

SOCIAL, FIELD AND REGIONAL CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE:
NEWS ON DARFUR IN AFRICAN MEDIA

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One evening, in the Fall of 2002, my late father sat me down in a hotel room in Nairobi. I had been suspended from school, weeks before the national university entrance exam, and my mum had refused to take me back to school. She had done so on prior occasions and finally put her foot down saying it was time my father took me back. My dad was scheduled to travel to the U.K. on a work-related trip, which he postponed to take me back. This is why we were sitting in a hotel room that evening in 2002. My dad looked at me and asked me to *read* instead of *studying*. The time for *studying* would come, he said, but this was not it. All he wanted from me was a grade that would get me into university. He didn't want me to be an A student, he asked me to at least get a B-. Sixteen years after this fateful night I submit my dissertation, the fruit of seven years of *study*. My one regret is that my father is not here to share this moment with me.

As much as I dislike it when people talk about 'African sayings' when trying to sound sagacious, allow me to paraphrase one that captures my graduate experience. Writing this dissertation took a village. A village whose boundaries are transnational in scope and multidisciplinary in tradition. Nonetheless, I will try to the best of my abilities to capture its members in the next few pages.

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As stated in the introduction, my village's boundaries spanned multiple countries. I thank journalists in Kenya, South Africa, and in Nigeria for taking time to talk to me. Though you remain nameless due to the precarious nature of your work, I thank you all for agreeing to speak honestly about the challenges you face while trying to construct knowledge about atrocities such as Darfur. Thank you for risking your lives to go into

dangerous places to inform the rest of the world about the plight of fellow Africans. I hope I have represented your words in ways that capture the essence of our conversations. I also want to thank the late Mandy Rossouw for giving a tired, severely jetlagged, and nervous graduate student his first ever interview.

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Before concluding, I have to thank my wonderful family. I remember the perplexed voices when I called my parents to tell them I wanted to apply to a Sociology Ph.D. department rather than Law School. My mom, Dee, has given up on trying to explain to her friends what it is exactly I do. My dad, Fred, who even when he was sick and, on his death-bed, would shake his head incredulously at the fact that I was in a Ph.D. department. He too gave up on trying to explain to what it is I did. Nonetheless, their support and love have been unending and unequivocal. My siblings Maggie and Jonathan have been my biggest cheerleaders while also taking the time to remind me that my big brother duties are essential and central to anything that I do. Dami, Osasu, and Abigail, I thank you for always being understanding when I had to miss family events. To Duncan, without whom this journey would never have started, thank you for pushing for me to come to Minnesota in 2007. To Curt and Jodi, Nancy and Jim, thank you for welcoming me into your homes over the last seven years. To Amelia Rebecca Aduayi, the newest member of my family and my favorite (albeit only) niece, you are one of the few bright spots during trying times.

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Finally, I thank my dad. Sitting in that hotel room that night in 2002, I realized that despite all my high school shenanigans he saw something in me. He was the smartest person I had ever met, and, as the first-born child, I have always worried that I would never measure up. A worry that has turned into acceptance. As I prepare to defend this dissertation, it strikes me that it is the result *studying*. An idea that only became part of my lexicon after *that* talk and for that, I am eternally indebted.

To Captain Wahutu, whose memory has kept this little light of mine shining, and to those who risk their lives and safety to keep us informed.

Abstract

This project is embedded within Max Weber's 1910 call to study the press while taking his message to a region of the world that is often studied within sociology for what it lacks rather than as one engaging in activities that could be considered on their merit.¹ With few exceptions,² sociology has approached sub-Saharan Africa as a space that is paradigmatic of incompleteness and beset by continual setbacks.³ By and large, sociological scholarship on knowledge production is still constrained by *coloniality*, which leads to a privileging of western organizations' construction of knowledge while treating knowledge production by organizations in Africa as ephemeral. The result of this imbalance is that we know more about how the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* covered Rwanda and Darfur than how Kenya's *The Daily Nation* represented either atrocity. Because sociology has been mostly silent on how countries neighboring Darfur covered the atrocity, there is an implicit message that African fields are not part of the 'global' in the same way fields in the global north are.

To analyze how African media fields construct knowledge about mass atrocity, this dissertation project is based on a content analysis of every single news article on Darfur from Kenya, South Africa and Rwanda published between 1st of January 2003 and 31st December 2008. Results from this content analysis are used to provide overarching themes of how Darfur was represented in these three countries. Although these data suggest convergence in how Darfur was framed by media fields analyzed here - and those from the global north examined by Joachim Savelsberg- this project's focus on by-lines to differentiate articles by African journalists from those lifted from wire agencies provides a level of nuance hither missing. While the content analysis offers macro-level evidence for how Darfur was covered, it is sufficient in explaining why and how African media fields employ these frames. To provide this explanation, journalist interviews were conducted in Kenya, South Africa, and Nigeria from the summer of 2012 to the summer of 2015. These interviews were conducted in Nairobi, Mombasa, Johannesburg, and Lagos. All except three were conducted face to face and the three over the phone.

Overall, findings suggest that, although African journalists and scholars are often critical of the use of the ethnic conflict frame as reliant on colonial tropes, arguing that it

¹ In this speech Weber argued for a large scale study of the press and suggested that sociologists carry out both a content analysis of coverage and a qualitative analysis of stylistic devices employed by the press; and focusing on how issues were discussed both within newspapers and outside them as well (Weber 1976)

² See for example Adamezyk, Chunyre, and Lauren 2015; Berry 2015; Luft 2015; Mojola 2011, 2014; Nyseth Brehm and Fox 2016; Savelsberg and Siguru 2017; Wahutu 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2018.

³ Terms often used here often include but are not limited to: 'capacity building', 'modernization', 'sustainability' etc.

de-contextualizes and de-politicizes atrocities, they used this frame relatively frequently. Further, although most of the sources quoted were Sudanese state actors, non-Sudanese African sources were marginalized by both wire agencies and African journalists. Sources from the United States and the United Kingdom played a more prominent role in influencing narratives about Darfur in the countries studied here. African media fields are primary narrative constructors of the atrocities in Darfur for African audiences. Being African conspires to produce a condition of invisibility and erasure of African voices in the global narrative construction of knowledge about mass atrocity.

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The day will come when history will speak [...] It will be the history which will be taught in the countries which have won freedom from colonialism and its puppets. Africa will write its own history and in both north and south it will be a history of glory and dignity (Lumumba 1961:230–31).

Introduction: Why This Project

This project analyses how African media fields construct knowledge about mass atrocity in Africa. It is motivated by two factors, both of which led to me wanting to join graduate school. The first is rooted in my first year as an undergraduate student at the University of Minnesota. In 2007, my home country, Kenya, had a highly contested election that led to the worst bout of post-electoral violence in the country's history. This violence was primarily limited to some parts of Kenya. Watching and reading coverage from media outlets in most western countries, one would have been forgiven for thinking that the whole nation had convulsed into a bloody and vengeful conflict. There was little to no mention of the intricate political, economic and historical injustices that had led Kenya to this point. In the eyes of the global press, Kenya was proving to be a typical African country, beset by ethnic hatreds and with the potential to be another Rwanda. For many, Figures 1 and 2 represented what my country had become. These images represented all that was 'wrong' with Kenyan politics and linked the country to past, and on-going, atrocities in other African countries. For some - as pointed out by Somerville (2009) - the crisis had an atavistic inevitability, with a constant stream of people running away from the violence of, "burning houses [...] and even people hacked to death" (Ogola 2008). Images were barely contextualized, which subliminally suggested that the whole country was in "a state of senseless anarchy" (Bunce 2010:518).

Figure 1: Image of Kenya's Post-Election Violence in 2007



Image by Voice of America news.

Figure 2: Image of Kenya's Post-Election Violence in 2007



Image by Agence France Press (AFP)

The second motivation is an intellectual interest borne and nurtured by frustration, and the above quote from Patrice Lumumba's will. I joined the University of Minnesota's Sociology department with the sole focus of telling African stories. For me, this dissertation is about allowing people who look like me and live where I lived, to tell our own stories. It is about giving African journalists a platform to discuss how they and their peers are constructing knowledge about Africa. It is about pushing back against the tendency to talk *about* and *for* Africa without speaking *to* and *with Africans*. This is not to suggest that I seek to tell an 'African story' since, with 54 countries in the continent, what counts as an 'African story' is in itself contested (see, Jacobs 2015). Moreover, the data presented in the chapters that follow offer a strong rebuttal to the notion of an 'African story.'

This second motivation was ignited by the writings of scholars such as Mahmood Mamdani, Achille Mbembe, Gayatri Spivak, Edward Said and V. Y. Mudimbe. This motivation is further anchored on scholarship on the production of knowledge by Berger and Luckmann (1966), how to study this knowledge by Merton (1968) and Mannheim (1936), and Weber (1976) on the need to study the press. This scholarship allowed me to give voice not only to African journalists but to also put them in conversation with scholars viewed as postcolonial in their approach. Thus, if knowledge is constructed within the structures in which social actors are immersed, how then does the postcolonial subject construct knowledge of suffering and pain experienced by other postcolonial subjects? Although the subject matter I focus on is one of mass atrocity, my arguments can and should be viewed as generalizable to other fields that engage in the labor to construct knowledge about African realities.

Sociology And Africa[ns]

Africa and Africans have received their fair share of academic surveillance since the 1960s when independence swept through the continent. Scholars of media were among those who paid attention. They primarily examined how media organizations from the global north represent Africa. Consequently, some patterns about media representation of Africa have now become truisms both within and outside academia. Media fields in the global north: 1) often represent Africa (and the global south) through frames that are stereotypical, often ethnicizing African conflicts; 2) lionize Western rescue/intervention; and 3) represent Africa with paternalistic, negative, neo-liberal frames that harm international relations. New work by scholars such as Nothias (2016), Savelsberg (2015), Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm (2015), and Scott (2015) shows these old critiques need to be reexamined and updated to reflect the current state of western journalism and its coverage of Africa.

As an undergraduate student working on a senior paper on the representation of conflict in Africa by media organizations, I was struck by the dearth of scholarship on how African media represent atrocity in African countries. I knew so much more about how the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* had depicted Rwanda and Darfur than how *The Daily Nation* or *The Mail and Guardian Online* had represented these two atrocities. The literature on media representation of Africa repeated the truisms mentioned above while not analyzing how Africa represented itself. Mudimbe (1988:15) has referred to this pattern as “epistemological ethnocentrism.” In the following chapters, I fill the yawning chasm by showing how African media organizations and journalists represent Africa to African audiences. At the moment of writing this dissertation, only

three scholars have examined how African news organizations represent conflict in Africa (Alozie 2005, 2007; Mody 2010; Ray 2009). Despite Hallin and Mancini (2004:304) arguing for a case study approach to understanding how media interact with other social forces - and articulating which actors and institutions play a crucial role in shaping the narrative - very little has been done on media fields in Africa. The hesitation has been more significant within the discipline of sociology, which one would think is uniquely suited to investigate some of the questions addressed in this dissertation.

It would seem presumptuous to argue that the discipline of sociology is uniquely suited to study how African journalists and media organizations represent an atrocity in Africa. Indeed, as I have lamented throughout the writing of this dissertation, American sociology is uniquely blinkered in its approach towards what 'counts' as sociology. In fact, the *global & transnational* parts of this dissertation, with foci on media and Africa, have been accepted for presentation in more African Studies Association meetings - and recently International Communication Association meetings - than in my association, the American Sociological Association. My first published paper submission argued that sociologists were missing out by not studying how African media fields constructed knowledge about Africa (Wahutu 2017a). This manuscript got a desk reject within a week of submission to a Sociology journal. It was deemed too 'specific' for a generalist journal and would be a better "fit with a journal that focuses on media or Africa" (Co-Editors 2014). It was accepted in the first instance in a media studies journal, with reviewers pointing out that it was an essential contribution to the study of media representations of Africa. The next two papers published from the same dataset were welcomed with open arms in non-sociological journals as well.

So why do I think sociology is uniquely placed? At its heart, this dissertation is about the construction of knowledge by institutions located within a specific social context. It is motivated by Weber's (1976) call to study the press and relies on both Berger and Luckmann's (1966) and Merton's (1968) exposition of not only the contextual nature of knowledge but the limits and opportunities contexts present. It builds on thinkers such as Bourdieu (1999) and DiMaggio and Powell (1991) on the one hand, and Mbembe (2001), Nyamnjoh (2005) and Shome and Hegde (2002) on the other. It stands at the intersection of two strands of sociological scholarship, that on the influence of global scripts on local knowledge production and that on the impact of nation-specific contextual and institutional realities (see, Haller and Hadler 2008; Savelsberg 2015; Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm 2015). My use of field theory and neo-institutional theories concomitantly harkens back to Benson's (2006) call to link the two theories together when studying media fields while my inclusion of postcolonial theory is in line with Go's (2013) call for a postcolonial sociology. In all of this, I argue for a re-imagination in studying representations of Africa by showing just how Africa represents itself. Thus, this dissertation fills the void in sociological scholarship, which currently appears to have little to no interest in how African media fields cover Africa and Africans.

Darfur

Darfur, a region in western Sudan, shot into international prominence following a rebel attack in the village of Golo on the 26th of February 2003 (Flint and Waal 2008; Mamdani 2010; Prunier 2008). For several years following the first reports, Darfur became the cause célèbre in most universities in the global north. Celebrity Figures such

as George Clooney (and his father Nick Clooney) and Don Cheadle traveled to the region, with George Clooney addressing the United Nations about the plight of Darfuris. Darfur was not the only conflict unfolding in Africa, nor was it the longest running one or the one with the most substantial number of deaths. Mamdani (2007, 2010) suggests that this notoriety was primarily due to the ease with which Western audiences could label actors in the conflict as ‘good’ or ‘bad.’ He suggests that Darfur fit neatly into the global war on terror, meaning that the perpetrators, defined as ‘Arab/Muslim’ could easily be identified as being radically *Other* and thus easy to rally against.

Known as “Land of the Fur” in English, Darfur was once a mighty sultanate and was only incorporated into Sudan by the British Empire in 1917 (Mamdani 2010; Prunier 2008). Such incorporation of one part of the British Empire into another part was not unique to Darfur, of course; the British colonial administration had acted similarly along the Kenyan coast in the early 1900s. Additionally, although the violence studied here is often talked about as starting in 2003, violence in the region dates as far back to the mid-to-late 1980s with two peaks in 1987-1989 and between 1995 and 1999 (Flint and Waal 2008:277; Savelsberg 2015:12). What is unique about the iteration studied here is that the attack in 2003 preceded one of the most destructive waves of violence.

The Data

I began collecting news articles on the Darfur conflict from Kenya, Rwanda, and South Africa in the fall of 2011. As no electronic record went as far back as needed (2003), I had to rely on microfilms and going through each newspaper, page-by-page, from each country. I identified 850 news articles on Darfur from these three countries. I conducted a

content analysis of the entire population of articles, which resulted in a dataset of 850 cases. I knew that to do this dissertation in the manner that I thought of as holistic, I would have to interview the journalists whose work I found included in this dataset. In the spring of 2011, with the guidance of my co-advisor, Professor Joachim Savelsberg, I reached out to several journalists from South Africa and Kenya and, eventually, Nigeria. Journalists from Rwanda were reticent to conduct interviews about their work. I finally supplemented the content analysis and my initial set of interviews by conducting, in 2015, a six-month participant observation of a journalism school in Kenya and the second round of journalist interviews.

The chapters of this dissertation will primarily rely on these data as I examine how African journalists construct knowledge about atrocity in Africa. I proceed by discussing various themes that are central to current scholarship: 1) the role of media organizations in constructing knowledge about Africa and communicating it to Africans; 2) interactions between national news organizations and wire agencies in this construction process; and 3) sources quoted by the different journalist communities located within countries. I try, as much as possible, to allow journalists to express their opinions about the various issues each chapter deals with. This process, though challenging at times, is vital as this dissertation sets out to provide African journalists with a platform to articulate their roles as carrier groups, located in the postcolony to cover an atrocity in the postcolony.

Road Map

This dissertation is divided into eight chapters. The first presents a review of the literature. It delves into scholarship on knowledge production and a discussion of the theories that I use. The scholars of that anchor this chapter are primarily Berger and Luckmann (1966), Mannheim (1936) and Merton (1968). I link this classic work to postcolonial scholarship, in conjunction with field and neo-institutional theories. While media studies have made use of field and/or neo-institutional approaches, this is one of the few studies that introduces postcolonial theory into this literature. The second chapter is focused on data and methods. It also clarifies my research questions.⁴

Chapter three traces the genealogy of media fields in several African countries, starting with Egyptian newspaper *Al' Wakae* in 1797 and ending with the Kenyan media field in 2012. Relying on Benson's (2013) discussions of the *logic, structure, and position* of media fields, this chapter focuses on the relationships between the media field and the state shaped during the colonial period, and maintained in postcolonial Africa. Understanding this context, I argue, is crucial to any project that seeks to explain how media fields in Africa construct knowledge about events both within their own countries and in other African countries. The findings in this chapter, on the relationship between the media and political fields, anchor the analysis and discussion in chapter four on whom journalists quote as a source, and who is thus viewed as a 'credible' co-constructor of knowledge.

⁴ I had initially wanted to carry out a newsroom ethnography à la Cottle (2007), Gans (1979), and Schlesinger (1978), but factors beyond my control, which I discuss in chapter two, made this impossible.

In chapters five and six, the type of knowledge constructed by media fields in Africa is analyzed. By focusing on the frames employed by the media fields, chapter five highlights social context within which fields are immersed in, such as relationships with the political field (chapter three) and the role of sources (chapter four), and how these contexts affect the choice of frames that journalists employ. Chapter five points to the effects of social context on all three countries, while chapter six narrows the scope to the Kenyan media field.

Chapter seven illustrates the process through which individuals become journalists. Its approach differs from that in the preceding chapters since it is less about the representation of mass atrocities and more about the individuals that choose to become journalists. It analyzes the motivations of journalism students to enter the field and juxtaposes these with the motivations of those already in the field.

In the concluding Chapter eight I link the findings and arguments from the previous chapters explicitly to the research questions raised in chapter two. Finally, chapter eight also summarizes the lessons learned from the findings and discusses the contributions made by this dissertation to both the sociological study of knowledge construction by the press and to the study of media representations of Africa in the field of communication studies.

Chapter 1: Literature Review

Introduction

Sociology of knowledge informs us that knowledge, taken for granted assumptions about the world, reflects the social location of an actor. Berger and Luckmann (1966) and Mannheim (1936) both remind us that one's structural position, social context, and social location can and should be presumed to affect how they will view and understand an event. Hence, understanding how knowledge (in the sociological sense of the term) is constituted, how collective memories are generated, and how social situations are framed and defined is essential. This is even more poignant when analyzing the representations of events such as genocides and mass atrocity⁵ by news organizations in countries not going through the atrocity and covering it for their 'home' audiences. Focusing on countries not going through an atrocity is an attempt to understand what Karl Mannheim refers to as the challenge of 'talking over each other' when the subject matter does not originate "from the same universe of discourse," (1936:281).⁶

Representations, just as the knowledge that anchors them, are highly dependent on one's social location. Work by Savelsberg (2015), Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm (2010) and Zacher, Nyseth-Brehm, and Savelsberg (2014) contends that the shape representations of an atrocity take may contribute to the denial⁷ of victimization and

⁵ Mass atrocity here is defined in the same manner as it is by Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay (2004:378) and Valentino (2000:4) as the intentional killing of a significant number of any group of noncombatants (at least 50,000 over five years).

⁶ Mannheim (1936) is not specifically talking about mass atrocity but rather, more generally different types of knowledge that are a result of individuals applying different knowledge frames to the same issue

⁷ Stanley Cohen talks about the different forms this denial may take such as the process of normalisation which leads to a cultural representation and eventual neutralisation both of which encourage a "dulled, passive acceptance of violence," (2001:52)

suffering, or they may induce or legitimize different forms of intervention. Conditions under which knowledge about mass atrocity is generated and how these conditions affect the framing of mass atrocities are neither well understood nor well discussed within contemporary literature. The few exceptions to this have been the work done by Savelsberg (2015) and Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm (2015) and, to a lesser extent, Alozie (2007), Grzyb (2010) and Melvern (2006). The construction of this knowledge is what this project attempts to explicate more generally.

This chapter is divided into four sections, the first three of which cover literature in the substantive areas of this dissertation, followed by the discussion and concluding sections. The first section focuses on research on knowledge creation and the second examines work on the construction of knowledge by media organizations and fields more specifically. This section reviews literature on the production of news generally and specifically the representation of atrocities in Africa. Section three focuses on the three theories that undergird this project. This approach to the chapter enables me to situate this dissertation within academic fields that I view as essential while engaging with the arguments and issues raised by the various works that I rely on in my project.

Section one focuses on research on knowledge, its relations to society and how the news constructs and shapes knowledge. It also engages literature on collective memory and highlights how news organizations rely on memory to make sense of the present. The use of memory here, specifically collective memory, is anchored on the understanding of collective memory as “supra-individual” and necessitating the attribution of subjective meanings of the past (Savelsberg and King, 2007:16). It is also informed by arguments made by Olick and Levy (1997) on the conditioning effect of

significant pasts on actors (such as colonization, political strife, and intervention, or lack thereof, during an atrocity) that engage in claims-making. Olick (1999) further argues that utterances made by actors carry with them *memory traces* of their earlier use. Grzyb (2010) touches on this by highlighting the role of the memory of Rwanda for Canadian (and western more generally) journalists when they report on Darfur. This project highlights how the presence, and absence, of particular frames, are a function of memory and nation-specific traits.⁸

The second section includes work done more broadly, in political science, communication studies, journalism studies, peace studies, and international studies. This is necessary as scholarship on news production and representations within sociology is quite limited in scope. It also works to provide a multidisciplinary approach that I view as necessary when endeavoring to not only understand but also efficiently analyze news media - in particular print media. This interdisciplinary approach further acknowledges essential contributions made by other disciplines, to our understanding of the processes through which journalists and news organizations go, to construct our reality (see for example Cook 1998; Gans 1979; Pedelty 1995; Schudson 2011; Tuchman 1978; Weimann 2000).

The idea of a ‘constructed reality’ is anchored on an awareness that undistorted news is in and of itself not always a tenable goal.⁹ This is based on the understanding that the simple act of reproduction comprises an act of distorting reality (Gans 1979: 305;

⁸ The use of the term “nation-specific trait” in this context differs from how it is used by mass communication scholars such as Wu (2003). Here it implies those traits of the nations from which journalists live in and not, as used by Wu and others, the traits of the country being reported on.

⁹ I am not advocating for a moral equivalence. Some distortions are so insidious that they should be avoided if not highlighted for their ridiculous and outrageous nature. An example of such a distortion is Robert Kaplan’s *Coming Anarchy* or initial coverage of the second Iraqi invasion by the New York Times which portrayed Iraq and Saddam as harboring Al Qaeda and Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Shapiro 1988: xii). From this stem my use of the term *framing* instead of *bias* throughout this dissertation. Framing allows for a more dynamic approach that enables me to consider, and account for, structural pressures at play, such as organizational, and broader institutional¹⁰ logics placing demands on journalists within a professional field.¹¹ Framing also eschews normative claims about fairness/unfairness, and balanced/unbalanced. This approach allows for a focus on journalists as enmeshed within multiple loci exerting various pressures on them - as both individual members of society and as members of a professional field- (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Gans 1979; Merton 1968; Tuchman 1978).

Entman (1993) posits that frames have - at the very the least - four locations in the process of communication: the communicator (journalists), the text (news reports), the receiver of the communication (the audience) and the culture¹² (social context). Frames provide multiple utilities for journalists as they attempt to make sense of an unfolding event for the audience. They define the problem (diagnostic frames), suggest possible remedies for the problem (prognostic frames), and they work to provide a rationale for engagement (motivational frames) (Benford and Snow 2000; Entman 1993; Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm 2015). The understanding of frames favored in the paper is influenced

¹⁰ Organization here implies individual outlets, within a professional arena, working disparately and independently of each other. Institution implies multiple organizations working in concert towards a particular goal. In this understanding, New York Times would be a news organization while being part of a larger media institution whose goal is to provide the news to the public. See Cook (1998), Peterson (2009) and Tuchman 1978 for a more specific discussion of these terms vis-a-vis the media and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) more broadly.

¹¹ An institutional approach allows for an understanding of news organizations as being in a contextual relationship with society rather than assuming that they operate outside the confines of the society within which it is embedded (Peterson 2009)

¹² In his discussion of culture Entman (1993:53) states that it can be empirically demonstrated as a set of commonly used frames in discourse of members in a particular social grouping.

by Benford and Snow (2000), Gerhards (1995), Goffman (1976), and Reese (2001), all of whom point to frames being *employed*. This implies that journalists do not create frames, or knowledge, afresh each time they represent an event. Instead, they rely on already existing framing paradigms/repositories to make sense of unfolding events. Here Reese's definition of a frame is useful

Frames [are] *organizing principles* that are socially *shared* and *persistent* over time, that work *symbolically* to meaningfully *structure* the social world (2001:11) [emphasis in the original]

Altheide (1996:651) reinforces this idea of a meaningful *structure* by stating that frames work to provide the boundaries within which particular events will be addressed and, just as importantly, how they will not be discussed. Hope (2010) and Gerhards (1995) both contend that the reliance on a repository of frames is what enables an event to be conceptualized and translated into a problem and eventual prescription of available solutions. Gerhards states that the framing process occurs when individuals “first define the empirical phenomenon, fact or occurrence as an issue, then label the phenomenon as a problem [that] should [be dealt] with” (1995:228). One way to efficiently carry this out is by *domesticating*¹³ the news by framing it in a manner that moves in concert with the assumed predispositions of its audience rather than working against them (Carey 1996).

The second section moves from the literature on media more generally to focus on research on foreign news and ultimately literature on reporting on atrocity in Africa. This

¹³ Hall (1973) refers to this process as encoding, where the foreign is transformed through its adaptation into recognizable events using knowledge structures familiar to the audience

section focuses specifically on the atrocities in Darfur¹⁴ but will from time to time draw on scholarship on the representations of the genocide in Rwanda. As with the first section, this section focuses primarily on research within the field of media scholarship from multiple disciplinary perspectives.¹⁵

This section revolves around questions raised in Weber's 1910 speech at the inaugural meeting of the German Sociological Society in which he proposed a roadmap through which to carry out an empirical study of the press. Weber takes the importance of the news and newspapers in society for granted, never questioning whether either was relevant or essential to society (1976). For Weber, it was imperative to analyze issues such as:

- 1) Not only what made it to the papers but also what did not (what is deemed to be newsworthy).
- 2) What the causes and consequences are of tensions between news as a source of information and as an advertising medium (constraints placed on packaging the news by economic concerns).
- 3) How, and if, differences in journalistic practices were influenced by relationships between the newspaper to its sources (the role and influence of sources).
- 4) What journalistic practices were affected by a tradition where institutional logics played a greater role in affecting the shape of the news than the intellectual acuity or the status of the journalists (organizational and institutional logics)?
- 5) The social origins and educational background of journalists (the social context of the journalist).¹⁶

¹⁴ I refer to Darfur here as an atrocity and not genocide since there appears to be no consensus as to whether or not it is genocide. The U.N. has referred to it as a Humanitarian Catastrophe and as Ethnic Cleansing at different stages of the crisis.

¹⁵ I address questions of research methodology in the next chapter.

¹⁶ Weber's proposal for an empirical analysis of the press lists nine areas that should be of interests to any study of the press. Here I focus largely on those questions that resonate with this project, but for a complete list of questions raised in this address, see Weber (1979).

The third section focuses on the theories undergirding this project. My use of multiple theories does not imply that more theory is always better. However, it is my firm belief that to begin to answer some of the questions I am interested in, I have to rely on various strands of scholarship at once. This implicitly suggests that to make these strands operate within the same framework, I need to rely on multiple theoretical approaches. Moreover, as suggested by Hadler and Haller (2011), the use of a single theory may at times fail to grasp all relevant aspects of behavior. My application of multiple theories is also due to the realization that the three are not mutually exclusive. The split here, therefore, is more for analytical clarity for the reader rather than an espousal of theoretical exclusivity. The theories I use for this project are field, neo-institutional, and postcolonial theories. While field and neo-institutional theories have been individually and concomitantly used successfully in the study of media and journalism (see for example works by Benson and Neveu 2005; Benson 1999, 2006; Bourdieu 1998, 2005), both are somewhat insufficient in analyzing media institutions in the global south by themselves.

They do not sufficiently consider the social and historical contexts within which different African journalists are ensconced, which I believe is necessary. Nor do they allow for the elucidation of the role of nation-specific traits and their interplay with institutional and professional logics and realities in the countries I study. Since not every human interaction takes place within the professional field, there has to be an attempt to analyze interactions that occur outside of it, and here is where field and neo-institutional theories are somewhat wanting by themselves for this project. Investigating the role of outside the field relationships in affecting how individuals may interact and behave

within the field is influenced by Goffman who suggests that interactions that occur outside an on-going interaction may change how the interaction is unfolding (1983:4).¹⁷ Merton (1968) also views the relations and interactions outside one's professional field as being just as relevant as those interactions within their professional field in any analysis of knowledge production. This is what influences my inclusion of postcolonial theory, as a way through which to analyze and understand the role of nation-specific traits such as ethnic identities and colonization.

Knowledge as a sociological concept

I rely on three epistemological understandings of the sociology of knowledge by Berger and Luckmann (1966), Mannheim (1936), and Merton (1968). Berger and Luckmann (1966) state that the sociology of knowledge is concerned with the connections between human thought and the social relations within which it arises. This mirrors the understandings of knowledge espoused by Marx (1904) who argued that human activity (labor), and the relations human activity generates, facilitates human thought. Two years after Berger and Luckmann (1966), Merton stated that the sociology of knowledge is “concerned with the relations between knowledge and other existential factors in society and culture,” (1968:456). Merton (1968) explains existential factors as being located in social bases (social position, occupational role, class, etc.) or cultural bases (values, ethos, climate of opinion, types of cultures, etc.). He viewed the relations/interactions outside one's professional field as being just as significant as those within it are for any

¹⁷ Goffman's point here was more specifically about trying to understand face-to-face interactions. He suggested that one had to understand the effect of matters outside a particular interaction to be able appreciate the face-to-face interactions they were observing (See Goffman 1983:3, 12, 14).

analysis of knowledge. The third understanding of sociology of knowledge I rely on is Mannheim's (1936). Mannheim understood sociology of knowledge as being primarily focused on how human thought operated in the society as an instrument for collective action. For Mannheim knowledge cannot be understood without investigating and understanding the social context from which it is created and utilized (1936:2).

News as knowledge

News organizations work to both create and shape our knowledge about the world outside ourselves (Gans 2005; McCombs and Shaw 1972; Schudson 1982; Tuchman 1978; Weimann 2000). Gans (2005) and Wall (2007) both point to the importance of the news in constructing the ideas of nationhood - and society - by helping in the process of making these vague concepts real. News organizations and the presentation of the news, therefore, provide an ideal opportunity to analyze how knowledge is both constructed and shaped, the journalists that produce and develop this knowledge (through framing), and to what extent their social and professional contexts affect their inquiry.

As objects of sociological interest, news organizations provide an opportunity to analyze arguments by scholars on how, and to what extent, institutions set normative frameworks within which individuals construct meanings of events (Fine 2001; Lippmann 1922; Merton 1968). News organizations also provide an opportunity to analyze the processes that work to provide institutional control of human comportment through having predefined patterns of conduct (Berger and Luckmann 1966:55). In this dissertation, these patterns include journalistic norms on whom to quote as a source, the use of frames to construct knowledge of Darfur, division of labor and hierarchies, and

social locations within which journalists are ensconced. The patterns are created for channeling journalistic conduct towards one direction, making the unknown known.

Entman (2004), McCombs and Shaw (1972), and Tuchman (1978) suggest that the news has an agenda-setting function in society and achieves this through the selective attribution of specific details and focusing audiences' attention to specific events. The news, however, doesn't necessarily tell us *what* to think but rather *how* we should think about it (Cohen 2001:169). Stories that focus on terrorism for example, not only work to define what is 'abhorrent violence' but also what should be understood as 'normative violence,'¹⁸ creating an *imagined community* of audiences that share in the consumption and affirmation of this normativity (Wall 2007; Weimann 2000). While focusing on terrorism, may be the manifest/conscious function of the story (i.e., getting the story out), the contemporaneous construction of what is normative is the latent/unconscious function of this focus. Subsequently, the framing of such a story relies on already salient knowledge and understandings of terrorists and with this, repulsive and normative forms of violence in society. This delineation of manifest and latent functions is what Merton (1968) views as a critical factor in analyzing knowledge production.

Berger and Luckmann (1966) also provide the answer to the question why I focus on the news by explaining the role of the sociology of knowledge. They argue that the sociology of knowledge must concern itself with what people *define* and *know* as their everyday *reality*. For Berger and Luckmann (1966), this definition of everyday reality is what establishes the very fabric upon which society creates meanings. I suggest that the role of journalists in presenting and packaging of news is equally important since they are

¹⁸ For further discussion of this, Asad's (2007) brilliant work *On Suicide Bombing* does a wonderful job of explaining the difference between these two forms of violence.

transmitters/carriers of knowledge. The shaping, and spreading, of knowledge, is made possible through journalists' decisions on what is remarkable and worthy of being made *known* to the audience (Fine 2001; Tuchman 1978).¹⁹ These decisions continually define and redefine, constitute and reconstitute phenomena and require the employing of narratives that work to organize and present reality for the audience. Park (1940) refers to this process as the creation of a *conceptual order*, which creates what Mills (1967) calls *second-hand worlds* for the audience. Gamson, Croteau and Hoynes (1989), Lippmann (1922) and Weimann (2000) also illuminate why an analysis of the news is necessary. They point out that the creation of *conceptual order* is an attempt by journalists to reconstruct complex narratives into simpler models so they (journalists) can understand it. This works to objectify new experiences, such as mass atrocity, in a manner that facilitates their assimilation into an already existing body of knowledge.

As socialized members of society, journalists' knowledge is representative of, and anchored upon, their societal influences on knowledge (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Durkheim 1961; Lippmann 1922).²⁰ Fairclough also suggests that texts (in this case news reports) are dependent on society and history, and the ways both provide an order through which to structure discourse (1992:195). This echoes Gamson et al. (1989) who argue that the news is never neutral and manifests the view of those that produce it. The audience will consume the news through the idiosyncratic coloration given to it by journalists (Gamson et al. 1989; Mills 1967). However, Hall (1973), Lippmann (1922) and Weimann (2000) remind us that encoded narrative is never a unilateral sign but

¹⁹ I do not imply that journalists make these decisions in isolation. As pointed out by Cook (1998:72) and Sigal (1973:173), and in the next section, this is often a group process occurring within a hierarchical bureaucracy.

²⁰ The role of professional influence on journalists' knowledge is discussed in the third section of this chapter.

complex, providing the potential to be decoded in multiple ways in manners incongruent with the original intent of the journalists. The audience is likely to decode the encoded narrative in a heterogeneous fashion (Hall 1973). To mitigate against the varying decoding of new narratives, journalists inscribe within their narratives a preferred reading through the use of already existing narratives and sedimented knowledge (Hall 1973; Tuchman 1978). Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm (2015) show this process by highlighting the use of a crime frame after judicial intervention in Darfur by the International Criminal Court (ICC). They show that Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir is labeled a criminal and perpetrator of the atrocities in Darfur more frequently after judicial interventions by the ICC than before interventions.

News narratives and collective memory

As stated in this chapter's introduction, the primary concern for this project is the varying ways in which journalists perceive of, and frame, Darfur by taking into account the social conditioning of their knowledge, and actively engaging existential factors such as professional pressures and influence of the countries and societies journalists come from. As a result, it is invariably interested in news narrative²¹ and the social context within which journalists construct this narrative. Narrative is defined here as a general orientation toward storytelling and is therefore susceptible to being personalized and emotional. Understood this way, news narrative is thus dynamic and cannot be viewed as a singular phenomenon that is uniform and monolithic across social contexts (Benson 2013:49).

²¹ Narrative here is understood as existing beyond its own textuality and instead governed not by what it contains (content) but by its function (Lucaites and Condit 1985; Prior 2004).

Benson (2013:50) states that, institutionally, narrative in journalism has recently gotten approval also through the kinds of stories that have won the Pulitzer Prize.²² Vinitzki-Seroussi's (2002) work on commemoration points to the importance of narratives and their role in the creation of meaning, interpretation of reality, and the construction of the world (and its moral and social order) for an audience. Savelsberg and King (2005, 2007) also point to the importance of analyzing narratives and the context they originate from by showing that different institutions, such as courts and international tribunals, are likely to produce distinct kinds of narratives that affect how different atrocities are remembered and framed. Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm (2015) and Savelsberg (2015) show that differences in media narratives and individual journalists' perception are linked to the social context (such as national interest) within which they are embedded.

These studies show that narratives, which journalists create and rely on to frame events such as mass atrocity, are neither naïvely constructed nor innocently relied upon. Fine (2001), Pendas (2006), and Savelsberg and King (2011) show that narrative genres employed by news organizations often focus on the individual, neglecting broader structural and cultural forces at play. Both Savelsberg and King (2011), and Pendas (2006) point to the importance of the media narrative during the Auschwitz trials in captivating the public. Pendas (2006:261) also shows that the focus was more on specific issues of cases such as the "physiognomy," and "personality" of the characters, and the more dramatic aspects of the trials. Pendas (2006: 259) further talks of a *structural amnesia* where reports from one day did not reference the previous day's reporting of the

²² Wahl-Jorgensen states that in the U.S., Pulitzer prize-winning journalism is one that increasingly employs "emotional story-telling," (2013:13).

trials. This results in events being represented as products of forces that are beyond human control, like the fluctuations in the weather, without consideration of context or relation to global forces (Tuchman, 1978; Weimann 2000).²³ Tuchman (1978) and Rosen (1999) point out that the creation of a dramatic narrative is a skill that is coveted and learned by journalists through years of practice. This process involves frequent repetition of dramatic narratives, which conventionalizes and makes part of society's sedimented knowledge about events and regions. Weimann (2000) and Asad (2007) highlight this process by examining public attitudes on terrorism and who is or is not a terrorist. Nonetheless, it is imperative to note that Darnton (1975) and Hallin and Mancini (1984) state that the focus on dramatic narratives in the news is a relatively new phenomenon with the shift occurring in the 1970s.

Fine (2001) emphasizes the role of narratives in making structural aspects of a story more compelling and memorable to the audience. This necessitates simplifying complex issues into a story about heroes and villains, creating an ordered narrative that makes it easier for the audience to remember and follow the story (Lippmann, 1922; Park 1940). Such narratives glean from everyday language, available to journalists, to provide structure for, and to frame, events, pointing to a reflexive embeddedness of narratives within the contexts in which they are produced and presented (Hall 1973, 2007; Schudson 1989; Tuchman 1978; Weimann 2000). The rootedness of narratives, Mannheim (1936) suggests, makes it possible for different individuals to interpret events in similar ways as long as they are immersed in the same social context. The effect of this is journalists'

²³ Gruley and Duvall (2012), Hawk (1992) and Mamdani (2007) have shown that issues like poverty, hunger and disease in Africa are often portrayed as outcomes of 'natural' conditions unique to Africa and Africans.

social backgrounds permeating into how they construct their narrative, which both affects the scope of inquiry and limits the resulting narrative genres. Savelsberg and King (2007) state that this limited repertoire of narrative genres acts to limit journalists' levels of innovation when reporting.

Connerton (1989) and Halbwachs (1992) suggest that limits to narrative innovation may also be a consequence of a reliance on memory to explain present events. Zelizer (2011) states that journalists structure their coverage of particular events in a manner that invites the audience to engage in the past. Schwartz (1982) and Tuchman (1978) also caution us that journalists selectively reference historical elements to ensure they endure. Thus, in the reporting of mass atrocity, what journalists remember and its juxtaposition with an on-going mass atrocity is crucial in understanding how knowledge works and is employed. This engagement with the past necessitates the representation of a mass atrocity as being *just as bad as* or *worse than* a previous atrocity in an attempt to raise the passion of the audience. Alexander (2004a) refers to this as *analogical bridging*. To achieve this simultaneous engagement with the past and the present, the construction of a shared trauma through narrative has to occur. This construction involves an outcry about the profaning of a value that is shared and thought of as sacred, which relies upon a narrative "about a horribly destructive process" (Alexander 2004b: 11). One way to attain this is through a narrative that focuses on individuals and their plight with an invitation to form, what Horton and Wohl (1956) refer to as, a *parasocial relationship* with individuals. Alexander (2004b) has argued that this link is created by making known:

- a) The nature of pain visible to the audience by explaining what happened.
- b) The nature of the victim and by virtue of this the nature of the perpetrator.
- c) The relation of the victims' trauma to the wider audience.
- d) The attribution of responsibility.

While not exhaustive, these four points illustrate the theoretical stages through which news coverage evolves to make a mass atrocity intelligible for the audience. This occurs through the selective presentation and representation of information within which a reflexive attribution of meaning is a function of the audiences' social context and reality (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Lippmann 1922; Mannheim 1936; Merton 1968; Tuchman 1978). The question thus becomes how narratives will differ with respect to socio-geographic differences in which journalists are situated. One may hypothesize that there would likely be a difference of narratives between journalists from the global north and those from Africa when reporting on the atrocities in Darfur.

The Sociology of News

The study of the media, specifically newspapers, as a source of knowledge can be traced to seminal works by Anderson (1983), Habermas (1989), Tocqueville (1947) and Weber (1976). Anderson's (1983) work discussed the communal effect of universal readership, which created an *imagined community* of readers. For Habermas (1989) the development of newspapers in the 18th century provided a space within which people in society could converse as equals. However, as the 19th century drew to a close, Habermas notes that this space becomes commercialized and consequently "refeudalized" by capitalism and the capitalistic class. Tocqueville's (1947) work on newspapers centered on the

interaction between newspapers and associations. Tocqueville suggests that society could not unite until the newspapers “brought [the associations] together and [kept] them united,” (p. 119). Recently media scholars have echoed Tocqueville’s view of the role of the news by stating that printers in colonial America sought to unite citizens by primarily printing foreign news, which afforded the local readers no grounds to grumble about local politics (Anderson, Downie Jr., and Schudson 2016; Schudson 2011). In colonial America, foreign news allowed for the creation of an *Other* and enabled a dichotomous view of the world: a world with colonial America at its center and a foreign periphery devoid of values seen as important and dear to the center. Anderson (1983) and Tocqueville (1947), suggested that journalists should be viewed as constructing society and giving form to the amorphous idea of a nation.

Over the years, the study of journalists, and the content that they produce, has also grown to include the contexts within which this production of the news occurs (Rosen 1999; Schudson 2011; Tuchman 1972, 1978; Wahl-Jorgensen 2013b). This shift has led to analyses that move away from questions focusing on the rigid *bias* versus *objectivity* paradigm to those on how news organizations, and routines within them, play a role in shaping the news (Reese 2001; Sigal 1973; Tuchman 1978). This shift has also informed our understanding of the news as an organizational product and hence *constructed* rather than as a transcription of events (Dimitrova and Strömbäck 2008; Schramm 1959). Such approaches have sensitized us to not only the organizational process and structures, but also the ritualistic socialization of journalists that lead to a homogeneity of work routines and outputs (Bourdieu 1999; Cottle 2006; Schudson 2001).

Additionally, journalists have come to be understood as not only producing the news but also engaging in constructing and giving meaning to reality (Gans 2005; Gitlin 1980; Schudson 2011). Rosen informs us that some journalists define their roles as a craft that builds the world for an audience while also, simultaneously, describing this world to the audience (1999: 2). It is essential to remember that as a result of social context, sedimented knowledge, and questions they ask and seek answers for, journalists have a perspectival view and understanding of the reality they construct and give meaning to (Gans 2005:311; Merton 1968). Schudson (2011) highlights this point by stating that the very act of communicating to the audience, journalism's primary function, is a "social coordination of individuals and groups through shared symbols and meanings" (p. 11).

