allocate these resources however they see fit, with very little rules or oversight (Mota, 2019). In some cases, the president of the party seems to have complete discretion over the allocation of such resources. According to interviews, access to such resources has increased the leverage that national party leaders have over their caucus, and some parties use such resources explicitly for promoting party unity. For example, the PP stipulated that any legislator that voted against impeaching Dilma would lose 15% of their share of party campaign allotment (Turollo, 2018). In sum, I assume that this resource both *can* be controlled by national leaders and is strongly desired by legislators.

The *Party Campaign Contribution* variable was compiled from official electoral data (*Tribunal Superior Eleitoral* – TSE), measuring the total amount of money that each deputy received from their party in a given election. From 1995 to 2018, federal deputies running for reelection received on average about R$530 thousand Reais (adjusted for inflation) from their parties, which is about 160 thousand US Dollars (at the 2018 currency exchange rate). A deputy in the 50^{th} percentile received about R$100,000 and those in the 90^{th} percentile about R$1.6 million. The average party contribution to legislators also increased greatly over time, from a meager R$7 thousand in 1998 to 1.2 million in 2018.

Before the 2014 election more than 50% of the legislators didn't receive a single dime from their parties, but after 2014 that number falls to less than 5%.

If it is used to promote party unity, we should find a significant coefficient between the following the party whip and receiving more party campaign contributions, ceteris paribus.

Standing Committee Assignments

In the search for party discipline, committee assignments are another obvious place to look, given its broader importance in legislative studies. When legislators are elected to represent certain values or interests, they have incentives to specialize in those topics, take strong positions on such issues and advertise their advocacy. Committees are the perfect stage in which to do so, because many of the policy minutiae are "hammered out" in committees, where interest groups and constituents have an opportunity to express and lobby for their preferences. Therefore, committees will be an especially desirable reward for legislators in non-clientelistic parties, since they are constrained by their voters and, therefore, care about position taking. By the same token, such assignments will be less desirable for legislators in clientelistic parties, because vote buying, and corruption makes position-taking and advertising less important.

However, even if legislators in clientelistic parties are indifferent about position taking, committee assignment can also serve over purposes, such as increasing private gain or access to resources. For example, Boas et al. (2014, p. 27) suggests that holding influential committee positions can be used as leveraged to increase campaign

contributions, and that donors who invest in such campaigns are rewarded with contracts. In another example, in 2018 a bill was under committee review that renegotiated all corporate debt with the federal government. The problem was that many committee members themselves owed vast sums to the federal government. Despite the obvious conflict of interest, the committee passed a generous 99% discount on interest rates and a 90% discount on late fees! That seems like an amount of money that would make worthwhile such a committee assignment. These committee markups frustrated the government's attempt to reduce the federal deficit: had changes not been made to the bill it was projected to save the federal coffers an additional R$ 7 billion (Parreira, 2017). In sum, committees may be desirable to clientelistic parties for the pursuit of goals other than position taking.

Nevertheless, other scholars cast doubt on the assertion that deputies care about committees (Samuels & Desposato, 2008), arguing committees only play a "secondary and imprecise" roll in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies (Figueiredo & Limongi, 1996). They point out that party leaders have a lot of power over committees. For example, party leaders can remove a bill from committee, through an urgency petition (similar to a discharge petition), weakening committee authority.[60] Moreover, committee positions rotate frequently, impeding specialization. As Samuels and Desposato (2008) remark, "all evidence suggests that deputies don't really care" [about committee assignments] (p. 7). Therefore, if these criticisms are correct, then we should obtain null findings regarding

[60] Indeed, analyzing such discharge petitions, Pereira and Mueller (2000) find that the greater the distance from the committee median preference to the executive branch the great the odds such a petition will be used.

committee assignments because legislators simply don't care about them. In my own test of the electoral effect of committee assignments, I found null effects (results in the Table 8.1 in the Appendix). In other words, I have found no evidence to show that such assignment increases reelection odds.

Nevertheless, for committees to be used for promoting discipline leaders must also have control over their distribution. In this regard the rules are quite clear, legislative leaders have the sole power to appoint and remove, at any time, members from standing committees. This is an awesome power, which can effectively change a committee's vote on salient bills, by altering its composition. For example, former President Temer pressured allied party leaders to remove certain committee members who were slated to vote in favor of investigation him based on a severe corruption scandal. Party leaders headed the call and replaced 17 committee members (out of 66) and effectively changed the committee's vote in the president's preferred direction. This example illustrates how party leaders can use their powers to punish members that will vote against the leader's position and reward loyal members.

But even if it is true that deputies desire committee assignments and leaders control access to them, what prior evidence exists that leaders use them to promote party discipline? On the one hand, Müller (2005) finds some evidence of party discipline regarding committee assignments, although not in all parties. On the other hand, Santos and Rennó (2005) show a positive but not statistically significant coefficient, although they do not disaggregate their results by party. Moreover, Santos (2002) also finds null effects of party discipline examining in PMDB during the 90's. Therefore, we find *little* prior

evidence suggesting that committees could be used to promote party discipline. Nevertheless, there are influential theoretical arguments about the internal power of leaders in the Congress (Figueiredo & Limongi, 1999), that makes testing this causal mechanism worthwhile, even if to corroborate the finding that committee assignment doesn't affect party discipline.

In terms of measurement strategy, *Committee Assignments* is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a federal deputy received a committee assignment in a "power committee" in that legislative year, and 0 otherwise. I classify as "power committee" the Committee for Constitution and Justice (CCJ) and the Committee on Public Finance and Taxes (CFT). The CCJ has a *de facto* veto on all legislation, since they adjudicate the constitutionally of all bills before they are sent to other committees or to the floor. The CFT similarly decides if bills are "compatible and adequate" with the federal budget, also having *de facto* veto power. These committees have a special place in the hierarchy of committees because of their inherent veto power and broad scope, and, therefore, demand for positions in them will be more intense,[61] making it possible reward to legislators. Therefore, if we find a positive and significant coefficient between following the leader's

[61] While some readers may take issue with this classification as arbitrary, I have also coded this variable in different ways, and the result were very similar across coding strategies. One coding strategy focused on demand. Since some committees have higher demand then others, I excluded low demand assignments from the count. In practice, I first calculated the percentage of party members in each committee. Then, I coded as 0 all committees in which less than 5% of total party members were assigned to that committee. I also used 9% as an alternative cut off point, with similar results. I also tested the duration of the appointment, reasoning that longer duration will be associated with more loyalty, with similar results. In future research I can devise other ways to test this variable, but if party discipline was related to committee assignment in a robust and clear fashion, I would have found it in at least one the coding strategies mentioned above, yet, as we shall see, I do not.

recommendation in roll call votes and receiving committee assignments, that constitutes evidence of party discipline.

Rapporteur Assignments

The final possible resource that leaders may use to promote party discipline *is Rapporteur Assignments*. In the Brazilian Chamber the ordinary legislative process dictates that bills must be marked-up in committee and the rapporteur is the individual responsible for "reporting" that bill in committee. The committee then votes to accept or reject their report. Although leaders can use discharge petitions to remove a bill from committee, a significant share of bills follow the ordinary process involving rapporteurs.

Since rapporteurs can influence the amendment and the language of a bill, such assignment naturally attracts the attention of stakeholders, other deputies, the government, and the media. All these actors will lobby the rapporteur to alter the bill according to their preferences. Therefore, such assignments are great opportunities to curry favors and increase name recognition, especially in a centralized legislature such as in Brazil, where there are few opportunities for individual legislators to "make their mark." Thus, rapporteur positions will be especially desired by legislators that derive electoral benefits from position taking. Therefore, we should find that non-clientelistic parties should be more inclined to use such appointments as "carrots" to increase party discipline.

Nevertheless, it is also possible that such appointments may serve the goals of legislators in clientelistic parties. In some cases, legislators engage in *quid pro quo* deals

with interest groups and business. For example, in 2016 the Federal Police accused rapporteur Senator Romero Jucá (PMDB-RR) of adding an amendment to a bill (*Medida Provisória* 627/2013) at the direct request of a business, allegedly in exchange for campaign donations (Mascarenhas, 2016).

Moreover, in other cases legislators may benefit directly from their reports. During the aforementioned example of the 2018 bill that renegotiated all corporate debt with the federal government, the rapporteur of that bill, Newton Cardoso Júnior (PMDB - MG), owed more than R$ 67 million to the federal government (Wiziack, 2017). He directly benefited from his own report, personally saving more than R$11 million (Di Cunto & Ribeiro, 2018). That also seems like an amount of money that would make worthwhile such a rapporteur assignment.

Therefore, it is at least plausible that rapporteur assignments can be desired by legislators in clientelistic parties for corrupt ends, despite their lack of interest in position taking. Nevertheless, we should still expect such assignment to be desired more intensity by legislators in non-clientelistic parties, for it also affords a great opportunity to position taking and for advertising legislative accomplishments. However, in my own test of the electoral effect of rapporteur assignments, I found null effects (results in the Table 8.1 in the Appendix). In other words, I have found no evidence to show that such assignment increases reelection odds.

Another necessary assumption for party discipline to be present is that party leaders must be able to influence the distribution of committee assignments. While such assignments are under the formal purview of committee chairs, since party leaders

nominate committee chairs, they may retain some influence over them. In practice leaders can veto the rapporteur assignments distributed in standing committees by removing members from the committee. Therefore, leaders could use their influence over rapporteur assignments to promote discipline in roll call votes.

Regarding prior empirical findings, there are very few studies of rapporteur assignments in the Brazilian Congress. The only analysis that I am aware of finds that following the party's recommendations increases the probability of receiving a rapporteur assignment (Santos & Almeida, 2005), although the results are not disaggregated by party. Therefore, since we have some priors to suggest this is a potential causal mechanism of party discipline, it is worthwhile to investigate it in more detail.

I operationalized this variable as the count of all rapporteur assignment given to each deputy in a given year. Only about 50% of the sample received at least one rapporteur assignment during a legislative year and members in the 75th percentile of the distribution received more than six assignments, each year, showing a skewed distribution. If there is evidence of discipline regarding rapporteur assignments, we should find a positive and statistically significant coefficients of *follow the party leader*.

Independent Variables and controls

Follow the Party Leader (Lagged)

My main independent variable of interest is: how often an individual deputy followed a party leader's recommendation in roll call votes each year. Before every roll call vote, each party leader (and the government leader) has an opportunity to recommend

how their caucus should vote. I created a dummy variable indicating if a deputy followed the vote recommendation of their leader. If they did, then that vote was coded as 1, otherwise it was coded as 0. If the leaders issued no recommendation at all I exclude that vote from the analysis. This dummy variable is then aggregated per year to create a percentage measure expressing how often a given deputies followed the recommendations of their party leader. I use the lagged version of *Following the Party* (t-1) as the main variable of interest, because causes should be prior to their effects, but I also include the present year (t=0) version of this variable as a control.

Figure 6.1 shows how often on average legislators followed their leader's recommendation in roll call votes. To facilitate visualization, I display the data for only 4 parties, illustrating different party types. Figure 6.1 shows that the PT with the highest degree of party unity, regardless of if they were in the government or in the opposition. Note, however, how the PR became much more united between 2003 and 2012, when they joined the PT coalition government under President Lula and then Dilma. While the level of party unity prior to that period was very low, in 2003 they achieved the same level of party unity as the PT, which is astonishing for a personalistic and clientelistic "party for rent." The PMDB and the PP also had a lower level of unity compared to the PT, but the gap decreases significantly from 2007 to 2011, when they achieve impressive levels of unity for personalistic parties. The empirical question I will seek to answer in this chapter is the following: are those high levels of party unity the result of party discipline and what are the causal mechanisms involved?

