

Wikipedia: Remembering in the digital age

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
BY

Chen, Simin Michelle

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

Advised by Giovanna Dell'Orto

June, 2012

© Chen, Simin Michelle 2012

Acknowledgments

I owe my deepest gratitude to the following people who have supported me throughout my journey in writing this thesis, for without whom this thesis would not have been possible:

- God, for his word and grace was what kept me going even when the journey was getting increasingly harder.
- My thesis adviser, Dr. Giovanna Dell’Orto, for her continued encouragement, wisdom, guidance, patience, and belief in me. Words cannot express my gratitude. I owe the completion of this thesis to her.
- My committee members for their useful insight and words of encouragement.
- Jordan Beim, for being my rock. I thank him for always being there for me.
- Jenny Ernie-Steighner, for her positive disposition on life and advice. I can always count on her to put things into perspective for me.

Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to my family.

Abstract

Collective memories are usually sanctioned by ruling elites, who determine the types of memory that should be remembered along with how they should be remembered. With the emergence of the Internet, individuals have taken a more active role in preserving and re-presenting the past, thereby opening up a fertile terrain for the study of non-official collective memories. As an open-source website, Wikipedia has the potential to broaden the range of memories accessible on a global platform, memories that may or may not be sanctioned by elites. This thesis seeks to examine the ways national events are remembered on a global platform such as Wikipedia, and the implications of having that borderless public space for the representation and remembrance of events. Using textual analysis, this paper first examines the ways in which the New York Times and Xinhua News Agency reported on and interpreted the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989, and how the protests were subsequently remembered in both presses in the 21st century. This paper then compares the official memory of the protests in the two presses with its public memory, as represented by the ways in which contributors on Wikipedia remember the protests. Findings point to Wikipedia as a site of struggle over the hierarchy of memories, serving as a mirror into the present social order and power in our global society. The interaction between alternative and opposing memories on Wikipedia both reveal and is affected by the differences in how the protests were framed and made meaningful only to those who belong to certain cultural groups. This then calls into question the possibility of having a wider range of memories that encompasses the un-reported and under-reported memories of an iconic event in the digital age.

Table of Contents

<u>CHAPTER ONE: REMEMBERING IN THE DIGITAL AGE</u>	<u>1</u>
<i>THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: COLLECTIVE MEMORY</i>	8
<i>COLLECTIVE MEMORY AS MULTIPLE AND CONTESTED</i>	11
<i>COLLECTIVE MEMORY AS HAVING A PRESENTIST FOCUS</i>	14
<i>COLLECTIVE MEMORIES IN TEXTUAL COMMUNICATION</i>	16
<i>RESEARCH QUESTIONS</i>	25
<i>THE TIANANMEN SQUARE PROTESTS OF 1989</i>	29
<u>CHAPTER TWO: WIKIPEDIA, THE POSTER CHILD OF PARTICIPATORY WEBSITES</u>	<u>38</u>
<i>WIKIPEDIA: A CULTURE OF ANYTHING GOES?</i>	41
<i>MAINTAINING LAW, ORDER, AND QUALITY ON WIKIPEDIA</i>	45
<i>PREVIOUS RESEARCH</i>	50
<i>NOT YOUR PARENTS' ENCYCLOPEDIA</i>	58
<i>METHODS</i>	61
<u>CHAPTER THREE: CREATING OFFICIAL MEMORIES OF TIANANMEN SQUARE PROTESTS OF 1989</u>	<u>72</u>
<i>A PRO-DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT OR A COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY REBELLION?</i>	72
<i>THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE?</i>	74
<i>IDENTITY OF DEMONSTRATORS</i>	82
<i>AGGRESSIVE CRACKDOWN OR QUELLING A REBELLION?</i>	87
<i>CREDIBILITY AT STAKE --- THE ROLE OF THE NEWS MEDIA</i>	105
<i>PRESS' REMEMBRANCE OF THE MOVEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY</i>	108
<u>CHAPTER 4: REMEMBERING THE MOVEMENT ON WIKIPEDIA</u>	<u>123</u>
<i>TO NAME OR NOT TO NAME IT A MASSACRE</i>	132
<i>REFLECTION OF SOCIETY ON WIKIPEDIA</i>	141
<u>CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION</u>	<u>151</u>
<u>REFERENCES</u>	<u>164</u>

Chapter One: Remembering in the digital age

“Memory is unavoidably, and sometimes maddeningly, inconsistent” – Vivian (2010)

Since the creation of nation-states, there has been a need to share a common past as well as a common future (Weissberg, 1999). For in a nation-state, a person was to be defined not merely as an individual but also within the bounds of a national identity. In order for the individual to be defined as a member of a larger group, memory became an increasingly important tool in the process of socialization (Weissberg, 1999). These memories, however, do not reside solely in the consciousness of the individual but also in that of society, through what is known as collective memory. Defined as recollections of a shared past, collective memory is the result of social and communication processes that are reflected in material artifacts through the reproduction of signs and symbolic acts (Eyerman, 2004; Kansteiner, 2002; Leavy, 2007). Through exposure to symbolic acts and sites of memory, society is urged to remember the past, especially dominant aspects of collective memory, as well as to recognize one’s place in society (Leavy, 2007; Weissberg, 1999).

Before the digital age, the production and maintenance of dominant aspects of collective memory in a nation largely belonged to the domain of the ruling class, sanctioned by the ruling intellectual (i.e. academics), political (i.e. government) and cultural (i.e. media) elites. They are the ones with cultural authority, access and resources to produce sites of memories, usually with the nation-state as the common referent (Kansteiner, 2002; Leavy, 2007). These elites decide the types of memories that should be remembered in addition to how they should be remembered, therein monopolizing the

cultural landscape (Leavy, 2007). Pearson (1999) explains that while individuals and groups of individuals retain separate memories that often form the basis for contestation, it is the powerful institutions producing and circulating commodified public memory that ensure the types of historical representations that become both ubiquitous and dominant.

As collective memories do not merely dwell in the minds of individuals but are also represented in material forms, numerous scholars have attempted to examine collective memory embodied in textual objects and physical landscapes, such as museums, archives, monuments, commemorative ceremonies, rituals and books (Connerton, 1989; Eyerman, 2004; Hess, 2007; Leavy, 2007; Nora, 1989; Zelizer, 1995). Some scholars have chosen to focus on the mass media in their analysis of collective memory. Scholars such as Edgerton (2001), Hoskins (2010), Johnson (1995), Leavy, (2007) and Lippmann (1922) have pointed out that much of our information about the world is shaped or reinforced by the media in today's media-saturated era. Among the scholars of collective memory who have taken an interest in the media, some have turned to the news media in particular. These scholars argue that the mainstream press often plays a central role in the construction and dissemination of collective memories, resulting in a repository of shared images and narratives for both the storage and retrieval by most of society (Hoskins, 2010; Leavy, 2007; Teer-Tomaseli, 2006).

Unlike other forms of media, the type of collective memory sustained and circulated by the mainstream press can be characterized as official memory constructed by cultural elites like the media. This is partly due to journalistic conventions, when the press relies to a great degree on and acquires much of its information from official state sources since journalists often need to quote sources of authority to lend credibility to

their stories (Leavy, 2007; Sigal, 1973; Zandberg, 2010). Gans (1979) argues that the power of official sources, combined with the need for journalistic efficiency, structures how news organizations decide what is considered news (as cited in Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, & Sasson, 1992). It is this close relationship with and reliance on political establishments that has often resulted in little distinction between the government's official story and the press's version of events, even though there has been notable exceptions.

The mainstream press, along with other groups of ruling elites, has long dominated the memory production landscape, though it is important to recognize that these groups of ruling elites may not necessary agree with one another's memories of events. As explained by Hoskins (2010), "those who have control or ownership of" the "medium or media are potentially able to powerfully influence the future trajectory and continuance (or discontinuance) of the public memory of a given event," which has largely been the case until the rise of the digital media (p. 466).

In recent years, with the emergence of the Internet, new ways of preserving, mediating and representing the past have been introduced, in part because the digital media has created different "equations of ephemera into our remembering processes and capacities" (Hoskins, 2010, p. 467; Kidd, 2009). Digital media thus has an integral role to play in what is remembered and how that memory would be retrieved, rendering it almost impossible, as Huyssen (2003a) claims, to "discuss public memory separately from the enormous influence of the new media as carrier of all forms of memory" (as cited in Kidd, 2009, p. 167). More importantly, new media has "the potential to widen the range of memories accessible on the public stage" (Noakes, 2009, p. 137).

The Internet, serving as yet another repository of collective memories, becomes a fertile ground for the study of non-official collective memory. Typified by the proliferation of free and open-source software, which has nurtured the growth of peer-production of content, the Internet has effectively circumvented barriers of access that have come to characterize “traditional” media. By making the process of cultural production more participatory, the Internet has given individuals a greater role in authoring content, which has ended up re-directing time that used to be spent on the passive consumption of cultural products to the active production of content (Sullivan, 2009).

Perhaps one of the best-known examples of a large-scale participatory website is Wikipedia, an online multilingual encyclopedia that anyone can edit. As with many peer-produced, participatory websites, Wikipedia has fundamentally altered the relationship between text, its creators and its users in groundbreaking ways (Bruns, 2008). The distinction between producer and consumer, which was once clearly defined and enforced by the medium itself (and still is in traditional media), is now blurred by participatory websites, where one may alternate at will between the reader and writer (Bruns, 2008; Sullivan, 2009). As a result, participants of the Internet are both users and producers of content.

As an open-source participatory system, Wikipedia presents an opportunity for participants to re-present, re-construct and reshape past events based on what they believe should come to constitute our memory of those events. This is because in spite of the dominant memory of an event, there always exist in society simultaneously alternative memories. These memories may have existed in folklore or personal accounts passed

down from one generation to the next, in paintings or books circulated within the communities who believed them. However, before the Internet and Wikipedia, these alternative memories may have had little opportunity to exist alongside dominant memories on an international platform. While some of these memories are accommodated and tolerated within the dominant culture, others may be silenced or ignored (Pearson, 1999). Lacking the resources needed to be heard, alternative memories may risk being effectively forgotten and erased from the consciousness of dominant culture. As an almost free-for-all peer production system, Wikipedia has the potential to give voice to and make public not just official memory but also alternative memory, which has in turn provided new terrains for exploring and examining collective memories that may or may not be sanctioned by the cultural or political elites of society. In addition to giving voice to alternative memory, as a borderless global platform open to contributors from around the world, Wikipedia presents broader consequences to collective memory that may well extend beyond the nation-state. Collective memories of many past events that are intrinsically bound to nation-states and made meaningful only to those who belong to them have now become part of a global space. A space where contesting memories of contributors tied to different nation-states meet.

Wikipedia is most commonly understood and widely recognized as a source of knowledge - an accumulation of the collective representations of the knowledge of its contributors (Bruns, 2008). Like any encyclopedia, Wikipedia is “a mirror of contemporary learning, it offers a valuable opportunity to examine prevailing attitudes and beliefs” (Reagle, 2010, p. 144). However, unlike traditional encyclopedias, Wikipedia presents “divergent representations of knowledge currently in wider

circulation; it describes (interpretation of) reality” rather than making judgments about what is real (Bruns, 2008, p. 119). Furthermore, unlike traditional encyclopedias, Wikipedia is not the final product but a continuous work-in-progress, which in the process of gathering knowledge, ends up pitting different, and sometimes competing and contradictory, representations of knowledge that contributors have against one another in a continuous contest of ideas (Bruns, 2009).

This contest of ideas, which is clearly seen and well documented on the discussion pages of Wikipedia, serves to remind us that knowledge is not just political, it also provisional (Suvillian, 2009). Yet, knowledge of past events is also the representations of the past – a reflection of memories, dominant and alternative, that still are or were, depending on the memory, circulating in society at one point in time. It is crucial to note that the relationship between collective memory and knowledge on Wikipedia is ultimately a dynamic process. The eventual result of the negotiation of memories of past events on Wikipedia is the knowledge of the event, which in turn informs how the event will be remembered by Wikipedia’s readers. As a result, by examining the representations of knowledge of past events on Wikipedia, one is also examining how the past is being remembered.

While previous studies that examine Wikipedia have focused on range of topics, depth of information, accuracy, mechanisms to ensure quality, its collaboration process, and its community, few have focused on the diversity of voices on Wikipedia and what that means for our overall memory of an event. As a result, the emphasis of this project is on the collective remembering that contributors on Wikipedia do, which implies an active process of engagement. Though this project does not study the impact of Wikipedia on

readers' memory, this project assumes that a virtual space like Wikipedia will have an impact on the social formation of collective memory. The politics of content production on Wikipedia, along with that of the contributors' memory of the event, will be revealed through examining the process of collective remembering on Wikipedia. While collective remembering occurs among contributors, the end result is a coherent narrative; a memory of the event presented to readers of Wikipedia. It is also this memory that either challenges or conforms to the reader's own memory of the event, which the reader has learned as a member of society.

On a broader level, this thesis examines the impact of participatory technology on the ways national events are being remembered on a global platform, and the implications of having a borderless public space on the collective memory of an event. It is via the process of knowledge creation based on memories of contributors on Wikipedia that competing representations of the past among contributors are manifested and it is within these competing representations that we can locate how the past is being remembered. As a potential space for non-official and non-dominant memories, due to Wikipedia's 'anyone-can-edit' philosophy, this thesis raised several overarching research questions – What is Wikipedia's potential as a space for non-official and non-dominant memories? In order to examine the official memory of the Tiananmen Square Movement to compare it with the non-official memory on Wikipedia, this thesis also asked - What is the official memory of Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 as examined through the press? It must always be noted, though, that electronic media such as Wikipedia neither reflects nor determines collective memory in its entirety, but it should be understood as being inextricably involved in its construction and evolution.

Theoretical framework: Collective memory

Wertsch (2002) terms collective memory in the media “textually mediated” (p. 5). This means that collective memory of the historical event is based on “narratives that stand in, or mediate, between the events and our understanding of them” (Wertsch, 2002, p. 5). He explains that the reason people share a representation of the past is because they share the same textual resources, which may result in homogeneous, complementary or contested collective memories (Wertsch, 2002). In his book, *Voices of collective remembering*, Wertsch (2002) was mainly interested in understanding the role of textual mediation, specifically of state-produced, official historical narratives in Russia’s collective memory. While this thesis uses textually mediated collective memories in the news and not state documents to compare official memory with grass root memory in Wikipedia, his conceptual framework is particularly useful for this thesis because news articles and Wikipedia content are essentially narrative texts.

Wertsch (2002) explains that narrative texts are tools to be employed in organizing and reconstructing memories of the past. Instead of serving as containers of precise, unchanging information, these texts play a role in memory construction by serving as “indicators of the sort of thing” an individual belonging to a certain community might say (Wertsch, 2001, p. 8). The reason why some collective memories are associated with certain communities is because, as Halbwachs (1941/1992) theorizes, while it is individuals who remember, they do so as members of a community. As a result, individual memory and collective memory are not always two separate entities or even bipolar opposites, but they are interconnected. Though individual memory differs

greatly from collective memory, the present and our place within it is understood relationally and actively remembered through communicative practices that help contextualize the present (Leavy, 2007). As further elucidated by Halbwachs (1941/1992), no memory is possible outside group memberships because it is groups that provide the frames necessary for the individual to retrieve certain events, make sense of them as well as forget others.

This approach is also echoed by Eyerman (2004), who argues that individual memories and collective memories are intrinsically interlinked, in that individual memory is derivative of collective memory. This is especially the case of memory not personally and directly experienced. In essence, group memberships structure the way the individual perceives the world. Halbwachs (1941/1992) explains that memories are made relevant to the individual when “they are part of a totality of thoughts common to a group... to recall them is hence sufficient that we place ourselves in the perspective of this group...” (p. 52). This suggests that collective memory is in a way group-specific and his examples of both the family and professional groups are of particular significance because each group has its own “proper mentality, its memories which it alone commemorates, and its secrets that are revealed only to its members” (p. 59). These memories are also models and elements of teaching, reflecting what is considered important to society at a particular time. In other words, even though individuals remember in the literal sense, it is social groups who determine what is considered memorable and how those memories relate to the individuals (Burke, 1989). As such, “memory is more than the byproduct of group existence, it is its very lifeblood” (Olick, 2007, p. 6).

Connerton (1989) further echoes Halbwachs (1941/1992) by elucidating that we situate what we recollect within the mental spaces provided by the community. These mental spaces are constructed through human experience that is inherently situational and communal. Hence, everything we remember, no matter how personal, exists in relationship to cultural ideas and values that give it meaning. Any individual memory is always dependent on collectively constructed words, language and images (Teer-Tomaselli, 2006). For instance, “when a member of the group perceives an object, he gives it a name and arranges it into a specific category” (Halbwachs, 1941/1992, p. 168). These categories, Halbwachs (1941/1992) argues, always precede the individual as already existing in society. Halbwachs (1941/1992) illustrates the reason why individuals have to rely upon categories prescribed by society. He explains, “A person who alone remembers what others do not resembles someone who sees what others do not see. He is in certain respects like a person suffering from hallucinations who leaves the disagreeable impression among those around him” (p. 74). The implication of this is that unless the memory of an individual is also accepted by her or his community, the memory will soon fade into oblivion and be lost in time. Therefore, the individual needs to conform to society’s conventions, which gives meaning to the individual’s memories, or risk being ostracized by society, therein illustrating (again) the social aspect of individual memory.

To Wertsch (2002), Halbwachs’ (1941/1992) conceptualization of collective memory assumes that some sort of collective mind exists above and beyond the minds of individuals in a society. Wertsch (2002), on the other hand, understands collective memory as one where a representation of the past is distributed among members of a collective in what he terms “distributed version of collective memory” (p. 21). This

means that memory is viewed as being embodied socially in small group interactions as well as among people and instruments of memory (Wertsch, 2008). More specifically, instruments of memory, such as textual resources or materials in which collective memories are stored and externalized, that they choose to employ in their remembering.

Though Wertsch (2002) recognizes that society plays a crucial role in shaping the individual's memory of the event, Wertsch argues that the individual is also an active agent and has his or her "own inalienable rights" when recollecting historical events (p. 17). Wertsch (2002) bases his arguments on his observations that because individuals in society can usually defend and support their account of the past instead of repeating it mindlessly, an active agent must be involved in textually mediated collective memory. He believes that there are two voices when the speaker speaks – the speaker as a cognitive agent and the voice built into the textual means (s)he employed, which in and of themselves bring a social position and perspective.

In other words, contributors draw upon accounts that do not derive solely from their own intentions but had existed in someone else's contexts, and serving someone else's intentions (Wertsch, 2002). Hence, what the individual usually recollects then is inherently multivoiced, rather than the product of an isolated cognitive agent. Yet, this memory that is multivoiced is also reflective of the general ideological perspective of the members in a society, a larger collective that provides the narrative texts employed by the individual to structure his or her account of the past (Wertsch, 2002).

Collective memory as multiple and contested

Mannheim's (1929/1936) concept of carrier groups further explains that "society" is embodied in the individual. This concept is important and useful in examining a global project like Wikipedia, which relies on the collaborative efforts of authors, and hence is the compilation of individual memories of authors who belong to different carrier groups. The concept of carrier groups is based on Mannheim's (1929/1936) belief that it is not the "isolated individual, who do the thinking, but men in certain groups who have developed a particular style of thought...characterizing their common position" (p. 3). This means members' thought-systems are largely influenced by the social position (s)he belongs to and neither the individual nor the social group can legitimately be considered the bearers of society's entire thought-system.

Mannheim (1929/1936) treats reality not as "existing independently of us in a fixed and definitive form" but instead, the way society understands reality is structured and thereby limited by mental frames or thought-systems, which are historically determined and continuously developing (p. 66). To him, thought-systems are reflective of "the interests and powers of perception of the different perspectives (which) are conditioned by the social situations in which they arose and to which they are relevant" (p. 284). The concept of carrier groups is especially important because it indicates the existence of different frameworks within the same society that challenges the possibility of ever having a uniform and collective thought-system. This explains why people belonging to different carrier groups talk past each other because "memory is blind to all but the group it binds" and hence, their realities exist in different paradigms that may not always make sense to one another (Nora, 1989, p. 9).

Extending Mannheim's (1929/1936) arguments, Halbwachs (1941/1992) explains that the individual moves in and out of social positions (carrier groups) due to their mobility. It is therefore possible to change memories as individuals pass from one group to the next. Due to the individual's multiple associations, it becomes possible for the individual's memory of the same event to be influenced by many different paradigms or frameworks. There are as many collective memories as there are groups and institutions and hence, no collective experience can ever be embodied in a single collective memory (Halbwachs, 1941/1992; van Dijck, 2007). Mannheim's (1929/1936) idea of carrier groups can help inform Wertsch's (2002) concept of collective memory as distributed among individuals in a society, since individuals essentially belong to various carrier groups. In other words, collective memory is distributed across different carrier groups and the carrier groups individuals belong to will very likely influence not only their access and exposure to, but also their choice of, texts utilized to aid in their thinking and memory of events.

The above understanding of carrier groups is especially important because it indicates the existence of different frameworks within the same society that challenges any possibility of ever having a uniform and unified collective memory of the same event. Furthermore, the idea of carrier groups also implies that there is potential for competing memories of the same event. This is because the collective memory embodied by different carrier groups is different. Irwin-Zarecka (1994) reiterates Mannheim's (1929/1936) assertions that realities of the past are not carbon copies of publicly available accounts. They are often worked out within smaller and larger communities of memory.

This argument is also supported by van Dijck (2007), who echoes Halbwachs' (1941/1992) observations that no collective experience can ever be embodied in a singular collective memory. This has implications on our memory of past events because it implies that there is a potential for competing memories of the same event. Each carrier group presents a unique prism through which they remember and understand historical events and unless seen as whole, each group's memory of the event will never add up to a singular collective memory of the event that everyone can agree on. Hence, what each carrier group chooses to remember is shaped by the concerns of the present in order for that memory to be relevant, and it can be safely assumed that different societies will have different concerns.

Collective memory as having a presentist focus

The above implies that collective memory of historical events is constructed and deeply influenced by the interests of contemporary society. Furthermore, as the above scholars have illustrated, collective memory is not always the result of a direct experience, rather often times it is mediated and always group-specific. Halbwachs (1941/1992) also discovered in his study that society reorganized and modified the frameworks of its memory, deliberately distorting the past to suit its contemporary concerns. This finding is also supported by Schwartz (1982), who claims that the "needs of the present entirely color the collective memory of the past" (as cited in Fowler, 2007, p.28). Collective memory unifies society by providing a shared narrative frame, which simultaneously justifies and explains present goals as well as locates and orients individuals within it (Alexander, 2004; Connerton, 1989; Halbwachs, 1941/1992;

Langenbacher, 2010; Leavy, 2007). In other words, we will experience our present differently in accordance with the different pasts to which we are able to connect that present (Connerton, 1989). This is not to say history itself changes, but what events society views as important as well as how society views those events changes to serve present political purposes and needs (Johnson, 1995).

Hence, collective memory has a presentist and functional orientation. According to Iniguez, Valencia, and Vazquez (1997), a presentist approach imposes a certain order onto events and in doing so, gives legitimacy to a certain narratives. Events that are in those narratives are turned into “causes of succeeding events,” a logical and unchanging chain of causes and effects leading up to the present (p. 237). This approach not only has power within the collection of events it chooses to make a sequence of but also imposes a “regimen of truth” on all other groups, groups who are only admitted into legitimate debate if they fit the narrative’s logic or criteria (Iniguez, Valencia, & Vazquez, 1997, p. 237).

As a result, one should always be aware of who the producers of collective memories are and more importantly, for whom collective memories are produced and shared (Zelizer, 1995). This is an important question to always keep at the back of our minds, since the control of society’s memory largely conditions the hierarchy for power because the control and legitimatization of memory is critically a political issue (Connerton, 1989). Yet Schudson (1997) cautions against viewing collective memory as simply a tool to manipulate society. Instead, collective memory is a process that is constantly evolving and is dynamic (as cited in Zandberg, 2010). While current concerns and interests inform how and what we remember about the past, schemes or experiences

learned from the past also shape our understanding of the present (Connerton, 1989; Zandberg, 2010). In fact, Schwartz (1982) argues that the past always imposes a set of determining limits to which we, in the present, can draw from (as cited in Fowler, 2007).

Following the argument that collective memory has a presentist focus, it is therefore safe to assume that different members of a community will remember different things in accordance to their contemporary political situation, and that these memories may sometimes exist in a coordinated system of complementary forms. Other times, instead of involving multiple perspectives that complement one another, these memories compete with or contradict one another (Halbwachs, 1941/1992). Consequently, Olick (2008) warns against treating collective memory as a single unified whole in society – “THE collective memory of a society as ONE thing” (Olick, 2007, p. 10). The problem with this approach, Leavy (2007) and Olick (2007) both elucidate, is that collective memory is not singular and consensual but multiple and often a site of tension, resistance and conflict over its meanings, as was evident in the discussion pages of Wikipedia.

Collective memories in textual communication

The postmodern approach to knowledge indicates that there are various representations of knowledge because our interpretations of ‘truths’ are not always similar, and our collective memory of past events is what we often perceive as the ‘truth,’ regardless of whether it is indeed true or false, which is something Wikipedia has clearly revealed as its contributors from all walks of life and culture collaborate on the same topic. Collective memories, as defined by Schuman and Scott (1989), are collectively shared images and knowledge of past social events that have social functions, even if the

events have not been personally experienced (as cited in Paez, Basabe, & Gonzales, 1997). They are a collective representation of an event as it has been refashioned over time (Johnson, 1995). Additionally, collective memories also involve a shared way of interpreting these events as a group (Carlson, 2010). Though collective memory is a shared activity, it does not always mean consensus. Instead, collective memory should be best understood as a site of intense discursive struggle and conflict due to its ability to manipulate the dynamism of a community of people (Anderson, 2001; Irwin-Zarecka, 1994).

Leavy (2007) explains that collective memories are “enshrined in the material representations that helped create them, later acting as sites of recollection and remembrance” (p. 6). In fact, most people’s memories of historical events that occur on a national or international scale are mediated because most of society does not actually have a direct and immediate experience of those events. Instead, they learn and remember past events from various cultural forms such as school textbooks, commemorative practices and the media, among others. Society depends on all these various cultural forms to get a complete memory of an event. No single social group, actor or community can fully control the development of narratives about the past, nor is everything that is known about a particular event or collective experience embodied in a single memory (Edy, 2006; Teer-Tomaselli, 2006; van Dijck, 2007; Zelizer, 1998). Instead, collective memory depends on an amalgam of several groups, bouncing “to and fro among all of them to gain meaning” (Irwin- Zarecka, 1994; Zelizer, 1998, p. 4). Though the significance of various cultural forms in shaping collective memories cannot be understated, some scholars have argued that our information about the world is shaped

and reinforced by the media (Edgerton, 2001; Hoskins, 2010; Johnson, 1995; Leavy, 2007, Lippmann, 1922).

The media plays a crucial role in determining, shaping, maintaining and sustaining the content of collective memory in a society. Hoskins (2010) explains that the media's ability, especially that of broadcast media, to "mediate simultaneously to a national and now routinely global audience" provided a "common and shared experience, and thus arguably memories" of events broadcasted (p. 463). This is particularly true for those who did not experience the event firsthand, and, as explained by Johnson (1995), must then rely on modes of communication to learn about the event. Their memories of the event will thus be shaped in part by how the event is portrayed in the media. Even witnesses and participants of the event will have to turn to the media to learn the whole story of the event as well as to refresh their memory about the event once their initial sense of involvement has waned (Johnson, 1995). Consequently, most of the larger society's memory of past events is based on narratives provided by the mass media, a position many scholars agree on.

The idea that the media defines much of our relation to the past by providing collective identification with it, collective remembrance, and by shaping our collective memory of events has been examined by various scholars through the study of different media. Scholars such as Dayan and Katz (1992) focused on televised historic media events, events that are culturally significant and captivating enough for audiences to set aside their daily routines and join in the shared viewing experience such as the funeral of John F. Kennedy or the moon landing by United States' Apollo 11 in 1969. Dayan and Katz (1992) explain that media provide audiences with "shared reference points, the

sense of a common past,” as well as “bridges between personal and collective history” - audiences can remember where they were and what they were doing when an important media event was broadcast (p. 212). In addition, media events have the ability to “edit and reedit collective memory” by selectively drawing on past references to give meaning to current events (Dayan & Katz, 1992, p. 212).

Due to media events’ powerful effects on collective memory, Dayan and Katz (1992) posit that their images and narration are in competition with history in defining the contents of collective memory, particularly ceremonial events that are frequently quoted either in edited or fictionalized form (and hence, remembered and re-remembered) in films and television programs. In *Television histories: shaping collective memory in the media age*, a collection of papers that explore the relationship between collective memory and television programs, scholars analyzed various prime-time entertainment programs, documentaries and public affairs programming and their role in shaping our understanding of the past.

Other scholars have turned their attention to the media of popular culture such as novels (Lipsitz, 1990) and comic books (Beaty, 2009), examining the role these media play as sites of remembrance and transmission of unofficial and counter-memories. Lipsitz (1990) focused on novels written by authors from marginalized communities. Counter-memories are embodied in the stories novelists write, which are revealed in the tensions between traditional western historical narratives and the novelists’ own lived experiences. Beaty (2009) examined the depiction of 9/11 in the comic book, Captain America, in Marvel Comic’s attempt to construct an on-going memorial to the victims of September 11, 2001. Yet others such as Zelizer (1998) examined the impact of collective

memory on contemporary society's ability to react to current events through the analysis of war photographs. Zelizer (1998) examined photographs of concentration camps during World War II, arguing that photographic images of the concentration camps have had a sustained impact on contemporary society's ability to react to current war atrocities.

In addition to photography, Meek (2010) also included films in his study of media's representations of past trauma, which he argues media has allowed us to participate in a shared experience and identification with the past that is sustained across physical and temporal distance. Meek (2010) explains that collective identification with the past among disparate individuals in society is made possible by the media. Hence, audiences who view the same media were seen as participating in a collective experience, which ends up shaping society's collective memory of events. The ability of the media to disseminate and shape collective memory of past events across generations and locations means it plays a vital role in sustaining cultural continuity and identity, a concept also explored in Dawis's (2009) analysis of imported Chinese entertainment films on diasporic Chinese community in Indonesia.

In today's media-saturated age, journalists too play a vital role in the construction and dissemination of collective memory, with some scholars arguing that the construction of it begins with journalists. This is especially true for localized historical events that are deemed important enough to capture international and national media attention. The relationship between the news media and collective memories has been found to be dynamic and significant, though many researchers have used different approaches to examine this relationship. Hoskins (2010) in examining the challenges for the interdisciplinary study of memory in a media saturated era, points out the correlation

between news agenda and memory making. He argued that “newsworthiness is translated into collective memory through striking images and accounts” (p. 464). In other words, elements of the event that qualifies it as newsworthy are also features that influence and shape memory. The viewing of news of momentous events on television is so deeply shocking that it can directly impact “flashbulb memory” of public happenings, memory that can be recalled in such vivid details as if the viewer experienced or witnessed it in person.

Contributing a chapter in *Save as...Digital Memories*, Hoskins (2009) explains that television news is especially good at capturing the defining moment of an event, encapsulated in a single or series of still images and video footages. With television news’s compulsion to repeat and replay images and video footages, compounded with the accumulation of captions, contexts and narratives, much of the original meaning of a news event is squeezed out of society’s memory of the event. Using the examples of the planes crashing into the twin towers of the World Trade Center and the felling of Saddam Hussein’s statue in Baghdad, Hoskins (2009) illustrates the ‘flash frames’ that have come to define our memory of pivotal moments in our history. The ability of television news to selectively sustain and reframe the past is made even more significant with the trend of sharing and reproducing news footages and images across multiple news channels and media platforms. As a result, flashbulb memory of events, which consists of detailed, precise, and distinctly vivid snap-shots of the event, has been defined as a product of broadcast media (Hoskins, 2009). Arguably, it is these flashbulb memories of iconic events that are deeply imprinted in the memory of society, influencing the representation, and hence, memory of the event.

Other scholars examined the use of collective memories by journalists to establish cultural authority, therein legitimatizing their position in society as an authoritative interpretive community, a community of cultural elites (Edy, 1999; Ha-Ilan, 2001; Meyers, 2007; Zandberg, 2010; Zelizer, 1992). Carlson (2010) explains that the ability to speak authoritatively about the past is always limited to a small group of speakers, and journalists are often afforded a special role in providing narratives that order the past while contributing to a shared sense of identity for groups in the present. Journalists often draw on shared social meanings, using powerful themes and grand narratives that are often derived from collective memories to help readers make sense of present events (Ha-Ilan, 2001; Leavy, 2007). While journalists rely on collective memories, they also function as interpreters for audiences as the events unfold and it is often their interpretations that shape collective memory. Hence, other scholars have examined the process by which journalists narrate and present historical events while packing and distributing collective memory simultaneously for their public (Culbert, 2001; Leavy, 2007; Zelizer, 1998).

Though the importance of images should not be ignored, as images on television or photographs are instrumental in creating the pictures we remember of the event, Johnson (1995) argues that newspapers are the primary media source of remembered information, providing the stock of facts people remember about an event. The initial reporting is central to how the public first comes to remember the event because, as Leavy (2007) explains, the first few representations of an event, especially one that is shocking, are the ones that stick. It is also the initial stages of reporting that carry historical significance because the accumulation of representations created during this

time will serve as the “backdrop against which all future representation is measured” (Leavy, 2007, p. 66). Even when the event is no longer current, the event, along with its representations, will be recycled elsewhere in the media, and hence, will circulate in the public imagination for years to come (Teer-Tomaselli, 2006).