What Shapes Content?

Producing and packaging news content is influenced by assumptions about how the world works, what will make sense, and what the audience should see as exigent (Gamson et al. 1989; Gans 2005; Schudson 2011). For a story to satisfy these criteria, it is best served by not only being an exception but also bordering on the margins of what journalists, and by extension, their audience, understand as normative (Gans 2005; Weimann 2000). The news will thus incorporate particular narratives and explanations that reify the normative while making alternative narratives subordinate. Analyzing the news within this framework necessitates an appreciation of the fact that journalists are likely to pursue issues that concern people like themselves and those that are reflective of concerns of those within their social contexts (Gamson et al. 1989; Moeller 1999; Schudson 2011). This requires a simultaneous analysis of multiple factors that may influence the shape of the news as highlighted by Weber's 1901 speech.

Journalists' agency

Hall's (2000) work alerts us to the autonomy journalists have in selecting, researching and producing the news. Schudson (2011) also points out that selecting, highlighting, and shaping of news is part of journalists' work as they disseminate and produce information on issues of general public interest and importance. This process of selection is informed by selective judgments, values, and prejudices (Crilly 2010; Entman and Rojecki 2010). As already mentioned, journalists do not transcribe events, and they have some latitude in interpreting them according to their perspectives and understandings of said events (Schudson 2011).

This latitude suggests that journalists will ascribe causes and effects to reality in an attempt to typify the unknown into the known (Chin-Chuan et al. 2002; Park 1940). Schudson suggests that the act of making assertions as to what topics the audience needs to see as salient highlights the process of constructing reality and creates a hierarchy of moral salience (2011:31). This process, referred to in this project as framing, works to structure the world by providing boundaries within which to discuss an event (Altheide 1996:651; Entman 1993; Reese 2001:11).

Bureaucratic structures

Entman (2004) and Hall (2000) both suggest that to understand how the news is framed requires one to be attentive to the role of the bureaucratic organization. Additionally, Cook (1998) also cautions against reading too much into the strength of agency in the process of framing. He argues that transposing individual motivation onto journalists as a whole ignores the fact that the packaging of news is a group process that occurs in a hierarchical newsroom (Cook 1998:72). Sigal (1973) further illustrates this hierarchy and group process to framing by stating that editors pore over a story and sometimes not only

cut details but also add others. Moeller (1999), Chaon (2007) and Crilly (2010) have also highlighted the crucial role played by editors in the choice of not only what stories about an atrocity will be published but also how they will be framed.²⁴

Entman and Rojecki (2010) and Sigal (1973) have also suggested that a story's congruence with both dominant professional norms (such as the types of sources quoted) and organizational routines (space management and deadlines) play a significant role in not only determining the specific aspects to be focused on but also their eventual framing. Furthermore, Entman and Rojecki (2010) and Reese (2001) both argue that the news exemplifies the effects of a tacit obeisance of professional norms and routines, and cultural patterns within which journalists are enmeshed.²⁵ Consequently, though a journalist's agency may play a role in shaping news content, literature on journalistic agency intimates that this role is minimal at best (Entman and Rojecki 2010; Rosen 1999; Sigal 1973). This suggests the possibility of a journalist's perception of an atrocity as an individual being different from how their published reporting frames it.

The news will be framed in a manner that employs "words and images highly salient" within society's knowledge structure (Entman 2004:6). Rughani (2010) alludes to this by pointing out that, in the course of reporting, a range of editorial guidelines provide a framework within which a journalist finds balance between the need for the audience to be informed and the sensibilities of the subjects being covered.²⁶ This suggests a presence of an already set pattern being relied upon, both consciously and

²⁴ Chaon's and Crilly's accounts are even more germane since both have reported on an on-going atrocity while being stationed in the country going through the atrocity. Chaon covered the genocide in Rwanda as it was unfolding while Crilly covered Darfur from 2004 to 2009 travelling extensively to the region.

²⁵ See also Chin-Chuan et al. (2002) and Tuchman (1978) who also argue the same in their respective projects

²⁶ He does also state that these guidelines are variously interpreted depending on the context journalists' find themselves in, they are rarely fixed or concrete

unconsciously, by journalists, a pattern that would presumably include reporting styles, types of sources, who counts as a credible source, choice of frames to be employed, images and metaphors used and what event is deemed worthy of being made knowable.

Sources

Constructing the news narrative is further complicated by that fact that journalists rarely have the opportunity to witness an unfolding event in its entirety. They often have to reconstruct it from bustle of information that may be conflictual, coupled with patchy eyewitness accounts. In such situations, Epstein (1973), Park (1940) and Tuchman (1973, 1978) all suggest that intelligibility becomes paramount.²⁷ It is within this environment that journalists have to decide on what frames to use and who is a credible and reliable source.

That journalists have the unenviable task of gathering as much relevant information as quickly and efficiently as they can, framing it in a manner that not only captures the audience but also appears simultaneously novel and familiar, all the while facing pressures such as deadlines and resource pressure cannot be denied (Chaon 2007; Hilsum 2007). As a result of this, news organizations work to *routinize the unexpected* to ensure efficient ways to provide a product that is satisfactory for the audience (Tuchman 1973). One way journalists do this is through the use of conventional channels, which rely mainly on briefings, wire services,²⁸ and press releases as sources of information ideally in addition to, but more often instead of, first-hand witnessing and independent research (Sigal 1973:121). Rosen (1999) refers to this process as “institutional reporting,”

²⁷ This process is what Entman (1991, 1993) refers to as framing and argues that it is in this process that the news content should be understood as carrying moral judgement and becoming subjective in nature.

²⁸ In this dissertation, wire agencies are viewed not as sources to be quoted but as news providers.

where journalists flip through their contact lists and call the relevant spokespeople (p.160). The choice of who counts as a source works to anoint who possesses appropriate knowledge and an authoritative version of reality (Ericson, Baranek, and Chan 1989:3; Sigal 1973). Drawing from Becker (1967), Cohen refers to this choice, of who to use a source, as a perpetuation of a ‘hierarchy of credibility’ that determines which voices will be heard and viewed as credible (Cohen 2001:175).²⁹

Hannerz (2012) and Sigal (1973) both caution us on the influential role played by sources in shaping the news. They state that the sources a journalist relies upon will color their view of events and screen their line of sight. In his study of the Vietnam war, Hallin (1989) finds that news reports were closely tied to the level of agreement there was amongst the political elite. Hallin (1989), like Beaudoin and Thorson (2002) and Russ-Mohl (2010) much later, suggests that an over-reliance on sources, and with this institutional reporting, leads to journalists merely reflecting consensus within their sources of information. Nowhere was the notion of reflecting consensus clearer than during the run-up to both Iraq invasions where Saddam Hussein was roundly demonized in both the American and British news media (Weimann 2000). Indeed, Entman (2004) alerts us to the fact that the presence of consensus among sources considered to be elite, such as government officials, often has an adverse effect on whether or not journalists will carry out their independent investigations.

The reliance on a coterie of sources has also been criticized by both Hallin (1989) and Entman (2004) as leading to cognitive constraints and limiting the scope of

²⁹ For Becker (1967), the ‘hierarchy of credibility’ is the unequal moral distribution of the right to be believed. Those highest in the hierarchy are considered by journalist as having complete information about events that is neither partial nor distorted.

investigation and range of employable frames. Journalists are also seen as being susceptible to manipulation by sources in instances where a conflict intersects with powerful political agendas (Philippa Atkinson 1999b; Dimitrova and Strömbäck 2008; Weimann 2000).³⁰ McNulty (1999) and Gruley and Duvall (2012) illustrate this point by pointing out that sources relied upon by journalists perversely worked to legitimize the view that Rwanda and Darfur were ethnically driven conflicts: legitimizing arguments put forth by the Hutu and Khartoum regimes respectively with disastrous consequences.

Covering Foreign Atrocity

The point of covering international news, Moeller suggests, is to “make the world fascinating,” (1999:10). Atkinson (1999b) echoes this and postulates that as a result, news coverage of conflict abroad is not meant to provide detailed analyses of the issues involved, but merely to draw attention to an unfolding conflict. Lippmann (1922) posits that the pressures on the news media to express complex events in short messages result in the media merely signaling to events, neither contextualizing them nor explaining their complexity. To highlight this, it is instructive that any attempt to contextualize foreign news by media organizations has at times led to a drop in newsstand sales.³¹ In a compilation of the 10-worst selling covers by *Time* magazine (compiled by the magazine to celebrate its 75th anniversary), five of the ten were news stories about international events that provided thoughtful analysis.³² Only two foreign covers made it to the top

³⁰ Nowhere has this been more evident than in the initial coverage of both Iraq wars.

³¹ This was the finding in a 1995 Pew Study that outlines coverage of international affairs by media in the U.S. Moeller (1999) finds a 25 per cent drop in newsstand sales whenever *Newsweek* covered a foreign subject.

³² “Anguish over Bosnia” (May 17th, 1993), “Benjamin Netanyahu” (June 10th 1996) “Boris Yelstin (March 29th, 1993) and “Somalia: Restoring Hope,” (December 21st, 1992).

sellers of all time, the beginning of the Gulf War and the death of Princess Diana (Moeller 1999:18).

Despite this dreary statistic, the importance of foreign coverage cannot and should not be downplayed. This is reinforced by Ostertag (2010) who finds that 63% of interviewees in his study of the American audience are confident in their knowledge and understanding of issues 'going on in the world' as a result of consuming the news. The public does not have personal experience with international events and gains its knowledge of the foreign from the news (Beaudoin and Thorson 2002; Lippmann 1922; Mody 2010). In light of this, we cannot take the role of news in constructing knowledge about foreign atrocities, particularly, and societies lightly (Aguirre, Ferrándiz, and Pureza 2003; Chin-Chuan et al. 2002). Even more so if, as suggested by Zinnes (1968), the perception of a foreign conflict is often more important than the actual evolution of the conflict itself.

Covering foreign atrocity requires a distant reality being transformed into one that is salient and intelligible by creating conceptual order. Therefore, journalists filter an atrocity through the domestic system of a society's knowledge structure, and with this, reliance on recognizable language and frames becomes paramount for a journalist (Chin-Chuan et al. 2002; Hall 1973; Seaton 1999). Chin-Chuan et al. (2002), Hall (1973) and Moeller (1999) all suggest that ambiguity, and indeterminacy, of social reality abroad, is domesticated in an attempt to avoid cognitive dissonance for the audience. This domestication happens through the framing of an atrocity in a manner in line with the cultural and historical systems of knowledge and meaning inherent within the target audience (Chin-Chuan et al. 2002; Entman and Rojecki 2010; Merton 1968). Cohen

asserts that distant suffering is often represented in a formulaic manner with “soothing and repetitive chronologies, sensationalized [and domesticated] frames” (2001:173).

Said (2008) alerts us to a similar process in how the global north has represented Islam by reminding us that Orientalist media discourses are constructed through imperialist eyes in a manner that is self-serving and reductive. Said (2008) asserts that the effect of this is mystification and distortion of the Orient through a reproduction of already present frames and stereotypes about the foreign *Other*.

Cohen (2001:171) and Moeller (1999:15) both suggest that domestication is partly influenced by the fact that a news report needs to enable the audience to make cultural connections between its world and that of the *Other* being represented. This process relies on employing frames that make “nonrecognizable happenings or amorphous talk into a discernable event,” (Tuchman 1978: 192). Subsequently, the attempt to make known relies, heavily, on already present and taken for granted knowledge structures. Hawk (1992) and Seaton (1999) echo this by suggesting that even though journalism may bend language to suit its needs it still depends on language and frames that will help the audience recognize and make sense of events. Berger and Luckmann (1966) refer to this as a reliance on common sense explanations by individuals.

When reporting on an atrocity, journalists are likely to rely on the collective memory of past atrocities. The hope is that the story being reported upon will be made even more evocative (Atkinson 1999a, 1999b; Moeller 1999). Already present and salient frames, narrative genres highlighting good and bad guys, and the audiences’ moral obligation to *do something* or *to care* are relied upon to make this connection (Entman 2004; Moeller 1999). In this pursuit to domesticate foreign news on atrocity, Atkinson

(1999b), Chin-Chuan et al. (2002) and Moeller (1999) all suggest that reporting on foreign atrocity will often misrepresent, and misunderstand, the nature of an unfolding atrocity as something else, such as civil war, a refugee crisis or a humanitarian emergency.

Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm (2015) also show that different countries employ different domestication techniques for their respective audience in their reporting of a foreign atrocity. It is crucial for the journalists to ensure that their representation of an atrocity seems not only familiar to their audience but also relatively consistent with the audience's world-view (Scheler 1980; Shapiro 1988). This not only ensures that newsstand sales do not drop, but also enables journalists to signal to an unfolding event (Lippmann, 1922; Moeller 1999). Atkinson (1999b) states that this need to domesticate foreign news, the episodic nature of international news coverage, and a lack of localized knowledge all cause the misunderstanding of an atrocity by journalists. This has the effect of misdiagnosing the cause of the atrocity and with it a fundamental mismatch between the cause and suggested remedies. However, Gans (2005) and Mody (2010) suggest that perhaps it is less about misunderstanding of foreign events and more about journalists wanting to inscribe their values on foreign news.³³ Gans (2005) hypothesizes that this inscription works to remind the audience of the violation of values and assumes that there is consensus on these values by the audience. The news works to define the normative for the audience by highlighting social disorder internationally (Gans 1979:53; Shoemaker, Danielian, and Brendlinger 1991:782).

³³ This is not necessarily a new phenomenon in the focus on foreign news see Schudson (2011) on the news and colonial America.

Ebo (1992) asserts that news about Africa should be presented in a manner that is cognizant of Africa's historical and cultural context. Ebo (1992) and Maloba (1992) both suggest a possibility of the news about Africa being undistorted. One way this distortion occurs, they argue, is by focusing on *how* an atrocity unfolds and not *why* it began, which decontextualizes and portrays the conflict as ahistorical and apolitical (Maloba, 1992; 58). This implies the possibility of undistorted news, which both Gans and Shapiro see as impractical. Schudson (2011) also argues that while the news involves a collection of objective facts, these facts are susceptible to subjective judgments, values, and prejudices that will influence what journalists consider as being newsworthy and what is not. Entman (1993) further adds that even if journalists follow the rules for 'objectivity' they are likely to convey "a dominant framing of the news" (p. 56). Because of this, we cannot assume that standards of objectivity in and of themselves are similar across geographies. They are influenced by various realities and value judgments (Gans, 2005: 305). News narratives will contain both conscious and subconscious assumptions about how the world works and what is considered necessary and sensible (Fine 2001:20; Gamson et al. 1989:384; Park 1940:673; Vinitzki-Seroussi 2002:34). One cannot assume thusly, that a focus on the *why* would be any more cognizant of historical and cultural contexts more than a focus on the *how* as suggested by Ebo (1992) and Maloba (1992).

On the subject of contextualization, Gans suggests, perhaps counter-intuitively, that exaggeration (distortion) may be useful for journalists in enhancing their ability to inform the audience by arousing interest in topics that they wouldn't have paid attention to (2005; 309). In the case for Darfur, Listoe (2010) takes a similar approach by contending that because factual reporting has failed to provide adequate knowledge about

the unfolding atrocity, journalists need more imaginative ways to report about it. Crilly (2010), himself a journalist and past reporter of Darfur, pushes against this argument asserting that this only justifies the use of dichotomies that decontextualize and oversimplify atrocity. Crilly (2010) underlines the dangers of these dichotomies by pointing out the dangers of the *Arab vs. Black African* dichotomy in Darfur that ignores victims who self-identify, and are identified, as Arabs. Mamdani (2001, 2007, 2010) and Prunier (1995, 2008) also trouble the use of dichotomies in the reporting of the Rwandan genocide and the atrocities in Darfur by showing the fluidity and complexity of identity, victimhood, and perpetrators.

Covering an African Atrocity

Moorcraft and Taylor inform us that African news occupied less than two percent of the annual reporting from the 1950s to 1990s. However, they point out that the exceptions to this were dramatic events that took place across the continent such as 1) The Sharpeville massacre in South Africa in 1960; 2) The Congo massacres in the 1960s; 3) The Rhodesian war of the 1970s; and 4) the Mau Mau liberation movement in Kenya (2008: 105). This is principally a by-product of the fact that social disorder is what makes up a large part of foreign news, which, according to Atkinson (1999b: 102), leads to a tendency to focus on sensational and short-term approach in reporting. The focus on the dramatic when it comes to Africa, Atkinson (1999b) argues, is anchored on similar foundations as Kaplan's (1994) *Coming Anarchy* which implied that conflict in Africa was inspired by fossilized ethnic and cultural realities (and was a threat to the west unless something was done to stem it).³⁴ This, incidentally, echoes fears of a periphery devoid of

³⁴ Kaplan was not only an academic but also a journalist as well thus his inclusion in this section.

values thought to be important to the center that Schudson (2011) talks about (for various other variants of the same argument see work by Gurley and Duvall 2012; Mamdani 2007; Myers Garth, Thomas Klak and Timothy Koehl 1996; Said 1979, 2008).

Styan (1999:288) and Seaton (1999) posit that the near absence of international coverage is due not only to the low priority of African news but also that the fact that news from Africa has to fit rigidly defined preconceived categories of what is deemed newsworthy.³⁵ Cohen calls this near absence *the Chad Rule* where “no one wants to hear about Chad” (2001: 173) unless it fits within a predetermined understanding of what is expected to happen in Chad (in this case Africa as a whole). Mamdani (2007) has also suggested that reporting on atrocity in Africa by western journalists is principally reductive, turning complex contexts into morality tales. This narrative about Africa is reliant on not only a homogenization and marginalization of African victims and Africans in general, but also the (re)production of normalized stereotypical knowledge about Africa (Amoko 1999:227; Mamdani 2007:6). This type of representation hovers precariously between, on the one hand, homogenized knowledge leading to a normalization (and eventual disregarding) of conflict in Africa, and on other hand, trying to convince the audience that this is newsworthy and new. A process Bhabha (1994) calls refers to as *fixity*. This approach to coverage is carried out in the hope that it will allow the audience to want to *do something* without engaging in what Cohen calls moral preaching (2001: 181).³⁶

³⁵ This determination of newsworthiness is often done by editors in domestic newsrooms far from an unfolding atrocity.

³⁶ See Cohen (2001) on the effect of the audience being “tired of the truth,” (181-195).

McNulty (1999: 269) suggests a somewhat different, but not necessarily contradicting, approach to understanding reporting on atrocity. He suggests that the volume of coverage of African crises is often directly proportional to the scale of either Western involvement in a particular crisis or the level of clamor by a country's citizenry for something to be done. McNulty (1999) postulates that as a result, an atrocity will be framed as ethnic/tribal, focus on the humanitarian aspects of the atrocity, and demand an apolitical response, all of which belie the complexities of the atrocity. Hilsum (2007) argues that, even though a focus on the humanitarian aspect of an atrocity ends in raising awareness about humanitarian situations, it does not result in a comprehension about the events leading up to them. She posits that increasing knowledge about an atrocity is just as, if not more, important as raising awareness. Hilsum's (2007) work begins to develop a possible explanation for imputation of latent and manifest functions when producing news reports that Merton (1968) sees as imperative to the sociology of knowledge.

Sidahmed, Soderlund, and Briggs (2010) counter Hilsum (2007) by stating, perplexingly perhaps, that the only way in which an enabling environment for humanitarian intervention can be achieved is through a well-informed audience. They suggest that the fact that a nation will even contemplate intervening is a sign that the news media has worked to inform the public well enough of the unfolding atrocity. They imply that a humanitarian focus and the probability of future intervention are the result of the public being aware of the context and complexities underpinning a conflict. Cohen (2001) warns against this type of reasoning by arguing that attention paid to an atrocity by an audience should not be conflated with the audience's understanding of the atrocity (see work by Hannerz 2012, Hilsum 2007 and Pendas 2006 for similar critiques of this

conflationary reasoning by Sidahmed et. al. 2010). Mamdani (2010), like Hilsum (2007), attributes pressure to intervene and the creation of an enabling condition for humanitarian intervention to Non-Governmental Organizations on the ground whose officials (often Western and white) are used as primary sources of information (see also Hannerz 2012; Hilsum 2007; McNulty 1999; Styan 1999).³⁷ Both Mamdani (2010) and Hilsum (2007) criticize this use of Western sources as the primary sources of information by arguing that it results in victims (often from the global south) being “silent, faceless and anonymous” (Hannerz 2012:142).

Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm (2015) add a different layer of influence on the reporting of an atrocity. They suggest that a nation’s collective memory of traumatic events in their past, such as Ireland’s potato famine and poverty or Germany’s memory of the Holocaust, will manifest itself in how the media field frames the atrocity. This echoes Schramm (1959) who finds that journalists’ representations of an international event differed substantially based on their nations of origin instead of the day’s events. Bennett (1988) and Chaon (2007) contend that these differences are also attributable to the differences in gatekeeping functions of editors who are influenced by factors such as perceived audience reception and economic constraints like the need for advertising revenue.

McNulty (1999) views western journalists as more likely to be ill-informed about complexities of atrocity in Africa than they are subjective. Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm (2015) and Mody (2012), however, show that subjectivity does indeed play a role in

³⁷ Mamdani’s (2010) argument focuses on Darfur while Hilsum’s (2007) focuses on Rwanda and Biafra before it.

affecting what the journalists will focus on. Accordingly, the fact that a study of news coverage of Bosnia and Rwanda from 1st October 1990³⁸ to two weeks into the genocide in Rwanda finds that Bosnia received twenty-five times more articles than Rwanda. Similarly, the fact that American news reports were more likely to report on the tactics and strategy in Bosnia and not Rwanda cannot be chalked solely to being ill-informed (see Myers, et. al. 1996). It can, and should, be understood as a product of the interplay between social context, cultural sediment, and work routines shared by journalists within particular organizations or the larger professional field (Bourdieu, 1988; Gamson et. al. 1989; Schudson, 2011). This approach recognizes the conscious and unconscious process of framing an atrocity like Darfur by journalists while accounting for a level of agency that McNulty's (1999) argument seems to lack.

In the case of African news coverage of atrocity in Africa, Alozie (2005) finds that South Africa's *Mail and Guardian Online* (hereinafter M&G) provided extensive coverage of Darfur but rarely carried its own investigative pieces. This finding is similar to Nigeria's and Kenya's coverage of the genocide in Rwanda. For both Kenya and Nigeria, despite their extensive coverage and their attempts to contextualize the Rwandan genocide, there was hardly any original investigative coverage (Alozie 2007). Ray's (2009) analysis of news reports from Nigeria, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Egypt highlights a tendency to oversimplify and racialize the Darfur conflict. Ray finds that the labels used to demarcate "fault lines in [Darfur] are often the same as those used by Western news sources" (2009: 172). Mody (2010) reports similar patterns identified in her analysis of African media outlets such as the M&G. Mody (2010) states, for the case of M&G, that

³⁸ 1st October 1990 is the date that RPF invaded Rwanda from Uganda. In addition, the reporting on Rwanda spikes temporarily to match that of Bosnia in the days following the plane crash in 1994.

the actions of the *Janjawiid* militias are often framed as ethnic cleansing with *black Africans* often characterized as victims.

A word of caution is needed here. While Alozie (2005, 2007), Mody (2010) and Ray (2009) examine ‘African’ reporting, they define African news stories by dint of the fact that they appear in a newspaper from an African country and not by the by-line in news stories. The main problem with this approach is the fact that most African newspapers, as shown later in chapter four and also by Jacobs (2015) and Styan (1999), get their news coverage of other African countries from “ a handful of western-based news agencies” (Styan 1999: 289). Subsequently, one cannot assume that since a news report appears in an African newspaper, it *ipso facto* represents any sort of ‘African’ understanding of an atrocity or actors in it. Additionally, Mody (2010) and Alozie (2005, 2007) both analyze a single newspaper in their sites of study. Admittedly this could be the result of limited data access and page limitations, though in the case of Mody it is perplexing since she mentions the battery of graduate research assistants she used; yet, she focuses solely on online newspapers and only one newspaper from the African countries she analyzes. Nonetheless, both imply that each newspaper they study is normative within its social context. This assumes, erroneously, an internal homogeneity of narratives at the national level in both sites. The reliance on wire agencies as for coverage on Darfur further complicates any argument on the role of African media organizations in reporting on Darfur.³⁹ We are also unable to discern from Mody’s (2010) and Alozie’s (2005 2007) work whether the reliance on agencies is typical of fields in the

³⁹ In Mody’s (2010) analysis of South Africa’s *M&G* and Egypt’s *Al-Ahram*, she states that 92% of the articles analyzed in South Africa were credited to “agencies” and 52% in Egypt. Moreover, in South Africa, ‘agencies’ could also include the South Africa Press Agency..

countries they studied or unique to the specific newspapers they studied. In South Africa's case, this would be important since M&G's part owner is the *Guardian* of the U.K., which provides a substantial number of M&G's coverage of African countries (Jacobs 2015).

Ray (2009) takes a different approach in her analysis of news reports on Darfur from multiple African countries. She analyzes at least two newspapers within each site.⁴⁰ However, even in this study, there is little to no analysis of the journalists' perspective and social context except for Gamal Nkrumah who reports for Egypt's *Al-Ahram*. Despite the fact that Cook (1998) suggests that the process of packaging the news is a group process which plays out in a hierarchical newsroom, Alozie (2005; 2007), Mody (2010) and Ray (2009) say little to nothing about newsroom dynamics. Therefore, how much journalists have internalized the expectations of their editors, as argued by Sigal (1973) and Rosen (1999), and whether this is manifested in the news reports is not discussed by either Alozie (2005; 2007), Mody (2010) or Ray (2009).

Theoretical Approach

Before commencing my discussion of the theories I employ, it is imperative to lay out my understanding of what theory is and how I use the term in relation to this project's subject matter. My understanding of theory and its use is anchored in the understanding of Calhoun, Gerteis, Mody, Pfaff and Virk (2007) in the introduction of their book *Classical Sociological Theory*. These authors define theory as a *guide* to conducting sociological

⁴⁰ The exception to this is Rwanda where she analyses only one daily, *The New Times*. However, this is partly because Rwanda only had this one daily at the time of her analysis. Analyzing two newspapers, wherever possible, enables us to better understand what common practice is and what is idiosyncratic to particular organizations within a country.

inquiry. They argue that, in addition to acting as a guide, theory also attempts to provide order to results of an inquiry. Calhoun et al. (2007) further suggest that theory is primarily concerned with developing concepts, which enable scholars to understand social life. This process occurs through theory working to not only identify “patterns in social relations and social action,” but also producing “explanations for both specific features of life in society and changes in overall forms of society” (Calhoun et al. 2007:3). This approach to understanding theory and its use provides for malleability to the term that I think is necessary for this project in its attempt to use three theories that have not been put into dialogue before now. To this end, this project contributes to the study of representation of genocide and mass atrocity by not only using field and neo-institutional theories to discuss media representations but also integrating the two with postcolonial theory. It collapses the center-periphery boundaries of analysis by working to highlight the interconnectedness and interrelationships between media fields in the global south and the global north. This is why I use postcolonial, field and neo-institutional theories concomitantly.

Field theory

Martin suggests that field theory is more of an analytical approach rather than a static formal system (2003: 24). He views field theory as allowing for a reflexivity that is rigorous and necessary when attempting to carry out large-scale political and institutional analyses (2003:3). Fields contain an internal logic where those in the field have shared understandings of what the rules within fields are and operate within this framework (Fligstein and McAdam 2012:11). This does not mean that the field is impervious to exogenous pressures but rather that these demands are not always translated into the

field's internal logic (Martin 2003). As a theoretical approach, field theory occupies the meso-level, symbolizing the local social world within which individuals are embedded and towards which they orient their actions (Sallaz and Zavisca 2007: 24). It links ideas of *agency* (micro) and *structure* (macro) and highlights how both work to influence each other while also reinforcing each other (Fligstein and McAdam 2012:7).

Field theory provides the space to analyze the “global convergences in media organizations and practices” within what Benson (1999) calls the “world media system” (p. 484). This approach to analysis allows for a relational and spatial mode of thinking, which in turn enables greater transnational research on the media (Benson 1999, 2006; Hallin 2005). It employs a dynamic relational approach to understanding the web of interactions that operate within and between news organizations. Accordingly, I argue that viewing African media as part of the global journalistic field (as defined by both Benson 2006 and Bourdieu 1999), with inherent tensions and bounded in the rules of the game and logic, explains the convergences between African and western reporting on Darfur found by Mody (2010) and Ray (2009). The task of field theory is, therefore, to examine the role of institutional logics while simultaneously highlighting and being cognizant of the complex interplay between social structures⁴¹ and cultural forms within a society (Benson and Neveu 2005:12).

Martin (2003) sees field theory as an excellent “vehicle for making complex social phenomena intuitively accessible without relying on prejudices or “common sense” first person understandings” (p. 36). It eschews normative understandings of how the journalistic field should operate or how journalists should report on mass atrocities that

⁴¹ To quote Tuchman (1978:183) “social structure produces norms, including attitudes that define aspects of social life which are of interest or importance to citizens.”

occur in African countries. Professional fields have a particular coherence that is based on a working consensus on the rules of the game; individuals will stake out predictable sides due to the structure of the social space (Bourdieu 1999; Martin 2003).⁴² For Bourdieu (1999), actions within the field are governed by a matrix of dispositions that work to organize the perceptions of those within it. This suggests that journalists can tell what the field demands from them, at any time, and adequately adjust to meet this expectation. How they organize and categorize their narratives and frames will be influenced and derived from their field rather than from solely from their personal experiences and cultural schemas that exist independently in their psyches (Boyd-Barrett 1980; Martin 2003:39).

Bourdieu (1991) informs us that journalistic dispositions are an embodiment of a complex historical trajectory and introduces the term *habitus* to capture this complex arc and its nature (p. 53). Bourdieu (2013) defines *habitus* as a subjective system of “internalized structures, schemes of perception, conception and action common to all members of the same group” (p. 86). MacLeod (2009) states that *habitus* works as a regulator of individuals and their external world, a mechanism between “human agency and the social structure” (p. 15). For Bourdieu (1999), *habitus* allows for an appreciation of the role of social and educational background in shaping the actions of journalists. This relation between *habitus* and the field presently occupied by an individual enables Bourdieu (1999) to incorporate the relationship between the individual’s past and their present and to account for how it influences them. Emirbayer and Johnson (2008) state

⁴² Weber (1958) highlighted the notion of ‘rules of the game’ in his idea of “spheres of value” in which he emphasizes the intrinsic laws within his six spheres. For Bourdieu (1999) each agent within the field is defined by their position in it each with its own problems.

that the term *habitus* allows Bourdieu (1999) to posit that, while social context may influence one's actions, social context does not fully explain the individual's actions (Emirbayer and Johnson 2008: 37). MacLeod (2009) adds onto this understanding of *habitus* by suggesting that it operates as a "conceptual bridge between the subjective (inner consciousness) and the objective (external) constraints of the material world" (p. 15). This discussion on *habitus* sees the notions of agency and structure as being inseparable, and individuals as always being structurally situated with the choices they make being tempered by the social context within which they find themselves (MacLeod 2009: 451).

In light of this attenuation of *habitus*, I do not view journalists as 'objective' observers or as mere transcribers of events. As professionals, they are embedded within complex organizations while also being well socialized into their society and its unique structures that form taken for granted/ common-sense knowledge. For Bourdieu (2005), *habitus*, like Berger and Luckmann's (1966) common-sense knowledge, provides one with the tacitly accepted presuppositions within professional fields. Field theory, therefore, encapsulates both the characteristics of individual journalists (such as social and educational background) and the pressures within the profession. It looks at the entire ecosystem that is the journalism field and how each part acts and reacts in relation to each other (Benson and Neveu 2005: 11). Merton (1968) alludes to something similar by stressing the importance of taking into account the interaction between knowledge and *existential factors*, such as occupational role or ethnic affiliation. This is what necessitates an appreciation of *habitus* and a recognition that it is not a fixed concept but

rather dynamic and susceptible to one's on-going experiences (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:133).

Adding onto the discourse on *habitus*, Benson (2013) introduces the twin notions of *habitus* affinities and *habitus* disaffinities. Benson (2013) posits that *habitus* affinities will contribute to more/positive coverage of groups that have affinities and that this is reversed in the case of *habitus* disaffinities when other groups are covered. This notion of “affinities” and “disaffinities” can be seen as underlying Gans' (2005) discussion of values being imputed to foreign news and Schudson's (2011) discussion of the role of foreign news in colonial America. As posited by Bourdieu (2005), despite the competition within the media field over readership, exclusive information, and distinctiveness, this competition - perhaps counter-intuitively - leads to and instills uniformity. Factors such as the homology of production and reception spaces and economic considerations like circulation numbers emerge as forces that affect the framing of news, leading to uniformity in news narratives (Bourdieu, 1984; Benson, 2006; Cook, 1998; Gamson et al 1987). This would suggest that affinities and disaffinities might not play a prominent role in *how* atrocity is covered since the field's rules of the game will subdue high levels of variance.

While Bourdieu (1998, 2005) suggests that a field approach to analyzing news organizations will have to be cognizant of the influence of the economic and the political field, this project departs from this approach slightly by including the role social context⁴³ in addition to the political and economic considerations of news making. The focus on the economic concerns, however, it tempered by Schudson (2011) who reminds us that

⁴³ Social context here refers to geopolitics, collective memories, colonial histories, etc.

economic concerns do matter, but only in as much as its tendency to sometimes works to crush journalists, intentions which include much more than merely making a profit. The ability for field theory to be used to conduct institutional analysis is what makes it a good candidate for partnering with neo-institutional theory (Benson 1999, 2006; Emirbayer and Johnson 2008).

Neo-institutional theory

Sparrow (1999) defines news organizations as institutions due to their production of information in a manner that provides a framework within which individuals operate in and understand events. He reminds us that the perception of the news media as an institutional actor is not new in and of itself (1999:5).⁴⁴ A news organization inhabits an interorganizational field with other news organizations, all working to produce the news while relying on broadly the same procedures and with similar expectations. News organizations seek to stabilize their presence in the field and to secure their status within it by ensuring that they gain enough cultural and economic capital (Cook 1998; Sigal 1973; Sparrow 1999). The pursuit of stabilization and securing of statuses plays a crucial role in reinforcing uniformity and risk-aversion. It is for this reason that I also rely on neo-institutional theory in this project. A neo-intuitionist approach sensitizes us to the weight of implicit rules and organizational dynamics, both of which produce a relative degree of internal homogeneity within the journalistic field (Benson 2006; Bourdieu 1998; Sparrow; 1999).

This line of thought is developed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) who - while recognizing the influence of Bourdieu - begin by questioning why organizations look so

⁴⁴ He mentions essayist Thomas Carlyle in 1841 and Thomas Jefferson who both viewed the news media as separate political actors in society.

much alike. They initiate their exposition by defining the organizational field as organizations that, when looked at in totality, appear to constitute a recognized area and work to produce similar products and/or services. Both DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Martin (2003) suggest that fields develop once there is a mutual awareness among those who participate in a set of organizations that all of them are working in concert towards a collective enterprise. It is this that convinces DiMaggio and Powell (1991) that there is a natural affinity between neo-institutionalism and Bourdieu's field theory. Except for Mohr (2000), Martin (2003) and, specifically in the study of the news media, Benson and Neveu (2005) and Benson (1999, 2006, 2013), there has been generally been no attempt to use these theories concomitantly (Wang 2016).

Benson (2006) suggests that the use of neo-institutional theory should help in highlighting and explaining some shortcomings that come with Bourdieu's conception of field theory. Some of these gaps include the silences by Bourdieu (1999) on the role of and possibility of external heterogeneity and the constraints placed on the field by this heterogeneity, such as limits and checks placed on the media field by both the political and economic fields (Benson 2006). Organizational analysis scholars, such as Emirbayer and Johnson (2008:5), have also argued that although singular organizations may seem to act independently, they often work in concert with others within their field and never in complete isolation. Emirbayer and Johnson (2008: 36) state that Bourdieu's framework provides for a set of tools with which to analyze how organizations are not only structured by but also structure, the larger social configurations in which they are embedded.

Benson (2006) and Hallin (2005) have further stated that the nature of the organizational ecology within which the journalistic field finds itself does play a role in influencing how the field frames the news. Emirbayer and Johnson (2008) augment this argument by suggesting that a field-based approach in the analysis of organizations not only analyzes the different organizations but also allows for a focus on the social configurations within which the organizational fields are embedded. This approach to organizational study has also been used by Savelsberg, King and Cleveland (2004) who suggest that organizations will seek to adapt to a changing and competitive environment by leaning towards efficient and effective organizational forms likely to survive. It is this homogenization process that DiMaggio and Powell (1983) refer to as *isomorphism*, which they define as a process through which “one unit in a population [is forced to] resemble other units that face the same set of environmental condition” (p. 149). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest that the concept of *institutional isomorphism* works to capture not only the politics that permeate organizational life but to builds upon Weber’s (1946) work on bureaucratization. I rely on, in different chapters and with varying intricacies, all three types of *isomorphism* suggested by DiMaggio and Powell (1983):

1. *Mimetic isomorphism*, an artifact of moments of uncertainty within the field, yielding standard responses.
2. *Normative isomorphism*, a consequence of professionalization
3. *Coercive isomorphism*, an outcome of formal and informal pressures on an organization to induce change.

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) do caution, however, that these distinctions are merely analytic and may not always be empirically confirmed. Consequently, in the case of reporting on an atrocity, while the use of similar kinds of sources may be the result of

normative isomorphism, it is also a result of trying to provide information in an uncertain situation and therefore *mimetic*. One way to analyze the process of *isomorphism* is by focusing on the routine and extra media levels highlighted in Reese's (2001) hierarchy of influences, which I discuss in chapter two.

Both field and neo-institutional theory suggest that although fields have a degree of autonomy, there still is an internal homogeneity between the organizations within the field. Because of this, Bourdieu (1999) suggests that what occurs within a field cannot be understood by solely focusing on either exogenous or endogenous factors. The use of neo-institutional theory and field theory allows for a concomitant focus on both endogenous and exogenous factors while accounting for actors' flexibility rather than resorting to an all-encompassing and somewhat rigid consensual structure that is implied by the idea of institutional logics. Using both theories enables me to account for the role and influence of hierarchies within the newsroom, how different journalists in different countries navigate this terrain, while also accounting for the fact that organizations within the same organizational field become increasingly similar to each other (Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Savelsberg et al. 2004). While field theory emphasizes convergence within a professional field through what Bourdieu (1999) refers to as the rules of the game, neo-institutional theory introduces *isomorphism* as a means through which organizations within the field become homogenous. Both theories thus point out how and why journalists and news organizations in different countries and contexts may appear to be sticking to particular narrative genres when reporting on Darfur. Hallin (2005) reminds us that field theory is attuned to understanding the media as an institution that is embedded within a "wider social formation," (p. 224) which enables it to be a useful tool

for both historical and comparative analysis of the media. Thus, Benson and Neveu (2005) suggest, field theory is slightly better suited than neo-institutional theory, to study media organizations since the former places greater emphasis on competition and distinctions among journalists and with this the ‘relational’ construction of journalistic identity than the latter does (p. 12).

Postcolonial theory

While the definition of postcolonial theory is difficult to boil down to a simple encapsulation, I rely on the understanding presented by Shome and Hegde (2002). They summarize postcolonial theory as an interdisciplinary field of inquiry that attempts to theorize the problematics and context brought to the fore by the processes of colonization and decolonization (Shome and Hegde 2002). Shome and Hegde (2002) suggest that postcolonial theory sees itself as working to undo the historical structures of knowledge production, which are firmly rooted in the various histories and geographies of modernity. Go (2013) informs us that one of postcolonial theory’s significant innovations is that it seeks to emphasize the ideological, cultural and even epistemic structures always at play but often not fully acknowledged (p. 29). This innovation is captured in works by Fanon (1965, 1967, 1968), Mbembe (2001), Said (1979, 1989, 1993) and Spivak (1990), all of whom are viewed as leading theorists of postcolonial studies.

Analytically, media fields are not restricted to sites located within a particular society or nation-state. Fields can be thought of as being *transnational* while simultaneously being *intranational* (Benson 1999, 2006; Go 2013). This is what makes it paramount to put African journalists who live and work in African countries (and have reported on Darfur) into dialogue with those from western nations. If the possibility exists

that journalists worldwide have adopted similar definitions of newsworthiness (Shoemaker, Danielian, and Brendlinger (1991), then simultaneity of knowledge production by journalists from the global south and the global north demands theoretical tools that work to conceptualize context within this global/local configuration (Shome and Hedge 2002: 262). Postcolonial theory provides these tools. It allows for an exposition of not only the influence of the professional field and institutional logics but also, importantly, the role of factors outside of the field such as national histories, geopolitics, social contexts and collective memories.⁴⁵ This allows for a nuanced approach to representations and framing atrocities, and the different nation-specific factors at play.

The use of postcolonial theory concomitantly with field theory has been argued for by Go (2013) who suggests that both field and postcolonial theories seek to map out “*relational* stances and positions,” (p. 47). For Go (2013), both theories seek to understand the interaction between actors within a space where, although power differentials exist and are acknowledged, there also exists a mutual constitution and interdependence of actions within fields. Postcolonial theory goes further than field theory because it includes the role of cultural and ideological structures and influences into notions of mutual constitution and interdependence. Postcolonial theory allows for an interrogation of structures and historical trajectories that “frame contemporary social relationships within the global/local nexus” (Shome and Hegde 2002: 261) that media fields in Africa are sited in.

Postcolonial theory thus confronts us with the recognition that institutionalized

⁴⁵ As highlighted by both Goffman (1967) and Martin (2003:33), human interactions do not always occur within the field and as such these 'outside' interactions have to be taken into account .

knowledge is subject to forces of colonialism, geopolitics, and history (Said 1979). This is especially important in the case of foreign reporting of atrocity where, as highlighted by both Gans (2005) and Schudson (2011:40), notions of objectivity are weak at best. While this argument has been made before when taking to task culturist perspectives in representing conflicts in Africa (see Amoko 1999; Atkinson 1999a, 1999b; Ebo 1992; Hawk 1992; McNulty 1999; Seaton 1999), little to no attempt has been made to analyze representations of conflicts in Africa by journalists from Africa.⁴⁶ Studies conducted by Alozie (2005, 2007), Mody (2010) and Ray (2009) have largely focused on conducting content analyses of news reports in African newspapers without interrogating whether or not journalists residing in the postcolony are the credited authors. The insistence on the use of by-line accreditation goes to Mannheim's (1936:267) assertion that an analysis of knowledge needs to differentiate at the group level in a much more nuanced way rather than, such as in the case of Alozie (2005, 2007), Mody (2010) and Ray (2009) specifically, taking a monolithic understanding a profession.

Scholars of African affairs have bemoaned the lack of historicity and contextualization when western journalists report on events occurring in Africa (see for example, Amoko 1999; Ebo 1992; Maloba 1992; Mamdani 2007, 2010). They have suggested that the lack of historical, or any, context when reporting on atrocities in Africa works to rewrite the role of colonization and influence of western nations in stoking seeds of discontent within African societies. Mbembe (2001) posits that this lack of interest is influenced by the fact that for most individuals in western nations a “narrow and simplistic prejudice persists [about] African social formations,” (p. 3). Consequently,

⁴⁶ The exception here being a conference presentation Savelsberg, Nyseth-Brehm, and Wahutu (2013) and work by Wahutu (2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2018).

atrocities such as Darfur belong to the category “of simple societies or traditional societies,” (Ibid). Such machinations continue to place those in the Metropole at the status of the universal standard and in turn places into hierarchies differences in expression into spatial (Northern Muslims vs. Southern Christians) or temporal (civilized center vs. primitive periphery) categories (Boatcă and Costa 2010).