Figure 6. 1 Party Unity scores in the Chamber of Deputies not counting absences 1995-2018



An important measurement issue regards how to code votes when deputies are absent. Since this is a somewhat controversial issue, to assuage potential critics I created an alternative measurement strategy that accounts for different interpretations. The first coding strategy treats absences as missing data, as displayed in Figure 6.1. The alternative strategy treats all absences as a vote against the party. I opt for treating absences as missing in my main models, because we cannot really know why legislators were absent in any given vote, therefore, it's the more parsimonious strategy to treat them as missing. In many cases legislators are absence for mundane reasons, most commonly to stay in their districts and attend a rally, for example. As one deputy expressed to me in interview, in a country of such a vast territory like Brazil it is burdensome to show up to the capital every week. Their time can sometimes be better spent in their districts.

Coding those cases as voting against the party will certainly muddy the waters and introduce error in the regression analysis. Naturally, there is no doubt that at least *some legislators, some of the time,* may be absent for strategic reasons. For example, there is a correlation between absence rates and bills in which party leaders and government leader are at odds. The problem is that it is impossible to establish which votes were strategic and which were "mundane." Treating all absences as missing data is a safer strategy compared to incorrectly classifying mundane absences as strategic.

Moreover, leaders may allow legislators to be absent without punishment, since they may not want to hurt the electoral prospects of their own caucus (Pearson, 2015). Absence in this sense provides cover of deputies, and leaders understand that such cover may be electorally expedient. If this interpretation is sound, then the strategy of treating absences as missing is reasonable because it is only when legislators vote *explicitly* and *systematically* against the leadership's recommendation that they will be punished, and absences can be mostly ignored by leadership. Nevertheless, to be thorough I test both versions of the *Following the Party*. Using one or the other doesn't significantly change the overall regression output. For example, the positive evidence of party discipline in the PR that I find in Figure 6.5 are not sensitive to the different coding strategies.

Another relevant issue regards when leader don't give a vote recommendation at all. If leaders systematically fail to issue a vote recommendation in contentious votes, then roll call party unity overestimates the real level of disagreement in the party. If, however, most leaders whip votes most of the time and party unity is high, then that high level of party unity is more meaningful. In Figure 6.2 I show how often (%) leaders in different

parties used their vote recommendations in roll call votes. As we can see, most parties issued recommendations between 90-95% of the time.

Figure 6. 2 Party leader does not issue a vote recommendation (%) in roll call votes per year (1995-2018)



We can also see some variation among parties, with the PT more willing to whip votes overall, particularly in the earlier period. Moreover, in the years that leaders don't issue as many vote recommendations is also when party unity is lower. For example, in 2003 during the time of high party unity in the PR, the percentage of whip bills is never lower than 95%, and therefore, we can cast doubt on the notion that high party unity is the misleading product of not issuing a recommendation in controversial bills.

Following the Government Leader

In all roll call votes, the government leader can also recommend how parties in the coalition should vote, just like party leaders do. Therefore, votes for or against the party are almost always simultaneously a vote for or against the government. Since many scholars argue that the executive branch matters more than parties in Brazil, to ascertain the presence of *party* discipline, I need to control for *government* discipline, and I do so by explicitly including the variable *Following the Government* in the regression model. This variable is operationalized as the percentage of times a legislator follows the vote recommendation of the government leader in roll call votes, divided by the total number of votes they were present for in that year. This variable is coded in an identical manner as *Following the Party* described above but taking the government's recommendation as the reference instead of the party's recommendation.

The main problem with identifying party discipline is when both the party leader and the government leader recommend the same vote, when that happens, we cannot distinguish if the legislator is being "disciplined" by the party, or by the government, or both. In fact, including both *Following the Party* and *Following the Government* in the same regression is problematic because of high collinearity. For example, from 2003 to 2012 the correlation between following the party and following the government in the PT reaches .93, significant at the .001 level. Such high level of collinearity between such important independent variable is bound to cause problems, such as inflating the standard errors and even flipping the direction of the regression coefficient (Lewis-Beck, 1980). For that reason, I created an alternative measure for *Following the Party* that tries to address

collinearity directly and does so by considering only bills in which the party and the government issue recommendations that are at odds with each other.

Following the Party when at odds with the Government

To sidestep collinearity, I created an alternative variable that measures the percentage of times a legislator follows the party leader's vote recommendation each year, but *only* when the party leader's vote recommendation was at odds with that of the government leader, following the procedure adopted by Samuels and Desposato (2008). If the party leader recommends a yay and the government a nay, then sticking with the party in such cross-pressured votes constitutes a more stringent and parsimonious test of party discipline. If what really matters is following to the party's recommendation, then we should find a positive and statistically significant relationship between *Following the Party when at odds with the Government* and how much resources legislators received in the following year. Given this procedure, if following the party in such votes is systematically related with receiving more resources, we can have more confidence that party discipline is present, and that it is not the artificial result of collinearity with *Following the Government.*

This is the main independent variable I will consider in the analysis that follows. In this version, if legislators follow the party leader's recommendation, that vote is coded as "1," if the deputy voted in any other way, that vote is coded as "0," following the exact same procedure as the simpler version of *Following the Party* described above. I then

calculate the yearly percentage score for each deputy, and, as before, count absences as missing data.

However, one limitation of this approach is that it constrains the sample size, since legislators are only cross pressured in this manner in a smaller number of bills. For example, in the PR there are no bills of this kind in 2004 and 2006, meaning that the leader either always agreed with the government, or/and when they would have disagreed, the leader didn't issue a vote recommendation at all. Furthermore, because deputies are more likely to be absent in such controversial votes, relying on this strategy further decreases the number of observations, since absences are counted as missing. This limitation in the data implies that using this variable is a conservative test of party discipline, since a lower number of observations yields larger standard errors, increasing the likelihood of null results, all else equal. Therefore, this empirical strategy makes it more difficult to find what I expect to find, namely positive and significant coefficients.

Moreover, cross-pressured votes are distinct from the general "population" of roll call votes. There is a correlation between bills in which party leader and government leader are at odds and slimmer passage margins (+ or - 10%), as well as a with a higher number of absences. This suggest that these bills are more controversial and salient, which increases the stakes of defection from the party. This makes for a more conservative and parsimonious test of my hypothesis. These are not irrelevant bills. If I find positive and statistically significant coefficient of party discipline using this more conservative strategy, we can be more confident that positive evidence of *party* discipline is not being driven by collinearity with *Following the Government*.

In Figure 6.3 I display the percentage of votes in which leaders and government disagreed in four parties. The pattern in the data ebbs and flows with the entry and exit of parties in the governing coalition. When in the opposition many votes are cross-pressured, when in the government, the opposite is true. I also created an alternative coding strategy in which I code *all* absent legislators as voting *against* the party recommendation. However, my main results are robust to this alternative coding strategy.

Figure 6. 3 Cross-Presssured Bills in four parties 1995 to 2018



Controls

Naturally, toeing the party line is not the only reason legislators receive resources, in other words, other independent variables may explain variation in the dependent variables, which we need to control for. For example, more senior members may generally receive more resources, ceteris paribus. Thus, we need to control for confounding factors such as seniority that could obscure the relationship between toeing the party line and

receiving resources. Therefore, I include several control variables, including *seniority*, *number of party switches*, *vote share in last election*, if the deputy is a *substitute*, which *president* is in office, *malfeasance changes* and *sex ascribed at birth*, which I describe below.

Seniority is simply the count of how many years a deputy has served in the Chamber. In the period from 1995 to 2018, more than 40% were in their first term, some 25% in their second term, 16% in their third and the 18% reminder served 3 or more terms. It is possible that more senior members may receive more resources because they are more experienced, knowledgeable, and powerful.

The variable *Vote Share* is defined as the total amount of personal votes each deputy received in the last election, divided by the total number of votes in their district. It may be that legislators that receive more votes are more likely to receive more resources, because party leaders want popular vote-getters to remain in the party.

The *malfeasance* variable is a dummy which takes the value of "1" if the deputy was indited or officially investigated for a severe malfeasance and if that was reported in a national media outlet, and "0" otherwise. Malfeasance changes include crimes such as corruption, embezzlement, tax evasion, fraud, money laundering, and even murder. However, I exclude sex scandals that were not crimes, such as consensual affairs. I also exclude the so-called opinion crimes, because in heated debates legislators may overstep the bounds of civility but there is little evidence that anyone cares and they are obviously not severe malfeasance, as commonly understood. Using those criteria, about one if every five federal deputies were prosecuted or investigated for severe malfeasance in the 1995 to

2018 period. For parties concerned with their reputation among voters, such charges of malfeasance could have a negative effect on elections. As such in those parties a deputy accused of severe crimes could be removed from important committees to avoid the negative publicity, for example. Therefore, for conventional, non-clientelistic parties, we can predict that the *Malfeasance* coefficient will be negative. However, in clientelistic parties, leaders may choose not to punish legislators accused of malfeasance, since their voters are mostly indifferent to them. Therefore, I expect heterogenous effects based on party type.

The control variable *number of party switches* counts the number of times a deputy has changed parties. More party switching should negatively impact resources because such legislators may be considered a bad investment of scarce party resources, given the expectation that they are more likely to leave the party.

The *substitute* variable has the value of "0" if the deputy was elected as a substitute, and "1" if they were not. A substitute deputy means their votes were insufficient to win a seat to Congress outright, but that they can fill a seat *if* it is vacated, in a waiting list of sorts. Given that many deputies leave office to run for mayor or to take a position in federal or state agencies, this creates about 100 vacancies in each term that are to be filled by substitute deputies. These substitute deputies tend to stay in office for less time and are probably less likely to receive resources, but they are numerous enough that should be included in the analysis. I expect this variable will have a positive effect on resources, since substitute deputies (coded as zeros) are less important to the party than their non-substitute counterparts.

I also include the dummy variable *Sex*, and I predict that males will have an advantage over females, given negative stereotypes, implicit biases, and the structural effects of patriarchy in Brazil. Finally, I also included a variable that controls for time, namely, a categorical variable for each new presidential term. I use such a variable because there are strong theoretical reasons to do so, given that presidents manage the coalition in different ways, which may impact party discipline, as several studies have suggested (see Amorim Neto et al., 2003).

Modelling Strategy

Finding evidence of party discipline consists in showing that legislators that follow the party leader more often also receive more resources on average, ceteris paribus. Moreover, my theoretical framework predicts heterogenous effects across parties, as I expect to find evidence of party discipline in clientelistic parties (**H1**). Meanwhile, hypothesis 2 (conventional wisdom) and 3 (revisionist) predicts homogeneous effects in all parties, namely, null coefficients for **H2** and positive ones for **H3**. Finally, **H4** (conditional party government) also predicts heterogeneous effects, predicting party discipline only in mass-parties with strong organizations. Therefore, I will run separate regression analysis for each party to capture the possibility of heterogeneous effects and compare party types.

