

REREADING RUSSELL

ESSAYS ON
BERTRAND RUSSELL'S
METAPHYSICS AND
EPISTEMOLOGY



*C. Wade Savage and
C. Anthony Anderson,
editors*

MINNESOTA STUDIES IN THE
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Essays in Bertrand Russell's
Metaphysics and Epistemology*

EDITED BY

C. WADE SAVAGE AND C. ANTHONY ANDERSON

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Note on References

Various methods of citing references are employed in the book. Some papers provide full references in the endnotes; others list the references separately. References are located at the end of the paper in some cases, at the end of the book in others. Some papers cite the Russell entries by employing the abbreviations on pp. ix-x; most do not.

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List of Abbreviations

ABR	<i>The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell</i> , 3 volumes
AMa	<i>The Analysis of Matter</i>
AMi	<i>The Analysis of Mind</i>
Essays	<i>Essays in Analysis</i>
FG	<i>An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry</i>
HK	<i>Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits</i>
IMP	<i>Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy</i>
IMT	<i>An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth</i>
KEW	<i>Our Knowledge of the External World</i>
LA	“Logical Atomism”
LK	<i>Logic and Knowledge</i>
MMD	“My Mental Development”
MPD	<i>My Philosophical Development</i>
ML	<i>Mysticism and Logic</i>
MLT	“Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types”
NSD	“The Nature of Sense-Data—A Reply to Dr. Dawes Hicks”
NTF	“On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood”
OD	“On Denoting”
OP	“On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean”
OT	“On Order in Time”
PFM	<i>Portraits from Memory</i>
PL	<i>A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz</i>
PLA	“The Philosophy of Logical Atomism”

PM	<i>Principia Mathematica</i> , 3 volumes
POM	<i>The Principles of Mathematics</i>
PP	<i>The Problems of Philosophy</i>
RUP	“On the Relations of Universals and Particulars”
RSDP	“The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics”
TK	<i>Theory of Knowledge</i>
UCM	“The Ultimate Constituents of Matter”

Preface

This volume evolved over several years from a conference at the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science on Bertrand Russell's later epistemology, ontology, and philosophy of science—the philosophy of *The Analysis of Matter* (1927), *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* (1940), *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits* (1948), and *My Philosophical Development* (1959). The evolution has been significant, in both the contents and the conception of the volume. Some of the essays were presented at the conference; some were written by conferees afterward; and some were written by additional invitation. All were originally prepared for the volume, although two have since appeared elsewhere. Some of the essays deal with Russell's later period; some deal with earlier periods; and some deal with all periods. The volume thus covers the entire body of Russell's metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of science; and it reveals continuities running through the often noted differences among various phases of his philosophy. To mention a few of the more striking continuities, the outline for much of the later Russell can be found in *The Problems of Philosophy* (1912); the methodology of *The Analysis of Matter* (1910–13) is explicitly modeled on that of *Principia Mathematica* (1910); and his later event ontology resembles the ontology of sensed and unsensed sensibilia developed in *Our Knowledge of the External World* (1914).

Russell was one of the founders of twentieth-century analytic philosophy of science, along with Ernst Mach, Moritz Schlick, and others. In addition to his technical contributions in logic and mathematics, he devised an empiricist ontology to accommodate the Einsteinian theory of relativity and also quantum mechanics, one in which space, time, force, and matter are analyzed in terms of a causal framework of perceptual and nonperceptual events. And he developed an empiricist theory of knowledge to accompany his scientific ontology, one in which the principles of nondemonstrative inference are generalizations from scientific practice. The technical contributions have been widely studied and employed. But their relation to the philosophical contributions needs more examination. We hope the present volume will help to stimulate work of this sort.

Russell saw, perhaps more clearly than anyone (except possibly Einstein), both the value and the danger of science to the contemporary world. At times he despaired of the cruelty and stupidity of his fellow humans, as evidenced by their suicidal pursuit of ever more destructive weapons of war, but his faith that scientific enlightenment is the only solution did not waver. He articulated the scientific ideal with courage, wisdom, and humanity. He is one of the noblest philosophers in history and an incomparable model for philosophers of science.

We in the Minnesota Center are conscious of a special debt to Russell. Our founder, Herbert Feigl, regarded Russell as one of his mentors. Our director from 1971–81, Grover Maxwell, considered himself a disciple of Russell. He suggested the conference that led to this volume, and we greatly regret that he did not live to see the project accomplished.

We are indebted to David Maytum for assistance in preparing the manuscript, and to Ruth Wood for the index.

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