Critiques of western journalists by scholars such as Amoko (1999), Atkinson (1999a, 1999b) and Mamdani (2007, 2010) implicitly suggest that African journalists do provide historical and or social/cultural contexts. While Mody (2010) and Ray (2009) suggest that this is not the case, I have discussed my misgivings with the methodology employed, case selection, and the definition of ‘African news’ and of ‘African’ by both of them. I have similar reservations with work conducted by Alozie (2005, 2007) even though he does find that African news organizations did seek to provide contextual information about the genocide in Rwanda and the atrocities in Darfur. In all four studies, there is little to no discussion of the factors that influence African journalists’, or news organizations more generally, that are reporting on an atrocity.

Benson suggests that a cross-national analysis of journalism should enable scholars to understand which factors (such as geographic location, nation-specific traits, social contexts) if any have a larger influence on journalistic production (2005:102). Furthermore, as pointed out by Bourdieu (1988), there is a need to appreciate and acknowledge that what is needed are not multiple points of view but rather an understanding of the relative placement of these points of view. This makes it necessary for this project to embody Benson’s (2006) critique of speaking about ‘the news’ more generally when using data from a single country. Benson (2006) argues that it behooves

research on media fields to analyze and explain the variety of narrative styles and topical foci one finds around the world. This requires showing how historical, cultural and social forces within the nation-state affect the journalistic field and interrogating how different configurations of these structures make the production of news different in different countries.

Research Questions⁴⁷

The central question this project is concerned with is *How knowledge about genocide and mass atrocity in Africa constructed in the media*. More specifically, it asks:

- r.1) Does the representation of mass atrocity vary by region/nation?
- r.2) How does the representation of mass atrocity change over time?
- r.3) Who gets to narrate and be heard when journalists cover Darfur?

All three questions are grounded in postcolonial scholarship, which argues for the centrality of cultural and ideological structures and influences in any analysis of phenomena in the global south. More specifically, research questions one and two seek to investigate the extent to which reporting in the chosen countries eschews or relies upon binary relationships that fit into spatial (Northern Muslims vs. Southern Christians) or temporal (civilized center vs. primitive periphery) categories (Boatcă and Costa 2010). Both questions also seek to highlight moments of convergence or divergence in narratives about Darfur and explain some of the factors at play. For the interpretation of patterns rely on institutional isomorphism, as discussed in chapter one. Research question three is interested in who is viewed as having the legitimacy to act as a co-constructor of

⁴⁷ For a summary of what methods will be used to answer each research question see figure 6

knowledge. Thus, in the “hierarchy of credibility” (Becker 1967), where do we find African voices when the story is credited to African journalists?

The question of volume is also relevant to this project. Wu (2000) alerts us to the fact that old colonial ties are important factors when trying to ascertain the volume of news flow. The implicit assertion here is that news about Darfur, is much more likely to be covered by news organizations from the U.K. than by the U.S. or Canada for example. In the study of African newspapers, Skurnik (1981) and Sreberny-Mohammadi (1984) both find that factors such as regionalism and national interests⁴⁸ were determinants of the amount of news coverage provided for an event.⁴⁹ Skurnik also suggests that there is a tendency of African news organizations to favour news from their own regional and linguistic zones (1981: 104). This would imply that Kenya might have more news reports on Darfur than South Africa.

The two methods used to answer these questions are content analysis of news reports and interviews with journalists. Content analysis captures the macro-levels framing patterns over the duration that I’m interested in while interviews capture individual perceptions of journalists that may not be reflected in the news reports (news reports often reflect organizational consensus of how to frame Darfur which may not necessarily match individual perceptions of Darfur).⁵⁰ All three questions revolve around the individual, organizational and extra-media levels in Reese's (2001) hierarchy of influences.

⁴⁸ One component of national interest according to Skurnik is “historical, pre-independence ties,” (1981: 117)

⁴⁹ For Skurnik, this is specifically for African countries while for Sreberny-Mohammadi its foreign news in general.

⁵⁰ I explain the difference in public vs. private understandings of Darfur in the next chapter.

Discussion

The preceding pages have pointed to the effect of the professional field on journalistic habitus and echo similar arguments by Bourdieu (2005:30) and Haller and Hadler (2008:284). The role of journalists' social contexts within which media organizations and fields are immersed in are also crucial factors in affecting journalists' habitus. Savelsberg and King (2007) and Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm (2015) both show that distinct institutional actors produce distinct narratives that are influenced by the logic of the field within which they are created. Other salient factors to consider when talking about knowledge construction by journalists are arguments espoused by Berger and Luckmann (1966), Mannheim (1936) and Gamson et al. (1989) who point to the centrality of the individual's social context and location in affecting knowledge. To bridge this seeming divide over multiple and disparate forces exerting pressure on journalists, Benson (1999) and Gamson et al. (1989) suggest a presence of homology in production and consumption spaces as affecting the type and choice of narrative employed. This homology, as suggested by Wang (2016), provides an environment that 'evokes' mental structures poised to receive 'schematically embedded' information" (p. 3). The news, therefore, relies upon and confirms cultural repertoires, while continuing to reproduce already present structures of knowledge about conflicts in Africa.

Leavy (2007) states that media narratives rely on repositories of representations, which act as "the baseline public memory of [an] event, and therefore, the backdrop against which all future representation are measured" (p. 66). Subsequently, the journalist finds him or herself limited in how to cover an atrocity and reliant on those frames and narrative genres already present. This reliance on, and ensuing repetition of, frames has

the effect of institutionalizing particular narratives, rendering the meanings in them stable and habituated (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Hall 2007).⁵¹ This repetition also works to present events as self-contained and ahistorical while concentrating on the individualized narrative, removing events from their broader context (Gamson et al. 1989; Halbwachs 1992; Park 1940). Hannerz (2012) and Hilsum (2007) point to this by arguing that the focus on the humanitarian aspects instead of the political or the military aspects of an atrocity raises the passions of the audience but does not explain the cause and evolution of an atrocity. The emphasis on the dramatic goes to Merton's (1968) question on the role of manifest and latent functions imputed to the production processes of knowledge. To understand the extent to which particular frames were habituated, I analyze whether or not the representation of Darfur changed over time through research question two.

The reliance on cultural repertoires and the reproduction of present knowledge structures suggests that representations of events will reflect the social contexts of the observer (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Mannheim 1936; Merton 1968). Scholars, such as Griffin (2004) and Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm (2015), have shown that an atrocity's framing, and what/how society remembers and highlights, is heavily influenced by geographic location, social contexts, and nation-specific traits. Fairclough (1992) suggests that texts are likely to reflect the society from which they arise from (p. 195). Pedelty's (1995) work in El Salvador reflects Fairclough's (1992) argument showing how foreign journalists, and "parachutist journalists" more specifically, have a propensity of relying on "their cultural values and social conditions when interpreting the world" (p.

⁵¹ While Gruley and Duvall (2012) show that narratives anchored on 'tribal animosity' declined over time in the reporting of Darfur, this change rarely, if ever, sought to challenge the stability of previous 'tribal animosity' narrative that had been employed.

110). Surprisingly there is relative silence as to how these same factors affect African journalists' and news organizations reporting of atrocity. It is this lacunae that my first research question works to fill.

As I highlighted in the first section, the question of knowledge (both relied upon and created) has resonance in the field of journalism when those who report on mass atrocity come from different social/geographic locations, each with its knowledge structure and method of evaluation. While analyzing the news as an organizational (Gans 2005; Tuchman 1973; 1978) or even an institutional product (Cook 1999; Peterson 2009) is in itself a worthy empirical endeavor, it has at times failed to wrestle adequately with the contextual realities of journalists and their respective social and historical contexts. These approaches have primarily been structural in their approach, often to the detriment of agentic processes. As a result of this, I begin my analysis of the news by considering both the structural and agentic influences as carried out by Markham (2012), Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm (2015) and Schudson (1989, 2011) rather than solely a structural approach. This approach is cognizant of the fact that the news establishes a web of meanings and understandings that lead to a matrix of assumptions by the audience about society; and through which audiences live their lives (Schudson 2011; Weimann 2000). It also recognizes the news as a source of knowledge that creates communal sentiment and constructs public conversation in a society (Schudson 2011:26).

This project focuses on claims about how location, institutional logics, and professional fields work to shape and affect the worldview and perspectives of journalists. It takes a dynamic middle road between the, broadly speaking, epistemological discussions on knowledge highlighted in this chapter. It is less like

Tuchman's (1978) and Lippmann's (1922) projects that focused on news production processes employed by media institutions as the primary site of analysis. Instead it, like Bunce (2010, 2015), seeks to analyze both production processes and the negotiations of narratives employed and relied upon by journalists. I emphasize both structural influences (news organizations) on knowledge production and agentic processes (journalists preferences and perceptions) of privileging one type narrative or source over the other when reporting. This is undergirded by arguments, like those by Entman (1993), Gamson et al. (1989), Gans (1979), Park (1940) and Tuchman (1978), suggesting that assumptions held by journalists influence frames and narratives they rely upon. While my first research question analyzes the narratives employed, research question three tackles the preferences of whom is to be quoted by journalists.

Focus on the agentic processes is moored on arguments on the strength of nation-specific traits (Bhabha 1994; Mamdani 2007; Mohanty 1991) like collective memory (Olick 1999; Olick and Levy 1997; Vinitzki-Seroussi 2002) and cultural trauma (Alexander 2004a, 2004b; Vinitzki-Seroussi 2002), which provide *colored spectacles* (Mills 1940) through which journalists interpret atrocity. It is also informed by Gamson et al. (1989) and Snow and Benford (1992) who take an agentic approach in showing narratives and frames as being interpretive and working to make the world intelligent for both the narrator and their audience. An agentic approach suggests that though knowledge is path dependent, this does not necessarily imply that journalists have no choice but to rely on already existing narratives and institutional pressures in their reporting. Path dependency should therefore not be assumed to imply path determination.

Tuchman's (1978) illustration of how news institutions set norms that socialize individual journalists into using them to construct meaning influences my structural approach. In this formulation, actors controlling more organizational resources (like editors) will often impose their definitions of events should a conflict about narrative structure and genre occur (Bunce 2015; Chaon 2007; Crilly 2010; Tuchman 1978). Bourdieu (1999), DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Entman (1989) also show us that institutional conditions like editorial practices and competition are more likely to neutralize the effects of personal motivation and societal background. They argue that with more competition, organizations within the same field begin to mimic each other, which, in turn, leads to less heterogeneity and stifles agency. This would suggest that the appropriate unit of analysis would be the organization and not necessarily individual journalists; since as professionals, journalists are bound to follow the rules set forth by their organization and the organization's particular style (Tuchman 1978).

As pointed out by Fine (2001) it is not solely social conditions but the structural arrangements within each of these conditions that play a part in how individuals understand and react to situations. The structural arrangements, Fine (2001) suggests, work in concert to create contexts that enable particular interactions and discourses to occur. While Fine (2001) does suggest that the individual's interests and strategies play a role in dictating interactions and discourses for journalists, these are often suppressed by factors such as institutional logics and professional and economic concerns (Bourdieu 1999; Entman 1991, 2004). Moreover, Entman and Rojecki (2010) and Sigal (1973) both remind us that a story's congruence with both professional and organizational norms largely influence not just the choice of stories but also what aspects will be especially

highlighted. This delineation between structural and agentic processes does not imply that they operate in clearly defined and exclusive terms. I acknowledge that the line between the two is often fuzzy and that the relationship between them is dynamic rather than static. Thus, my analysis focuses on the influence of both (agency and structure) factors and their effect on the production and organization of news about Darfur through multiple research methods.

Conclusion

As I have pointed out, even though representations of atrocity in Africa have been extensively analyzed, the focus has primarily been on western news institutions and journalists. Although a worthy endeavor in and of itself, scholars have failed to take into account the role of journalists in the global south in shaping/influencing knowledge about atrocities in the global south. Critiques of media fields in the global north by scholars like Atkinson (1999a, 1999b), Mamdani (2001, 2010) and McNulty (1999) implicitly suggest that journalists from African countries provide reporting that is cognizant of historical and cultural contexts. While this may be true, none of these works include an analysis of media fields in the global south to illustrate how different or similar global south media fields are to those that they criticize in the global north. Moreover, Leopold's (1999) work on the reporting of the conflict in Northern Uganda in Uganda's newspapers, finds that even within a country, the historical and cultural contexts of a conflict may rarely if ever be explored.

Complicating the assumption that African newspapers may provide a nuanced approach is the suggestion by Styan (1999) that a majority of African countries "get their

images of other African countries from a handful of western-based news agencies,” (p. 289). Styan (1999) further states that local journalists are rarely if ever, employed by foreign news agencies due to the bias towards in-house trained staff familiar with the structures of these agencies. Styan (1999) and Bunce (2015) arguments and the results in chapter four (below) raise an interesting conundrum in the study of knowledge production by news organizations. If news organizations work to both create and shape knowledge about the world outside ourselves, several African countries’ understanding of atrocity in African countries would presumably reflect a western understanding of them. With this in mind, is there such a thing as ‘African’ news coverage?

Furthermore, considering the fact that Gans (1979), Hannerz (2012), Rosen (1999) and Sigal (1973) all view sources as vital in any analysis the news or what influences the shape of content, the lack of any analysis of their role in the reporting of the atrocity in Darfur by either Alozie (2005, 2007), Mody (2010) or Ray (2009) is perplexing. This is even more pertinent if the sources of news about an atrocity are predominantly western news agencies as Styan (1999) suggests, or International Non-Governmental Organizations as indicated by Hannerz (2012) and Hilsum (2007). Hilsum (2007) also indicates that sources often work to reduce the complexity of the conflict into a single compelling plot; such the defense of values considered to be national values (Entman 2009; Gans 2005; Russ-Mohl 2010). This points to the fact that the news is as much a product of sources as it is of journalists (Dimitrova and Strömbäck 2008; Ericson et al. 1989; Gans 2005; Hilsum 2007; Schudson 2011; Sigal 1973) . As such, any attempt to explain the news has to take into account the considerations that govern the choice of sources by journalists (Gans 1979: 281).

This chapter has sketched out the scholarship on news media and knowledge that put into dialogue multiple strands of scholarship. It has also shown that we as of yet do not know, how journalists in Africa perceive of and understand atrocity in African countries. However, if most of the images about Africa are primarily those from western news agencies, does it make sense talking about African journalists and their understanding of atrocity in Africa? I contend that yes, it is. Having conducted interviews with African journalists from Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, Nigeria, and South Africa, it is evident that they do have strong opinions on reporting on atrocity in Africa. Even in instances where they are not different from their counterparts in the global north, it is necessary to understand why this is the case, if scholars are to make any meaningful arguments about global scripts and their influence within the global/local nexus in the field of journalism.

More generally scholarship on the global south, and Africa has primarily has been left to and is dominated by, postcolonial scholars. This is true despite the fact that postcolonial scholars make arguments relevant to the understanding of both knowledge production and knowledge relied upon by news organizations when talking about atrocity in Africa. The use of postcolonial theory, in combination with both field and new-institutional theory, brings with it this dissertation's theoretical innovation. It also contributes to empirical research on the representation of atrocity in Africa by building a dataset of news articles reporting on the atrocity in Darfur and by using multiple research methods to analyze the data collected.

Thus, this dissertation begins with the simple premise that multiple factors influence knowledge about mass atrocity. Consequently, we cannot assume that a Kenyan

journalist will provide the proper context for a mass atrocity in Africa nor is an American or English journalist always going to offer simplistic narratives about the same.

Journalists face multiple pressures as professionals and members of their respective nations and societies, which makes it imperative to analyze knowledge both as a product of construction through social relations (Berger and Luckmann 1966), social context (Mannheim 1936) and the existential forces such as occupational role (Merton 1968). Focusing on solely either of these belies the fact that as individuals, journalists do not operate in a vacuum. Studying all three stays true to Goffman's (1967, 1983) view the individual and social structure are not competing entities but rather joint products of interaction *sui generis* (see Warfield Rawls 1987).

Chapter 2: Methodology

Introduction

This project analyzes news reports from January 1st, 2003 (approximately a month and a half before the attack in Golo on February 26th, 2003) to December 31st, 2008. This time frame enables me to move beyond the coverage of news-breaking events such as the application for (and issuance) of arrest warrants by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) at the International Criminal Court (ICC) for Ahmed Haroun, Ali Kushyb and President al-Bashir, moments of increased levels of violence or visits by international government officials to refugee and IDP camps. The impetus to carry out a cross-national comparative study of the media representation is anchored on a rich history going back as far as the 1920s with the investigation by Lasswell (1927) on propaganda during WWI, and, more recently, Schramm's (1959) study on news around the world, Sreberny-Mohammdani's (1985) study for UNESCO on the New International Information Order (NIIO), Wu's (2000) study of what determines international news and Shoemaker and Akiba's (2006) work on news around the world. Contemporary studies more relevant to this project are those by Alozie (2005, 2007) Mody (2010), and Ray (2009) on African news media on Darfur, and Savelsberg (2015) and Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm (2015) on the global north's representations of Darfur.

I conducted content analyses of news reports from three countries: Kenya, Rwanda and South Africa. In addition, I conducted and analyzed interviews with journalists from Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, South Africa, and Nigeria. While it would be desirable to include an examination of Sudanese media, Darfur is currently in the midst of renewed hostilities. A visa to the country would thus be impossible to attain.

Moreover, there is every intention to add interviews from Egypt and other African nations being added at a later point in time, such as the post-graduation phase of my academic career.

Methods of Analysis

Because this project is cross-national, I rely on an already present dataset of news articles that were collected for Savelsberg's NSF-funded research project on Darfur (Savelsberg 2015; Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm 2015). I also build on an already constructed coding instrument and interview guideline from that project, which provides a unifying platform across the datasets (the already present dataset and that created in the course of this project). News articles to be analyzed were gathered from microfilms provided by the Centre for Research Libraries. I used neither LexisNexis, ProQuest, AllAfrica nor Factivia since their collection of African newspapers at best non-existent.

Although this project is primarily qualitative in its approach to data analysis, it also relies on descriptive statistics to capture the more macro level phenomena in the data. The use of both types of data is aimed at providing a context for an interpretation of the descriptive analysis and is influenced by the work by Sreberny-Mohammadi (1984), Savelsberg (2015), Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm (2015) and Miller, Dingwall, and Murphy (2004). Miller et al. (2004:331) argue that revisiting qualitative data enables the researcher to explain variation that may be found during quantitative analysis of the data; such as the prominence or decline of particular frames from a specific country. Moreover, the flexibility of qualitative analysis methods allows for a discovery of localized differences in how journalists perceive of and discuss Darfur. This provides greater explanatory power than may be provided by solely relying on quantitative indicators.

Miller et al. (2004:332) also posit that a reliance on quantitative analysis alone would not be amenable to capturing and explaining the contextual factors that are often seen as potentially threatening pollutants to a research's integrity and generalizability.⁵² This does not imply a wholehearted espousal of this somewhat harsh critique of quantitative analysis. However, for my project, contextual factors are best captured by both methods rather than either method solely. Though the descriptive analysis may highlight convergence in media narrative (as suggested by Mody 2010), qualitative data from journalist interviews and participant observation provide the context to understand why exactly media narratives may converge.

Quantitative Analysis

The quantitative analysis is mainly descriptive and, as already mentioned, complementary to the qualitative approach. It is primarily macro in its approach and highlights overarching patterns within the news reports. I used content analysis to examine news reports from the selected countries. All the newspapers are in English, and I chose each based on its circulation and readership numbers or by whether or not I had access to it. All have their publishing headquarters in the larger cities: *The New Times* of Rwanda; *The Sowetan* and the *Mail and Guardian* both of South Africa; *The Daily Nation* (founded in 1958) and the *East African* and *The Standard* all from Kenya.

⁵² Miller et al. (2004) call this *context-stripping*

1. The New Times of Rwanda.

This newspaper was founded in 1995 and is currently the only English daily in Rwanda. It is privately owned and is published from Monday to Saturday with a sister publication *The Sunday Times* on Sundays. It also has a weekly sister publication, *Izuba Rirashe* that is published in Kinyarwanda.

2. The Sowetan and Mail and Guardian Online from South Africa

Founded in 1981, the *Sowetan* is an English daily newspaper from South Africa that started as a liberation struggle newspaper in the township of Soweto, near Johannesburg. It has a primarily left-leaning editorial perspective. As of 2014, it had a circulation of 99, 287 daily. The Times Media Group of South Africa owns *The Sowetan*. The *Mail and Guardian Online* was the first online newspaper in Africa in 1994. It grew from the *Mail and Guardian* newspaper, which was founded in 1985 and boasts on its web page to be the must-read newspaper for anyone who was interested in South African politics during the Apartheid era. M&G is more liberal in its political leanings and considers itself as having a humanist philosophy.

3. The Daily Nation and the East African from Kenya.⁵³

The Daily Nation, founded in 1959 by Micheal Curtis and Charles Hayes and later bought by His Highness the Aga Khan in 1960. Published under the auspices of the Nation Media Group, it is the largest circulating, and most read newspaper in Kenya. The *East African*, also published by the Nation Media Group was founded in 1994. While *The Daily Nation* is published daily (as the name suggests) the

⁵³ Circulation numbers are discussed in the next chapter.

East African is a weekly newspaper. *The Daily Nation* caters to a local audience while the *East African* is primarily a regional newspaper that caters to audiences in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda. Both publications can be considered as left-leaning in their political orientations.

4. *The Standard* from Kenya

Founded by Alibhai Mulla Jivanjee in 1902, and later sold to European hoteliers Anderson and Mayer in 1908, it is the second largest selling newspaper in Kenya. It is primarily intended for a Kenyan audience but is also sold in neighboring Tanzania and Uganda. Unlike the other two Kenyan newspapers, *The Standard* has for a long time been considered more conservative in its approach.

The use of content analysis is influenced by Prior (2004) who argues that how words are organized and set within a text is essential to understanding what the organizer hopes to achieve. Prior (2004), suggests that content analysis is tasked with trying to understand how texts may be arranged to guide the reader into performing in specific ways. She states that the organization of Charles Dickens' *Oliver Twist*, for example, is meant to entice the reader into consciously taking a moral stance against the effects of poverty and exploitation while simultaneously depicting the writer as a dispassionate narrator of events (Prior, 2004: 89). Paek, Yoon, and Shah (2005: 589) echo this by positing that hard news readership consistently results in positive relationships with an individual's involvement within their community.⁵⁴ Perhaps with this relationship in mind, Prior (2004) suggests that documents (in this case news reports) have to be viewed

⁵⁴ This harkens back to the idea of an *imagined community* created in reading the news and thus a feeling of investment in the betterment of one's community.

less by what they contain and more as receptacles (of moral indignation, spectacles of suffering, consumption, etc.). It is therefore essential to ask how they have been produced and under what circumstances this production occurs (p. 91). This approach allows for my analysis to focus less on a culturist critique on the use of frames such as *Arab vs. black African* in the reporting on Darfur and more on *when, how, why* and *who* uses these terms to report on Darfur over the time span being studied.

Due to the substantial volume of news reports gathered, I collaborated with two undergraduate students as coders to help with the process. As suggested by Macnamara, for a content analysis to be ‘rigorous’ there has to be an attempt to acquire “maximum reliability” (2006:10) which necessitates more than one coder. This ensures that the eventual results were not idiosyncratic to my subjective judgment. I relied on Cohen’s *kappa (k)*. The reliability coefficient for the variables is .74, which though not at the .75 threshold that is often considered the rule of thumb for Cohen’s *kappa* (see Banerjee et al. 1999; Macnamara 2006: 12) is close enough for me to be comfortable with the conclusions I draw from the data.

Qualitative Analysis

The qualitative data analyzed used in this project was primarily interviews with journalists from Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, South Africa, and Nigeria. This was augmented by 6-month participant observation of journalism students in one of East and Central Africa’s premier journalism and communication school, Daystar University (hereinafter, Daystar).

Interviews

I conducted the journalist interviews between 2012 and 2015. The interview data enabled me to go further than work done by Mody (2010), Ray (2009), Grzyb (2010), and Alozie (2007) all of whom relied on content analyses of news reports alone. The interviews seek to understand how journalists discuss and perceive of the atrocities in Darfur, its victims, and the various actors involved in a setting that is not influenced or susceptible to editorial decisions and policies. Interview data explores the role and influences of the *rules of the game* on how journalists cover(ed) atrocity. As such, the role of *habitus* and that of historical trajectories that work to place journalists in the nexus of being African and a journalist in a professional field that takes pride in its ideals of objectivity are what the interviews attempt to tease out.

The interviews are necessitated by the fact that, despite uniformity found in media narratives, as demonstrated by Mody (2010) and Ray (2009), journalists' perceptions of Darfur are necessarily aligned with how their narrative is framed in the published news reports analyzed. This distanciation may occur for two reasons:

- 1) As pointed out by both Cook (1998) and Hall (2000) news production is often a group process, and the choice of news content entails a complex process that starts with a methodological sorting and selection of events in accordance to a socially constructed set of categories (newsworthiness). Thus a news article is likely to represent editorial and elite source consensus (see here, Beaudoin and Thorson 2002; Hallin 1989; Russ-Mohl 2010) and not an individual journalists' understanding of an atrocity. Studies hitherto conducted on African newsrooms appear not to take into account this fact.

- 2) As Hadler and Haller (2011) point out in their work on recycling discourse, while the presence of a global script may influence an individual's sense of what comprises appropriate behavior, privately individuals are likely to hold differing views. They suggest that in private, behaviors are largely influenced by the national context of the individuals (2011:333).⁵⁵ Consequently, discourse about Darfur is likely to vary significantly as one moves from one country to the next. It is this puzzle, between what I view as akin to Goffman's (1967, 1983) front-stage (published news report) and back-stage (personal perceptions) behavior, that motivates the use of both content analysis and interviews in this project.

However, Miller and Glassner (2004: 125) caution that scholars who espouse a more radical constructionist approach to interview data argue that interviews are not necessarily useful. This is because knowledge about a reality "out there" in the social world is not obtainable from interviews. This approach suggests that interviews are in and of themselves exclusive interactions between the interviewee and the interviewer that occur at a particular moment. As such, they are at best context specific and constructed to fit the demand of the interactive milieu of the interview. Miller and Glassner (2004) propose, however, that though interviewees are likely to respond to the interviews using "familiar narrative constructs" (such as what it means to be 'black African') it is incumbent for the interviewer to not only recognize this as a possibility but also realize that prior cultural understandings inform the interviewee's response. In the context of this

⁵⁵ They also argue that the use of a single theory will fail to grasp all aspects of behavior, such as environmental behavior in their study.

project, the influence of cultural perceptions is crucial since it points to interesting *nation-specific traits* and *collective memories*. Hence, those familiar constructs seen by Miller and Glassner (2004) as impediments are, for me some of the more important facets of interviews.

I am also keenly aware of the critiques by scholars, such as Collins (1990), who suggest that researchers cannot make legitimate claims if they do not have the subjective knowledge central to understanding the life experiences of the groups they study. While I cannot claim to understand the experiences of journalists let alone South African or Nigerian journalists, I firmly believe that any existence of (social) difference does not imply that the interviews I conduct will be bereft of useful information on the social worlds occupied by these journalists. Moreover, my experiences during the interviews highlighted the advantages and disadvantages of being an "outsider" or an "insider" in South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya. It would be imprudent not to acknowledge the implications of my identity as an "insider" (African, Kenyan, urban and middle class) and being an "outsider" (Kenyan, scholar from the United States).

I am reflexively mindful of the intersecting nature of my identity. My identity is likely to and did trigger different responses to my questions depending on whether I identified or was identified as an insider or an outsider. The various intersections of my identity and how it was constructed were, at different points, beneficial and detrimental and I needed to be flexible in decisions about which facet of my identity I emphasized. As highlighted by Juluri (1998:86), this 'insider' - 'outsider' tension enables me, to achieve a level of access that most scholars from the global north are unable to reach. Being able to choose when to be an 'insider' or an 'outsider' and when to employ both

identities at the same time gave me the ability, to “share the burden and privilege of certain kinds of colonized and racialized subjectivities” (Juluri 1998: 86). This also allowed me to speak as both an ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’, and “as [a] transnational intellectual and as [a] representative of specific national and local constituencies” (Juluri 1998:86). To journalists, especially Kenyan, and Nigerian journalists, I was the son that was telling the story of African journalists and conflict to Americans. I was, in this sense, working to correct the record and challenge stereotypes about conflict in Africa. This very ability to employ both identities was at times impossible since often either my ‘insider’-self or my ‘outsider’-self played a negative role. Therefore, in Rwanda, my surname Wahutu, often leads to misidentification as an ‘insider’ linked to the genocide. In a conversation with a Rwandan government official, the official advised that I use my English name James and middle name Siguru instead of my surname

Ethnography

[B]etween an internal reading of the text which consists in considering the text itself and for itself, and an external reading which crudely relates to the society in general, there is a social universe that is always forgotten, that of the producers of the work (Bourdieu 2005:33)

The above quote motivated me initially to conduct ethnography of a newsroom in Kenya. The media house was selected on the basis of preexisting networks built from my 2012 round of interviews and new ones that I was hoping to forge in the last series of interviews. Ethnography was intended for me to understand better the relationship between journalists and their news organizations, especially editors, and the effect such relationships have on the framing of news content.

My approach to securing entry was partly influenced by MacLeod (2009:8) who used his previous contacts in Calderon Heights to broach the subject of conducting an ethnographic study. As in Gans' (2005) study, I was going to focus more on editorial meetings and informal chats with specific journalists, rather than on particular journalists during my ethnography. Gans suggests that it is best to focus on what journalists are doing primarily then later to ask the "hows and whys," (2005: 73). This works to ensure that my experience in the field is one that can capture nuances of structure and agency in news production. It also ensures that I stay out of the way when the selection of frames and news reports becomes hectic during editorial meetings (Gans 2005:75). I intended on staying in the newsroom for the whole duration of my fieldwork, unlike Gans who periodically returned to check on how the journalists handled different kinds of stories (unless as previously mentioned, opportunity to accompany a journalist in the field arises). Since I was focusing on a particular type of coverage leaving and checking in periodically to see how journalists handle different stories would be unnecessary. None of this came to be.

I arrived in Kenya in early February only to find the media field engaged in a bitter dispute with the government about the transition to digital transmission. With global television broadcast moving to digital technology, the government and the media field had been embroiled in legal tussles about when Kenyan television companies were required to begin their transition. Therefore, a day after I arrived in Kenya, the government switched off all TV broadcast signals and for approximately one week, the whole country was in television darkness. I had walked into a major fight between the three major news organizations and the government about digital migration. The

migration to digital transmission was meant to have happened in 2013, but due to several court challenges by the three media organizations had been postponed on numerous occasions. In the meantime, the government sold broadcasting frequencies to a Chinese company and bought several frequencies as well. This left the three media companies with very few options vis-à-vis frequency distribution. This situation was made even more complicated by the fact that over the past few years, the media houses have not adequately explained to the audience what the migration entailed. Consequently, the public had little to no empathy about their plight and blamed the media for not making the move when they had time. My contacts explained that whatever hope there had been was now gone since there was a feeling of persecution within media houses. As a result, I conducted ethnography, not in a newsroom but a journalism school in Nairobi.

As a research method ethnography was conferred legitimacy at the turn of the 20th century within academia by classical works by social anthropologist such Bronislaw Malinowski (2001) and Margaret Mead. Within sociology, it gained legitimacy when *in situ* observations of social phenomena were viewed as central to empirical data collection (Baszanger and Dodier 1997).⁵⁶ The push for observing social phenomena and making them central to empirical data collection is also attributable to scholars from the *Chicago School* tradition. Ethnographies, perhaps more than interviews and content analyses, enable a scholar to study individuals in their everyday setting and work to highlight how well socialized they are into the *norms* and *rules of the game* within the organization that they work for. Cottle explains what to him would constitute a ‘good’ ethnography (2007):

⁵⁶ Not all *in situ* studies count as ethnographic studies, however. Baszanger and Dodier (2004) suggest that ethnographic studies are grounded in specific contexts and do not always seek to make generalizable arguments by stripping away context from the study

an ethnography that is good is one that relies on prior reading and goes beyond the façade to help reveal the “complex forces, constraints and conventions that shape the selections and silences of media output” (2007:5). Ethnography thus provides insights that I could not have achieved through a content analysis alone. Conducted in a journalism school, it will provide for the adequate theorization of how future journalists are prepared for entry into the field in which the news media operates. Moreover if, as suggested by both Ericson, Baranek, and Chan (1987: 345) and Schlesinger (1978:47), the organization of the news creates the news and not the events of the day, then ethnography provides the best opportunity to understand how future journalists are taught to construct knowledge.

Paterson (2008) states that our shared reality is one that is shaped by the production of the news. However one cannot understand the manufacturing of a reality that is shared unless one gets to the heart of the “manufacturing process and the shared cultures,” of those that manufacture this reality (Paterson 2008:2). He suggests that ethnography provides an avenue through which to achieve this. This understanding of the role of ethnography to a sociological inquiry is also espoused by Schlesinger who informs us that an ethnography of news production avails to scholars information on the “working ideologies and practices of cultural producers,” (1980:363). Ethnography, therefore, provides an opportunity (grounded on the theories I use for this project) to observe the formal practices taught to future journalists in their training to provide the shared reality events.

Hierarchical Model of Influence

To carry out an analysis of this magnitude, I rely on Reese’s (2001) hierarchical model of influence on news production. Reese’s (2001) model locates journalists in a web of

organizational and ideological constraints (p. 174). It separates the matrix of influences into individual, routine, organizational, extra-media and ideological spheres (Reese 2001; Shoemaker and Reese 1996). This delineation into different spheres of influence is still mindful of the fact that journalists are often at the intersection of several of these spheres. Added onto this is a recognition that successive levels subsume the one/ones before it and thus the higher one goes, the more the factors exerting influence upon them (Reese 2001:178).

At the *individual* level, the focus is on the background, attitudes, and training of journalists in their professionalization process. Scholarship on this level works on analyzing characteristics of journalists and how they view their roles (see for example work by Bourdieu 1999 and Rosen 1999). The analysis of journalists' background is undergirded by questions raised by the sociology of knowledge where scholars argue that social context of the journalist conditions the individual journalist's assumptions, the kinds of questions asked, and events seen as newsworthy. Most scholarly criticism of the representations of Africa has focused on this level of analysis. These studies have primarily been content analyses of news reports and as such, there is an inbuilt assumption that the news report accurately reflects the journalists' understanding of events in Africa. In an attempt to remedy this, this project tackles this level of influence by using interviews in addition to content analysis, as explained above. Focusing on journalists helps to illustrate how sedimented knowledge and different contexts (social, professional, etc.) all work to influence journalists from different countries (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Durkheim 1964; Mannheim 1936). However, Hall (2000) suggests that focusing on this level would be insufficient since news content entails a complicated

process that starts with a methodological sorting and selection of events in accordance to a socially constructed set of categories rather than a set ideology. Thus, a focus on journalists or news content solely would miss the complexity of the sorting and selection of events as newsworthy within the bureaucracy of the newsroom.

At the *routine* level, scholarship has primarily focused on professional norms and practices that journalists internalize in their work that place constraints on individual agency (Schudson 1989, 2011). However, Reese (2001) and Tuchman (1978) suggest that routines can also act as outlets for creativity through the structures they make available. The *organization* level focuses on how power is exercised within the news organization in the pursuit of the organization's policies and goals. Scholarship at this level focuses on the forces at play in shaping what stories journalists consider newsworthy and how these stories are framed. One way to achieve this is by focusing on editorial decision-making and how power is exercised implicitly, periodically and explicitly. Gans (1979), Reese (2001), Sigal (1973) and Tuchman (1978) all suggest that journalists anticipate the organizational boundaries in their daily work and this influences how they frame their news content. This belies the assertion by McNulty (1999) about journalists being ill-informed. The pernicious nature of these routines may not be self-evident to the journalists themselves, as shown by Bourdieu (1991, 2005). Just interviewing them would thus not yield adequate results for this level of analysis as it may in the prior level. This is what makes conducting ethnographic work of a newsroom a worthy enterprise. However, because of forces beyond my control, a newsroom was not possible during the data collection stage. Instead, I conducted a participant observation of a highly ranked and internationally recognized journalism school in Nairobi. This allowed me to

understand how people ‘become’ journalists and how they viewed the state of the field they were preparing to enter into.

The next level, the *extra-media* level, focuses on non-media institutions that affect the shape of the news. Bourdieu (1999), Reese (2001) and Merton (1968) have all suggested any analysis of the news and the knowledge they produce and rely on, cannot take journalists as the sole authority of how the content will be framed. Instead, they posit, narrative is influenced by a variety of institutions in society: such as influential news sources, other media organizations, economic considerations, political climate and interest groups. Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm (2015) allude to the same by highlighting the role of nation-specific traits in shaping the narrative employed by journalists from different countries. This level requires a field approach to understanding news organizations. It views the field as working in concert with other fields in society such as the political field. A field approach argues that though disparate, news organizations all work in concert. Cook (1998) states that despite the differences in technology, deadlines, and target audience, news organizations are primarily structured similarly in their internal organization, interaction with sources, and the formats employed (Cook 1998:64). This implicit and explicit inter-organizational agreement on processes and regulations and how these affect the content and methods of journalism make it necessary to adopt both field and neo-institutional approaches (Benson 2006; Cook 1998; DiMaggio and Powell 1983).

The final level in this model is the *ideological* level. Here Reese (2001) suggests that a critical view of news production should consider: 1) recruitment of journalists; 2) routines journalists follow; 3) journalists’ attitudes; 4) organizational policy, and 5) larger social structures and how they all work to maintain the *status quo*. This level suggests

that all of these factors work to make media organizations tools for social control. This strand of research argues that the news is biased since it seeks to promote *informational imperialism* within which the global south is systematically presented as barbaric (Altheide 1984:484). The suggestion here, implicitly at least, is one of coordination by the news media to portray the global south as primitive and anarchical (Amoko 1999; Atkinson 1999a, 1999b, Hawk 1992).

This level is, however, difficult to maintain with the current proliferation of new media technologies and outlets such as the recent rise of social media and blogs as platforms through which news is disseminated. Altheide (1984) points to research that provides mixed results at best when it comes to reporting on issues in the global south in the 1970s and 1980s. Nothias (2016), Savelsberg (2015), Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm (2015) and Scott (2015) also draw a complicated picture in their work on the representation of Africa in the global north. I suggest here is that there is not necessarily a *meta-conspiracy* (Allen and Seaton 1999) against the global south by journalists from the global north but that the picture is complicated and not uniform as some may suppose, as shown by Mahtani (2009). What can be agreed on, however, is that foreign news and specifically news on Africa, in the global north tends to focus on cycles of conflict and crises more often than not (Allen and Seaton 1999; Beaudoin and Thorson 2002; Gans 1979; Moeller 1999).

Coding Scheme and Interview Guide

As mentioned earlier, the nature and scope of this project dictated that I rely on a coding instrument that is readily available. Thus, I relied mostly on the coding scheme developed in the context of Savelsberg's Nation Science Foundation-funded project

(Savelsberg 2015; Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm 2015) to analyze news reports that I gathered. An abridged version of the coding instrument is appended at the end of this document (Appendix A).

Building on work by Entman (1993) on framing, scholars differentiate between different types of frames. These vary from frames that seek to identify and point to problems, diagnostic frames, to those that try to propose solutions (prognostic frames) and finally those that attempt to provide a rationale for engagement (motivational frames) (Benford and Snow 2000; Gerhards 1995; Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm 2012). When discussing and reporting on genocide and mass atrocity, frames about civil war, state crimes, insurgency and humanitarian emergency are often used. The coding instrument captures this as well, and I used it to investigate two of the three research questions (r.1 and r.2). The resulting data forms the basis of chapters five and six. Questions surrounding the use of sources by journalists can be answered by using this coding instrument as well. The last variable enabled me to keep track of this and build a database of the types of sources used by journalists over time in Kenya, South Africa, and Rwanda. This was mainly relevant in answering r.3 and the resulting data form the basis upon which chapter four relied upon.

Appendix B is the interview guideline that I used. Just as the coding scheme, this guideline has been used by Savelsberg (2015). It thus provides the basis from which I conducted my comparison. In addition, this guideline is constructed to closely parallel the coding scheme (Appendix A). Journalists' perception on a number of issues can thus be compared to their reporting of Darfur.

Chapter 3: Development and Trajectory of the Media Field 1895-2015

Introduction

This chapter contextualizes the development of the media field in Kenya specifically, and Africa generally. It highlights the development of the media field from the pre-colonial period until 2015. With an emphasis on the Kenyan media field, it traces:

- 1) The field's relationship with the postcolonial State.
- 2) The field and the liberalization of the political and economic fields post-1990 following the implementation of IMF and World Bank policies.
- 3) The relationship between organizations and those that own them.
- 4) The perception of the field by journalists.

I rely mainly on interviews with journalists (from Kenya, South Africa, and Nigeria), and data from a 6-month participant observation in a journalism school in Kenya.

Theoretically, I make use of Benson's (2013) three levels of field analysis, field *position*, field *logic*, and field *structure* primarily in this chapter to highlight the field's development.

Benson (2013) defines field *position* as the field's relative juxtaposition to "either non-market or market power, as mediated by the state" (p. 25). At independence, the media field was closer to the non-market logics than market logics, by aligning itself with, or being co-opted, by the State in Africa. The role of the State, however, has not

been straightforward and is riddled with complexities and intricacies. For example, as Kenya transitioned towards political liberalization in the late 1980s, the field experienced a rush of new entrants and a shift towards market logics. However the State, as in other parts of the world (see Benson 2013; Cook 1998), still makes policies, enforces laws and regulations in a manner that affects the field.

Benson (2013) defines field *logic* as the “dominant news practices and formats” which are primarily translations or refractions of outside the field-forces (p. 25). Consequently, an analysis of the media field’s *logic* calls for a tracing of the field’s historical trajectory and the factors leading to its formation. Moreover, analyzing the field’s *logic* is central to this project since “the rules of the game are established when the field is founded and, once routinized, tend to persist over time,” (Benson 2013:25). For most former colonies, even once external conditions changed, (such as the end of colonization or the liberalization of the political and economic fields in the late 1980s), the internal logic often persisted. Moreover, external conditions did not change as much concerning legislation and subsequent laws that the new States instituted, maintained and enforced in relation to the field. They mainly mimicked those initiated under colonial occupation.⁵⁷

Benson’s (2013) exposition of the media field *structure* argues that a field approach should work to situate “the position of each media outlet in relation to other media outlets in the class stratification of audiences,” (p. 26). So social location as it relates to the audience’s class stratification and an outlet’s stake in it may lead to media

⁵⁷ In Kenya see, The Preservation of Public Security Act, Cap 57, The Official Secrets Act of 1968 and The Books and Newspapers Act of 1960 (formerly The Book and Newspapers Ordinance of 1906) which continue to be enforced by the state whenever it suits the State

outlets producing different discourses: suggesting a homology of production and consumption spaces of the outlet and its target audience. However, due to the primarily elite nature of newspaper audiences in most African countries, a class approach would not yield as much as one may hope when analyzing discourse. Instead, as shown by both Nyamnjoh (2005:231–253) and Wasserman and Maweu (2014a, 2014b), the role of ethnicity and the politics of belonging play a more visible role than that played by class. Subsequently, when analyzing the field's *structure* the focus invariably highlights the role of ethnicity in affecting how the field operates. This focus allows for an elucidation of the role of habitus *affinities* and *dissaffinities* in influencing how media fields frame local events.