While this approach may seem straightforward, exactly *how* we test for party discipline is tricky because different scholars, using slightly different methods, produce

different results. For example, in one study most parties showed evidence of discipline (Lyne, 2008a), in another only a few did (Ames, 2002a, 2002b), and in third, results were mixed (Samuels & Desposato, 2008). Therefore, my strategy is one to boost confidence in positive and significant results by showing that they are not the result of "p-hacking," and are not sensitive to specification or coding strategy, and I do so by testing different specifications and coding strategies. If the result remains similar across the board, then we can conclude that they are robust. Moreover, since my theory predicts a positive and significant coefficient, I will adopt a conservative method, stacking the odds against finding significant and positive results. Given this approach, what are the possible biases that must be addressed to convince the reader that the evidence of party discipline is sound?

The first concern is a temporal: what comes first, do legislators toe the party line first and then receive rewards later or do they receive rewards first and vote with the party after? Here I adopt the convention in assuming that legislators vote with the party first and receive rewards later. I will use the lagged version (t -1) of *Follow the Leader* because it guarantees that the purported "cause" is temporally prior to their effects. Nevertheless, I include in the regression both *Following the Leader* in the present year (t=0) as a control. Moreover, because of possible collinearity between the two variables may cause problems, I also conduct specification robustness tests to rule out this possibility of biased results.

Additionally, to better measure the relationship between voting behavior and resource distribution, I used a panel data structure, which is an improvement over the simpler cross-sectional version that is usually adopted. With a panel I can explicitly control for temporal dynamics that may confound the analysis. Regarding panel data, we have two

options: fixed effects or random effects. Fixed effects controls for omitted variable bias, by focusing on how change in following the party over time affects the dependent variable. As such, one can implicitly control for variables that are idiosyncratic to individual deputy, such as charisma, gender, or race, for example.

Random effects models focus instead on the cross-sectional variation, between deputies, and allows me to explicitly control for certain time-invariant factors, such as sex. I opt for the random effects version, for several reasons. First, the downside of fixed effects is that it drops observations from the analysis which constrains the representativeness of the results and increases the size of the standard error. Given how small the sample size is already, reducing the number of observations is a strategy to be avoided. Second, since I include the lag of my dependent variables as controls, using fixed effects generates a bias pointed out by Nickell (1981), the solution to which requires even more demanding assumptions. Since I do want to include the lagged versions of my dependent variables that strategy should be avoided. Third, the intercept of the fixed effects absorbs all time invariant factors related to the individual, while the random effects version allows me to explicitly model them, and since some of my controls are time-invariant, that is the best option in that regard. Fourth, some of my models have such a low number of observations that fixed effects fails to arrive at a unique solution and identify the model, affecting comparability. For all those reasons and following the general advice of Bell and Jones (2015), I opt for random effects models.

To the best of my knowledge, my empirical analysis of party discipline in Brazil is the most extensive, conservative, and robust of its kind to date. Most scholars usually focus

on one or another possible "carrot" that leaders may use to promote discipline, usually earmarks, while I analyze four of them. Moreover, most scholars focus on one legislative session or another, while I analyze 5 of them, more than 23 years of data, from 1995 to 2018. Additionally, by using a panel data structure, my results boost greater internal validity. I also run extensive robustness checks, following the example of Treisman (2007). Finally, by stacking the odds against confirming my hypothesis in several ways, any evidence of party discipline will have passed a high threshold.

Results

Results from the regression analysis of each of the four dependent variables (DV) are presented below. To recap, the main models use *Following the Party when at odds with the Government*, that only counts bills in which the party leader and the government leader gave conflicting vote recommendations and treats absent deputies as missing data. In Figure 6.4 I present the coefficients for the variable *Following the Party when at odds with the Government* (IV) regressed on *Earmarks* (DV), comparing different parties in separate models. What we find is evidence of party discipline in the PT that is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. According to these results, a one percentage point increase in *Following the Party when at odds with the Government* leads to an increase in *Earmarks* of R$6,892 in the following year on average, *ceteris paribus*. These linear results imply that a one standard deviation increase in following the leader's recommendation increases the size of the *Earmarks* by about R$240,000. Therefore, these results are substantively significant. This evidence favors hypothesis **H4** and the conditional party government

theory, which argues we should only find evidence of discipline in cohesive parties with strong organization. (Full results are displayed in Table 8.2 in the Appendix.) One could also interpret Figure 6.4 as favoring the conventional wisdom (**H2**), at least in part. While there is an exception, the PT, most parties show no evidence of party discipline, partially confirming the predictions of that hypothesis.

Figure 6. 4 Random Effects Panel Tobit Regression DV: Earmarks IV: Following the Party when Party Recommendation is at odds with the Government (Lagged)



Note. Sources TSE, *Camara dos Deputados, Cebrap*. Confidence interval 95%. See regression Table 8.2 in the appendix. The point estimates show how a one percent increase in the *Following the Party when at odds with the Government (lagged)* changes the appropriation of earmarks, measured in Brazilian Reais adjusted for inflation, with separate coefficients for each the eight different parties. There is no Y axis in the Figure, and the parties are listed from least to more personalistic.

Are these results for the PT sensitive to how we code absences? No, using the alternative method of counting absences yields the same results, the PT shows a positive and significant coefficient in either scenario. However, these significant results for the PT

are not robust if we use the high collinearity version of our test, in which we look at all bills and include in the model both *Following the Party* and *Following the Government.* When we do so the results are fickle, tend to show null results, and the direction of the coefficients changes. This is likely due to multicollinearity between those two variables, which during the Lula government reaches .93 at the .001 confidence level. This seems to confirm the intuition that using the *Following the party when at odds with the Government* variable is a more appropriate than the alternative.

Are these results robust to different specifications? We can gauge how sensitive the results are to this problem by removing each control variable from the equation one by one. Carrying out this procedure shows that the positive and statistically significant coefficient for the PT does change in some specifications. I also find that the positive and statistically significant coefficient is particularly strong when we restrict the sample to the years Lula was president, when the PT was leading the government. In sum, I would classify these results are moderately robust.

Next, I look at *Party Campaign Contributions* as a dependent variable. Results from the empirical analysis of *Party Campaign Contributions* as the DV are displayed in Figure 6.5 (full regression result are presented in Table 8.3 in the Appendix). Regarding party-controlled campaign contributions, only the PR and the PMDB have a positive and statistically significant coefficient. According to these estimates, in the PR a one percentage point increase in *Following the Party when at odds with the Government* rises the amount of *Party Campaign Contributions* by R$13,500 on average, *ceteris paribus*. This implies that a one standard-deviation increase in *Following the Party when at odds*

with the Government expands access to party-controlled campaign funds by about R$ 470,000, which is substantial.

Figure 6. 5 Random Effects Panel Tobit Regression DV: Party Campaign Contributions IV: Following the Party Average when Party Recommendation at odds with the Government



Note. 95% confidence interval. Sources TSE, *Camara dos Deputados, Cebrap*.

Are these results robust? For the PR they are, but for the PMDB less so. When I use the alternative coding strategy of the IV, analyzing all bills and including both *Following the Party* as well as *Following the Government* on the right-hand side of the equation, the coefficients for the PR are still positive and significant. Moreover, when I test different specifications, removing controls one by one, I also find that the results are extremely robust, even increasing the magnitude of the effect and never loosing statistical significance. When I code absences as voting against the party, the results are also

consistent. In sum, regarding *Party Campaign Contribution* I found evidence of party discipline in the PR across many different models, with different ways of coding the independent variable and across different specifications. Therefore, we can be confident that the results for the PR are strong and highly robust.

The only other party with positive and significant coefficients regarding *Party Campaign Contributions* is the PMDB, although the results aren't as robust as those for the PR. When I run a separate model including at all bills and both *Following the Party* as well as *Following the Government*, the coefficient for the PMDB losses it's statistical significance. When I run as separate analysis counting absences as voting against the party, the coefficient remains in the same direction and significant. When I run the specification test, removing each control variable one by one, the result remains robust. Overall, the results for the PMDB are moderately robust. Unless we are willing to classify the PMDB as a mass-party, none of the other hypothesis can explain this empirical result. Only if we classify the PMDB as clientelistic is that this data makes sense, as I will explore in more detail later.

Next, I test legislative assignments as the Dependent Variable. The results for the regression analysis with *Power Committees* as the DV are displayed in Figure 6.6 below (full results are displayed in Table 8.4 in the Appendix). The result broadly suggest is that there is little evidence of party discipline regarding "power committee" assignments, in any party, which corroborates the conventional wisdom hypothesis (**H2**) and cast doubt on the argument that committee are used to promote discipline.

We can also see in Figure 6.6 that the coefficients of the PR and PTB are negative. However, those results are neither robust nor statistically significant, therefore, we cannot take those coefficients as dispositive evidence of a negative relationship, instead these display null results, therefore, based on this evidence we cannot ascertain the direction of the relationship in those parties. The fact that this negative coefficient is also not robust adds to the conclusion that we should not put much analytical weight on them.

Figure 6. 6 Random Effects Panel Logit Regression DV: Committee Assignment IV: Following the Party when Party Recommendation at odds with the Government Lagged



Note. 95% confidence interval. See regression table 4.6 in the appendix.
Sources: TSE, *Camara dos Deputados, Cebrap*.

The final test of party discipline regards the distribution of *Rapporteur Assignment*, with regression coefficients for different parties displayed in Figure 6.7 (full results are displayed in Table 8.5 in the Appendix). In that Figure I find evidence of party discipline

in the DEM, in the PT and in the PMDB. Are these results robust to different coding of the IV and specifications? The positive coefficients for the PT and PMDB cease to be significant when I consider all bills, including both *Following the Party* and *Following the Government* in the right-hand side of the equation. But keep in mind however that this may be due to high collinearity between those variables. When I code absences as voting against the party, the only coefficient that remains positive and significant is that of the PT. Moreover, the specification test also shows that the positive coefficients for the three parties are not very robust in that regard, loosing significance when certain variables are removed from the equation. Overall, these results show a low level of robustness.

Figure 6. 7 Random Effects Panel Negative Binomial Regression DV: Rapporteur Assignment IV: Following the Party when Party Recommendation at odds with the Government Lagged



Note: 95% confidence interval. Sources: TSE, *Camara dos Deputados, Cebrap.*

Discussion of Findings

In this chapter I have sought evidence of party discipline in Brazil's main political parties, contrasting four competing hypotheses with different empirical implications and looking at four possible causal mechanisms. Which hypotheses were corroborated by the data? The answer hinges on how we classify the parties, and some parties are easier to classify then others. For example, the PT and PR are clearly on opposites ends on the clientelism and personalism dimensions, the first conforming to the ideal of the mass-party with strong organization and ideological cohesion, while the second is one of the most clientelistic and personalistic parties in my analysis. However, the DEM and PMDB are more in the "middle of the road" regarding those dimensions, and more difficult to classify. In my view, those parties are certainly closer to the clientelism ideal type than the mass-party one, and therefore, **H1** is a better explanation than **H4**.

Interpretation of the result also hinges on how we analyze the four different possible causal mechanisms of discipline. For example, regarding the conventional wisdom (**H2**), we find support of that hypothesis only regarding *Committee Assignment*s, where we find null results across the board. However, one must keep in mind that these committee assignments have no statistically significant impact on legislative elections (see Table 8.1 in the Appendix), and therefore, the null results may be better explained by the low electoral salience of committee assignment, rather than corroboration of the conventional wisdom hypothesis. As such, my interpretation is that positive evidence of party discipline does not need to be found regarding all possible DV's at the same time to count as dispositive. As I have explicitly argued, some "carrots" may be more desirable in some

parties more than in others, and, therefore, I expected positive coefficient regarding some DV's but not others.