Consequently, the news has the ability to define for its readers what is deemed significant about the event and how we should remember it as well as its relations to our experiences of the present. For this reason, news has often been described as discourse. As public discourse, news strives to control the meaning of the events it conveys, validating particular ways of remembering the past and revivifying certain pasts or elements of those parts at the expense of others as well as granting authority to certain speakers (Ha-Ilan, 2001; Hoskins, 2010; Irwin-Zarecka, 1994; Zandberg, 2010). It is thus crucial to recognize that the same media that transmit the event is also the source of discourses that help define it as meaningful (Leavy, 2007; Meek, 2010). As a result, the repository of representations that the press creates will eventually shape our collective memory of the event, one that is mediated and constructed.

While the above scholars have explored mainstream media’s relationship with collective memory, Pentzold (2009) and Noakes (2009) have explored the effects of “new” media on collective memory. Perhaps of greater relevance to my own research interest is Pentzold’s (2009) study of Wikipedia as a discursively constructed global memory place. It is a space that facilitates the “discursive fabrication of memory” as memorable elements of the past are negotiated between authors (p. 264). In her analysis of the London bombing entry on Wikipedia, she identified the two keywords that garner the most attention from authors – ‘terrorist’ and ‘terrorism’. Using the technique of

argumentation analysis, she discovered that the arguments could be categorized into two distinct positions – for and against the use of the keywords ‘terrorists’ and ‘terrorism.’

Noakes (2009), on the other hand, examined the website, “The BBC’s ‘People’s War’” as a site for the collection, transmission and shared remembrance of individual wartime memories, paying particular attention to the relationship of gender in shaping the remembrance of World War II in contemporary British culture. In her analysis, she identified a hierarchy of memory where some stories were more visible than others, reflecting current views about the war where soldiers were worthier of commemoration than those who objected the war. In addition, Noakes (2009) also discovered that male combatants’ memories of the war, especially battles that were recognized as being significant to the war’s eventual outcome, were more likely to be written with a sense of authority and entitlement that their experiences were more important, compared to those of any other group. As discovered by Pentzold (2009) and Noakes (2009), a hierarchy of memories exists in the virtual world, where some interpretations are more visible than others. A hierarchy does not just exist in terms of memories but also in the form of access and ownership, as discovered by Clarke (2009), where the museum’s curators determine the distribution of memories.

Similar to Noakes’s (2009) study of unofficial memories by individual citizens, Clarke’s (2009) chapter in the book, *Save as...Digital Memories*, presents an analysis of Museu da Pessoa or Museum of the Person, a virtual museum and digital archive of Brazil’s citizens’ personal histories. The purpose of the digital museum was to record, collect and archive the life stories of citizens into a public databank and resource during a period of Brazil’s reassessment of its past and construction of alternative historical

narratives to counter official narratives defined by Brazil's elites. The articulation of memory and construction of narratives by diverse groups enabled by the museum became the first step in what can be considered a transition from remembering to knowing, which in turn "facilitated the intersection between the individual and the historical, and the transition from individual to collective memory" (Clark, 2009, p. 156).

Clarke's (2009) study demonstrated that memory processes and their integration into frameworks of collective memory are "constructed in dialectical terms with broader social and institutional frameworks, and in relation to paradigms of knowledge within which the individual recollections take place" (p. 157). Consequently, they placed the individual and memory construction within the bounds of a larger social context.

Crucially, Museu da Pessoa illustrates the ways in which the accumulation of individual narratives of his or her past may be elevated into social and collective memory when mediated through digital networks and media.

In a way, Clarke's (2009) study is relevant to my own study of Wikipedia, where individuals with their own memory (real or mediated) of the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 participate in the active process of remembering, which through the digital platform of Wikipedia has the ability to convert the personal into the collective and therefore, arguably possesses the potential to impact the collective memory of the event on a global scale.

Research Questions

Informed by the theoretical approach that collective memories of past events are mediated, culture-specific and shaped by contemporary concerns, the thesis focuses on

Wikipedia as a global platform that presents additional dimensions to the process of remembering, reshaping and constructing collective memory of past events. Being a participatory website with fewer barriers of access than traditional media, Wikipedia presents an excellent opportunity to open up the “public stage” to all who have access to it and “enabling the inclusion of memories which were previously marginal to or excluded from collective remembrance” of the event (Noakes, 2009, p.137). In other words, Wikipedia has the potential to give voice to non-official and non-dominant memories. Despite that possibility, Noakes (2009) rightfully cautions us to “consider whether all memories are equal” within this new site of memory or “whether the actual process of remembering and of deciding to record an aspect of memory means that some experiences and some identities are privileged over others” (p. 137).

As a result, in order to examine Wikipedia’s potential as a space for non-official and non-dominant memories, I compared the collective remembering of contributors on Wikipedia with the official memory constructed by cultural elites. To examine official memories circulated by cultural elites, since journalists are cultural elites because they function as a legitimate interpretive community and influences society’s collective memory of past events, I examined how the mainstream press of two different communities remembers past events. Specific questions were asked – How did the press interpret the event, what were the narratives, and which sources were considered credible? Comparing the official memory of past events with that of memories on Wikipedia, specific questions were raised – Do Wikipedia contributors reproduce and maintain official collective memories or do they challenge them? How are different memories negotiated and, in the process of remembering, which memories were

privileged (and therefore included in the article) and considered legitimate, and which were silenced (and therefore not included in the article)? Which memories receive the most attention or contestation among contributors?

In order to document the process of collective remembering on Wikipedia, I have chosen to closely examine the topic, Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989, on the English language Wikipedia. The same topic also exists on the Chinese language Wikipedia under the title name, 六四事件, which directly translates to the June Fourth Incident. Even though the Chinese language version of the topic exists, I will only be looking at the English language version because it remains the largest language version with the most number of articles compared to the other language versions.

Furthermore, the English language Wikipedia, benefiting from English being the lingua franca of the world, draws many users and contributors from around the world, even those whose native language is not English. Wikipedia argues that non-native users use English Wikipedia rather than the Wikipedia of their native language because the English version tends to contain more information (“English Wikipedia,” n.d.). As a result, the English language Wikipedia with its wider reach of users will invariably have a greater impact than its Chinese language counterpart, influencing the ways in which Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 is remembered globally.

The event, Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989, was chosen as a case study because it was one of the most significant and memorable news events to come out of China since the death of Chairman Mao. It was also one of the largest in the history of China (Cheng, 1990; Mason & Clements, 2002). The movement tugged at the heartstrings of many American viewers watching the protests from afar. The Chinese

students appealed to the most cherished American values such as human struggle for freedom against repression, good versus evil, and what the Americans believed to be the Chinese students' yearning and outcry for democracy (Mark, 2007; Park, 1940; Kluver, 2010). Perhaps most importantly, no consensus has yet been met with regards to the final moments of the movement, with the Chinese government and Western sources depicting and remembering two oppositional versions of events that occurred on the 3rd – 4th of June 1989. The existence of two dominant memories that are in opposition to each other renders the movement a great case study.

As Park (1955) explains, events of tragedy and heroism are often remembered as something more than themselves, which is exemplified in the enduring memory of the movement within the international community. Even in the 21st century, the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 is still being referenced to and juxtaposed with modern day democratic movements around the world, which will be further elaborated in the subsequent chapters. Through the continual reference to and comparison of the protests to modern-day democratic struggles, the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 has truly been enshrined as an iconic symbol of 20th-century history of the struggle for democracy.

On a broader level, this paper discusses the larger implications of having a borderless public space on collective memory of the event. As a global platform, Wikipedia opens up the stage for local events that are remembered by local audiences to reach a global one. Memories of local events will no longer just belong to the realm of the local or nation-state but also to the global audience and be influenced by memories of global contributors, contributors who are allowed to participate in the shaping of a memory that may not necessary belong to their culture-group. On a global platform

where (local) memories shaped by cultural forces meet as alternative, competing or similar memories, what sort of memories would develop because of that interaction?

The Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989

The Tiananmen Square Protests began on April 15, 1989, with the death of Hu Yaobang. Hu was a former Chinese official whose tolerance for dissidents and leniency towards the student demonstrators during the protest of 86-87' had won him support but resulted in his forced resignation from the Chinese ruling party (Kluver, 2010; Cheng, 1990; Francis, 1989; Han & Li, 1992). Hence, to some scholars, honoring and mourning his death was a political act of discontent directed at the Chinese party (Guthrie, 1995). The students were discontented with the political and economic climate they were in due to official profiteering, increasing cost of living, unequal opportunities and corruption.

As a result, they wanted the right to speak freely about the surmounting grievances (Zuo & Benford, 1995). The student demonstrations gained momentum in the subsequent days and the number of demonstrators from universities snowballed into the thousands (Cheng, 1990; Lin, 1992; Zhao, 2001). Perhaps threatened by the immense support of the movement, the Chinese government attempted to halt the movement by officially condemning it as a turmoil in an editorial published in its official newspaper on April 26, arguing that the movement was directed by external and oppositional forces bent on destroying China (Li, Li, & Mark, 2007; Kluver, 2010).

Upset that the movement was labeled a conspiracy and at being portrayed as puppets manipulated by forces with ulterior motives, the student demonstrators continued their protests with heightened fervor (Kluver, 2010; Liu, 1992; Zuo & Benford, 1995).

Frustrated by the lack of governmental concessions and dialogue, the students went on a hunger strike on May 16 and were resolved to fast until governmental officials met them in equal dialogue (Cheng, 1990; Guthrie, 1995; Zhao, 2001). The hunger strike quickly won the sympathy of the public when the Chinese government's indifference towards the well-being of the fasting students galvanized the residents to respond, mobilizing them to call for the resignation of top Chinese officials (Cheng, 1990; Guthrie, 1995; Zuo & Benford, 1995). What had initially started as a student demonstration soon evolved into a movement that embraced supporters from all walks of life. Even though mass public support for the students and the hunger strike forced the Chinese government to engage in a dialogue with the students, the dialogue was not fruitful and martial law was declared on May 20.

The already tense relationship between the demonstrators and the Chinese government was further aggravated by the arrival of "The Goddess of Democracy" statue into the square, a statue that the student demonstrators had constructed to represent the goals of the movement (Li, et al., 2010; Kluver, 2010). The "Goddess of Democracy" statue, which was based upon the Statue of Liberty, was placed in front of Mao portrait, as it to challenge the legitimacy of the founder of the state, an action the Chinese government felt was extremely disrespectful (Kluver, 2010). On June 3rd, an ultimatum was broadcast in which the student demonstrators were asked to leave the square or suffer the consequences. Due to the public's support for the movement, the government also issued a warning to Beijing residents, warning them to stay off the streets the night of June 3rd. True to its words, the government carried out a military crackdown on June 3-4,

a decision that would capture the imagination of international audience for many years to come.

Though there is little dispute over how the events unfolded during the movement, scholars parted ways when it came to re-telling the movement's final moments, which in turn reflected the position and judgment they take on the demonstrators and Chinese government. Much of Western literature remembers the movement as being a peaceful struggle for democracy. The students were largely depicted as exercising restraint and being committed to legality, a tactic that had won them mass support and further enhanced the movement's legitimacy (Cheng, 1990; Chong, 1990; Crane, 1994, Francis, 1989; Han & Li, 1992; Kluver, 2010; Li, 1990; Liu, 1989; Mu & Thompson, 1989; Zuo & Benford, 1995). As a movement largely remembered for its non-violent nature, the Chinese government's decision to use military force was a costly decision that invariably crystallized the "movement's nonviolent identity and cast the state in the role of forceful repressor of defenseless students" (Crane, 1994, p. 402).

It is not uncommon for scholars to think the Chinese government overreacted in considering the protest dangerous, believing that the students were only asking for reforms. This has led them to argue that it was the Chinese government's unwillingness to loosen its control over China or to give China any form of freedom that motivated the decision for military intervention (Francis, 1989; Liu, Ming, & Gang, 1989). Many scholars thus define the military intervention as a crackdown that was brutal, bloody, violent, and excessive, often referring to it as a massacre (Cheng, 1990; Chong, 1990; Crane, 1994; Liu, et al., 1989; Mason & Clements, 2002; Skidmore & Gates, 1997; Zuo & Benford, 1995).

Despite that, most details of what occurred on the 3rd and 4th of June, such as the number of casualties and the social classes who suffered the most losses, remain inconsistent. The number of casualties ranged widely, depending on the sources (Cheng; Lin, 1992; Han & Li, 1992). The Chinese official statements stated that about 300 people had died and about 7,000 – 9,000 people were wounded, with more soldiers injured than any other social class. Non-official sources such as the Red Cross, Beijing hospitals and newspapers reported deaths in the thousands (Lin, 1992).

Though many scholars agree that a violent suppression took place on the 3rd and 4th of June, some scholars have argued that there were actually no deaths in the square, making the memory of the Tiananmen Square “massacre” inaccurate. Instead, the violence occurred in the city on the way to the square (Liang, 2001; Wasserstrom, 1994). While many scholars have noted the inconsistency of sources in reporting the number of casualties, they did not always agree on the social class that suffered the most. Some scholars said it was mostly civilians who were hurt (Liang, 2001; Han & Li, 1992), whereas others said few civilians were harmed (Cheng, 1990; Wasserstrom, 1994).

Despite these inconsistencies in the details of the movement’s final moments, much western literature included the violence and brutality of soldiers (see Cheng, 1990; Guthrie, 1995; Han & Li, 1992; Zuo & Benford, 1995), but few mentioned the violence towards the soldiers. In fact, Zhao (2001) pointed out that most people, including journalists, were biased against martial law and largely ignored soldiers’ reports of being beaten up by local residents. The different narratives of the movement’s end have led Li, Li and Mark (2007) to state in *Culture and Politics in China* that there is an absence of a

comprehensive and neutral account of the events that occurred during the movement's final moments.

Even though scholars such as Han and Li (1992) have argued that the 1989 military intervention in Tiananmen Square was another "bloody chapter in China's history of attempts to challenge the power of an authoritarian apparatus that refused to back down," some scholars sought to explain the Chinese government's predicament during the movement (p. 59). These scholars have portrayed the decisions by the Chinese government towards the demonstrators as being tempered by circumstances that have historical and cultural roots. The common understanding that the Chinese government brutally suppressed the pro-democracy movement to hold on to absolute power instead of compromising on what many scholars see as valid grievances no longer seemed so clear cut.

Scholars like Cheng (1990), Kluver (2010), and Zhao (2001) saw the Chinese government's decision as expected and inevitable, based on the 1989 movement's historical and cultural allusions to previous protests and the Cultural Revolution, which had turned into bloody anti-government riots. The overwhelming support the movement received from within China and abroad intimidated the government, which based on memory of past riots, had reasons to believe the '89 movement would eventually spiral out of control like the previous protests (Cheng, 1990; Kluver, 2010; Zhao, 2001). Many western observers, Kluver (2001) argued, misunderstood the perceived threat that the protesters had posed to the Chinese government, which had led them to not only rationalize their actions but trivialize all other considerations to halt the movement, including the moral responsibility for their actions (Liu, 1990; Zhao, 2001).

Liu (1992) explained that Deng Xiaoping's experience with protesters, particularly students, had been a threatening one. Hence, it was thus not difficult for Deng to genuinely believe that the student movement was a conspiracy nor was it difficult for him to conjure thoughts of the possibility of the movement spreading to the whole nation, and causing further turmoil and instability (Liu, 1992). The suspicion of demonstrators and perhaps a lack of confidence in the Chinese government's ability to legitimize their rule other than through brute force led the Chinese officials to be skeptical of the demonstrators' intentions (Kluver, 2010; Zhao, 2001). The Chinese government might have genuinely believed that the movement's goal of eradicating corruption was disingenuous and they were in fact hiding a more sinister goal and, posed a real threat to the legitimacy of the government (Kluver, 2010).

Consequently, a few scholars have parted ways with the popular understanding of the Chinese government's motivations for military intervention and have argued that the government's decision to quell what they believed was a counter-revolution reflected more than a desire to hold on to power. The '89 movement brought forth memories of the early revolutionary period and the historical agenda of the 1920s and 1930s. Those were the days of "the Communist Party's precarious existence, sufferings, and sacrifices," as well as China's "humiliation at the hands of imperialist powers" (Liu, 1992, p. 57). The Chinese Communist Party ascendance to power was only achieved through decades of revolution and war, and as a result of this struggle, harbored a deep-rooted wariness towards parties who threatened the stability of the state (Chen, 2003). The Chinese officials therefore saw their actions as preserving China from crumbling into what they believe was interference from Western forces who wanted to see China become a satellite

in the system of capitalism (Kluver, 2010; Liang, 2001). Western ideology of democracy and freedom espoused by the students only confirmed the Chinese officials' suspicion of "ideological and cultural infiltration" into the movement by foreigners (Kluver, 2010, p. 82).

Much like the student demonstrators, the Chinese officials saw themselves and their actions as patriotic individuals fulfilling a greater good for their country. They saw themselves as protectors of the People's Republic, which was hard won from decades of battle and "with the blood of thousands of revolutionary martyrs" (Liang, 2001, p. 205). By not taking harsh measures to quell the movement, the Chinese officials believed that they were betraying the memory of tens of thousands of martyrs who had died for China's revolution.

Thus, from the memory of Cultural Revolution and the fear of being humiliated by Western forces emerged a desire to safeguard China's sovereignty from western interference at all cost, even if it meant bloodshed (Chen, 2003; Liang, 2001; Liu, 1990; Kluver, 2010; Zhao, 2001). Despite being resolved to stop the movement from spreading, top Chinese officials never intended to use military force unless it was the last resort, according to some scholars. Scholars have pointed out that the Chinese government had exercise restraint and tolerance for as long as it could but its acts of moderation were met with even more daring displays of disobedience towards the government (Crane, 1994; Han & Li, 1992; Zhao, 2001).

Even though the common understanding of the demonstrators and Chinese government was one-dimensional, giving an impression of unity among the demonstrators and Chinese officials, a few scholars have indicated that there were often

disputes in the methods of achieving their respective goals in each party (Liang, 2001; Zhao, 2001). Some student demonstrators wanted the Chinese government to be overthrown completely, whereas others only wanted more dialogue, respect and faster reform from the government. Conversely, Chinese officials such as Zhao Ziyang and Wan Li (initially) did not perceive the movement to be a turmoil and even hinted that the students' demands were legitimate, thus sympathizing with the student demonstrators (Han & Li, 1992; Liang, 2001; Lin, 1992; Liu, 1990).

Therefore, it is important to recognize that despite the decisions taken by the demonstrators and Chinese officials, which had led to the inevitable course of action that ended the movement, "the students did not set out to pose a mortal challenge to what they knew was a dangerous regime. Nor did the regime relish the use of force against the students." This quote from *The Tiananmen Papers* compiled by Liang, and edited by Nathan and Link (2001, p. XXXV) is significant because it is perhaps the best explanation of the bind both parties were in towards the end of the movement. This quote may even be the answer to reconcile the differing memories of the movement held in much of western literature. After all, the decisions made by both parties and the motivations driving those decisions were never as clear and simple as the labels make us believe - labels that have reduced complex events into one-dimensional narratives and have limited our ability to think beyond the labels.

The purpose of providing a scholarly review of the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 is not to imply that their interpretations and memory of the movement are the most accurate and therefore the standard against which all other interpretations should be judged. Rather, it is to point out that even intellectual elites, a community traditionally

considered an authoritative source of truth, did not always agree on the details that occurred during the movement's final moments. Neither do the scholars agree on the motivations that led to the military actions against the demonstrators, a significant factor that has an impact on how the Chinese government is viewed and subsequently remembered. Consequently, these disagreements show the controversial nature of the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989. As a global iconic event whose final moments are still being contested, this thesis seeks to examine how contributors on Wikipedia remember this movement.

Chapter Two: Wikipedia, the poster child of participatory websites

Wikipedia has grown into its own since its inception in 2001. Over the years, Wikipedia has come to dominate public consciousness. Founded by Jimmy Wales and Larry Sanger, Wikipedia has grown into one of the largest reference websites with over 121 million articles in more than 284 languages and attracting close to 365 million visitors worldwide (“Wikipedia: About,” n.d.). According to a nationwide survey by the Pew Internet and American Life Project (2007), about 36% of American adult Internet users consult Wikipedia, making it one of the most heavily visited site on the Internet. Due to Wikipedia’s popularity and high user traffic, no other reference sites have even come close to comparison (Lih, 2009). In fact, in the cluster of websites that are focused on educational and reference material, Wikipedia was rated the top online information destination, drawing nearly six times more traffic than the next closest site, as reported in the Pew Internet and American Life Project in 2007.

Wikipedia’s popularity is due in part to its free, open source software where anyone and everyone can access and edit topics that interest them, much unlike its traditional encyclopedia counterparts, who have seen their influence and relevance wane in the face of Wikipedia (Lih, 2009). Unlike traditional printed encyclopedias, which are subjected to editorial gate-keeping, physical and structural constraints, Wikipedia is able to transcend the limitations of its counterparts by providing timely updates of the most recent events, information and scholarship (Halavais & Lackaff, 2008; Lih, 2004). This is achieved in part by Wikipedia’s lack of formal gatekeepers, which has provided a

platform for anyone to participate in the content production process and to channel their views into the collaborative development of a shared knowledge project (Bruns, 2009).

The ease with which users can contribute has resulted in over 16 million users on the English Wikipedia, many of whom have been responsible for creating more than 3 million articles in total as of April 2012 (“English Wikipedia,” n.d.). The wide range of topics on Wikipedia, the speed at which information gets updated and its accessibility have all resulted in Wikipedia being the first and sometimes only stop for online encyclopedic information. In addition to being cited as a source on historical facts and figures, the popularity of Wikipedia has also resulted in the press citing Wikipedia contents as a secondary source for additional reading (Lih, 2004; Royal & Kapila, 2009; Rosenzweig, 2006).

In addition to Internet users’ support of Wikipedia, Wikipedia’s culture of encouraging internal and external links gives its content a high Google ranking on many keyword queries. The Pew Internet and American Life Project (2007) discovered that Wikipedia is the number one external site visited after Google’s search page, receiving over half of its traffic from Google. This discovery is also supported by Laurent and Vickers’ (2009) study to determine the significance of English Wikipedia as a source of online health information. In their study, they found out that articles from Wikipedia showed up in the list of top 10 websites on Google over 70% of the time for health-related queries. This has contributed to Wikipedia’s prominence as a health information destination based on its position among search engine results, emphasizing the essential role Google plays in contributing to Wikipedia’s popularity. All these factors have

contributed to Wikipedia's success as a top information destination, which also meant that it now had a social responsibility.

When New York Times reporter David Rohde managed to escape from Afghanistan, where he was help captive by the Taliban for seven months, the Times suppressed publishing a report of his escape for the fear of endangering his life. The Times requested other news agencies to act similarly, including a request to Wikipedia to help suppress this information because an anonymous contributor had attempted to add that bit of information to Rohde's biographical article, a responsibility Wikipedia had to bear as a popular site for knowledge and information (Reagle, 2010). Rohde's biographical article on Wikipedia was protected from further edits and the anonymous contributor's edits were removed, with the "lack of sufficient reputable sources" as justification for the removal (Reagle, 2010, p. 90). It was not until the news media broke the story that Rohde's biographical article protection was lifted. This episode suggests that Wikipedia, despite its anyone-can-edit mantra, was not immune to external societal forces and concerns. For Rohde's safety, Wikipedia had to suppress that information until it was safe to allow its contributors to disclose it, attesting to the great amount of influence Wikipedia exerts on society.

More importantly, Wikipedia claims to be an encyclopedia and not a "publisher of original thought" or "a vehicle for propaganda, advertising and showcasing" ("What Wikipedia is not," n.d., "Wikipedia is not a publisher of original thought," para. 1). Like any encyclopedia, Wikipedia's aim is to represent a collection of facts, facts that are considered irrefutable and above subjectivity and ideological differences (Halavais & Lackaff, 2008). Consequently, Wikipedia's claims of its content being grounded in

documentation give it the ability to influence readers' memory of pertinent historical events because readers are led into thinking the content stands outside ideology. With its large audience base and Internet users' reliance on Wikipedia for background information, the ways major global events are remembered and represented will likely have larger implications on our collective memory of those events, shaping how we interpret and interact with the world (Graham, 2011). Consequently, Wikipedia is a force to be reckoned with and hence, to be examined and understood. In order to examine collective remembering on Wikipedia, it is necessary to first understand the nature of Wikipedia.

Wikipedia: A culture of anything goes?

One of the fascinating things about Wikipedia, and its popular characterization, is that its content is written and maintained by largely 'anonymous' volunteers without pay, even though the daily operational expenses is supported by Wikimedia Foundation, an American non-profit charitable organization. Since contributors are not required to register or log into an account to contribute, this practice might give the impression that contributors are not held accountable for their actions. In actuality, the term anonymous is misleading because it refers to contributors who are not logged in to an account when they are editing content on Wikipedia, but that does not mean that they cannot be tracked (Reagle, 2010). The contribution of an anonymous user is attributed to an IP address, which can be traced back to the user's computer with Wikiscanner, a tool that can identify the origins of 'anonymous' edits based on IP addresses (Reagle, 2010; Stvilia, 2008). This means that contributors are not entirely 'anonymous.' Also more accurately,

the bulk of Wikipedia's entries are written by a handful of dedicated users who strive hard to maintain the quality and reliability of its content (Reagle, 2010; Sullivan, 2009). Most are dedicated volunteers who spend hours digging through stacks of books to confirm one fact, or hours to check the grammar of entries, or who write software intended to prevent vandalism on Wikipedia (Lih, 2009).

Many contributors devote time and effort to making entries better because they feel empowered in a system where contributions are judged on their own merit rather than source (Sullivan, 2009). In other words, anyone, regardless of qualifications, credentials and expertise, can contribute. For once, they can contribute their knowledge for everyone to see and their personal interests in specific topics and indulgence or obsessions can easily find a home on Wikipedia (Lih, 2009; Stvilia, 2008). Personal gratification aside, Wikipedia manages to survive and retain its most passionate contributors because it is extremely social (Benkler, 2006; Bruns, 2009; Lih, 2009; Reagle, 2010; Sullivan, 2009).

Belonging to a community and working towards a common goal as well as being recognized and valued by that community are what attracts many of Wikipedia's contributors to the site (Sullivan, 2009). After all, people's identities in the 21st century are often bounded by the relationships they form and interests they share with others (Sullivan, 2009). Reagle (2010) sums up the nature of Wikipedia as "both a community and an encyclopedia. And the encyclopedia, at any moment in time, is simply a snapshot of the community's continuing conversation" (p. 1). As a result, the community on Wikipedia is anything but a "colony of ants" that exhibits "swarm intelligence" (Reagle, 2010, p. 149). Rather, the community consists of groups of dedicated contributors who

know one another. This community and its collaborative culture, Reagle (2010) argues, are key to understanding Wikipedia.

Contrary to popular belief that Wikipedia is a “utopian rendering of openness” that “anything goes,” it is far from an anarchic system (Reagle, 2010, p. 74). Though Wikipedia has made efforts to improve the quality of its articles by developing policies and guidelines, contributors are not formally required to be familiar with them (“Wikipedia: About,” n.d.). Instead, Wikipedia relies on the larger community of fellow contributors and administrators to enforce those policies and guidelines, and to advise one another about proper editing procedures. In other words, Wikipedia articles are subjected to peer reviews and authors contributing to the same topic will often police one another to ensure that every contributor adheres to Wikipedia’s policies. Contributors are motivated to police one another’s contribution because there is usually a sense of ownership of articles that they may keep close track of, such as articles that they have contributed to or have started (Sullivan, 2009).

Wikipedia further motivates contributors by rewarding their efforts to improve the quality of content through publicly awarding high-quality articles the status of ‘Featured Article,’ which is determined by other Wikipedia contributors. An article that has been awarded the title will receive a small bronze star icon on the article itself, a mark of excellence for all Wikipedia users to see. Through this practice of recognizing good effort, Wikipedia is able to keep contributors motivated enough to ensure every contribution to the article meets the Featured Article criteria for verifiability, neutrality, comprehensiveness and style (“Wikipedia: Featured article criteria,” n.d.).

To conceive of any community as being entirely anarchic is “untenable,” as argued by Reagle (2010), because some level of structure is necessary, even inevitable, to support other values within the community (p. 74). This is also the case with Wikipedia, where in order to reach the goal of being an encyclopedia, some form of hierarchy is necessary, with some contributors given more editing privileges than others (Bruns, 2009; Reagle, 2010; Sullivan, 2009). For instance, administrators are a small and select group of Wikipedia contributors who have been chosen by their peers and who have more editing privileges than the average contributor. Though anyone can apply to be an administrator on the English Wikipedia regardless of their Wikipedia experience, candidates are generally active and regular contributors who have gained the general trust of the community. They are volunteers and are responsible for enforcing Wikipedia’s policies, resolving disputes among common contributors and maintaining order on Wikipedia. Unlike common contributors, they have access to restricted technical features such as blocking contributors from contributing, protecting, restoring and deleting pages (“Wikipedia: Administrators,” n.d.). Administrators are also given the privilege of placing a lifetime ban by blocking the IP address of a contributor who has proven to be persistently disruptive (Reagle, 2010).

The quality of content on Wikipedia is largely maintained this way with the community of contributors, regardless of editing privileges, maintaining order and socializing new contributors to the process of editing on Wikipedia. Wikipedia’s collaborative culture is therefore based on mutual respect, trust and good faith, for without those qualities, Wikipedia would not be able to function (Benkler, 2006; Bruns, 2009; Reagle, 2010; Sullivan, 2009).

Maintaining law, order, and quality on Wikipedia

Far from being an “anything goes” system, Jimmy Wales, co-founder of Wikipedia, has often stressed in his public talks that “Wikipedia functions a lot more like a traditional organization than most people realize” (as cited in Reagle, 2010, p. 149). Simply put, there are guidelines, policies and features in place to not only ensure the accuracy and reliability of content but also to prevent Wikipedia from devolving into an battleground of competing ideas with no end in sight. Despite the benefits of an open-system with no formal gate-keeping, Wikipedia also recognizes the drawbacks of such a system, such as vandalism of its content. Vandalism is the deliberate act of defacing an article through malicious acts such as deleting of sentences so that the paragraph appears incoherent or adding random words and symbols that do not contribute to the overall understanding of the sentence, in addition to adding profanity.

Unfortunately for Wikipedia, vandalism of its content occurs frequently and persistently, prompting Wikipedia to take measures to quickly remove vandalism on its website through the use of patrols, its first line of defense against vandalism (Reagle, 2010; “Wikipedia: Patrol,” n.d.). The purpose of patrols is to check newly edited articles in a timely manner with the goal of improving and maintaining the quality of articles to achieve the featured article title (“Wikipedia: Recent changes patrol,” n.d.). Most patrol actions are performed by computer programs such as bots and the recent changes patrol, a communal patrol of individual users responsible for checking the recent changes to articles for harmful edits. Patrols quickly revert articles to their previous state if

vandalism occurs, which also means that such disruption to content can be kept to a minimum.

Though it is common for most topics to suffer from vandalism, most vandals are not too much of a problem because of the efficiency of patrols. Some topics, however, are more contentious than others and suffer from continuous vandalism or edit wars. An edit war occurs when authors repeatedly add and remove the same content back and forth, which is not only deemed unconstructive but may also result in the contributor getting banned or blocked from editing (Hafner, 2006; “Wikipedia:Edit warring,” n.d.). Other times disruption to the content comes in the form of a more malicious action – defamation or lies. Due to Wikipedia’s lack of formal gate-keeping, it becomes relatively easy for any vandal or prankster to ‘deface’ articles, as in the infamous case of John Seigenthaler in 2005.

In a Wikipedia article of John Seigenthaler, an administrative assistant to Robert Kennedy, a prankster thought it would be funny to include an unfounded claim that Seigenthaler was implicated in the assassinations of the Kennedy brothers, a mistake that went undetected for 132 days (Lih, 2009; Reagle, 2010; Seigenthaler, 2005). Worse still, damage to Seigenthaler’s reputation had a ripple effect and was not just contained within the walls of Wikipedia but also appeared on other information sources that draw on Wikipedia’s content (Seigenthaler, 2005). Even though Wikipedia was not legally held liable for the defamation of John Seigenthaler, its credibility suffered as a result of the negative media attention that ensued (Lih, 2009; Reagle, 2010). This embarrassing incident prompted Wikipedia to take precaution against controversial topics. As a result, if an article is particularly problematic, it can be protected temporarily by administrators

to either prohibit any non-administrator changes or prevent anonymous and new users from editing the article (Reagle, 2010).

One of the reasons why taking precaution against controversial topics is necessary is because ironically (though not surprisingly), the reason for Wikipedia's strengths is also the reason for its weakness. Wikipedia's success can be aptly explained by Surowiecki's (2004) concept of the wisdom of crowds - "The fact that cognitive diversity matters does not mean that if you assemble a group of diverse but thoroughly uniformed people, their collective wisdom will be smarter than an expert's. But if you can assemble a diverse group of people who possess varying degrees of knowledge and insight, you're better off entrusting it with major decisions rather than leaving them in the hands of one or two people, no matter how smart those people are" (p. 21).

It is Wikipedia's approach to diversity that has made it popular. However, its diverse population of contributors also means that they will bring with them preconceptions, assumptions, and different representations of knowledge and memories, some informed by the cultures they belong to (Leuf & Cunningham, 2001). Consequently, in a collaborative culture like Wikipedia, it is not uncommon to see contributors with oppositional viewpoints working on the same article. This is why the Neutral Point of View (NPOV) policy is necessary because "Wikipedia is not the product of collectivism but of unending argumentation" (Reagle, 2010, p. 151).

NPOV is one of three core content policies that Wikipedia has formulated to improve quality standard and to prevent Wikipedia from becoming a warzone of competing ideologies. It is a fundamental principle of Wikipedia, is non-negotiable and all contributors and articles must adhere to it ("Wikipedia: Neutral point of view," n.d.).