Habitus *affinities* contribute “to more (and positive) news coverage of some groups, whereas habitus *dissaffinities* could contribute to less (and less positive) news coverage of other groups” (Benson 2013:27). Benson’s (2013) elucidation of affinity provides more nuance to affinity than those by either Golan (2008) or Hester (1973) who focus primarily on *cultural affinity*. Here again, work by Gans (2005) on covering foreign news by American news outlets comes to mind. Journalists who have reported on Darfur talk about the role of *affinities* and *dissaffinities* in affecting the framing of the news. Journalists from Kenya and South Africa highlight the fact that *affinities* and *dissaffinities* follow different contours depending on national historical trajectories and collective memories. In South Africa, *affinities* and *dissaffinities* follow the contours of political history, religion, race, and their role in affecting understandings of victimhood and perpetrators in Darfur. In the words of a South African journalist and an editor:

Our implicit support lies with the so-called black Africans. For two reasons: 1) is the fact that we can associate better with them both because of, if you want to call it that, a similar political strife that we've had from apartheid in South Africa. But also, the fact that we know that we almost culturally understand the people from South Sudan better than we do the people from North Sudan and that is also based on religious issues. South Africa is overwhelmingly a Christian country (journalist interview, South Africa 2012).

There is a definite disdain from Khartoum towards Darfuri people and as a South, as a Black South African, you know it is a very sensitive issue when you actually see that sort of racial discrimination (editor interview, South Africa 2012).

In Kenya, *affinities* and *dissaffinities* play out along the contours of race, which affected understandings of victimhood. The words of two journalists are revealing:

I don't want to say [President Omar al Bashir] is a bad person, but what I would say that these things [ICC intervention] tend to make him turn against Sudanese who are black and hardens his stance in retaliation thus making it harder to negotiate (journalist interview, Kenya 2012).

I was able to talk to various people, original Arabs, Arabs, people of mixed blood that is African...the products of interracial marriages and actually the pure native Africans. The blacks [...] they call [Arabs] "the brown colonizers" not white but brown-skinned colonizers. Therefore, [they] want [their] land back (journalist interview, Kenya 2012).

The 'Mass' in Mass Media

It is imperative to note here that when talking about media fields in Africa, the notion of *mass media* is inappropriate. The media landscape's development is such that not all media platforms have developed equally over the course of the landscape's growth.

Nassanga (2009) illustrates the folly of the term *mass media* by pointing out that media organizations, especially television stations and newspaper publishers, are not only concentrated in urban areas but also mainly provide programming that caters to primarily

urban elites. This urban-centric approach is not a recent development but rather part of how the media field operated even before independence. As pointed out by Gadsden (1980), of the 56 indigenous language newspapers in Kenya between 1945-1952, all but seven were printed in Nairobi and served the city and its environs. Three of the other seven were published in Kisumu, a city on the shores of Lake Victoria, and three in Mombasa, a city on the coast. A Kenyan journalist, from Royal Media Services, highlighted this urban-centric approach to audience targeting when discussing Figures⁵⁸ used by television stations in their battle against a government shutdown in February of 2015:

Even the people who do not have TV, let's take for the example those in the slums, so then you will find them in a [eatery] somewhere, where there's a TV, watching news. Most of them you will find them, in a large crowd in front of a TV just watching the news. So maybe the numbers they are from urban centres, which would make sense (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

Most Africans still reside in the shadows regarding new communication technologies (see work by Franda 2002; Nyamnjoh 2005). For large sections of the population, the proliferation of both satellite and terrestrial media means very little since they are the preserve of a select few. This is because not only do most Africans live in rural areas⁵⁹ but also, the languages used in broadcasts are rarely, if ever, local languages. This thus means that audiences have to be literate in French, English, Portuguese or Spanish if they hope to partake in consuming media (especially television and newspaper) messages. As pointed out by Nyamnjoh, this literacy can often “be a

⁵⁸ The number used was that 93% of Kenyans could not get their news due to the shutdown

⁵⁹ According to the World Bank, in 2015, 63% of Africans lived in rural areas. This number jumps to 75% when looking at Kenya.

privilege too remote for both rural and urban” dwellers with low literacy levels (2005:22). This explains the critical role vernacular radio broadcasts play in most African countries. In Kenya, Nyabuga and Booker (2013) point to the fact that 74 % of Kenyans accesses the 120 radio stations in the country. They also find that 70 % of radio audiences listen to "Kiswahili [Kenya's national language] stations compared with 68 percent and 52 percent" who listen to vernacular and English stations respectively. As shown in Table 1, 68 % of Kenyans report getting their everyday news consumption through the radio, while 79 % of Kenyan households (2.7 million households) reported having a receiver in 2010 (Table 2).

Table 1: News consumption through Radio

	2003%	2005%	2008%	2011* %
Never	5	7	8	10
Less than once a month	2	2	1	2
A few times a month	3	5	2	4
A few times a week	4	15	13	16
Everyday	77	71	76	68
Don't know	0	0	0	0

Survey Question: *How often do you get news from the radio?*

* Samples sizes: 2003-2008 = 1200 and 2011=2400

Confidence interval = 95%

Table 2: Households Owning television or radio in Kenya, 2006-2010*

	2006		2007		2008		2009		2010	
	HH	%	HH	%	HH	%	HH	%	HH	%
TV sets**	1.5	20	2.0	24	2.3	27	2.5	28	2.7	30
Radio sets	5.5	72	6.2	74	6.2	74	6.5	74	7.0	79

* From data provided by Nyabuga and Booker (2013) who use data from Kenya's 2009 population and housing census, the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, the International Communication Union and the Communication of Kenya (CCK)

** Numbers are in millions

Colonization and The Field

Colonialism played a significant role in shaping the *logic, position*, and the external constraints that have affected, and continue to affect the field. This section analyzes the development of newspapers and radio broadcasts as the field developed during the colonial era, teasing out not only the influence of colonization on the field but also the role of African elites during this period; especially the latter group's role and influence on Africa's press.

Print media

The first newspaper in Africa date as far back as the Egyptian newspaper *Al Waka'e*, founded in 1797. Following Egypt, the first newspaper in Sub-Sahara Africa was the *Royal Gazette and Sierra Leone Advertiser* in 1801, followed by Ghana's *Royal Gold Coast Gazette* in 1822 (Nyamnjoh 2005). Kenya's first newspaper was the *Taveta Chronicle*, commissioned in 1895 by Rev. Albert Stegal of the Church Missionary Society⁶⁰ (Media Council 2012). While most early newspapers were printed in the language of colonial occupiers, there were exceptions such as *Iwe Thorin* and *Imvo Zabantsundu* (Black opinion). *Iwe Thorin* was published in Yoruba starting 1859 by missionaries (Bourgault 1995:154; Nyamnjoh 2005:40). *Imvo Zabantsundu* was published in Xhosa by John Tengo Jabavu, a black South African political activist born in Healdtown district of South Africa, starting in 1884 (Nkrumah 1965:2).

Nyanjom (2013) posits that the objective of the colonial media was primarily to indoctrinate the native population "against 'indigenous values' " (p. 45) while exalting all

⁶⁰ This same society paid for the return of Livingstone's body for burial in England after his death while searching for the source of the Nile.

that was European, from religion to way of life. The colonial administration was often quick to label any indigenous newspapers started by western educated Africans advocating for independence (such as the *West African Pilot* founded by Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria), a "plague that was afflicting the whole country" (Nyamnjoh 2005:40). Across the continent, "colonial administrative control, censorship and other restrictions severely hampered the birth and growth of a vibrant press" (ibid). Colonial control and censorship were worse in Francophone Africa than in Anglophone Africa, and control was focused on broadcast media (radio) more than in print media; the former was seen as being more 'mass' than print media (ibid).

The Radio

The Media Council in Kenya (2012) and Bourgault (1995:69) both place the first radio transmission in Kenya in 1927 when the Cable Wire Limited began its operations, primarily serving the white settler community. The British East Africa Company controlled Cable Wire Limited. In both Francophone and Anglophone Africa, radio was seen as a tool for disseminating colonial policies (Bourgault 1995:69) and was supposed to keep the colonial citizens informed about events back in the metropole (Nyamnjoh 2005). As such, Africa was more of a *pied-à-terre* for most of the colonial era radio stations and their broadcast were not aimed at native populations (Gibbons 1974:109). However, in Anglophone Africa, the British promoted the use of vernacular languages early (unlike the French) in their pursuit of building an African audience. Nyamnjoh cautions that, though broadcasts in indigenous languages were produced, this was not a celebration of local culture but rather meant to "reach as many people as possible with a message aimed at curbing dissidence" (Nyamnjoh 2005:44). Ainslie (1966) states that

European editors of colonial radios were instructed to "encourage" African opinions to be expressed, as long as the views supported the objective of the colonial administration (p. 108). Colonial authorities saw broadcasting in the colonies as having the potential to act as a catalyst in the acculturation process necessary for the colonial project to continue unabated.

In 1959, the colonial administration formed the Kenya National Broadcasting Service (KNBS). Modeled after the BBC, KNBS was a response to growing calls by nationalists agitating for Kenya's self-determination (Media Council 2012:15). KNBS was nationalized in 1964 (at independence) and renamed Voice of Kenya (VOK), later renamed Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC), becoming the sole radio and television broadcaster. The new Kenyan government knew the importance of radio and understood that radio allowed them to talk directly to Kenyans. In these early years after independence, radio broadcasts would become the personal address system for the President.

The Field at Independence

At independence, political constraints ensured that the media field created knowledge about the nation only in the manner approved by the State. Newly independent States and their citizens had just emerged, mostly from protracted and often bitter liberalization wars. One effect of colonization had been to block native Africans from occupying positions of authority within not only State structures but also professional organizations like the media. Thus independence led to rapid moves to indigenize organizations to make them more representative of the now independent citizens; a process Mamdani (1996) refers to as *deracialization*. Mamdani (1996) argues that what these new States

needed instead was not necessarily for the State to *deracialize* its structures but rather their *detrribalization* and with it the concomitant democratization of the State. Not democratizing State structures would lead to the post-independent media fields paying a hefty price vis-à-vis their relationships with political fields. Non-democratization enabled the postcolonial State to create, through administrative practices, what Mbembe (2001:103) calls a “master code” that became society’s primary way to see itself. In Kenya, for example, this “master code” defined the nation as a *family* and the President as the *father of the nation*. Though seemingly innocuous, Ogola (2011) posits that this established culturally legitimate hierarchical relationships enhanced the legitimacy of the regime.

New Political Elites and the Field

Africa’s leaders inherited media fields that the departing colonial administration had used principally as tools of oppression. The State quickly put the media field, just as the economic and political fields, to the service of a ruling minority. Just as they had done with the instruments of governance, instead of reforming the field these new elites were quick to re-appropriate its structures and with this, the field’s colonial rationalities. Nyamnjoh (2005) states that one effect of the colonial administration’s obsession with controlling broadcasting was making evident to future African leaders that governments were more vulnerable when they failed to maintain “rigid control over the media” (p. 45). States, like Kenya and Ghana (both former British colonies), viewed the media field as an arm of the government whose job was to disseminate the States’ agenda.⁶¹ Nyamnjoh (2005) points out that the media field in postcolonial Africa from 1960 to 1980 was

⁶¹ Here again, just like under the colonial administration, the control was more rigid on broadcast than it was on print media.

"either the mouthpiece of the government or subjected to draconian laws and administrative censorship" (p. 42). Media organizations, especially those that had radio broadcasts, would become mouthpieces of the post-independence leaders in the name of ensuring unity and development of the State. Odhiambo (1991) states that the expropriation of the media field "was a major feature of the newly independent countries in Africa" (p. 23). The two mediums that were most susceptible to this expropriation were television and radio. Radio's susceptibility was due to its cheap maintenance costs and the government's stranglehold over broadcasting frequencies. For the case of TV, Bourgault (1995) and Tudesq (1992) point to the fact that television broadcasts were seen as easier to establish monopolistic control over than radio. This was due to factors like the cost of owning a TV, and the costs of setting up of television transmitters. Bourgault (1995) informs us that, by 1988, there were only 160 television transmitters in Africa compared to 1,059 radio transmitters in 1987.

In Kenya, the government and the Kenya African National Union (KANU), the ruling party, owned the two major broadcasters, KBC in 1964 and the Kenya Television Network (KTN) later. KTN, launched in 1990 by the Kenya Times Media Trust (itself established by KANU in 1987), was Kenya's first 'private' station (Kadhi and Rutten 2001). Though the government, and KTN itself, tried to portray KTN as independent, it was clear to anyone, who watched its news broadcasts that it was sympathetic to the ruling party. For both broadcasters, like in the rest of the continent, broadcasts typically began with comprehensive coverage of recent activities by the head of state. News about these activities would come directly from the Presidential Press Unit, with news editors being obliged to read run them in their entirety (Kadhi and Rutten 2001).

Political elites, like the late Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah (a former journalist himself), did not consider an independent and privately owned press as a viable option (Odhiambo 1991). Nkrumah argued that the media could not function in strict accordance with facts within a system that was competitive and capitalistic (Nkrumah 1965). He posited that in privately-owned news organizations, journalists would find themselves selecting and rejecting some facts based on whether or not they aligned with their employer or those who paid to advertise in their newspaper. Moreover, with the pressures of competition over advertising revenues, Nkrumah (1965) worried that trivialities would be sensationalized and peace would be perverted to the detriment of the newly independent state. This concern follows very closely the framework of questions raised by Weber (1976) on the tension between the news as a source of information and as an advertising medium.

For Nkrumah, an African journalist's role was to toe the party/State line; the State being both the paymaster (and largest purchaser of advertising) and gatekeeper. A journalist, a true African journalist, was supposed to serve the society by making sure it was moving "in the direction of [the State's] aspirations" (Odhiambo 1991:24). A direction that championed nationhood and pushed for "the political emancipation of [...] African people" (Biney 2011:115). Nkrumah's elucidation of the role of an African journalist was also predicated upon a concern that journalists' principles were being informed by "western epistemological assumptions about truth and practice, even if the reality on the ground" called for "contextually appropriate systems of meanings" (Nyamnjoh 2005:87).

Moreover, despite journalism schools starting in the late 1950s in Anglophone Africa and the late 1960s in Francophone Africa, this did not result in the contextualization of journalistic canons (Nyamnjoh 2005:89). Journalism schools had a tendency to use North American and Western European canons without adapting them to local realities. As a result curricula content, pedagogical approaches, and operational standards mimicked those from the global north (for discussion of this see chapter seven). Historically, this lack of curricula contextualization was partly a result of the presence of foundations and nonprofit organizations⁶² that sought to educate African journalists in journalistic foundations and ideals.⁶³

The Field in Kenya

The media field in Kenya invites mixed opinions from those who, like Nyamnjoh (2005), view it as profoundly compromised to those who point to its vibrancy and as the "most respected, thriving, sophisticated and innovative in Africa" (like a BBC policy briefing) (BBC 2008:3). When discussing the field in Kenya specifically, or Africa generally, it is necessary to acknowledge its growth within an environment that sought to nation-build through a top-down approach (Atieno-Odhiambo 1987; Ogola 2011). Ogola reminds us that during the period immediately after independence, politicians, "the media, and the public were expected to privilege a narrative of national unity" (2011:80). Mbeke, Ugangu, and Okello-Orlale argue that at independence:

⁶² Examples of these organizations included the International Press Institute and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation.

⁶³ Fair (2013) alerts us to a similar situation in post-conflict Liberia for which she notes that between 2003 and 2011 there were at times more "outside media experts on the ground" than "Liberian media professionals of any kind" (p. 153).

The new leaders realized that influence and control over the flow of information was a necessary precondition for stemming undue criticism, consolidating political power and ultimately ensuring that the masses played only a passive role in national affairs (2010:18–19).

Odhiambo (1991) and Riegel (1977) state that this expectation was routine in emerging nations in the global south and was not unique to Kenya or the African continent. It is during this post-independence period as well that the notion of ‘development journalism’ would emerge. ‘Development journalism’ was envisioned as a way through which the field would be proactive by consciously contributing to the nation-building agenda.⁶⁴ This was not necessarily a departure from how the colonial media had worked before independence. The field's *logic*, where the field was central to nurturing pliant members of the State, withstood the end of colonization.

The nation-building agenda turned the field into a tool for governments to fight/ combat fragmenting loyalties in the march towards promoting national unity (Bourgault 1995; Riegel 1977:63). Kenya’s first Minister for Information and Broadcasting (Achieng Aneko) saw no qualms with the government establishing control over the field. He saw it as the government’s egalitarian duty (Odhiambo 1991). Kenya’s first minister for Justice Tom Mboya (a trade unionist and Pan Africanist) echoed Aneko’s view by arguing that the State would judge the field on whether it was:

Hostile or sympathetic to the national cause; was it reactionary or progressive; was it identified with the imperialist forces and money interests in the former colonial countries; and how far [was] it regarded as a tool of foreign penetration and an agent of neo-colonialism (Mboya 1970:136).

⁶⁴ For an in-depth discussion of development journalism see work by Dixon (1997) and Nyamnjoh (2005)

This antagonistic relationship between the political and media fields was not unique to Kenya. In Zimbabwe, for example, the country's first post-independence Director of Information, Justin Nyoka, referred to the idea of a free media as a "spurious western value" urging journalists to be sensitive to the government's direction, which was primarily nation-building (Obonyo and Peel 2012:141). More recently, the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa started calling for a "statutory mechanism to set and enforce media standards" in the wake of increasing anxiety over the changing relationship between the media and political fields (ibid).

Odhiambo (1991) further states that some Kenyan editors were also "willing to accept a certain amount of limitation of press freedom" (p. 24). Ronning (1994) views this self-censoring as an internalization of what were perceived to be the political field's rules of the game (p. 72). This internalization is best captured in a published opinion piece by Hilary Ng'weno (1969), Kenya's first African editor, who defended limits to media freedoms by arguing that:

The challenge to the press in young countries is the challenge of laying down the foundations upon which future freedoms will thrive [...] Under some conditions (of poverty, illiteracy, and disease) in which vast numbers of Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans live, it would be sacrilegious to talk about press freedom, for freedom loses meaning when human survival is the operative principle upon which people live [...] In such countries, the first duty of the press, as indeed of any other institutions or individuals, is to encourage greater national unity.

During this period, the *position* of the field was squarely within the non-market logics. The desire, or attempt, to move the field towards market logics was not only a threat to the nation-building agendas of the new state but also as a sign of hostility towards the nationalist cause. This relationship between the political and media field, alerts us to the

extent to which "the press suffered repression at the hands of newly crowned African leaders" (Obonyo 2011:12).

The Story of Kenya's Newspapers

As previously mentioned, between 1945 and 1952, Kenya had at least 56 indigenous newspapers that catered to the native population (Gadsden 1980). None of which was able to revive its operations following a state of emergency instituted by the colonial administration in 1952. During the emergency, the colonial office gave itself the power to grant and revoke printing permits and with this the authority to suppress and eventually kill off a vibrant indigenous press (Gadsden 1980:533). As a result, at the inception of independence, *The Daily Nation* (hereinafter *The Nation*) and the *East African Standard* (hereinafter *The Standard*) were the only two privately owned newspapers (Ogola 2011).

The Nation, founded in 1959 by Micheal Curtis and Charles Hayes, and later bought by His Highness the Aga Khan in 1960, supported Kenya's independence (Ainslie 1966:104). Ogola (2011) and Winsbury (2000) both suggest that H.H. Aga Khan, the Ismaili spiritual leader, sought to ensure that not only his business interests would be protected by the incoming regime but also that the sizeable Ismaili community in Kenya would be protected as well. At this time, Kenya had the largest population of Ismaili Muslims. H.H. Aga Khan bought *The Nation* as a sign of commitment to the 'new Africa' and to signal goodwill to the incoming regime as he urged his followers in Kenya, and Africa at large, to take up citizenship in the new nations. The decision was therefore partly based on a wish to demonstrate his support for the "new Africa in concrete terms" (Loughran 2010:3). It was also partly influenced by the push, and wish, for an

independent newspaper to counter the colonial-leaning *The Standard* as independence edged ever so close (Loughran 2010).

The Standard vociferously sought to expand British military presence and the exercising of violence against the liberation movement leaders and indigenous populations. This was after its founder, Alibhai Mulla Jivanjee, sold it to European hoteliers Anderson and Mayer, who were "settler friendly" (Kadhi and Rutten 2001:243). *The Standard* became a voice for the "white settler community and was fiercely against internal self-rule" (Ogola 2011:81). Ainslie (1966:100) tells of the shock and dismay amongst the settlers when the British government announced that Kenya would be granted its independence. This shock, Bourgault (1995) states, was because *The Standard* "had largely ignored the 'winds of change' sweeping" through the British colonies in the 1950s (p. 163). After independence, however, *The Standard* started supporting the government. Jomo Kenyatta, initially referred to as an evil genius, would now become the man "to thank for a peaceful transition to independence" (Ainslie 1966:103) in the columns of *The Standard*. This support was, just like *The Nation's*, predicated upon its pursuit to "curry favor with the new government" (Bourgault 1995; Ogola 2011).

Staff working for both newspapers were mostly white in the early 1960s. At *The Standard*, the staff was almost all white and all British trained until 1965. Staff at *The Nation* were also primarily white except for Chota Karadia (an Asian) and George Githii (an African)⁶⁵ (Ainslie 1966:106). Partly, because *The Nation* was founded by two British citizens and later owned by the Aga Khan, it was considered foreign by governments in East Africa where copies of both newspapers were sold. To remedy this

⁶⁵ Githii would later leave *The Nation* to become President Jomo Kenyatta's personal assistant.

perception of 'foreignness' *The Nation* began indigenizing its staff a year after independence (Bourgault 1995). Hilary Ng'weno would become *The Nation's* first African editor as part of this indigenizing project (Ainslie 1966). Nonetheless, politicians in East Africa were extremely suspicious of *The Nation* as they suspected it of pitting politicians against each other, instead of against the colonial administration, for profit (Ainslie 1966). Both newspapers would be banned in Tanganyika in January of 1964, accused of distorting their coverage of Tanganyika during a revolt in Dar-es-Salaam (Ainslie 1966:105). This ambivalent relationship between Tanzania and newspapers from Kenya continues to this day and is seen as a regular part of the relationship between Nation Media Group (NMG) and Tanzania. A sub-editor from NMG remarked that:

Yes, they [tensions between NMG and Tanzania] come and go. so we are solving this one and then we will be back. But our Tanzania correspondents are still writing so the newspaper still has stories from Tanzania even though we can't sell there for maybe another week or two (sub-editor interview, Kenya 2015).

Post-independence, both newspapers explicitly- and implicitly- pushed the government's agenda by not only being mild in their criticism but also "appropriating and popularizing the State's invented mythologies" (Ogola 2011:81). Both newspapers would begin calling Jomo Kenyatta the *father of the Nation* and the nation *a family*. This relationship, between both newspapers and the State, was not impacted in any significant way with the ascent of Daniel Arap Moi to the presidency after the death of Jomo Kenyatta in 1978. President Moi, through proxies and party functionaries, ended up owning a controlling stake at *The Standard* while asserting control over *The Nation* through his business relationship with its principal shareholder, H.H. Aga Khan (Ogola 2011:83). Only decades later, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, would the media field in

Kenya begin to agitate for democratic principles and values. In addition to the rise of multiparty politics and an increasingly repressive regime, another critical factor for this pivot was the banning of *The Nation* from covering the parliamentary proceedings in the late 1980s (Dixon 1997; Kabatesi 1993; Loughran 2010).

Political Liberalization and The Field

In the decade leading up to the 1990s, States in Africa had experienced failing economies and the constriction of democratic space, which at times resulted in coups d'état. As a result, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund pushed African States to accept a raft of policy prescriptions (referred to as Structural Adjustment Programs) that included currency devaluation, privatization of state-owned enterprises and the opening up of the democratic space to allow for multiparty democracies.⁶⁶ One effect of the Structural Adjustment Programs in Kenya was a rise in independent and privately-owned print organizations. Before the 1990s, the government indirectly supported "mainstream print media by frustrating the alternative news media" (Ogola 2011:81) - so much so that by 1991, 20 publications had been officially banned (Kadhi and Rutten 2001). In 1989 alone four independent publications were banned by the government (Kalyango 2011).

This diversity vis-à-vis ownership and voices, post-SAP, also brought with it an increase in 'alternative' publications, referred to as the *gutter press*,⁶⁷ which would last for short durations before disappearing altogether. Media scholars and practitioners accuse the *gutter press* of establishing themselves through regular extortion and

⁶⁶ While several scholars have critiqued these policies and their overall effectiveness, and I agree with most if not all of the critiques of SAP, this discussion is beyond the purview of my dissertation. Should one be interested in some of the analyses, see Komola (2007, 2012); Mbembe and Nuttall (2004); Schatz (1994, 1996)

⁶⁷ Some examples include *The Dispatch*, *Exposure*, *Weekly Sun*, *Compass*, *Crossfire*, *The Post*, *The Post on Sunday*, *Dunia*, *Kenya Confidential*, *The Independent* and *The Weekly Citizen*.

corruption, viewing them as a stain on the field (see, Kadhi and Rutten 2001; Makali 1998:1–3; Nyamnjoh 2005:60). Makali (1998:1–3) argues that the *gutter press* do not hesitate to kill a story should they be bribed and have shown a willingness to "sell entire print runs" to people seeking to protect their reputations. In the 1990s this niche within the field intently sought to discredit President Moi's regime and most, if not all, were funded by his political foes (Ogola 2011). This created an environment in which, though pluralistic, the field was also inundated by "ruthlessness and unprofessionalism" (Odhiambo 2002:310).

A confluence of events brought about by political liberalization led to the government no longer being the single largest source of advertisement revenue; political liberalization and the concomitant economic liberalization brought new players into the market and thus a new stream of advertising revenue. Despite this, it is still true that the government continues to be one of the biggest purchasers of advertising. In 2010 alone, the government spent approximately five billion Kenya shillings on advertising: making it the fourth largest buyer of advertising space.⁶⁸ This, despite a ministerial directive to cut spending on advertisements (Nyabuga and Booker, 2013:71). Nonetheless, new revenue streams allowed the field to move closer to the market pole than had been previously possible. A benefit of this was the mobilization of oppositional discourse within mainstream newspapers and making them less rigid in their political leanings (Ogola 2011). *The Nation*, for example, became more confrontational in its relationship with the State (Ogola 2011:84). However, *The Standard* struggled long into the 1990s

⁶⁸ See Table 7 for a breakdown of ad purchasers by sectors. Also, advertising revenues have been steadily rising from 2003 when the total revenue spent was Ksh 6.6 billion, followed by Ksh 8.4 billion in 2004, Ksh 9.3 billion in 2005, Ksh 13.6 billion in 2006 and Ksh. 17.4 billion in 2007 (Mbeke, Ugangu, and Okello-Orlale 2010:39)

due to President Moi's apparatchiks interfering with its editorial position and its continued overreliance on government advertising purchases.

A note of caution is required when trying to understand the effect of political liberalization and marketization on the field. Despite the entry into the field of the *gutter press*, these outlets have not been able to capture the market share in a way to make them recognizable voices. *The Standard* and *The Nation* are still major players in the field.⁶⁹ As shown in Table 3, these two dailies have largely been competing for a sizeable, albeit stagnant, market share of approximately 400,000 buyers per day (Githaiga (2012)). The paucity of newspaper circulation is epitomized by the fact that the four daily newspapers have a distribution of 13 per 1000 versus 264 per 1000 of leading dailies in the US.⁷⁰ On the one hand, Table 4 shows that the circulation numbers from 2005 to 2010 have largely been low registering at barely 0.2% of Kenya's total population at its peak. On the other hand, readership numbers are much higher as shown in an audience survey which found that Kenya had an average of ten "pass-on-readers" for each newspaper that is purchased (Ipsos-Synovate 2011). As a result, *The Nation's* readership numbers hovers around 5.5 million weekly readers, as shown in figure 3.

⁶⁹ See Figure 3 for a breakdown of readership numbers of these and other newspapers in the field.

⁷⁰ It is important to note that this difference in circulation figures is not due to the quantity of dailies solely. Hallin and Mancini (2004) suggest that the differences are also about the "nature of the newspaper [and] its relation to its audience," (p. 22). They argue that newspapers in some countries, such as Southern European countries in their study, target a small elite as its audience thus had smaller circulation numbers. This is arguably the same scenario in Kenya.

Table 3: Daily Circulation Numbers of Newspapers

Daily Newspaper	Established	Target Audience	Ownership	Circulation per day
The Standard	1902	All demographics	The Standard Group	110,000
The Nation	1958	All demographics	Nation Media Group	180,000
The Star	2007	Primarily major cities	Radio Africa	15,000
Taifa Leo	1958	Primarily Swahili speakers	Nation Media Group	44,000

Data from the Media Council Report of 2012 and Githaiga (2012)


Table 4: Circulation numbers for newspapers from 2005 to 2010*

Year	Weekly newspapers	Daily Newspaper
2005	250,000	200,000
2006	300,000	220,000
2007**	480,000	400,000
2008	350,000	320,000
2009	380,000	280,000
2010	400,000	320,000

*Table from (Nyabuga and Booker 2013)

**2007 was an election year thus the uniquely high number.

Figure 3: Readership Numbers in 2011 (combined weekly and daily)



Numbers used in this figure are from (Nyabuga and Booker 2013)

Mitullah (2012) captures the elite nature of newspapers in Kenya by showing that sixty percent of rural dwellers in Kenya have “never gotten its news through newspapers” compared to only thirty seven percent of urbanites (p. 4). This finding is also echoed in Table 5, which shows that by 2011 only ten percent of Kenyans received their news primarily from newspapers.⁷¹ TV viewership does not fare any better either, with only thirty three percent receiving their daily news through TV, as shown in Table 6. An analysis of newspapers, therefore, is not necessarily one about knowledge production by newspapers for Kenyans as a whole, but rather for a small sub-set of Kenyans, a subset that is primarily urban, literate, and of relatively high socio-economic status.

⁷¹ Results from Afrobarometer survey rounds two, three four and five held from 2003 to 2011

Table 5: News consumption through Newspapers (in percent of population)

	2003	2005	2008	2011*
Never	36	42	52	52
Less than once a month	11	9	8	9
A few times a month	15	14	10	12
A few times a week	23	22	16	17
Everyday	16	13	14	10
Don't know	0	1	.	1

Survey Question: *How often do you get news from newspapers?*

* Samples sizes: 2003-2008 = 1200 and 2011=2400

Confidence interval = 95%

Table 6: News consumption through TV (in percent of population)

	2003	2005	2008	2011*
Never	45	45	49	40
Less than once a month	8	7	4	5
A few times a month	10	8	7	6
A few times a week	15	14	11	15
Everyday	22	26	31	33
Don't know	0	1	.	1

Survey Question: *How often do you get news from the TV?*

* Samples sizes: 2003-2008 = 1200 and 2011=2400

Confidence interval = 95%

A Plurality of Perspectives?

The presence of multiple voices in the field has not translated to a diversity of viewpoints since three organizations make up the main players in the field. The three organizations, Nation Media Group (NMG), Standard Group (SG) and the Royal Media Services (RMS), all have multiple media outlets at their disposal. Until mid-2016 NMG owned two radio stations in Kenya (Nation FM and QFM) and one in Rwanda (KFM), seven newspaper publications and two TV stations (Nation Television and QTV). Starting July of 2016, the organization was reorganized to having just one TV station, one radio station in Kenya (Nation FM). SG owns three newspaper publications, one radio station and one

TV station (KTN). RMS owns two TV stations (Citizen and Inooro TV) and 16 radio stations that broadcast in different vernacular languages. One journalist explained RMS's lack of a newspaper was explained as a business decision:

With newspapers, we are not...they were not doing as well, so I think he [the owner] just made the decision you know. It was a business decision; because we are not making sales with our newspapers [...], Kenyans are loyal. Before you make them change their minds, or change their habits, they stick to their habit. You know, they are loyal, if I'm buying paper A, unless you give me a miracle I'll keep on buying paper A (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

Notably for NMG, marketization led to its growth from just two dailies in 1990 (*The Nation* and its sister publications *Saturday Nation* and *Sunday Nation* all in English and *Taiifa Leo* in Kiswahili) to being the “biggest media firm in Africa outside South Africa, with a market value of \$324 million and a 52.54 % dollar return” (Maweu 2014:28). By 2015, NMG had the largest printing press in East Africa and even published newspapers for rival companies such as The Star Newspaper. This growth has had the effect of interlocking directorships⁷² being the order of the day (both within NMG and the field as a whole) and a rise within newsrooms of the perception that business-minded CEOs are supplanting the editor as “the editorial boss” (Gachuhi 2013:15). Wasserman and Maweu (2014a) show how the interlocking directorships, play into how journalists at NMG cover and approach certain stories:

⁷² This is where multiple boards of directors and senior managers at NMG also hold critical roles in boards of other organizations that are often advertisers with the *Nation*.

These board of directors are also board of directors in other companies. For example, our chairman and former CEO, Mr Kidero [former governor of Nairobi] is also the chair of Standard Chartered Bank...and again the Standard Chartered Bank is one of our main shareholders! So you see, Standard Chartered is protected all through...and we cannot say anything negative about it (from a journalist interview quoted in Wasserman and Maweu 2014a).

Although it is near impossible to overstate radio's importance, it is also not uncommon for the radio stations owned by either organization to repeat the news from their newspapers throughout the day or for TV broadcasts to mostly replicate the news events covered by the newspapers. All three media organizations have their headquarters in Nairobi and thus often focus on the news more relevant to the audience in Nairobi than those in Isiolo, which is 169 miles away. As such, neither internal nor external pluralism exist, which leads to the news not being a multiperspectival product and homogenous in viewpoints (Benson 2013:132; Hallin and Mancini 2004:29).⁷³

The Influence of Advertisers

The dominance of the media field by NMG, SG, and RMS has led to claims, such as those by Makokha (2010), Maweu (2014), and Ogola (2011), that in order to protect revenues there has been sharp increase in what Schudson (2011:112) refers to as "market-driven censorship." This sentiment is poignantly illustrated in journalist interviews by Maweu (2014:33) where journalists state they had at times been "prevailed upon by top management" to reframe their coverage of news deemed detrimental to advertisers. As suggested by an NMG journalist:

⁷³ Hallin and Mancini (2005:29) define internal pluralism as individual organizations providing diverse viewpoints; external pluralism refers to the media field as a whole offering a wide range of viewpoints(2005:29).

I would say the media has developed some form of symbiotic relationship with advertisers...we have big time advertisers who want to bully the media to have their way and they will openly threaten that we should not bite the hand that feeds us...there is a sense that advertisers have succeeded in intimidating the media because we are practicing journalism, but we cannot afford to rise above these commercial interests...there are certain advertisers we cannot touch no matter how big the scandal is (journalist interview quoted in Maweu 2014).

A journalist interviewed by Helander (2010) discussed a situation in which *The Standard's* largest advertiser (Kenya Airways) in retaliation of perceived negative coverage cut all its advertising and directed all of it to *The Nation* for over a year. The failure of RMS's newspaper, *The Citizen*, is attributed to the stopping of advertising space purchases by telecommunications giant Safaricom in retaliation for a negative story published by *The Citizen* (Helander 2010:532). Table 7 shows the growing strength of the communications sector in advertising revenue for the field and the growth of sector spending over six years. Pressure from advertisers is also felt in television programming where a producer explained to Helander "how advertisers are able to influence television programming content" (2010:533).

Advertising revenues, as presented in Table 7, and sentiments raised by journalists illustrate concerns articulated by both Croteau and Hoynes (2006:177–178) and Wasserman and Maweu (2014a:623–624) that market pressures to maximize profits are likely to lead media production to be “commandeered by large corporations and being molded to suit their interests and strategies” (Wasserman and Maweu 2014a: 624). These concerns also echo fears raised by Nkrumah (1965) who saw privately owned news organizations as being susceptible to the demands of those who advertised in their newspapers. For Nkrumah (1965:6), media organizations working in a "capitalist or neo-

colonialist environment" had profits from circulation and advertising as their primary concern. This, he argued, would compromise the integrity of journalists working within these organizations.

Table 7: Media Advertising Expenditures by Sector, 2009 and 2014*

Sector	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Communications	6.435	9.41	10.829	15.233	19.382	16.75
Financial services	4.098	7.358	9.815	14.712	14.338	14.629
Corporate	3.403	5.585	7.505	9.702	11.689	12.885
Pharmaceuticals	2.262	3.448	6.102	5.901	4.87	5.608
Total Spend	16.198	25.801	26.746	45.548	50.279	49.872

*A breakdown of how much was spent in specific media forms can be seen in a more detailed Table 28 in the appendix. Data received from Ipsos-Synovate Kenya

Pressure by advertisers on news organizations is, however, not the only factor that has affected the framing of local events in the news. An interviewee from RMS suggested that senior management (members of the board), owners, and editors, were just as likely to expurgate and manipulate reports to fit their specific narratives:

All [news frames] are influenced so much by the topmost people, the managers, the editors, the owners, that when it reaches the audience, it is a different message. It...it can be distorted. If somebody does not feel that this information should be relayed out there, it will change. That means that its sort of like censoring, that means that information that gets out there is rather manipulated and there is somebody, somewhere, who would not question it. But like ours [radio broadcasts] it is totally vernacular, this person is, you know, they are [in remote villages] they do not have any other means of communication, so they trust you (Journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

The journalist suggested that RMS journalists continually second guess their frames since the rules of the game do not appear to be clear-cut or even well-articulated:

I do not believe only when you are down there, even when you are the editor and you are the managers, it is still hectic [...] you have now owners second-guessing you [...] after [editor goes through it] the owner now goes through it, and then he changes it. So now, you feel like...*ok you guys should have just come and do the work because... my input clearly has gone to waste* (Journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

The State's Role

Although the State affects the field through the amount of money it spends on advertising, it has also played an integral role in influencing the field *logic* and *position* through legislation that has worked to both help and stifle the field. One way the State has affected the field's logic has been through the lack of actual law articulating what media freedoms were in Kenya. An effect of this is captured in the exorbitant penalties levied against media organizations by a judge who argued that high penalties⁷⁴ were intended to “encourage responsible journalism, fair and accurate reporting, and self-examination by the media” (Tettey 2006:236). In 2001, the Kenyan parliament passed a Statutes Law (Miscellaneous Amendments Bill) that required publishers to increase "the bond required by any start-up newspaper from Ksh 10,000 [\$127.00] to Ksh 1,000,000 [\$ 12,723.00]" with any breach of this being punishable with either a \$12,723.00 fine or a jail term of up to three years (Obonyo and Peel 2012:154).

In 2006, the State wielded its power over the field by invading and destroying copies of *The Standard* and disconnecting broadcasting signals used by KTN. Then Internal Security Minister (the late John Michuki) ordered this action, which was carried out under the purview of the Communication Commission of Kenya (CCK); established through a parliamentary act in 1998. CCK's role is, ostensibly, to ensure that licensees

⁷⁴ Totaling just over half a million dollars at 2014 exchange rates

complied with the licensing terms as well as the law and is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Information and Communication. It is the body tasked with providing licensing for entrants into the field, a process shrouded in secrecy and viewed by most Kenyans as a prime patronage tool.⁷⁵

This precarious nature of the field's relationship with the State was partly addressed by expanding the concept of freedom of expression in Kenya's new constitution of 2010. Before this, interpretation of this freedom vis-à-vis the field by the State meant that media freedoms inhabited a "legal and policy netherworld" precariously exposed to political intrigues (Odhiambo 2002:297). This netherworld was because the constitution did not explicitly reference media freedom; instead, media freedom was derived from individual liberties and Article 79 of the constitution.⁷⁶ Thus, even though the field operated as a collection of organizations recognized as such by the Companies Act of Kenya, its operations were treated similarly to private individuals and with the freedoms and rights afforded private persons (Odhiambo 2002:297). The new constitution worked to provide protections for the media as institutions rather than having the field derive its protections from those afforded private persons. Article 34 of the constitution required Kenya's parliament to put into place (within three years of the constitution's promulgation) a regulator that was independent of both government and commercial interests (Obonyo and Peel 2012). Though media ownership in Kenya may be private, the State wields an inordinate level of control through advertising revenues

⁷⁵ An example of patronage at play often highlighted is the fact that the Royal Media Group got its broadcasting license because the owner, S.K. Macharia, was a close ally of former President Kibaki.

⁷⁶ This section provides for an individual's freedom of expression, which includes the freedom to hold opinion without interference, the freedom to communicate one's ideas without interference, the freedom from one's correspondence being interfered with. It, however, does not grant the right to information access.

and legislative authority (see Momoh 1987 for discussion of media ownership and media control in Africa).

Politics, Ethnicity and The Field

Electoral politics often seem to bring out the worst versions of media organizations in African countries. From radio RTLM in Rwanda to the use of the radio by rebel forces in Bentiu state in South Sudan (April 2014), the media field has been put to use for some unsavory purposes. For Kenya, Charo and Makali (1998) and Nyamnjoh (2005) show that violence that plagued two districts in Kenya following the 1998 elections exposed the field as being “keener to promote ‘hate journalism’ through exaggeration and politicization of ethnic tensions than accurate and responsible journalism” (Nyamnjoh 2005:56).⁷⁷ An interviewee who mused about the centrality of the media's role in stoking animus stated that:

This person is, you know, they are inside there [in the rural areas]. They do not have any other means of communication, so they trust you. Obviously, they are going to get the wrong information, and I think yeah that is a negative because that is what happened in 2008 violence. Because they believe you; and because of that, they get agitated and start doing stuff (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

Patronage Politics and Political Coverage

Jomo Kenyatta's government used patronage to influence *The Nation* and *The Standard* while owning the sole TV and radio broadcasting station (KBC). The Moi regime not only continued this trend but also made sure that its apparatchiks sat on the editorial board of *The Standard*, thus influencing editorial decisions. The Moi regime maintained its control of the TV and radio broadcasting station KBC, while also increasing its

⁷⁷ Here too Kwame Nkrumah's concerns continue to be echoed.

stranglehold on TV broadcast through the pseudo-free KTN. The third regime, the Kibaki government, not only continued with patronage politics, such as the awarding of broadcasting licenses to Royal Media Group, but it was during this regime that *The Standard* was attacked in 2006.⁷⁸ As recently as 2015, the relationship between NMG owner, H.H. Aga Khan and the current Kenyan government was put on display. In the midst of a dispute about media migration from analog to digital transmission (in which broadcast transmission had been disconnected by the government), H.H. Aga Khan visited the statehouse (the President's official residence) after which NMG's broadcasts were restored. In a conversation with a professor at my field site, the professor intimated that H.H. Aga Khan called his CEO and informed him that TV broadcasts would be back that night in time for primetime news. This led to a domino effect, and the other two organizations started broadcasting again.

The elections in 2007 resulted in one of the worst bouts of post-election violence in Kenyan history. While successive elections post-1992 had seen spells of violence (except 2002), the acrimony accompanying the 2007 campaign period set the stage for a fiercely contested election (Branch and Cheeseman 2008; Lynch 2006, 2008; Okediji and Wahutu 2017). One of the casualties of Kenya's post-electoral violence was the perception of the media field as instrumental in shaping the democratic transition in Kenya and as a guardian of public interest "against state power" (Ismail and Deane 2008:320; Ogola 2011). Ogola argues that the coverage of the 2007-2008 political crisis needs to be placed in a "much broader and more complex paradigm" (2011:88). A

⁷⁸ The defense of this attack by the government led to the now famous quote by then Minister for Internal Security and Provincial Administration (John Michuki) who said that "when you rattle a snake you must be prepared to be bitten."

paradigm that takes into account the fact that the media field in Kenya has always been entangled within a field of power that is complex and still playing a significant role in how it develops. Much like Bourdieu's (2005) fields of power, the political field at times plays a more significant role than the economic field.