However, given that I find null results in most of the parties most of time regarding all four DV's, we should concede that there is *some* evidence in support of the conventional wisdom. It may indeed be that most parties do internalize the incentives of the candidate-centered electoral system and lack discipline. However, that theory has important caveats: some parties do not behave as this theory predicts and it is important to understand and predict when and why the conventional wisdom fails. Even though most parties do conform to that theory, there are exception to the rule. If we accept that the conventional wisdom cannot explain certain exceptions, but is mostly true for most parties, then my results give some partial support for that hypothesis. However, the conventional wisdom has a hard time explaining the positive and significant coefficients that we do find. The conventional wisdom will have a particularly hard time explaining the evidence of party discipline in the PR regarding *Party Campaign Contributions*, which is highly robust. According to that theory, parties should have little role to play in elections, and even if endowed with resources, they should seldom be used as rewards for party discipline. In other words, the received wisdom cannot explain some of the exceptions.

In the opposite direction, the revisionist theory (**H3**) predicts party discipline across the board, in all parties, because of the centralized rules of the Chamber (Figueiredo & Limongi, 1999). And this should be particularly true regarding carrots that are internal to the Chamber, such as committees. As the results make clear, we find no support for that theory, regarding any of the four mechanisms tested. Positive coefficients appear only in some parties but never in all of them, so we can reject that hypothesis with more

confidence. It is important to put this contribution in context, because, in my view, this is the dominant theory in Brazil today.

Regarding the *conditional party government* hypothesis (**H4**), I do find some supporting evidence in that regard. Namely there is positive evidence that the PT uses *Rapporteur Assignments* and *Earmarks* to reward legislators who follow the party's vote recommendations. This seems to confirm that when the caucus agrees on the main issues of the day and invests in party organization, they can overcome the personalistic incentives of the electoral arena and discipline their members (Samuels, 1999). But among the parties with positive evidence of discipline only the PT "fits the bill" of the mass-party type. In other words, it is the only party that would "fit" the conditional party government theory (**H4**). In contrast, the DEM, PR and PMDB should not be classified in the same way, and in chapter 4 and 5 we reviewed evidence that cast doubt on the applicability of that theory to those parties.

Regarding the main hypothesis of this study, namely that clientelistic machines can produce party discipline under boss domination (**H1**), we do find some evidence that corroborates it. Regarding *Party Campaign Contributions* the data shows strong and extremely robust evidence of party discipline in the PR. In fact, the positive coefficient for the PR is more robust than those regarding the PT. In other words, if critics believe that the evidence of party discipline in the PR is not robust *enough*, even more is true for the PT and the other parties, leading us to conclude that no evidence of party discipline is robust. But such a burden of proof would then be too high to count as a "fair shake" for the alternative hypothesis, biasing the result in favor of the conventional wisdom, which

excepts null results across the board. Moreover, the procedure I adopted is already stacked against what I seek to find, it's conservative, robust, and parsimonious.

How can we interpret the positive results of party discipline in the PMDB, DEM and PR in light of our competing hypothesis? Based on what we learned about each party in chapters 4 and 5, the PR is not ideologically cohesive and does not have a significant following in the electorate. At the same time, the PR engages in corruption and clientelism to an extreme degree, and is clearly dominated by a boss, Valdemar Costa Neto. Therefore, we can rule out the possibility that conditional party government (**H4**) applies to the PR. That party certainly does not have a well-developed and widespread national party organization, nor do they carefully indoctrinate candidates in their "ideology." In fact, the ideology of the party is nebulous at best, as shown in chapters 4 and 5. The problem is that no other current theory of legislative parties can adequately explain party discipline in the PR, only my theory offers a plausible explanation. To all other explanations these results are a complete theoretical anomaly. To explain their behavior, it may be better to "follow the money" instead of assuming responsible party government, as some do.

I also find some dispositive evidence of party discipline in the PMDB, but the magnitude of the effect is smaller and less robust than in the PR. How can we interpret those findings? Disaggregating the results for the PMDB shows that the coefficients are positive and significant precisely when it's also more dominated by a powerful and corrupt leader, starting in 2014. According to court documents, one of the main reasons Michel Temer became president of the party in 2014 was to control the targeting of illegal resources (Alencastro & Barretto, 2016). According to his indictment, Temer was the head

of a criminal organization within the party, and he had the supreme decision-making power within that group (Odilla, 2017). Therefore, it is plausible that the PMDB has become increasingly clientelistic and dominated by a corrupt boss. If this is true, then this is evidence in support of my theory of clientelistic party discipline in boss dominated parties (**H1**). Moreover, no other theory can reasonably explain positive evidence of party discipline in the PMDB, as the conditional party government thesis clearly does not apply here, since the PMDB is widely acknowledged as ideologically heterogenous.

Finally, there is some evidence of party discipline in the DEM, but those results are also not very robust. Nevertheless, any reasonable scholar would place that party closer to the PR than the PT, and as we saw in chapters 4 and 5, the data supports that intuition. Therefore, of all the competing explanations mentioned above, the clientelistic party discipline (**H1**) is the one that fits best the positive results in the DEM. Nevertheless, given their low robustness of their coefficients I put little analytical weight on those results.

Other theories that examine the link between clientelism and party discipline also cannot explain these results. Lyne (2008a) and Desposato (2007) argue that clientelistic party discipline cannot exist in candidate-centered party systems, such as Brazil. Yet I find evidence directly refuting that proposition. Therefore, only my theory of clientelistic party discipline can account for the empirical results we find.

Another issue is the explanatory power of my theory. For example, based on my data I would expect to find positive coefficients of party discipline in the PTB, which is highly clientelistic and is dominated by a strong boss, Roberto Jefferson. However, it is possible that null results for the PTB may be due to a type II error. Purely statistical issues

could be contributing to finding null results in the PTB, such as multicollinearity. Indeed, the correlation between *Following the Party* and *Following the Government* in the PTB is .89, significant at the .001 level. Moreover, the *Following the Party* variable is positive and significant at the .001 level in the full sample model, when I include both *Following the Party* and *Following the Government* in the specification, instead of analyzing just the votes that places party leaders and the government at odds. It is possible then that party discipline does occur in that party, but it is difficult to separate it analytically from *government* discipline. Nevertheless, I concede that my theory suggests evidence of discipline in that party, and I find none, which obviously calls into question the explanatory power of my theory. However, it is also difficult to dismiss the evidence of discipline the PR, given its robustness and substantive magnitude, and no other theory can explain those results. Additionally, evidence of party discipline in the PMDB and DEM can also be reasonably interpreted as corroborating the clientelistic party discipline hypothesis, which increases the explanatory power of the theory.

A final concern is the fact that I did not analyze all the relevant causal mechanisms by which leaders can promote discipline, only the ones that I could obtain good data on. Other important instruments include patronage and the distribution of illegal resources from corruption, which are hard to measure. In terms of patronage, it is difficult to exaggerate just how important and pervasive it is in Brazil, yet we have limited data on which to base empirical tests, since there is no official record of it most of the time. If that is the principal causal mechanism by which clientelistic parties promote party discipline but I cannot test it, then my results could underplay the real extent of discipline in such parties.

Regarding illegal resources, we also know from several scandals that party leaders distribute illegal cash to whip votes. That was clear both during the Monthly Allowances scandal and in the Car Wash scandal. Yet, given limited data, I have not been able to properly test its effects on promoting party unity. It is quite possible that there is evidence of party discipline regarding these illegal resources in parties such as the PTB, but we don't have the data to prove it, adding to the type II error problem.

Finally, given that we also find evidence of party discipline in the PT, the importance of my theory becomes even more critical and obvious. It does not take much expertise in Brazilian politics to conclude that the PT and the PR could not be more different, and yet both display evidence of party discipline. To assume that conditional party government is the explanation of party discipline in the PR is to make an obvious and grave mistake. But scholars armed with that theory are primed to err in that direction. When such radically different parties exhibit the same observationally equivalent behavior, we need strong theory and nuanced analysis to distinguish the radically different causal mechanisms that produce these similar behaviors.

In the next chapter I will explore my contribution to the broader literature, avenues for future research, normative implications, and the generalizability of my argument.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

Introduction

In this concluding chapter I will briefly locate my contribution to a more general theory of party discipline and suggest avenues for future research. I will then show how my theory generalizes beyond the Brazilian case, briefly discussing the cases of Argentina and the United States. I will then explore the normative implications of my theory and findings, specifically regarding the dangers of political reforms that ignore the role of clientelism.

Contribution to the literature

I started this research with a well-established motivating puzzle: weak parties with strong legislative leaders in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. If parties are personalistic and poorly institutionalized because of the candidate-centered electoral rule, why do legislators delegate so much power to leaders in the Chamber? This puzzle has eluded scholars for decades and the contradiction of institutional incentives has even been naturalized as a distinguishing feature of Brazilian politics (Pereira & Mueller, 2003). Within that broader puzzle, I focused on a particularly thorny question: can legislative leaders promote party discipline and what are the causal mechanisms?

On that issue we found competing explanations and empirical findings. The conventional wisdom places an emphasis on the electoral arena, arguing that the candidate-centered electoral rule weakens legislative leaders, and, therefore, we should find no

evidence of party discipline in the Brazilian Chamber. In contrast, the "revisionists" focus on the incentives generated in the legislative arena, arguing that legislative leaders have the wherewithal to promote party discipline, because the internal rules concentrate power in their hands. A third camp focuses on party organization, arguing it moderates and mediates the incentives produced by formal institutions. Parties that are resource-poor strengthen party organization to attract and retain the support of policy-minded voters, social movements, and unions (Samuels, 1999). They invest in party organization to overcome the individualizing incentives of the electoral arena and strengthen the party's ideological cohesion. This generates a path to party discipline analogous to the theory of conditional party government, in that, if parties strengthen their organization, then ideological cohesion and polarization will follow, which in turn generates incentives for party discipline.

However, none of these existing explanations can account for the robust evidence of party discipline I find in one of Brazil's most clientelistic and personalistic parties, the Party of the Republic (PR). Evidence of party discipline in the PR is a complete theoretical anomaly for all alternative explanations. In fact, scholars that study the intersection of clientelism and party discipline explicitly deny this type of behavior is possible in Brazil (Lyne, 2008a; Desposato, 2007).

The difficulty in explaining the behavior of the PR points to a broader fragility in the general theory of party discipline, regarding the confusing relationship between clientelism, formal institutions and personalism. Many scholars in legislative studies collapse personalism with clientelism. For example, Hunter (2007) considers both to be part of a same underlying dimension, as do many other scholars. But the association of

personalism and clientelism is contradicted by the very history of the United States. The progressive movement during the turn of the 20th century used a candidate-centered rule, primaries, to fight against clientelistic party machines that concentrated power in the hands of corrupt party bosses, who made nominations in "smoked filled rooms." In other words, candidate-centered rules were used to fight against bossism in clientelistic machines. Vote buying and patronage exist under all electoral rules. Personalism and clientelism are distinct and the sooner we realized this the better our theories and interpretation of empirical evidence will become.