Lih (2009) explains that enforcing NPOV policy has a practical reason - to ensure that Wikipedia will not succumb to polarized views, which would only hinder its progress and success, especially since Wikipedia attracts contributors from all over the world. In its efforts to prevent contributors from using Wikipedia for their own political and ideological purposes, the NPOV policy requires content on Wikipedia articles to present “fairly, proportionately, and as far as possible without bias, all significant views that have been published by reliable sources” (“Wikipedia: Neutral point of view,” n.d., para. 1).

Wikipedia holds no assumption that neutrality would be easy to achieve. It even acknowledges that humans are subjective beings and recognizes that contributors can fail to see bias inherent in a point of view, especially when deeply ingrained in one’s culture (Reagle, 2010; “Wikipedia: Neutral point of view/FAQ,” n.d.). Despite that, Wikipedia takes the stance that “many disputes over the terminology and phrasing can be resolved by simply balancing points of view” (“Wikipedia: Neutral point of view/FAQ,” n.d., “writing for the enemy,” para. 3). In other words, Wikipedia does not “judge the validity of any one view on the topic, but rather presents such views side by side, for its users to evaluate” (Bruns, 2008, p. 114). Hence, the NPOV policy reveals Wikipedia’s approach to knowledge – it recognizes that there are multitudes of viewpoints, which are neither right nor wrong but are all representations of human knowledge (Reagle, 2010). In fact the “threshold for inclusion in Wikipedia is verifiability, not truth,” meaning that it considers more important that readers can trace the material in Wikipedia back to its original reliable source rather than whether contributors consider the knowledge true or false.

As a result, according to Wikipedia, in order to achieve neutrality, contributors are required to describe different viewpoints and disputes but not to engage in them (“Wikipedia: Neutral point of view,” n.d.). To Wikipedia, the ability to achieve neutrality, for instance to characterize disputes fairly, is an “empirical and not a philosophical question” (“Wikipedia: Neutral point of view/FAQ”, n.d., “There’s no such thing as objectivity,” para. 3). Even though Wikipedia does not claim that one view is more valid than the other, it does however present the prevalent representations of knowledge about the world by requiring that each article “fairly represents all significant viewpoints that have been published by reliable sources” (Bruns, 2008; “Wikipedia: Neutral point of view”, n.d., “Due and undue weight,” para. 1). In fact, Wikipedia cautions against giving “minority views as much of or as detailed a description as more widely held views” (“Wikipedia: Neutral point of view”, n.d., “Due and undue weight,” para. 1). It argues that while the NPOV policy requires contributors to abstain from taking a stand on any views as encyclopedia writers, the policy does not prevent them from “describing the majority views as such and using the words of reliable sources to present strong criticisms” (Wikipedia: Neutral point of view/FAQ”, n.d., “Giving “equal validity,” para. 2).

NPOV is further aided by two of the other three core content policies - ‘Verifiability’ and ‘No Original Research,’ which were also introduced in direct response to criticism that Wikipedia lacks reliable research and accuracy. Both policies were implemented to improve quality standards and to ensure that the various points of view on any one topic are accurately and neutrally presented. In Wikipedia’s attempts to build on its credibility, it introduced stricter requirements to properly cite reliable sources for

claims made in its entries (Bruns, 2008). Wikipedia defines reliable sources as “published materials with a reliable publication process, authors who are regarded as authoritative in relation to the subject, or both” (“Wikipedia: Identifying reliable sources”, n.d., para. 1). These three core policies determine the type and quality of sources that is acceptable in Wikipedia articles (“Wikipedia: Neutral point of view,” n.d.).

With policies, features and administrators in place to maintain and improve the quality of Wikipedia, it becomes clear what its goal is. Ultimately, the goal of Wikipedia is to build an encyclopedia and it is an otherwise egalitarian and open space until someone interferes with that goal, as clearly stated on their website, “Wikipedia is free and open, but restricts both freedom and openness where they interfere with creating an encyclopedia” (“Wikipedia: What Wikipedia is not”, n.d., “Wikipedia is not an anarchy,” para. 1). Interestingly, in Wikipedia’s pursuit of its goal, it has unintentionally created a space that is not entirely free for everyone to edit. With its policies, guidelines and contributors policing one another, it has become a space where not all voices are given equal attention. Wikipedia’s internal power structure will inevitably have implications on the types of memories that would be allowed to develop as a result of it.

Previous Research

Widely covered in the press in August 2007 was the discovery that many high profile groups and companies in society such as the Diebold electronic voting machine company, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, the Vatican, and Scientology members had removed embarrassing information from their respective articles (Reagle, 2010). Others such as Auckland City councilor, Aaron Bhatnagar, used

Wikipedia to discredit his opponents in the local elections by removing favorable facts and inserting unflattering descriptions about his opponents (Orsman, 2008).

These discoveries can be perceived in two equally valid ways. On one hand, the groups' attempt to control their image can be attributed to Wikipedia's popularity as a resource tool for information and hence, it is a testament to Wikipedia's success as well as its ability to influence readers' knowledge of the topic. On the other hand, the ability of groups to practice image control by manipulating the truth is the result of Wikipedia's lack of editorial gatekeeping and failure of its fact-checking mechanism, a responsibility of Wikipedia's community of contributors. Unnerved (or simply fascinated) by Wikipedia's open source collaborative approach to knowledge accumulation, in addition to Wikipedia's popularity among Internet users, numerous scholars have turned their attention to assessing the quality of content on Wikipedia.

Several studies have examined the accuracy of Wikipedia, often comparing it to traditionally authoritative sources of knowledge such as traditional encyclopedias, which are often assumed to be more accurate because of their stringent gate keeping process where only experts with the appropriate credentials can participate. One of the more widely known studies is from the highly regarded *Nature* magazine. In a study conducted by *Nature*, comparing the accuracy of science entries, it was reported that Wikipedia's level of accuracy was close to that of Encyclopedia Britannica (Giles, 2005). The study discovered an average of four errors in each Wikipedia article, compared to three in each Britannica article. The result of the *Nature* study came as a surprise to many, who did not expect Wikipedia to be in "such close proximity in quality to a traditionally edited encyclopedia," while using a grassroots process, though it was the external validation that

many Wikipedians have been waiting for (Lih, 2009, p. 208). Not surprisingly, Britannica objected vehemently to the methodology and results of the *Nature* study in a press release and advertisements across several newspapers. By that time, Wikipedia had already fixed all the errors identified in the study within days of learning of those errors (Reagle, 2010). The quick turn around by Wikipedia is testament to its efficiency and speed of updating information due to its lack of structural limitation, much unlike traditional encyclopedias.

Benkler (2006) also lauded the strength of Wikipedia's "distributed correction mechanism" in fixing errors in *The Wealth of Networks* (p. 71). In his analysis of peer production and sharing in the networked information economy, Benkler (2006) described an incident in which Wikipedia's speed at rectifying errors enabled it to exceed other major online encyclopedias such as Columbia and Encarta as a source of accurate encyclopedic information. A year before the *Nature* study in 2005, Robert McHenry, a former editor in chief of Britannica, criticized Wikipedia for being unreliable, noting particularly the inaccuracy of Alexander Hamilton's birth date in a Wikipedia article of his biography, in addition to the way dates were referenced in the article. In response to McHenry's criticism, Wikipedia contributors began an intensive effort to correct all the references in the biography. Interestingly, Encarta and Columbia both failed to fix the inconsistency surrounding Hamilton's birth, which meant that by the time Wikipedia had a reasonably clean version, it was the only encyclopedia other than Britannica to be a reliable and accurate source of basic information. Benkler (2006) explains that it is "precisely the correction mechanism that makes Wikipedia, in the long term, a robust model of reasonably reliably information" (p. 72).

Since the *Nature* study, several studies have also examined the accuracy of Wikipedia's content, though with inconsistent results. While a study by Rosenzweig (2006) concluded that Wikipedia surpasses Encarta in coverage and matches it in accuracy, another did not yield positive results. In another study that compared the accuracy and thoroughness of Wikipedia articles to those of several well-respected encyclopedias and information sources such as Encyclopedia Britannica, the Dictionary of American History and American National Biography Online, Wikipedia turned out to be a less reliable source (Rector, 2008). The study revealed inaccuracies in eight out of the nine entries evaluated and exposed flaws in the citation process, which were mainly attributed to sources with no citations. Overall, the study rated Wikipedia's accuracy at 80 percent, far behind that of the other sources compared in the study, which had 95-96 percent accuracy.

Besides focusing on accuracy as one measurement of quality, scholars such as Bragues (2009) chose depth as an indicator of quality. In Bragues's attempt to test the hypothesis that the marketplace of ideas (or wisdom of the crowd) is reliable enough as a "social mechanism to generate valid information," he pits Wikipedia, the model of collaborative knowledge production, against the tradition of relying on individual elites for intellectual tasks (p. 118). Evaluating Wikipedia articles of seven top Western philosophers by comparing them to academic works such as philosophy reference books and histories of philosophy, he concluded that while there were no errors, the "the sins of Wikipedia are more of omission than commission" (p. 152). Bragues (2009) explains that even though the biography components of the articles examined were particularly strong, the articles omitted significant (and arguably more significant) aspects about the

philosophers – aspects that made the philosophers great, such as their ideas and the rationale for those ideas. This finding led Bragues (2009) to speculate that contributors may lack the expertise, confidence or even inclination to grapple with philosophical analysis and interpretations, therein providing readers with only an incomplete knowledge of the philosophers.

Bragues' (2009) findings support the claims of other recent research that suggests that in spite of "Wikipedia's topical coverage of general knowledge and technical issues" being quite good, it has "blind spots in other specialist areas" (Reagle, 2010, p. 7). In Rosenzweig's (2006) study of Wikipedia as a historical resource, he noted that some topics were incoherent and inadequate in terms of depth and accuracy. Other topics such as biographies, on the other hand, were comprehensive, accurate and comparable to traditional encyclopedias. The reason for this huge disparity, Rosenzweig (2006) claims, is because the English language platform of Wikipedia favors Western culture and English-speaking nations, which has attributed to its impressive accuracy in writing about events concerning US history.

Royal and Kapila (2009) also noted Wikipedia's bias towards certain topics, which is reflective of current power relations. In a study conducted by Royal and Kapila (2009), they discovered that differences exist in terms of topical diversity and depth of coverage on Wikipedia. The more popular and current topics, as well as the larger countries by population, had the most detailed coverage. Companies with larger revenue and resources such as *Fortune* 1000 were also likely to have greater coverage on Wikipedia.

Royal and Kapila's (2009) findings were also supported in Graham's (2011) study of representation of geographical places on Wikipedia. Graham (2011) discovered that representations on Wikipedia were skewed towards places of global dominance. The country with the most Wikipedia articles tagged to it was the United States with almost 90,000 articles whereas small island nations and city-states had fewer than 100 articles. Not surprisingly, Graham (2011) found that almost all of Africa was poorly represented in Wikipedia, with more articles written about Antarctica than all but one of the 53 countries in Africa. In other words, much of the world still remains underrepresented or unrepresented.

Of equal importance is Graham's (2011) observation of patterns of self-focus bias in almost every Wikipedia language edition - which explains a large amount of information about Portugal, Brazil and other Portuguese speaking countries in the Portuguese language edition but very little information about everything else beyond that. This means that with the exception of widely used languages such as English, the other language editions would have limited topical coverage of the world, therein limiting their audiences' access to information about the world on Wikipedia. Significantly, Graham (2011) pointed out one of the limitations of Wikipedia and by that extension, any other peer production projects. On a site like Wikipedia where there can "only be one representation of any given feature or event present at any one time," it becomes almost inevitable that some voices would be "louder and more likely to frame representations than others" (p. 278).

The significance of Wikipedia to our understanding of the world around us is bolstered by Graham (2011), who argues that "virtual representations can begin to

influence our understandings of material, offline places – most importantly by influencing how geographic imaginations constitute and legitimate power relations” (p. 217). The disparity in quality of topics serves to remind us that Wikipedia is essentially a socially produced document, where the interests of contributors and the current hierarchies and divisions based on economic power, social relations and global dominance are reproduced and reflected on Wikipedia (Graham, 2011; Rosenzweig, 2006; Royal & Kapila, 2009). Therefore, even though Wikipedia is largely considered an online encyclopedia, whose goal is to be a collection of facts and general knowledge, current research has exemplified that Wikipedia is not a neutral source of information. As an encyclopedia that is partial toward global and cultural powers, its partiality will have serious implication on our understanding and memory of past events as it privileges certain memories over others.

While some scholars were interested in evaluating quality of articles, others were more interested in understanding the mechanism and coordination processes employed by Wikipedia to ensure quality assurance of content. For instance, Stvilia (2008) noted in his study of the organization of information quality assurance work in Wikipedia that there are distinct roles in the content construction process, resulting in the quality of Wikipedia articles being “reasonably good or, at the least, nowhere near as bad as might be expected” (p. 984). This is because the community takes issues of quality very seriously, fulfilling their roles by carefully reviewing and discussing content. Kittur and Kraut (2008) dig deeper into Wikipedia’s coordination process by examining the relationship between the number of editors on Wikipedia and the article’s overall quality, discovering that coordination improved the article’s quality especially in its formative stage.

However, more editors do not immediately translate into better quality articles. Instead, appropriate coordination techniques had to be applied in order to effectively harness the “wisdom of the crowd” (see Kittur and Kraut, 2008). Cultural differences also played a role in determining the collaboration process. In another study, Pfeil, Zaphiris and Ang (2006) investigated the behavior of contributors on various language platforms of Wikipedia in creating and reviewing content, and they discovered that aspects of collaborative online work were heavily influenced by pre-existing cultural differences. This finding attests once again to the idea that Wikipedia, as an open source collaborative system, allows cultural relations to be clearly manifested, unlike traditional encyclopedias where the editorial process is accessible to only a select few.

Research on the quality of content on Wikipedia has largely yielded mixed results, as the above studies have revealed. Rosenzweig (2006) offers an explanation for the inconsistency in findings by comparing research of Wikipedia aptly to the tale of the blind men and the elephant, wherein a scholar’s evaluation of content on Wikipedia depends largely on the topics the scholar ‘touches’ or focuses on. As a project that relies largely on the dedication and topical interests of contributors, undoubtedly some topics that are popular with contributors would be more accurate and thorough than others. Similarly, some language versions would have a larger range of topics than others. With over 3 million articles on the English Wikipedia, studying Wikipedia can be a mammoth task, especially taking into consideration the speed at which content is continuously being updated.

The fact of the matter is, at any point, Wikipedia is an on-going discussion, a never-ending piece of work that is dynamic and constantly evolving. Its edit histories and

discussion pages (also known as talk pages) are direct indicators of this unfinished product's "ongoing process of exploration, negotiation, and communication," which makes it difficult for anyone to really assess and measure its quality (Bruns, 2008, p. 163). Every analysis or evaluation of Wikipedia's articles is merely a capture of what was going on at that period – contributors' interests, dedication, efforts, and 'prevalent' representations of knowledge, immobilized in time.

Not your parents' encyclopedia

Even though any definitive study of Wikipedia's quality may prove to be elusive due to the rate at which content gets updated, the focus of many scholars has been on the quality of Wikipedia. This preoccupation with Wikipedia's quality can also be seen beyond the walls of academic research. Albeit being popular with many Internet users, Wikipedia is not without its critics, who have sought to discredit and vehemently caution Internet users against relying on it as a reliable source of information. According to critics, user-generated content is "positively harmful" and even though its content is free, Wikipedia ends up costing society a fortune by "making us stupid" (Reagle, 2010, p. 166).

Recently, a journalist from *The Guardian* found fault with Wikipedia's lack of formal gate keeping, citing the example of Senator Kennedy's article on Wikipedia, in which contributors wrongfully included that he had died after a seizure on inauguration day (Berlins, 2009). Berlins (2009) took issue with the resistance by contributors to founder Jimmy Wale's proposal for stricter rules in response to the Kennedy's article. Berlins' lack of confidence in volunteers whose credentials and expertise are unknown is

clearly encapsulated in this comment, “allowing anyone to contribute to it without checking his or her credentials was always a flawed concept, encouraging inaccuracy, unreliability and irresponsibility” (Berlins, 2009, para. 1). This sentiment was also echoed by intellectuals like Suzanna Sherry, an American law professor, who criticized Wikipedia for exhibiting the dark side of the democratization of knowledge (in Sullivan, p. 116).

Criticism surrounding Wikipedia’s anyone can edit philosophy, the emphasis on quality, especially in terms of accuracy, and the need to sometimes compare Wikipedia to authoritative sources of knowledge production, are perhaps indicative of society’s discomfort with Wikipedia’s approach towards knowledge production. When it comes to Wikipedia, it is no longer possible to fall back on the ‘trust criteria’ to which one is accustomed to in traditional authoritative sources of knowledge, where the authors are not only trained experts but are also easily identifiable (Sullivan, 2009). The emergence of Wikipedia essentially challenges society’s current understanding of “legitimacy, cultural production and institutional power” (Lichty, 2011, p. 228). Wikipedia does not stand alone in the face of criticism when it comes to non-expert-led forms of production, which have become ubiquitous in this present Internet age. Similar criticisms were also directed at citizen journalism, led by fears that the voices of the masses are displacing intellectual elites in deciding what counts as knowledge and truth (Bragues, 2009).

Reagle (2010) explains that how Wikipedia is received by society provides an insight into our larger social context, and arguments about whether new forms of knowledge production are “on balance, good or bad” compared to traditional authoritative sources “reveal more about the speaker than the subject” (p. 145). Instead of

being focused on assessing the quality of Wikipedia, which often times reveals an underlying bias of the speaker towards Wikipedia being somehow inadequate or unreliable and hence deserving to be evaluated, some scholars chose to examine Wikipedia as a stand-alone in a league of its own. They argued that Wikipedia is essentially a different animal from traditional authoritative forms of knowledge production. It has more in common with other participatory websites rather than traditional sources of knowledge, where readers have “virtually no insight into their production processes” (Bruns, 2008, p. 129). Appreciating Wikipedia therefore requires the individual to depart from old perceptions of knowledge production and to embrace the new trend of consumer-led production - collaborative construction of knowledge that the interactive Internet has facilitated (Bruns, 2008).

As a result, to give Wikipedia any justice, some scholars have turned to examining and understanding its collaborative culture, community and internal processes, instead of comparing it to traditional forms of knowledge production (Bruns, 2008; Sullivan, 2009; Reagle, 2010). Similarly, this thesis is informed by scholars who have chosen to examine Wikipedia’s collaborative culture and internal processes. Therefore, this thesis takes the position that Wikipedia’s collaborative culture and community shape the process of content creation based on memories of contributors. In his attempt to examine the processes of user-led content creation, Bruns (2008) discovered that beyond Wikipedia’s “different models of participation, of evaluation, of governance, of ownership” compared to traditional encyclopedias, lie its “vastly different conceptions of the nature of the knowledge which is represented on their pages” (Bruns, 2008, p. 162). This argument is also echoed by Sullivan (2009) in his book, *Wikipedia: A new*

community of practice?, where he attempts to understand the technology and its form of knowledge production and dissemination by looking at communities of practice in the past that were involved in processing information. Sullivan (2009) arrived at the conclusion that Wikipedia does not merely introduce a new form of knowledge production and dissemination but challenges the positivist approach to knowledge, an approach that underlies many authoritative sources of knowledge, particularly that of encyclopedias.

Unlike the positivist approach to knowledge inherent in traditional encyclopedia, which assumes that there is always only one truth, Wikipedia provides a variety of representations of knowledge on any one topic (Bruns, 2009). Reflective of the times that we are currently living in, Wikipedia can be seen a poster child for the postmodern approach to knowledge, wherein there is no ultimate truth but rather, many alternative and contradictory (interpretations of) ‘truths’ that can co-exist in the same space. Consequently, any attempts to understand and examine Wikipedia, should first recognize that Wikipedia, like all of its entries, is merely an on-going discussion, whose last word in history will not be written in a long time.

Methods

Based on Wertsch’s (2002) and Mannheim’s (1929/1936) perspectives, collective memory is viewed as distributed between agent and texts, as well as among individuals who belong to different carrier groups within society. Thus, the task becomes one of listening for the texts and the voices behind them, including the voices of individuals using those texts to produce memories (Wertsch, 2002). As a result, this paper will

closely examine the discussion pages of the article, Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989, on Wikipedia. The overarching question guiding this research is: What is Wikipedia's potential as a space for non-official and non-dominant memories? To focus this research, this larger question was broken down into smaller ones: 1) How are different memories negotiated? 2) In the process of remembering, which memories were privileged, and which were considered legitimate? 3) Which memories were silenced? 4) Do contributors reproduce and maintain official memories or do they challenge them? 5) Which memories receive the most attention or contestation among contributors?

It is possible to examine the negotiation and contestation among Wikipedia contributors since the article first came into existence because almost nothing is forgotten on Wikipedia. Every edit made to the Wikipedia article and every discussion about the article is captured, archived and easily accessible in the article. The discussion page, also known as a talk page, serves as a space for contributors to discuss and propose ways to improve the article, such as re-naming the article or adding sections, as well as settling disputes among contributors about how the event should be remembered. Wikipedia refers to discussion pages as talk pages, and does not make any distinction between them. As a result, for the sake of consistency, this paper will refer to the talk pages as discussion pages.

The discussion page appears on the tab at the top of any article, and discussion among contributors on how to improve the article is saved there. Due to the large volume of discussion among contributors, past discussions are archived and cannot be edited. Contributors who wish to start a new discussion or revive an old discussion have to do so on the current discussion page, and when the current discussion page gets too long, it will

be archived and a new current discussion page will be started for newer discussion content. The discussion page archives the voices of contributors in each talk page - their disputes, conflicts and negotiations among one another, in addition to their decision to accept or reject edits that were made to the article.

Even though Wikipedia archives every single edit made to the article in the article's revision history page, it does not capture the discussion that goes behind the decision to reject or accept an edit, especially a contested edit. Hence, it is within the discussion pages (and its revision history pages) that we get a glimpse of how the contributors are shaping the memory of the protest as it appears on the Wikipedia article, illuminating what about the protest should be remembered and how. As a result, the discussion pages capture the process of remembering and deciding what should constitute our memory of the event by determining what memory is considered valid and legitimate.

The archives of all past discussions since its first dated discussion entry, October 21st 2002, which was recorded in archive 1 of the talk page, till the last modified entry on the 7th of June 2011 at 16:46 were examined. Since all Wikipedia entries are still a work-in-progress, all past three archives, along with the current discussion page, were captured and saved to prevent new edits from affecting the time period of study. Each group presents a unique prism through which contributors remember historical events, and unless studied as a whole, each group's memory of the same event will only be pieces to the whole collective memory. Therefore, to uncover the competing memories of the event, attention was paid to how disagreements are negotiated and settled, which will shed light on the dominant memories deemed legitimate and worthy of remembrance as well as memories that command the most attention (such as dispute or elaborations) from

the Wikipedian contributors. In addition, to get a complete understanding of the ‘final’ memory of the event – the memory that contributors deemed legitimate to present to the rest of the world, the main page of the topic was also captured and saved on the 8th of June 2011.

To document the official memory of the event in order to compare it with the public memory of the event by Wikipedia contributors, I examined the news coverage of prominent mainstream press in the United States and China – New York Times and Xinhua News Agency. The overarching question guiding this research is: What is the official memory of Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 examined through the two different presses? This overarching question was broken down into smaller questions to help focus the research 1) How did the press interpret the events? 2) What were their supporting narratives? 3) Which sources were considered credible? 4) How is the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 remembered in the presses in the 21st century? The two news sources were chosen because of their prominence in the communities they belong to. New York Times was ranked first in overall reach of U.S. opinion leaders, rendering it an influential and widely read national newspaper as well as the one of the largest seven-day newspapers in the United States (“New York Times: Media Kit,” n.d.). Xinhua News Agency, on the other hand, is the official press agency of the government of the People’s Republic of China, and is thus an authoritative source for information related to current affairs in China. It is also the largest news agency in China.

Despite the prominence of both news agencies in their society, these two agencies clearly differ as they function in entirely different political systems. New York Times is an independent news press whereas Xinhua news press is the official news agency of the

Chinese government. As a result, Xinhua is limited in what and how it can report news separate from the Chinese government's official stance, whereas New York Times has more journalistic freedom independent from the United States government's official viewpoints. As a result, it must be noted that even though NYT may not represent official memories of events in the same way that Xinhua News Agency does, its prominence as a national newspaper in the United States renders the paper a perfect resource for the study of not only dominant but official memories of events. This is because NYT often quote official government statements about global events, and the Tiananmen Square Movement of 1989 was no exception.

The role of the press in shaping the representations, and therein memory, of the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 would benefit from the understanding of US-Sino relationship during that period as well as thereafter. This is because the press does not exist in a vacuum but has a symbiotic relationship with society. While shaping our memory of events, the press also takes from society social cues and cultural paradigms to which it perceives events. Hence, the US-Sino relationship shapes the lens through which the movement was reported by both presses, which in turn further influences the US-Sino relationship. The Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 was largely seen as an incident that turned the tide of US-Sino relationship from friendliness to antagonism, and their relationship had been arduous and fickle since (Chen, 2003; Huang, 2000).

With the exception of President Bush, congress and the American public favored a "punitive approach aimed at signaling American outrage" toward the Chinese Communist Party's handling of the demonstrators during the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 (Skidmore & Gates, 1997, p. 515). Washington consequently punished the

Chinese government by officially condemning it and imposing economic sanctions. Washington was suspicious that forces within the Chinese Communist Party were trying to sabotage the Chinese economic reform program, which would help China transition out of a Maoist Communism by increasing the role of market mechanism in its economic system (Huang, 2000). Washington consequently punished the Chinese government by officially condemning the Chinese government and imposing economic sanctions. Similarly, the Chinese government came to believe that the internal disturbance was caused by foreign intervention, and was determined to safeguard its sovereignty (Chen, 2003; Huang, 2000). Consequently, the US-Sino relationship during the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 was mired by tension and suspicion towards each other.

Using LexisNexis Academic, I searched for the term “Tiananmen Square protests of 1989” in New York Times and the term “Tiananmen Square 1989” in the English Xinhua General News Services. According to LexisNexis Academic source information on Xinhua General News Services, Western news correspondents in Beijing rely on Xinhua’s English-language General News Services to keep abreast of Chinese affairs, which includes interpretation and commentary about current affairs from Xinhua’s perspective. It should be noted that as an English language news service produced for a global and English-speaking audience, the content and topics that Xinhua General News Services chooses to report on might differ from its Chinese counterpart, 新华网, which is written for its own citizens and Chinese speaking audience. However, I chose to study the English General News Service because of its reach beyond readers who know the Chinese language.

I examined articles that contained the term within two specific time periods: the months of April-June 1989 and from March 2002, which was the first entry of the topic in Wikipedia, to 7th June 2011. I chose to focus on the initial media coverage of the movement, from its start in April till it reached the height of its tension on the 4th of June 1989 and till the end of June 1989, as the baseline for how the event was first portrayed and remembered. Even though the movement ended on the 4th of June 1989, I chose to study the event till the end of June so as to capture the aftermath of the incident - its explanations, interpretations and re-imaginings to its readers by the news media as well as government officials. This is based on the idea that it is the initial reporting of the event that sticks (Leavy, 2007).

The search terms yielded a total of 140 articles from NYT and a total of 62 articles from Xinhua during months of May and June 1984. Taking into account that the Chinese may have used a different term to refer to the movement, I expanded the search to include the term “counter revolutionary” on Xinhua, which then yielded a total of 109 articles. I also examined continued media reference of Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 from the period during which the Wikipedia topic was first created on 15th of March 2002 till 7th of June 2011. This is because I wanted to examine if the memory was still being recycled or if changes had occurred in how the event was remembered in the 21st century. During that time period, a total of 238 articles were written about the Tiananmen Square protests on NYT. Unfortunately, articles remembering the incident on Xinhua stopped at 2001. The ways in which the two different presses interpret and remember the event are then compared using textual analysis and further discussed in terms of their potential implications on our collective memory of global events.

Both Kansteiner (2002) & Halbwachs (1941/1992) have established that collective memories have a strong social aspect because memories only “assume collective relevance when they are structured, represented, and used in a social setting” (Kansteiner, 2002, p. 190). Therefore, the means of representations of how society (or community) reconstruct the memories after the actual event will provide the best information about the evolution of collective memories (Kansteiner, 2002). Eyerman (2004) sheds light on how to locate collective memory. According to him, while the past may be embodied in material objects, how the past is understood and interpreted is through language. Hence, we preserve versions of the past by representing it to ourselves in the forms of words, images, narratives and myths (Connerton, 1989; Eyerman, 2004). It is within these competing narratives that we can locate how the past is being remembered and what is being forgotten, ignored or repressed. Hence, framing would be useful as a methodological guide for unpacking the complexities of power and access on in the news media and on Wikipedia.

Chapman and Lupton (1994) defined framing as the emphasis placed around particular issues that seek to define what the issue is really about (as cited in Menashe & Siegel, 1998). The angle that frames the portrayal of any issue determines which aspect of the issue gains prominence, and which recedes into the background, leading to the promotion of interpretations that benefits one side while hindering the other, and hence are defined by what they omit as well as include (Entman, 2003). Through selective omission and inclusion of issues and perspectives news agencies are able to simultaneously naturalize and perpetuate labels that distinguish the normal from the deviant in society (Curran, 2002). Frames are often persistent in character and change

very little or gradually over time (Gorp, 2007; Schon and Rein, 1994). These frames are often perpetuated, repeated, and recycled in the media, resulting in certain representations becoming aligned with what society considers common sense (van Dijk, 1998; Misra, Moller, & Karides, 2003).

As such, through framing, the media can possibly control the number of mental representations that are available to the audience when they are making sense of the news event and therefore shape their audiences' view of the world (van Dijk, 1998; Gorp, 2007). Gamson and Modigliani (1987) further explain that a "frame is a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them." (as cited in Yang, 2003, p. 232). Through this connection, reporters are able to promote a particular interpretation and in turn, shape audience's understanding and remembrance of the event (Entman, 2007). Hence, facts and images take on their meaning by being embedded in some larger system of meaning or frame (Gamson & Croteau, 1992). The words and images that make up the frame can be distinguished from the rest of the news by their capacity to stimulate support of or opposition to a particular side in an issue (Entman, 2003).

Consequently, frames become tools through which the media relies on to define, convey, interpret, and evaluate information, and in turn the frames affect audiences' reaction to an event (Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992, Entman, 1993). This is because frames call to attention some aspects of the event while obscuring others, and are hence able to shape audiences reactions to the event. More importantly, framing also suggests the solution and in doing so, justifies the actions towards how the issue should be handled. It is important to note that frames were not developed outside of culture but are

bounded by it. Frames are “broadly shared beliefs, values, and perspectives familiar to the members of a societal culture... on which individuals and institutions draw in order to give meaning, sense, and normative direction to their thinking” (Schon & Rein, 1994, p. xiii).

Similarly, reporters are also members of the same culture that created the frames. Hence, though reporters rely on frames to define, interpret and evaluate the world around them for their audiences, they are also invariably influenced by it. The selection of frames to define an event is usually the result of interaction between the reporter’s individual belief systems, drawn from a cultural stock of frames in society, and the influence of factors internal and external of the media organization that employs the reporter (Gans, 2004; Gorp, 2007). Due to the numerous factors that affect the selection of frames in defining an event, the application of frames is often subjected to negotiation and contestation by news agencies and their audiences (Gorp, 2007). As a result, despite its persistent nature, new frames can sometimes replace existing ones as cultural beliefs, values, and attitudes in society evolve overtime.

In my attempt to examine the various texts, I identified main themes and paid attention to word choice, phrases and images used to describe these themes. For instance, Xinhua’s use of the label ‘counter-revolutionary,’ which dominated its coverage of the Tiananmen Square movement, to describe the demonstrators justifies the Chinese government’s solution to curb the revolution by enforcing martial law. On the other hand, the NYT use of the label ‘massacre’ to describe the aftermath of the Chinese military intervention emphasized the exceeding force that was used against the demonstrators, which in turn justifies the press public condemnation of the Chinese government. The

following chapter will document the ways in which the movement was interpreted, represented and remember in the presses.

Chapter Three: Creating official memories of Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989

A pro-democracy movement or a counter-revolutionary rebellion?

Narrative texts are best viewed as tools or raw materials to be employed in organizing or reconstructing a memory of the past. Instead of serving as containers of precise, unchanging information, these texts seem to play a role in memory by serving as indicators of “the sort of thing” an individual or group would say. Instead of remembering the precise words, we are much more likely to remember the gist of what happened (Wertsch, 2002). Additionally, meaning is created not just through what is told, but *how* it is told (Leavy, 2007). Hence, all the narratives made up how the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 was remembered, and the images that endured and survived through the decades since it first occurred.

In order to answer the overarching question: What is the official memory of the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989, this chapter juxtaposes the different interpretations, and hence supporting narratives, of the different presses. Specific research questions were asked: 1) How did the press interpret the events? 2) What were the supporting narratives? Due to the tenuous US-Sino relationship during the 1989 and thereafter, which was briefly discussed in the previous chapter, as well as the different political climate in which voices of dissidents are viewed differently, it is reasonable to assume that the representations of the same event will differ between the two presses. The differences in representations between the two different presses can be attributed to the different frames and supporting narratives that were used to shape the overall representation (and hence, memory) of the movement.

Both New York Times and Xinhua General News paid close attention to the evolution of the movement, giving an almost day-by-day account of it since the movement captured media's attention on the 18th of April till 4th of June 1989. Despite reporting on the same events, the news focus, coverage and interpretations differ between the two news presses, resulting in different ways of representing the movement. These representations offer us a glimpse into the creation of official and dominant memory of the event; the first few representations of the event invariably bear weight on how the event will be remembered for years on.