Obonyo (2011) goes even further in his critique of the field during the 2007/2008 post-electoral violence. He suggests that even though the government ordered the shutting down of live broadcasts and even though the editors complained bitterly about this illegal action, government officials had previously met with media owners “and the two parties had agreed with the proposal that live broadcasts be banned” (2011:10). This echoes Oloo (2013) suggestion that while the main dailies in Kenya provide the illusion of operating independently from the influence of their owners and politicians, this is merely a front. Though the private media organizations are vibrant, this should not be conflated with their being independent since the field is either owned or controlled by “groups closely linked to key members of the [three] post-independence regimes” (Githaiga 2012:9).

Ismail and Deane (2008), suggest that the relationship between the media and political fields is not unique. They argue that “media in most societies are politically biased or aligned in some way, have tendencies toward sensationalism and simplification and balance self-interest- whether profit or power- with acting in the public interest” (2008:326). Though somewhat accurate, Ismail and Deane’s (2008) understanding of how the Kenyan media field operates misses a crucial point about the characteristic of the field: how ethnicity affects electoral coverage. The critique of the field is primarily centered on the fault lines that came to the fore during elections and moments of

uncertainty where the media are seen as exacerbating fault lines. Hence, while sectionalism may be a standard feature of media fields, as suggested by Ismail and Deane (2008), the outright ethnic bias in coverage of political events is what scholars and practitioners have decried. The alacrity with which the field in Kenya seeks to focus on affinities and disaffinities leads to questions on the types, form and even extent of media freedoms that the field should be granted not just in Kenya but also across the continent.

Ethnicity and Coverage of Local & Regional Events

In interviews with NMG journalists, Wasserman and Maweu (2014b) find that NMG takes political stands influenced by the affiliations of the politicians supported by senior NMG executives. In 2007, more than in previous elections, this support was along ethnic lines. Oloo (2013) finds that within the media field, there is a tacit understanding that the notion of editorial impartiality is slim because editors are understood as having their own political biases. In the case of Kenya, this often also implies ethnic allegiances. In a telling interview a journalist states:

In the 2007 elections and its aftermath, newsrooms were divided right in the middle along tribal lines between Kikuyus and their sympathizers and Luos and their sympathizers [...] In my own media house at The Nation, we had two TV sets one tuned to KTN which was aligned to ODM (Luo faction) and another tuned to NTV which was pro PNU (Kikuyu faction) [...]. So the influence is huge, it's a sorry state, but it is the reality (journalist interview quoted in Wasserman and Maweu 2014b).

An NMG journalist reiterated this to me in 2015:

So, you have reporters from a particular media house who could not go to a particular area or and vice versa. So that was part of the issue as well, and it forced a rethink within media circles as well. In terms of a balance of stories, especially originally considering that we are a very tribal country as well, so it did force a rethink (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

Journalists interviewed by Wasserman and Maweu (2014b) point to the importance of understanding ethnic allegiances by stating that, at the *individual* level, notions of integrity and ethical principles will at times come second to ethnic loyalties. This is not unique to this contemporary moment in Kenya's media field since between 1945 and 1952 ethnic animosities were rife in indigenous newspapers (Gadsden 1980:522). In this sense, the *logic* of the field has endured. It is also vital to point out the role played by the audience in influencing the tone and framing of the newspaper. As mentioned by an editor at NMG, "sometimes it is what is happening out there that determines the news angle we take" (editor interview quoted in Wasserman and Maweu 2014b). Thus for NMG to sell newspapers, editors feel the need to position their news frames in a manner that sometimes sacrifices "issues of national importance to appease the highly ethnicized publics in different regions [of the country]" (Wasserman and Maweu 2014b). This sentiment points to a homology of news production and consumption spaces (Mahtani 2009).

Yet, when it comes to covering the atrocities in Darfur, journalists suggest that a narrative constructed around notions of ethnicity and ethnic animosity to explain the atrocities is misplaced. Journalists stated the atrocities were driven by more than just purely ethnic allegiances and often spoke about an instrumentalization of ethnicity. In Kenya, responses to questions about the role of ethnicity were mostly in the following manner:

I do not think that the initial thing that led to the violence was ethnicity.
I do not think so. Probably ethnicity just found its way into the conflict,
but that was not the issue (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

I do not think Darfur is ethnic. Darfur initially is about the economy; it is about survival. It is about what we call source of livelihoods that have come to clash, probably because of global warming and climatic changes (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

This sentiment by journalists echoes findings by Alozie (2007) who argues that there is tendency to avoid ethnicity as an explanatory tool in regional conflicts. There was incredulity that there would even be a narrative based on ethnic tensions as the primary cause of atrocities. One journalist mentioned the Kony 2012 campaign, by an American volunteer organization, as an example of stereotypical understandings of conflict in African countries by journalists and audiences in western countries:

Darfur, just as the similar ‘stop Kony’ campaign just became yet another moniker for this hopeless, hapless continent that is dark and has people wielding machetes, and it’s surprising that that would still hold at a time East Africa and Africa has become the leading destination for business investments and attracting all sorts of people (journalist interview, Kenya 2012).

Despite all of the hand-wringing about the use of ethnicity to explain Darfur, chapter five illustrates that the ethnic conflict frame was used in the coverage of Darfur not just in Kenya but South Africa and Rwanda as well. As Table 19 shows, Kenyan journalists referenced used the ethnic conflict frame in 23.4 % of the articles on Darfur.

Implications For Field and Postcolonial Theories

How does consideration of field and postcolonial theories help us understand this period of the field’s development? As this chapter has highlighted, the *logic* and *position* of the field cannot be separated from the colonial experience. The field developed either in response to colonization or with the express aim to indoctrinate the native populations. A consequence of this was that native elites quickly understood the role the State could play

in controlling the field. Native elites also learned, from media organizations started in response to colonization, such as *Imvo Zabantsundu* in South Africa and *West African Pilot* in Nigeria, the importance of the field in mobilizing sentiments for or against the State. Controlling the field meant that the new leaders would gain not only narrative control but also the power to censor and restrict a field that may have posed a challenge to their hegemony. This relationship between the State and the field dominated the era right after independence in most countries in Africa.

With this in mind, the assumption that private media will work towards holding allegiance to the public rather than the State fails to consider power relations between the political and media fields. Bourdieu (1999:79) points to the centrality of the political field in the media field's evolution by suggesting that for all its attempts to appear independent, the journalistic field is connected and linked to the political field. Moreover, Helander (2010) states that journalists she interviewed allude to the strong relationship between private ownership and government control which echoes concerns raised by those interviewed by Maweu (2014) and Wasserman and Maweu (2014a).

Students at Daystar raised similar concerns about the relationship between H.H. Aga Khan and the government. These students, some of whom were practitioners in the field, often stated that it was a foregone presumption that journalists and editors were regularly summoned to the statehouse by the government whenever the latter wanted to pursue certain narratives or to chastise them for perceived or real 'negative' coverage. One story that was often repeated to highlight this was one in which Godfrey Mwampembwa, an editorial cartoonist for *The Nation*, was fired after the government had complained, both publicly and privately, that he had been 'too critical' of the

government. As shown in this chapter, one cannot understand how the media field works in Kenya without taking questions of government influence, advertisers, media owners, and ethnicity into account. Indeed as highlighted by Bourdieu (2005) the media is rarely, if ever, fully autonomous, but rather a "weakly autonomous field" that "refracts" instead of merely reflecting forces external to it. In Kenya's case, such external forces include ethnicity.

Even though political liberalization enabled private media organizations to break down the monopoly of the airwaves, enjoyed by KBC before the 1990s, this did not lead to a vibrant and engaged press. If anything, some media owners and advertisers took a more significant role in shaping and influencing the type of coverage that the field would engage in. This new reality has led to Obonyo (2011) to state, perplexingly, that from a "purely journalistic point of view," the greatest threat to media freedoms is no longer the state but rather the media owners themselves. He argues that media owners have formed a powerful lobby group that uses self-censorship to "force government to cede to its demands" (2011:18).

As the political field's influence on the field waned, the economic field's level of influence has increased. The growth and influence of advertisers are not unique to the Kenyan media field. As pointed out by Schudson (2011:112), "market-driven censorship" is a major concern in media fields in the global north. Schudson (2011) points out that as State-driven censorship has become less of an issue, news judgment has grown "less and less protected from commercial concerns" (p. 112). The role of advertisers needs to be understood within the broader global context of pressures on the media field to increase or maintain current levels of revenues. Thus, as news organizations have become more

attuned to their profit margins, a concomitant drive to appease advertisers has seen a rise. This awareness of profit margins isn't necessarily deleterious. As pointed out by Benson (2006: 196), market pressures work to as much to enable just as they do to constrain the media field's autonomous power. One thing to remember though is that in Kenya, as in most countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the government is also one of the largest purchasers of advertising space; as such, a move to the economic field away from the political field does not necessarily imply an end to the State's influence over the field. As Nyabuga and Booker (2013:71) have pointed out, even during a ministerial directive to reduce spending, the government was still the fourth largest purchaser of advertising in Kenya.

Additionally, the State still has within its books laws and statutes inherited from the colonial State that sought to suppress a vibrant press. Laws such as the power to grant and revoke printing permits employed by the colonial administration post-1952 were retained at independence. This law, in conjunction with those like *The Books and Newspapers Act of 1960* mean that the State remains a key player in controlling the field. The State, as highlighted by attack on *The Standard* in 2006, has not necessarily changed in its quest to control the field and has adopted a Janus-faced approach to the field. On the one hand, it has pushed the idea of respecting media freedoms while on the other hand it maintained a plethora of regressive colonial-era laws on its books. This maintenance of colonial laws should be understood as the result of "oblique powers that intermingle liberal institutions and authoritarian habits, social democratic movements with paternalistic regimes"(García-Cancilini 1989:3 [cited in Kraidy 2002:320]). The State has learned how best to deploy its control on the field whenever it perceives the latter as stepping outside its boundaries when covering local events.

Discussion

This chapter has illustrated how colonization affected the role of the media field during its formative years. Under colonization, the primary function of indigenous media was uplifting the natives and fostering a sense of togetherness. These organizations needed to alienate the colonizers/settler community while nurturing a sense of unity amongst the colonized. However, the urban nature of the media meant that media organizations mirrored the bifurcating character of the colonial state. The audience was split into what Mamdani (1996) eloquently calls *citizens* and *subjects*. *Citizens* lived in urban areas, were able to agitate the State for more freedoms, and were more educated. *Subjects* lived in the rural areas and were generally less educated and needed the tutelage of the state. The former read newspapers and were more likely to own a television set. The latter relied primarily on the radio, were less likely to own a television set or to read the newspaper. As Tables 1 and 2 show, one could argue that this bifurcation is still present in modern-day Kenya.

In Nigeria, the colonial administration depicted indigenous newspapers as a “plague,” while in Kenya the colonial administration gave itself the powers to issue and revoke permits following the 1952 state of emergency. This period also provided a template for how the State would later interact with the field. The dawn of independence meant that both *The Nation* and *The Standard* felt the need to trumpet the policies of the State to survive. Statements by politicians like Tom Mboya coerced both newspapers to take a pro-government position and ensure an internal homogeneity within the field. Leaders, from Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana to Achieng Aneko in Kenya, all proclaimed that it was imperative for the field to work in concert with the government and support State ideology. They saw the field as one avenue through which to enable the polity

construct ideas of nationhood and society since the media could give sense to and make real these vague concepts (Gans 2005). As these leaders sought to embrace and propagate the idea of nationhood, they needed to the field to push citizens to view themselves as members of the new nation (Pye 1963:3; Shah 1996:148). To political leaders, the media's role was not that of a neutral observer but rather one that was culturally grounded and seeking to promote their nation-building agenda (Shah 1996). It is this thinking that influenced ideas of what an *African journalist* was meant to do and how the field was meant to operate about the State's nation-building agenda.

The case of KBC is illustrative of this point. While the United Kingdom had the BBC, which was neither fully public nor fully privatized and could have served as a model for a public-service broadcaster, the Kenyan State decided against this model. Instead, it chose to take full control of KBC and turned it into its mouthpiece. The colonial experience and the immediate postcolonial period all worked to fortify the field's *logic* and its proximity to the non-market power; the post-colonial State controlled the non-market pole. This *logic* endured all through to the late 1980s when the World Bank and IMF forced the liberalization the political and economic fields in the global south.

In the post-political liberalization period, the State became less overt in its control due to several factors; one of which was new private companies buying ad space in the media field. Organizations within the field now had to compete for new streams of revenue which has led to a rise in market-driven censorship. Advertisers became key players in deciding the shape of coverage and were willing to withdraw their revenues whenever they thought that coverage had been negative. However, even though the field's *position* moved towards the market pole, this did not lead to a radical change in its

relationship with the state. If anything, the State became a key player in the scramble of advertising revenue by the media houses while also maintaining colonial-era laws in its books. This existence of laws initially constituted by the colonial administration illustrates the extent to which the post-colonial State was willing to mimic the departing colonialists whenever it suited them.

The push to control the field, while couched as necessary for development, was about ensuring that the means of communication were owned and controlled by the State. The newly elected leaders were willing to mimic those colonial administrative structures and relationships that allowed them to (according to Kwame Nkrumah) *seek the political kingdom first*. The trappings of power were appealing even when these very trappings shared remarkable resemblance to those of the departing colonialists. Acemoglu and Robinson posit that the end of colonialism saw postcolonial governments in sub-Saharan Africa taking a page from the departing colonizers by "severely narrowing the distribution of political power" (2012:111–12). The media field was instrumental in this process. In this period, and generally until the late 1980s, the field was dismissive of the interests and concerns of those that were poor and marginalized while lionizing the state (Shah 1996).

Conclusion

This approach pursued here is not a path deterministic approach to the media field, the political field and the influence of colonization on the field. As Nyamnjoh (2015:38) has argued, as democracy takes root in African states, the media fields should see continued growth of environments that foster more freedoms and progress. As shown in this chapter, considering the totality of the field's development in Kenya shows that the

environment has indeed improved over the years. One measure of this improvement is provided in chapter four where a Kenyan journalist points out that local journalists did not need to work with foreign correspondents as much because the political climate has dramatically improved. This trend resulted in less fear about government recriminations and less anxiety about personal safety when covering issues that the State may have previously viewed as sensitive.

Chapter 4: The George Clooney Problem: Outsourcing Knowledge Construction

I am here to represent the voices of the people who cannot speak for themselves...In the time we are here today, more women and children will die violently in the Darfur region than in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Israel or Lebanon (George Clooney 2006 UNSC address: cited in Mamdani 2010)

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the sources used by journalists in the coverage of the atrocities in Darfur. The first section provides an analysis of the media field in Kenya and the sources quoted by journalists. Here I distinguish between local media organizations and journalists, and foreign bureaus that have their regional headquarters in Nairobi. Such distinction allows for an analysis of the different choices made by local and international journalists when quoting their sources. Moreover, it is in line with Mannheim's (1936) assertion that differing contexts will lead to individuals understanding the world through multiple perspectives. Thus, although both are journalists working in the field, this approach investigates whether being African and working for an African organization leads to differences in decisions over whom to cite. The section ends with a discussion of how findings align with or complicate current scholarship on field and postcolonial theories. In the second section, I compare Kenyan to Rwandan and South African newspapers. First, I analyze the sources quoted in these three countries (see Tables 14, 15 and 16).

This chapter relies on data from the journalist interviews and newspaper content analysis. The content analysis captures who exactly is quoted by journalists while the

interviews work to understand how journalists speak of their decisions of whom they select as sources while illustrating who journalists think they quote with the most frequency and why. To analyze who “speaks” during the representation of atrocities, sources were coded for organizations or individuals paraphrased or quoted. As shown in Table 8, sources were coded as belonging to four broad categories:

Table 8: Categories of Sources

Category	Sources in category
State actors	Government officials, politicians ⁷⁹ , Diplomats, Military personnel on the ground
International Non-Governmental Organizations	Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group
Transnational Organizations	International Criminal Court, United Nations, African Union, European Union, Arab League
Other	rebels, anonymous sources, other news organizations, Observers of Darfur, etc.

Who Then, is a Source?

As pointed out in chapter one, understanding the news as a process of knowledge production necessitates that we view sources as co-constructors of this knowledge (see Gans 2005; Kothari 2010; Park 1940; Weimann 2000). Sigal (1973) posits that the news is not what happens but instead what "someone says has happened" (p. 69) which makes the choice of whom to quote pivotal. Consequently, the choice of whom to use as a source works to anoint who should be seen as credible and what type of knowledge is worthy of being reported. Benson (2006) talks about sources, especially political sources,

⁷⁹ Politicians include those in opposition parties and those in the ruling party.

as determining what is important for the audience. Gans (2005:238) saw news selection as heavily reliant on two processes, one that determined the “availability and [relationships between] journalists [and] sources” and the other that determined “the suitability of news, which [tied] journalists to audiences” (2005:238). The news is, therefore, a product that is negotiated between sources and reporters with the aim of creating a connection with the audience.

With this understanding of the role of sources in shaping the narrative espoused by journalists, it is also important to explain who counts as a source for this project. This chapter is interested in the *voices* that are given prominence in the different stories that are analyzed. Thus, even though current scholarship views wire agencies as news sources (see, Benson 2013; Van Hout and Geert 2008; Sigal 1973) I view them as news producers, just like the newspapers I study. As such it is the people, and organizations, quoted who count as sources for this project. As I focus on these voices, I am also conscious of the fact that news organizations, whether local or foreign, are susceptible to the vagaries of the sources they use and what these sources are willing to tell them.

Theoretical Expectations

Field theory would suggest that we see some level of similarity across the media fields analyzed here. One such similarity would be in the type of sources that journalists rely on most heavily being from the group I categorize as "State actors." Covering an atrocity is a difficult task even in the best of circumstances, from resource challenges to the safety of journalists reporting from the ground. During moments of uncertainty, news production will entail an even tighter coupling of “two information processes: one the news

organization; the other, the government” (Sigal 1973:4).⁸⁰ Thus at times of uncertainty, the convention of relying on government officials, and relying on already present narratives within official circles, takes on an even more significant role. In the process of *routinizing the unexpected*, the field is likely to rely even more on what Rosen (1999) refers to as "institutional reporting:" a process in which journalists go through their lists of contacts and call the relevant spokespeople in organizations, such as spokespeople in aid organizations, government agencies or foreign embassies.

For Bourdieu (2005), taking a field approach allows scholars to unpack the web of ‘mediations,’ which are at the heart of the process of news production. One such factor is the role of sources. As suggested by Schudson (2011), perhaps hyperbolically, sources are the “deep, dark secret power of the press” (p. 127). Rosen (1999) and Schudson (2011) both point to the centrality of State actors in acting as *authorized knowers*. Pedelty (1995) points to the sharp rise in this perception of State actors during a conflict.

Despite expecting some similarity, we should also expect to find differences in the countries of origin of the different sources used in different countries. Thus, though State actors are used by media organizations more than other sources, one would expect that journalists will use more government sources from regional or national governments than from the global north. It is safe to assume that journalists would typically have more access to their government's officials than those from other countries. The question about countries of origin of sources used is of paramount importance when examining postcolonial scholarship. If, as Mbembe (2001) argues, events (such as conflicts) in Africa are often viewed as a bottomless abyss from which only noise emanates, who is

⁸⁰ By government here, Sigal (1973) is not referring a specific government but, rather governments in general

tasked with making this intelligible for an African audience? If the framing of narratives on atrocity in Africa often works to provide the global north with a platform for a “public account of its subjectivity” (Mbembe 2001:3), which sources do Kenyan journalists favor when framing Darfur? Decisions on whom to quote as a source are central to questions surrounding who constructs the knowledge about atrocities in Africa for Africans.

Postcolonial scholarship has argued that knowledge about the global south has often been a product of the “western colonial and philosophical imagination” (Eze 2014:236). Andreasson (2005) and Murungi (2004) state that this colonial imagination is even more prevalent amongst those from the global north who produce knowledge about the global south. Considering critiques about how commentators from the global north produce knowledge about the global south, the role of sources used by journalists becomes critical. Taking these sentiments into account and postcolonial critiques over the production of knowledge about the global south by the global north, we may expect that African journalists will give precedence to sources from both Sudan and other African countries in their coverage of Darfur. This is rooted in both postcolonial thought on knowledge construction and concerns raised by journalists on the representations of Africa.

Kenya and The Global Media Field

African media fields are comprised of two subfields. The first is the national media subfield with its *structure*, *logic*, and *position* all being shaped by the national context and history. The other is the cosmopolitan media subfield, which contains journalists working in African capital cities for foreign bureaus and from countries from the global north. Though one may expect some interaction between subfields in the coverage of

Darfur, this is not the case. Kenyan journalists, and by extension the national media subfield, are largely removed from the international journalistic community that works in Nairobi. This forces us to reckon with the position of national media subfields, and their coverage of African events, within the global media field (Benson 1999; Bourdieu 1999). Although discursively aware of foreign journalists working in Nairobi, and mutually constructing narratives about events in the region, the national media subfield is in the periphery of this global narrative construction. As illustrated by Table 9, wire agencies play a key role in constructing the narrative on Darfur in Kenya. As stated by two journalists from *The Standard*:

There is no give and take relationship, that mutual relationship or friendship, the kind of dependency can only give and can't supply. So, there is, it's something that is very common. That network is not there. The guy you are talking [the New York Times bureau chief in Nairobi] about I don't know him, but I read his stories (journalist interview, Kenya 2012).

Because Kenya has become a bit of a regional hub a lot of journalists rely on each other for news stories and other things [but] you also have people working in their own little corners and not being a part of any discussion, and foreign journalists traditionally stick together, and a lot of them stay away from local journalist because of dissimilar experience or something like that (journalist interview, Kenya 2012)

There is frustration amongst journalists I spoke with about both the non-interaction and peripheral role played by Kenyan journalists. This disappointment revolved around a perception of the Kenyan media field ceding narrative control to western media organizations and journalists:

What is our responsibility? That [relying on foreign news organizations] is actually the failing of the media in this continent [...] Where is your credibility going to be? Ten years from now, 20 years from now, somebody reading what New York Times published in The Standard or The Nation or Mail and Guardian, what perceptions will they have about the media in the continent? [...] We have failed as a continent (journalist interview, Kenya 2012).

The problem with [relying on wire services] is, we are not in control of that narrative. Ok? With international media, what happens is you...you have all this trouble here somebody is sent to cover the story then they'll do their research, but they do not understand the history and the culture the way a local person would (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

Table 9: Articles from Kenya disaggregated by by-line

	National media field	Reuters (UK)	AP (US)	Western Author	Agencies**	IRIN	N/A*	TOTAL
The Daily Nation	79 14.66%	231 42.86%	60 11.13%	19 3.53%	39 7.24%		16 2.97%	444 82.37%
The Standard	27 5.01%						3 .56%	30 5.57%
The East African	35 6.49%			19 3.53%		2 .37%	9 1.67%	65 12.06%
Total	141 26.16%	231 42.86%	60 11.13%	38 7.05%	39 7.24%	2 .37%	28 5.19	539 100%

*N/A refers to those articles with no by-line attribution

**Agencies refers to stories that are a combination of information lifted from multiple wire agencies

Journalists directed their frustrations towards the role of editors and managers of their respective news organizations. They argue that the loss of narrative control is exacerbated by editors' willingness to use stories by the cosmopolitan media subfield to the detriment of their (local journalists) own stories. The key players in the provision, gathering, and processing of news about Darfur in Kenya are Reuters (founded by Julius

Reuter in 1851),⁸¹ Agence France-Presse (founded by Charles Havas in 1832) and the Associated Press (founded in 1846).⁸² The use of wire agencies, however, does not play out in the same manner across the field. As shown in Table 9 there is substantial variation in how the three newspapers analyzed here use stories from these agencies. Indeed, *The Standard* and *The East African* barely rely on wire agencies for their coverage of the region, and it is only *The Nation* that lifts more than half (61.23%) of its stories from wire agencies and 3.53% from western authors. Subsequently, only 17.8% of *The Nation*'s stories about Darfur were authored by journalists in the national media subfield compared to 90% by *The Standard* and 53.8% of *The East African*'s coverage.

Editors present this reliance on the cosmopolitan media subfield as an economic necessity in a competitive market, while journalists reject the financial necessity argument. While data on comparative costs is currently not available, it is noteworthy that NMG has two journalists whose beats are Sudan and South Sudan and yet *The Nation* often paid wire agencies for stories on Darfur; even when its sister newspaper, *The East African*, had journalists covering events in Darfur at the same time. Journalists at these two publications saw this ubiquity the cosmopolitan subfield either dereliction of duty or a lingering subservience to whiteness, both of which led to Africans losing the power to frame the narrative about Africa:

⁸¹ Julius Reuter had been a subeditor at Charles Havas' *Agence Havas* in 1848 before leaving to found Reuter's news agency in London (see, Bielsa 2008).

⁸² These organizations relied heavily on the growth of telegraphic lines in their formative years and were the first international media organizations (see Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen 1998:1).

Let me tell you it's been very frustrating, [...] You know, sometimes it's the newsroom that sponsors you to go to these conferences, *go to this conference interview so and so bring us this story*. You go there you spend your resources you spend your time, you file the story. The following day what do you see? You see there's a story from Reuters; yours has been killed, and if you look at even the stuff that has come from Reuters, it's very sketchy [...] We have this mentality that foreign media is the best you know...until they bash us, [...], it is something that it's a practice that goes on in the newsroom, and it frustrates most reporters (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

Especially when you are talking about issues next door, we are more placed, better placed than them. But you see this thing has something to do with colonization, which is also creeping into [...] You see it everywhere, you see it in restaurants...you sit here, and a *mzungu* [white person] comes, and they rush to him. You see it everywhere. Some editor, in his mind, thinks that a *mzungu* story would be better than yours (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).⁸³

An NMG⁸⁴ journalist referred to this predominance of the cosmopolitan media subfield as being 'purely criminal' once the tape recorder had been switched off. Another sub-editor at NMG confessed to having no idea how much NMG lifted stories from wire services; they were surprised that the number was as high as I indicated in Table 9.

This preponderance of stories from the cosmopolitan subfield was also seen by journalists from *The Standard* as failure by the field, despite the fact that *The Standard* barely used stories the cosmopolitan media subfield:

⁸³ This particular journalist has almost 14 years of experience covering Sudan and nearly 11 years covering issues on Darfur and South Sudan more specifically.

⁸⁴ Some journalists I spoke to published stories in both *The Nation* and *The East African* both of which are owned by Nation Media Group. They identified themselves as NMG journalists rather than with individual newspapers.

I think some of these problems and the stereotypes, we Africans are responsible for them. Here is a media house, the one I work for. You want to go and report on an issue about Darfur, Somalia, northern Uganda or wherever or even northern Kenya, nobody is willing to give you the resources to go there [...] So if you are a media house, you are a newspaper organization, and you cannot facilitate your people to go and get the accurate information, New York Times, Washington Post, Newsweek or whatever, they fly in their reporters then the reporters come do their jobs then they sell those stories to you, why should you complain? What is our responsibility? That is the actually the failing of the media in this continent. Sometimes they are busy...sometimes they are so irritating (journalist interview, Kenya 2012).

Thus, even though *The Standard* did not rely on this subfield as much as *The Nation* did, its journalists felt that *The Nation's* outsourcing of the coverage was cause for concern. A Kenyan journalist working for the Reuters bureau in Nairobi who although happy his client had picked his news story, was also exasperated:

The first way I look at it is *oh one of our clients has just used our story this is good*. The second thing I look at is *come on, Sudan is just next door; you guys will not even make a call and talk to a couple of...two or three people or talk to UN and come up with a story it's just here, you understand?* (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

Who Is Anointed as 'Credible'?

Table 10 lists the different groups of sources quoted by journalists covering Darfur and how often they were quoted. Journalists were always quick to ensure that I got the message that even though they favored particular sources of information, especially State actors, they still also used other sources. Two of the sources that journalists always mentioned in interviews were INGOs and transnational organizations such as the United Nations and the African Union. This was echoed in the results of the content analysis as well and results in Table 10, align with sources that interviewees stated as relying on.

Table 10: Sources quoted in Kenyan newspapers

Type of source	Number of sources (%)	Number of times quoted (%)
State Actors	197 (43.7)	509 (46)
Transnational Organizations	89 (19.7)	285 (26)
INGOs	24 (5.3)	96 (8.8)
Rebels	47 (10.4)	93 (8.5)
Other*	94 (20.8)	113 (10)

*This group is a collapsed marker for four smaller groups from which journalists got their sources from but are not analyzed here; Sudanese citizens and Darfuri refugees, anonymous sources and news organizations. With regard to the Sudanese Citizens and Darfuri refugees, they often appeared once and never again so it is impossible to meaningfully track them

Table 11: Top 10 Countries of origin for Sources used in Kenya

Type of source	Sudan (n=189)	Chad (n=8)	Kenya (n=7)	South Africa (n=5)	Nigeria (n=5)	Rwanda (n=5)	United States (n=66)	United Kingdom (n=25)	China (n=9)	France (n=6)	Total, (n=325)
State Actors	83	8	4	3	5	5	40	18	6	5	177
INGOs	4			1			13	3		1	22
Rebels	47										47
Individuals	53		3	1			12	3	3		75
News organizations	2						1	1			4

Table 12: Top 10 Countries of origin for Sources used by National Media Subfield

Type of Source	Sudan (n=56)	United States (n=28)	United Kingdom (n=9)	Kenya (n=6)	Tanzania (n=3)	France (n=3)	South Africa (n=2)	Canada (n=2)	China (n=2)	Rwanda* (n=1)	Total (n=112)*
State Actors	37	16	4	3	3	3	2	2	2	1	73
INGOs	1	9	4								14
Rebels	3										3
Individuals	15	3		3							21
News organizations			1								1

*Rwanda is tied with Libya , Ethiopia, the Vatican, Uganda, Somalia, Norway, Nigeria and Egypt

State Actors

The prominence of State actors is not surprising since government officials are considered to be some of the most important sources that a journalist could have (Rosen 1999; Sigal 1973; Tuchman 1978). During moment of uncertainty, State actors are an integral of the process of routinizing the production of news (Chermak 1994; Tuchman 1978). Consequently, as shown in Table 10, with almost half of the sources being State actors, there isn't much diversity in the voices narrating Darfur. Journalists view having a source "within the establishment" as a useful tool in their arsenal, and State actors were seen as necessary to getting information that was not only relevant but even vital. Two Kenyan journalists pointed to this when talking not only about Darfur but other atrocities they had covered:

You usually have a source within the establishment [...] Those are the sources you cannot name because they will give you timely information, accurate information. But they are not allowed to speak to the press; they are not authorized to speak. You've gotta protect their identity as well because that information is also very sensitive and could cost them not only their jobs but their lives as well and that of their families (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

A second journalist had direct contacts with President Salva Kiir (of South Sudan) and Riek Machar (also of South Sudan and former VP). He viewed government sources as some of his most important sources of information:

My sources, my biggest sources that I cannot quote [are those] who give me stories, which I then put officially to the ambassador. But Somalia is a bit complex because I cover Somalia. Also, there are people who would rather, because of close clan ties, they would rather mislead you. It happens quite often in Somalia, and you have to be very careful. But I still have very reliable sources such as [lists high sources in government]⁸⁵ (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

A former *The Nation* journalist, now working for a South African news organization in Nairobi also pointed out the importance of governments, such as the Sudanese government, in funding trips to regions affected by conflict. She was, however, also critical of relying on government-funded trips to government-sanctioned areas:

Take [a] trip where the government says *these are the people we are rehabilitating so you can speak to them*. In most cases they [those in camps] will be tutored, they will be told *this is what you can say*. So that is one of the difficulties of covering these regions when you don't have resources (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).⁸⁶

With almost half the sources used in Kenya coming from this category, there wasn't much space for other voices to be heard; voices in this category profoundly influence the narrative on Darfur (in newspapers at least). This homogeneity of voices is brought into sharp relief as shown in Tables 11 and 12, which disaggregate the sources by their countries of origin. Sudan produces the highest number of sources in this category, followed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and China. Kenya comes a distant fifth in the list of countries that produced State actors quoted by the national subfield.

⁸⁵ The journalists listed sources whom he referred to as confidential, so I then had to protect their confidentiality. While unorthodox, I can only imagine that the journalist viewed this as a way through which to establish their bona fides. Also, because this was an academic project, the journalist may have felt comfortable enough that the information would not reach his sources nor could it be expressly be connected to them.

⁸⁶ This sentiment was reflected in a 2004 July 2nd article in the Mail and Guardian (by Jeevan Vasager of the Guardian) that argued that secretary of state Colin Powell's trip to Abu Shouk, a refugee camp, had been a 'sanitized' view of human suffering (Vasager 2004).

While the large number of sources from Sudan makes sense (since it is the country in which the atrocity is unfolding) the relative absence of sources from Kenya is bewildering and especially considering that Kenya has historically been heavily involved in regional peace initiatives. Kenyan sources would, presumably, have intimate knowledge of the complexities of the conflict and the actors involved.

Even when one accounts for the overwhelming presence of the cosmopolitan media subfield reports in Kenyan media field (as Table 9 shows), the relationship between the media and foreign State actors does not change significantly. Parsing out sources used solely by the national media subfield, as Table 12 illustrates, we find that this subfield quoted only 237 sources. Out of these, American sources were cited more often than Kenyan sources; Sudanese sources are still the most widely quoted sources. Kenya is the fourth highest source producing country, in Kenya. In the pool of sources not from Sudan, non-African sources have a monopoly in narrative construction in Kenya even when the journalists covering atrocities are Kenyan.

It is difficult to argue that Kenyan journalists have more access to American State actors than to Kenyan ones. One explanation may be that Kenyan journalists place more ‘trust’ in American and English State actors than in Kenyan State actors. In this interpretation, Kenyan journalists give information from the United States and the United Kingdom more weight and credence when talking about an atrocity in the continent than voices from Kenya. Kenyan journalists, though aggrieved by the significant presence of wire services in constructing narratives about atrocities in Africa, themselves relegate Kenyan voices to the periphery by favoring American, English, and Chinese voices. This has the effect of pushing of Kenyan voices about Darfur to the periphery of the global

narrative construction. As illustrated in Table 11 the United States accounts for 14.9 % of the sources quoted by the media field as a whole, while Kenya accounts for 1.6% of sources. This gap is not significantly narrowed when looking at Table 12 which focuses on the national media subfield where American sources accounted for 23.3% of sources and Kenyan sources accounted for 5%. One primary reason for this paucity of Kenyan State actors in stories by the national media subfield is the strained relationship between journalists in this subfield and post-colonial State (see chapter three).

Transnational Organization Sources

The second group of sources quoted most frequently are those from transnational organizations. Transnational organizations are defined here as organizations that perform, and are expected to perform by member States, functions across several international boundaries (Huntington 1973). Most sources in this category came from the United Nations (UN), and its affiliate organizations, followed by the African Union (AU); the European Union (EU) provided the third largest number of sources. Moreover, with the UN running some of the largest refugee camps in Kenya, and having its then news station IRIN headquartered in Nairobi, its dominance in this category is not surprising. The International Criminal Court (ICC) was the organization that was used least frequently as a source. Journalists interviewed were frustrated with the ICC's seeming ambivalence at providing information on their work on Darfur. Journalists used the ICC infrequently (4.5% in this category), of which the court's prosecutor accounted for the most (ten) quotes. Journalists thought that the ICC was afraid that providing information to news organizations would harm its investigation. To the question on how helpful the ICC had

been as a source of information, an NMG journalist pointed out that it had only been helpful in his coverage of Kenya's cases at the court rather than in his work on Darfur:

I have been following Uhuru's [President] case, Ruto's [deputy President] case all these issues I have been covering, I've been covering the issue of the African Court of Human Rights, the idea to extend its jurisdiction to include international crimes I was in Arusha for that seminar. So, I have been in touch with the ICC [and they are very helpful] (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

Next to governments, transnational organizations are also often the ones with the resources to facilitate journalists' trips into remote areas. This is not a unique feature to Kenyan journalists and is commonplace amongst journalists who cover Darfur. As Savelsberg (2015:220) has pointed out, western journalists argue that the use of and reliance on transnational organizations is not only unavoidable but legitimate. However, this claim of legitimacy is dissimilar to how Kenyan journalists viewed using sources from this category. A highly respected NMG journalist discussed his unease at having his trip to refugee camps in Kenya facilitated by UNHCR. This journalist worried how this would, subtly, affect his framing of the situation in the camp:

Sometimes it can be very difficult, like for instance recently when the war broke out in South Sudan, Dadaab and Kakuma were flooded again. But how would I go there? The UNHCR took me there, so chances of me looking at thing from the UNCHR perspective are very high. But that takes a very experienced journalist to resist this kind of influence [which is often] not open and is subtle (Journalist Interview, Kenya 2015).

International Non-Governmental Organization Sources

Despite INGOs being a distant third with regard to the number of sources they provided, almost all journalists interviewed were worried about the influence of INGOs on how they framed Darfur. From the interviews, I had anticipated that INGOs would perhaps be

the second most used group since that would have to some extent complemented the number of concerns raised by journalists about their influence. As Table 10 shows, INGOs accounted for 8.7% of the total number of sources used in Kenya. Here too, just as with the State actors, there was a preponderance of American voices. Out of the 26 INGOs, 19 were headquartered in the global north (13 of these in the U.S.) and five in Africa.⁸⁷

Savelsberg (2015:62) points to the growing role and influence of INGOs in the dissemination of information about ongoing abuses such as those in Darfur, raising the alarm, and acting as first responders to an atrocity. INGOs are thus an essential avenue for getting information from the ground and often have more financial resources than media organizations working in Kenya. This financial capability allows them to conduct in-depth investigations on the ground and produce documents that the media can easily consume. Human Rights Watch (HRW), for example, interviewed some of the more than 110,000 Darfuri refugees in Chad and prepared a report that it provided to Reuters. The report was the foundation and sole quoted source in a subsequent story published by *The Nation* and lifted from Reuters. Titled “Rights abuses rampant in Sudan, say lobby” the story urged the United Nations to reinstate human rights monitors to Sudan. The key quotation in the story argued:

"With thousands of civilians already killed and hundreds of thousands forcibly displaced, this is exactly the kind of human rights disaster where the commission needs to appoint a monitor," it [HRW] said in a statement sent to Reuters (Reuters 2004b).

⁸⁷ Two organizations could not be traced and would seem to have simply folded their operations

In June 2004, *The Nation* (in a story lifted from the cosmopolitan subfield) also quoted an Amnesty International (AI) report that framed Darfur as a “dire” humanitarian situation with “repeated human rights abuse” by the Khartoum government that could no longer be ignored (Reuters 2004d).

Several journalists also pointed out that INGOs are also more likely to provide funding for travel to Darfur than most media organizations:

You want to go and report on an issue about Darfur, Somalia, northern Uganda or wherever or even northern Kenya; nobody is willing to give you the resources to go there. Even when you are given funds what you are given is not adequate to do thorough research. So you have to keep on slashing, and sometimes you have to go without food, because you will need that money to do something else [...] We actually go [to conflict zones] through NGOs...but individuals no, maybe politicians (journalist interview, Kenya 2012).

Another consequence of the financial capabilities of INGOs is that they can spend more time on the ground during an atrocity. As such, there was a sentiment by some journalists that once journalists had arrived at a site, such as a refugee camp, INGOs were often one of the only credible sources of information. This was especially true for journalists not familiar with the actors and terrain of the conflict. Subsequently, in moments of uncertainty, information gleaned from these INGOs was hardly ever seen as nefarious by them and journalists were likely to trust it completely:

Now the thinking is, of course, we don't think too much about this...but the thinking on the ground is because it's coming from the UN or certain NGOs, international NGOs, then its accurate information. So you will go with it (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

Journalists have an ambivalent relationship with INGOs, especially whenever INGOs become key players in the production of information about Darfur. Interviewees often had an apprehension that the framing of atrocities by INGOs was susceptible to

being colored by colonial and neo-colonial interests. Journalists, similar to Amoko's (1999) and Mutua's (2002) arguments, worry how the framing of atrocities using INGO language made INGOs seem as saviors of Africa(ns). A former journalist who had worked for *The Standard* pointed out the challenges faced by journalists in the media organization:

A journalist is hard pressed to pursue the agenda of the [INGO] because they are paying for your accommodation and the need to access these areas. This is not a unique problem to Africa per se; I've had conversations with other journalists who experience the same problems as well, especially in terms of investments. But yes, in brief, that is the challenge because our media houses do not have funding, or their priorities are not aligned in that direction (journalist interview, Kenya 2012).

This same journalist explicated the catch twenty-two situation journalists found themselves in. He pointed out that though journalists may be wary of using INGO sources, they also needed information. One stream of information that was constant and to some extent reliable was reports published by INGOs. An interviewee captured this ambivalence succinctly by stating:

Despite the fact that I am critical of some of these NGOs I also consume some of their information that they have, that they produce because it is pretty much the only information that is out there (journalist interview, Kenya 2012).

Theoretical Implications

The overwhelming use of State actors in the Kenyan media field is not surprising. Scholarship on media fields points out that journalists overwhelmingly use official sources. As argued by an editor quoted by Schudson (2011):

Everything that happens with [the government] is important...That's the journalistic law of the least effort. It's faster and easier to practice journalism based on what's happening in the world of government than putting emphasis on what's happening in society (p. 127–128).

Several journalists pointed out that government officials were always important to their work. This, as pointed out by both Benson (2013) and Hallin and Mancini (2004), leads to an internal homogeneity in the types of voices that are heard by the audience. Students at *Daystar* also discussed this uniformity in voices, arguing that constant repetition of sources used by newspapers in Kenya led to there not being anything that could be considered original reporting of events.

The monolithic nature of the types of sources quoted is a result of organizations competing for a small pool of sources they think of as 'elite.' In an environment that is chaotic and dangerous, State actors act as a mooring for journalists. They serve as an avenue through which journalists can get a constant stream of information that is easy to digest and useful to them. Thus, if journalism schools teach students that State actors are one way through which to get this information, and State actors are ever so willing to provide information, these voices will dominate the news. The news making process is organized to take advantage of some sources more than others, and more often than not, State actors are the ones most readily available (Sigal 1973:187). As a former NMG journalist quoted earlier said, "establishment sources" are the types of sources a journalist should always have, while another saw them as his most significant assets. Findings here point to the news being a product, and a discursive process, between two fields, the media field, and the political field. In this discursive process, journalists are interpretive agents who construct news accounts from numerous news sources within the political field (Van Hout and Geert 2008).

The ubiquitous presence of western sources in the overall reporting is partly a result of the cosmopolitan media subfield providing most of the coverage on Darfur for Kenyan newspapers. As shown in Table 9, 61.23% of the news published in Kenya on Darfur was provided by this subfield. Hence, as a result of *habitus affinities* between journalists in the subfield and their sources, it is only logical that we see more sources from the global north. Moreover, I argue that *affinities* are also institutional since institutions have a *habitus* that is grounded in the homologous spaces production and reception. As such the subfield, with organizational headquarters in the global north, will produce news content that is consumable to a largely western audience. One could argue that quoting a large number of official sources that are not from Sudan, the United States, and the United Kingdom just isn't good business for wire services. It would ostensibly be difficult to successfully encode the narrative to allow for smooth decoding by audiences in the global north if the sources quoted were primarily from other African nations.

Table 9 highlights the fact that *The Nation* relied more heavily on the cosmopolitan media subfield than either *The Standard* or *The East African*. The confounding thing about this finding is that, as pointed out in chapter three, NMG is ranked as the largest media conglomerate in East and Central Africa (Ali 2010; Wasserman and Maweu 2014a). Hence, while on the one hand, NMG has the resources to have journalists on the ground (and did have journalists on the ground), a larger proportion of its articles are lifted from the cosmopolitan media subfield. Despite this gulf in the proportion of stories lifted by the newspapers, the complaint about the reliance on wire services was voiced by journalists from all three publications. Therefore, even though journalists from both *The Standard* and *The East African* perceive and discuss

actions by *The Nation* as normative of the field, Table 9 suggests it is only normative of a single publication.