My findings perfectly illustrate why we should analyze personalism and clientelism separately. I find robust and substantive evidence of party discipline in the PR, the party that scores among highest on indicators of clientelism, and is, at the same time, the party that has the highest score in my personalism scale. When clientelism is sufficiently high, personalism no longer has the same effects on parties that the personal vote theory describes. He PR is personalistic, but it is not the party imagined by the personal theory or predicted by theories that focus on the candidate-centered distinction. That party is high concentrated in the hands of the boss, it is not decentralized or characterized by weak leadership.

Regarding competing explanations, my findings also lead me to conclude that the conventional wisdom (**H2**) does do a better job at explaining party behavior than the revisionists (**H3**). After all, it is true that I only found evidence of party discipline in some of the eight parties I have analyzed, which on the flip side means null results of party discipline in most parties. This could be interpreted in favor of the conventional wisdom, while admitting that there are important exceptions that it cannot explain.

My research adds to general theory by clarifying that, beyond the PT, there are other important exceptions to the rule of no party discipline in Brazil. And the behavior of such parties cannot be explained by the same theory used to account for the PT's behavior, namely conditional party government (**H4**). That same theory cannot explain the presence of party discipline in the PR. These two "exceptions" have different causal mechanisms generating them, but both share the fact that party organization is different than what the conventional wisdom predicts because on the candidate-centered electoral rule. In one case, we have cohesion and strong party organization, and in the other, we have boss domination and high levels of clientelism and corruption. But in both cases, party organization mediates and moderates the incentives from the electoral arena, explaining their exceptional behavior.

However, given the fact that I did not find evidence of clientelistic party discipline in the PTB as I expected, this may suggest a low explanatory power of my theory. However, it is possible that null results are caused by problems of collinearity between *Following the Party* and *Following the Government*, which is extremely high in the PTB. Indeed, that high level of collinearity may in itself be suggestive that indeed party leaders mediate the relationship between the government and the backbenchers (Samuels & Desposato, 2008 p. 11-12). Indeed, in my interviews I noted how legislators define themselves and their parties as being part of the government or the opposition, and that distinction surfaced almost immediately. This intuition finds support in the quantitative analysis of ideal point estimates, as Zucco (2009) shows that the government vs. opposition cleavage is very important and has become more so over time, at the expense of ideology. In fact, following the leader and following the government is almost the same for some parties, as there are

very few votes in which the party leader was at odds with the government. For example, in the PR there were no cross-pressured bills in the years 2004 and 2006. Therefore, in some years following the government and the party was almost indistinguishable.

It is possible that by focusing on causality and on empirical clarity regarding *party* discipline, as separate from *government* discipline, I have put too much emphasis in separating their effects, when such distinction is somewhat artificial. I is possible that by focusing on their separate causal effects, I have buried evidence of government discipline that is mediated and facilitated through party leaders. Future scholarship needs to find creative ways to tackle that thorny problem.

Nevertheless, while votes in which party leaders and the government disagree may be rare in some parties and in some years, those bills are important, for they show independence from the government. The PR displays evidence that party leaders do matter, precisely when the government and the party leader disagree. Those that follow the party will be rewarded with more money for their campaigns when they support the party against the will of the government. This makes clear to the government that they must negotiate with that party leader if they want to their support to pass legislation. This is a novel claim in several regards, because while many scholars believe earmarks are used by the executive branch to purchase legislative support (Pereira & Mueller, 2003), the story of my data is more about campaign money not pork, and it's about party leaders not the government. Finally, while discipline is seen as the result of ideological cohesion, my findings also tell an interesting and novel story about how clientelism can also lead to discipline.

Moreover, another reason why I didn't find more evidence of party discipline in clientelistic parties is that I simply couldn't test all the proper causal mechanisms, for

example, patronage and the distribution of illegal funds. Patronage may be the most important tool used to promote clientelistic discipline, but we simply do not have good data on that variable.

My results also suggest another wrinkle in the story of party discipline. It is also possible that boss domination in clientelistic parties is an unstable equilibrium. In order words, while party discipline in clientelistic parties is a possible outcome, boss domination may not last long enough to yield robust evidence of discipline. The condition of boss domination seems transient, and when a boss leaves office the party dynamic will likely change considerably. Take for example, the case of the PP that losses its influential leader Maluf in 2003, or take the case of the PMDB, which only seems to become more dominated by a boss starting in 2014. Because boss domination is based on their personal network of "favors and friends," when they retire that influence cannot be fully inherited by their successor, creating discontinuities.

While critics may consider this a drawback in the theory, it may instead be insightful. The instability in boss domination of party machines may help explain why the apogee of leadership strength in the U. S. during the turn of the 19th century was so brief. If the structural conditions of conditional party government were present to buttress party discipline, then we should find evidence of strong leadership enduring while the structural conditions remained. Since structural conditions of polarized constituents and partisan sorting should not change from one Speakership to the next, they cannot account for the abrupt changes in legislative behavior that actually occured from one Speaker to the next during that time. Instead, party discipline appears and disappears with Speakers Reed and

Cannon because only they had the control over the spoils system to "wheel and deal" their way into winning coalitions. When boss domination vanished, so did "party government."

Now, while those are important contributions to the literature in themselves, I do not want to exaggerate the explanatory power of my theory to explain party discipline in Brazil. Not all parties or politicians can be classified as clientelistic and corrupt. In fact, with the advent of social media, deputies have now a direct line of communication with voters, which facilitates position taking and advertising. Nowadays, you can see many deputies in Chamber looking into their phone as they record content for their followers. As one older deputy remarked:

> Today there are the 'deputies of the internet.' They are those who receive a message on Facebook or social media, that is negative about an issue, and if half a dozen of followers have negative opinions about a bill, then already want to change their votes on that bill.[62]

Such "internet deputies" clearly fit the model of personalistic legislators who are more concern about position taking and are constrained by their voters. This is what should come to mind when we think about classic personalism. Such legislators do have an incentive to protect their legislative independence from party leaders, and enough of those legislators in a party will lead toward behavior conforming to the personalistic catch-all type.

However, even with that caveat, my data also makes is clear that corruption and vote buying are still pervasive in Brazil, especially in poor states and communities. Sure,

[62] Personal Interview Federal Deputy PSDB #1

it does not affect all parties and politicians, but it is severe enough that we must take the issue seriously. Given such high levels of malfeasance and clientelism it is prudent not to assume that all politicians are driven by position taking. It is prudent not to confuse those legislators who are constrained by voters, from those who coerce them into selling their votes. Many legislators seemed more concerned with avoiding jail time and augmenting private gain, and that has important implications to their behavior. In other words, it is relevant to distinguish classic personalism from clientelism.

In sum, given my empirical results, it is more accurate to describe clientelistic party discipline in Brazil as an exception to the rule of weak parties and no party discipline. The evidence does support in part the conventional wisdom, in the sense that, most of the time, in most parties, the evidence of party discipline is lacking. But just as the PT does not conform to that general rule, the PR also doesn't, even while they are at the opposite end of the personalism and clientelism dimensions. While their behavior is observationally equivalent, they are such radically different parties that the explanation for one almost certainly cannot fit to the other. It is important to know when our theories don't work, where the exceptions will be found and why. Least we confuse two radically distinct parties, one normatively desirable and the other not. It is important to distinguish different causal mechanism that led to party discipline, lest we recommend counterproductive political reforms guided by misplaced theory.

Now, reasonable scholars may look at the evidence of party discipline in Chapter 6 and take issue with my interpretation of it. Some may even find the evidence of party discipline in clientelistic parties lacking. Granted, while my regression analysis can be seen as not overwhelmingly in support for my theory, the data on party organization is

incontrovertible. Remember, the received wisdom contends that in candidate-centered systems clientelistic parties are incapable of promoting party discipline, *because* they are too decentralized, their leaders are just too weak (Lyne, 2008a; Desposato, 2007). While my evidence of party discipline may be in dispute, the evidence of party centralization is as clear as it can ever be. In the PR more than 90% of municipal committees are appointed by the boss (see Table 5.16), in other words there is complete boss domination in that party. Moreover, that data is corroborated by interviews and secondary sources, all which point to extremely high levels of concentration of power in that party. After all, when a boss commands the party even from inside prison, as in the case of the PR, we should not classify that leadership as weak.

While we can quibble with the robustness of the evidence on party discipline, no reasonable scholar should put the empirical findings about party organization under doubt: the PR is not decentralized and does not have weak leadership, as the received wisdom believes. Not only do I find concentration of power in "personalistic" parties such as the PTB and the PR, but I also find *extreme* concentration of power, and no theory available today can explain that result. Therefore, my contribution is loud and clear regarding the effect of clientelism on party organization, and prior scholars get this terribly wrong, with important normative implications.

Generalizability

While most theories of political parties were created to explain party systems in developed countries, comparative scholars have nevertheless applied those theories to the developing world (see for example Ames, 2002b; Jones, 2002; Amorim Neto et al., 2005).

However, theories created for developed countries may not "travel" well to developing countries because of violation of their scope conditions. This seems to be the case in this study, because theories such as the conditional party government, procedural cartel, and the "personal vote" all assume conventional politics, while in practice many politicians focus on private gain and voting buying, violating foundational assumptions of such theories. While they assume that legislative behavior is explained by policy preferences and the relative saliency of the party brand, some parties and legislators may be motivated by other goals, such as avoiding jail. Those theories never assume that voters relate to politician based on clientelism, they always assume conventional linkage strategies, based on pork barrel and position taking. But I show that when clientelism is pervasive, parties will behave differently from what the conventional wisdom has assumed.

Moreover, theories that place emphasis on formal institutions also assume away clientelism, such as the important claims about party-centered rules. Additionally, emphasis on that distinction implies that formal institutions determine party organization. For decades this has been an axiom in comparative politics that few have called into question. However, in poorly institutionalized party systems, such as in Latin America, formal institutions are not necessarily enforced or even relevant. And, more importantly, such a distinction was created to analyze non-clientelistic parties and may not to be relevant to analyze boss dominated machines.

A comparison between Britain, Argentina and Brazil clearly illustrates the dangers of inferring the party organization from the electoral rule and illustrates my contribution to the broader literature. For example, Ames (2002a) treats both Britain and Argentina as

examples of strong party systems, both being normatively desirable. In Britain nomination control and career advancement are truly top-down, concentrated in the hands of *national* party leaders. Voters support MP's primarily as a referendum on the Prime Minister, and "party swings" are large and closely linked to the performance of the *national* party (Samuels & Shugart, 2010). Similarly, Argentina has a party-centered electoral rule and for that reason many scholars believe that it also has strong party organization and high party discipline, such as, for example, Jones (2002). Along the same lines, Calvo (2014) argues that the Argentine Congress is explained by procedural cartel theory (along very similar lines see Jones and Hwang, 2005, p. 268), arguing parties are disciplined because they care about their collective reputation for policy achievements.

However, formal rules are constantly disregarded in poorly institutionalized party systems, such as in Brazil or Argentina, so it perilous to take them for granted. As Freidenberg & Levitsky (2006) argue "there is often a vast gap between how those parties are organized on paper and how they function in practice. In many cases, decision-making power lies not in formal leadership bodies but in individual leaders or office-holding party bosses" (p. 179). In Argentina party statutes are "neither widely known nor taken seriously", and as a result, party rules are "openly violated all the time" (Freidenberg & Levitsky, 2006, p. 187). Some party members argued that the party "doesn't exist" (Levitsky, 2003, p. 29), and the national party organization "played virtually no role in shaping party strategy" (p. 26).