It can be inferred from Xinhua news' coverage that the overall representation of the movement leading up to military intervention was framed as one where military action was justified, necessary and required to quell what the Chinese officials viewed as a counterrevolutionary rebellion aimed at overthrowing the Communist party. Framing the movement as a counterrevolutionary rebellion instigated by a few dissidents, who were successful in influencing the students, justified the subsequent military actions taken towards the demonstrators and influenced how the movement was remembered. The demonstrations were depicted as spinning out of control, with news reports that demonstrators were attacking troops. As a result, in order to restore social order and safeguard the security and stability of the state (as well as the continuity of the Communist party), imposing martial law on Beijing was justified. News report stated that demonstrators attacked military troops and hence action taken towards them was framed as not only an act of defense but justifiable.

The overall representation of the movement seen in New York Times' coverage, on the other hand, portrayed the military action as the Chinese government's overreaction

to the movement. The government's inability to control the situation was framed as a loss of face and hence, an unnecessary and brutal crackdown was used by the government to quickly restore control, according to the New York Times reports. The New York Times portrayed the movement as a peaceful pro-democracy demonstration, one that had mass support from the larger public, including the Chinese press. As a result, the movement was represented as one where change was to be inevitable because of its mass popularity among the larger population. Framing the movement as peaceful and an expression of the people's will for democracy had repercussions on how readers remembered and reacted to the Chinese government's decisions towards the demonstrators.

The will of the people?

The NYT remembered and framed the movement as a legitimate struggle for democracy. One of the supporting narratives that were used to construct that memory was the idea that the movement was an expression of the will of the people, a movement that was able to garner mass support from the public. On 15th May 1989, the NYT reported:

In the first sign of organized participation by citizens, scores of people marched behind a wide red banner that read, "The citizens voice their support"¹

Since that day, there was a continuous flow of news reports from NYT portraying mass support for the movement, giving the impression that the movement was a unified collective desire for change across all levels of the population. Pouring in from NYT were reports of Chinese citizens from across all walks of life, including journalists, showing their support for the students by taking to the streets.² In an ultimate display of

support, “tens of thousands of people rushed out of their homes to block troops from reaching student demonstrators in the central square.”ⁱ

Such a scene where citizens and residents sacrificed their safety to defend and support the students was commonly reported in the NYT. On May 21st 1989, NYT estimated that “more than one million Chinese” took to the streets to “defy martial law and block troops from reaching the center of the capital, effectively delaying or preventing the planned crackdown on China’s democracy movement.”ⁱⁱ In addition to blocking troops from reaching the student demonstrators, many workers and supporters treated the students who protested “like heroes, joining in to give them food and support,” so much so that “those students who hadn’t marched felt pretty left out.”ⁱⁱⁱ

Despite some citizens feeling disillusioned and exhausted by the prolonged movement,^{iv} when tension between the Chinese government and demonstrators escalated on the 4th of June 1989, citizens once again rose to defend the demonstrators by throwing “themselves in front of army trucks and tanks, stopping and often reversing the long convoys. The soldiers retreated, some of them sobbing as they abandoned their orders to quell the uprising.”^v With support even from some soldiers, the movement has indeed created a “new sense of freedom, a giddy sense of liberty,” as was the impression given by NYT reports.^{vi} Due to the continuous and multiple reports of mass support, the movement was largely depicted as a legitimate expression of the people’s will and considered a patriotic movement for democracy. What had started as a students’ movement had quickly gain popularity among citizens and residents of Beijing, many of whom were sympathetic and supportive of the demonstrators’ goals, therein giving the idea that political change in China seemed within reach and almost inevitable.^{vii}

In addition to receiving support from within China, the movement also gained popularity among overseas Chinese, adding to the already heightened anticipation that political change within China was within reach. Their massive support for the movement played a role in legitimizing the movement as the people's desire for democracy, and the demonstrators in China were able to use that support to their advantage. The student demonstrators in China, who were "increasingly aware of support from Chinese around the world, hailed the protest a part of an international Chinese people's demonstration day to put pressure on the government."^{viii} Many overseas Chinese, though unable to protest with their counterparts back in China, had ready access to the American public, an opportunity they quickly seized to try to win support from the American public. Thousands of overseas Chinese students took to the streets in various parts of the United States "to voice anger at Beijing and to urge American support for their cause," proclaiming that "it is in the American interest to support the students because that is the future."^{ix}

Even after the military action against the demonstrators, which effectively put an end to the movement, overseas Chinese were not discouraged and continued to show their support for the movement. Continued support from overseas Chinese despite the military action further supported the NYT news frame that the movement as a legitimate expression of the people's will. On the 5th of June 1989, the NYT reported:

Elsewhere in Hong Kong, shops displayed Chinese newspaper pages full of photographs of the military action Saturday night in Tiananmen Square in Beijing. A parade of taxis went down the streets of Kowloon honking horns. Many people

marched through the streets in T-shirts with the Chinese characters for "Blood debt" inscribed on them in red. All afternoon, thousands of demonstrators occupied the wide street in front of the New China News Agency, a kind of unofficial Chinese embassy in Hong Kong, where they waved banners and chanted songs and slogans... Among the slogans seen outside the press agency were "Heaven and earth have a spirit of justice; the heart of man can never die," "The spirit of the Tiananmen martyrs will always live" and "Freedom and democracy will surely triumph."^x

Overseas Chinese and supporters in the United States showed their disapproval towards military action taken by the Chinese government even more aggressively by calling "on workers to stop delivering mail and collecting the garbage at the New China News Agency, the unofficial Chinese consulate" located in New York City.^{xi}

Chinese news agency located abroad were the focus of rallies and demonstrations with many supporters marching past its doors to express support for the movement in China. Scores of supporters also called for boycotts of businesses connected with China after receiving news of the "suppression of the pro-democracy movement in Beijing," which promptly led many citizens to withdraw money from the Bank of China cash machines.^{xii} Supporters of the movement who had access to the American public also sought intervention from the American government, and were reported in the NYT. Dozens of students who had been fasting near the United Nations demanded "the Security Council meet to condemn the killing of protesters in Beijing and calling for sanctions against China for human-rights abuses."^{xiii} Others stopped Americans to "ask

them to write to their representatives in Congress urging greater sanctions against the Beijing regime.^{”xiv} News reports such as the above had the effect of portraying largely unanimous support for the movement from Chinese abroad and within China, further legitimizing the movement as an expression of the people’s will.

Another narrative that supported the NYT news frame of the movement as a legitimate pro-democracy struggle was comprised of news reports that framed the Chinese ideals and desires, motivation for the movement, as similar to the ideals that define American democracy. As reported in the NYT, the student demonstrators expressed desires for many ideals that Americans have, such as “freedom of expression and especially an independent press, free elections in which anyone can compete, and strict application of the law to prevent corruption by relatives of those in power.”^{xv}

Further conflating the demonstrators’ goals with American ideals and legitimatizing the movement, senior President Bush said in an official news conference that the “demonstrators in Tiananmen Square were advocating basic human rights,” rights that the American government supports.^{xvi} Student demonstrators had openly said that they liked the American political system and were hoping that the demonstrations would help bring about the freedom to speak out, a basic right in America that they read about or witnessed while studying in America.^{xvii} Touching on ideals that are enshrined in the U.S. Constitution as well as values that the American public holds dear, the student demonstrators undoubtedly drew sympathy from the NYT readers living in America.

Explaining in a NYT report, a Chinese doctoral candidate in American history said the “calling for freedom of the press, freedom of speech and other basic rights are not revolutionary... those rights are protected in the Chinese Constitution, but

circumvented by other policies, including the imposition of martial law.”^{xviii} This statement is significant in establishing the idea that freedom and basic rights were not foreign to the Chinese and neither was the goal of the movement an attempt to replicate the American political system but rather, it was to re-establish those ideals that were already Chinese. Hence, the statue erected in Tiananmen Square that has come to symbolize the goals of the movement for the Chinese demonstrators was “not a replica of the Statue of Liberty...but was meant to represent a goddess of freedom and democracy,” ideals that were also considered Chinese.^{xix} Consequently, the student demonstrators wanted to remind the public that their goals and the statue were not uniquely western ideals but traditionally Chinese ones too, therein legitimizing the movement.

Despite largely framing the movement as demonstrators’ desire for democracy, NYT had on occasions noted that the Chinese understanding and desire for democracy (at least for most of the population) stemmed not from “vague yearnings for democracy” but rather from “profound economic frustrations and disgust over social inequities and corruption.”^{xx} Many foreigners had misunderstood the cause of the demonstrations, believing erroneously that the movement was against the Chinese communist party, when it was in fact a movement to reform the party.^{xxi} To many Chinese who were frustrated with their predicament within the Chinese system, they looked to democracy as a solution to eliminate corruption and inequality, however naïve that was. Hence, even though the NYT news reports had repeatedly framed the movement as a “pro-democracy” movement, it is important to recognize that to many Chinese, democracy is as much a moral issue as it is a political one. Many Chinese supporters embraced democracy believing that it would cleanse China of the corruption that has become customary for

Chinese government officials in China, seeing it more as a means to an end rather than the end itself.^{xxii}

The overseas Chinese students and student demonstrators saw themselves as examples of freedom. They grew up watching American movies in Chinese theaters, reading Reader's Digest, listening to Voice of America broadcasts and being exposed to American students and teachers, and therefore it was hardly a surprise that they chose a symbol of American freedom to represent their movement. Encapsulating the demonstrators' ideals for a more democratic system and less corruption was a 27-foot sculpture known as the Goddess of Democracy and Freedom, which was modeled after the Statue of Liberty in New York. The statue, which was made by art students, was not only a symbolism of the students' common hopes for democracy, but also functioned as a public relations coup.^{xxiii}

The student demonstrators knew that the Chinese authorities had little choice but to keep the statue in the square, even though it symbolized the democratic movement and official weakness. This is because they knew the Chinese government would not risk being seen by the international media as attacking a symbol of democracy and freedom. Hence, it must be noted that the choice of statue, the Goddess of Democracy and Freedom, can be seen as a strategic move on the part of the student demonstrators. In their desire to garner global support and sympathy for the movement, in particular from the Western democratic world, the student demonstrators chose a symbol that they knew Americans could identify with so as to "win the hearts of American viewers."^{xxiv}

Consequently, it is important and interesting to note that while the news media shaped the memory of the event through specific narratives, the student demonstrators

were not passive elements in the news story but active participants in influencing those narratives. In their effort to reach sympathizers overseas, the students carried banners in several foreign languages, demonstrating their awareness and understanding of the role of foreign media in spreading their messages.^{xxv} The demonstrators “knew the cameras would be there and planned their demonstrations to be where the cameras already were.”^{xxvi} Even though the NYT journalists sought to distance themselves from the progression of events by attempting to reinforce their position as objective reporters, they acknowledged the “presence of the cameras in Tiananmen Square nourished” the hopes for democracy and “may keep them alive despite the army’s guns.”^{xxvii}

While the NYT portrayed the movement as the Chinese people’s desire and struggle for democracy, Xinhua news framed the movement as a counter-revolutionary rebellion. The supporting narrative constructing that memory was one where the movement did not gain the same mass public support that was portrayed in NYT. Despite hinting at the support the student demonstrators received from residents,^{xxviii} Xinhua stated in their news reports that the arrival of army troops in Beijing were “in accordance with the strong wishes of the masses to quickly curb the present turmoil in Beijing that is getting more and more serious.”^{xxix} The news report pointed out the “worries of residents in Beijing, who fear that the city’s ongoing air of tranquility cannot last indefinitely, since there is no sign that the students will compromise or the authorities will withdraw the troops surrounding the city.”^{xxx}

In depicting the residents of Beijing as being worried due to a sense of impending doom that was to come, since there were no signs that the students were going to compromise, Xinhua was able to give the impression that the demonstrators had

overstayed their welcome. In fact, the focus of Xinhua news reports was not on the support (or lack thereof) from residents towards the student demonstrators. Instead, by suggesting that the student demonstrators were to be blamed for any possible disruption of peace due to their unwillingness to compromise with the Chinese government, the onus of blame was shifted from the Chinese government onto the student demonstrators.

Identity of demonstrators

In addition to the portrayal of waning support from the public, the student demonstrators were also reported in Xinhua to have given up their sit-in and “most of them have returned to their universities,” giving the impression that passion for the movement was on a decline.^{xxxii} These narratives supported the Xinhua news frame of the movement as a counter-revolutionary rebellion. Xinhua news report made no mention of demonstrators who had stayed behind and persisted with the protest in Tiananmen Square. In fact, Xinhua’s representation of the student demonstrators is sharply contrasted with NYT news articles. Despite also mentioning the students leaving the square, NYT’s focus was on demonstrators who stayed behind. In NYT articles, the demonstrators were portrayed as not only being unfazed by the lack of government attention but had continued fighting for democracy in different ways. A news article from NYT reported a student demonstrator explaining his rationale for leaving and future plans to continue the movement:

The whole Government is too busy with its power struggles to pay any attention to us... If they wont listen to us, what’s the point of staying here? But, of course

we'll continue the democratic movement. We'll go to factories to spread the word about democracy. We'll organize ourselves into small propaganda units. We'll distribute leaflets. We'll hold some demonstrations.^{xxxii}

By omitting the student demonstrators who remained in the square, Xinhua was able to frame the movement as one that had dwindling support from the students, therein conveying a sense that the movement might come to a halt. Conversely, by focusing on the student demonstrators who were still persistent in their fight for democracy, NYT was able to convey a sense of optimism for the movement, framing the movement as only a matter of time before democracy would be achieved. As a result, the differences in reporting not only the support given by the mass public towards the movement but also in the ways in which the student demonstrators were portrayed in the different presses have a significant impact on how the movement was represented, and hence, remembered. As the student demonstrators were the fuel of the movement, it comes as no surprise that their identity played an important role in constructing the memory of the movement. Hence, the narratives used to describe the demonstrators served to either legitimize (NYT news frame) or delegitimize the movement (Xinhua news frame).

Xinhua news reports of the movement differed from NYT news reports in that the student demonstrators were depicted as being manipulated by a few masterminds instead of being a collective and unified desire for democracy, as was commonly reported in the NYT reports. Unlike NYT news coverage of the sit-in protest in Tiananmen Square, where student demonstrators were depicted as being willing participants in the struggle for democracy, Xinhua news article painted a very different picture of the sit-in protest.

Identifying a number of “ringleaders” from what the Chinese government considered were from “illegal organizations,” Xinhua news report pointed out that these ringleaders “browbeat young students to prevent them from withdrawing from the square” and threatened to “kill anyone who dares to retreat.”^{xxxiii} This statement is crucial because it discounts the large sit-in protest by student demonstrators as an indication of mass support for the movement. Instead of willing participants, Xinhua portrayed the majority of students as being coerced and threatened into staying in the square, therein supporting Xinhua’s news frame of the movement as being an illegitimate counter-revolutionary rebellion.

Furthermore, the article added that the hunger strike, which the student leaders tried to organize in their fear that the “young students would fail to stick to the sit-in protest...only succeeded in provoking a 48-72-hour hunger strike” by only four people.^{xxxiv} It is worth noting that the source of this news article was the Propaganda Department of the Beijing Municipal Committee. As a result, the Chinese official memory of the movement, along with its protests and hunger strikes, was one that had less support from within the student body than what was portrayed and subsequently remembered in NYT.

Identifying the leaders of the movement, putting the blame (of the unrest) on them, and subsequently punishing them was an effective strategy, both serving as a warning to the rest of the student demonstrators, and also quelling the movement. In what could be seen as a strategic move on the part of the Chinese government, the students were largely represented as patriotic and their patriotism for their country was described as what led them to be manipulated by a few ringleaders, who were to blame for inciting

the counter-revolutionary rebellion.^{xxxv} In explaining the movement and to justify the military action that followed on the 4th of June, a Xinhua news editorial wrote:

The recent event was by no means a patriotic movement to promote socialist democracy and freedom and to demand for punishment of official profiteering and elimination of corruption. It was a planned, organized and premeditated political turmoil plotted by an extremely small number of people who made use of such slogans to agitate the students and people unaware of the truth. "their purpose is to overthrow the communist party, overturn the socialist system, and subvert the people's republic of china to establish a bourgeois republic...the majority of the workers, peasants and intellectuals have been against the counter-revolutionary riot and supported the party and government..."^{xxxvi}

By stressing that the movement was the result of a small group of people taking advantage of the "student unrest to stir up planned, organized and premeditated political turmoil" Xinhua was able to frame the movement as a counter-revolutionary rebellion, further de-legitimizing the movement as an expression of the students and public desire for political change.^{xxxvii}

Focusing on a few ringleaders' personal political motives, Xinhua news agency was able to create the official memory of the movement as being a counter-revolutionary rebellion whose main goal was to "overthrow the leadership of the Chinese communist party and subvert the socialist people's republic of China," therein de-legitimizing the movement.^{xxxviii} While Xinhua portrayed the student demonstrators as largely being manipulated by a few ringleaders, the NYT on the other hand depicted the student

demonstrators as being willing participants with a mind of their own. The representation of the student demonstrators in NYT played a large role in garnering support and sympathy from readers in America. Though the student demonstrators were portrayed in a few articles as rebellious, defiant and illegal,^{xxxix} it must be noted that they were essentially defying orders from the Chinese government to stop protesting.

One wonders, however, if those representations of the students had any real negative connotation since the students were largely portrayed as heroes and martyrs for defying the Chinese government and dying in their fight for democracy. Narratives of student demonstrators in the NYT as being persistent, courageous, and willing to sacrifice their lives for the “sake of progress and democracy in China” further supported NYT interpretation of the movement as a legitimate pro-democracy struggle.^{xl} Some saw their participation in the movement almost as fulfilling a destiny. “It’s hard to say if this effort will succeed or not. We have to try. Even if we risk a crackdown, this is something we must do,” students were reported saying in NYT.^{xli}

Reported in NYT, many student demonstrators saw themselves as fighting for what the public wanted and representing the hopes and dreams of citizens who supported them. “If we stay here longer, we will contribute more to China’s democratization and increase our influence. If we withdraw, we will let down the citizens who have defended us. We will stay until our victory,” a student leader told NYT.^{xlii} Hence, portrayed in the NYT were narratives of the students’ willingness to sacrifice for a political cause that had become larger than them, and their heroic act of selflessness was one of the reasons the movement touched the hearts of the Chinese public. The students were seen as having

nothing to gain personally from the movement and the real motivation behind the movement was seen as being solely for the public good.^{xliii}

The student demonstrators' actions stood as a stark contrast to those of the Chinese government officials whose corrupt practices, the seed of frustration for many Chinese citizens, were commonplace, as framed by the NYT. The student demonstrators' efficiency and skills in ensuring order in the absence of police officers was depicted in the NYT as an indication that the students had the wellbeing of citizens in mind, which in turn contributed to the mass support for the students. "Much of the respect for students comes not only from the battle they are waging for democracy, but also because of the efficiency they have displayed," an article in the NYT wrote, where students groups were sent to "each major intersection to direct traffic" and to fill the "police role of mediating arguments and stopping fights" in the absence of police officers.^{xliv}

Aggressive crackdown or quelling a rebellion?

The positive representations of the student demonstrators in NYT, along with the portrayed support they had from the Chinese public both within China and abroad, had a profound effect on the ways NYT reacted to and reported the events that ensued on the 4th of June 1989. As a movement centered on the human struggle for freedom and change, one that had the ability to awaken the hearts of the Chinese nation, the movement was largely framed as a legitimate expression of the Chinese people's will and desire for democracy. Consequently, attempts by the Chinese government to suppress the student demonstrators were met with a great amount of interest by the NYT, who framed the military intervention as an aggressive crackdown. The movement, along with the hopes

of political reform, was depicted to be violently put to an end when “tens of thousands of Chinese troops retook the center of the capital early this morning from pro-democracy protesters” on the 4th of June 1989.^{xlv} The memory of the military intervention as an aggressive crackdown was supported in part by the narratives of brutality towards the student demonstrators by the Chinese military.

The Chinese troops were reported by NYT to have killed “scores of students and workers and wounding hundreds more as they fired submachine guns at crowds of people who tried to resist... sometimes firing in the air and sometimes firing directly at crowds of men and women who refused to move out of the way,” as they marched along the main roads surrounding Tiananmen Square.^{xlvi} Despite what could be seen as the local residents final few attempts to stop the advancing military troops, the armored personnel carriers still “forced their way through barricades erected by local residents” and ran over people.^{xlvii}

Though NYT news article pointed out that “many of those killed were throwing bricks at soldiers,” implying that the demonstrators were not always peaceful, the soldiers were reported to have also fired indiscriminately at on-lookers who were “simply watching passively or standing at barricades when (the) soldiers fired directly at them.”^{xlviii} Even after the military crackdown on the 4th of June 1989, soldiers were reported to have continued to beat and bayoneted the demonstrators, usually as a result of provocation but sometimes entirely at random. The brutality and heavy handedness of the soldiers were captured in an eyewitness account to NYT, which was a sharp contrast to a previous NYT news article that portrayed the soldiers to be supportive of the students^{xlix}:

I saw a young woman tell the soldiers that they are the people's army, and that they mustn't hurt the people," a young doctor said after returning from one clash Sunday. "Then the soldiers shot her, and ran up and bayoneted her. I ran away, so I couldn't tell if she lived or died.^l

Interestingly, NYT reported the official Chinese news media coverage of the military crackdown, which gave a radically different perspective, focusing more on the soldiers and the violence of the supporters and demonstrators. According to the NYT, the Chinese media had framed the troops as successfully crushing the “counterrevolutionary rebellion,” by not mentioning the civilian casualties. Instead, the Chinese media was reported to have focused on the soldiers who had been killed or gone missing as well as the damages caused by demonstrators.^{li}

It must be noted that the purpose of reporting the Chinese news coverage of the crackdown was not to show a contrast in coverage or perspective but to essentially discredit the Chinese media’s reports of the crackdown by pointing out inaccuracies. One of the soldiers who was reported by the Chinese press to have been “beaten dead by ruffians on Jianguomen Bridge” had actually been “run over by an armored personnel carrier,” according to the NYT.^{lii} NYT also sought to give a ‘complete’ picture of the brutal ways soldiers were killed, sometimes even justifying the residents’ acts of violence towards the soldiers, which were portrayed as vigilante justice instead of unruly behavior. For instance, NYT reported that a soldier who was found burned and hanging from a bridge had in fact shot a young child and was later “overpowered by a large crowd in the Chongwenmen district, who hung and burned” him.^{liii}

Equally interesting was the fact that the NYT pointed out that the amount of damage done to military and police vehicles may actually be more than what was reported in the Xinhua news report:

The official news also indicated that people had destroyed 31 military trucks, 23 police cars, two armored personnel carriers and 31 buses. But those numbers seemed much too low, for everywhere in Beijing people reacted to the killings by torching vehicles and creating blockades. The troops only controlled a few major thoroughfares, and elsewhere citizens continued to control the streets.^{liv}

This news article is significant in two ways. On the one hand, the news article showed that the situation had turned violent and chaotic but on the other, it also signified the immense support for the demonstrators and angry disapproval towards the Chinese government's decision for military action. The general antipathy towards the government and continued support for the demonstrators resulted in doctors estimating that at least 2,000 people had died since the military first opened fire on the 4th of June, a death toll that NYT acknowledged to be high.^{lv}

Another narrative prevalent in NYT news articles, which supported its interpretation of the Chinese military intervention as an aggressive crackdown, was the number of casualties and wounded, which NYT seemed to focus on. The NYT ran daily news reports from the 4th of June 1989 for over a week on the number of deaths and brutality of the troops towards the demonstrators. More significant was the way in which the news stories of casualties and violence were reported, which was mostly from the perspective of eyewitnesses' accounts detailing the unnecessary deaths and the heavy-

handed approach of the Chinese government.

It is important to note that narratives from eyewitness accounts not only have the ability to lend credibility to a news story but also to humanize it, making it even more compelling to read. The eyewitness accounts in NYT served to further bolster the NYT news frame of the crackdown as being brutal and aggressive. The aftermath of the military action was described by a doctor in a NYT news report as a tragedy on a scale that he had never seen before, with every room in the hospital covered with blood.^{lvi}

The number of casualties was so great that an eyewitness, a student who was part of the last group of protesters to retreat from Tiananmen Square, described the corpses as being piled up like dead fish.^{lvii} Instead of merely giving an account of the number of casualties, NYT ran a report putting a ‘face’ to the tragedy:

Hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of people were killed when the Government used troops to crush China's democracy movement, and this young man was one of the faces behind the numbers: a 21-year-old apprentice driver who was bicycling to work on Sunday morning when the People's Liberation Army shot him in the back, killing him instantly.^{lviii}

Framing the military action in a personal and emotional way from eyewitnesses’ accounts and students’ experiences undoubtedly had the result of invoking sympathy for the students and demonstrators.

The demonstrators and eyewitnesses’ accounts served to illustrate the excessive use of force against the students, who were mostly represented as non-violent, unarmed and vulnerable against an onslaught of soldiers bent on injuring and killing them. In a

strategic move on the part of the student demonstrators, The University Students' Autonomous Associations decided that to demonstrate their "intention to promote democracy through nonviolence," they would "surrender these weapons to the martial law troops."^{lix} The students "destroyed the guns on the steps of the monument, and dismantled the bombs by pouring out the gasoline" to prevent the weapons from being misused by criminals but more importantly, to eliminate the chance of the weapons being "treated as evidence that the students had committed violent acts against the troops."^{lx} Despite being unarmed, the student demonstrators who were in Tiananmen Square said the soldiers still charged at them, breaking apart the formation in which they were sitting, and beat them with all their might as they forced their way through the square (12, June, 1989, "Turmoil in China; student tells the Tiananmen Square: And then, 'machine guns erupted).

The ensuing scenes were chaotic and bloody with an eyewitness claiming that, "about 50 students who were so badly beaten that blood completely cover their faces" (12, June, 1989, "Turmoil in China; student tells the Tiananmen Square: And then, 'machine guns erupted). It soon became clear from the NYT news article that the soldiers were not just trying to intimidate or force the demonstrators to leave the square but also to punish them for staying behind for as long as they did. By reporting that the Chinese troops attacked unarmed demonstrators, NYT was able to highlight the brutality of the soldiers and in turn framed the military intervention as an aggressive crackdown. More importantly, it discredited the Chinese government as a governing body, therein highlighting the urgency and importance of having freedom and democracy in China – the very goals of the movement.

Even in the face of unrelenting armed military troops, citizens still demonstrated unwavering support for the demonstrators. Student demonstrators who were escaping from the soldiers told the NYT:

We were met by a large contingent of soldiers, all running from the direction of the Jewelry Market. When we met, they didn't shoot, but began beating us madly with huge wooden clubs. At this point, a crowd of citizens came rushing up the front gate and started fighting ferociously with the soldiers, they did this to protect us as we tried to break through in the direction of the railway station. The soldiers pursued us... the death toll was enormous. Soldiers had kept Red Cross ambulances from getting to the wounded.... I will never forget the students who lost their lives. I also know for sure that all decent people in the world will understand and support us.^{lxi}

The last statement from the eyewitness' account is significant because it appealed for sympathy and support from a global audience, revealing the students' understanding that support and pressure from the global community might help further their cause.

While the military action and brutality towards the student demonstrators were met with passionate expression of anger and indignation from fellow Chinese students studying in America, as well as some Americans, reaction from other groups in America appeared to be muted. One of the reasons for the muted outcry, noted in a NYT report, was the "lack of an identifiable figure among the protesters," which made it difficult to "project the conflict in terms that Americans could easily grasp."^{lxii} As a result, to create some sort of identification for the American public, the daring display of a lone young

man standing in the path of a moving tank (in an attempt to stop the tank), came to best epitomize the student demonstrators' fearless determination and strife for democracy and freedom against an oppressive Chinese government. The picture of a lone man who stepped in front of a column of tanks made front-page news in the NYT on the 5th of June 1989 and was captured by a Jeff Widener, a photographer for The Associated Press. Understanding the importance of support from the American public as well as the powerful representation of the image, Chinese students in America began selling T-shirts with the photo of the lone man against the tank on one side, and the plea for democracy on the other.^{lxiii} That image proved to be so powerful that it continued to be remembered as the symbol of the student movement against an oppressive Chinese government.

To further support the NYT news frame of the movement as an aggressive crackdown, NYT reported news that discredited estimates from Xinhua news and Chinese government sources. Mentioning the Chinese official estimate that “300 people had been killed and 6,000 wounded in the military crackdown in the capital,” the NYT news article followed by stating that “most independent estimates are higher, ranging from several hundred to 1,500 or more.”^{lxiv} Pointing out that the official estimates from the Chinese government may not be entirely accurate or complete, the NYT article explained that the Chinese “official estimates were regarded as suspect” because they mostly focused on injuries that were suffered by troops while omitting injuries by civilians, whom NYT described were being “raked with submachine-gun fire,” emphasizing again the brutality of the troops.^{lxv}

In direct contrast to the Chinese official estimates, a White House official said their cables from Beijing reported the death toll to be in the several thousands, anywhere

from 1,000 to 5,000.^{lxvi} Even the citizens and government authorities^{lxvii} were depicted as not believing the Chinese news reports, and more significantly, the accepted wisdom (and unofficial memory) among the Chinese is that “tens of thousands of civilians were shot or beaten.”^{lxviii} Contrasting the official Chinese estimates with foreign and local Chinese estimates, NYT was able to hurt the credibility of the Chinese government. Implying that the Chinese government was not being truthful or transparent about their estimates and was deliberately covering up the impact of their aggressive crackdown, NYT was able to support its frame of the military action as excessive and brutal.

There is something deeply romantic about the human struggle for freedom and a better future, and the reports from the NYT about the students and the military action were essentially a story about impetuous and idealistic youths against the old guard in power. The movement became not just a struggle for freedom and political change but also a struggle between good and bad. The student demonstrators were portrayed as being perseverant, courageous fighters and martyrs struggling for freedom and democracy, and who were mostly nonviolent and helpless against the military troops. The Chinese government on the other hand was portrayed as being unyielding, harsh and brutal, resorting to heavy-handed measures that resulted in a large number of deaths. In resorting to violence against largely unarmed demonstrators, the Chinese government lost its credibility as a governing body, and solidified the image of China as a dictatorship that cannot be reasoned with. The movement and the resulting military action was portrayed by the NYT, and would be remembered in America as bloody, tragic, and unnecessary.

The Chinese official news reports, on the other hand, painted a very different story of the military intervention and its aftermath. China’s memory of the military

intervention as a necessary solution was supported by the narratives of counterrevolutionary goals by a few manipulative ringleaders. While the students were depicted in the NYT news reports as fearless fighters for democracy, Xinhua news agency portrayed them as being manipulated by a few ringleaders whose main motive was to overthrow the Chinese communist party. Instead of seeking solutions, negotiating and coming to a compromise with the current communist party, the ringleaders were depicted as unyielding in the pursuit of their political goals. Some of the methods that the student demonstrators had used to rally support for their cause were also frowned upon by the Chinese government and were considered extremely disrespectful to the country. The statue of the Goddess of Democracy and Freedom was one such example. According to the Chinese government official statement published in Xinhua, the presence of the statue in Tiananmen Square was an “insult to the national dignity and image,” because the space was reserved for “erecting a huge portrait of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, China’s revolutionary forerunner, during major festivals,” and was thus considered sacred.^{lxix}

The Chinese government on the other hand was reported in Xinhua news to be tolerant and willing to negotiate with the impatient and impulsive demonstrators. Instead of chastising or forcefully removing the student demonstrators from Tiananmen Square, Zhao Ziyang, a Chinese government official who had been sympathetic to the student demonstrators, was portrayed to be understanding of their good-intentions:

You have good intentions. You want our country to become better. The problems you have raised will eventually be resolved but things are complicated and there must be a process to resolve these problems...you have been on hunger strike for six or seven

days. The whole of Beijing is discussing it. The party and government hope you will become calm and stop (the) hunger strike immediately. The party and government will not stop the dialogue with you when you put an end to (the) hunger strike.^{lxx}

Despite the reassurance from the Chinese government that they would continue negotiation with the demonstrators, the demonstrators were reported in Xinhua to have resorted to violence, a narrative that justified the counter-revolutionary rebellion frame, and the military action that followed.

In addition, the sympathetic and tolerant nature of the Chinese government is sharply contrasted with the impetuous nature of the demonstrators, further supporting its news frame that the rebellion had to be curb before it spun out of control. Xinhua news reported that the demonstrators and protesters broke into the offices of local and government offices, and covered many incidents in which beating, smashing, looting and burning were caused by the demonstrators^{lxxi}. As a result, the movement was framed as a rebellion that had to be quelled for the sake of safety.

Interestingly, the student demonstrators were labeled as patriotic students hoping to “promote democracy, eradicate corruption, punish official profiteering and overcome bureaucracy,” which the Chinese government made clear were also in conformity with the wishes of the Communist party and government.^{lxxii} In fact, the Chinese government assured the students that they would not be penalized for their “radical words and actions in the student movement.”^{lxxiii} Labeling the student demonstrators as patriotic enabled the Chinese government to distinguish them from a handful of individuals whom the government had identified as working behind the scenes to create turmoil in order to

advance their political goals. Referred to as a “small insidious counter-revolutionary political clique” by a professor in a letter to The Beijing Daily that was re-published by Xinhua news, the ‘political clique’ was described to have manipulated and taken advantage of the political and economic difficulties, the patriotic enthusiasm of the students as well as the public’s sympathy to achieve their political motives.^{lxxiv} In its emphasis of a select group of individuals who had the power of manipulation, Xinhua was able to frame the movement as a counter-revolutionary rebellion instead of a patriotic movement.