Table 12 points to the necessity of a different set of explanations when focusing on news reports by the national media subfield. At this level, arguments about *affinities*, whether individual or institutional, are insufficient. The paucity of sources from Kenya shows the importance of nuance when analyzing the sources used by a media field. The national media subfield hardly ever quoted Kenyan State actors over the five years this project investigates. I propose two explanations of why this would be the case: 1) a lack of trust in the political field by journalists in Kenya and 2) quoting foreign (mainly American and English) sources provides journalists with cultural capital amongst their peers.

The first explanation relies on the findings in chapter three. Chapter three discussed the hands-on approach newly independent leaders took in their relationship with the media field in the years following independence. This approach forced NMG and SG to align their internal logic to the state's expectations if they were to survive. However, even in the post-1990 political climate, the political field continued to look for novel ways to frustrate the media field, such as the burning of *The Standard's* newspaper copies in 2006 during the Kibaki regime. Instances like these are likely to have led to journalists not viewing government officials as generally trustworthy. This is all the more important since the period covered here coincided with the Kibaki regime, which most Kenyans saw as losing legitimacy after the 2007 election debacle. Thus, the audience would view quoting of Kenyan State actors by Kenyan journalists as evidence of the media being lapdogs of the State rather than its watchdog.

The second possible explanation for this dearth, which takes a postcolonial approach, is the prestige of quoting State actors from countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom. In a hierarchy of elite sources, American State actors are at the apex with Kenyan State actors seemingly closer to the bottom. Subsequently, those from the United States are seen as the "best" kinds of sources, and thus useful in raising the journalists' profiles amongst their peers. The critique leveled by NMG journalists against their editors favoring stories from the cosmopolitan media subfield could be leveled against Kenyan journalists. Kenyan journalists, in quoting State actors from the global north, are complicit in the creation of a particular binary, one of the saviors coming from the global north and victims living in the global south. They participate in a (re)production and normalization of white savior tropes and with this a simultaneous erasure of African voices and subjectivity (Amoko 1999).

These two explanations are not mutually exclusive. I suggest that the lack of Kenyan voices is a confluence of the idea of who counts as an elite source and the field's *logic*. This convergence is what leads to a displacement of Kenyan voices in the process of knowledge production. The national media subfield, by silencing Kenyan voices, privileges the global north's subjectivity while pushing to the periphery voices that postcolonial scholars and African journalists argue are subjugated by western media fields. This penchant for excluding Kenyan voices was also noted by Alozie (2007) in his work on Rwanda who found that *The Nation* did not use Kenyan experts as sources in its coverage. Even though journalists consistently raised the importance of controlling the narrative about Africa, their choice of sources belies this concern. To paraphrase

Magubane and Zeleza (2004), in knowledge production terms, Kenyan voices are treated as irrelevant by Kenyan journalists.

Comparative Perspectives

The analysis of sources used in Kenya has highlighted the extent and types of sources the media field used in its coverage of Darfur. However, Kenya alone does not allow us to draw any substantive conclusions in the pursuit of understanding how media in Africa represents atrocity in Africa. Indeed, regional similarities and differences in the decisions surrounding who will be quoted as a source and thus be anointed as possessing credible knowledge is one of this project's interests. Tables 13, 14 and 15 show the fundamental similarities and differences between how media organizations in Kenya, South Africa, and Rwanda covered Darfur. Interviews with Nigerian journalists are used to highlight decisions over whom to quote as sources by Nigerian journalists. One essential similarity highlighted in Table 13 is between Kenya and South Africa where we see that articles credited to their national media subfields accounted for less than half of the total number of articles; 26.16% and 19.2% respectively. The national media subfields played a marginal role in constructing knowledge about Darfur for their respective audiences. Rwanda's national media subfield is credited for 94.17% of Rwanda's articles. At the aggregate level, we still see that the national media subfield accounts for a paltry 35.5% of the articles on Darfur with 64.5% of the coverage credited to the cosmopolitan media subfield.

As shown in Table 14, there are divergences and convergences in which categories of sources the three countries relied on as co-constructors of knowledge. The

first confluence is in the use of State actors as the primary co-constructors of knowledge. A point of divergence is in the use of INGOs as sources where we see that Rwanda quoted actors from this category with much lesser frequency. Table 15 shows the nationalities of sources used by newspapers from Kenya, South Africa, and Rwanda. Another interesting finding is the fact that South Africa and Rwanda relied on sources from South Africa and Rwanda respectively more than Kenya relied on sources from Kenya (see Table 15). Thus, in both South Africa and Rwanda, local sources were active participants in the creation of knowledge about Darfur.

Table 13: Articles on Darfur disaggregated by by-line in Kenya, South Africa and Rwanda

	National media field	Reuters (UK)	AP (US)	Western Author	Agencies**	DPA (German)	IRIN	AFP (France)	BBC (UK)	N/A*	TOTAL (n=784)
Kenya	141 26.16%	231 42.86%	60 11.13%	38 7.05%	39 7.24%		2 .37%			28 5.19%	539 73.94%
South Africa	24 19.2%	43 34.4%	17 13.6%	4 3.2%		5 4%		30 24%	1 .8%	1 .8%	125 17.15%
Rwanda	113 94.17%			4 3.33%				3 2.5%			120 16.46%
Total	278 35.5%	274 34.9%	77 9.8%	46 5.9%	39 5%	5 .64%	2 .2%	33 4.2%	1 .1%	29 3.7%	784 100%

*N/A refers to those articles with no by-line attribution

**Agencies refers to stories that are a combination of information lifted from multiple wire agencies

Table 14: Frequency of quotation from different groups of sources

Type of Source	Kenya	South Africa	Rwanda	Total
State Actors	46%	39.9%	73%	48.5%
Transnational Organizations	26%	25.6%	15.8%	24.6%
Rebels	8.5%	8%	4.9%	7.9%
INGOs	8.8%	10%	1.6%	8%
Other*	10%	16%	4.4%	10.5%

*This group is a collapsed marker for four smaller groups from which sources were journalists got their sources from.

Table 15: Nationalities of sources used – N=1516

Country	Sudan	Kenya	South Africa	Rwanda	USA	UK
Kenya	35.4%	.9%	.9%	.9%	16.2%	3.7%
South Africa	31.1%	.4%	4%	.8%	14.5%	3.7%
Rwanda	12.5%	1.1%	.5%	52.7%	4.1%	1.6%
Total	31.9%	.9%	1.4%	7.2%	14.6%	3.4%

*American and English sources are the largest group of Western sources quoted in all three countries thus their inclusion here.

State Actors

While at the aggregate levels all three countries favored State actors, there are several differences in *which* sources within this group were quoted. In Kenya, as Table 15 shows, sources in this category were primarily from Sudan, the United States, and the United Kingdom. This pattern plays out in broadly the same ways in South Africa where sources were mainly from Sudan, the United States, and the United Kingdom as well.

However, in Rwanda, a different pattern emerges. Of the 184 sources used by the Rwandan media field, Rwandan State actors account for 52.7%. The high number of Rwandan voices in Rwanda is partly explained by the nature of Rwanda's reportage of Darfur. The *New Times* of Rwanda focused its coverage on the activities of the Rwandan battalion within the peacekeeping force in Darfur. Rwanda's narrative is primarily about how its troops are faring in Darfur, and as a result, the primary source of information was the military. Consequently, the military's spokesperson, Major Jill Rutaremara, was quoted 48 times (accounting for 37% of State actor voices); this is in comparison to the defense minister who was quoted three times or President Kagame, who was quoted four times over the same period. Below is a cross-section of headlines in the *New Times*:

- *From Kagitumba to Darfur-the RDF's Long Walk!* (29/09/2005).
- *Rwanda Almost Pulled Out of Darfur* (13/12/2006).
- *Ninth RDF Peacekeeper Dies in Darfur* (28/12/2007).
- *Sudan: RDF Boots in Darfur Reshaping Peacekeeping in Africa* (31/12/2008).

The use of military personnel as sources during conflict is not unique to Rwanda. In Nigeria, journalists also pointed out the importance of having sources within the military when covering atrocities such as Darfur. Nevertheless, a Nigerian journalist explained that the relationship between journalists and military sources was one of incongruity:

We rely on official sources, from the government and especially from the military. They brief regularly, and even though sometimes some people doubt these things, but at least you have official information from them (journalist interview, Nigeria 2015).

In South Africa, the use of military personnel as sources was explained as a function of South Africa having troops in Darfur. As one editor explained:

There is a lot of South African soldiers in Darfur and you know being South African I was able to go out with them and chat with them [...] Up until recently I was fortunate to have gone to [Darfur] and to be able to see for myself and what was happening and getting to chat with soldiers (editor interview, South Africa 2012).

However, Kenyan journalists never brought up the use of military personnel as sources during interviews nor were they quoted as sources in news reports - despite Kenya having provided troops for UNAMID's mission in Darfur.

Journalists explained the preponderance of the Sudan government voices in both South Africa and Kenya in primarily two ways. First, Sudanese embassy officials were very efficient in sending out memos to local journalists and often made sure to be available for interviews. A Kenyan journalist stated:

When I used to report about Sudan issues I used to have a lot of contacts in the Sudan embassy (in Nairobi). So I had a lot of documents from them, and they included me in their mailing system so if anything [was] happening in South Sudan or Khartoum, I used to get it. They send the information and write up [...] In case it is something that needs an interview I sit with the relevant person in this case they had a press attaché, so I talk to the person one on one so that I get the real picture (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

In South Africa, it was explained as a result of being part of an African fraternity and was seen as one more way to get an African perspective. An editor narrated how they would knock on “African doors” first:

There are also the diplomats and in my case being African I tend to knock on the door of Africans first you know because western diplomats often leak stories or give off the record comments [...] for me it's a big thing to you know... interact with Africans [...] for me it's very important [to get] a real sense of where African sort of diplomats are and listening from them (editor interview, South Africa 2012).

Of course, this journalist's assertion of knocking on ‘African doors’ first is belied by the fact that South African sources were quoted in only 4% of South Africa's stories.

Furthermore, Kenyan and Rwandan sources were quoted in a combined total of 1.2% of the news reports in South Africa (see Table 15). Thus, while there may be a perception that African sources were quoted a lot by South African journalists, except for Sudanese sources this was hardly ever the case in the period analyzed here.

Transnational Organizations

Though providing the second most extensive collection of sources, officials from the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) dominate this category. The ubiquity of AU sources is not surprising since all three countries are part of the peacekeeping mission in Darfur as members of the AU. Furthermore, both the UN and the AU have funded trips to Darfur for journalists from Kenya and South Africa. That being said, journalists don't view these trips as ‘freebies’ and imply that often these organizations will hope for a positive portrayal of their work. Multiple journalists echoed the sentiments below:

An African journalist like myself somehow got into Darfur through the UN or the African Union [who] have organized a visit. So I mean it's not a freebie but you have sort of access within a range (editor interview, South Africa 2012).

If for example, it's a funded trip to Darfur by the U.N. you will actually talk about what the U.N. is doing on the ground [...] It took a very long time for the A.U. and the U.N. to agree to send soldiers to Sudan, even when they did that the number of soldiers that were there were not adequate to repulse the onslaught of the Janjawiid or to repulse the support of the Sudanese military, so such limitation you will have to report but do it in such a way that you always do not injure the reputation of your financier (Journalist Interview, Kenya 2012).

The one transnational organization that journalists were often frustrated with as a source of information was the ICC. Of all the organizations that contributed information this category, the ICC accounts for merely 3.7%. Journalists from Nigeria stated that they didn't use the ICC as a source of information in their coverage of Darfur and none of the articles analyzed from Rwanda ever cited the ICC as their source. A South African journalist explained that ICC's reticence in providing information was perhaps as result of the court realizing that they had gone too far in their attempts to arrest and prosecute al Bashir:

The ICC obviously knows that it has gone out somewhat...I wouldn't say gone out on a limb but certainly extended itself to bring this prosecution. So its responses to journalists are always pretty much pro forma, *why they have done it*. They don't get into the subject of discussions or background discussions or anything more than that [...] they've gone out far enough to get this done (journalist interview, South Africa 2012).

A Kenyan journalist instead explained this reticence was explained as a consequence of the ICC's wish not to "jeopardize" its work:

It was never easy to get information from the ICC. The response I got was that *we will talk to you once we have succeeded in getting the perpetrators*. They said at that particular time it would jeopardize their investigation. So I never included that bit in any of my reporting (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

This seeming disconnect between journalists and the ICC is not unique to journalists in the national subfields. As pointed out by Savelsberg (2015:233), western journalists also talked about a disconnect from the court. A journalist working in a European city referred to their experience at the ICC as “useless” (ibid). Other journalists pointed out that they primarily received information from the ICC from sources other than the ICC; such as in-house journalists whose beat was the ICC (Savelsberg 2015).

International Non-Governmental Organization sources

Much has been said about the role of humanitarian organizations in influencing the framing of events in Africa (see, Franks 2013; Hilsum 2007; Mamdani 2007).

Scholarship has argued that the framing of an atrocity by INGOs will likely influence how the atrocity will be represented in the news and understood across the globe (see, Zacher, Nyseth-Brehm, and Savelsberg 2014). Mamdani (2007) points to the role of the ‘Save Darfur’ coalition in impacting global narrative (at the early stages of the conflict) and leading to a "depoliticization, naturalization and, ultimately, demonization of the notion of ‘Arab,’ as against ‘African’" (2007). There is trepidation over the extent to which INGOs, especially those with headquarters in the global north, negatively impact how these newspapers frame atrocities in Africa.

Journalists allude to a danger of oversimplification of complicated atrocities such as Darfur. This unease was epitomized in an interview with a South African news editor

who painstakingly teased out the relationships between INGOs, especially religious organizations, and western media representations of Africa:

I remember seeing those lines in some of the new agencies, which said 'majority Christian vs. Muslim' [...] I do think that a majority [of audiences in the Global North] adopted this because this is how [Darfur] was framed, I don't think in America everyone reads the New York Times. I mean it is a particular class and so you know being obviously Christian organizations and some uniting conservative bases [...] we know how conservative the Christian belt is and you know sometimes you want to raise money; it's just easier to [use this binary] but it's complicated. I just think that sometimes that does come into play and I mean, to some extent, and I don't want to blame NGOs for also doing the same but perhaps at times it is also just easy to raise money and to have to frame that way (editor interview, South Africa 2012).

This journalist's sentiment over the effect of INGOs on how Darfur was framed is not misplaced. The vital role played by INGOs in how Darfur was framed by media organizations in the global north is also highlighted by Zacher et al. (2014). Moreover, this binary (Christian vs. Muslim) is often linked to the initial framing of Darfur by organizations such as Save Darfur and evangelical Christian groups in the United States (see, Mamdani 2007, 2010). Nonetheless as shown in Table 14, sources from this category were not used as much as one may have expected (only 8% of the total number of sources). In fact, even in South Africa, which used the largest number of sources from this category, INGOs only account for 9.5% of the total number of sources. Even in this group, there is a bias towards the larger more 'international' organizations; Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International (AI) were the top two organizations quoted in all three countries.

Despite this relatively small presence of INGO sources, there was still much distrust of them among journalists. Intuitively one may argue that the small presence of

sources from this group may be due to this mistrust. The cynicism by journalists was primarily based on the fact that they were western and as such, presumably had an agenda against Africa and Africans often. During an interview in Nigeria, an editor explicitly stated that he did not trust AI's framing of the conflicts in Africa. Giving an example of an AI's report on military excesses in Northern Nigeria, the editor stated:

Amnesty International is always criminalizing without understanding the complex nature of Nigeria's diversity [...] This is why you see that not even many civil rights organizations will buy into the AI view because they know that at the end if you allow their opinion to spread like that they will criminalize some leaders and you'll be inviting them to ICC at The Hague, just as they are doing to Kenyan leaders now. But they [the global north] themselves are committing atrocities in other regions of the world; America is involved in Libya, Iraq, and Yemen-everywhere! And AI is not writing robust reports about what they are doing there (editor interview, Nigeria 2015).

This editor drew lines connecting Nigeria (violence by and against Boko Haram), Darfur, and Kenya (2007 post-electoral violence) to talk about his unease with western INGOs being used as sources during conflicts on the continent. The editor went as far as pointing to American military excursions in several countries and, in his opinion, the apparent silence these excursions had been greeted with by AI. While this one editor's stance may seem to be on one extreme end, other journalists in Kenya and South Africa espoused some variation of his argument. There was a sense that INGOs had blind spots in their reports about Darfur. In South Africa, an editor mused:

Sometimes we rely too heavily on what Human Rights Watch says about something or International Crisis Group or whatever. I don't generally suspect them of wanting to distort some of the issues [...] they don't go there with a pro-US agenda, but they have their own limitations I suppose (editor interview, South Africa 2012).

In Kenya, a former journalist with *The Standard* echoed this sentiment and posited:

As you know NGOs, or an organization that goes into an area, will sort of define a conflict according to their own agenda or according to what thematic area their impact will be (journalist interview, Kenya 2012).

The relationship between journalists and INGOs is based on varying levels of distrust on the one hand and necessity on the other. Several journalists pointed to the fact that some of the best reporting about atrocities in Africa had been carried out by these very INGOs. An NMG journalist stated that one of the best coverage of an atrocity had been on a blog by *Médecins Sans Frontières*. This same journalist explained why and when he relied on INGOs, especially western INGOs, even mentioning specific organizations he had relied on previously:

I was trying to understand what was going on, for that I would need original research done by civil society groups [such as] Amnesty [or] International Crisis Group who does journalistic work. They have more time, more resources to zoom in on the subject (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

In South Africa, an interviewee talked about quoting sources from INGOs almost as a necessary evil. They agreed with criticisms leveled on INGOs, such as those by Hilsum (2007), while also pointing out the need to “target” his audiences’ heartstrings:

I have seen this sort of thing [shift of narrative to humanitarian aspects of conflict and oversimplification] happen in every conflict including the roots of my own conflict here in South Africa. You know in a perfect world we would love the people to understand exactly what is happening [...] But the thing is you know, what holds for the humanitarian organization holds for me as a journalist. If I want to interest people in a story I have to, use a cheap phrase, I have to target their heartstrings (journalist interview, South Africa 2012).

Perhaps because of all the concerns raised by journalists interviewed, INGOs were used very sparingly by the news organizations studied. So, on the one hand, journalists

worried about the amount of influence these organizations carried and how this would affect their coverage of atrocities. On the other hand, these organizations were hardly ever used in the coverage of Darfur between 2003 and 2008. As shown in Table 14, Kenya's INGO sources occupied just 8.7% of the total number of sources while in South Africa they occupied 9.5% of this entire category. INGOs perform a very specific function for journalists, they allow journalists to outsource emotional labor while still engaging in the strategic ritual of objectivity. Karin Wahl-Jorgensen (2013) defines this outsourcing process as occurring through the quoting sources “who are allowed to express emotions in public” (p. 130).

Theoretical Implications

The fact that State actors are the most quoted sources is not necessarily surprising considering the literature on media representations. This scholarship informs us that the ease and propensity with which media fields use State actors is anchored on the fact that media and political fields constantly interact with each other (Cottle 2007; Rosen 1999; Sigal 1973). Cottle (2007) and Tuchman (1978) point to the fact that ‘authoritative’ (usually official) sources are sought out “and granted privileged access to the news stage as a way of buttressing” journalists’ claims of objectivity (Cottle 2007:4). What is of particular interest here is the fact that the national subfield seems to have given a wide berth to local voices in favor of foreign ones. As Table 15 shows, the relative silencing of sources from either Kenya or South Africa is evident both across the three countries but also within Kenya and South Africa. In both countries, the audience heard more from Sudanese and American sources than from voices located within their social contexts. In

Kenya, audiences were also likely to have heard voices from the United Kingdom more than any non-Sudanese African voice.

The occurrence of western and Sudanese voices in the State actors-category is partially explained by the fact that, as pointed out by Sigal (1973), governments are likely to use the media field as a tool in getting the attention of foreign governments. Thus, the preponderance of American government voices may be due to American officials using these media fields to essentially communicate to Sudanese embassies located in Kenya and South Africa and vice versa. The Sudanese embassy in Nairobi, for example, was seen as being ever willing to provide information to the media whenever it needed to get its message out. I suggest that the cultural capital that comes with having a source high up in the hierarchy of elite sources, i.e., American or English sources, is one that upwardly mobile journalists would view as a feather on their caps. All of this, obviously, is also linked to the almost hegemonic presence of news reports from cosmopolitan media subfield in Kenya and South Africa, as illustrated by Table 13.

From a postcolonial theory approach, the presence of American voices continues to reinforce the idea of a western savior. Normalizing the stereotypical reproduction of Africans as needing to be saved, and whose pain can only be explained by non-African voices. African media fields effectively silenced and erased non-Sudanese African voices from the construction process in both Kenya and South Africa. At the aggregate level, the condition of invisibility is even more salient in Table 15, which shows that all three countries rarely quoted sources from each other. Being African, from a country that is not Sudan, conspires to produce a condition of invisibility and erasure in narrative construction. The national media subfields, especially in Kenya and South Africa, have

anointed western voices as having the wherewithal narrate the suffering of Darfuris and convey the necessary remedy to end this suffering. Despite a large number of Rwandan voices in *The New Times*, at the aggregate level, non-Sudanese African voices are not what Hall et al. (1978) refer to as ‘primary definers’ nor are they even secondary definers of the atrocities in Darfur.

However, it is also crucial that the findings in Tables 11, 12, and 15 point to a challenge to postcolonial thought about whether or not voices from the global south are given a platform to narrate their experiences. It is not as simple as arguing that western media have silenced Africans. In all three fields, voices from Sudan play a crucial role in influencing how the narrative is shaped within Africa. In this sense, Sudanese voices are an essential factor pose a challenge to our understandings of how atrocities in Africa are represented.

Discussion

This chapter has highlighted the extent to which African news organizations have outsourced the task of constructing the narrative on Darfur. It started by showing the bifurcated nature of African media fields when it comes to coverage of events in Africa. Though journalists working in the two subfields are aware of each other, and each other’s work, there seems to be little to no professional interaction. While there could be various reasons for this, I argue that since actors in the cosmopolitan media subfield are members of the expat community, there are little to no spaces in which interaction would occur; the exception being through social media which one journalist from Kenya mentioned. These two groups of journalists occupy different spaces in Nairobi. One manifestation of this is the actual physical spaces in which foreign correspondents working in Nairobi meet.

Being a member of the Foreign Correspondents Association of East Africa, I received emails of events put together by foreign correspondents to socialize or for press briefings. Almost all events and invitations were located in high-end hotels in parts of Nairobi frequented by upper-middle to upper-class residents of Nairobi. These are the areas in which most expatriates in Nairobi live.

For both Kenya and South Africa, Table 13 reveals that a large number of articles on Darfur were lifted from the cosmopolitan media subfield; 73.8% and 80.8% respectively. There is a stark difference in how journalists in both countries reacted to this. While in Kenya, journalists bemoaned the preponderance of reporting from the global north, in South Africa, it was seen as par for the course. As a South African journalist put to me, the rather insular nature of the South African audience, in general, necessitated this approach in an era of budget reductions:

One thing you must understand about South African media is that it's incredibly insular and incredibly parochial [...] For example if my editor had to decide whether to send someone say to the U.N. or the security council meeting or do they choose Darfur they would select the U.N. simply because that's the story that people will read more easily than one from Darfur. So actually, that goes for the rest of the Horn of Africa and you know at the end of the day we are at the mercy of our readers. So, we don't ignore the issue altogether that would be irresponsible but we don't necessarily want to spend exorbitant money on something which we know our readers are not that interested in (journalist interview, South Africa, 2012).

Additionally, in both Kenya and South Africa, there is a preference for non-Africans when quoting non-Sudanese sources. The only counterweight to Sudanese voices was not voices from African governments but rather those from the United States and the United Kingdom. Recalling Benson's (2013) discussion on the role and place of *affinities* in the news, the large presence of voices from the global north is not surprising,

owing to the near-hegemonic presence of the cosmopolitan media subfield. The conundrum is that while African journalists were quick to rebuke the reliance on wire services, arguing that it meant losing control of the narrative when it came to choosing whom to quote, they seemed to favor non-African voices. They all gravitate towards voices from the global north, the same voices they were quick to denounce as not understanding African realities and contexts. American and English sources were anointed as being capable of making Darfur intelligible for an African audience by the national media subfields.

An explanation for this, as already mentioned, may be a lack of trust between the political and media fields in many African countries. For example, Alemika (2007) found that 56% of Kenyans did not trust the political class while in South Africa this number was 45%, no data was collected for Rwanda for this survey. I argue that there is even more distrust of the political class in Kenya and South Africa and the media field due to the strained relationship between the two fields in both countries; as illustrated in Chapter 2. Additionally, Fourie (2011:310) provides another possible avenue through which to understand the large presence of non-African sources in South Africa. In addition to also relying heavily on the cosmopolitan media subfield, Fourie (2011) suggests that South Africa's history means that South African media are largely "remnants of western colonialism" and thus they are more likely to give western voices a platform than (black) South African voices (p. 312, 315).

At the aggregate level, the cosmopolitan media subfield plays a larger role in shaping the narrative on Darfur than the national media subfield. One explanation may be that in organizations the cosmopolitan media subfield, such as wire agencies, present

themselves as neutral purveyors of news. This perception of neutrality has been sustained, Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen inform us, by wire agencies marketing their services as “plain, almost dull, but completely dependable” professional organizations (1998:6). What wire agencies have managed to do is act as the primary arbiters of what counts as international news and thus what is worth *knowing* for multiple domestic markets across the continent. What we have in these three countries is a process through which the national media subfields are not what Fligstein and McAdam (2012) refer to as *challengers* within the global media field. Consequently, African media fields are key in the relegation of local narratives to the periphery and reproducing western narratives about regional events like Darfur.

Rwanda provides a cautionary tale as to the extent to which one can generalize the findings from Kenya and South Africa. Not only did *The New Times* have 94.17% of its articles from the national media subfield but it also cited Rwandan State actors the most (52.7%), followed by Sudanese State actors (12.5%). In Rwanda, Rwandan State actors were the ‘primary definers’ of the atrocities in Darfur. Nonetheless, it is imperative to remember that for *The New Times*, the primary interest in Darfur was not necessarily the atrocities committed, but how RDF was performing and how far they had come since the genocide of 1994. It is fair to conjecture, from Rwanda’s coverage, that for the average Rwandan reader Darfur was critical not because of the atrocities occurring but because of how well it showcased how far the RDF had come and the sacrifices (through loss of life) endured.

Conclusion

The confluence of the cosmopolitan media subfield and sources quoted in stories results in the global north playing a dominant role in shaping the narrative about Darfur. The effect of this is likely to be seen in the framing of reports from Darfur in these countries, which is analyzed in the next chapter. There is also the possibility that frames will not vary as much when looking at Kenya and South Africa especially since they have more or less similar sources that are quoted. Because of the propensity of non-African sources being quoted by journalists, knowledge constructed in the pages of the newspapers analyzed is likely to reflect sources' sedimented knowledge. The result of this, sociology of knowledge informs us, is that Darfur will be objectivated and ordered into categories that the western sources understand as reality.

Chapter 5: Framing an African Atrocity for an African Audience

It's genocide and I mean that's not even disputed, that is why El Bashir is wanted by the ICC; so, no I don't think you will find many people in South Africa who see it differently (Journalist interview, South Africa 2012).

Introduction

News reports are receptacles that can allow us to understand how knowledge is transmitted to an audience by journalists. As discussed in chapter one, one way this transmission occurs is through the use of frames. Highlighting the importance of frames to communication, Entman (1993) posited that framing offered a “way to describe the power of communicating texts” (p. 51). He suggested that analyzing frames clarified the ways through which individuals could be influenced by a “transfer of information from [a news report] to that of consciousness” (Ibid). Entman (1993) and Hall (1973) have argued that those who receive the text may also arrive at an understanding of these frames that is different from that intended by the communicator. Thus, even though knowledge gained from news reports will be affected by frames, this is not a path-deterministic relationship.

Entman (1993) reminds us that frames will have approximately four locations in the communication process; the communicator (journalists), the text (news articles), the receiver of the communication (the audience) and the culture (social context). It is in this regard that this chapter focuses on journalists as communicators (through interview data), and their published articles. This approach acknowledges that journalists do not lose their agency when immersed in their professional fields and may, on a personal level, discuss events differently from how their stories frame the same event; recalling that published

stories are a product of a group effort in the newsroom. As previous discussed in chapter one, the understanding of frames favored here is of frames as being *employed*, which recognizes that frames are not created afresh every time they are needed. Rather, much like knowledge, journalists are much more likely to rely on already present frames to represent an event.

The first part of this chapter analyzes the frames employed by the media field in Kenya. Like in the previous chapter, it examines the frames employed by the entire field and then conducts a comparative analysis of the frames employed by the two subfields in Kenya. The second part of the chapter compares the frames used in Kenya to those used in South Africa and Rwanda to provide an empirically grounded comparative perspective. Additionally, this section also analyzes whether or not the narrative constructed by the media fields in these three countries is converging with global media narratives.⁸⁸

Theoretical expectations

Field theory suggests that similar frames will be present in both the national and cosmopolitan subfields in Kenya and across the fields in Kenya, South Africa, and Rwanda. Field theory points to the likelihood of a degree of homogeneity due to the convergence of media practices both at the national and at the global levels (Benson 1999:484). Thus, whether a journalist works for *The Daily Nation* or *Reuters*, in Nairobi, field theory would suggest that we are likely to observe them employ similar frames, due to a similarity in media practices. It is also true that even within the field we are likely to find variation between different media organizations that may be oriented towards factors

⁸⁸ As suggested Shoemaker, Danielian, and Brendlinger (1991)

such as material or cultural capital. In the United States, for example, newspapers and magazines such as *Mother Jones* are much more likely to be “culturally rich, but often economically starved” while cable television would be culturally poor while being materially rich (Benson 2006b:190). However, in the case of Kenya, and perhaps Africa as a whole, *Reuters*, (like the New York Times in the U.S.) has accumulated both material and cultural capital, wielding enough symbolic power to influence “the dominant ‘rules’ of journalistic practice (ibid). For this reason, there is a possibility of the national media subfields mimicking and reinforcing the frames employed by the cosmopolitan media subfields.

While it is true that journalists have *agency*, it is also true that this *agency* is often suppressed by the forces operating at a *structural* level. Cook (1998:72) and Sigal (1973:179) caution against reading too much into journalists’ *agency* because news packaging is a group process. This process limits the extent to which individual journalists have latitude in choosing frames for their stories. In response to a question on how journalists decide what frames to use to cover a story, a South African journalist pointed out that this was a constant battle between journalists, editors, and their readers. This journalist pointed to the tensions between journalistic *habitus* and the *rules of the game* and suggested that journalists:

fight on a regular basis with our editors and even with our readers. It's not good or bad, I'm not complaining or anything, I'm saying that is the reality of the life we live, and it's the life we chose, yeah and you still have to be relevant, that's how it goes [...] but [how to frame stories is] a tension that is there all the time (Journalist interview, South Africa 2012).

A Kenyan sub-editor working for NMG, in explaining the process an article had to go through before it was published, stated:

The reporters say what they are working on that week. So they get input from everyone. So we'll say *no don't take this angle, this angle may be better*. But then the news editor then sits with them, and they work out how the story is going to run, and they are going to follow it up. Sometimes if [journalists] come with a complete story, then the news editor just sort of helps them just work out what angle (sub-editor interview, Kenya 2015).

Postcolonial critiques of journalists from the global north have revolved around the accusation that they employ narratives anchored in colonialist tropes and imbued in colonialist stereotypes about the global south (see Gruley and Duvall 2012; Mamdani 2007; Said 2008). Such critiques of Western media fields and their representations of Africa(ns) implicitly suggest that there should be differences between frames used by African journalists and those by Western journalists (see for example Atkinson 1999a, 1999b; Ebo 1992; Hawk 1992; Maloba 1992). These critiques suggest that narratives produced by the global south are much more likely to be grounded in a more vibrant contextual and historical foundation. These narratives will also be cognizant of the nuances and fluidity of identities, such as ethnic identities, while also highlighting the role of colonization and neo-colonization in fanning hostilities. In this interpretation, African media is bound to be mindful of the histories and structures of oppression and subjugation that lead to violent outbreaks of conflict in countries such as Sudan. Similar arguments have also been put forth by scholars, not within the post-colonialist tradition but studying discourse. Fairclough (1992), for example, states that texts are primarily dependent on both society and history, stressing how both work to provide order through which to structure discourse. Gamson et al. (1989) also argue that the news produced is never neutral and manifests the view of those that create it.

Nonetheless, despite arguments based on field theory, scholarship has also suggested that, in addition to field specific pressures, frames are also influenced by nation-specific traits (see Savelsberg 2015; Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm 2015). Thus if frames are “socially shared,”⁸⁹ and the creation of the *represented* world requires journalists to employ domestic frames to make non-recognizable events into discernible ones (see Cohen 2001:71; Moeller 1999:15; Tuchman 1978:192), then there is a likelihood that frames used by the cosmopolitan and national media subfield will be different. This difference would be due to the more pluralistic nature of the cosmopolitan subfield’s audience and staff compared to the more national/regional scope of the national subfield’s audience and staff.

Framing Darfur for a Kenyan Audience

How do you frame Darfur for an audience that has been intimately aware of atrocities in neighboring countries? How does one make Darfur an attention-grabbing story in the middle of peace negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan, on-going deliberations over the conflict in Somalia, and the approaching elections that have seen bitter campaign periods and political intrigue? These were the questions that fascinated me as I conducted my data analysis for this chapter. To this end, I am specifically interested in the frames in Table 16 that not only capture the different ways in which mass atrocities in the global south are often framed, but also provide a basis for comparison between the findings here and those analyzed by Savelsberg (2015) and Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm (2015). This

⁸⁹ As suggested by Reese (2001:11).

chapter focuses on only a selection of the frames in Table 16: civil war; ethnic war; crime; and humanitarian emergency.

Table 16: Frames analyzed.

Frame	Definition
Insurgency Frame	Suggests that the state has a right to defend itself against insurgents/terrorists.
Civil War	Describes Darfur as a war between groups that are organized within the nation-state with the aim of secession and over throw of the government.
Ethnic War	Conflict is specifically referred to as an ethnic conflict (or use of Arab vs. African dichotomy).
Crime	Behavior reported potentially categorized as criminal or specifically labeled criminal.
Humanitarian emergency frame	The article mentions hunger, encampment, and/or illness of civilians as the main aspect of the conflict.
Aggressive State	Actions by the state are considered to have gone too far and disproportional but not necessarily criminal.

The first wave of atrocities in Darfur occurred between June and September of 2003.⁹⁰ Table 17 highlights the trend of the spotty coverage of Darfur in Kenya over the course of the study period. Surprising, perhaps, is the relative silence on Darfur in 2003, when tensions escalated, leading to an attack by rebels on an airbase in Al Fashir. The question of media silences is an interesting one. Prunier informs us that even within Sudan, there was silence about Darfur and the atrocities were seen as "a few nomads

⁹⁰ The first use of the term Janjawiid appearing in Sudanese newspaper *al-Ayyam* in September with an attack in the town of Kadnir in Jebel Marra.

shooting it up in the distance" (2008:125). In Sudan, like in the rest of the countries studied here, Prunier (2008) informs us that the focus was on the North-South peace negotiations in Naivasha Kenya. Furthermore, this silence also occurs in the milieu of the ramping up for, and eventual invasion of Iraq. In *The Nation*, for example, I found extensive coverage of the ramping up, and eventual invasion of Iraq, by the United States in the "international section" of the newspaper for most of 2003. This media silence should not be conflated with a lack of concern by various groups. Prunier (2008) states that the Massalit Community in Exile and Sudan Human Rights Organizations had been releasing press releases that were largely ignored.

The paucity of articles on Darfur in Kenyan newspapers is similar to those analyzed by Savelsberg (2015:225) who finds identical silences in newspapers from eight⁹¹ countries in the global north. More troubling is the fact that during the peak coverage of Darfur in 2004, Kenya produced merely 144 articles, which is comparable to Ireland's coverage of Darfur in the same year (Savelsberg 2015:224). However, unlike Kenya, Ireland had only one paper analyzed compared to the three I analyzed for Kenya and it is also the country with the second lowest number of articles in 2004 ahead of only Austria. There was a dip in coverage in 2005 by the media field in Kenya, and even though there were increases in 2006 and 2007, these did not rise to the level of 2004. This dip can be partly explained as a consequence of a prolonged campaign period over a draft constitutional referendum that was held on the 21st of November 2005.

⁹¹ Austria, Germany, United Kingdom, Canada, Ireland, United States, France, and Switzerland.

Table 17: Number of articles on Darfur published in Kenya.

Newspaper	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
The Standard	13	6	8	3	0
The Daily Nation	112	64	102	93	73
East African	19	5	9	25	6
Total	144	75	119	121	79

Consider also, that there were only 79 stories about Darfur in 2008, the year in which the ICC prosecutor applied for an arrest warrant for al Bashir. A potential explanation for the paltry coverage of Darfur in 2008 is that Kenya had just experienced its worst bout of post-electoral violence in the winter of 2008 and thus the coverage of regional conflicts may not have been of the highest importance. Moreover, the year 2008 also saw vociferous debates about whether Kenya's case would be forwarded to the ICC for prosecution or whether a regional court would be sufficient to prosecute those seen as bearing responsibility for the violence after the botched 2007 elections. Of the 79 Darfur stories in 2008, 35 were published between the 7th of January and the 1st of July (10 days before the application for the warrant of arrest). Hence, in 2008, Darfur only becomes slightly newsworthy again after the ICC applied for the warrant of arrest. An annual breakdown, as illustrated by Figure 4, points to the fact that Kenya employed a greater multiplicity of frames in 2004 and 2005 than in subsequent years. The aggressive state frame disappears altogether by 2008.

Figure 4: Annual Breakdown of Frames used between 2004 and 2008




Table 18 shows that Kenyan news stories on Darfur mostly framed the atrocities as civil war raging between rebel groups and the Khartoum government. An article in *The East African* referred to the situation in Darfur as a result of, amongst other reasons:

A four-year-old war between the Darfur rebel movements and the government, which is part of the breakdown between Sudan's center — the NCP in Khartoum, which controls wealth and political power — and the marginalised peripheries (Staff Writer 2007).

A story in *The Nation*, also in 2007, contextualized the atrocities in the following manner:

The origin of the conflict is now a truism. Some Darfurians took up arms to end marginalisation by Sudan's central government. To cut war costs, President Hassan al-Bashir's government armed Arab militias, now the infamous Janjaweed (Mbitiru 2007).

Table 18: Frames used in Kenya's Newspapers.

Frame	Number of articles using specific frame (% in parentheses)
Civil War	234 (45.79)
Crime	219 (42.85)
Humanitarian Emergency	192 (37.57)
Ethnic Conflict	174 (34.05)
Aggressive State	67 (13.11)
Insurgency	64 (12.52)

In its initial coverage of Darfur, *The East African* published an article that was attributed to an unnamed correspondent. The opening paragraph, citing a report by Human Rights Watch began, "The Sudanese government is responsible for "ethnic cleansing" and crimes against humanity in the western region of Darfur, Human Rights Watch said in a new report released last Friday" (Correspondent 2004). The article went on to list actions it thought of as criminal:

The report [...] documents how Sudanese government forces have overseen and directly participated in massacres, summary executions of civilians, burnings of towns and villages and the forcible depopulation of wide swathes of land long inhabited by the Fur, Maasalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups (Correspondent, 2004).

In 2005, Chege Mbitiru, a journalist for *The Nation*, contextualized Darfur and its actors in the following manner, "Most Darfuris are dark. Arab Africans, generally, display disdain for Africans too much ebony-hued" (Mbitiru 2005). All three newspapers viewed the atrocities as primarily pitting Sudan's center, Khartoum, and its marginalized peripheries. This sentiment was also echoed in interviews by journalists and often formed the basis upon which possible mechanisms were provided for solving the atrocities.

However, there is a stark difference when examining the article using their by-lines, as shown in Table 19 and the specific frames that journalists focused on. Of the 141 articles authored in the national media subfield, the dominant frame was not a civil war but rather the crime frame with the humanitarian frame close behind.

Table 19: Frames by media subfields in Kenya’s Newspapers*

Author by-line	Civil War	Crime	Humanitarian Emergency	Ethnic Conflict	Aggressive State	Insurgency
National media subfield	40 28.4%	49 34.75%	47 33.33%	33 23.40%	13 9.22%	14 9.93%
Cosmopolitan media subfield	194 52.43%	170 45.94%	145 39.19%	141 38.11%	54 14.59%	50 13.51%

*The total percentages add up to more than 100% since articles often used more than one frame in their coverage.

Darfur as a Civil War

The prevalence of this frame in Kenya in Table 18 is not necessarily surprising considering the prevalence of state actors as sources (see Table 10). This is also echoed in Figure 4, which points to an uptick in this frame in 2005, that is, during the Abuja peace talks, which had been going on from 2004 to 2006. Savelsberg (2015) suggests that the prevalence of the civil war frame can be attributed to the diplomatic field and the media field’s centrality in communicating the diplomatic field’s “framing of the conflict to a broad public” (p. 245). The first report referring to the atrocities as a civil war appeared on the 9th of April 2004 in *The Nation*. In it, Reuters talks about an accord reached by the “Sudanese government and rebels from west Sudan” in Chad (Reuters 2004c). As such, if the political field employs the media to communicate its stance as suggested by Sigal (1973) and as I suggest in the previous chapter, this frame’s presence and increase in use in 2005 is not unexpected.

Although this may be true at the country level analysis when examining the media field in Kenya, a different picture develops when one scrutinizes the articles published by the national media subfield compared to its cosmopolitan counterpart. Though the civil war frame was the most used frame in Kenyan newspapers between 2004 and 2008, Table 19 shows incongruence in how the two subfields used this frame. The national media subfield employed this frame in only 28.37% of its articles, compared to the 52.43% of those by the cosmopolitan media subfield. In interviews with Kenyan journalists, the ambivalence towards this frame was also evident. Most journalists argued that all the frames listed in Table 19 applied to the conflict at different stages and at times concomitantly. Even when journalists called it a civil war they also were keen to point to other frames that encapsulated Darfur for them:

I'm not used to giving adjectives to situations like these. The one thing that when you talk about a civil conflict, there's one aspect one has to take into account, the role of the Khartoum government; all around Sudan there has been an agitation towards democracy. One thing you have to realize in Sudan also is that the Sudan regime is hell-bent on retaining power [...] So there has been a theory, I don't know whether one can call it a conspiracy theory, that the conflict in Darfur is a creation of the Bashir regime, to the extent that one would say that, or else why hasn't the government invited the rebels to a round table so that they can sort it out. Instead, they resorted to a military reprisal of the militia groups (journalist interview, Kenya 2012).

Journalists were often quick to suggest that the civil war frame did not adequately capture the situation on the ground as the years had progressed; nonetheless, the staying power of this frame is evident in Figure 4. One journalist, while explaining the inadequacy of the civil war frame, argued that the use of the civil war frame was a consequence of a dearth of useful, reliable information from Darfur:

There definitely needs to be a new paradigm, even though some [frames] such as civil conflict, in general, do cover what's happening in Darfur. But because people don't have a full picture or a better picture of what is happening in Darfur, there cannot be another definition of what is happening (journalist interview, Kenya 2012).