Moreover, despite Argentina's closed list PR system (party-centered), nomination is not top-down, instead, candidates are normally decided based on primaries (Jones, 2002

p. 164). And in such primaries, clientelism usually determines the winners, not policy positions (Levitsky, 2003). As Freidenberg and Levitsky (2006) describe it, the "real party structure is fluid, decentralized, and increasingly organized around patronage" (192). In fact, even scholars who contend that Argentina resembles a procedural cartel, have to admit the empirical reality of the importance of clientelism and the weakness of the national party organization. As Jones and Hwang (2005) concede, "provincial party bosses are the key players who engage in delegation", not the *national* party organization or leaders. They admit that the dominance of the provincial boss in Argentina "is based principally on patronage, pork barrel politics and clientelism" (p. 269). In Argentinian primaries, "Peronistas who maintain traditional organizational practices have difficulty competing against these machine-like methods, and thus are losing internal elections and becoming marginalized" (Letisky, 2003, p. 209). As Levitsky (2003) concludes "the urban PJ is becoming less of a 'community of values' and more of a machine-like party" (p. 209). How can the causal mechanism explaining party discipline be based on policy reputations and strong party organization in such a scenario of weak party organization and widespread clientelism? How can voters simultaneously sell their votes and care about the party's reputation for legislative accomplishments at the same time?

Therefore, the similarities between Britain and Argentina may be less pronounced than what scholars such as Jones (2002) lead us to believe. To the contrary, the above description of the electoral connection resembles Brazil more than the Westminster model. If voters are selling their support, then they can't constrain legislators based on policy positions, and the entire theoretical edifice comes crashing down. Comparing Argentina with Britain suggests that party discipline in those two countries may not share the same

causal mechanism, because the electoral connection and party organization are so radically distinct. Party discipline in countries like Argentina and Brazil may be at least in part explained by clientelism. Similarly, India adopts a majoritarian electoral rule that is comparable to that of England, do these institutions produce the same legislative behavior? The obvious answer is no. And one of the reasons may well be the widespread use of clientelism in one country, but not in the other. In sum, a rigid and deterministic distinction between party-centered and candidate-centered as the main explanatory factor accounting for party discipline turns out to be incomplete at best.

One of the dangers of an applying such theories to the developing world is that in order to be consistent these scholars are forced to either deemphasize the empirical realities of clientelism or bend the theories, disregarding their foundational assumptions. For example, Jones and Hwang (2005) insist that despite notable differences between the Argentina and Britain, "the end effect on the functioning of the legislature is quite similar", where "majority party leadership uses its majority status (especially negative and positive agenda control) to dominate the legislative process" (p. 268). Therefore, for them, Argentina would be an example of a procedural cartel (see also Calvo, 2014), in which voters care about the party brand name and constrain their behavior. But when voters sell their support for handouts, the party brand name is moot, and the purported causal mechanism that explains delegation in these theories cannot be present. There may be *a* cartel in place in Argentina, but it is likely not the same one that is outlined in *the* procedural cartel theory.

Similarly, Ames (2002b) argues that Brazil's open-list PR system provides incentives for personalistic and decentralized parties, and, therefore, they should be unable

to promote party discipline. However, parties can build party organization precisely to moderate incentives from formal institutions. For example, parties that are resource-poor and that need to attract a large following of policy-minded voters to be viable have an incentive to build strong organization that ensures ideological cohesion and discipline (Samuels, 1999). In other situations, machine parties lead by powerful bosses can also discipline their members, but through an entirely different organizational structure and for very different reasons.

If party discipline is observationally equivalent in responsible mass-parties, as well as in boss-lead clientelistic machines, then all the more reason to analyze party organization in detail. Otherwise, we cannot distinguish which causal mechanism is at work. We cannot simply assume that the electoral rule will tell us all we need to know about party organization and internal party politics, as the Argentinian and the Brazilian case illustrate. If the dominance of the provincial boss in Argentina "is based principally on patronage, pork barrel politics and clientelism" (Jones & Hwang, 2005, p. 269), then in Argentina and in Brazil a similar puzzle exists: personalistic parties can promote party discipline. Clientelism can perhaps better explain this puzzle, in Argentina or in Brazil. What difference do formal institutions really make when clientelism is pervasive if these different systems hold so many similarities? Only future research that takes clientelism seriously will be able to answer that question.

My findings lead me to postulate that we cannot theorize institutional incentives in isolation from *linkage strategy*. Institutions have different effects depending if parties seek votes based on position taking and constituency service, or if instead they coerce their constituents to sell their votes and, once in office, steal from public coffers to remain in

power and away from jail. The electoral connection matters, but, alas, for many Brazilian voters, clientelism *is* the electoral connection. To ignore that basic fact is to ignore how a significant portion of the electorate relates to politics. Theories that assume otherwise are sure to miss the mark, particularly regarding parties that most utilize that linkage strategy, such as the PR. Candidate-centered and party-centered electoral systems may interact with clientelism in ways that we do not understand well yet, and future research should investigate that relationship in more depth. But here I add to the growing chorus emphasizing the need to take individual party organization seriously, and not assume that the electoral rule determines it. We also need to take clientelism to task and interrogate how it may alter existing theories that largely ignore it.

My theory should even apply to developed countries, as long as clientelism is pervasive. As Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) show, clientelism is present in developed countries such as Italy, Japan, Austria and Belgium (p. 3), and therefore, my theory could be applied there as well. In fact, my theory invites us to reexamine a well-known case, shedding new light on old problems. Thinking of the U. S., for example, I contend that the Speakerships of Joseph Cannon and Thomas Reed cannot be solely explained by extant theories (see Cooper & Brady, 1981; Krehbiel & Wiseman, 2001; Schickler, 2001). For example, Cooper and Brady (1981) argue that what explains strong leadership power is the "polarization of constituencies", which infused the parties with ideological cohesion, which is an early version of conditional party government theory. However, national parties in this period clearly lacked ideological homogeneity (Schickler, 2001), as evinced by the cross-party alliance to defeat Cannon in 1910, and the regional splits within each

party, for example. To theorize "boss" Cannon's power as a result of conditional party government (Cooper & Brady, 1981), majoritarianism (Krehbiel & Wiseman, 2000) or executive-legislative conflicts (Schickler, 2001) seems to miss something important about politics at the time, namely, the role of the spoils system. It is the same type of error that leads scholars of Brazilian politics to conclude that because legislative leaders are formally strong, therefore, all parties must be responsible and cohesive, all while ignoring massive levels of clientelism and corruption.

In fact, the "heyday of machine politics" which is "roughly, as excepted, 1890 to 1910" (Brown & Halaby, 1987, p. 598) coincides precisely with the pinnacle of party strength in the US, which starts with the adoption of the Reed rules in 1890 and ends with the revolt against Cannon in 1910. I do not see that fact as a coincidence. It is not a coincidence that Cannon himself was a "boss" in Chicago, one of the most notorious urban party machines. Clientelism and patronage gave Cannon the electoral immunity and resources necessary to increase party unity, as my theory predicts. His influence over the Post Office Committee gave him power over the "jewel" of the spoils system. For example, according to Rhodes (1992):

> Cannon had the authority to award and take away committee assignments, provide campaign money and spread around patronage. Like speaker Thomas "Czar" Reed who preceded him, Cannon's control of the federal patronage linked with machine politics at the state and local levels, represented a formidable threat for any insurgent. (p. 197)

Therefore, it is highly likely that my theory applies to that period of U. S. history as well.

My theory suggests that future research should investigate how Cannon and Reed's control over the spoil system, as well as their home-grown machines, allowed them to impose party discipline in a Congress usually characterized by weak leadership. Based on my theory and findings, I would argue that to explain the ebb and flow of party power in the U.S. we must include clientelism.

Moreover, the possible instability of boss domination in clientelistic parties that I have postulated, which ebbs and flows with the power of individuals, may better explain why strong leadership in the U.S. was so short lived. The wild changes in legislative behavior we see from one Speaker to the next during that time is more likely a reflection of changes in boss domination. Reed and Cannon could impose their will not because of ideological cohesion or the importance of the party brand, but because they dominated the spoils system and had the wherewithal of patronage to build legislative support for their agenda. When they left the position of Speaker, the conditions for party discipline disappeared, and the next Speaker has no choice but to change the "leadership style" of the Speaker. Such pronounced changes cannot be explained by factors such as ideological cohesion (Cooper & Brady, 1981) or the desire to check the president (Schickler, 2001), because such incentives should persist in the short time span from one Speaker to the next. In other words, my theory may better explain why party power in that era was so short lived, it's because boss domination is an unstable equilibrium which vanishes as soon as the boss retires.

Therefore, exceptional as it may be, bossism and clientelism may have generated party discipline in the most well studied case in legislative politics, when leadership power was at its all-time peak. A general theory should be able to explain such a well-known case at the very least. I believe that my theory has started that important task. Moreover, such a theory will help undo the confusion of confounding personalism with clientelism, when the U. S. case itself illustrate how candidate-centered rules were used to curb the abusive and anti-democratic power of machine bosses.

That case also illustrates other gaps in the literature I have been emphasizing. While party bosses played an important role in elections, the electoral connection between the urban party machine and voters was personal and direct, between the ward heeler and voters. Therefore, the electoral connection contains the same combination of personal connection at the base, with powerful leaders at the top, that characterizes many clientelistic parties.

In order to advance this literature, we need to better understand variation in party organization under clientelism. We need to understand what clientelistic parties have in common across different formal institutions, and how they change across them. Only when we do so will we be able to provide a more complete theory of party discipline that considers the effect of clientelism in political parties. If we fail, I fear we will misinterpret even the most well studied cases in legislative politics, such as the U. S., at the time of maximum leadership power. If we fail in this endeavor, we will likely continue to recommend reforms that are ineffective and that may even backfire.

Thus, we need new theories to explain legislative behavior when conventional scope conditions are violated, when clientelism is pervasive. Because vote buying alters the "electoral connection" between voters and legislators, if we truly believe the electoral connection matters, then we must verify that the assumptions of our theories are compatible with the empirical evidence about such connection. Therefore, by creating a theory of clientelistic party discipline, I provide more clear expectations about when we should find party discipline overall, clarifying the scope conditions of important theories of legislative politics. Finally, insights from my theory informs normative discussions of political reform, generating novel and important policy recommendations.

Normative implications

Stretching the conventional wisdom beyond its scope conditions has led brilliant scholars to misinterpret legislative behavior in ways that preclude us from implementing reforms that will really improve democratic accountability. In the Brazilian case specifically, my theory informs current and urgent normative debates regarding institutional reform. My theory and results lead me to believe that any attempt to reform the political system that does not address clientelism directly will be ineffective and may even backfire.

Seeing high party discipline as a normatively desirable trait, many scholars concluded that if a party is disciplined then it must be true that is it a "responsible" party that cares about their "collective reputation among voters" (Lyne, 2008a). As such, the reasoning goes, any reform that strengthens party leaders can only lead to more accountability and even more "responsible" parties. For example, Rosenbluth and Shapiro

(2018) explicitly defend strengthening parties as cure to many maladies, including corruption and clientelism, arguing that parties with "strong internal hierarchies are best able to deliver on policy promises" (p. 21). Moreover, Lijphart (2004) explicitly argues that "closed lists can encourage the formation and maintenance of strong and cohesive political parties" (p. 101). But if we assume that disciplined parties are necessarily evidence of responsible mass-parties, then we may hold incorrect beliefs about the normative value of the status quo.