In an official statement by the Chinese government in Xinhua news, government officials explained that they had strictly differentiated between the “young students’ patriotic enthusiasm” and the “conspiratorial activities” of a small group of people whose goal was to “push the Chinese communist party to end its autocratic rule.”^{lxxv} The narrative that the ringleaders were fabricating rumors and smearing the party and government leaders, in an attempt to deceive the student demonstrators and the public so as to evoke antagonistic sentiments towards the government further supported its news frame. According to government officials in a news report by Xinhua, the ringleaders had fabricated the rumor a student was run over by a police car, when he had in fact been killed in a bus traffic accident. Unaware of the truth, many students became angry with the government.

Furthermore, in the same Xinhua news article, the ringleaders were reported to have spread the rumor that Premier Li Peng had promised to meet the students in Tiananmen Square even though no such promise was made. As a result, when Premier Li Peng did not show up, he was rumored to have “cheated the students,” which led to the

staging of a class boycott by some 60,000 students.^{lxxvi} According to Xinhua, the ringleaders also established secret ties, set up illegal organizations, forced the government to recognize them, and were depicted as being unpatriotic by focusing their attack on Deng Xiaoping, who had made great contributions to China's progress and foreign policy goals.^{lxxvii} The ringleaders had also "declared their aim was to organize armed forces" and to "unite with various forces including the Kuomintang in Taiwan," and did not hesitate to risk their lives to strenuously oppose the communist party and the government.^{lxxviii}

The narrative of being unpatriotic, a label that Xinhua had given the ringleaders served to support its frame of the movement as being a counter-revolutionary rebellion, and hence, justified the actions taken to quell the rebellion. As a result, the Chinese government took a clear stance that their intention was only to suppress the ringleaders who they had labeled counter-revolutionary rebels, and not the student demonstrators in particular. Despite that, Yuan Mu, the Chinese State Council spokesperson, explained through Xinhua that though the Chinese government had never regarded the vast number of students as rioters or rebels, there were some rioters among the students. Yuan Mu further elucidated that the ringleaders' subversive messages and slogans aimed at overthrowing the communist party were "entirely different from those demands put forward by the students in the early stages of students' demonstrations for more freedom and democracy."^{lxxix} Consequently, the shift in the student demonstrators' slogans, motives and purposes led Chinese officials to believe that a small group of rebels "resorted to the students' demonstrators to stir up turmoil" for the purpose of overthrowing the communist party.^{lxxx}

Being depicted as not merely being dissidents, but people who were taking advantage of the patriotism of the students and tolerance of the government and communist party to stage a counter revolutionary rebellion, the Chinese government was able to justify taking military action against the ringleaders for the sake of “safeguarding stability and unity” of China.^{lxxxix} Furthermore, the situation in Beijing was getting increasingly chaotic, with masses being instigated to “openly insult, jointly speak against, beat and kidnap soldiers of the liberation army,” as well as to seize weapons to be used against the soldiers.^{lxxxii} Xinhua reported that facing anarchic conditions, local authorities were overwhelmed by the task of keeping Beijing under control and were unable to prevent or stop the repeated smashing, looting and attacking of local authorities.^{lxxxiii}

Unlike in NYT reports where most of the violence was inflicted by military troops onto civilians and demonstrators, Xinhua news reported the opposite. Focusing on the narratives of violence by the demonstrators, Xinhua was able to support its frame of the military action as being justified. The “ringleaders of the illegal organizations,” the Autonomous Students Union of Beijing Universities and the Autonomous Workers’ Union, were reported to have distributed weapons, incited “the mobs to kill members of the security force” as well as urged the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square to take up arms against the Chinese government.^{lxxxiv} The public was also asked to rise up against authority, as the masses did in the French Revolution, with some people threatening to put the party and state leaders under house arrest.^{lxxxv}

Without making any explicit reference to the demonstrators, civilians or supporters, Xinhua news reported that a mob of rioters pushed down the wall of a construction site, stole tools such as bars and bricks, and was getting ready for fighting in

the streets. They “pelted the soldiers with stones trucked in by the ringleaders of the rioters,” and burned vehicles such as trams, fire engines and military vehicles.^{lxxxvi} The soldiers were reported by Xinhua to have fired gunshots into the air in the hope of dispersing the mob armed with iron bars and throwing Molotov cocktails, but to no avail.^{lxxxvii} Significantly, by labeling what could be assumed to be demonstrators and supporters as rioters, and by portraying them armed and violent, Xinhua framed the military force as being justified and necessary to restore law and order to the capital as well as to prevent further turmoil. In addition, using military force was also portrayed as an act of defense on the part of the military troops, who were being attacked by rioters. Consequently, the movement was depicted as a rebellion wherein military intervention was justified.

Unlike the articles in the NYT where the focus of casualties and the wounded was on demonstrators and civilians, Xinhua news articles focused their attention on the military, who was reported to have suffered more casualties and wounded than the demonstrators and civilians. This difference in emphasis by Xinhua is significant because it justified the movement as a violent rebellion. Xinhua reported that in a video produced by China Central Television, a major state broadcasting company in China, there were scenes of burned bodies of soldiers, proof of brutality towards the military by crowds of people. The videotape also showed “guttured army personnel carriers of the martial law troops, crowds stopping martial law troops (from) entering the city proper, tear gas explosions and assaults against martial law troops.”^{lxxxviii}

Even when Xinhua reported civilians who were wounded or killed, it framed their deaths in such a way that was justified or unavoidable. Xinhua articles continued to assert

that civilians who were wounded or killed were either “rioters who deserved the punishment,” onlookers who did not know the truth,^{lxxxix} or medical personnel and other people who were carrying out various duties during the “counter-revolutionary rebellion.”^{xc} Unlike NYT, the emphasis of Xinhua news coverage was on the military troops who were injured or killed by crowds of people, presumably civilians who were supporters and demonstrators, and paid scant attention to the deaths suffered by demonstrators.

In fact, Xinhua reported that when martial troops were ordered to clear Tiananmen Square in the early hours of the 4th of June, “they shot no student or civilian to death, and military vehicles did not run over any person – no person was run over and injured or killed.”^{xcii} Interestingly, this article stood as a sharp contrast to NYT’s articles, which often contained eyewitness accounts of violence caused by the military troops. Xinhua’s depiction of military intervention and violence towards military troops ran contrary to that of NYT, and was in stark contrast to NYT’s reporting of the military intervention as an aggressive crackdown. Instead, the military was portrayed as exercising caution even in the face of quelling a rebellion.

On 17th June 1989, Xinhua gave an account of an official interview given by the state council spokesperson, Yuan Mu, to an audience in the United States, in which he insisted that no casualties resulted from the clearing of Tiananmen Square by military troops. In an interview with anchorman Tom Brokaw, Yuan Mu debunked globally circulated reports of a “bloodbath” that had resulted from the military action in Tiananmen Square, and asserted in the interview that those reports were “groundless” and inaccurate.^{xciii} Yuan Mu insisted “nobody was crushed under the wheels of armored

vehicles when the people's liberation army (pla) troops marched into the square to enforce martial law and restore order in the capital," likely as a retort towards foreign reports of tanks crushing demonstrators while forcing them to clear the square.^{xciii} On the contrary, the students who were in Tiananmen Square "withdrew peacefully in rows" and were "waving banners."^{xciv} Even though the official account was that no casualties occurred when the military cleared Tiananmen Square, the entire process of quelling the counter-revolutionary rebellion was not without casualties, with the emphasis on its army suffering huge losses.

Asserting that these were the facts of what really happened and referring to the latter part of the protest as a rebellion, Yuan Mu explained in his interview:

As for the entire process of putting down the counter-revolutionary rebellion, some thugs died and some onlookers were also killed or wounded...the PLA suffered huge casualties... the number of wounded PLA officers and men exceeded 5,000 and the number of wounded people including thugs and onlookers exceeded 2,000...the total death toll was less than 300, with PLA officers and men accounting for about half...^{xcv}

Yuan Mu's interview is significant because the official account of the Chinese government is that no one died in the Tiananmen Square, which means any memory of the military action in Tiananmen Square being an aggressive crackdown is inaccurate, at least from the official memory of the Chinese.

Also of great significance is the repeated emphasis from Chinese officials such as Yuan Mu, and by Xinhua news, that the casualties were mostly criminals and bystanders,

a narrative that further supported the frame of the military action as justified. An eyewitness wrote a letter to The Beijing Daily, which was re-published by Xinhua, that absolve the troops from blame for causing the “accidental” death of bystanders. The bystanders, the eyewitness wrote, had ignored government warnings that were widely broadcast against leaving their homes, and some had even shielded rioters.^{xcvi} Consequently, their deaths were considered to be no one else’s’ fault but their own. Xinhua news hardly mentioned student demonstrators specifically who were hurt or killed except for an article that estimated the deaths of “students from all Beijing Universities and colleges” to be at 23.^{xcvii}

Hardly any students perspective or eyewitnesses’ accounts were given in Xinhua news articles. This is a stark contrast to NYT articles, which ran numerous articles of students who reported witnessing fellow student demonstrators being gunned down by army troops, and other eyewitnesses’ accounts that attest the death toll was higher than reported in Xinhua due to vicious attacks by the military troops. NYT paid prominent media attention to the days leading up to the military action and its aftermath, covering the media blackout in China, media censorship, deaths of demonstrators and supporters, and the hunt for the arrest of the ringleaders. Compared to NYT, Xinhua news was mostly focused on justifying the use of military forces and on describing the number of casualties suffered by the military as a result of quelling the rebellion.

Significantly, by distinguishing the patriotic student demonstrators from a group of ringleaders who have hijacked the student movement,^{xcviii} the Chinese government was able to justify the use of military forces to quell what would be remembered as a carefully planned and orchestrated rebellion^{xcix} that was a threat to the safety of the citizens and

troops. As depicted in Xinhua news articles, the movement was framed and subsequently remembered (and would be remembered) as one that was hijacked by a few ambitious conspirators against a Chinese communist party that was tolerant and willing to negotiate but was ultimately “forced to take resolute and decisive measures to put an end to the turmoil”^c

Credibility at stake --- the role of the news media

While reporting the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989, both NYT and Xinhua were not only interpreting the events but also making value judgments on the credibility of news media in each other’s country, denouncing the news media in the other country as not credible, possibly as a way of establishing their own authority. By undermining the credibility of news in one another’s country, both newspapers were also claiming authority on their own interpretations of the events, which is crucial since both news sources had opposing interpretations of the events. Hence, a specific research question was asked – which sources were considered credible? By claiming credibility over another source, both NYT and Xinhua are essentially pointing out that their interpretations of the event, which affect how the event was remembered, are more legitimate than the other sources.

NYT was able to undermine the credibility of Chinese official sources through narratives of whitewashing and propaganda of the movement by the Chinese government. The NYT wrote that the Chinese evening news reports had shown public support for the military intervention but cautioned its readers by stating “the technique of the television news is an old one here. It is designed to give the impression of a groundswell of support

among the people.”^{ci} Significantly, this news article pointed to state propaganda by way of its media and warned against believing news reports from the Chinese media, especially if they portrayed the Chinese government in a positive light. The NYT had repeatedly highlighted the ‘deceit’ of the Chinese government in its news article by accusing them of “trying to conjure reality from illusion by use of words” when Chinese authorities claimed that “not a single demonstrator (had) died in Tiananmen Square,” a tactic that the NYT considered a “traditional Chinese solution,” to whitewash the truth about its own actions.^{cii}

Perhaps more damaging to the reputation and credibility of the Chinese sources is the NYT report that delegitimized the Chinese official stance that its military intervention was justified. In the NYT’s article, China’s senior leader, Deng Xiao Ping, was reported to have asserted in a speech that the “crack down on pro-democracy demonstrators” was necessary to “prevent their own demise,” because they had failed to “thoroughly get rid of spiritual pollution and oppose bourgeois liberalization.”^{ciii} Calling Deng Xiao Ping “tough, discursive, ruthless and xenophobic,” NYT wrote that China intended to “rewrite the history of the military crackdown in Central Beijing” by “describing the pro-democracy students as hooligans and playing down the number of demonstrators killed.”^{civ}

The above NYT article is significant in that it is not just making the claim that Chinese official sources cannot be trusted but that the specific Chinese official memory of the movement as a counter-revolutionary rebellion was nothing but a propaganda ploy intended to whitewash the real reasons for military intervention. In turn, NYT made the value judgment that its own coverage and interpretation of the events were more credible

than the official Chinese sources. Conversely, while NYT was discrediting Chinese sources, Xinhua news also attempted to tarnish the reputation of American media sources through narratives of truth fabrication on the part of Western sources in their attempt to incite turmoil and create political instability within China.

By blaming the Voice of America (VOA) for fabricating the truth in order to incite trouble within China, Xinhua was able to frame American news media as not being credible. Xinhua gave detailed accounts of the specific times when VOA fabricated rumors and contrasted them with what Xinhua considered the truth – such as VOA’s reporting that hundreds of students were detained when, according to Chinese sources, none were arrested or detained.^{cv} Other rumors that VOA was accused of spreading were related to eyewitness accounts of the “bloody slaughter” that left over a thousand dead in the square and public opposition towards the military intervention. According to Xinhua, none of that happened and VOA was blamed for “trying to create terror among students” to incite further rebellion in China.^{cvi} By reporting that VOA did not fairly and objectively report the events that unfolded, Xinhua was undermining its credibility and that of other western media organizations, which Xinhua wrote had distorted the facts that the violence caused by supporters of the demonstrators was in self-defense.^{cvi}

Through the narrative that the VOA and Western media were harboring ulterior motives in their biased reporting, Xinhua was able to discredit the NYT. Furthermore, Xinhua was also specific about the interpretations that could not be trusted – in particular, the official memory of the movement by NYT. Xinhua reported that the “so-called bloodbath of Tiananmen” by the Chinese army had been an “eternal theme” for many foreign newspapers although the Chinese media had repeatedly broadcasted videos of the

“clearing of Tiananmen Square” and “interviews with many eyewitnesses” to prove that any reports of a bloodbath in the square were merely a sensational rumor.^{cvi} In fact, Xinhua accused VOA and other western media of “attempting to change historical facts” for persistently sticking to its official memory of the event as a bloodbath even though Xinhua had evidence to suggest otherwise.^{cix} Despite repeatedly broadcasting videotapes and interviews of eyewitnesses’ accounts to prove that there was no bloodshed in Tiananmen Square, Xinhua asserted that the Western media had ignored that evidence and had continued to stick to its official memory.^{cx}

Chinese news media attempts at discrediting the western media stemmed in part from the perception that the western media was deliberately creating turmoil within China by supporting the student demonstrators. Of great significance was Xinhua’s explanation for the ‘rumor mongering’ behavior of the western media, which according to Xinhua was “aimed at creating confusion” and “poisoning” the minds of its readers and setting off “an anti-China campaign.”^{cx} This article is crucial in that it not only served to undermine the credibility of the western media but also accused them of malicious attempts at attacking the reputation of China, which have the effect of evoking strong negative emotions towards western media by those who are more nationalistic. Creating a sense of distrust of Chinese and Western sources on both sides had a lasting effect on how the sources were perceived by the Wikipedia contributors, influencing their decisions to trust one official memory over the other.

Press’ Remembrance of the movement in the 21st century

Taking into consideration that news frames sometimes evolve over time, which affects the modern official memory of the movement, a specific question was asked – how are the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 remembered in the presses in the 21st century? Despite a movement and event that happened within China, articles regarding the movement or military action taken in Tiananmen Square on the 4th of June 1989 were relatively few by the 21st century in the Chinese media. Since 2001, there were very few news reports from Xinhua mentioning the movement or military action in Tiananmen Square, and the times the movement was mentioned were related to efforts to prosecute the ringleaders or delegitimize their democracy efforts.^{cxii} On the other hand, the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 has been kept in Western journalists’ imaginations as one of the largest and most significant pro-democracy movements to come out of China. NYT continues to have news coverage remembering the movement from 2002. The Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 was remembered and has been remembered as a failed attempt at a democracy movement by NYT, one which has been kept at the forefront of NYT readers’ memory.

The news frame employed by NYT in the initial coverage of the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 remained relatively unchanged even in the 21st century. In fact, serving to continuously remind readers of the military action in Tiananmen Square that brutally ended the pro-democracy movement, the memory of the movement continues to get evoked in reference and comparison to protests, pro-democracy movements, public uprising and political instability within China and elsewhere. Hence, even though the movement is no longer current, the pivotal moments of the movement along with its

representations were still evoked and recycled in NYT, contributing to the lasting memory of the movement in the public's imagination.

In a NYT article about the emergence of democratic Muslim parties within the Middle East, the pro-democracy movement in China was compared to as a cautionary tale, one that was seen as being “brutally crushed while the world looked on” despite its initial optimism.^{cxiii} NYT was not the only media agency to compare protests that occurred in recent years to the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. Reported in the NYT, in a live coverage of the mass protests by immigrant youths in Paris, the Cable News Network (CNN) compared the protest to the 1989 Tiananmen Square uprising in Beijing.^{cxiv} Reported in the NYT was an article that drew a parallel between the recent protests in Egypt and China. The 2011 uprising in Egypt had netizens comparing the protests in Tahrir Square in Cairo to Tiananmen Square, and President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt to Deng Xiaoping of China, the leader of the Communist Party of China who ordered the military action.^{cxv}

In addition to comparison of protests outside of China, the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 was remembered as one of the largest protests in China and other protests in China and Hong Kong have often been compared to it.^{cxvi} The NYT compared the march in Hong Kong, organized by a coalition of pro-democracy groups, to the “big pro-democracy demonstrations in 1989 in Beijing that preceded the Tiananmen Square killings.”^{cxvii} However in doing so, they NYT also provided a word of caution because since the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, Beijing would not tolerate any actions from within the government that might suggest that it was giving in to public pressure.

Furthermore, the Chinese officials were described as also sensitive to rallies, especially in the heart of Beijing, fearing that such protests would only “evoke the student-led demonstrations in 1989 that led to a bloody crackdown.”^{cxviii} As a result, the reference to the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 in news reports of more recent demonstrations and movements in the 21st century have kept the memory of the pro-democracy movement alive. It is important to note that the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 has become a symbol of human struggle for freedom and democracy against an oppressive state in the Western media, even though the real intentions of the Chinese government party has largely been obscured and remain inconclusive. By remembering the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 in this specific way, the NYT is not only discrediting the Chinese official memory and making a value judgment on its credibility, but is also reducing a complex and difficult political situation that the Chinese government was placed in into a myth that Western audiences can easily relate to.

The representation of the movement, which was often centered on the military action in Tiananmen Square, had a pivotal role to play in the construction of the official memory of the movement; thereby affecting the ways American readers remember the movement and their subsequent sentiments towards the military action. Significantly, the representations of the movement in the NYT articles have been kept constant, with little variation since it was first reported, and subsequently remembered in NYT. As one of the most significant democracy movements that tested U.S.- China relationships in the decades that led up to the 21st century, the memory of the movement framed as a “brutal suppression of democratic strivings in Tiananmen Square in 1989,” was deeply etched into the memories of NYT readers.^{cxix}

In numerous NYT news articles, the movement was almost always remembered as a violent military action against largely unarmed and peaceful demonstrators rallying for democracy. The official and dominant memory of the movement as ending in a bloody military action has often been reinforced in numerous articles, especially because NYT had to provide background information about the movement when it's referencing it or covering news stories related to it. In commemorating the Tiananmen Square military action, the NYT explained that the protest to demand "freedom, democracy and an end to government corruption" was put to an end "when the Communist Party sent army tanks into Beijing to crush a pro-democracy movement organized by unarmed, peaceful students" camping out in the square.^{cxx}

The NYT's news frame and the memory of the violent suppression and heavy-handed approach with which the Chinese government dealt with the demonstrators were often evoked when covering news stories of government reactions to protests occurring within China. Covering the police crackdown in Dongzhou, when police officers fired at protesters who had been protesting against the construction of a power plant in their village, foreign journalists had compared the protest to "the massacre of hundreds of protesters in 1989 at Tiananmen Square in Beijing."^{cxxi} In addition, NYT conjures the memory of Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 when writing about political figures or dissidents involved in the movement and about the political landscape in China.

In discussing the current political climate in China, NYT made a reference to the student movement in 1989, explaining its prolonged effects in shaping China's political climate:

Such a Darwinian ability to evolve grew out of the party's near-death experience in 1989, when students and intellectuals occupied Tiananmen Square for seven weeks to demand free elections and an end to press restrictions, corruption and nepotism. In the years since it violently crushed those protests, the regime has found a way to satisfy many people much of the time -- enough so that it has dissuaded most citizens from rolling the uncertain dice of pro-democracy street demonstrations.^{cxxii}

The Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 seemed to mark the turning point of China's political climate, as noted in a few NTY articles. Not only did the Chinese government order "a violent crackdown on dissent," which resulted in the mass demonstration at Tiananmen Square, but it also "purged the most liberal leaders."^{cxxiii} After the crackdown, attempts at serious political reform became taboo, and people in China lost interest in politics and instead became focused on financial gains. The ideals of nation and socialism seemed to be lost forever.^{cxxiv}

Other times when NYT referenced the movement, it was to remember the Chinese political dissents' heroic deeds in their struggle for democracy. The Chinese government has continued to take precautionary measures to prevent a similar pro-democracy demonstration from happening and has not permitted student leaders involved in the movement to return to China. One such example is Mr. Wu'er, who is the second most wanted student leaders out of a list of 21 student leaders in China. According to NYT, China has refused to engage in dialogue and has prohibited Wu'er's parents from traveling abroad to visit him or him to visit them in China.^{cxxv}

Another example that was given much media attention was when the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to human rights activist Liu Xiaobo, whose role in the movement had marked him as a ringleader and who was subsequently jailed as a political prisoner by the Chinese government. In a NYT editorial piece, readers were once again reminded that, “no matter what Beijing says or does, the world will not forget Mr. Liu. It will not forget Gao Zhisheng and Hu Jia and all the other jailed dissidents,” and will “honor their courage and their struggle for freedom.”^{cxvvi} In fact, political observers have said that the “June 4 killings will haunt the (communist) party until it acknowledges having bloodily suppressed the mainly peaceful pro-democracy protests and pays respects to the hundreds of people killed, injured or purged.”^{cxvii}

Interestingly, the image of the man confronting the tank has proven to be one of the most enduring visual representations of the movement because of its ability to encapsulate the demonstrators’ courage, determination and struggle for democracy. It is an image that has often been evoked when remembering the movement. In a series of cartoons commemorating International Children’s Day, and days before the anniversary of the military action, one of China’s more outspoken newspapers published a child’s drawing that appeared to refer to the military action, reported the NYT. The drawing depicted a man standing before a line of tanks, evoking one of the most famous photographs of the Tiananmen protests.^{cxviii}

In comparison to Xinhua news, NYT has paid much media attention to the pro-democracy movement, paying particular attention to the military action on June 4th. A few days after the 21st anniversary of the military action in Tiananmen Square, NYT gave a descriptive background explanation of the protest to NYT readers:

The man stood only half as tall as the lead tank. But his body language made it clear: He wanted the slow-moving column halted, and halt it did, the huge treads on the lead tank grinding to a stop just a few feet from his face. It was a close call -- the tank came perhaps within a second or two of killing him -- and it seemed to encapsulate many of the confrontations in recent days between the citizens and the army: the touch-and-go maneuvering, with soldiers not sure when to press on and when to retreat; the determination of the demonstrators, brave and unyielding in ways that might have been unthinkable a few weeks ago.^{cxxix}

Through referencing, comparing, explaining and commemorating the pro-democracy movement in news stories, NYT has paid much media attention to the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. As a result, over the years, NYT was able to evoke and reinforce specific ways of remembering the movement, particularly its initial news frame as a peaceful student-led demonstration that was brutally suppressed.

Decades after the military troops marched into Tiananmen Square to forcefully disperse the demonstrators, the Chinese government has not wavered on the official memory of the event as a rebellion. As a result, there were no news articles since 2002 in Xinhua commemorating the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. In fact, the omission of coverage of the movement in Xinhua is as important as the unchanging news frame of the movement in NYT. The deliberate media silence was intentional since the official memory within China was that the movement was a counter-revolutionary rebellion that needed to be quelled and not commemorated. In its lack of news coverage, Xinhua was making a point of not recognizing the protest and the

military intervention that followed as a legitimate event worthy of remembrance. In fact, the Chinese government was determined to preserve its official memory of the movement by preventing its commemoration.

According to NYT, Tiananmen Square was covered with police officers on the 20th anniversary of the military intervention. They searched visitors to the square as well as prevented foreign media reporters and photographers from entering the square.^{cxxx} In addition, the Chinese government also blocked a host of Internet services that facilitate file sharing and communication close to the 20th anniversary of the military intervention in an apparent attempt to prevent any forms of remembrance or protests that may ensue due to its commemoration.^{cxxxi}

Despite little media attention in Xinhua, NYT continues to pay media attention to the anniversary of the military action, giving voice to the memory that has been silenced by the Chinese official memory. As deduced from numerous NYT articles, the memory of the movement seemed to remain strong in the minds of supporters and Chinese citizens. Intellectuals and the parents of student demonstrators killed in 1989 have “signed a petition calling for an official reassessment of the 1989 protests that would acknowledge the merit of the student-led demonstrators’ complaints against official corruption and calls for greater government accountability.”^{cxxxii} The Chinese official version of history that has labeled the protests a counter-revolutionary rebellion has infuriated many Chinese.^{cxxxiii} As a result, the supporters of the movement were pushing the Chinese government for a public apology, and for it to be officially re-remembered as a legitimate movement against corruption instead of a counter-revolutionary rebellion.

Evidence of the support (and remembrance) that supporters still hold for the demonstrators, “an unexpectedly large crowd numbering in tens of thousands, including some Mainland Chinese,” gathered together for a vigil service to mark the 15th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square military action.^{cxxxiv} The 16th anniversary of the “Tiananmen Square killings” also received immense support with “thousands of residents” lighting white candles at a vigil in one of Hong Kong’s largest urban parks to commemorate the dead demonstrators. In NYT’s coverage, this scene is sharply contrasted with the atmosphere in Beijing, where security was tightly enforced with “large numbers of uniformed and plainclothes officers” preventing protests from forming and people from publicly commemorating the tragedy that occurred as a result of the military action.^{cxxxv} Prominent dissidents were also either detained, confined to their homes or forced out of town to prevent them from orchestrating demonstrations or vigils on the anniversary of the military action.^{cxxxvi}

Through NYT’s reference and remembrance of the movement in the 21st century, NYT was able impress upon its readers its memory of the movement. In doing so, NYT was also able to comment on the Chinese government’s treatment (or lack thereof) of the memory. Using the narratives of censorship, media silence and official repression of the memory of the movement, NYT was able to continue to discredit the Chinese government as being an unreliable source of information for the movement in the 21st century. In what NYT saw as the Chinese government’s reluctance to confront its past and struggle to maintain its official memory, the Chinese government was reported by the NYT of having prevented the Chinese public from knowing the ‘truth,’ or what NYT considered as the truth. Showing an example of China’s attempt at whitewashing the

‘truth,’ a NYT article said that textbooks in China referred to the demonstrations as the spread of “bourgeois liberalism,” whose aim “was to overthrow the Communist Party.” Significantly, the textbooks either referred to the military intervention (which NYT remembered as “the lethal aftermath”) as restoring order in time or did not mention it at all.^{cxxxvii}

NYT also reported that the extent of China’s censorship towards the memory of the movement was also seen beyond its own textbooks and in areas that would potentially be seen as an opportunity to find out the ‘truth.’ In its struggle to preserve its official memory of the movement, China ordered Google to remove search results of websites that mentioned the military intervention in Tiananmen Square during 1989, an intervention that the NYT continually referred to as “the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre.”^{cxxxviii} Google agreed to China’s terms and purged its search results of websites that offended the Chinese government. To ensure its official memory would not be challenged within China, the Chinese officials also ordered copies of *The Beijing News*, one of China’s leading commercial newspapers, to be removed from newsstands, and censored its website after the news agency “published a photograph of victims wounded during the 1989 democracy movement in Tiananmen Square.”^{cxxxix} The Chinese authorities also banned distribution of the English version of *Time Out Beijing* in its struggle to preserve its official memory beyond the borders of China.

Beyond China’s censorship of the movement was its media silence and official repression of the memory, narratives that NYT used often used to continue to discredit the Chinese government as reliable sources of information. Reporting that the memory of the movement and its military intervention had mostly vanished from the Chinese news

media after that fateful summer in 1989, NYT stated that few young Chinese know anything about it.^{cxl} In addition, due to the Chinese's "official repression of the memory of Tiananmen," few Chinese were aware of the struggles for democracy waged in the 1989.^{cxli}

To portray the effects of China's official repression and media censorship of the memory of the movement on Chinese youths, NYT ran a feature story on numerous Chinese students and their memories of the movement. That feature story is significant in that it proved, through personal accounts of Chinese students, the lack of knowledge of the movement within China due to the government blackout of information. Even when the Chinese students were aware of the military intervention, their memories were consistent with the Chinese official memory. Some students described the "bloody crackdown witnessed by a worldwide television audience outside China" as rumors and "as hearsay," whereas others remembered the intervention as people leaving safely from Tiananmen Square or that "the soldiers fired back when they were attacked."^{cxlii}

While the news article was meant to illustrate the ignorance of many Chinese youths (or their general unwillingness to discuss the incident) about the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, its implications run even deeper than that. By running reports of media censorship and official repression of the memory, these articles have the effect of undermining Chinese sources' credibility. The implication of such reports is the underlying moral judgment that not only are Chinese official sources unreliable due to whitewashing but even unofficial ones because the official repression of the movement has rendered their memory of the movement inaccurate. Hence, the result of such narratives is the general distrust of Chinese's memories and accounts of the military

intervention on the 4th of June 1989. This sentiment of distrust was also reflected in the discussion pages of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 topic on Wikipedia, an issue that will be further discussed in the following chapter.

Interestingly, while Chinese sources were depicted as not being credible, the same was reported about the Chinese citizens towards western sources. The NYT reported antagonistic sentiments of the Chinese towards the western media, a result of western media coverage of China during the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. The western news media was seen then as a “source of otherwise elusive truth” and Chinese students now view Western media with skepticism, arguing that the “Western media is even more biased than (the) Chinese media,” and worse still, they are against them.^{cxliii}

Such sentiments seemed to be shared by the younger generation in China, especially after the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 set the US-China relationship back. For instance, the younger military officers in particular have grown up knowing an “anti-American ideology, which casts the United States as bent on thwarting China’s rise.”^{cxliv} These feelings of distrust and antagonism are important because they affect the way Chinese nationals respond to western viewpoints that are critical of the Chinese government, leading them to view those viewpoints as biased and untruthful instead of critically examining them, an issue that will be further explained in the following chapter.

In conclusion, even when covering the same events, both NYT and Xinhua frame them differently, which is evident by the narratives used to support those frames. In the NYT, the events of the pro-democracy movement were reduced to the single event on the 4th of June 1989, when the Chinese troops entered the square, putting an end to the demonstrations. Hence, the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 was remembered as a

pro-democracy movement that was brutally and aggressively crushed by a government bent on protecting its own interest, a government that cannot be reasoned with and hence, had lost its credibility as a governing body in the process.

On the other hand, the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 was framed and remembered by Xinhua as a movement that had been hijacked by a few ringleaders, whose goal was to revolt against the government, and had to be quelled. This initial reporting of the event is crucial to how society first comes to remember the event because these narratives and interpretations that first enter the minds of society are the ones that endure. Significantly, elements that were considered newsworthy, such as acts of heroism or violence were the driving forces influencing the narratives in both newspapers that came to shape the collective memory of the movement.

By selectively drawing on past references and representations of the failed attempt at democracy so as to give meaning to current events, the NYT was able to keep its memory of the movement fresh in the minds of its readers well into the 21st century. The NYT's memory of the movement had remained consistent since its initial stages of covering the event, which has served as a backdrop that all the future representations were reported against. Importantly, there is little space for contestation or negotiation of interpretation between the two newspapers because these news articles were written for a national audience and had a role in building national identity. In particular, the NTY was drawing from shared values of democracy and freedom within its society to give meaning to its articles, and reminding its readers of the ideals that they hold dear.

As news articles are written with audience in mind, journalists often draw from society's shared cultural symbols and signs (such as democracy and freedom) that its

audience can relate to as well as to foster national identity. Journalists are also invariably shaped by the same cultural lens that their audiences share, influencing the ways in which they view the world around them. As a result, it is not surprising that both the NYT and Xinhua news agencies represented the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 in vastly different ways even though their journalists were reporting on the same events. The NYT largely represented the protests as a peaceful expression for democracy and freedom (to a large extent) against an uncompromising and oppressive Chinese government, who in order to safeguard its power, brutally suppressed the popular public movement. Xinhua news agency, on the other hand, represented the movement as a once-patriotic movement for political reform that had been sabotage by a handful of counter-revolutionary leaders who manipulated the demonstrators into causing internal chaos and turmoil.

Despite having little room for the negotiation of interpretation between the two presses, the two news agencies still reported on each other's coverage, often discrediting, refuting and retorting each other's news coverage in their reports in an attempt to claim authority over their own interpretations. Interestingly, this process resembles a precursor to Wikipedia entries, with the main differences being that it is not the public who gets to negotiate the interpretations, and that negotiation does not occur between the different news agencies on the same platform, even if it may occur within its own. Wikipedia, on the other hand, written by and for a global audience, allows for the negotiation between different memories within the same space. Yet, even in a space where in philosophy anyone can edit, in practice that may not always be so.