One explanation for the limited use of the civil war frame by the national subfield may be the fact that with South Sudan and Sudan in conflict and the political unrest in countries such as Somalia, referring to Darfur as a civil war would not resonate with readers. In essence, in the drive to capture the audiences' attention, one more civil war in the Eastern Africa/Great Lakes region is not news. One image that highlights this was an editorial cartoon by one of Kenya's foremost political commentators, Godfrey Mwampembwa (2004).⁹²

Figure 5: Godfrey Mwampembwa editorial cartoon from the Daily Nation



It would be easy, and tempting, to argue that, for the cosmopolitan subfield, this frame fits one end of Bhabha's (1994) *fixity*, that of civil strife in Africa. Though

⁹² Mr. Mwampembwa goes by the pen-name 'Gado.'

intuitively this makes sense, this explanation ignores the role of sources as co-constructors of knowledge. Thus, while on the one hand, this frame aligns well with arguments about stereotypical representations of conflict in Africa, there is also, on the other hand, the substantial number of State actors used as sources (see Table 14). Thus, this frame is also a manifestation of the diplomatic field's role in influencing the framing of Darfur for the cosmopolitan media subfield, just as it is for the national media subfield. As alluded to by both Kothari (2010) and Savelsberg (2015) the choice of sources by journalists plays a key role in the framing of atrocities.

Darfur as a Crime

The crime frame was the second most used frame as highlighted in Table 18. There was a consensus in the journalists' interviews that events in Darfur were criminal, and that at the very least the victims deserved some form of justice. Here too, we see a difference in how often the two subfields used this frame (Table 19). For Kenyan journalists, Darfur was primarily framed as a crime rather than a civil war:

So in the case of Darfur, I don't think if there could have been a justification of the crimes committed in the name, I mean for somebody to commit the crimes that had been committed in the region and continues to be committed, in the name of creating stability in the state (editor interview, Kenya 2012).

There needs to be some fresh thinking about Darfur; it's no longer a local fight this is an international issue. Then because we are talking about crimes against humanity, that are being committed, it doesn't matter what you call them, a genocide or a terrible conflict what is agreed is crimes have been committed (journalist interview, Kenya 2012).

As such, seeking justice was seen as a worthy goal to be pursued by the international community and transnational organizations engaged in the peace negotiations. A leading journalist on Sudan/South Sudan/Darfur who works for *The East African* stated that:

[The African Union] is saying, peace is more important than criminal, international criminal justice, there are others arguing no, you cannot let him go scot free you are creating precedence. Those are issues that have been conflicting, and there is no solution yet. The side of justice is naturally stronger. What would you say, I come and kill all your brothers, and then I tell you *because you are left it's better to have peace, otherwise if you continue to pursue justice you will also go* (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

Figure 4 points to the crime frame being cited the least in 2006 when it was present in only 26.1 % of news articles. Here again, the role of the Abuja negotiations may be at play as this was when the deal was signed. There was a modest increase in 2007, the year that the Office of the Prosecutor at the ICC applied for and was granted arrest warrants for Ahmed Haroun (a cabinet minister between 2003 and 2009) and Ali Kushayb (a senior Janjawiid commander). Kenya's use of this frame, more specifically, mirrors the trend documented by Savelsberg who finds fluctuation in the use of this frame in response to actions by the ICC or the UNSC (2015:234-5). In 2008 for example, the use of the crime frame in Kenya would significantly increase from previous years following the application by the prosecutor for an arrest warrant for President al Bashir. This is in contrast to the continual decrease in the use of this frame from 2004 to 2006 during which various peace negotiations had been on-going in Abuja, Nigeria and Sirte, Libya.

Even though journalists frequently mentioned this frame in interviews, there was disagreement as to whether understanding Darfur as a crime and the consequent remedies was the best approach. A journalist arguing for criminal prosecution posited that President al Bashir was using the notion of peace to “blackmail the ICC to derail international criminal justice” (journalist interview, Kenya 2015). Despite this seeming consensus amongst journalists within the national media subfield, it is instructive to note

that only 34.75 % of articles by this subfield referred to Darfur as a crime. Additionally, only 36.36 % of articles by the subfield saw the ICC's involvement as necessary in the pursuit of justice compared to 63.64% of articles by the cosmopolitan media subfield. This disparity was not as significant when discussing the specific labels used to frame what crime had been committed and the associated charges to be leveled against perpetrators. For both subfields, the crimes amounted to genocide more than they were war crimes or crimes against humanity. 23.31 % of articles by the national media subfield called Darfur a genocide compared to the 24.05 % of articles by the cosmopolitan media subfield.

Darfur as a Humanitarian Emergency

The humanitarian emergency frame is one of the more interesting frames used during this period because INGO sources were the third most cited sources. Despite being the third most quoted frame overall (see Table 18) it was the most mentioned frame in the early coverage of Darfur (see Figure 4). The number of articles citing this frame dropped rather precipitously in 2005 and it never really attained the frequency of use it had achieved in 2004. The first two articles that were published in Kenya on Darfur both referred to it as a humanitarian disaster. On the 1st of January 2004, *The Nation's* Henry Owuor filed an article which cited the United Nations as referring to Darfur as “one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises” (2004:14). The next article on Darfur appeared on the 7th of March with *The Standard's* Al Kags focusing on the internal displacement of Darfuris and the concomitant refugee crisis this had led to as the primary issue. Citing John Prendergast, from the International Crisis Group, and the United Nation’s IRIN, Kags described the situation in the following manner:

Hundreds of thousands of civilians have fled their homes, and at least 100,000 of them have taken refuge in Chad, while the rest have pitched camp along the border. The refugees are exposed to high temperatures during the day and very low temperatures at night. The only shelter they have is small temporary shacks that could easily be blown away by strong winds. Food is scarce, aid agencies are working hard to feed the refugees. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is working to move the refugees further inland, and the World Food Programme has begun bringing in relief food (Kags 2004).

One of the first stories about Darfur by a journalist who had traveled to Darfur focused on the trials and tribulations of Darfuris living in camps. Titled *Disaster looms in refugee camps*, and focusing on the risks the conflict brought to the region, Peter Kimani wrote:

By the time you finish reading this article, six children will have died of hunger and malnutrition in Darfur [...] About 200,000 more people have fled to neighbouring Chad, posing a security risk in that country. Kenya hosts 70,000 Sudanese refugees. There is pain in the people's eyes, anger in their voices. *My mother is dead* a boy aged about 11, tells us, as he wards off flies buzzing around him. *I have to take care of my three brothers* (Kimani 2004).

In a subsequent paragraph, Kimani (2004) tells the story of Rawia:

Rawia is one of the latest arrivals in Otash, where her parents sought refuge just over a month ago together with 17,000 others [...] A sense of helplessness afflicts thousands of people who were once in control of their lives but now have to depend on a begging bowl (Kimani 2004).

A journalist from *The East African*, with extended experience covering Sudan/South Sudan and Darfur, referred to the humanitarian crisis being a result of Khartoum's response to the initial rebellion over the marginalization of Darfuris:

Later on, it degenerated into a humanitarian crisis because people were displaced, you know, villages were burned, people were killed, and there were those in need of food, healthcare (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

Another journalist, also from *The East African*, in explaining why this frame was not as prevalent in media reports about Darfur, stated that human suffering in Darfur was not necessarily newsworthy in-and-of-itself:

For me as a writer, the humanitarian issue is known, I would not break news by saying people are suffering in Darfur. It is something that is known for how many years 13? I would look at how the political dynamics are feeding into this conflict, yeah that would be my main concern (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

However, this same journalist was also attentive to the fact that the humanitarian emergency frame had been responsible for not only raising awareness internationally but also sparked an urge to *do something*:

For me the real focus of Darfur has been because of the humanitarian situation and human rights abuses, that is what the international community is very much concerned about. I would say that the way it has been framed in the papers is humanitarian suffering that's where the world has come in. That's where the UN has come in and those who are causing sexual atrocities, that is how it has been framed. But these other issues, politics, local, does not really gain any traction, not much, so it's the humanitarian issue (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

For this journalist at least, even though the humanitarian situation was not in any way new, it functioned as a tool for gaining the audience's attention. Thus, despite the journalist's reservation on the usefulness of the frame, Table 19 reveals that the national media subfield cited it with the second most highest frequency. Nonetheless, the use of this frame by the subfield did not preclude criticisms of Western journalists as being guilty of exaggerating the humanitarian situation in Darfur as captured in this extract from a news story in the *East African*:

Reporters Without Borders offers some insight into the innate difficulties of making accurate reports about Darfur. The report is based on the findings of an investigative team that went to Sudan between March 17-22 this year. From the report, one gets the nagging feeling that the main international media outlets have not only inaccurately represented what is going on there but might have exaggerated the humanitarian situation (Mbaria 2007).

This news report echoed the critiques of Western journalists that Kenyan journalists voiced during interviews as well:

The Western journalists on the other hand will be in a hurry to just look at it as you know what they are seeing now without that historical perspective [...] secondly, as is the case of their coverage of Africa, in general, there is always a tendency to exaggerate (editor interview, Kenya 2012).

This sentiment was anchored on two issues that have somewhat been controversial in debates surrounding Darfur. The first is what Mamdani refers to as the “numbers debate” (2010:25–39) which is what the news article by Mbaria (2007) seemed to allude to when talking about the exaggeration of “the humanitarian situation” (Mbaria 2007). Thus, this frustration was not due to Kenyan journalists not caring about the suffering of Darfuris but instead, there was a feeling of obfuscation of numbers of suffering by both INGOs and western media organizations. The second issue influencing this sentiment was based on journalists taking exception to how the continent had been, and continues to, be covered:

Having grown up watching CNN and other international broadcasters they told the stories about Africa from a very narrow and very foreign perspective. It was with that that Africa in one way, in a certain like...I think about all the conflicts across the continent because they were the only things that were covered (journalist interview, Kenya 2012).

Darfur as an Ethnic Conflict

Perhaps the most surprising frame in both Tables 18 and 19, and Figure 4 is the ethnic conflict frame. Despite the incredulity shown by Kenyan journalists at the framing of Darfur as an ethnic conflict by the global north, one cannot ignore the significant portion of stories that employed the frame. Figure 4 shows that in 2004, 50.8% of all news coverage referred to Darfur as an ethnic conflict and 38.7% of news articles in 2005 used this frame. One explanation of the presence of this frame in the stories by the national media subfield is that Kenyan journalists and their audience have a nuanced understanding of the term ethnicity. As explained by an editor for *The Nation*, “If you

mean ethnicity as in all types of ethnicity, religious, tribal, Arab, African whatever [...] I would say it has played a role” (editor interview, Kenya 2012). The use of this frame relies upon and confirms cultural repertoires, while concomitantly reproducing already present structures of knowledge about identity in African societies.

Another explanation, linked to the homology of production and consumption spaces explanation, is the influence of the national context within which media fields operate. Savelsberg (2015) presents a similar phenomenon in his analysis of Darfur’s coverage in Germany and Ireland. He posits that Germany avoided using the genocide frame due to the “cognitive impediment” caused by the Holocaust; for Germany, Savelsberg (2015) states that it was hard subsuming Darfur under the same category under which the Holocaust is categorized. Ireland focused on the humanitarian frame partly as a result of its collective memory of famine and extreme poverty (Savelsberg 2015:254). Nyamnjoh (2005) and Wasserman and Maweu (2014a, 2014b) have both suggested that when analyzing the media fields in African countries, one cannot ignore the role of ethnicity. Consequently, this frame works to *domesticate* Darfur by relying on already salient words and images that form Kenya’s knowledge-base. A former NMG journalist, now working for the China Central Television (CCTV) in Nairobi, alluded to this when he mused that:

Look, we've been ethnic for ages ok? And you sit down with your group of friends, and you'll see everybody taking a mickey out of this ethnic group that ethnic group and we all laugh at it, it's funny. Then when it gets on top there, it becomes an issue, and I think we need to take a step back and look at, look we need to embrace it. We've tried a different method it's not working, so let's go through it this way, and there needs to be checks and balances as well to make sure it doesn't go over (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

For this journalist, ethnicity was a part of Kenyan identity and thus innocuous in and of itself. Ethnic identities often became a space of contestation, and contention once

politicians instrumentalize them for political gain (See Mamdani 2001; Okediji and Wahutu 2016). The *East African* epitomized this nuanced use of the ethnic conflict frame in a story published on the 15th of May in 2007 titled “Complex Conflict With No Solution in Sight.” In the story, the author discusses a new variation of violence that was sprouting in Darfur amongst the different communities:

Inter-tribal violence has been on the rise. Arab tribes have started using the weapons they received from Khartoum against each other, as disputes over land and pasture have become increasingly heated. Fighting between Arab tribes in South Darfur escalated last December to date, with hundreds dying in clashes between the Targam, Abbala (camel herders) Northern Rizeigat, Baggara (cattle herders) southern Rezeigat, Habaniya and Fallata (East African 2007).

It is important not to overstate the number of newspaper stories by the national media subfield that used this frame. As Table 19 illustrates, less than a quarter (23.4%) of news articles by the subfield used this frame compared to the 38.11% of those by the cosmopolitan media subfield. There were also several reports that attempted to complicate the binary approach through which this small number of news reports talked about Darfur. In a 2007 report, Zachary Ochieng', a journalist for *The East African* who has covered Darfur and Sudan for more than a decade stated:

While the Darfur conflict is often characterized as a clash between "Arab" and "non-Arab" African people, this radically oversimplifies and mischaracterizes the conflict. Instead, the way both the rebel movements and primarily the government have manipulated ethnic tensions has served to polarise much of the Darfur population along ethnic lines. These tensions create shifting alliances among the government, Arab and non-Arab tribes, and rebel groups as well as internecine conflicts among competing Arab groups and among rebel factions (Ochieng' 2007).⁹³

⁹³ This argument is similar to those made by Deng (2006), Mamdani (2010) and Prunier (2008)

This doesn't mean that we should ignore the role of the national media subfield using this frame, rather that the fault lines that Ray (2009) and Mody (2010) find in their samples are not necessarily pervasive. At the same time, criticism by Kenyan journalists, and media scholars over the use of this frame cannot be blind to the fact that national subfield used, even if to a limited degree, this frame to talk about Darfur.

Theoretical implications

Despite the different emphasis on the frequency of citing particular frames, the field as a whole represented Darfur primarily as either a civil war, a humanitarian emergency, a crime, or as an ethnic conflict. Focus on the civil war frame can be attributed to the peace talks between South Sudan and Sudan, which had been on-going for almost two years before the first news report on Darfur surfaced in Kenya. Several news reports discussed Darfur within the context of the peace negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan, which were on-going in Kenya. Thus Darfur was, in the early years, hardly talked about as a conflict meriting its own analysis and action but as part of the larger North-South conflict (see, Nation Media Group 2004; Reuters 2004a, 2004c, 2005). There was also the reliance on State actors as sources which rendered the field as an avenue through which these sources influence the narrative on Darfur. The national media subfield appears to have been more focused on the criminal and humanitarian emergency frames than the civil war frame as highlighted in Table 19.

Table 18 shows that the field in Kenya echoes media fields from the global north that Savelsberg (2015) analyzes in the three frames that dominate its representation of Darfur: civil war frame, crime frame, and the humanitarian emergency frame. Both the

national and the cosmopolitan media subfields produced a narrative about Darfur that was mostly homogenous in its dominant frames and journalists principally interpreted information from their sources in similar ways. This reliance on, and ensuing repetition of these frames worked to institutionalize particular narratives, rendering the meanings in them stable and habituated (Hall 2007). This had the general effect of reinforcing the already limited narrative genres which constrict the types of frames and level of innovation at the disposal of journalists (Savelsberg and King 2007).

The presence of the ethnic conflict frame in news reports from the national media subfield is an interesting facet of how Darfur was framed. One could argue that the use of this frame by Kenyan journalists is a result of journalists relying on *common sense knowledge* of the society in which they are enmeshed. As such, if Kenya has been "ethnic for ages" then one would expect journalists to create some form of *conceptual order* about the actors and events in Darfur through an 'ethnic lens.' A recent study by Albaugh (2016) finds that 40% of Kenyans identify with ethnic and national identities equally. Coupling Albaugh's (2016) finding with Bourdieu's (1999:45) contention that the media field constructs the news to confirm what everybody already knows, while not destabilizing the audience's mental structures, then the use of the ethnic conflict frame by the national media subfield is not as surprising. Additionally, the presence of this frame could be the result of editorial decisions beyond the control of individual journalists. As suggested by the sub-editor from NMG, quoted in the opening pages of this chapter, the choice of particular frames is influenced by discussions between the journalists, sub-editors, and editors.

From a postcolonial approach, the ethnic conflict frame in news reports by the national media subfield is bemusing. It shows (as with decisions over who is used as a source) that this subfield is, however minimally, party to ethnicizing narratives on conflict in Africa. In this regard, Kenyan journalists find themselves within the global/local nexus of knowledge production in which conflicts are viewed as having a proclivity for ethnic hostilities. The presence of the ethnic conflict frame could also be as a result of stories containing Sudanese voices as primary sources. As a Kenyan journalist explained his understanding of the actors in the conflict, "they call [Arabs] 'brown colonizers' not white but brown-skinned colonizers" (Journalist interview, Kenya 2012). I suggest that the overwhelming presence of State actors from Sudan as sources and the large presence of refugee voices could both (in similar but also different ways) lead to this frame's use. Darfuri refugees and State actors identify with their ethnicity. Thus, there is a similarity in how both refer to actors using ethnicity. Indeed, Kothari (2010) has suggested that the ethnic conflict frame was often present in the New York Times stories that contained "Sudanese refugees as primary sources" (p. 219). However, State actors also used this frame to talk about the atrocities as an internal issue that could only be dealt with by the Sudanese State rather than by outside intervention. In this way, their use of ethnicity is different from how refugees and Darfuris use ethnicity.

Subsequently Kothari's (2010) explanation needs to be expanded to include not just refugees but also the use of State actors as sources. This explanation, while acknowledging that narratives rely on already prevalent frames of conflict in Africa that postcolonial scholars have often decried, is also cognizant of the critical role of sources in shaping a news frame (Kothari 2010; Savelsberg 2015). Additionally, the presence of the

ethnic conflict frame can be understood through Bhabha's (1984) mimicry⁹⁴ in which the national media subfield has normalized identities fossilized during the colonial era. In this understanding, Kenyan journalists present Darfuris as *similar* to Kenyans - by belonging to ethnic groups - but *different* through conflict and suffering. Its presence epitomizes the *ambivalence* of mimicry, “almost the same, *but not quite*” (Bhabha 1984: 124); an echo of colonial tropes on the similarity yet difference of Africans to white colonialists (Wa’Njogu 2009:77).

Comparative Perspectives

Field theory suggests that we should expect some similarity in the frames used by media fields in Kenya, South Africa, and Rwanda. However, there also may be some differences in which frames are more salient in the three countries since each country is likely to be influenced by not only their national contexts but also by the sources each used in their coverage. As shown in Table 14, despite similarities at the aggregate level, in the types of sources used by media fields, there were differences in the country of origin that the sources came from. Thus, while Rwanda used State actors as their primary sources, the Rwandan field primarily relied on Rwandan State actors unlike Kenya and South Africa whose fields relied on State actors from the global north more than Kenyan or South African State actors, respectively. Thus, while on the one hand, all three countries may employ frames aligned with the diplomatic concerns of official sources, they may also differ on their choice of primary frame through which to talk about Darfur. Thus, if Kenya framed Darfur as primarily a civil conflict, Rwanda and South Africa may not

⁹⁴ Bhabha (1984) uses mimicry to talk about the process of colonial appropriation and “normalization” of the colonial subject or State.

necessarily frame it as such. Another interesting question for this section is whether the presence of the ethnic conflict frame is a quirk of Kenya’s media field or something that could be generalized to the media fields studied here.

Table 20: Frames used in Kenya, South Africa, and Rwanda*

Country	Civil War	Crime	Humanitarian Emergency	Ethnic Conflict	Aggressive State	Insurgency	n
Kenya	45.45%	42.67%	37.66%	34.4%	12.99%	12.06%	539
South Africa	60%	40.77%	46.92%	39.23%	10.77%	10.77%	130
Rwanda	13.18%	16.28%	12.4%	13.95%		2.33%	129

*The percentages are percentage of total news articles on Darfur published in each country

Table 20 shows that in all three countries the primary frames that were employed are mostly similar. While there is a difference in the salience of particular frames, there is an overarching similarity in the frames used by the media fields. Thus, in all three countries the top four frames employed were the civil war frame, the crime frame, the humanitarian emergency frame, and the ethnic conflict frame. However, Table 21 points to the fact that frames used by the national and cosmopolitan media subfields mirrored each other. The main difference is, which specific frames these subfields placed their emphasis on. An interesting pattern that stands out in Table 20 is the paucity of frames employed by *The New Times* newspaper of Rwanda. As mentioned in Chapter four, news about Darfur in Rwanda primarily centered on the exploits of the RDF. Rwanda’s coverage was a constant stream of self-laudatory articles about how well trained, disciplined, and efficient the Rwandan military was.

Table 21: Frames Used by subfields in all three countries*

	Kenya		South Africa		Rwanda	
	NMSF	CMSF	NMSF	CMSF	NMSF	CMSF
Civil War	40 (28.37)	194 (52.43)	12 (50)	61 (60.4)	13 (11.5)	3 (42.86)
Crime	49 (34.75)	170 (45.94)	10 (41.67)	39 (39.2)	16 (14.16)	3 (42.86)
Humanitarian Emergency	47 (33.33)	145 (39.19)	7 (29.17)	52 (51.59)	13 (11.5)	2 (28.57)
Ethnic Conflict	33 (23.4)	141 (38.11)	9 (37.5)	42 (41.58)	14 (12.39)	4 (57.14)
Aggressive State	13 (9.22)	54 (14.49)	4 (16.67)	10 (9.9)	0	0

*Totals add to more than 100% due to multiple frames employed in any one article.

Darfur as a Civil War

For Kenya and South Africa, Darfur was primarily a civil war (see Table 21). This frame is partly due to both countries being heavily engaged in negotiations in Nairobi between Khartoum and Juba. Also, for South Africa especially, Thabo Mbeki (South Africa's President from 1999-2008) was explicitly involved in the talks between Khartoum and Darfur. Hence, it is no wonder that 60 % of South Africa's stories framed the conflict as a civil war. It is also not surprising that, for both subfields in South Africa, the civil war frame was employed the most, as shown in Table 21. In the case of the South African media, though their country's diplomatic efforts were newsworthy, the atrocities in and of themselves were less consequential. Indeed, as a journalist from South African newspaper put it:

One thing you must understand about South African media is that it's incredibly insular and incredibly parochial, so, therefore, you won't find us ever leading a newspaper, or a radio bulletin or anything like that with a story relating to Sudan unless it's something like Thabo Mbeki was shot in Sudan (journalist interview, South Africa 2012).

This same journalist also mentioned that the role played by Thabo Mbeki in the negotiation influenced how South African journalists covered the atrocities, “*our former President was involved in the negotiations and the referendum; we spent a lot of time training diplomats, government officials, etcetera from Juba and so. So, we have very vested interests*” (journalist interview, South Africa 2012). A foreign editor in South Africa stated that his understanding of Darfur as a civil war was anchored upon Khartoum’s political machinations:

So, to look at it as the center-periphery thing doesn't strike me as being at odds with the ICC formulations. For me, it's the State that is at the center and feels threatened by peripheral movements, peripheral tendencies you know centrifugal forces in the State (editor interview, South Africa 2012).

A Kenyan journalist (working for a South African media organization with offices in Nairobi) explained the use of this frame to discuss atrocities. The journalist was very clear on in-house policies about how decisions about how to frame conflicts in Africa were arrived at:

I think it depends mostly on the policy of the media houses. Take for example [this media house] you find that outrightly saying it's a civil war for us does not happen immediately because there are a lot of factors to be looked into (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

In Kenya, a journalist for *The East African* also suggested that the political intrigues between Khartoum and the rebels are what they saw as being important and newsworthy. Putting on his ‘journalistic hat,’ the journalist posited that after 13 years of conflict, human suffering was no longer a news story. This focus on the political dynamics is epitomized

in one of the first stories by *The Standard's* Ken Ramani who contextualized Darfur for his readers in the following way:

The conflict began in 2003 when JEM and SLA rebels attacked government forces and installations. The government, caught by surprise, had very few troops in the region, and - since a large proportion of the Sudanese soldiers were of Darfur origin - distrusted many of its own units; its response was to mount a campaign of aerial bombardment supporting ground attacks by an Arab militia, the Janjaweed, recruited from local tribes and armed by the government (Ramani 2004).

Table 20 also points to Rwanda for having taken a different approach in its framing of Darfur. Despite Rwanda having contributed to the peacekeeping mission in Darfur, there appears to have been a hesitance, relatively speaking, in using this frame. Table 20 shows that Rwanda employed this frame less frequently than the crime and ethnic conflict frames. One way to understand this hesitance is through a nation-specific traits approach. Rwanda's averseness in employing this frame may be anchored on the fact that during the genocide, Western media and the international community both framed the genocide in Rwanda as another African civil war. As such, there is a hesitance to call Darfur a civil war lest the same mistake is made in Rwanda. Here again, Savelsberg's (2015) argument on cognitive impediments caused by collective memory comes into play. Unfortunately, without actual interview data, there was no real way to ask journalists this and see if this is true, but Savelsberg (2015:5, 196–197) informs my supposition of Rwanda's relative reluctance to employ this frame. Additionally, Table 21 points to the small proportion of articles by the national media subfield in Rwanda that used this frame compared to the proportion (albeit just three articles) of those from the cosmopolitan media subfield.

An interesting finding vis-a-vis this frame's usage in the three countries is that a smaller fraction of articles by the national media subfields referred to Darfur as a civil war compared to those by the cosmopolitan media subfields, as shown in Table 21. Thus, the results in Table 20 must be tempered by the fact that there is an apparent divergence of the choice of framing when one analyzes the articles and disaggregates them by by-line attribution; as Table 21 does rather than at the aggregate level shown in Table 20 does.

Darfur as a Crime

Table 21 points to the centrality of the crime frame in the national media subfields; in all three countries, it was among the top two frames employed. In its first coverage of Darfur on the 14th of March 2005, *The New Times* of Rwanda published a story by a Kenyan author, Gitau Muthuma, that talked of the atrocities as persecution of Darfuris by Khartoum through a proxy army.⁹⁵ Muthuma's analysis presented Khartoum's criminality through its use of the Janjawiid and challenged the AU to do more in Darfur if lives were to be saved:

In its attempt to hoodwink the international community, Khartoum is not using its troops as such to persecute the populace. What Khartoum has done is to arm criminals released from her prisons and unleashed them on the innocent civilian population of Darfur. The Janjaweed, or 'devils on horseback,' as they are called, have proceeded to rape, murder, and generally visit mayhem in Darfur, triggering an unprecedented refugee crisis, comparable only to the one caused by the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. And despite an international outcry, Khartoum does not seem ready to abandon its policy of extermination in Darfur (Muthuma 2005).

In a different story, titled “Darfur in the Pan, Unity On the Call” on the 11th of October 2005, Kenneth Kimathi, writing for *The New Times*, stated:

The UN Commission of Inquiry on Darfur described as massive, the scope of atrocities carried out in the territory, primarily by the government and its allied

⁹⁵ Muthuma, Gitau. 2005. “The Darfur Crisis: Are Accords Enough?” *The New Times*, March 14.

Janjaweed militias. And the situation on the ground shows a number of negative trends, which have been developing since the last quarter of 2004. They include deteriorating security, including the targeting of humanitarian workers (Kimathi 2005).

In Kenya and South Africa, this frame was discussed by journalists through the lens of actions by the international community and the ICC. Two South African journalists squarely addressed this frame as a result of intervention by the ICC and the role of the Sudanese State:

The crimes against humanity, their backing for the Janjawiid and others who have been accused of a war crime, I don't think is without reason that Omar al Bashir has been indicted by the International Criminal Court. I don't think that is without reason. Obviously, he refuses, I suppose for pragmatic reasons one would expect anyone to refuse to submit themselves to international justice in that way but I don't think that it's an entirely unjustifiable indictment (Journalist interview, South Africa 2012).

I am inclined, I'm afraid, to see the State as the principal culprit. Because right at the beginning its fundamentalist agenda, which [it has] diluted somewhat over the years, blinded them to the possibility of compromise and federation and those political solutions which might have diffused the conflict (Editor interview, South Africa 2012).

For Kenyan journalists, the criminality resulted from the government of Sudan abdicating its responsibility to its citizens. A journalist with *The Standard* was adamant that irrespective of the specific charge there was a consensus that crimes had been committed:

Because we are talking about crimes against humanity, that are being committed, it doesn't matter what you call them, a genocide or a terrible conflict, what is agreed is crimes have been committed and on a very large scale (Journalist interview, Kenya 2012).

In interviews with journalists from Kenya and South Africa and from news articles from all three countries, the criminality of the Sudanese State appears to be a foregone conclusion.

What specific crime?

All three countries cited genocide as the primary crime committed more than the charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes. Unlike the findings by Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm (2015:596), there was no difference in whether the author of the news article was a reporter (in this case the national media subfield) or news agency (the cosmopolitan media subfield). However, there is the *caveat* that the most significant percentage of citation was a mere 23.75 % which occurred in Kenyan newspapers. Thus, while the frame is the most cited frame in categorizing actions by the Sudanese State and the Janjawiid as criminal, this is less than a quarter of the news stories in Kenya. South Africa cited this frame 20 % of the time while Rwanda employed it in only 13.95 % of its stories on Darfur. The hesitance to employ this frame is captured in two interviews in South Africa and Kenya in 2012. In the first interview, the interviewee was wary of the role of the ICC in influencing how observers of Darfur understood the atrocities:

Yeah, I guess Ocampo's charge may be a bit too cut and dry. It does seem to me to be fundamentally out of line. It's quite hard to prove any kind of genocide, rather than just political ambition to stick with a charge of genocide. You have to have, obviously, proved that there was a penchant to eliminate a people which is quite hard to prove, it's not like with the Holocaust where you can find documents where they map out the grand strategy sort of final solution. But genocide, in any case, seems to be a term that has been defined rather vaguely, more and more vague as law, international criminal law has gathered momentum (Editor interview, South Africa 2012).

This same editor mused about the effect of this particular case to the legacy of the prosecutor of the ICC:

Yeah, I wonder what history is going to say about Ocampo...I don't...I mean I don't share in a lot of the criticism of him in Africa. I mean I think it would have been politically astute for him to try, at least, to prosecute somebody outside the continent but one can understand why...the focus was Africa (Editor interview, South Africa 2012).

A Kenyan journalist who had previously worked for *The Standard* voiced his reservation for calling Darfur a genocide:

If we are going to use a term like genocide in Darfur, we had better be sure that genocide is taking place. To the best of my knowledge, and admittedly I haven't followed this story for some time, but to the best of my knowledge, I do not believe that there has been an INGO that has gone into Darfur and done extensive research that has come out with the conclusion that there is genocide. If such exists and if it is verifiable then, fine, that term can be used in accordance to the international definition of what a genocide is. But branding it based on interviews that have been done by people here and there who, of course, due to the trauma that they have been through can't imagine anything worse than genocide to describe what they saw. So that colors the entire debate and it also goes back to access to the area (Journalist interview, Kenya 2012).

Both journalists' unease over the term genocide epitomized arguments about whether or not Darfur was a genocide by both de Waal (2007) and Mamdani (2007). De Waal, more specifically, has argued that:

Implicit in the use of the word 'genocide' for Darfur is a moral calibration: genocide is worse than other crimes against humanity, and thus to question whether the atrocities in Darfur qualify as genocide is tantamount to minimizing, denying, or excusing the crime [...] For the purposes of stopping the killing and prosecuting those responsible, the use of the term 'genocide' initially helped draw attention to the disaster, but it has subsequently become something of a distraction to effective action (2007:32).

Rwanda's minimal use of the genocide label is, to some extent, surprising. Having gone through a genocide itself, one that was largely not referred to as a genocide as it unfolded, one may have thought that the field would employ this frame more than Kenya and South Africa. One possible explanation for the minimal use of this frame is provided by Savelsberg (2015:197). Savelsberg (2015) considers the reluctance of Germany to use

the genocide label to describe the atrocities in Darfur being linked to the cultural trauma⁹⁶ of the Holocaust. Thus, not having gone through a genocide removes what Savelsberg (2015) refers to as a cognitive impediment for Kenyan and South African journalists, towards labeling Darfur a genocide.

Darfur as a humanitarian emergency

In his book *Foreign news: Exploring the world of foreign correspondents*, Ulf Hannerz (2012) suggests that the reliance on information from INGOs and the framing of atrocities as humanitarian catastrophes by journalists often works to provide journalists with a veneer of objectivity. Hilsum (2007) has also argued that the reliance on aid organizations as sources of information obfuscates the role played by the international community and a country's political machinations that led to the conflict being covered. The data in this chapter - in conjunction with that from chapter four - suggests that the humanitarian emergency frame and INGOs as sources are not as widespread as one may expect.

Interviews with journalists in Kenya and South Africa suggest that this frame is necessary when the aim is to target the heartstrings of the reader and get them to care about the victims. A journalist from South Africa argued this frame helped them put a human face to the suffering and create a *parasocial* relationship between the audience and victims:

Humanitarian catastrophe certainly covers it. The number of refugees, the hardship, humanitarian most one I certainly could live with. In a perfect world, we would love the people to understand exactly what is happening, we would love that to happen, but the thing is you know what holds for the humanitarian

⁹⁶ Savelsberg (2015) specifically employs this term to German journalists who bore the weight of being seen as perpetrators of the holocaust unlike in the Rwanda case where that distinction, between perpetrators and victims, is not made by this project.

organization holds for me as a journalist. If I want to interest people in a story, I have to...not to use a cheap phrase...I have to target their heartstrings; I have to put it into a human context (journalist interview, South Africa 2012).

A different South African journalist argued that even though she knew Darfur was much more complicated, it wasn't until it took "a humanitarian twist" with people "dying and starving" and the feeling that 'something had to be done' for South Africans to pay attention. Thus, according to this interviewee:

It took all sort of overtones regarding the humanitarian disaster and of course we had the sort of Hollywood rage, you know, sort of taking on, George Clooney, etcetera and they took the same sort of humanitarian issue [for South Africans to pay attention] (journalist interview, South Africa 2012).

Yet, despite this sentiment over the importance of this frame for a South African audience, the national subfield used this frame in only 29.17% of its stories. It was used with lesser frequency than the ethnic conflict frame.

Kenya cited this frame with the second most frequency. Kenyan journalists argued, just as their South African counterparts, that this frame was central in gaining international attention. In Kenya, especially, even though there was a realization that the political machinations of the actors in Darfur were important, this frame was talked of as a necessary evil in the pursuit to get the audience's attention. Rwanda's minimal use of this frame, just as the use of the civil war frame, is also attributable to its history and the memory of the genocide. One could argue that the focus by the international community on the humanitarian emergency and the effects of this on how the genocide unfolded, has played a role in how the Rwandese media talks about conflict in Africa. There is also the fact that because Rwanda was most interested in what its military was doing in Darfur, this frame quite simply did not fit into this narrative. Moreover, unlike Kenya, which has

for years taken in refugees escaping conflict from the region, neither Rwanda nor South Africa could have used this frame to domesticate their narrative as effectively as Kenyan journalists.

Darfur as an Ethnic conflict

Perhaps the most significant finding with regard to the coverage of Darfur was the use of the ethnic conflict frame in all three countries. Though in both Kenya and South Africa it was the fourth most cited frame, it is the second most mentioned frame in Rwanda. Table 21 reveals that the South African national media subfield had this frame as its third most cited frame while the subfield in Rwanda employed it with the second greatest frequency. Scholars of media representation have often argued that the use of this frame by Western journalists as a clear sign of them not understanding African conflicts (see Atkinson 1999; Ebo 1992; Gruley and Duvall 2012; Hawk 1992; McNulty 1999; Myers, Klak, and Koehl 1996). In his discussion of Rwanda, Kenneth Harrow states that commentators with superficial knowledge of Rwanda retreated “into the comfortable stereotype that these were two "tribes" with ancient tribal hatred that always fought wars against each other” (2005:35).

In their work on Darfur, Gruley and Duvall point out that the use of “‘tribe’ is an important trope” that American media often employ in their coverage of Africa (2012:30). Journalists in Kenya and South Africa also voiced this critique against representation of Africa by the global north:

Definitely and this happens in spite of the fact that there is so much information out there about Africa. What I feel is there is a laziness, a lot of, well not just Western media but Westerners themselves have adopted this with respect to Africa; yes, of course, they have their own very local interest as we have ours (journalist interview, Kenya 2012).

I mean also whether it's, you know Darfur or some complicated conflict within Africa, I mean we know that Western journalists have...sometimes simplistically adopted it, you know, because it just makes it easier and frankly that's lazy journalism (journalist interview, South Africa 2012).

It would be imprudent not to point out that Western journalists who covered Darfur were also hesitant over the use of this frame. In an illuminating interview for his book, Savelsberg (2015) captures a journalist's frustration over the use of this frame in Western newspapers, saying:

The distinction between black Africans and, you know, Arabs was one that has quite a lot of currency as an easy differentiating point between the sides. But when you scrutinize it, it breaks down. So, that one was particularly problematic (journalist interview by Joachim Savelsberg 2011).

In a separate interview, a different journalist criticized the use of this frame by an English newspaper by arguing that this particular frame lacked nuance:

The Guardian took a fairly standard position which was that the Sudanese Arab, mostly Muslim, government was oppressing Christian, black, African tribes and was using the Janjaweed Militia to conduct some kind of broad extermination if not genocide. I don't think we ever called it that [genocide]. But as I learned more about the situation not just by visiting but also by reading about it, I began to understand that the roots of this conflict were much more complicated than that (journalist interview by Joachim Savelsberg 2011).

When one disaggregates the articles using by-lines, as Table 21 does, one cannot ignore the fact a large percentage of articles by the national subfield authors used “ethnic conflict” as an explanatory frame. One argument for the presence of this frame in Kenyan reports may be the fact that ethnicity was used as one or multiple causes of the various stages of the unfolding atrocities. Take, for example, *The Standard's* Ken Ramani who referred to atrocities in the following manner:

While the conflict has a political basis, it has also acquired an ethnic dimension in which civilians were deliberately targeted on the basis of their ethnicity, and an economic dimension related to the competition between pastoralists and

farmers for land and water (Ramani 2004).

This specific role of ethnicity in the conflict, as one more explanatory factor, but not the whole story was also echoed in interviews:

For me I don't think that the initial thing that led to the violence was ethnicity, I don't think so. Probably ethnicity just found its way into the conflict, but that was not the issue (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

In South Africa, the use of this frame was discussed as a consequence of kinship between the journalists and those seen as victims of the atrocities. Journalists highlighted the *affinity* between victims and audiences, subsequently creating a *parasocial* relationship and a sense of shared trauma. Consider these explanations:

There is a definite disdain from Khartoum towards Darfuri people, and as a South...as a Black South African you know, it's a very sensitive issue when you actually see that sort of racial discrimination. So there is complete disdain of like 'these people' you know kind of thing... 'othering' which to me is a very sensitive issue and that was very apparent for me. I think for me one, it would be naïve to think that there is no sort of ethnic issue at play, I mean there definitely is, so that's one (journalist interview, South Africa 2012).⁹⁷

We often don't consider North Africa or big chunks of North Africa as 'real Africa,' Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia. I mean but also Sudan, at least the northern part of Sudan, so therefore this kind of divide is very evident in reporting and in the way [Darfur] was analyzed, right [...] Our implicit support lies with the so-called black Africans. For two reasons: the one is the fact that we can associate better with them both because of, if you want to call it that, political strife a similar political strife that we've had from apartheid in South Africa. But also the fact that we know that we almost culturally understand the people from South Sudan better than we do the people from North Sudan (journalist interview, South Africa 2012).

South African journalists also explained the use of this frame as 'one more' factor that was at play and complicating events on the ground. There was also the sentiment that the

⁹⁷ The quotation marks around 'these people' and 'othering' capture the tonal inflection when the interviewee used these phrases.

role of ethnicity in shaping the conflict was a fact and the government was working to hide its role in the conflict:

[There are] other overlaying factors which accentuate the differences, you know the religious factor the fundamentalist kind of religious versus whatever, you know Christian animist. I mean I know that in Darfur those lines, the ethnic, religious lines are not as clear as they are, you know, in South Sudan and North Sudan but still I think they are there in some form (editor interview, South Africa 2012).

Well, ethnicity does play a role and again this is, the enormity is denied by the Sudanese government [...] The issues between Africans and Arabs are very complicated, you get for example the Sudanese minister who was saying to me 'what am I? Am I an Arab or an African?' (journalist interview, South Africa 2015).

The reference to the fluidity of ethnicity in Darfur was also captured in an interview, by *The New Times* of Rwanda, of a Sudanese Member of Parliament. In it, the Member of Parliament plays up the notion of ethnicity's fluidity to try and dissuade criticisms against the government. To the question, "*the situation in Darfur has attracted conflicting conclusions, with some countries such as the US calling it genocide against the black populations by Arab militias. What do you exactly think is taking place?*" the Member of Parliament responded:

The situation in Darfur is not genocide. I am a black man. I know the people in Darfur are Muslims and Arab pastoralists. All these insinuations of mass killings and genocide are only an attempt by part of the international community to justify their interests in the Sudan [...] I think this situation in Darfur is not genocide, it's not mass killing, and not on a racial basis. This is a transitional problem between farmers and tribes in Darfur themselves. The Arabs and many African tribes arrived together in villages, they intermarry, no problem of genocide in Darfur. I will ask you to explain the situation actually according to the information we give you (Munyaneza 2005).

In two different articles, the use of this frame was employed in a manner that implied that it was not necessarily Rwandan journalists who framed the atrocity as an ethnic conflict.

Instead, the stories indicated, this claim had been leveled against the Khartoum government by others, such as the late Gaddafi:

Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, whose government has been accused of aiding Arab militias fighting ethnic blacks in Darfur, had long opposed a UN force to help the ill-armed 7,000-soldier African Union peacekeeping mission (Mukombozi and Suuna 2007).

Gaddafi said without the two groups' leaders [SLA-Unity and JEM] present in Sirte, "we cannot achieve peace." He also cast doubt on what the international community could achieve in Darfur. "To internationalize a tribal problem is an exercise in futility" (Musoni 2007).

Therefore, the presence of the ethnic conflict frame can, to some degree, be attributed to the significant role played by Sudan's political field in shaping the narrative over Darfur. For Sudanese State actors that were directly quoted, referring to Darfur as an ethnic/tribal issue encoded the atrocity as an internal issue to Sudan; just as the framing of Darfur as a civil war did. It tapped into the overarching discourse of 'African solutions to African problems' that had originated in the post-Rwanda period.

In both Kenya and South Africa, journalists alluded to the use of this frame as the result of an *affinity*, which led to the domestication of the news being bounded by this *affinity*. As such, they used this frame to enable their audience to make cultural connections between their world and that of the *Other* that was being represented. For both Kenyan and South African journalists, there is a vacillation in the use of this frame in discussing Darfur. On the one hand, journalists were openly critical of Western journalists using this frame, with some calling it 'lazy', while on the other, these same journalists saw no contradiction arguing that "it would be naïve to think that there is no sort of ethnic issue at play" (journalist interview, South Africa 2012).

A similar ambivalence was also present amongst Nigerian journalists. Linking ethnicity to religious identity, an editor from Nigeria explained Darfur in the following manner:

This is a story of a complex diversity in two different countries. But it's just management of diversity out of control. You know the Northern part of Sudan, and then the Southern part of Sudan, then religion, it is actually a conflict nurtured by religion: Muslims and Christians (editor interview, Nigeria 2015).

In the very same breath, this editor went on to accuse Western journalists of relying on stereotypes when framing atrocities such as those in Darfur. Discussing how media from the global north had covered both Darfur and Nigeria, this editor went on to say:

[Stereotypical representation] is in both countries, Sudan and Nigeria. When they (Western journalists) go to report [on atrocities] sometimes I see some stereotypes from the Western media [...] I don't know why all these wire services, news agencies especially from the Western media, do not separate these facts. They don't know, they are so stereotypical. They just profile and go. They don't look at various data that they can get from various geopolitical zones to illustrate their stories (editor interview, Nigeria 2015).