In fact, in response to the widespread scholarly consensus that Brazil's problem is weak parties, reformers over the past two decades have sought to increase the powers of party leaders in the hopes of improving democratic accountability. However, my research reveals a danger in that policy recommendation: some bosses in Brazil are already too powerful, just as they were during the machine era of U.S. politics. It seems to me that it would be bad advice to strengthen already powerful bosses, just as it would have been unwise to give more power to the U.S. bosses of old in hopes of solving the spoils system. In the American case weaking bosses through the advent of primaries was indeed the correct solution, just as improving internal party democracy in Brazil may be more necessary than giving more power to bosses.

Indeed, if Brazil were to change from an open-list to a closed-list PR system tomorrow, as many scholars suggest we should, it will most likely not become akin to the Westminster model. Instead, such a change would make Brazil more like Argentina, which is to say, not much better, and perhaps even worse, given Argentina's notoriously dysfunctional politics. Such are the dangers of associating party discipline with ideologically cohesive parties and linking clientelism with personalism. Strong leadership

is compatible with clientelism and, as such, those reforms may only strengthen party bosses in clientelistic machines. Instead of weak clientelistic parties, Brazil would have clientelistic parties with even more powerful bosses.

Yet the reform impetus to strengthen parties continues unabated. While recent reforms did not curb clientelism, they did give more power to leaders such as Valdemar, without changing their linkage strategy and the perverse incentives it creates. Giving more power to parties will not change the way in which voters relate to politicians. Since clientelism can adapt to any set of rules, changing electoral rules will not change the linkage strategy. Giving leaders more power over rank-and-file will not make clientelism any less prevalent.

My theory raises the possibility that the reforms passed in Brazil, based on the advice of scholars such as Lijphart (2004), may have already backfired. Today the party system is as corrupt as it ever was, but even more fragmented. In terms of fragmentation, my argument is straightforward, as the power of leaders in clientelistic parties increases, minority factions will have an incentive to leave that party and create a new one, in which they will control the levers of power. The result is that empowering clientelistic party bosses may have incentivized fragmentation, and today Brazil have become one of the most fragmented party systems in world, ever.

Another important policy recommendation that follows from this logic is the need to guarantee a certain level of internal democracy in political parties to avoid that bosses in party machines concentrate all the power. And an easy and "quick fix" to accomplish this is also revealed by my research, namely, curbing, and changing the rules regarding temporary municipal party committees. While they were intended to be temporary, leaders'

interest in using them to dominate their parties has led to lack of enforcement and unreasonable loopholes. However, Congress could close that loophole of temporary committees though legislation and take other steps to guarantee and expand greater internal party democracy. Of all the reform on the agenda today, ending the use of temporary committees is straightforward, easy to understand and that will likely find little resistance among the public. But only with appropriate theory we can begin to design reforms that will work to make parties more accountable.

Indeed, my findings lead me to believe that the reforms that are most urgently needed in Brazil are those that address clientelism directly, that curb corruption and impunity. As the famous Italian mafia prosecutor Giovanni Falcone once said, "the most revolutionary thing you could do in Sicily is simply to apply the law and punish the guilty" (Stille, 1995, p. 411). The same seems to apply to Brazil, given our legendary levels of impunity and corruption. The examples of Maluf and Chico das Verduras mentioned earlier illustrate this tragic truth. At the bare minimum, candidates in jail for vote buying and corruption should not be allowed to "vote buy" their way back into a public office, even gaining judicial immunities. Ending such immunities may be one possible solution, just as reforming the judicial branch may also be necessary. For example, perhaps the Supreme Court (*Superior Tribunal Federal*) should focus on constitutions issues, while Brazil's other "Supreme Court", the *Superior Tribunal de Justiça* (STJ), could specialize in analyzing politician with immunities. And, moreover, given the charges of bias against the Judge Sergio Moro, responsible for the Car Wash operation, judicial reforms need to make sure that branch can live up to their obligation of impartiality, and recover some of the legitimacy they have lost in the wake of that scandal.

Now, while enforcing the law may go a long way towards changing the status quo, we must combat clientelism from the demand side as well, not only from the supply side. The demand for vote buying is based on poverty, inequality, and the role of the state in society. Voters will continue to demand favors and handouts so long as they are faced with extreme poverty and poor public services. Therefore, no matter how many clientelistic politician are put behind bars, as long as voters continue to demand handouts and favors at such high rates, candidate will emerge to fulfill that demand.

The solution to curb the demand for clientelism revolves around creating a welfare system that reduces the need for handouts, expanding, for example, a basic income program. Moreover, in order to combat patronage, we need to extinguish political appointments in the public service, requiring civil service exams for almost all state employment. After all, what really led to the end of the urban machine politics in the U. S. was less a change in the electoral rule, and more of a change in income, changes in welfare policy and the creation of civil service exams, ending the spoils system. If we do not change the electoral connection between voters and politicians, well-meaning political reforms may have their intended effects muffled, fail or even backfire.

But all this insight would be lost if we assume that party discipline is only possible in responsible and ideologically cohesive parties, and that clientelism is always associated with classic personalism, decentralized party organization, and no party discipline, as the received wisdom does. Without appropriately theorization the consequences of clientelism for parties in government, Brazil will remain a puzzle that will continue to elude scholars. But once we understand that party discipline can also be a consequence of clientelism, even in a personalistic candidate-centered system such as Brazil, then the behavior that was a

puzzle becomes more tractable. After all, it is quite intuitive that a powerful boss such as Valdemar Costa Neto can distribute resources to increase party unity. While some facts may be controversial, some things we do know. One of them is that the PR is definitely not decentralized and characterized by weak leadership. In that party, it is beyond a reasonable doubt that Valdemar completely controls the party, and all existing theory to this date cannot explain that undeniable fact.

But it is only after we come to terms with that fact that we will be able to recommend political reforms that will indeed increase democratic accountability and produce responsible parties. Instead of strengthening corrupt bosses in the hopes of increasing accountability, we should increase internal party democracy and attack the real problem at its root: voters should support parties and candidates based on policy, not based on material favors and handouts.

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Appendix

Which resources matter for re-election?

For a resource to be used in the promotion of party discipline, it's important to demonstrate that legislators actually "care" about it. One way of establishing that evidence is to show that these resources are valuable in elections. If a given resource helps deputies win reelection, then it is likely that deputies do care about it. If one of my dependent variables are not associated with re-election, then we can predict that it is likely that such a variable will not be used as a reward for discipline.

In table 8.1 I test that relationship looking at all deputies that ran for reelection in the period, and then measuring which resources explain higher reelection rates. According to the data, only *Party Campaign Contributions* is significantly related to reelection. Moreover, the magnitude that effect is substantial, for example, moving from the 50^{th} to 90^{th} percentile of the *Party Campaign Contributions* scale results in a 13% average increase in reelection odds, at the conventional levels of statistical significance, *ceteris paribus*. So, we can have some of confidence that party campaign contributions is indeed coveted by legislators for purely electoral reasons.

This data also shows that *Earmarks* is negatively related to reelection, although that result not statistically significantly at conventional levels and is sensitive to changes in the specification of the model. As such, I have very little confidence in the robustness of that negative coefficient, as it may be caused by collinearity, for example. Therefore, I cannot confirm that earmarks are important to federal deputies *because* of their electoral salience.

However, recall that earmarks may be important for other reasons, such as personal gain, as mentioned before. Finally, committee and rapporteur assignments also show no statistically significant effect on reelection.

Table 8. 1 Random Effects Probit Regression DV: Reelection Dummy (1995 -2018)

VARIABLES	1	2	3	4	5
Earmarks	-4.82e-08	-6.01e-08*			
	(3.46e-08)	(3.07e-08)			
Party Campaign Contributions	3.96e-07**		4.10e-07**		
	(1.64e-07)		(1.65e-07)		
Rapporteur	-0.00379			-0.00176	
	(0.00672)			(0.00562)	
Power Committee	0.117				0.0890
	(0.142)				(0.0995)
Vote Share Lagged	3.574**	-6.68e-05	3.669***	-6.67e-05	-6.64e-05
	(1.398)	(0.00117)	(1.394)	(0.00116)	(0.00115)
Malfeasance Scandal	-0.150	-0.187*	-0.150	-0.186*	-0.183*
	(0.116)	(0.0958)	(0.116)	(0.0957)	(0.0957)
Titular	1.048***	1.359***	1.006***	1.338***	1.337***
	(0.174)	(0.131)	(0.171)	(0.130)	(0.130)
Seniority	0.0427***	0.0405***	0.0414***	0.0388***	0.0384***
	(0.0144)	(0.0117)	(0.0143)	(0.0117)	(0.0117)
Party Switch	-0.164**	-0.0625	-0.163**	-0.0612	-0.0608
	(0.0785)	(0.0609)	(0.0784)	(0.0608)	(0.0608)
Sex Male=1	0.0998	0.260*	0.128	0.258*	0.247*
	(0.194)	(0.146)	(0.192)	(0.145)	(0.146)
Constant	-0.603*	-1.162***	-0.574*	-1.131***	-1.140***
	(0.324)	(0.241)	(0.323)	(0.240)	(0.240)
Observations	1,078	1,886	1,078	1,886	1,886
Number of Deputies	777	1,305	777	1,305	1,305

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 8. 2 Random Effects Panel Tobit Regression DV: Earmarks IV: Following the Party when Party Recommendation at odds with the Government

VARIABLES	(1) DEM	(3) PMDB	(5) PSDB	(7) PR	(9) PP	(11) PT	(13) PTB	(15) PDT
Earmarks (Lagged)	0.128	0.444***	0.245***	0.403***	0.312***	0.303***	0.406***	0.442***
	(0.0827)	(0.0615)	(0.0676)	(0.0710)	(0.0692)	(0.0655)	(0.0916)	(0.0888)
Following the Party Against the Government	2,535	-9,709	62.51	-9,247	-55.91	7,002**	-8,501	1,764
	(8,548)	(6,116)	(10,627)	(8,352)	(7,327)	(3,428)	(10,811)	(17,182)
Following the Party Against the Government (Lagged)	-1,420	6,048	19,107	3,512	-5,369	6,892**	12,019	4,050
	(8,283)	(6,073)	(12,144)	(8,499)	(6,412)	(3,142)	(10,558)	(16,565)
Vote Share	-1.037e+07*	-5.202e+06	-9.934e+06	-9.668e+06	1.117e+07*	-5.600e+06	-4.308e+06	-1.750e+07
	(5.384e+06)	(4.638e+06)	(7.376e+06)	(6.723e+06)	(5.896e+06)	(5.333e+06)	(7.395e+06)	(1.626e+07)
Malfeasance Scandal = 1	-104,697	304,271	1.571e+06***	-94,288	415,925	84,213	-920,259*	2.381e+06**
	(450,692)	(427,909)	(516,674)	(480,762)	(405,331)	(362,566)	(483,719)	(1.017e+06)
Seniority	-4,352	-185,271***	-9,911	-90,237	62,432	33,274	-9,476	177,160*
	(53,726)	(52,172)	(55,032)	(68,591)	(42,730)	(42,031)	(48,216)	(101,065)
# of Party Switches	-118,592	411,947	664,402	242,402	633,223*	-87,811	270,200	-680,281
	(468,898)	(353,113)	(532,924)	(379,979)	(362,944)	(440,348)	(280,580)	(1.642e+06)
Titular = 1	2.310e+06***	-649,714	782,060	1.861e+06**	2.868e+06**	869,052	-173,106	-416,030
	(779,346)	(743,271)	(815,087)	(941,776)	(1.164e+06)	(699,102)	(981,077)	(1.535e+06)
Constant	-3.180e+06*	-1.254e+06	-3.705e+06**	-2.162e+06	-6.985e+06***	-1.854e+06*	-23,357	1.083e+06
	(1.657e+06)	(1.327e+06)	(1.694e+06)	(1.592e+06)	(1.819e+06)	(988,498)	(1.756e+06)	(3.900e+06)
Observations	725	1,016	628	464	789	843	426	317
Number of Deputies	207	277	189	127	187	210	114	89