Chapter 4: Remembering the movement on Wikipedia

The particular ways in which the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 were remembered and reinforced in the NYT provide a glimpse into the dominant Western memory of the movement. Crucially, the official memory has lasting effects on the way society remembers the event, as exemplified by the contributors of Wikipedia. It is important to reiterate that Wikipedia presents a space where memories of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 are articulated and reproduced, therein reflecting what contributors believe should constitute our memory of the movement. At the time when the Wikipedia article was examined, it was a detailed article that provided readers with a thorough background of the protests, explaining why the protests started, what were the demands of the demonstrators, who was involved, and how the events developed according to its timeline, as well as the impact of the protests within China and internationally.

The Wikipedia article described the Chinese government as being slow to reform, resulting in the escalation of protests, though the protests were peaceful with the students showing respect to the government, and numerous government officials showing concern for the students during their hunger strike. In its attempt to adhere to a neutral point of view policy, the article also provided a brief explanation from the point of view of Chinese officials as to why military intervention was necessary, careful to point out that not everyone within the party thought that was a good approach. Though the Wikipedia article pointed out violence towards Chinese military troops when the students and

residents of Beijing clashed with the Chinese troops, the brutality of the soldiers towards the students were also well documented in the article.

Though overall the article attempted to provide different accounts of the events that occurred, the article provided numerous eyewitness accounts from reporters of the Western media as evidence of the troops' brutality. For instance, news reporter Charlie Cole was included in the Wikipedia article as having witnessed "Chinese soldiers firing Type 56 assault rifles into the crowd" ("Tiananmen Square protests of 1989," n.d., "3 June – 5 June," para. 7). The article also included Cole's report of having seen "tanks smashing into the square, "crushing vehicles and people with their treads" ("Tiananmen Square protests of 1989," n.d., "3 June – 5 June," para. 8). Both James Miles of BBC and Richard Roth of CBS were quoted in the Wikipedia article as witnessing not a massacre in Tiananmen Square but a massacre in Beijing, with Roth quoted as stating, "there's no question many people were killed by the army that night around Tiananmen Square, and on the way to it – mostly in the western part of Beijing" ("Tiananmen Square protests of 1989," n.d., "3 June – 5 June," para. 10).

The memory of the movement as ending in a massacre is dominant in the Wikipedia article and it is not uncommon for the word "massacre" to be used in place of the more neutral title name, "Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989," in parts of the Wikipedia article ("Tiananmen Square protests of 1989," n.d., "History deleted inside mainland China," para. 6). Perhaps of greater significance is the section in the Wikipedia article entitled "History deleted inside Mainland China." This section included numerous instances of China trying to censor information related to the protests, including one example in which Ma Lik, the leader of a pro-Beijing political party in Hong Kong, had

insisted that military action did not result in a massacre. The decision to place the example of Ma Lik in the section, History deleted inside Mainland China, is evidence of contributors' belief that counter-dominant memory claims are inaccurate or simply a product of Chinese censorship.

While the Wikipedia article provides a coherent background and single memory of the protests to its global readers, the process of presenting what appears to be a 'unified' memory of the movement is not without contestation or negotiation. Though the process of negotiation between contributors over what should be presented on the Wikipedia article cannot be detected in the article itself, it is in the talk pages that negotiation and contestation over different memories of the movement are captured. At the time when the talk pages were examined, there were a total of three archives of talk pages, as well as a current "talk page," which also listed the number of WikiProjects that the article is a part of – nine in total. WikiProjects are collaborative works to improve the coverage of certain topics, organized by themes such as human rights, history, and politics on Wikipedia. Being a part of nine WikiProjects meant that the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 receives a fair bit of attention from the Wikipedia community, which is working to improve the quality and coverage of the topic. According to the article status on Wikipedia, the article has been edited over six thousand times since its first edit on the 15th of March 2002 by over three thousand contributors.

This chapter examines the process of remembering the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 on Wikipedia and compares it with its official memories as depicted in NYT and Xinhua news articles. Specific research questions were asked: 1) Do Wikipedia contributors reproduce and maintain official collective memories or do they challenge

them? 2) How are different memories negotiated? 3) Which memories were privileged and considered legitimate? 4) Which memories were silenced? 5) Which memories receive the most attention or contestation among contributors?

Through examining the talk pages of Wikipedia, it became evident that some contributors sought to reproduce and maintain the same official memory of the movement as the NYT, one where largely peaceful student demonstrators were brutally suppressed by the Chinese military. The memory of the movement as a violent military intervention had led to some contributors considering anything to the contrary biased or inaccurate, even if the opposing memory is the Chinese official memory of the movement. NYT's official memory of the movement has become the dominant memory in the talk pages and in the main article, therein being privileged and considered legitimate. This has often resulted in many cases (though not always) where the Chinese official memory was silenced. This inability to accept a memory different from NTY resulted in many contributors considering the "Military Action" section in the main Wikipedia article biased towards the Chinese military. The main article, they argued, gave the impression that the military troops were defending themselves from attacks by unruly protesters, a Chinese official memory that had been reproduced.

A contributor wrote in the talk pages that the section had misrepresented quotes from a PBS interview with John Pomfret, a journalist who was in Beijing on an assignment in 1989. Misinterpreting quotes from the interview, the section had portrayed the student demonstrators as being the perpetrator of violence and causing the first casualty. According to the contributor, [Kenohki](#), the way the military action was presented in the Wikipedia article implied that "unruly protesters charged a tank with no

provocation,” which, according to Kenohki, seemed difficult to imagine. Aware that readers, especially those with no prior knowledge, would sympathize with the Chinese military troops and considered their actions an act of defense if the section was not changed, Kenohki wrote:

It is important to truthfully, and unbiasedly state these events, and I imagine that some protesters might have been guilty of crimes. However, reading the article now, I almost get the impression that it seeks to justify what is generally viewed as an over-reaction from the PLA, during the 1989 protests --- Kenohki (talk) 16:25, 4 May 2010 (UTC).^{cxlv}

Kenohki was not alone in harboring such thoughts. Other contributors have resorted to deleting content that described supporters and demonstrators exhibiting violent behaviors, as noted by a contributor, Sigrid 18:35, 19 February 2006 (UTC).^{cxlvi} As a result, the official memory, as commonly portrayed in NYT articles, of the movement as peaceful until the military intervention deeply influenced the editorial decisions of several contributors. By reproducing and maintaining the NYT’s official memory of the movement, the contributors were legitimizing its memory and in doing so, delegitimizing its opposite – the Chinese official memory.

The memory of the military intervention as a bloody suppression that resulted in the deaths of many demonstrators and supporters was so deeply ingrained in some contributors’ minds that when presented with eyewitness accounts that supported the official Chinese government statement that there were no deaths in the square, the contributors considered those accounts unreliable, and were silenced completely. In the

Wikipedia article was student leader Hou DeJian eyewitness account, which was cited from the Gate of Heavenly Peace documentary, confirming that there were no deaths in the Square and refuting reports that military tanks rolled over the student demonstrators. Despite Hou DeJian's eyewitness accounts, a contributor questioned the political affiliation of the student leader, contested and removed the entire paragraph in a move that was also supported by fellow contributors:

The above section was removed. I am not doubting the source. Preferably there are 50 videos on youtube to counter this one by people who claim to be on the square too. What is disturbing is the same 3 people claiming this never happened. Hou DeJian, Chai Ling and Ma Lik who was definitely associated with an extreme left pro-beijing political party. User 75.33.15.87 I have taken this out for the time being. Benjwong (talk) 05:35, 8 January 2008 (UTC).^{cxlvii}

It is interesting to note that even though the NYT implied in a few articles that the demonstrators occupying the square on the day of the military action left it peacefully, the memory of the military action in Tiananmen Square protests as being excessively violent made it difficult for some contributors to accept a memory that showed otherwise. Other contributors believed that it mattered less that blood was spilled in the square and more that the “principle behind what went on was that the State used lethal force against unarmed civilians,” as according to contributor John Smith 22:22, 19 July 2006 (UTC).^{cxlviii}

As revealed by the talk pages, the perspective contributors believe is accurate – either the Chinese government official memory or American official memory of the

movement, directly impacts how contributors viewed and subsequently labeled the student demonstrators in the Wikipedia article. Hence, it is not surprising that the representation of student demonstrators would be one of the most contested among the Wikipedia contributors because of the memory's ability to either legitimize or delegitimize the efforts of the students. A contributor, Миборовский, argued against describing the protests as illegal in the Wikipedia article, explaining that the protest was only illegal in the eyes of the Chinese government:

It is the POV of the Chinese government that the protests were illegal. Therefore we cannot present it as fact as you did. -- [Миборовский](#) 05:50, 30 September 2006 (UTC)

Миборовский's argument was met with contention from another contributor:

Miborovsky, it's a fact that this student riot was not legal as I stated above based on various points, and it's not only illegal in China, but also illegal in all the other nations including the U.S. If you think this is just "POV of the Chinese government," please give your verifiable and reliable source... -- [Pingball](#) 02:21, 1 October 2006 (UTC)

Another contributor remembered the movement as one that begun peacefully and only devolved into a riot when the students were forced to defend themselves against the military, a memory that was often reinforced in NYT articles. As a result, the contributor refused to 'approve' the edits that described the demonstration as a riot:

I am against using the term "student riot" first and other references to the event second, as "student riot" does not begin to summarize the entire event. Use of the word "illegal" 3 times in the summary section of the article is unwarranted and very much against [WP:POV](#)... I am against using terms such as "in few cities" to downplay the significance of the event. Basically the entire re-wording that [Give source pls](#), [Pingball](#) and [Flow m](#) are trying to change to is very POV and I will not allow it to be inserted. As [Sumple](#) said above, all three of you are [WP:SOCKS](#) or single purpose accounts and that combined with your multiple reverts is enough to get all of you banned.

All of this being said, the only thing I can see that might be able to be changed is the wording “by the government of the People’s Republic of China” which is a little POV. If that is how the government refers to the event, then it should be included as an alternate name without the POV slant. -- [Mattarata](#) 22:59, 1 October 2006 (UTC).^{cxlix}

The bone of contention over labeling the student demonstration as an illegal riot points to the difference in how the contributors remembered the movement, as well as how they want the movement to be remembered by Wikipedia readers. It also points to the inability to accept an opposing viewpoint of the movement as illegal, which was the Chinese official memory of the event. Attempts to challenge the dominant memory of the movement were often met with hostility from other contributors. This is because collective memory of events is often intricately tied to a national identity, which also provides the lens through which people view the world and their place within in. Hence,

challenging one's collective memory is almost akin to challenging one's identity and worldview, an issue that would be further elaborated. The NYT official memory of the movement was not only reproduced and maintained in the talk pages but was also the dominant memory, silencing the direct opposing memory that was the official Chinese government.

Despite the dominant memory of the student demonstrators as protesters instead of rioters, the talk pages remain a space where contesting memories are still given a voice. Even though many contributors reproduce the official memory as depicted in NYT, there were still instances of negotiation that occurred within the talk pages. A contributor who disputed the changes made to the Wikipedia article gave voice to the Chinese official memory of the event, a memory where the supporters and demonstrators exhibited violent behavior, therein justifying the military action against them:

This section was previously called 'government crackdown on protestors'. In any Western country in which people attacked the police with molotov cocktails and bricks, burned soldiers alive and beat soldiers to death whilst constantly advancing on the soldiers it would be called a riot not a protest and those responsible would be called thugs not democracy campaigners ... Of course the authorities had to restore order and of course the soldiers had to open fire at times. They were under attack after all. So I dispute the use of the words 'crackdown' and 'protestors'. In another country it would be 'rioters' and 'restoring order'...

[Shieldsgeordie](#) (talk) 02:44, 18 March 2010 (UTC).^{cl}

In the true spirit of the talk pages, Shieldsgeordie's issue with the term used to describe

the demonstrators did not fall on deaf ears. Another contributor, JTSchreiber, agreed with Shieldsgeordie that the name of the section in the Wikipedia article, “government crackdown,” should be renamed based on Wikipedia’s NPOV policy as that term had a negative connotation.

However, JTSchreiber argued that labeling the protesters who exhibited violent behavior toward military troops as “rioters,” which Shieldsgeordie had argued for, was also against NPOV policy. JTSchreiber subsequently took out the term “rioters” without much contestation from Shieldsgeordie:

Ok I fully get your meaning now. Interpretation of non-neutral is subjective but I don't mind you taking out 'rioters' because it would be difficult to know where to use it without tarring innocent protestors with the same brush. So I concede that in this case protestors is the safer option... Shieldsgeordie (talk) 11:48, 19 March 2010 (UTC).^{cli}

As of the 10th of June 2011, the term “protesters” was still being used to describe the demonstrators, including the ones who attacked and beat military soldiers.

To name or not to name it a massacre

The differences in how the movement was remembered was also reflected in the contestation over the title of the Wikipedia article, which was also one of the most highly contested topics for many contributors. The disagreement over the title reflected a key issue – the remembrance of the movement by many contributors as being encapsulated into a single event on the 4th of June 1989, one that was remembered as a massacre. The

main dispute was over the title of the Wikipedia article. Many contributors have argued for a change from Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 to the Tiananmen Square massacre over the course of several years. Several contributors have argued that the title be changed to Tiananmen Square massacre, a memory supported by many articles in NYT, to reflect what is considered commonly known and accepted in society:

I was not the person who brought this up, but I had actually never heard of the term “Tiananmen Square protests” until I came to Wikipedia – I thought that people had always referred to the event as the Tiananmen Square Massacre. It seems to me 2 main factors came into play in whether we should call this article “...Protests” or “...Massacre”: 1) What is the common name to which this event is referred to?, and 2) Historical accuracy. Regarding point 1), I got curious, and quickly googled both the phrases "Tiananmen Square protests" and "Tiananmen Square massacre", and got 73,600 hits for protests, and 242,000 hits for massacre... "...massacre" might actually be the more common name to which the event is referred, so maybe we should do a more detailed study on that. As for 2), all I am saying is that we should take into account whether the term "massacre" or "protest" better reflect the actual event... -- [Notveryfunny](#) 07:07, 8 October 2006 (UTC).^{clii}

Using the search results from a dominant search engine such as Google as a justification to support the title “Tiananmen Square Massacre” was not uncommon for many contributors who have argued for the title change to Tiananmen Square Massacre.

Some contributors have compared the popularity of the different terms used to describe the movement. One such example was contributor Staberinde who had compared the names “Tiananmen Square Massacre” with other names, one of which was “Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989,” across Google Print, Google Scholar and Amazon.com. Noting that the name “Tiananmen Square Massacre” yielded the most results across all three search tests, Staberinde, perhaps to point out what (s)he considered a denial by the community to recognize the event as a massacre, wrote:

Current title is hilarious. What’s next, “"Holocaust" to be renamed to "Jewish incident in WW II"? - Staberinde (talk) 15:37, 9 March 2008 (UTC).^{ciii}

Other contributors have relied on results from Google Books search to support the title change to include the term massacre. The fact that the search term “massacre” ranks more highly on search engines, especially Google, supported assertions by contributors that the term massacre was more commonly recognized in society, therein attesting to the dominant memory of the movement as a massacre. On June 2011, a contributor opened a requested move ticket, which is a process for requesting the re-naming of an article and is usually invoked when the contributor expects a dispute concerning the title change. Requested move are processed by a group of regular contributors and they vote on whether to accept the new title change. The contributor wanted the title of the Wikipedia article to be renamed from Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 to Tiananmen Square Massacre:

... Google Books search indicates that “Tiananmen Square Massacre” is five times as popular as “Tianamen Square protests”... Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| talk 03:38, 4 June 2011 (UTC).^{cliv}

Contributor Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus’s requested move did not go too well with the rest of the community of contributors, who opposed the request to rename the title, citing reasons that the term “massacre” is biased and did not adhere to the NPOV policy.

Other contributors also argued that “massacre” only encapsulated one event of the movement, and is not a complete or accurate description of the entire movement, whereas others disputed that a massacre even occurred in the square.^{clv} As there was no consensus to change the title, the request to rename the title was subsequently denied. The contributors’ memory of the protests’ final moments was reflected in the Wikipedia article, with contributors including eyewitnesses accounts from western journalists and US ambassador James Lilley as evidence that a massacre did occur, though not specifically in the square. The final moment of the movement was therefore referred to as a massacre throughout the article. Despite eyewitnesses’ accounts in the Wikipedia article that a massacre did not occur within the square, the movement was still referred to as the Tiananmen Square massacre in parts of the Wikipedia article, which is most likely the result of a lack of thorough editing to ensure consistency of memory-claims.

Despite the larger community of contributors taking the stance that the word “massacre” is biased and not NPOV, other contributors, as did contributor Notveryfunny, have insisted that the term “massacre” more accurately reflected what happened during

the movement. While contributors like Bensonby believed that the title Tiananmen Square Massacre was a common description of the event, others were upset that the community would not acknowledge the term massacre even when presented with video evidence:

I could see that this is a full blown massacre, without even considering the aftermath, or do you suggest that these (Youtube videos) were all made in Hollywood... - HappyInGeneral (talk) 14:56, 9 January 2008 (UTC).

Significantly, it must be noted that the memory of the movement on Wikipedia, in particular the memory of the events that occurred on 4th of June 1989 as a massacre, is in line with numerous NYT articles that had over the years repeatedly reinforced the memory of the movement as being a brutal and bloody suppression.

Even though the title was not changed to massacre, contributor Rodparkers eventually added the article to the category “massacres in China.” Taking into consideration “what has become known as the Tiananmen Square Massacre,” Rodparkers 04:15, 12 October 2006 (UTC) explained that readers who remember the movement as a massacre, as it is commonly remembered in Western societies, would be led to this Wikipedia article if they are searching for more details online. Citing her or his experience, Rodparkers said (s)he searched for this article on Wikipedia by way of category listing and since the article had not been added to the category of massacres in China, (s)he was unable to find it. In the absence of any objection from the community, Rodparkers was able to include the article in the category “massacres in China.”

Despite having to seek the consensus of the Wikipedia community, the talk pages served as a space where different memories meet, are contested and negotiated, as the above contestation over the article's title has shown. The title Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, despite being disputed and contested repeatedly over the years, still remains because it is considered the most NPOV – a Wikipedia policy that contributors have used repeatedly to argue against the use of the term massacre in the title. Often stating similar arguments that “just because the world takes a POV stance that it is overall a massacre, does not mean that Wikipedia has to take that stance” as argued by [Mattarata](#) 17:21, 9 October 2006 (UTC), Wikipedia contributors disregarded what society or search engines considered notable or popular. In the community's efforts to enforce the NPOV policy, choosing terms that are considered neutral over loaded terms such as “massacre” was more important.

Significantly, what is considered NPOV is also another highly contested topic on Wikipedia, with several contributors arguing that the name Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 is non-NPOV since to them the term massacre most accurately represents the movement. To these contributors, not mentioning a commonly recognized aspect and dominant official memory, as depicted in the NYT, of the entire movement is equally biased. Contributor Folantin, who had been reverted for adding the phrase “Tiananmen Square massacre,” commented:

I have tried to add the phrase "Tiananmen Square massacre" (which is obviously the most common name in English) to the lead of this article and have provided reliable references. However, I have been reverted. I am worried that this article is

subject to some sort of POV- pushing. There is no way this article can be said to be neutral without a prominent mention of its most common name in English... --

[Folantin \(talk\)](#) 12:49, 2 March 2008 (UTC).

In [Folantin's \(talk\)](#) 21:52, 3 March 2008 (UTC) clarification statement, (s)he explained that the real intention was not to change the title but to give a prominent reference to the phrase "Tiananmen Square massacre" in the lead of the article, in addition to mentioning the massacre within the body of the article. Other contributors have also agreed with Folantin:

"It seems to me that calling the article Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 is not NPOV. By deliberately avoiding "massacre" we are in fact taking a POV. There is no good reason that the article should not go by the most common name." [TK421 \(talk\)](#) 03:52, 30 March 2008 (UTC).^{clvi}

The talk pages indicated that a good amount of negotiation took place, exposing contributors' different memories of the movement. However, due to the enforcement of NPOV policy by the Wikipedia community, the official memory of the movement as framed in NYT was overshadowed by a memory that is in line with the Chinese official memory, which has led several contributors to argue that Wikipedia has been hijacked by Chinese sympathizers and has been censored:

What, are Chinese now coming on here to try to white wash what happened in Tiananmen Square? Of course this should be set to Massacre, because that is what it is called in the English-speaking World. -Preceding unsigned comment added

by 96.251.26.6 (talk) 23:07, 18 May 2008 (UTC).

This seems to me an obvious example of kowtowing to the Chinese Government - perhaps because of a fear that they will bar Wikipedia from Chinese sites unless the site is called by this ludicrous, non-NPV title. I long to be proved wrong and for the title to be changed - Francis Hoar 212.183.134.209 (talk) 18:55, 7 September 2009 (UTC).^{clvii}

Though the above comments in the talk pages are from contributors who are ethnocentric and distrusting of the Chinese government, they reveal an important aspect of Wikipedia as a space where not everyone's contributions are equally legitimized or considered.

Judging by the disapproval and reverts by the Wikipedia community towards adding the word "massacre" to the title, it may appear that the Wikipedia community is legitimatizing the Chinese official memory of the movement, where the movement was not remembered as a massacre. Upon further analysis, however, it must be pointed out that there is little indication in the talk pages that Wikipedia contributors were defending the official Chinese memory of the movement. Rather, exemplified by their comments, they were demonstrating a concerted effort to enforce the NPOV policy, while still giving weight to the memory of the movement as a massacre:

For the record, then, I agree with you that "massacre" should be mentioned as a common name (among others) of the incident, though the title of the article should remain where it is due to NPOV and the lack of a single unambiguously most common name. --PalaceGuard008 (Talk) 08:57, 3 March 2008 (UTC).^{clviii}

Other contributors have also echoed similar sentiments. Contributors such as Mattarata 17:21, 9 October 2006 (UTC) explained that (s)he disagreed with the term “massacre” in the title due to its lack of NPOV in addition to how (s)he remembered the movement – as a protest during which a massacre occurred. As a result, despite disapproving the use of the term “massacre” in the title to represent the movement, (s)he still believed that there should be a reference in the article to the movement being “in large part, a massacre,” a position other contributors seemed to agree on. In fact, in the Wikipedia article, contributors included journalists’ eyewitness accounts that, while refuting claims of a massacre within the Tiananmen Square, pointed to a ‘massacre’ that occurred outside the square in parts of Beijing. As of June 2011, the Wikipedia article’s emphasis of the movement was on the events that took place on the 4th of June 1989, referring to the events that occurred on that fateful day as a massacre. Consequently, reference, events or anniversaries related to that day have been referred to as the Tiananmen Square massacre.

Comparing the heavily contested topics on Wikipedia talk pages to how NYT and Xinhua remembered and continue to remember the movement well into the 21st century, it is interesting to note that the ways in which many contributors remember the movement is in line with NYT’s official memory of the movement. The NYT official memory of the movement as a largely peaceful demonstrations by student protesters, whose hopes and struggle for democracy were violently suppressed by Chinese military forces, was reproduced, maintained and defended by many Wikipedia contributors in the talk pages.

Consequently, the Xinhua official memory of the movement as one where a few ringleaders, whose purpose was to overthrow the government, justifying military action against them, was eclipsed by the dominant memory. While some contributors clearly

reproduced NYT's official memory of the movement, it is crucial to note that others were also (and perhaps simply) reinforcing Wikipedia's NPOV policy wherein neutral terms were always privileged over terms that had latent negative connotations, such as rioters and massacre.

Reflection of society on Wikipedia

The talk pages reveal that many contributors' memory of the movement reflected NYT's official memory, which had an effect on the ways the movement was remembered and represented in the Wikipedia article. However, the talk pages also indicated that some contributors have used that space to voice their concerns that Wikipedia was complicit in its biased portrayal, which some believe were driven by ideological undertones that had negatively and falsely represented the Chinese government. As a result, it did not go unnoticed by some contributors that supporters of the Chinese official memory were victims of a bias driven by ideological undertones.

Some contributors such as Oroja have taken the removal of images that depicted violence by protesters against the Chinese government as a sign that the article has been censored by contributors determined to perpetuate a western memory of the movement that tarnished the image of China. Images depicting burned buses as evidence of violence against the Chinese government were removed on grounds that they were copyright protected, which Oroja adamantly refuted. Arguing that those images were in fact public domain, Oroja wrote:

The truth is that the images were removed by advocates of a nation that sheds blood in the streets of Baghdad while making idle accusations against more peaceable governments -- in this case a government that patiently waited weeks while its capital city was occupied by protesters and which eventually dispersed the out-of-control assembly in proper fashion - by forcing the crowd out an exit of the square, left open in keeping with standard riot-control tactics practiced by responsible forces worldwide... [Oroja](#) 17:34, 15 December 2006 (UTC).^{clix}

As if almost anticipating an onslaught from Wikipedia administrators, and perhaps also an indication that (s)he had suffered similar treatment from administrators, Oroja 17:34, 15 December 2006 (UTC) asserted that while (s)he will fix the article, (s)he had no interest in engaging in a web war with administrators who “harass and abuse” contributors whose edits they do not approve of.

Contributor Oroja had a history of distrusting Wikipedia and its administrators and had in the past voiced her or his concerns that the Wikipedia article read more like an advocacy piece rather than a neutral representation of events. Specifically, Oroja 18:41 15 December 2006 (UTC) was upset that the community had refused “to cite any abundant sources from reputable Asian publications,” which had led to the perpetuation of the official Western memory of the event at the expense of the Chinese official memory. Reinforcing the Chinese official memory of the event, Oroja argued that the Chinese government was trying to regain control from disruptive protesters who had attacked and killed military troops instead of committing a brutal suppression or massacre

as presented in the article (reflecting the Western official memory perpetuated in the NYT), a “widely reported fact” that Oroja accused the community of not acknowledging.

Believing that the Wikipedia community was complicit in spreading western ideals that rested on the negative image of China, Oroja wrote:

Unfortunately, Wikipedia and its cabal that pays homage (and donates free labor) to its libertarian-capitalist founder have no interest in reporting the truth as understood by reputable, established *non-Western, non-capitalist* publications.^{clx}

Oroja’s comment is significant because it reveals the different memory and hence, interpretation of ‘truths’ by the community of contributors. As evident by the comments in the talk pages, contributors carry with them opposing memories of the movement, each believing theirs to be the ‘truth.’ Consequently, it may not be the actual intention of contributors to perpetuate a Western official memory, but rather they appear unable to accept an opposing memory of the movement as ‘true,’ revealing not only a limitation to the availability of sources that support a different memory but also its credibility.

Oroja was not the only contributor who had accused the community of playing favoritism. Contributor Shieldsgeordie, citing a Spanish film footage that documented crowds of people attacking and burning army and police personnel and vehicles, challenged the article’s dominant memory of the movement as an aggressive crackdown. According to Shieldsgeordie (talk) 15:57, 17 March 2010 (UTC), the reason why the Tiananmen Square ‘massacre’ was given so much attention and the Chinese government so much criticism for its military intervention was because China is not a Western European or American ally. Shieldsgeordie had been vocal about his suspicion of not just

the western media but western sources. Shieldsgeordie (talk) 13:15, 23 March 2010 (UTC) argued that the “western media ignores the truth and pushes propaganda, making it very difficult for people to find alterative points of view.” (s)he further elucidated:

They (western media) are just better at censorship and propaganda than China...As for the Chinese people serving prison sentences for whatever, these need to be looked at on a case-by-case basis because who knows what their real crimes were. The Chinese government tends not to openly accuse Western governments of interference in its affairs but that doesn't mean it doesn't happen. Thus, sometimes the real reason for some people's convictions may be that they (had) worked for foreign governments and were trying to destabilize the country...^{clxi}

Shieldsgeordie (talk) 13:15, 23 March 2010 (UTC) even went as far as to accuse the U.S. of contributing to the turmoil in China during the movement, stating that the U.S. had trained some of the student leaders in mass demonstration techniques. While Shieldsgeordie’s assertions were not verified nor supported by evidences, it is important to point out that his sentiments echoed those of the official Chinese government, who had in numerous Xinhua news article accused the western media of instigating chaos and inaccurately covering the events on the 4th of June 1989.

Other contributors have also accused the article of propagating anti-PRC propaganda as well as masquerading Western propaganda as fact, leading an anonymous contributor to state that such western propaganda had inhibited people’s understanding of events that had occurred in China in the last 50 years.^{clxii} Another contributor

Миборовский 18:42, 18 July 2006 (UTC), in her or his support of the official Chinese memory, even argued that the Tiananmen Square massacre was a myth that had been created around actual events, a myth that largely served Western interests. Миборовский had tried several times to include the statement that the Tiananmen Square massacre was a myth in the article but was reverted by fellow contributors and administrator for reasons such as non-NPOV and lack of verifiability.^{clxiii} Миборовский's retort to the reasons by fellow contributors was to point out what (s)he saw as biased treatment towards the western official memory:

The principle of verifiability is essential but much of the text in this section is unverifiable and there is no reference to the source. A neutral point of view is also important but much of the material here is far from neutral. It seems to be me that western propaganda is ok here with no verification needed and no source required... Миборовский's 18:42, 18 July 2006 (UTC).^{clxiv}

Significantly, the above concerns by contributors pointed to the inherent limitation of Wikipedia. Despite the NPOV policy, the article would always only be as good as the community of contributors writing it as well as administrators policing it. In other words, the memory of the community of contributors writing the article, based on sources available to contributors external to Wikipedia, has a profound effect on the presentation of the movement to readers, which in turn influences how the movement is remembered by them. It must be noted that sentiments of the above contributors did not exist solely in a vacuum on Wikipedia, but they are a reflection of the suspicion and antagonistic sentiments towards Western sources, and in this case, sentiments that already

exist within China. Hence, contributors who perceive Wikipedia and its community as spreading what can be deduced as a western official memory of the movement were the ones who were reproducing the Chinese official memory of not just the movement but also the role western sources played in the movement.

It is not surprising that the contributors who were reproducing the Chinese official memory of the movement would feel alienated by the larger Wikipedia community on the English language Wikipedia. It is important to remember that Wikipedia was produced first and foremost for an English-speaking audience by an American even though it attracts an international crowd and new language versions of Wikipedia are continuously being developed. Furthermore, contributing on the English language Wikipedia requires a certain level of proficiency in the English language, invariably limiting access to Chinese contributors who are non-English speakers preventing them from contributing to an event that directly impacts them. As a result, as hard as contributors try to adhere to the NPOV standards on Wikipedia, a western official memory still persists, due in part to the English language being the lingua franca, thereby attracting largely English-speaking contributors.

The above antagonism and suspicion towards western sources stem from contributors' lack of trust of western sources to accurately (or what they considered accurately) depict the movement. In a contributor's suggestion to improve the Wikipedia article, (s)he suggested that the community examined and included the role of the western media in influencing the movement. The contributor, Speaker cn ([talk](#)) 00:22, 29 April 2008 (UTC) wrote:

Because of the western media's distorted reports on the 2008.3.14 Lhasa riot, people have reasons to doubt the credibility of the western media's report on the 1989 Tiananmen protest and whether they had served as provokers of bigger conflicts between the protesting students and the Chinese government. An investigation of western media's report on the Tiananmen Square protests in year 1989 is proposed...^{clxv}

Contributor Speaker cn wanted the community to add information on how the western media had used images and videos to mislead the student demonstrators, citing the iconic image of the single man standing in front of the tank as an example. Implying that the iconic image had been used unfairly and inappropriately by western sources to portray the Chinese government use of military intervention in a negative light, Speaker cn 00:22, 29 April 2008 (UTC) explained:

Until today, I still cannot understand why the stopping tanks could have served as an evidence of the toughness of the Chinese government towards the students for so many years? The tanked stopped and hadn't run into the young man, had it? I also don't understand in which country and since when it had become an honor for people to disrupt army from carrying out orders?^{clxvi}

Contrary to what Speaker cn would have expected the image to convey – leniency of the military for not running over the young man and the foolhardiness of his actions - the image has been circulated in the western media as a symbol of courage and determination, a memory that was maintained by another contributor. In response to

Speaker cn's comments on the iconic image, Fred (talk) 16:28, 26 May 2008 (UTC) replied, "As to the man stopping the tank, it is a touching image of courage that continues to impress me." Crucially, Speaker cn wanted to illustrate the hypocrisy of the western media where actions that would normally be considered anti-patriotic in some countries were applauded in the case of China. The community did not act upon Speaker cn's proposals even though contributor Fred recognized that the presence of foreign media in the square had some effect on the actions and decisions of both the demonstrators and government, an effect the NYT had also recognized. However, not all contributors were civil towards Speaker cn's suggestions. Novidmarana (talk) 06:51, 5 May 2008 (UTC) in particular, called Speaker cn's suggestions another "nutty conspiracy theory" that the world does not need.

While it is not uncommon for contributors to devolve into name-calling and mud slinging when they do not agree with the comments by fellow contributors, it is more pertinent to note the inability of many of them to entertain or logically discuss different memories without resorting to almost knee-jerk emotional reactions towards those memories. This is due to the deep distrust of many contributors towards Chinese sources, even unofficial ones. In response to an edit made by contributor Ran, which stated that many Chinese citizens prefer slow democratization and reacted with hostility to calls for liberalization from abroad, contributor Fred Bauder 00:13, Sep 19, 2004 (UTC) argued that there is no way to gauge public opinion in a totalitarian state like China. Comparing China to the Soviet Union, he explained, "what the Chinese man on the street may or (may) not say is not more reliable than reports of what the Soviet man on the street said." This comment is important and telling because it points to the distrust of Chinese sources

and hence, it makes the value judgment that the Chinese citizens' opinions and memories are not reliable. Importantly, contributor Fred's comments reveal the unwillingness to accept or even consider memories and opinions different from theirs.

Contributor Fred's distrust of Chinese sources is not uncommon, and many contributors working on the Wikipedia article harbored similar sentiments. Specifically, many contributors pointed to the media censorship in China and the Chinese government's lack of openness towards the movement, in particular the military intervention that occurred on the 4th of June 1989, which had rendered Chinese sources unreliable. [John Smith's](#) 18:01, 12 January 2006 explained that due to China's refusal to have any debate on the issue, he does not believe that any sources from the Chinese government can be objective. When presented with the official Chinese accounts of the movement that differ, from most western sources, instead of considering the possibility that Western sources may not be accurate, contributors often point to the unreliability of Chinese media. Numerous contributors have used the argument of media censorship and the suppression of the memory of Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 to justify their distrust of Chinese sources. An anonymous contributor 60.234.163.163 (talk) 01:16, 30 May 2008 (UTC) wrote:

Western media and official Chinese government reports differ and, of course, only one version can be the right one. Now think: There is only one media in China, the "official" government version. But there are heaps of independent newspapers and TV channels in the west. If the Chinese version was right, then at least a FEW western media would tell THEIR story... But when all western media take the same

view and contradict the only official Chinese version, chances are high they (the western media) are right.^{clxvii}

As much as the antagonism and suspicion of Western sources did not occur in a vacuum, neither did the distrust harbored by many contributors towards Chinese sources. These sentiments were also reflected and maintained in the NYT and Xinhua, both in an attempt to discredit one another so as to claim authority over their own narratives. It is in the talk pages that two official memories, one depicted in NYT and the other in Xinhua, collided with one another. Significantly, the highly contested topics such as the appropriate title for the article, the portrayal of the student demonstrations, and the memory of the movement reveal a reproduction and maintenance of official memories. While some negotiations do occur, the official memory of the movement as remembered in the NYT is the dominant memory that permeated through the talk pages.

Hence, the memory of the movement as reflected in NYT as a brutal crackdown to crush public appeals for democracy was privileged over other memories. This dominance of this memory had rendered its opposition, the Chinese official memory, illegitimate. Even when presented with Chinese sources that challenged the dominant memory, contributors deemed those sources were deemed by focusing on contributors' narratives of media censorship and memory suppression by the Chinese state as justification for rejecting those narratives. Deeply linked to one's identity, collective memories can take the status of truth-claims, structuring how one remembers an event, which in turn bears implications on the individual's worldview. Consequently, they make it difficult for individuals to entertain the possibility of oppositional memories as being

true – even in an open, borderless space as Wikipedia.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

The talk pages of the Wikipedia article, “Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989,” have shown that Wikipedia is indeed a space where anyone can edit. However, the ability to edit is not without conditions, for it is those conditions that are necessary for Wikipedia to fulfill its vision as an online encyclopedia. As a result, even though Wikipedia remains a space without traditional gatekeepers, where anyone without qualifications or credentials can edit, it is still a space governed by its own rules and gatekeepers. An examination of the Wikipedia discussion pages reveals that the contributors have to abide by the NPOV policy and the community often cites that policy to refute and reject new edits. Fellow contributors and administrators often police the contribution of one another, ensuring that even though anyone is free to edit, it is not guaranteed that every edit would be accepted nor every truth-claim considered by the community.

Consequently, Wikipedia should be seen as a space that will only be as good as its community of contributors who police one another and who contribute to the article. More importantly, Wikipedia’s ability to transcend beyond traditional encyclopedias by giving non-dominant and non-official collective memories a voice is limited and bounded by its contributors’ level of tolerance and acceptance of truth-claims different from their own. Serving as an example, the talk pages of the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 illustrated that, while an opportunity to produce memories in opposition to dominant ones definitely exists, unlike in traditional media or traditional encyclopedias, it is not often

seized upon by its community of contributors.

A close examination of the talk pages reveal that the dominant memories permeating the talk pages closely resembled narratives perpetuated by NYT – where the movement was largely framed and remembered as an aggressive crackdown to crush largely peaceful demands for democracy and freedom. Its opposing memory, which is the official memory of the Chinese government, was not given an equal voice in the talk pages. Contributors who reproduced or maintained opposing memories to the non-dominant memories in the talk pages are often silenced and considered illegitimate. The opposing memories that are often rendered unreliable closely resembled narratives perpetuated by Xinhua - where the movement was mostly framed and remembered as a counter-revolutionary rebellion instigated by a few ringleaders bent on causing internal turmoil and to overthrow the government.

While the NYT remembered the movement as a brutal and unnecessary crackdown on the public's appeal for democracy, Xinhua remembered it as a justified form of action to quell a violent rebellion about to cause further disturbances to the safety of the public. These opposing memories are often reproduced and maintained by contributors in the talk pages and often become a source of conflict among contributors, clearly exemplified by the highly contested topics in the talk pages. While there are instances where opposing memories are negotiated and are sometimes either accepted or become subdued under the dominant memory, most examples in the talk pages show an inability of contributors to consider, much less accept, opposing memories. This is particularly true with the English language Wikipedia where “western” bias may exist.

Wertsch (2002) appropriately explained contributors' inability to even entertain

opposing memories – the differences in memories do not simply reflect different perspectives to be accepted or rejected in a dispassionate way. Instead, these memories reflect strongly held commitments to particular narratives, commitments that are often masked by the tendency to believe those narratives as simply reflecting the truth. As a result, collective memories can function as truth-claims, as seen in the case of the talk pages of Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989. Collective memories are especially important as truth-claims. This is because collective memories serve as a powerful force for maintaining and legitimating communities, stressing the continuity between past and present (Carlson, 2010).

Consequently, iconic events such as the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 have become vehicles through which the nation is articulated (Leavy, 2007). Gans (2004) explains that when journalists report events, they frame that information in a national context and hence, bring the nation into being. Foreign reporters such as NYT journalists responded to the protests based on their beliefs that had roots in the myths of revolution, freedom, and democracy, which stemmed from their memory of the American Revolution (Kluver, 2010). Rachlin (1988) further explained that the meaning of world events is colored by the host country's national interest, political and cultural perspectives. Thus, when the NYT reporters framed the Tiananmen Square demonstrations as a 'pro-democracy' movement, such terminology was equated with an American definition (Tenney, 1992). These beliefs that appealed to and emphasized American values have resulted in an overly simplistic and mythologized depiction of the demonstrators and their goals, as if labeling the movement a modern-day Boston Tea Party set in China was enough to encapsulate the complexity of the movement

(Wasserstrom, 1994). How NYT reporters reported the demonstrations thus revealed the national myths and convictions that Americans deeply cherished.

How the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 is remembered is therefore intricately linked to not just national identity but also the identity of self. When we are asked not to remember, we are essentially asked not to honor or respect the group or movement that deserves remembrance (Irwin-Zarecka, 1994). The inability to entertain collective memories different from one's own demonstrates the "power of collective memory as a national psychological shield that refuses to accept contradicting narratives" (Becker, 2010, p. 109). The close link between collective memory and national identity therefore accounts for the "sharp contrast in attitudes to the past in different cultures" (Burke, 1989, p. 106). Hence, contributors who maintain opposing collective memories of the same event talk past each other not merely because they differ in viewpoints, but more critically, because they differ in their respective frames of references (Mannheim, 1929/1936). In this particular case, collective memories function as a frame of reference through which contributors not only remember the event, but while doing so, structure their views of nation and self.

Wikipedia's NPOV policy, one that is based on the assumption that facts are irrefutable, is therefore flawed because there are varying memories of the same 'facts,' each claiming theirs as the truth. Yet, there are benefits to the NPOV policy, such as the refusal to accept the term 'massacre' in the title of the article, allowing for a more neutral term to be displayed as the title. Though in theory the NPOV policy protects the article from being overly biased towards one particular memory, it is much harder in practice to have a balanced article without any value judgment on the different memories. The

refusal to acknowledge that facts may not as be irrefutable as one may believe has implications on what is deemed legitimate to be included in the Wikipedia article, therein affecting readers' understanding of the movement. This has resulted in a Western memory of an event that has ideological undertones, leading to our incomplete understanding of historical events.

It is important to recognize that the various memories contributors produced about the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 did not derive solely from their own thinking. Instead, contributors drew upon words and narratives that had existed in someone else's contexts and served someone else's intentions, as Wertsch (2002) explains. The textual resources (such as references) that contributors employ in collective remembering always belong to, and hence reflect, a social context and history. It means that instead of being neutral or asocial, the textual resources employed in collective remembering bring with them a social position and perspective, accounting for the conflicting memories of the same event. It is therefore no surprise that different groups in society, such as newspapers, strive to publicly shape the shared memory of an event's significance in ways that benefit claims to social power and authority (Carlson, 2010).

As such, it is undeniable that the press has a role to play in shaping our collective memories of events. Contributors in the talk pages of Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 often cite the unreliability of sources as reasons to reject them, and subsequently, the narratives that they carry. Contributors who do not trust Chinese sources that support the Chinese official memory of the movement often refer to media censorship and memory suppression of the movement by the state as reasons to discredit the reliability and validity of those sources. This carries serious implications for contributors who want to

include eyewitness accounts or official documents from Chinese sources to support the Chinese official memory of the movement. Often brushed off as being inaccurate or the product of propaganda, and therefore biased towards the Chinese government, these memories that run contrary to the dominant memory on Wikipedia are often deemed illegitimate. Conversely, contributors who do not trust the Western memory of the movement often argue that those sources are biased against the Chinese government.

The practice of discrediting news sources based on their perceived distortion of objectivity and truth is not uncommon, especially between sources that interpret and remember the same events in oppositional ways. Gans (2004) explained that what is considered news bias is judged against specific standards or ideals of non-bias. However, as Gans (2004) aptly pointed out that even these standards of non-bias are flawed because they are constructed on value judgments about the “nature of external reality, knowledge, and truth” (p. 305). This concept is useful in explaining the inability (or refusal) of either NYT or Xinhua news to consider each other’s oppositional frames of the movement as valid, non-biased, and legitimate.

It must be noted that the reasons contributors cited for distrusting sources often closely resemble those perpetuated in NYT and Xinhua, where the newspapers discredit opposing narratives so as to claim their own narratives as legitimate. This mutual distrust of sources has undoubtedly affected contributors’ ability to consider or entertain narratives (which these sources carry) that are different from their own. Little attempt or effort is made to investigate or try to entertain the thought that Chinese official memories and eyewitnesses’ accounts that support those memories may in fact bear some truth. The reverse is also true for contributors who distrust the dominant Western memory of the

movement. As elucidated by Merton (1972), due to mutual distrust between China and the Western world, it becomes inevitable that the frames of references, where collective memories are part of, which inform their understanding of the world “find expression in intellectual perspectives that are no longer located within the same universe of discourse” (p. 9). These frames of references have undoubtedly shaped Western and Chinese official sources re-telling or narratives of the movement, which has in turn shaped readers’ memory of the movement.

Wasserstorm (1994) argued that the Chinese officials were not the only ones who were guilty of trying to mythologize history in 1989, western journalists also played a key role in reporting the events and have created their own share of myths in the process. Narratives of patriotism, democracy, progress, and revolution guide the lens through which foreign reporters report the events that unfolded during the movement. Furthermore, the fact that it was the students and intellectuals who demanded freedom and democracy only served to vindicate Western mythic narratives, leading to the romanticizing of the movement (Kluver, 2010) It is also because of the conflating of myth and history that it has been difficult to separate truth from myth when dealing with the movement and military intervention.

While Gans (2003) have argued that the Internet appears to hold “the greatest technological potential” for multiperspectival content, which is content that encompasses facts and opinions reflecting all possible perspectives in society, he also noted its limitations (p. 104). Gans (2003) had pointed out that having a multiperspectival platform might bridge the differences in how we view and remember events due to our different frames of references and standards for bias. As envisioned by Gans (2003), a

multiperspectival platform is a space for unrepresented, underrepresented and unreported facts and opinions. While Gans' (2003) idea of a multiperspectival platform pertains to the news media, his vision seemed to have a good possibility of becoming a reality through collaborative projects like Wikipedia, where contributors from multiple backgrounds participate in constructing content. However, findings from this research appear to confirm the challenges of participatory websites in their ability to transcend the "number of reality and value judgments" that affect one's view of the world (p. 305).

As a space where dominant memories in society are reproduced and maintained, and where alternative memories are silenced, the Wikipedia article has made it possible to capture the common consensus among dominant groups of contributors. Articles on Wikipedia, such as the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989, then become ideological projects where existing power relations on a local and global level are manifested and articulated. Wikipedia thus is a site on which various individuals, each belonging to different social and cultural carrier groups, struggle over the definition of the memory of the movement. Hence, to these contributors, Wikipedia is not only a site of struggle over meaning but also a site of struggle over the hierarchy of meaning, where one memory is deemed more legitimate than the other. As such, Wikipedia has proved to be a great example of the reflection of dominant memories in society, not just giving us information on historical events but also serving as a mirror into the present social order and power in our global society.

Though Wikipedia is a collaborative project that anyone can edit, the information accumulated on Wikipedia is not necessarily one that has taken into account popular local knowledge. Rather, it is elite knowledge, knowledge that has traditionally been conferred

authority in society such as that of news organizations, scholars, political organizations, advocacy groups and government publications that has the most credibility on Wikipedia (Schwartz & Schuman, 2005). After all, not all claims have equal historical weight in society (Fine, 1996). It is thus not surprising that eyewitnesses' accounts from news reporters were deemed as reliable enough to be included in the Wikipedia article, whereas eyewitness accounts, especially those that were in opposition to the dominant memory in the talk pages, from local Chinese were not. Wikipedia should thus be conceived as a technology that dismantles traditional barriers of access while erecting new ones in its place.

As Foucault (1980) explained, "the problem is not changing people's consciousnesses – or what's in their heads – but the political, economic, institutional regime of the production of truth" (p. 133). Since we remember historical events through labels that characterized and summarized these events, symbols and narratives that come to represent important historical events are important (Schudson, 1992). Consequently, the implication of Western media's dominance in the production of information online means that the image of the lone man standing in front of the line of tanks would be widely remembered by readers of the English language entry as one that epitomizes the entire movement. The hopes and struggle for democracy represented by the daring display of an unarmed individual against an oppressive and uncompromising government party represented by the column of tanks were captured and embodied in that single image.

This photograph has captured the imagination and hearts of many Western journalists and continues to be commemorated well into the 21st century. The NYT

commemorated the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 by featuring the recollections of four photographers who each captured the iconic photograph of the man standing down a column of tank from a different camera focus. Each photographer gave an eyewitness account of that fateful morning, with two journalist photographers repeating the dominant memory that the troops fired at the crowd. NYT's international picture editor Patrick Witty (2009) wrote in his blog article, "Few images are more recognized or more evocative... it is one of the most famous photographs in recent history" (para. 1). More significant was how the NYT explained the symbolism of this photograph to its readers:

Twenty years ago, on June 5, 1989, following weeks of huge protests in Beijing and a crackdown that resulted in the deaths of hundreds, a lone man stepped in front of a column of tanks rumbling past Tiananmen Square. The moment instantly became a symbol of the protests as well as a symbol against oppression worldwide — an anonymous act of defiance seared into our collective consciousnesses (para. 2).

Elevating this photograph to an iconic status within the Western media also means that other images that support the Chinese official memory, such as crowds of violent protesters or the Goddess of Democracy Statue, were silenced. Hence, the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 would always come to represent the brutality and oppressive nature of the Chinese government, silencing alternative interpretations and the Chinese collective memory of the incident. Evidence in the Wikipedia article and talk pages suggest a Western interpretation as the dominant memory of the movement. Consequently, despite being a global platform where in philosophy everyone is equally

able to contribute, evidence has shown that in practice that is rarely the case. In fact, the English edition Wikipedia is a reflection of global hierarchy of power, wherein some content producer and distributor are considered more credible than others. In turn, their interpretations are deemed more legitimate than others. Hence, even though contributors are allowed to participate in content production, their narratives may not always be accepted.

The Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 on Wikipedia represents the collaborative writing of an event that directly affects Chinese citizens, who seem to have few means to participate in the shaping of its narrative on Wikipedia. This is because in order to participate in the editing of the article, contributors need to be proficient in writing and reading the English language. Conversely, if contributors want to include the Chinese official memory in the article, they would need to have a working knowledge of the Chinese language in order to translate and adequately comprehend Chinese official documents, news articles and records. Languages function as a barrier that limits the full participation of contributors, which undoubtedly affects the ability of Wikipedia to fully include opposing memories in the article.

In some sense, our memory of events and concerns that occur outside our linguistic and cultural boundaries will always be incomplete. The lack of access and language barriers reflect the pervasive political and cultural implications of the unequal distribution of international communications power and resources, and contribute to the broader structures of dominance and Western hegemony in the production of knowledge (Flew & McElhinney, 2002). As such, we will never know the entire spectrum of different narratives of the same topic and even if we do, we will not always accord the same

amount of credibility to those narratives. Despite the existence of a global platform like Wikipedia, which brings us much closer to the internationalization of knowledge and even memory of events than ever before, the disparity in access and global hierarchy of content production raise doubt that knowledge and collective memory can ever be globalized.

This thesis has focused on the formative years of reporting the incident and it is beyond the scope of this paper to include all news articles from June 4th 1989 till current day. Future research could include attempts to broaden the time-period to include June 4th 1989 till present times. Also, the Chinese language version of Xinhua News, 新华网, is not available on LexisNexis Academic at the point of writing. Future research could benefit from examining the Chinese language newspaper and the Chinese language Wikipedia. This is because there may be a possibility that the coverage and interpretation of the event may differ between the English language and Chinese language version of Xinhua news. While the English language Xinhua General News Services may be concerned with providing Chinese official interpretation of current affairs and its official stance on Chinese news to a global audience, its Chinese counterpart may be more concerned with providing news aimed at fostering national identity and solidarity. Furthermore, as this paper examined official memories from newspapers, future research can be broadened to include textbooks, government documents or monuments, as well as conduct audience research on the effects of these sources on collective memory.

In conclusion, the aim of this thesis is to start a conversation about collective memory in a collaborative virtual space like Wikipedia. Though the above findings are only the tip of the iceberg, these findings shed light on the challenges of knowledge

production and dissemination in a global space. It points to the limitations of Wikipedia, bringing its vision of a world in which “every single human can freely share in the sum of all knowledge,” a world where knowledge and memories of iconic historical events is global, back down to earth (Reagle, 2010, p. 3). Despite the possibility and potential of being a poster child for the postmodern approach to truth, this research shows that in practice Wikipedia contributors may not always (and perhaps neither do they want to) live up to that potential. Consequently, our knowledge of global past events may never be fully complete, and neither would our memories of global events be completely accurate. Examining collective memories in an ever-evolving platform like Wikipedia amplify the nature of collective memory. Like Wikipedia, collective memories of iconic events are often in a constant state of flux, a work in progress but never the final product.

References

- Anderson, C. (2001). Contested public memories: Hawaiian history or Hawaiian or American experience. In G. R. Edgerton & P. C. Rollins (Eds.), *Television Histories: shaping collective memory in the media age* (pp. 143-168). Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky.
- Alexander, J. C., Eyerman, R., Giesen, B., Smelser, N. J., & Sztompka, P. (2004). *Cultural trauma and collective identity*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Beatty, B. (2009). The superhero comic book as war memorial. In M. Keren & H. H. Herwig (eds.), *War memory and popular culture: essays on modes of remembrance and commemoration* (pp. 105-119). Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company.
- Becker, A. (2010). Building up a memory: Austria, Switzerland, and Europe face the Holocaust. In E. Langenbacher & Y. Shain (Eds.), *Power and the past: collective memory and international relations* (pp. 97-120). Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Benkler, Y. (2006). *The wealth of networks: how social production transforms markets and freedom*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Berlins, M. (2009, January 27). Wikipedia is unreliable in its current form. So why do its users resist even modest changes? *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.guardian.co.uk>
- Bragues, G. (2009). Wiki-philosophizing in a marketplace of ideas: Evaluating Wikipedia's entries on seven great minds. *Mediatropes ejournal*, 2. Retrieved from <http://www.mediatropes.com>
- Bruns, A. (2008). *Blogs, Wikipedia, Second life, and Beyond: from production to*

- produsage*. New York: Peter Lang Publishing.
- Burke, P. (1989). History as social memory. In T. Butler (Ed.), *Memory: History, culture and the mind* (pp. 97-114). Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell Inc.
- Carlson, M. (2010). Embodying deep throat: Mark Felt and the collective memory of Watergate. *Critical Studies in Media Communication*, 27(3), 235-250. doi: 10.1080/15295030903583564
- Chen, Y. (2003). China's foreign policy making as seen through Tiananmen. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 12(37), 715-738. doi:10.1080/1067056032000117722
- Cheng, C. (1990). *Behind the Tiananmen massacre: Social, political, and economic ferment in China*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Chong, W. L. (1990). Petitioners, popperians, and hunger strikers: The uncoordinated efforts of the 1989 Chinese democratic movement. In T. Saich (ed.), *The Chinese people's movement: Perspectives on Spring 1989* (pp. 106-125). Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Clarke, M. A. (2009). The online Brazilian Museu da Pessoa. In J. Garde-Hansen, A. Hoskins & A. Reading (Eds.), *Save as...digital memories* (pp. 151-166). Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Crane, G. T. (1994). Collective identity, symbolic mobilization, and student protest in Nanjing, China, 1988-1989. *Comparative Politics*, 26(4), 395-413. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/422023>
- Connerton, P. (1989). *How societies remember*. Cambridge, UK: The University Press.
- Culbert, D. (2001). Memories of 1945 and 1963: American television coverage of the end of the Berlin Wall, November 9, 1989. In G. R. Edgerton & P. C. Rollins (Eds.),

- Television histories: shaping collective memory in the media age* (pp. 230-243).
Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky.
- Curran, J. (2002). *Media and Power*. London, UK: Routledge.
- Dayan, D., & Katz, E. (1992). *Media events: the live broadcasting of history*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Dawis, A. (2009). *The Chinese of Indonesia and their search for identity: the relationship between collective memory and the media*. Amherst, NY: Cambria Press.
- Edgerton, G. R. (2001). Television as historian: A different kind of history altogether. In G. R. Edgerton & P. C. Rollins (Eds.), *Television Histories: shaping collective memory in the media age* (pp. 1-18). Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky.
- Edy, J. A. (2006). *Troubled pasts: news and the collective memory of social unrest*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- English Wikipedia. (n.d). Retrieved April 3, 2012, from:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/English_Wikipedia
- Entman (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. *Journal of Communication*, 43(4), 51-58. doi: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.x
- Entman (2003). Cascading activation: Contesting the White House's frame after 9/11. *Political Communication*, 20, 415-432. doi: 10.1080/10584600390244176
- Entman (2007). Framing bias: Media in the distribution of power. *Journal of Communication*, 57, 163-173. doi: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.2006.00336.x
- Eyerman, R. (2004). The past in the present: Culture and the transmission of memory. *Acta Sociologica*, 4(2), 159-169. doi:10.1177/0001699304043853
- Fine, G. A. (1996). Reputational Entrepreneurs and the memory of incompetence:

- Melting supporters, partisan warriors, and images of President Harding. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 101(5), 1159-1193. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2782352>
- Flew, T. & McElhinney, S. (2002). Globalization and the structure of new media industries. In L. A. Lievrouw & S. Livingstone (Eds.), *Handbook of new media: Social shaping and consequences of ICTs* (pp. 304-319). London, UK: Sage.
- Foucault, M., & Gordon, C. (1980). *Power/knowledge: selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977*. New York, NY: Pantheon Books.
- Fowler, B. (2007). *The obituary as collective memory*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Francis, C-B. (1989). The progress of protest in China: The Spring of 1989. *Asian Survey*, 29(9), 898-915. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2644834>
- Gamson, W. A., Croteau, D., Hoynes, W., & Sasson (1992). Media images and the social construction of reality. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 18, 373-393. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2083459>
- Gans, H. J. (2003). *Democracy and the news*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Gans, H. J. (2004). *Deciding what's news: A study of CBS evening news, NBC nightly news, Newsweek, and TIME*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- Giles, J. (2005). Internet encyclopedias go head to head. *Nature*, 438, 900-901.
doi:10.1038/438900a
- Gorp, B. V. (2007). The constructionist approach to framing: Bringing culture back in. *Journal of Communication*, 57, 60-78. doi: 10.1111/j.0021-9916.2007.00329.x
- Graham, M. (2011). Wiki space: Palimpsests and the politics of exclusion. In G. Lovink & N. Tkacz (Eds.), *Critical point of view: A Wikipedia reader* (pp. 269-282).

Amsterdam: Institute of Network Cultures.

- Guthrie, D. J. (1995). Political theatre and student organizations in the 1989 Chinese movement: A multivariate analysis of Tiananmen . *Sociological Forum*, 10(3), 419-454. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/684783>
- Hafner, K. (2006, June 17). Growing Wikipedia refines its 'anyone can edit' policy. *New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com>.
- Halavais, A., & Lackaff, D. (2008). An analysis of topic coverage of Wikipedia. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, 13(2), 429-440.
doi:10.1111/j.1083-6101.2008.00403.x
- Halbwachs, M. (1992). *On collective memory*. (L. A. Coser, Trans.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1941).
- Ha-Ilan, N. (2001). Images of history in Israel television news: The territorial dimension of collective memories, 1987-1990. In G. R. Edgerton & P. C. Rollins (Eds.), *Television Histories: shaping collective memory in the media age* (pp. 207-229). Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky.
- Han, T., & Li, J. (1992). Tiananmen Square Spring 1989: A chronology of the Chinese democracy movement. California, CA: University of California.
- Hauser, G. A. (1998). Vernacular dialogue and the rhetoricality of public opinion. *Communication Monographs*, 65(2), 83-107. doi:10.1080/03637759809376439
- Hess, A. (2007). In digital remembrance: vernacular memory and the rhetorical construction of web memorials. *Media, Culture & Society*, 29, 812-830.
- Hoskins, A. (2010). News and memory: old and new media pasts. In S. Allen (Ed.), *The Routledge companion to news and journalism* (pp. 460-470). New York, NY:

Routledge.

- Huang, X. (2000). Managing fluctuations in U.S.-China relations: World politics, national priorities, and policy leadership. *Asian Survey*, 40(2), 269-295. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3021133>
- Iniguez, Valencia & Vazquez (1997). The construction of remembering and forgetfulness: Memories and histories of the Spanish civil war. In J. W. Pennebaker, D. Páez & B. Rimé (Eds.), *Collective memory of political events* (pp. 237-252). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Irwin-Zarecka, I. (1994). *Frames of remembrance*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Johnson, T. J. (1995). *The rehabilitation of Richard Nixon: The media's effect on collective memory* J. Nadelhaft, (Ed.). New York, NY: Garland Publishing.
- Kansteiner, W. (2002). Finding meaning in memory: A methodological critique of collective memory studies. *History and Theory*, 41(2), 179-197. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3590762>
- Kidd, J. (2009). Digital storytelling and the performance of memory. In J. Garde-Hansen, A., Hoskins & A. Reading (Eds.), *Save as...digital memories* (pp. 167-183). Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kittur, A., & Kraut, R. E. (2008). Harnessing the wisdom of crowds in Wikipedia: quality through coordination. *Proceedings of the 2008 ACM conference on computer supported cooperative work*, 37-46. doi: [10.1145/1460563.1460572](https://doi.org/10.1145/1460563.1460572)
- Kluver, R. (2010). Rhetorical trajectories of Tiananmen Square. *Diplomatic History*, 34(1), 71-94. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.2009.00833.x

- Laurent, M.R., & Vickers, T. J. (2009). Seeking health information online: Does Wikipedia matter? *Journal of American Medical Informatics Association*, 16. 471-479. doi: 10.1197/jamia.M3059
- Langenbacher, E. (2010). Collective memory as a factor in political culture and international relations. In E. Langenbacher & Y. Shain (Eds.), *Power and the past: collective memory and international relations* (pp. 13-50). Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Leavy, P. (2007). *Iconic events: Media, politics, and power in retelling history*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Leuf, B., & Cunningham, W. (2001). *The Wiki way: quick collaboration on the Web*. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Liang, Z., Nathan, A. J., & Link, E. P. (2001). *The Tiananmen papers*. New York, NY: Public Affairs.
- Li, P., Li, M. H., & Mark, S (2007). Introduction. In P. Li, M. H. Li & S. Mark (Eds.), *Culture & politics in China: An anatomy of Tiananmen Square* (pp. 1-12). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Lichty, P. (2011). Digital anarchy, social media, and Wikileaks. In G. Lovink & N. Tkacz (Eds.), *Critical point of view: A Wikipedia reader* (pp. 226-235). Amsterdam: Institute of Network Cultures.
- Lih, A. (2009). *The Wikipedia revolution: how a bunch of nobodies created the world's greatest encyclopedia*. New York, NY: Hyperion.
- Lin, N. (1992). *The struggle for Tiananmen: anatomy of the 1989 mass movement*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

- Lippmann, W. (1922). *Public Opinion*. New York, NY: Free Press Paperbacks.
- Lipsitz, G. (1990). *Time passages: collective memory and American popular culture*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Liu, A.P.L. (1990). Aspects of Beijing's crisis management: The Tiananmen Square demonstration. *Asian Survey*, 30(5), 505-521. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2644842>
- Liu, A. P. L. (1992). Symbols and repression at Tiananmen Square, April-June 1989. *Political Psychology*, 12(1), 45-60. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791423>
- Mannheim, K. (1936). *Ideology and utopia*. (L. Wirth & E. Shils, Trans.). New York, NY: A Harvest Book. (Original work published 1929).
- Mannheim, K. (1936). *Ideology and utopia*. (L. Wirth & E. Shils, Trans.). New York, NY: A Harvest Book. (Original work published 1929).
- Mark, S. (2007). Observing the observers at Tiananmen Square: Freedom, democracy, and the news media in China's student movement. In P. Li, M. H. Li & S. Mark (Eds.), *Culture & politics in China: An anatomy of Tiananmen Square* (pp. 259-284). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Mason, T. D., & Clements, J. (2002). Tiananmen Square thirteen years after: The prospects for civil unrest in China. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 29(3), 159-188. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30172556>
- Media Kit. (n.d.). Retrieved April 2, 2012, from <http://nytmarketing.whsites.net/mediakit/newspaper>
- Meek, A. (2010). *Trauma and media: Theories, histories, and images*. New York, NY: Routledge.

- Menashe, C. L., & Siegel, M. (1998). The power of a frame: An analysis of Newspaper Coverage of tobacco issues – United States, 1985-1996. *Journal of Health Communication*, 3, 307-325. doi: 10.1080/108107398127139
- Merton, R. K (1972). Insiders and outsiders: A chapter in the sociology of knowledge. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 78(1), 9-47. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2776569>
- Meyers, O. (2007). Memory in journalism and the memory of journalism: Israeli journalists and the constructed legacy of “Haolam Hazeh.” *Journal of Communication*, 57(4), 719-738. doi: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.2007.00365.x
- Misra, J., Moller, S., & Karides, M. (2003). Envisioning dependency: Changing media depictions of welfare in the 20th century. *Social Problems*, 50(4), 482-504. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/sp.2003.50.4.482>
- Mu, Y., & Thompson, M. V. (1989). *Crisis at Tiananmen: reform and reality in modern China*. San Francisco, CA: China Books & Periodicals.
- Neuman, W. R., Just, M. R., & Crigler, A. A. (1992). *Common knowledge. News and the construction of political meaning*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
- Noakes, L. (2009). The BBC’s “People’s War” website. In M. Keren & H. H. Herwig (eds.), *War memory and popular culture: essays on modes of remembrance and commemoration* (pp. 135-149). Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company.
- Nora, P. (1989). Between memory and history: Les Lieux de Memoire. *Representations*, 26, 7-25. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2928520>
- Olick, J. K. (2007). *The politics of regret: on collective memory and historical responsibility*. New York, NY: Routledge.

- Orsman, B. (2008, September 10). Councillor uses Wikipedia to discredit rivals. *NZ Herald*. Retrieved from <http://www.nzherald.co.nz>
- O'Sullivan, D. (2009). *Wikipedia: A new community of practice?*. Farnham, England: Ashgate.
- Paez, Basabe & Gonzales (1997). Social processes and collective memory: A cross-cultural approach to remembering. In J. W. Pennebaker, D. Páez & B. Rimé (Eds.), *Collective memory of political events* (pp. 147-174). Mahwah, N.J: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Park, R. E. (1940). News as a form of knowledge: A chapter in the sociology of knowledge. *The American journal of sociology*, 45(5), 669-686. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2770043>
- Park, R. E. (1995). *Society: collective behavior, news and opinion, sociology and modern society*. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.
- Pearson, R. (199). Cluster loses again: The contestation over commodified public Memory. In D. Ben-Amos & L. Weissberg (Eds.), *Cultural memory and the construction of identity* (pp. 176-201). Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press.
- Pentzold, C. (2009). Fixing the floating gap: The online encyclopedia Wikipedia as a global memory place. *Memory Studies*, 2, 255-272. doi: 10.1177/1750698008102055
- Pfeil, U., Zaphiris, P., & Ang, C. S. (2006). Cultural differences in collaborative authoring of Wikipedia. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, 12, 88-113. doi:10.1111/j.1083-6101.2006.00316.x
- Rachlin, A. (1988) *News as Hegemonic Reality: American Political Culture and the Framing of News Accounts*. New York, NY: Praeger.