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 8. 3 Random Effects Panel Tobit Regression DV: Party Campaign Contributions IV: Following the Party Average when Party Recommendation at odds with the Government

VARIABLES	1 DEM	2 PMDB	3 PSDB	4 PR	5 PP	6 PT	7 PTB	8 PDT
Following the Party Against the Government	-2,826	8,166**	3,044	13,784***	-1,039	-543.6	-6,573	-1,071
	(5,338)	(3,778)	(4,043)	(4,133)	(3,811)	(2,605)	(4,069)	(1,693)
Vote Share Lagged	-999,379	585,861	576,360	4.054e+06	-2.633e+06	-5.180e+06**	995,399	-2.571e+06**
	(2.749e+06)	(1.988e+06)	(2.865e+06)	(2.777e+06)	(2.338e+06)	(2.258e+06)	(1.791e+06)	(1.287e+06)
Malfeasance Scandal	35,275	278,354*	-25,615	-414,646**	-380,838**	311,385**	-94,598	66,708
	(235,767)	(158,898)	(162,461)	(184,232)	(152,918)	(139,174)	(121,651)	(71,757)
Seniority	1,400	21,260	6,481	42,742	22,920	22,095	-15,488	6,403
	(26,208)	(16,585)	(15,192)	(28,104)	(16,110)	(15,625)	(11,975)	(7,729)
# of Party Switches	228,873	-123,689	-297,823**	-10,215	-412,037***	-208,653	138,278**	-903,276
	(219,834)	(147,863)	(126,803)	(166,151)	(142,894)	(177,442)	(62,527)	(2.438e+07)
Titular	590,031*	750,632***	-87,910	-16,796	-91,131	405,322*	47,076	76,506
	(320,267)	(244,222)	(208,543)	(296,830)	(342,856)	(222,285)	(193,012)	(96,485)
President Dilma I	1.298e+06***	-254,098	399,954*	721,822***	466,178*	84,320	-707,383***	-394,948***
	(317,826)	(248,802)	(224,052)	(239,473)	(245,661)	(198,282)	(206,480)	(103,786)
President Lula	-1.179e+06***	-1.566e+06***	-864,732***	-1.776e+06***	-1.702e+06***	-750,356***	-1.673e+06***	-575,627***
	(258,999)	(197,457)	(175,799)	(201,476)	(178,275)	(166,832)	(184,630)	(69,164)
President FHC	-2.563e+06***	-2.965e+06***	-1.901e+06***	-3.166e+06***	-2.855e+06***	-2.065e+06***	-4.112e+06	-709,100***
	(376,199)	(301,138)	(230,314)	(474,703)	(278,934)	(334,171)	(4.715e+07)	(106,313)
Sex Female	28,358	-439,066	-327,597	47,031	-456,644	43,433	-747,940	-741,661***

	(401,735)	(273,419)	(234,114)	(279,614)	(519,803)	(196,215)	(468,478)	(168,097)
Constant	333,397	671,523	1.504e+06***	818,337	2.983e+06***	509,311	2.390e+06***	2.244e+06
	(657,269)	(518,989)	(406,320)	(537,691)	(668,243)	(381,889)	(477,737)	(2.438e+07)
Observations	165	244	188	116	144	251	88	68
Legislators	118	145	126	85	92	143	59	49

Standard errors in parentheses

Table 8. 4 Random Effects Panel Logit Regression DV: Committee Assignment IV: Following the Party when Party Recommendation at odds with the Government

VARIABLES	(1) PR	(3) PP	(5) PTB	(7) DEM	(9) PMDB	(11) PSDB	(13) PDT	(15) PT
Lagged DV: Power Committees	2.538***	2.732***	3.462***	3.380***	3.360***	3.298***	2.656***	3.561***
	(0.357)	(0.283)	(0.343)	(0.251)	(0.212)	(0.292)	(0.345)	(0.261)
Following the Party Against the Government	-0.000869	-0.00447	0.000637	-0.000861	0.00378	0.00629	-0.000247	0.00180
	(0.00545)	(0.00350)	(0.00622)	(0.00421)	(0.00295)	(0.00523)	(0.00810)	(0.00392)
Following the Party Against the Government Lagged	-0.00108	0.00161	-0.00296	0.00666	-0.000388	-0.00292	0.0120	-0.00133
	(0.00528)	(0.00352)	(0.00619)	(0.00453)	(0.00298)	(0.00627)	(0.00839)	(0.00366)
Vote Share Lagged	1.480	-0.248	4.210	3.460	-1.491	-1.102	-15.91*	0.862
	(4.509)	(3.214)	(4.741)	(3.063)	(2.653)	(4.299)	(8.342)	(4.098)
Malfeasance Scandal	-0.0587	-0.238	-0.591	-0.224	0.00794	0.132	-0.423	0.307
	(0.341)	(0.301)	(0.395)	(0.307)	(0.242)	(0.327)	(0.549)	(0.347)
Seniority	-0.00866	0.0341	0.00647	-0.0226	0.00216	0.0436	-0.0795	-0.0619
	(0.0504)	(0.0343)	(0.0362)	(0.0382)	(0.0302)	(0.0341)	(0.0571)	(0.0436)
# of Party Switches	-0.386	-0.280	-0.302	-0.0826	-0.231	0.184	-0.183	0.410
	(0.274)	(0.240)	(0.199)	(0.231)	(0.208)	(0.258)	(0.976)	(0.397)
Titular	0.324	-0.0512	-0.522	1.094**	0.484	0.167	1.278	-0.168
	(0.676)	(0.595)	(0.643)	(0.509)	(0.379)	(0.478)	(0.886)	(0.568)
President Dilma	0.100	-0.181	-0.189	-0.568	0.327	-0.0770	0.206	0.334

	(0.499)	(0.552)	(0.731)	(0.646)	(0.402)	(0.504)	(0.694)	(0.488)
President Lula	-0.167	0.355	-0.378	-0.120	0.244	-0.0968	0.206	0.305
	(0.441)	(0.477)	(0.641)	(0.567)	(0.373)	(0.439)	(0.656)	(0.451)
President FHC	0.550	0.0958	-0.231	-0.629	-0.365	-0.260	-0.681	0.419
	(0.533)	(0.516)	(0.704)	(0.607)	(0.375)	(0.525)	(0.741)	(0.478)
Sex Female	0.799		-1.184	1.342	1.323**	0.0422	0.315	0.787
	(0.817)		(0.831)	(0.859)	(0.575)	(0.520)	(1.156)	(0.515)
Constant	-2.774**	-2.079**	-0.111	-4.587***	-3.981***	-3.362***	-3.410*	-3.845***
	(1.185)	(0.821)	(1.225)	(1.200)	(0.785)	(0.983)	(1.819)	(0.975)
Observations	468	769	429	733	1,019	631	318	845
Number of Legislators	128	178	115	207	279	191	89	210

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 8. 5 Random Effects Panel Negative Binomial Regression DV: Rapporteur Assignment IV: Following the Party when Party Recommendation at odds with the Government

VARIABLES	(1) PR	(3) PP	(5) PTB	(7) DEM	(9) PMDB	(11) PSDB	(13) PDT	(15) PT
Lagged DV: Rapporteur	0.0319***	0.0252***	0.0151***	0.0258***	0.0225***	0.0460***	0.0206***	0.0199***
	(0.00430)	(0.00471)	(0.00313)	(0.00372)	(0.00256)	(0.00563)	(0.00612)	(0.00277)
Following the Party Against the Government	0.00384*	0.00284**	0.00320	-0.00410***	0.00211*	0.00296	0.00607*	-0.00171
	(0.00205)	(0.00140)	(0.00246)	(0.00155)	(0.00119)	(0.00239)	(0.00344)	(0.00110)
Following the Party Against the Government Lagged	-0.00389*	0.00211	0.000460	0.00501***	0.00251**	0.00504*	0.00474	0.00426***
	(0.00215)	(0.00138)	(0.00246)	(0.00168)	(0.00121)	(0.00283)	(0.00325)	(0.00102)
Vote Share Lagged	-2.200	-2.793*	0.494	0.972	-0.459	0.896	-0.314	1.770
	(1.891)	(1.519)	(2.161)	(1.457)	(1.087)	(1.419)	(2.952)	(1.618)
Malfeasance Scandal	0.0395	-0.0896	-0.254	-0.0887	0.0528	-0.138	0.114	-0.0538
	(0.129)	(0.119)	(0.156)	(0.116)	(0.0979)	(0.108)	(0.299)	(0.124)

Seniority	-0.0345*	0.0222	0.00557	0.0149	-0.00326	0.00276	0.00150	0.0107
	(0.0205)	(0.0145)	(0.0158)	(0.0154)	(0.0119)	(0.0111)	(0.0253)	(0.0154)
# of Party Switches	0.224**	-0.184	0.0195	0.0689	0.120	0.0470	0.354	0.0505
	(0.0872)	(0.128)	(0.0876)	(0.0989)	(0.0815)	(0.0846)	(0.283)	(0.160)
Titular	-0.00340	0.288	0.282	-0.153	0.0794	-0.0208	-0.174	-0.0397
	(0.227)	(0.260)	(0.286)	(0.194)	(0.152)	(0.172)	(0.319)	(0.179)
President Dilma	1.517***	1.591***	2.341***	1.602***	2.279***	1.798***	2.899***	2.914***
	(0.280)	(0.297)	(0.478)	(0.317)	(0.281)	(0.255)	(0.537)	(0.352)
President Lula	1.664***	1.946***	2.160***	1.549***	2.259***	1.800***	2.396***	2.909***
	(0.260)	(0.286)	(0.468)	(0.304)	(0.279)	(0.246)	(0.535)	(0.346)
President FHC	0.979***	1.122***	1.544***	0.929***	1.458***	0.385	1.315**	2.204***
	(0.319)	(0.309)	(0.492)	(0.323)	(0.283)	(0.296)	(0.580)	(0.358)
Sex Female	0.176	-0.578*	-0.538	-0.221	-0.128	-0.332**	0.367	-0.439***
	(0.252)	(0.339)	(0.399)	(0.253)	(0.188)	(0.163)	(0.531)	(0.156)
Constant	-2.275***	-1.563***	-2.256***	-1.466***	-2.657***	-2.444***	-3.709***	-2.516***
	(0.449)	(0.516)	(0.668)	(0.460)	(0.386)	(0.404)	(0.873)	(0.440)
Observations	467	790	428	733	1,020	632	317	845
Number of Legislators	128	187	115	207	280	191	89	210

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1