- Rector, L. H. (2008). Comparison of Wikipedia and other encyclopedias for accuracy, breath, and depth in historical articles. *Reference Services Review*, 36(1), 7-22.
doi:[10.1108/00907320810851998](https://doi.org/10.1108/00907320810851998)
- Rainie, L., & Trancer, B. (2007, April 24). Wikipedia users. *Pew Internet & American Life Project*. Retrieved from <http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2007/Wikipedia-users.aspx>
- Reagle, J. M. (2010). *Good faith collaboration: the culture of Wikipedia*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Rosenzweig, R. (2006). Can history be open source? Wikipedia and the future of the past. *Journal of American History*, 93(1), 117-146. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4486062>
- Royal, C., & Kapila, D. (2009). What's on Wikipedia, and what's not...? Assessing completeness of information. *Social Science Computer Review*, 27(1), 138-148.
doi:10.1177/0894439308321890
- Schon, D. A., & Rein, M. (1994). *Frame reflection: Toward the resolution of intractable policy controversies*. New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Schudson, M. (1992). *Watergate in American memory: how we remember, forget, and reconstruct the past*. New York, NY: BasicBooks.
- Schwartz, B. & Schuman, H. (2005). History, commemoration, and belief: Abraham Lincoln in American memory, 1945-2001. *American Sociological Review*, 70(2), 183-203. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4145367>
- Seigenthaler, J (2005, November 29). A false Wikipedia 'biography.' *USA Today*. Retrieved from <http://www.usatoday.com>

- Sigal, L. V. (1973). *Reporters and officials: the organization and politics of newsmaking*. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath
- Skidmore, D., & Gates, W. (1997). After Tiananmen: The struggle over U.S. policy toward China in the Bush Administration. *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 27(3), 514-539. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27551766>
- Stvilia, B., Twidale, M. B., Smith, L. C., & Gasser, L. (2008). Information quality work organization in Wikipedia. *Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology*, 59(6), 983-1001. doi:10.1002/asi.20813
- Sullivan, D. (2009). *Wikipedia: a new community of practice?*. Farnham, England: Ashgate.
- Surowiecki, J. (2005). *The wisdom of crowds*. New York, NY: Anchor Books.
- Teer-Tomaselli, R. (2006). South Africa. In I. Volkmer (Ed.), *News in public memory: An international study of media memories across generations* (pp. 159-176). New York, NY: Peter Lang Publishing.
- Tenney, W. J. (1992). US Responses to the Tiananmen and Kwangju Incidents: American Relations with China and Korea. *East Asia*, 11(4), 58-76. doi: 0.1007/BF03023496
- Van Dijk, T. A. (1998). Opinions and ideologies in the press. In A. Bell & P. Garret (Eds.), *Approaches to media discourse* (pp. 21-64). Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
- Van Dijk, Z. (2009). Wikipedia and lesser-resourced languages. *Language problems & Language planning*, 33(3), 234-250. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org.ezpl.lib.umn.edu/10.1075/lplp.33.3.03van>

- Wasserstrom, J. N. (1994). History, myth, and the tales of Tiananmen. In J. N. Wasserstrom & E. J. Perry (Eds.), *Popular protest and political culture in modern China* (2nd ed.). (pp. 273-308). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Weissberg, L. (1999). Introduction. In D. Ben-Amos & L. Weissberg (Eds.), *Cultural memory and the construction of identity* (pp. 7-26). Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press.
- Wertsch, J. V. (2002). *Voices of collective remembering*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- What Wikipedia is not. (n.d.). Retrieved April 2, 2012, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Wikipedia_is_not
- Wikipedia. (n.d.). Retrieved April 2, 2012, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/About_Wikipedia
- Wikipedia: About. (n.d.). Retrieved March 31, 2012, from <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About>
- Wikipedia: Administrators. (n.d.). Retrieved April 2, 2012, from <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Administrators>
- Wikipedia: Edit warring. (n.d.). Retrieved April 2, 2012, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Edit_warring
- Wikipedia: Featured article criteria. (n.d.). Retrieved April 2, 2012, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Featured_article_criteria
- Wikipedia: Identifying reliable sources. (n.d.). Retrieved April 2, 2012, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Identifying_reliable_sources
- Wikipedia: Neutral point of view. (n.d.). Retrieved April 2, 2012, from

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Neutral_point_of_view

Wikipedia: Neutral point of view/FAQ. (n.d.). Retrieved April 2, 2012, from

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Neutral_point_of_view/FAQ

Wikipedia: Patrol. (n.d.). Retrieved April 2, 2012, from

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Patrol>

Wikipedia: Recent changes patrol. (n.d.). Retrieved April 2, 2012, from

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Recent_changes_patrol

Witty, P. (2009, June 3). Behind the scenes: Tank Man of Tiananmen. *The New York*

Times Blog. Retrieved from <http://lens.blogs.nytimes.com>

Yang, J. (2003). Framing the NATO air strikes on Kosovo across countries. *The*

International Journal for Communication Studies, 63(3), 231-249. doi:

10.1177/0016549203065003002

Zandberg, E. (2010). The right to tell the (right) story: journalism, authority and memory.

Media, Culture & Society, 32(1), 5-24. doi: 10.1177/0163443709350095

Zarecka, I. (1994). *Frames of remembrance: the dynamics of collective memory*. New

Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Zelizer, B. (1995). Reading the past against the grain: The shape of memory studies.

Critical Studies in Mass Communications, 12(2), 214-239. Retrieved from

<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ufh&AH=9335242&site=e>

host-live

Zhao, D. (2001). *The power of Tiananmen: state-society relations and the 1989 Beijing*

student movement. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Zuo, J., & Benford, R. D. (1995). Mobilization processes and the 1989 Chinese

Democracy Movement. *The Sociological Quarterly*, 36(1), 131-156, Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4121281>

Footnotes

¹ WuDunn, S. (1989, May 15). Students in China flood main square. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/05/15/world/students-in-china-flood-main-square.html>

² Support for the student demonstrators came from all walks of life, showing that there was collective support from the public. “Scenes like that near Tiananmen Square - the Square of the Gate of Heavenly Peace - occurred all over central Beijing today, as office clerks, factory workers, bank tellers, journalists and taxicab drivers fought through vast seas of people to get near the enclave of hunger-striking students, now the center of China's swelling democracy movement” (WuDunn, 1989). The movement has also touched the hearts of many teachers. Teachers, who have once taught the student demonstrators, also came out onto the streets to block the military trucks with their bodies. Others went to Tiananmen Square to look after the student. The teachers were seen to want “some results” as well and have turned their attention to “trying to figure out ways to help the students” (WuDunn, 1989).

ⁱ Kristof, N. D. (1989, May 20). China hard-liners send troops to Beijing; Party head may be out, reporting is curbed. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/05/20/world/china-hard-liners-send-troops-beijing-party-head-may-be-reporting-curbed.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>

ⁱⁱ Kristof, N. D. (1989, May 21). Upheaval in China; Biggest Beijing crowds so far keep troops from city center; party reported in bitter fight. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/05/21/world/upheaval-china-biggest-beijing-crowds-so-far-keep-troops-city-center-party.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>

ⁱⁱⁱ Butterfield, F. (1989, May 25). Aspiring party leaders at forefront of revolt. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/05/25/world/aspiring-party-leaders-at-forefront-of-revolt.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>

^{iv} Even though the movement was able to garner support from the public, the impression given from NYT was that it has dragged on for too long with too many hurdles placed by the government and work units. These hurdles have undoubtedly damped the public's spirits and optimism for the movement. Supporters of the student demonstrators were reported telling NYT that, “the movement has lasted for so long and we citizens have done our best to support the students. We have given them bread rolls, clothing and quilts. But as ordinary citizens, we are not rich. We are exhausted and we are disillusioned.” According to the supporters, “the movement is at a lull, that thus far it has failed and dampened the spirit among the citizens and workers” (WuDunn, 1989).

^v Kristof, N. D. (1989, June 4). China erupts ... the reasons why. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/04/magazine/china-erupts-the-reasons-why.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>

^{vi} Kristof, N. D. (1989, June 4). China erupts ... the reasons why. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/04/magazine/china-erupts-the-reasons-why.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>

^{vii} NYT ran numerous articles portraying a giddy sense of excitement that a political change was near or almost inevitable. “The power really lies in the people. China must no longer be controlled and manipulated by one man...,” supporters were reported saying in NYT (WuDunn, 1989). The progress of events conveyed a sense of optimism that the students will eventually achieve their goals because supporters have gained confidence and are now more outspoken and bold about their demands. Supporters were saying that it was wrong of the Chinese government to go “against such a clear demonstration of the people's will?” and since “the people have gained confidence in the last few days,” they will not be kept silent anymore (WuDunn, 1989). Even though the NYT acknowledged that “Similar exuberance has appeared periodically in Chinese history and has almost always proven unwarranted,” this time around, many Chinese seemed “to think that democracy is almost within grasp.” Such optimism was easy to understand because a million workers and students took to the “streets to demand more democracy and the Government was sounding steadily more conciliatory.” (21 May, 1989, “To the streets; armed only with

-
- optimism, China's people rise again". Prime Minister Li, in announcing the crackdown, even promised to continue talks with student dissidents. Hence, "there appears to be a growing consensus that China's political structure must be liberalized" (Kristof, 1989).
- ^{viii} Kristof, N. D. (1989, May 29). Students renew call for change in Beijing March. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/05/29/world/students-renew-call-for-change-in-beijing-march.html>
- ^{ix} McFadden, R. D. (1989, May 21). Upheaval in China; Thousands of Chinese rally in the U.S. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/05/21/world/upheaval-in-china-thousands-of-chinese-rally-in-the-us.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>
- ^x Bernstein, R. (1989, June 5). Vast Hong Kong crowd protests Beijing's action. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/05/world/vast-hong-kong-crowd-protests-beijing-s-action.html>
- ^{xi} Basler, B. (1989, June 11). Turmoil in China; In Hong Kong, black signs to denote horror. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/11/world/turmoil-in-china-in-hong-kong-black-signs-to-denote-horror.html>
- ^{xii} Basler, B. (1989, June 11). Turmoil in China; In Hong Kong, black signs to denote horror. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/11/world/turmoil-in-china-in-hong-kong-black-signs-to-denote-horror.html>
- ^{xiii} Hays, C. L. (1989, June 10). Turmoil in China; Chinese students keep pressure on in the U.S. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/10/world/turmoil-in-china-chinese-students-keep-pressure-on-in-the-us.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>
- ^{xiv} Kaufman, M. T. (1989, June 22). New Yorkers try to defend students hunted in China. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/22/nyregion/new-yorkers-try-to-defend-students-hunted-in-china.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>
- ^{xv} Kristof, N. D. (1989, April 22). 100,000 defy a ban on protests in Beijing to demand democracy. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/22/world/100000-defy-a-ban-on-protests-in-beijing-to-demand-democracy.html>
- ^{xvi} Crackdown in Beijing; Excerpts from Bush's news session. (1989). In *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/06/world/crackdown-in-beijing-excerpts-from-bush-s-news-session.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>
- ^{xvii} Kristof, N. D. (1989, April 22). 100,000 defy a ban on protests in Beijing to demand democracy. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/22/world/100000-defy-a-ban-on-protests-in-beijing-to-demand-democracy.html>
- ^{xviii} Hays, C. L. (1989, June 10). Turmoil in China; Chinese students keep pressure on in the U.S. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/10/world/turmoil-in-china-chinese-students-keep-pressure-on-in-the-us.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>
- ^{xix} Hays, C. L. (1989, June 10). Turmoil in China; Chinese students keep pressure on in the U.S. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/10/world/turmoil-in-china-chinese-students-keep-pressure-on-in-the-us.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>
- ^{xx} Kristof, N. D. (1989, June 4). China erupts ... the reasons why. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/04/magazine/china-erupts-the-reasons-why.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>
- ^{xxi} Butterfield, F. (1989, May 25). Aspiring Party Leaders at forefront of revolt. *The New York Times*, p. A12.
- ^{xxii} Kristof, N. D. (1989, April 28). 150,000 march in defiance of Beijing. *The New York Times*, p. A1.
- ^{xxiii} Kristof, N. D. (1989, May 30). Chinese students, in about-face, will continue occupying square. *The New York Times*, p. A1.
- ^{xxiv} Goodman, W. (1989, June 7). Review/Television; the inherent bias, good or bad, of the mindless eye. *The New York Times*, p. C17.
- ^{xxv} WuDunn, S. (1989, May 29). Reporter's notebook; spies learn students can be stern teachers. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/05/29/world/reporter-s-notebook-spies-learn-students-can-be-stern-teachers.html>

-
- ^{xxvi} Frank, R. (1989, June 4). TV view; On Tiananmen Square, echoes of Chicago in '68. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/04/arts/tv-view-on-tiananmen-square-echoes-of-chicago-in-68.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>
- ^{xxvii} Goodman, W. (1989, June 7). Review/Television; the inherent bias, good or bad, of the mindless eye. *The New York Times*, p. C17.
- ^{xxviii} Showing their support for the demonstrators, "the army troops transferred to enforce martial law on parts of Beijing were impeded in the suburbs by masses of students and residents" ("Beijing newspaper highlights," 1989).
- ^{xxix} Beijing newspaper highlights. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Service*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>.
- ^{xxx} Beijing newspaper highlights. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Service*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>.
- ^{xxxi} Hospitals urged to protect health of hunger strikers. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Service*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>.
- ^{xxxii} Kristof, N. D. (1989, May 28). Upheaval in China; Chinese students urge end to siege of Beijing Square. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/05/28/world/upheaval-in-china-chinese-students-urge-end-to-siege-of-beijing-square.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>
- ^{xxxiii} Backgrounder: the counter-revolutionary rebellion in Beijing (source: propaganda department of the Beijing municipal committee). (1989). In *Xinhua General News Service*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>.
- ^{xxxiv} Backgrounder: the counter-revolutionary rebellion in Beijing (source: propaganda department of the Beijing municipal committee). (1989). In *Xinhua General News Service*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>.
- ^{xxxv} Backgrounder: the counter-revolutionary rebellion in Beijing (source: propaganda department of the Beijing municipal committee). (1989). In *Xinhua General News Service*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>.
- ^{xxxvi} Chinese communist party is core of leadership: editorial. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Service*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>.
- ^{xxxvii} Minority manipulated students: Beijing mayor. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Service*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>.
- ^{xxxviii} Minority manipulated students: Beijing mayor. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Service*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>.
- ^{xxxix} The student demonstrators were portrayed as "rebellious" ("After the students go home," 1989), "defiance" (WuDunn, 1989) and "illegal" (Kristof, 1989) in a few news articles.
- ^{xl} Turmoil in China; Student tells the Tiananmen story: And then, 'machine guns erupted.' (1989). In *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/12/world/turmoil-in-china-student-tells-the-tiananmen-story-and-then-machine-guns-erupted.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>
- ^{xli} Kristof, N. D. (1989, April 22). 100,000 defy a ban on protests in Beijing to demand democracy. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/22/world/100000-defy-a-ban-on-protests-in-beijing-to-demand-democracy.html>
- ^{xlii} Kristof, N. D. (1989, May 22). Upheaval in China; Beijing throngs again thwart advances by troops amid signs military balks at crackdown. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/05/22/world/upheaval-china-beijing-throngs-again-thwart-advances-troops-amid-signs-military.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>
- ^{xliii} WuDunn, S. (1989, May 30). Workers' resistance lags in Beijing. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/05/30/world/workers-resistance-lags-in-beijing.html>
- ^{xliiv} WuDunn, S. (1989, May 23). Shortages and anarchy begin to cripple Beijing. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/05/23/world/shortages-and-anarchy-begin-to-cripple-beijing.html>
- ^{xliv} Kristof, N. D. (1989, June 4). Crackdown in Beijing; troops attack and crush Beijing protest; thousands fight back, scores are killed. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/04/world/crackdown-beijing-troops-attack-crush-beijing-protest-thousands-fight-back.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>

-
- ^{lxi} Turmoil in China; Student tells the Tiananmen story: And then, 'machine guns erupted.' (1989). In *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/12/world/turmoil-in-china-student-tells-the-tiananmen-story-and-then-machine-guns-erupted.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>
- ^{lxii} Kaufman, M. T. (1989, June 22). New Yorkers try to defend students hunted in China. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/22/nyregion/new-yorkers-try-to-defend-students-hunted-in-china.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>
- ^{lxiii} Kaufman, M. T. (1989, June 22). New Yorkers try to defend students hunted in China. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/22/nyregion/new-yorkers-try-to-defend-students-hunted-in-china.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>
- ^{lxiv} Kristof, N. D. (1989, June 7). Turmoil in China; artillery firing in suburbs adds to tensions in Beijing; mystery on leaders grow. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/07/world/turmoil-china-artillery-firing-suburbs-adds-tensions-beijing-mystery-leaders.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>
- ^{lxv} Kristof, N. D. (1989, June 7). Turmoil in China; artillery firing in suburbs adds to tensions in Beijing; mystery on leaders grow. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/07/world/turmoil-china-artillery-firing-suburbs-adds-tensions-beijing-mystery-leaders.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>
- ^{lxvi} Kristof, N. D. (1989, June 7). Turmoil in China; artillery firing in suburbs adds to tensions in Beijing; mystery on leaders grow. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/07/world/turmoil-china-artillery-firing-suburbs-adds-tensions-beijing-mystery-leaders.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>
- ^{lxvii} A student demonstrator who was arrested by the police said that the policewomen who were guarding her were watching "a news program on the crackdown in Beijing and laughed when a reported declared that the Chinese citizens were welcoming the troops. "One of them said, "Why don't you show it to us?" " Ms. Cheng said. "There were no pictures on the screen and she said it very sarcastically. "At another point, when pictures failed to back up the message, a policewoman scoffed, "The TV has turned into a radio station... They told me: 'Don't be pessimistic. Things cannot be that bad.' (Berger, 1989).
- ^{lxviii} Kristof, N. D. (1989, June 7). Turmoil in China; artillery firing in suburbs adds to tensions in Beijing; mystery on leaders grow. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/07/world/turmoil-china-artillery-firing-suburbs-adds-tensions-beijing-mystery-leaders.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>
- ^{lxix} Beijing criticizes installation of goddess statue on Tiananmen Square. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- ^{lxx} Zhao Ziyang, Li peng visit hunger striking students in Tiananmen Square. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>.
- ^{lxxi} Li Peng's speech at Beijing Cadre Meeting. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- ^{lxxii} Why impose martial law in Beijing. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- ^{lxxiii} Li Peng's speech at Beijing Cadre Meeting. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- ^{lxxiv} Roundup: letters support crackdown. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- ^{lxxv} Why impose martial law in Beijing. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- ^{lxxvi} Why impose martial law in Beijing. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- ^{lxxvii} Li Peng's speech at Beijing Cadre Meeting. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- ^{lxxviii} Backgrounder: the counter-revolutionary rebellion in Beijing (source: propaganda department of the Beijing municipal committee). (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>

-
- ^{lxxix} State council spokesman on students' demonstration. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- ^{lxxx} Li Peng's speech at Beijing Cadre Meeting. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- ^{lxxxii} Li Peng's speech at Beijing Cadre Meeting. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- ^{lxxxiii} Urgent public notice given jointly by Beijing government and headquarters of troops imposing martial law. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- ^{lxxxiv} Why impose martial law in Beijing. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- ^{lxxxv} Backgrounder: the counter-revolutionary rebellion in Beijing (source: propaganda department of the Beijing municipal committee). (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- ^{lxxxvi} Why impose martial law in Beijing. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- ^{lxxxvii} Backgrounder: the counter-revolutionary rebellion in Beijing (source: propaganda department of the Beijing municipal committee). (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- ^{lxxxviii} Backgrounder: the counter-revolutionary rebellion in Beijing (source: propaganda department of the Beijing municipal committee). (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- ^{lxxxix} Riot videotapes distributed abroad. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- ^{lxxxix} Yuan Mu, a Chinese government official, was reported stating, "over 5,000 officers and men of the liberation army were wounded, and also wounded were over 2,000 civilians (including rioters who committed crimes and on-lookers who did not know the truth)." ("Yuan Mu on world public opinion," 1989)
- ^{xc} Beijing mayor on rebellion death toll. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- ^{xcii} State council spokesman on quelling of counter-revolutionary rebellion. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- ^{xciii} State council spokesman on quelling of counter-revolutionary rebellion. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- ^{xciv} State council spokesman on quelling of counter-revolutionary rebellion. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- ^{xcv} State council spokesman on quelling of counter-revolutionary rebellion. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- ^{xcvi} Roundup: letters support crackdown. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- ^{xcvii} Yuan Mu on world public opinion. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- ^{xcviii} Yuan Mu, in his interview with Tom Brokaw of NBC, said the counter-revolutionary conspirators or rebels who have been mistook for or disguised as student demonstrators had been putting forth messages aimed at subverting and overthrowing the communist party of China. Yuan Mu explained that "their slogans are entirely different from those demands put forward by the students in the early stages of students' demonstrations for more freedom and democracy" ("roundup: letters support crackdown," 1989).
- ^{xcix} Explaining the rationale for martial law, the Chinese government explained that the rebellion was carefully planned and orchestrated by a small number of political dissents living in China and abroad. Explained in the article, "a group of original members of the "china spring" organization living in the united states set up a "china democratic party" and sent a "letter to all compatriots" on April 16 which reached some Beijing university campuses. It incited the students to "demand that conservatives and

bureaucrats step down" and "push the Chinese communist party to end its autocratic rule." all these facts show that a small number of people at home and abroad colluded with each other, acted in collaboration and planned the turmoil carefully" ("why impose martial law in Beijing," 1989).

^c Li Peng's speech at Beijing Cadre Meeting. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>

^{ci} Bernstein, R. (1989, June 18). Crackdown in China: Reporter's notebook; In Beijing, it's difficult to find facts or truth. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/18/world/crackdown-china-reporter-s-notebook-beijing-it-s-difficult-find-facts-truth.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>

^{cii} Butterfield, F. (1989, June 11). Hard line; Deng reappears with a chilling lesson about power in China. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/11/weekinreview/hard-line-deng-reappears-with-a-chilling-lesson-about-power-in-china.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>

^{ciii} Butterfield, F. (1989, June 17). Crackdown in China; Deng is said to link force to safety of party. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/17/world/crackdown-in-china-deng-is-said-to-link-force-to-safety-of-party.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>

^{civ} Butterfield, F. (1989, June 17). Crackdown in China; Deng is said to link force to safety of party. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/17/world/crackdown-in-china-deng-is-said-to-link-force-to-safety-of-party.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>

^{cv} Beijing paper denounces Voices of America. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>

^{cvi} Beijing paper denounces Voices of America. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>

^{cvi} Let's see how Voice of America defends its rumor-mongering. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>

^{cvi} Let's see how Voice of America defends its rumor-mongering. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>

^{cix} Let's see how Voice of America defends its rumor-mongering. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>

^{cx} Voice of America continues rumor-mongering. (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>

^{cx} China refutes rumor created by British "Sunday Express." (1989). In *Xinhua General News Services*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>

^{cxii} Chinese articles mentioning imprisoned Chinese democracy activist, Liu Xiaobo.

^{cxiii} Ibrahim, S. E. (2005, May 21). Islam can vote, if we let it. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/21/opinion/21ibrahim.html?pagewanted=all>

^{cxiv} Sciolino, E. (2006, March 30). Violent youths threaten to hijack demonstrations in Paris. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/30/international/europe/30smashers.html>

^{cxv} Wong, E., & Barboza, D. (2011, February 1). China, concerned about unrest, censors the Internet. *The New York Times*, p. A0.

^{cxvi} The NYT reported that the recent student demonstrations "may have been the largest student unrest in China since the Tiananmen Square demonstrations of 1989" (Kahn, 2003).

^{cxvii} Bradsher, K. (2003, July 7). Hong Kong delays security bill after cabinet member quits. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/07/world/hong-kong-delays-security-bill-after-cabinet-member-quits.html>

^{cxviii} Wong, E. (2010, March 16). China: group of artists to be compensated for land. *The New York Times*, p. A0.

^{cxix} Frankel, M. (2011, May 15). Toward a Pacific community. *The New York Times*, p. BR0.

^{cxx} Jian, M. (2008, June 4). China's grief, unearthed. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/04/opinion/04ma.html?gwh=CD606A6B408B64521E402D258B69A499>

^{cxxi} French, H. W. (2005, December 17). Chinese pressing to keep village silent on clash. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from

<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9502E4D91630F934A25751C1A9639C8B63&pagewanted=all>

^{cxxii} Jacobs, A. (2011, April 3). Where 'Jasmine' means tea, not a revolt. *The New York Times*, p. WK0.

- ^{cxxiii} Kahn, J. (2004, August 21). Chinese advocates of reform seek help from Deng's spirit. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/21/world/chinese-advocates-of-reform-seek-help-from-deng-s-spirit.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>
- ^{cxxiv} Mishra, P. (2009, January 23). The bonfire of China's vanities. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/25/magazine/25hua-t.html?pagewanted=all&gwh=56458C670B0D5F6543BEA04F7D17D5EC>
- ^{cxxv} LaFraniere, S. (2009, June 4). Protest leader tries to surrender in Macao. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E00E0DC1F3EF937A35755C0A96F9C8B63>
- ^{cxxvi} Liu Xiaobo. (2010). In *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- ^{cxxvii} Kahn, J. (2005, Nov 15). China to give memorial rite to Hu Yaobang, purged reformer. *The New York Times*, p. A1.
- ^{cxxviii} Wines, M. (2010, June 3). China: tank cartoon censored on eve of anniversary on Tiananmen Square. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/03/world/asia/03briefs-BEIJING.html?gwh=11F63F951024C9D515ED68BA8ECB5857>
- ^{cxxix} Back then: 1989. (2010). In *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- ^{cxix} LaFraniere, S., & Bradsher, K. (2009, June 5). Hong Kong pays tribute to Tiananmen protesters while Beijing stays silent. *The New York Times*, p. A0.
- ^{cxixi} Jacobs, A. (2009, June 9). China requires software on new computers to block 'unhealthy information.' *The New York Times*, p. A0.
- ^{cxixii} Yardley, J. (2004, June 4). China hides dissidents for Tiananmen anniversary. *The New York Times*, p. A3.
- ^{cxixiii} Yardley, J. (2004, March 8). Chinese SARS hero urges party to admit error for '89 massacre. *The New York Times*, p. A1.
- ^{cxixiv} Bradsher, K. (2004, June 5). Hong Kong crowds mark Tiananmen Square killings. *The New York Times*, p. A1.
- ^{cxixv} Bradsher, K. (2005, June 5). Thousands at Hong Kong vigil for Tiananmen anniversary. *The New York Times*, p. 1.
- ^{cxixvi} LaFraniere, S. (2009, June 4). Protest leader tries to surrender in Macao. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E00E0DC1F3EF937A35755C0A96F9C8B63>
- ^{cxixvii} French, H. W. (2004, December 6). China's textbooks twist and omit history. *The New York Times*, p. A1.
- ^{cxixviii} Thompson, C. (2006, April 23). Google's China problem (and China's Google problem). *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/23/magazine/23google.html?pagewanted=all&gwh=1211979F249F634B2DE28AA0E7468E47>
- ^{cxixix} Lin-liu, J. (2008, August 4). Beijing under wraps. *The New York Times*, p. A0.
- ^{cxli} Hua, Y. (2009, May 31). Tiananmen Square, 20 years later: China's forgotten revolution. *The New York Times*, p. WK0.
- ^{cxli} Mishra, P. (2009, January 23). The bonfire of China's vanities. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/25/magazine/25hua-t.html?pagewanted=all&gwh=56458C670B0D5F6543BEA04F7D17D5EC>
- ^{cxlii} Yardley, J. (2005, January 22). For Beijing students now, protests aren't even a memory. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/22/international/asia/22zhao.html>
- ^{cxliiii} Dewan, S. (2008, April 29). Chinese students in the U.S. fight a 'biased' view of home. *The New York Times*, p. A1.
- ^{cxliv} Wines, M. (2010, October 12). China shows sterner mien to U.S. forces. *The New York Times*, p. A1.
- ^{cxlv} Talk:Tiananmen Square protests of 1989/Archive 3 (2011). Retrieved June 10, 2011, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Tiananmen_Square_protests_of_1989/Archive_3
- ^{cxlvi} Talk: Tiananmen Square protests of 1989/Archive 2. (2011). Retrieved June 10, 2011, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Tiananmen_Square_protests_of_1989/Archive_2

-
- cxlvii Talk:Tiananmen Square protests of 1989/Archive 3 (2011). Retrieved June 10, 2011, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Tiananmen_Square_protests_of_1989/Archive_3
- cxlviii Talk: Tiananmen Square protests of 1989/Archive 2. (2011). Retrieved June 10, 2011, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Tiananmen_Square_protests_of_1989/Archive_2
- cxlix Talk: Tiananmen Square protests of 1989/Archive 2. (2011). Retrieved June 10, 2011, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Tiananmen_Square_protests_of_1989/Archive_2
- cl Talk:Tiananmen Square protests of 1989/Archive 3 (2011). Retrieved June 10, 2011, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Tiananmen_Square_protests_of_1989/Archive_3
- cli Talk:Tiananmen Square protests of 1989/Archive 3 (2011). Retrieved June 10, 2011, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Tiananmen_Square_protests_of_1989/Archive_3
- clii Talk: Tiananmen Square protests of 1989/Archive 2. (2011). Retrieved June 10, 2011, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Tiananmen_Square_protests_of_1989/Archive_2
- cliii Talk:Tiananmen Square protests of 1989/Archive 3 (2011). Retrieved June 10, 2011, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Tiananmen_Square_protests_of_1989/Archive_3
- cliv Talk:Tiananmen Square protests of 1989/Archive 3 (2011). Retrieved June 10, 2011, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Tiananmen_Square_protests_of_1989/Archive_3
- clv The community of contributors who opposed the title change to Tiananmen Square Massacre gave the following reasons:
- Oppose:** the massacre is only a part of the article, the protests preceded the massacre. Your search results seems biased towards the event that ended the protests. Though, there should be two articles, one on the protests, and one on the massacre, since the massacre itself is a notable event and has analysis and further commentary on its impact from reliable sources, as the protests do as well. These are two separate but linked events. 184.144.168.112 (talk) 04:36, 4 June 2011 (UTC)
- Comment:** This has in fact been discussed extensively in the past. The last major debate appears to have occurred three years ago (see Talk:Tiananmen Square protests of 1989/Archive 3#Title 3) and resulted in no consensus. Zzyzx11 (talk) 04:47, 4 June 2011 (UTC)
- Oppose:** There are obvious bias and POV issues in employing *massacre* in this case. This is made clear by the fact that an entire section is dedicated to the naming issue for this event. *Tiananmen Square protests*, or some derivative thereof, appears the most neutral. Secondly, as already mentioned, the article is not simply the June 4 crackdown but includes everything before that point. --Labattblueboy (talk) 14:46, 4 June 2011 (UTC)
- Oppose:** The evidence has clearly shown there was no massacre and probably no deaths within the square. The protesters left the square peacefully after negotiations, this is proven. The use of the word massacre is obvious bias and has extensive POV issues. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 122.108.213.163 (talk) 12:46, 6 June 2011 (UTC)
- As of June 11, 2011 at 02:25 a Wikipedia administrator by the name of [Vegaswikian](#) replied to the ticket with a note --- No consensus to move.
- clvi Talk:Tiananmen Square protests of 1989/Archive 3 (2011). Retrieved June 10, 2011, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Tiananmen_Square_protests_of_1989/Archive_3
- clvii Talk: Tiananmen Square protests of 1989/Archive 3 (2011). Retrieved June 10, 2011, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Tiananmen_Square_protests_of_1989/Archive_3
- clviii Talk: Tiananmen Square protests of 1989/Archive 3 (2011). Retrieved June 10, 2011, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Tiananmen_Square_protests_of_1989/Archive_3
- clix Talk: Tiananmen Square protests of 1989/Archive 3 (2011). Retrieved June 10, 2011, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Tiananmen_Square_protests_of_1989/Archive_3
- clx Talk:Tiananmen Square protests of 1989/Archive 3 (2011). Retrieved June 10, 2011, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Tiananmen_Square_protests_of_1989/Archive_3
- clxi Talk: Tiananmen Square protests of 1989/Archive 3 (2011). Retrieved June 10, 2011, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Tiananmen_Square_protests_of_1989/Archive_3
- clxii Contributor 85.94.191.251 claimed that “much of the materials relating to modern Chinese history could have been written by CIA or other Western propaganda organizations and interests.” Contributor [85.94.164.71](#) (talk) 13:57, 31 October 2007 (UTC) pointed out an issue with the article, which included BBC reporter Kate Adie’s eyewitness account of “indiscriminate fire” within the square though she was

nowhere near the square at that time. [85.94.164.71](#) pointed out that there were many other similar problems with the article, resulting in western propaganda masquerading as fact. Another contributor, **Миборовский** 01:36, 30 September 2006 (UTC), in response to a fellow contributor who was afraid that the article might be highly vulnerable to PRC propaganda efforts, wrote “as hard as it may be for some to grasp, anti-PRC propaganda is what is plaguing this article.”

^{clxiii} Luna Satin 09:21, 16 July 2006 (UTC), an administrator who supported the revert, informed Миборовский that (s)he needed to include reliable sources to support her or his edits to the article or else it would not be accepted. Other fellow contributors who removed Миборовский edit, Kevin 10:30, 16 July 2006 (UTC) and Sumple (Talk) 11:12, 16 July 2006 (UTC) argued that the statement might not adhere to the NPOV policy.

^{clxiv} Talk: Tiananmen Square protests of 1989/Archive 2. (2011). Retrieved June 10, 2011, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Tiananmen_Square_protests_of_1989/Archive_2

^{clxv} Talk: Tiananmen Square protests of 1989/Archive 3 (2011). Retrieved June 10, 2011, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Tiananmen_Square_protests_of_1989/Archive_3

^{clxvi} Talk: Tiananmen Square protests of 1989/Archive 3 (2011). Retrieved June 10, 2011, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Tiananmen_Square_protests_of_1989/Archive_3

^{clxvii} Talk: Tiananmen Square protests of 1989/Archive 3 (2011). Retrieved June 10, 2011, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Tiananmen_Square_protests_of_1989/Archive_3