Implications for Theory

From a field theory approach, the coverage of Darfur at the aggregate level, show substantial isomorphism, with all three countries having similar dominant frames. Journalists and their media organizations all appear to have internalized narratives that have been, and continue to be, used to discuss events such as the atrocities in Darfur. The dominance of these frames is also understandable through a limited *repertoire* approach elucidated by Savelsberg and King (2007). Savelsberg and King (2007) posit the narrative genres used by journalists are limited to those narratives that are already present and as a result, the journalists' level of innovation is constricted. Table 20 also shows that at the cross-national level, there was uniformity in which four frames were used more frequently over the years. As a result, these four frames became habituated through

uniformity in what is considered newsworthy by media fields both in the global south and north. At this level, therefore, there is relative uniformity in how the three countries talked about the atrocities in Darfur. However, it is also true that a closer look at the nation-state level reveals differences in which frames are more salient in each country. Journalists from each country, for example, placed a different emphasis on the frame they chose to employ in their coverage of Darfur.

In all three countries, we see that national contexts and types and levels of interaction with the Sudanese State and the actors in Darfur played a significant role in which frames were used more than others. South African journalists primarily framed the atrocities as a civil war. As pointed out in interviews, the use of this frame was often very deliberate and used only after reflection by media organizations as to its relevance and appropriateness. Following arguments by Savelsberg (2015) on the presence of this frame in the global north, and the interviews relied upon here, I argue that the diplomatic role played by South Africa's Thabo Mbeki influenced South African journalists to use the civil war frame as its primary frame. In Rwanda, the frame applied to Darfur was primarily a crime frame. Rwanda's interaction with Darfur played a large role in influencing its narrative. Rwanda's coverage focused on the experiences of its military personnel and as a result, a lot of reports were about the deaths, injuries, and attacks of RDF troops by several actors in Darfur and the criminality of this. Additionally, having gone through a genocide itself and the eventual prosecution of *génocidaires*, Rwanda's focus on the criminal frame is not surprising. I argue that these two factors have played a

large role in shaping not only the *habitus* of the journalists but also that of Rwanda's media organizations.⁹⁸

The findings on the use of ethnic conflict as an explanatory frame pose several conundrums for postcolonial critiques. The first is obviously how to explain its use considering all the critiques that have been leveled at Western journalists for employing this frame in their coverage of Africa. One explanation borrows from field theory, more specifically Tuchman's (1978:186) reading of Schütz's (1973) suggestion on understanding social reality.⁹⁹ I suggest that despite the fact that African journalists and observers critique the use of ethnicity as a frame to discuss conflict, journalists also recognize that ethnicity (in its various and problematic forms) is a phenomenon that is established. As such they will critique its use, but not necessarily the actual presence and influence of ethnicity in the political and social realities of African countries. Understood in this way, ethnicity takes an almost *laissez-faire* role in its impact on social life in African countries. Ethnic conflict, as a frame, is therefore intricately linked to the reality within which African journalists, and subsequently African media fields, are enmeshed. Thus, even for Rwanda, whose genocide was framed as an ethnic conflict by media from the global north, and whose legislature compares the use of ethnic categories within Rwanda as tantamount to inciting genocide (see Buckley-Zistel 2006; Burnet 2012; Longman and Rutagengwa 2004; Purdeková 2008), journalists cannot be assumed to be immune to talking about the identities of actors in a conflict through this frame.

⁹⁸ The notion of organizational *habitus* is espoused by organizational scholars such as Dobbin (2008) and Emirbayer and Johnson (2008)

⁹⁹ Gaye Tuchman argues that Schütz (1973) suggests that "rather than adopt an attitude of doubt toward phenomena in the social world, actors in the social world accept phenomena as given" (1978:186).

The other conundrum posed by the presence of the ethnic conflict frame is how to explain it through a postcolonial analysis. Mbembe (2001) has argued that when observers from the global north analyze events in Africa, there is often a perception that African social formations are simplistic and phenomena, such as mass atrocity, belong to traditional societies (p. 3). Bhabha (1994) has characterized colonial discourse as having its primary objective as construing the colonized as degenerate on the basis of racial origin and as a social reality that is often the 'Other' (p. 101). Following these critiques, the fact that this frame appears would imply that African journalists have, at the very least, bought into the colonial narratives about African social conditions. Moreover, from a postcolonial standpoint, this particular frame provides the audience a platform from which to give a "public account of its subjectivity" (Mbembe 2001:3) while denying the actors in Darfur their subjectivity and historical depth. Much like Spivak's (1990) colonizer, the media field in these three countries appears to be working towards constructing their audiences' identity as conflict-free as they construct that of Darfuris as victims and Khartoum as perpetrators. This works to define the actors in the conflict not as *civic citizens*, like the readers, but rather as *ethnic citizens*. This frame transforms Darfuris into, astonishingly, what Mbembe (2001:11) refers to as "radically *other*." This is especially interesting since the use of this frame, in South Africa's case, is one that is not taken lightly by media organizations. A Kenyan journalist, working for a South African media house with offices in Nairobi, pointed this out:

Most of the times you will not outrightly say this tribe is fighting this tribe because of the history of the country. They really try to stay away from tribes and naming names [...] but you find that a lot of international media houses had no problem saying that (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

It is necessary to point out here for this journalist, “international media houses” meant media organizations from the global north and not media houses from other African countries. Thus, even though she worked for a South African media house in Nairobi, she did not view her media house as ‘international’ in the same way as Reuters or *The New York Times* are.

There is also a case to be made that the use of this frame is merely a reflection of how the actors in the conflict identify; as shown in both the interview excerpts from Kenyan and South African journalists and from the news story excerpts from *The New Times*. In this reading, Spivak's (1990) subaltern (in the case the Sudanese & Darfuris) is actually speaking and, as pointed out in the previous chapter, has the lion's share in the shaping of the narrative. What the data have shown, however, is that the subaltern is reifying the identities that have hitherto been attributed to being the preserve of an on-going colonial understanding of Africa[ns]. Sudanese voices play a large role in the narrative construction process and are the primary claims-makers in the three countries. Thus, in response to Spivak's (1990) seminal question "can the subaltern speak?" the data in this and the previous chapter show what the subaltern is actually saying.

Discussion

This chapter has highlighted the frames employed by African media fields in their coverage of the atrocities of Darfur. It has also pointed out the in-country differences and similarities between the national and cosmopolitan media subfields in each of the three countries. At the macro ‘African media field’ perspective, there are clear similarities in the overarching frames that were employed by the media fields in the three countries.

However, at the more meso nation-state level there is a different emphasis in different countries when they talked about Darfur and the picture is even more nuanced at the ‘micro’ subfield level. As a result, the choice of what level of analysis one chooses will affect how we understand the framing of events in Africa by African media fields.

As the data show, there is an interconnectedness of global and local knowledge scripts. Silences in the media fields studied here and those from the global north in 2003 and the subsequent burst in coverage in 2004 point to this. The spike in coverage in 2004 was also closely aligned to the visible and loud reactions by not only the international community but also Kofi Annan’s speech to the United Nations’ General Assembly (UNGA) on the 10th anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda. This should not be taken to assume that global and local knowledge scripts often align in perfect synergy. If anything, both Haller and Hadler (2008) and Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm (2015) show that, more often than not, nation-specific influences and attitudes play a large role in influencing how individuals think and talk about global events.

Tables 20 and 21 point to the important roles of national contexts in affecting the choice of frames such as South Africa’s focus on the civil war frame and Rwanda’s focus on the crime frame. Results here point to a hesitance to use the genocide frame in all three countries, even though it was the most cited criminal responsibility label. The minimal employment of the label genocide echoed the stance by the AU and the report by the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General. The latter, which was dominated by African jurists and had South Africa’s Dumisa Ntsebeza (the chief prosecutor of South Africa’s TJRC) as a member found that the “element of genocidal intent [seemed] to be missing” (United Nations 2005:5).

Additionally, Rwanda's near lack of use of the genocide frame resembles Savelsberg's (2015) findings of Germany's representation of the atrocities in Darfur, albeit for different reasons.

The presence of the ethnic conflict frame also points to the limits of current postcolonial and media scholarship discourse on representations of Africa. Although I have explained the presence of the ethnic conflict frame, it would be imprudent to assume that newspaper readers understand this frame in a similar fashion. As pointed out by Hall (1973), encoding narrative does not imply that the narrative will be decoded in similar ways. Additionally, I have shown that while (some) Africans are part of the narrative construction (see, chapter four), they have also reified the very identities that scholars of contemporary Africa attribute to the colonial enterprise as creating (sometimes from whole cloth) (Iliffe 1979; Mamdani 1996, 2001).

Conclusion

The literature on media representation has largely trained its intellectual curiosity on Western media representations of Africa and as a result, there is a silence as to how media in African countries represent other African countries. There is a dearth of literature to explain the presence of frames such as the ethnic conflict frame within African media. As I have demonstrated, these frames are not merely a consequence of the lifting stories from the cosmopolitan subfield, but rather, African media houses are engaged in the use and normalization of these very frames. It is easy to claim that this is the manifestation of internalization of a colonial mentality, as was voiced by interviewees from Kenya in chapter four; or that the ethnic conflict frame works to create a sense of shared identity and thus collective trauma between the audience and the victims in

Darfur. However, I discuss some of the complicated reasons for this frame's presence in chapter eight. The presence of the ethnic conflict frame also provides an avenue for future research, one that is focused on disambiguating the role of this frame in explaining how the media in Africa view the suffering of other Africans around the continent. Finally, the results here, in conjunction with those from the previous chapter, would suggest that when it came to Darfur, Rwanda was more insular in its approach than either Kenya or South Africa.

Chapter 6: Covering Darfur For a Kenyan Audience

Introduction

One debate in sociological scholarship on the construction of knowledge has followed two related approaches to studying how knowledge of global events is constructed at the local and national levels. One strand takes a neo-Weberian approach to studying this construction by investigating the extent to which “nation-specific institutional and cultural sensitivities” (Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm 2015:566) filter global narratives before they reach local or national audiences. The second strand of scholarship argues for the primacy of global forces in affecting how knowledge is constructed at the national and subnational levels through the generation of global scripts which are re-transmitted to a localized audience (see, Boyle 2002; Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer 2000). In both strands, actors, and actions, that play an integral role in affecting local representations of events unfolding in the global arena often include INGOs and advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 2014; Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm 2015:569; Zacher, Nyseth-Brehm, and Savelsberg 2014), judicial interventions (Hagan 2003; Savelsberg and King 2011; Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm 2015), interventions by transnational organizations such as the United Nations (Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm 2015) and local/national media fields (Benson 2013).

Recently, there has been a renewed sociological focus on how media organizations produce knowledge about mass atrocity (see, Savelsberg 2015; Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm 2015). This recent approach joins scholarship from other disciplines on how media fields in the global north construct knowledge about events, such as atrocities, in Africa (see, Atkinson 1999a, 1999b; Fair and Parks 2001; Gruley and Duvall

2012; Grzyb 2010; Hilsum 2007; Mody 2010; Myers, Klak, and Koehl 1996). However, this renewed focus has primarily examined how western news organizations produce knowledge about mass atrocity in African countries, disregarding how African media organizations produce this same knowledge. Only recently has media scholarship investigated how African media organizations represent conflict and instability in African countries (Alozie 2005; Emmanuel Alozie 2007; Mody 2010a; Ray 2009; Savelsberg and Siguru 2017; Wahutu 2017a). These studies have focused on how organizations construct knowledge of mass atrocities for African audiences, the role/influence of global scripts on local knowledge production and the role of localized knowledge repertoires.

Even here, sociologists have not been at the forefront of this new research avenue, despite sociology being interested in these very questions and having the tools to engage with these issues. Even with the vast amount of scholarship on the construction of knowledge by media, little work has been done to understand how organizations in Africa construct knowledge about African events that garner global attention for local audiences (Savelsberg and Siguru 2017; Wahutu 2017c, 2017b). Belair-Gagnon and Revers argue that sociology of media, as a field within sociology, has over the years moved to “communication and media studies and has been less populated by scholars employed by sociology departments” (Forthcoming:1).¹⁰⁰ I extend this argument to state that sociology has lagged even further behind communication scholars in studying media organizations in the global south.

This chapter takes first steps towards addressing these gaps. By taking an organizational level approach to its analysis, it works to provide sub-nation-level nuance

¹⁰⁰ For a genealogy of the field see Belair-Gagnon and Revers (2017) and for current challenges faced by media sociology within American sociology see Brienza and Revers (2016).

that the previous chapters do not offer. It illustrates how the questions and results from the preceding chapters play out at the organizational level. It thus views media organizations at the country level as engaging in what Mbembe (2001) refers to as "meaningful acts" by treating the knowledge constructed by news organizations in Kenya as a means of assessing Kenyans' understanding of an atrocity in Africa; an understanding shaped by carrier agents who are skilled in framing events "with a resonant narrative structure" (Sheinheit and Bogard 2016:974). While this chapter fills a void in current sociological scholarship of media fields, it is also firmly ensconced in the scholarship on media in Africa by communication and media studies scholars (see, Atton and Mabweazara 2011; Ileri 2016; Mabweazara 2011; Moyo 2011, 2013; Mudhai 2007, 2011; Ndangam 2009; Willems 2014). This scholarship takes seriously the influence of African social contexts on the fields they study. As such, the influence of digital networks on African journalists, for example, are contextualized within Kenya's budding tech culture rather than Silicon Valley's.

Why The Kenyan Media Field?

Wu states that the volume of coverage of international events by a country's media field depends on factors such as cultural ties, communication resources, level of trade between the two nations, territorial size and physical distance (2003:9). In chapter five I discussed how factors such as Kenya's shared border with what was then Sudan, Kenya's engagement in negotiations between Khartoum and Juba in Naivasha, and its hosting of refugees -and exiled rebels in Nairobi- resulted in prominence being given to Darfur by Kenya's media field compared to the other media fields in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Moreover, despite recent political assaults on the media field, Kenya's media organizations are still among the more independent media in Eastern Africa.

As pointed out in chapter four, two subfields operate within most African media fields. Thus, Kenya constitutes a field site which allows for an elucidation of news products written and published by journalists ensconced within two media subfields operating within the same national boundary. This approach is built on Fligstein and McAdam's (2012) twin concepts of *challengers* and *incumbents*. It is cognizant of the fact that within an African country's media field, the cosmopolitan media subfield, with its vast resources and perennial focus on global audiences (see, Boyd-Barrett 2001; Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen 1998; Bunce 2010, 2011), may be the *incumbent*.

The motivating questions for this chapter are therefore: 1) what frames did Kenyan journalists use to construct knowledge about Darfur in comparison to wire agencies working in Nairobi? 2) Who was viewed as being a credible voice in this construction process? And 3) to what extent do global forces affect how knowledge about Darfur was constructed for a national audience? To achieve this, I analyze *The Nation* and *The Standard* and *The East African*. As discussed in chapter three, *The Nation* and *The East African* are published by the Nation Media Group (NMG) while *The Standard* is published by the Standard Group Limited (SG). Thus, even though I study three newspapers the focus is on primarily two media organizations. Additionally, *The East African* serves the Eastern Africa region while two dailies are primarily meant for the Kenyan audience.

Theoretical Expectations

Field theory suggests that NMG and SG will have similar dominant frames. This would primarily be due to the field *logic* similarly affecting news organizations within identical contextual realities.¹⁰¹ Moreover, the field's *structure*, as defined by Benson, (2013) suggests that *The Nation*, with the largest circulation and readership numbers in Kenya, is in a position of influence between the two daily newspapers while its parent company is the dominant player within the field. As a result, we should also expect some isomorphism by the papers with smaller circulation and readership numbers towards the dominant newspaper. This means that even though a newspaper uses a different primary frame, there is a likelihood that this frame will be closely followed by a frame or frames similar to those used by the dominant player.

Field theory also suggests that the dominant frame employed by journalists working in the cosmopolitan media field will resemble that employed by journalists working in the global north. Since organizations in this subfield are oriented towards the global north, we should expect that this subfield's primary frame will be the crime frame, resembling the primacy of this frame in the global north (see, Savelsberg 2015; 236). Furthermore, Benson's (2013:25) exposition of field *structure* would suggest that Kenyan journalists working for the national media subfield, due to the contextual and institutional realities that they are enmeshed in, are likely to give salience to different frames in their coverage of Darfur. One such difference may be in not only the primary frame they employ but also in the use of the ethnic conflict frame. Hence, although chapter five

¹⁰¹ Benson defines field *logic* as the "dominant news practices and formats" that are primarily translations or refractions of outside the field forces (2013:25).

shows that the ethnic conflict frame appears with relative frequency at the field and subfield levels, this chapter's analysis of the organizational level and its use of the by-line accreditation should yield more nuanced results.

At the organizational level, we should expect both *normative* and *mimetic* isomorphic processes towards *The Nation*. As shown in the preceding chapters, *The Nation* occupies the role of *incumbent* within Kenya's media field. Thus, through *mimetic* and *normative isomorphism*, we should see *The Standard* and *The East African* newspapers closely resemble *The Nation* in the frames given salience. At the field level, a neo-Weberian approach suggests that we should expect a difference in frame salience. This difference would be because the two sub-fields engage, and interact, with different nation-specific and institutional pressures due to differing field *logics*.

This chapter also analyzes the sources relied upon by journalists working for the two media organizations in their coverage of Darfur. The analysis of who is deemed worthy of being quoted is central to understanding the knowledge construction project Kenyan media organizations are engaged in. From a field theory perspective, we should expect to find that all three newspapers relied on sources from similar categories, i.e., State actors, transnational organizations, INGOs, etc. Additionally, considering postcolonial critiques, we should also expect to find a preference for African, and especially Kenyan, sources quoted by Kenyan journalists across all three news organizations. This expectation would be in line with Benson's (2013) concept of "habitus affinities," which suggests that journalists will disproportionately quote sources with whom they share affinities (national, racial, social class, etc.).

Empirical Analysis

This chapter relies on the 539 newspaper articles on Darfur published by Kenyan news organizations. It begins with an analysis of the number of stories published by the three newspapers with particular attention being paid to each story's by-line accreditation. This focus on bylines should inform us of the key players in the constructing the knowledge that Kenyan audiences consume. The second section compares who is quoted by Kenyan journalists in comparison to journalists working for foreign news bureaus stationed in Nairobi. This section will highlight which sources were quoted within NMG by both *The Nation* and *The East African* followed by a comparison between *The Nation* and *The Standard*. This section is then followed by a similar approach to studying how Darfur was framed in Kenya. This approach allows me to not only assess how different groups of journalists cover an atrocity but also how the field's *structure* and *logic* intersect to influence not only the choice of frames but also whom to quote. The final section of this chapter is a discussion of the empirical results with a focus on how the results challenge or affirm current scholarship on media.

Reporting on an African Atrocity

Before analyzing how the different organization in Kenya framed Darfur, I highlight who filed the stories about Darfur published in Kenya's newspapers. As Table 9 (in chapter four) illustrates, news about Darfur was primarily supplied by the cosmopolitan media subfield. From Table 9, it is evident that Kenyan journalists are peripheral actors in the knowledge construction project. This push to the periphery was not unique to news about events occurring in Darfur. Two journalists from NMG independently recounted a

specific event where stories they filed about an event in Nairobi were not used in favor of those from the cosmopolitan subfield:

I've seen it. [The] Nation sent, during the CPA, sent three journalists at the Intercontinental, Garang was there, it was the final days, they were meeting there, what you call the supporters of the CPA; Italy, Norway, US and all these guys who were supporting the peace process, three journalists. Me, I was there for The East African, [...] So, these guys went, they did their stories, and I saw them, and we did the interviews together with this guy. Tomorrow we are seeing Reuters, in The [Daily] Nation (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

Let's say you are an employee. You are paid a salary to do that work. They are not going to pay you for this particular story, but here they are, they pick a story from Reuters and pay a lot for it. So, does it really make sense? I actually attended that conference [...], it's very, very frustrating. It's a practice that goes on in the newsroom, and it frustrates most reporters. If you come across most reporters, and they are very frustrated (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

The above excerpts and Table 9 show that concerns raised by Styan (1999) about where Africans got images of other Africans from have not been alleviated. Concomitantly, the dominance of organizations in the cosmopolitan subfield in the global media field's production of knowledge (discussed by Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen 1998) is manifestly evident in Kenya and how it covered Darfur. The dominance of the cosmopolitan subfield in the process of constructing knowledge about Darfur is likely to affect how each newspaper framed Darfur. Given *The Nation's* reliance on the cosmopolitan subfield for its coverage of Darfur, we should expect that its framing of Darfur will be different from that by both *The Standard* and *The East African*. Table 9 also points to the dominant role of *The Nation* in the production of knowledge within Kenya's media field. Producing 82.37 % of news on Darfur, and with a weekly readership number of almost 6 million compared to *The Standard's* 3.2 million, places the former at the *incumbent* level and the latter at the *challenger* level within Kenya's media field.

Who Is Quoted

Scholarship has pointed out that news is not always what occurs but what someone else says has occurred (Pedelty 1995; Rosen 1999; Sigal 1973). Thus, this section focuses on who is quoted by the two media organizations, and – additionally -- how frequently they are quoted. It analyzes the extent to which audiences hear different voices, a feature Benson (2013:150) calls “external pluralism.” Out of a total of 36 different nationalities, those in Table 22 represent the three top countries from which sources quoted originate. Table 23 captures who is often quoted by the three major newspapers in Kenya, and who is, therefore, high in the credibility hierarchy (Becker 1967). It also illustrates the countries from which sources came, for articles published by the respective subfields in Nairobi.

Table 22: Frequency of how often sources from top three source providing countries were heard

	National Media Field	Cosmopolitan Media Field
Kenya	5	.3
Sudan	47	40
United States	23	11.5
United Kingdom	7.5	4.8
Other*	17.5	43.1

*Although this category seems to account for a large portion of sources within each field, it is important to remember that it represent 36 different countries.

Table 22 shows that the Kenyan audience heard more from American and English voices than from Kenyan ones. Though one may argue that the national subfield gave voice to Kenyans more frequently than its cosmopolitan counterpart, this is counteracted by the fact that they gave voice to more American and UK sources than the cosmopolitan subfield did. Moreover, the "other" category highlights the extent to which the cosmopolitan subfield provided Kenyans with a polyphony of voices; thus being more

externally pluralistic. Table 22 also points to an interesting disjuncture. Despite Kenyan journalists decrying the loss of narrative due to the lifting of stories from the cosmopolitan subfield, (and notwithstanding scholarly critique over western representations oversimplifying and objectifying Africa and conflicts in Africa), Kenyan journalists appear to have favored sources from the global north as a counterweight to the prevailing use of Sudanese sources. Thus, for the Kenyan audience, no matter the by-line accreditation, knowledge about events in Darfur was primarily the preserve of Sudanese, American, and English co-constructors.

Whom The Nation Media Group Views As Credible

Moving beyond the field level and analyzing whom the two news organizations quoted, we see in Table 23 that both organizations favored State actors above any other group of sources. This pattern is in line with findings by Schudson (2011) and Sigal (1973). Table 23 further shows that NMG appears to have internalized the global rules of the game when it comes to who its journalists consider as a *credible knower* (see, Rosen 1999; Schudson 2011). Its newspapers, *The Nation* and *The East African*, do not appear to be remarkably different from other news organizations covering conflicts in foreign countries (see, Pedelty 1995). The preference for State actors as sources is not that much different from what Schudson (2011) and Sigal (1973) tell us is the modus operandi of news organizations from the global north in their day to day operations. The following interview with a journalist confirms this:

I used to have a lot of contacts within the Sudan embassy. So I had a lot of documents from them, and they included me in their mailing system so anything happening in South Sudan or in Khartoum administration I used to get. They send the information and the write-up, I critically analyze and have a look at them, and I go back to [the embassy officials]. Then in case, it is something that needs an interview I sit with the relevant person, in this case, they had a press attaché, so I talk to the person one on one (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

Table 23: Number of times sources were quoted by the three newspapers

Sources	The Daily Nation	East African	The Standard
State Actors	445 (47%)	37 (37.8%)	27 (46.5%)
Transnational Organizations	257 (27%)	16 (16%)	12 (20.7%)
Rebels	86 (9%)	3 (3%)	4 (6.9%)
INGOs	67 (7%)	20 (20%)	9 (15.5%)
Other*	85 (9%)	22 (22%)	6 (10%)
Total	940	98	58

* This group is a collapsed marker for four smaller groups from which journalists got their sources from but are not analyzed here; they include Sudanese citizens and Darfuri refugees, anonymous sources and news organizations such as the LA Times.

Table 23 shows that *The Nation* quotes State actors more frequently than *The East African*. This pattern seems to be a function of the fact that *The Nation* lifts stories from the cosmopolitan subfield more regularly than *The East African*. This subfield relied on State actors from various other countries primarily due to their more global audience. However, recalling that Table 9 showed how *The Nation* and *The East African* relied on the cosmopolitan subfield to varying degrees, Table 24 poses another puzzle. How do we explain the fact that the newspaper with the most substantial number of articles lifted

from the cosmopolitan subfield (*The Nation*) quoted State actors from the U.S. and the U.K. less frequently than its sister publication?

Table 24: Cross Section of State actors' nationalities

Nationality	The Daily Nation (n=445)	East African (n=37)	The Standard (n=27)
Kenya	2 (.4%)	1 (3%)	2 (7%)
Sudan	241 (54%)	9 (24%)	17 (63%)
United States	90 (20%)	15 (40%)	3 (11%)
The United Kingdom	28 (6%)	4 (11%)	1 (4%)

To understand why, it is instructive to know which specific organizations each newspaper relied on within the cosmopolitan subfield. Unlike *The Nation*, which lifted its stories from organizations such as Reuters and AP, *The East African* published stories by individual journalists living in the global north. One such correspondent whose stories were consistently published by *The East African* is an American (living in the United States), whom an NMG sub-editor referred to in the following manner:

Well, part of our current problem is, we have one strong reporter who can cover conflict, and he's currently doing Sudan and Somalia. So meanwhile, we are going to the American, or whomever we can, who can then at least get us a story. We'll interrogate it as far as we can, maybe have a little back and forth with him if we can [...] But right now, we are really thin on having reporters, who are mature enough and have been in the industry long enough who can actually go do stuff like that (sub-editor interview, Kenya 2015).

Nonetheless, both newspapers also favored State actors from the U.S. and U.K. to Kenyan State actors as sources. *The Nation* has Kenyan State actors accounting for only .4 % of voices; compared to 20 % and 6 % for those from the U.S. and U.K. respectively.

For *The East African*, Kenyan State actors account for three percent in comparison to those from the U.S. and U.K. who account for 40% and 11% respectively.

Who The Daily Nation And The Standard View As Credible

The two dailies quoted State actors with relatively similar frequency (see Table 23).

However, *The Nation* cited transnational organizations and rebels more frequently than *The Standard* did. This presence of rebel voices in articles from *The Nation* is a function of two concurrent factors: lifting articles from the cosmopolitan subfield and financial capability to send its journalists to the field. Journalists working for the cosmopolitan subfield, having more resources, can give disparate voices an opportunity since they travel to the region more frequently than the national subfield's journalists. Furthermore, as was suggested by a journalist working for *The Standard*, rebels are "willing to talk to [western journalists] [...] because they want to show their might" (journalist interview, Kenya 2012). Rebels are therefore more likely to talk to western journalists whom they view as conduits through which they can inflate their importance to audiences.¹⁰²

In addition to lifting stories from the cosmopolitan subfield, *The Nation's* parent company also has the financial capability to send its journalists to Darfur - or to peace negotiations in cities like Abuja (Nigeria) and Sirte (Libya) - more frequently than *The Standard* can. Being able to travel to Darfur was seen by journalists as beneficial since allowed them to form relationships with rebels who could facilitate their travel into other strongholds within Darfur. Talking about this, a journalist stated that "[rebels] used to be some of my contacts, and actually we traveled together with them to Darfur, South

¹⁰² An example of rebels using western journalists to exaggerate their significance is epitomized by how Sierra Leone's RUF rebels' used BBC coverage of the civil war to signal their legitimacy and strength (see, Wurie Khan 1998).

Sudan, and Khartoum just to have a look at what was taking place" (journalist interview, Kenya 2015). A journalist working for *The Standard* put the financial limitation of working for the newspaper in this manner:

At times, you are told that there is no money to take you to such a dangerous place [...] You want to go and report on an issue about Darfur, Somalia, northern Uganda or wherever or even northern Kenya; nobody is willing to give you the resources to go there. Or even when you are [given money] what you are given is not adequate to do thorough research. So, you have to keep on slashing, and sometimes you have to go without food because you will need that money to do something else (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

The consequence of which the journalist summed up like this:

So, if you are a media house, you are a newspaper organization, and you cannot facilitate your people to go and get the accurate information, *The New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Newsweek* or whatever, they fly in their reporters, then the reporters come, do their jobs, then they sell those stories to you, why should you complain? (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

Even despite NMG's capability to finance trips for its journalist, chapter four has shown that it still preferred to lift stories from the cosmopolitan media subfield:

Sometimes it's the newsroom that sponsors you to go to these conferences: *go to this conference, interview so, and so bring us this story*. You go there; you spend your resources, you spend your time, you file the story. The following day what do you see? You see there's a story from Reuters, yours has been killed, and if you look at even the stuff that has come from Reuters, it's very sketchy [...] we have this mentality that foreign media is the best you know...until they bash us, [...] (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

The ability to travel to Darfur also brings with it unique challenges. Journalists often found themselves having to negotiate with both State actors and rebels to get stories from both sides, all the while trying to convince both sides that they were not spies for

the opposing sides.¹⁰³ This negotiation process between rebels and State actors whom journalists want to use as a source perhaps explains why journalists favored quoting primarily State actors since this was safer and more reliable. The main danger of seeking out rebels as sources is that it places the lives of the journalist at risk should the published story not align with what the rebels expected it to be. To the question why would rebels talk to journalists, especially African journalists, a journalist with *The Standard* responded that “they can get you should you write anything they do not agree with” (journalist interview, Kenya 2012). Journalists often reminded me:

Most of these guys [rebels] used to live in Nairobi, and up to now some of them live in Nairobi. They used to be some of my contacts, and numerous times actually we traveled together with them to Darfur, South Sudan, and Khartoum just to have a look at what was taking place (journalist interview 2015).

This sense of being ‘got’ was never expressed by journalists when talking about their State actors. In fact, journalists viewed their relationships with State actors as stable and symbiotic. Speaking about a colleague at NMG, a journalist stated:

He was in Juba, and then he went to Ethiopia; actually, he called me just a few minutes before I came here and told me that, initially, he had interviewed Salva Kiir; now Riek Machar is saying, *can you come for my side on this?* So, he went to Addis (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

Journalists saw having sources “within the establishment” as something that was not only needed by journalists but as beneficial for State actors too. In the coverage of Darfur, a journalist with NMG pointed to embassy officials at the Sudan embassy in Nairobi as

¹⁰³ A journalist attributed his chain-smoking to the stress induced by this constant state of pressure.

being very diligent in sending out communiques to journalists whenever they had a message that needed to be broadcast.

Framing Darfur For Kenyans

When framing Darfur for a Kenyan audience, the cosmopolitan subfield used the civil war frame as their primary frame (see Table 25). Despite having headquarters in the global north and being oriented towards audiences in the global north, this frame is different from how media organizations in the global north framed the atrocities. Savelsberg (2015:236) finds that media organizations in the global north primarily framed Darfur as a crime, but his analysis does not focus on story by-lines explicitly which may yield different results.

Table 25: Frames Used by Kenya’s Media Field (% in parenthesis) *

Frame**	National Subfield	Cosmopolitan Subfield
Civil War	40 (28.27)	194 (52.43)
Crime	49 (34.75)	179 (45.94)
Humanitarian Emergency	47 (33.33)	145 (39.19)
Ethnic Conflict	33 (23.4)	141 (38.11)
Genocide	35 (24.8)	89 (24.1)

*Table looks at the number of times frames appeared.

**Percentages add to more than 100% since articles often used multiple frames.

Table 25 shows that the national subfield primarily framed the atrocity as a crime rather than a civil war, resembling how fields in the global north framed Darfur. This presents us with two interesting challenges. The first is that the cosmopolitan subfield, contributions of which were printed in Kenyan newspapers, did not resemble news organizations studied by Savelsberg (2015) in their choice of what frame to emphasize. This is surprising as editors of news agencies are located in the global north (see, Bunce 2011, 2015) and are viewed as more focused on audiences in the global north than the

global south (see, Boyd-Barrett 2001; Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen 1998). This focus on audiences in the global north was explained by Ian Macdowell (former Reuters news editor) as necessary since the most important news markets for wire services were countries in the global north (see chapter four). The second challenge is that Kenyan journalists, despite critiques of how conflict in Africa is covered by western journalists, framed Darfur in similar ways as western journalists.

Framing Darfur for NMG's Audience

The framing of Darfur within NMG presents us with an interesting perspective with regard to news as an organizational product (see Table 26). *The Nation* and *The East African* differ only minimally in how they framed Darfur despite the former's reliance on the cosmopolitan subfield as shown in Table 9. For both newspapers, the civil war frame was employed in more stories than the crime frame, but only minimally so.

Table 26: Frequency of Frames Used by Kenyan Newspapers*

Frames	The Daily Nation	The East African	The Standard
Civil War	45.5	46	43
Crime	42.7	43	43
Humanitarian	36.7	40	46.6
Emergency			
Ethnic Conflict	34.6	29	26
Genocide	23.2	26	26

*Percentages add to more than 100% since journalists often employed multiple frames within the same story.

These two frames appear to have been arrived at through organizational level influences such as the role played by editors of both newspapers in influencing the choice of frames.

As stated by a sub-editor from *The East African* and an editor for *The Nation*:

What we have at *East African* is a meeting on Monday morning, everybody. All the reporters and all the editors. Then we discuss the paper for the week before what went wrong what went right. And then the reporters then say what they are working on that week. So, they get input from everyone. So, we'll say *no don't take this angle; this angle may be better*. But then the news editor then sits with them, and they work out how the story is going to run, and they are going to follow it up (sub-editor interview, Kenya 2015).

The editor is essentially a gatekeeper. You are a media house's last line of defense. So, you are supposed to be responsible for whatever goes past your defense. So even if you got a story, whether from your writer or whether from these agencies, you still have the obligation to ask questions, to interrogate (editor interview, Kenya 2012).

In this sense, Kenyan journalists covering Darfur often had to be aware of their editors' preferences. The NMG sub-editor illustrated the importance of knowing what their managing editors would allow by stating that who the editor was "might make a difference in how the story is run" (sub-editor interview, Kenya 2015). Highlighting this point, she continued to state:

For example, our managing editor is very conservative. So, she'll say *no I don't want that*, or a story will come in, and she'll say *no that's not good for our readers*. But that's because of her personality. [She] looks for the soft side of a story. So, when the story comes in it is likely to be less harsh because of her. So, when she's on leave and her deputy [steps in], you can almost tell that there is a different kind of mindset (sub-editor interview, Kenya 2015).

Journalists working for both newspapers voiced their exasperation with this approach by editors. For those who had traveled to Darfur or Khartoum or the multiple peace conferences across the continent, there was a sense of dismay at how editors back in Nairobi influenced the framing of their stories. Much like Chaon's (2007) lament about the coverage of Rwanda by western media organizations, a longtime journalist covering Darfur intimated:

You know it happens a number of times, sometimes you are assigned to go cover a story, you come back with a story, and then the editor adds something else. The editor or sub-editor adds something else, in the process, you find that it's not actually what you wanted to bring out. The angle you wanted to bring out has been distorted in a way and what happens is that if you ever interview somebody for a story, then you will be the person they call [to complain] (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

Despite *The Nation* and *The East African* operating as two separate media actors, Table 26 points to a predisposition to uniformity and risk-aversion in their choice of the two most frequently used frames. There are two possible explanations why both *The Nation* and *The East African* resemble each other in how they framed Darfur despite the former relying on the cosmopolitan subfield's coverage more than the latter. The first is that both newspapers understood Darfur in similar ways (i.e., a civil war) and the second is that *The East African* mimicked its sister publication due to the latter's dominance within the organization. I suggest that the latter provides for a stronger explanation for the use of similar frames despite *The Nation's* penchant for lifting articles. Within NMG, *The East African* operates as a junior partner mimicking the much more dominant *The Nation*. Therefore, because the same parent company owns both, I argue that there is a tendency to want to appear to be putting across the same message to those readers who may read both newspapers. Additionally, both newspapers are seeking out homologous spaces of reception, and thus their use of the crime and civil war frames is meant to not only reify this understanding of Darfur but also to ensure that the mental schemas of their audiences are left intact. Thereby, they guarantee that over time these two frames resonated more than others. These two papers highlight the strong influence of the organizational rules of the game in ensuring that readers of both newspapers decoded Darfur in similar ways.

Nevertheless, Table 26 does point to some, albeit minimal, variation in what specific crimes the two newspapers viewed as being perpetrated against the civilian population. *The East African* primarily viewed the atrocities as genocide (26 percent) compared to *The Nation* (23.2 percent). This variance is partly explained by the different use of memory to narrate the events in Darfur. *The East African*, possibly due to it having an audience in Rwanda and across the region, talked about Darfur within the context of past atrocities and more specifically the genocide in Rwanda and the atrocities in South Sudan. 15.4% of articles in *The East African* referenced the genocide in Rwanda compared to 5% of those in *The Nation*. In this sense, *The East African* seems to have been more deliberate in trying to create a *parasocial* relationship between their audience in the region and the victims in Darfur. *The East African*, sought out to ensure that its regional audience would have a frame that resonated with their particular understandings of one of the worst instances of atrocities in the region.

Framing Darfur in *The Daily Nation* and *The Standard*

Table 9 shows us that *The Nation* published a total of 444 news articles on Darfur compared to *The Standard's* 30 over the same period, showing just how dominant the former is in influencing perception on Darfur in Kenya. Coverage of Darfur peaked in 2004 with a total of 144 articles on Darfur, while *The Standard's* coverage accounted for a mere 10.4% of the total coverage of news by the two dailies. This small number of articles on Darfur is partly attributable to *The Standard's* parent company not having similar financial resources as NMG. We are thus left with a contradictory reality in which, although NMG has better financial capabilities, it uses these resources not to have its journalists cover Darfur but instead to buy stories from the cosmopolitan subfield. But

perhaps most astonishing was the surprise expressed by a sub-editor for NMG at the large number of articles lifted from the cosmopolitan subfield. This same sub-editor would go on and justify the large number of articles by the cosmopolitan media subfield in the following way:

It's almost like *so what's new about Darfur? Is it the same old story?* So, I think reporters also get tired, and then even the editors will probably say *ok so what new thing are you telling us about Darfur? We already know they are fighting and they have killed how many millions.* [We] will want to move on to something else. Like now we are big on Kiir and Machar. Darfur has to take a back seat, [so] we'll spend our resources on something else, our meager resources. I think our priorities have shifted (sub-editor interview, Kenya 2015).

The two daily newspapers used markedly different frames to describe the atrocities. *The Standard* primarily framed Darfur as a humanitarian emergency rather than a civil war.¹⁰⁴ Framed this way, the conflict is viewed as having a 'human face' rather than one primarily based on political machinations. For *The Nation*, the civil war frame represents how both its journalists and its editors talked about Darfur during interviews:

For me as a writer, the humanitarian issue is known, I would not break the news by saying people are suffering in Darfur. It is something that is known for how many years, 13? I look at how the political dynamics are feeding into this conflict (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

¹⁰⁴ This despite quotes from refugees accounting for 6.9% of the total number of quotes by *The Standard* compared to 9.4% of the total number of quotes by *The Daily Nation*.

The principal duty of any state is the protection of its citizen. You safeguard their interests in whichever way, including those who live in marginalized environments where competition for resources is intensive and where insurrections are prone to occur. So, when a state fails in this cardinal duty, then it creates an environment for these things...some of which actually become full-blown rebellions. So, the state has..., the [Sudanese] State in this particular respect, has failed in its cardinal duty of protecting the interest of the people (editor interview, 2012).

While the journalist and editor quoted above, appear to be singing from the same hymn book, the situation was different at *The Standard*. The two journalists, who had covered Sudan and Darfur for *The Standard*, argued that Darfur was a criminal enterprise orchestrated by an authoritarian government:

It's no longer a local fight; this is an international issue. Then because we are talking about crimes against humanity, that are being committed, it doesn't matter what you call them, a genocide or a terrible conflict, what is agreed is crimes have been committed and on a very large scale (journalist interview, 2012).

It seems that the government had a very dim view of people in that region. They had a very crude and expansionist approach towards what was taking place in Darfur, and therefore the right of the people was being pushed aside to accommodate the priorities of the government and given that of course, some people decided to push back leading to where we are now. I could be wrong, but that is my perception of what took place (journalist interview, Kenya 2012).

The Standard's organizational stance appears to focus on the humanitarian emergency frame even though this may be at odds with how its own journalists understand Darfur. A possible explanation for this is that both of the journalists who primarily covered Darfur for *The Standard* had been trained by *The Nation*, where they both had worked before joining *The Standard*.

Because the two dailies compete for a relatively small number of consumers (see Table 4)¹⁰⁵ there is a tendency to be risk-averse, which leads to the production of largely similar products (Cook 1998; DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Sparrow 1999). Even though *The Standard's* primary frame differs from that used by *The Nation*, the former cannot be (and is not) radically different in its framing since the latter's dominance works to ensure that its frames dominate the narrative. *The Standard* is therefore inclined to intertwine its framing of Darfur with frames that are already dominant in the field. Consequently, even though *The Standard's* primary frame is the humanitarian frame, the paper still made sure that the crime and civil war frames were both prominent in their coverage. Hence, although *The Standard* tried to focus on a different aspect of Darfur in its coverage, it still had a predisposition towards the two frames that had been rendered dominant within the field by *The Nation*. I argue that, by doing this, *The Standard* reaffirms the dominant narrative on Darfur by drawing on similar framing genres as *The Daily Nation*, which in turn ensures that the civil war and crime frames typify narratives on *what* happened in Darfur (see Schudson 1981; Tuchman 1973:129). One effect of this typification is captured by both Savelsberg and Siguru (2017) and Wahutu (2017c) whose dominant frames strongly resemble those by *The Nation*.

Discussion

This chapter has illustrated several factors at play in the coverage of an African atrocity for an African audience. It has shown the peripheral role played by the national subfield in the construction of knowledge about Darfur, while highlighting the extent to which both subfields marginalize not only Kenyan but also non-Sudanese African voices.

¹⁰⁵ Githaiga (2012) puts the number of buyers a day being roughly 400,000.

Finally, it has pointed to similarities in framing both by organizations within the national subfield and between the national and the cosmopolitan subfields.

At the organizational level, one may ask why NMG, with all its resources, would prefer to lift stories from the cosmopolitan media subfield to using its own journalists. Some, such as Jacobs (2015), point to the oft-repeated arguments about a lack of financial resources. This argument also finds support amongst editors in African countries who argue that they lift a lot of stories due to not having resources to send journalists to Darfur. However, as illustrated in chapter three, NMG is not particularly lacking in financial resources. This applied all the more when we consider the fact that, as repeatedly highlighted here as well as in chapters four and five, NMG often did send its journalists to Darfur and Darfur-related events yet ended up using coverage from the cosmopolitan media subfield. I suggest that having stories lifted from the cosmopolitan subfield is more about signaling NMG's engagement with western news organizations than an explicit attempt to marginalize Kenyan journalists' voices.

By having most of its coverage lifted from this subfield, NMG signals to its audiences that it is not only part of the global conversation about conflict in Africa, but that it has the economic capital to engage in this discourse. The fact that lifting many stories marginalizes its voices is thus more of a consequence than it is a goal. Therefore, even when it sends its journalists to cover a press conference in the middle of Nairobi where Darfur is discussed (as was the case during the negotiations around the Comprehensive Peace Agreement), lifting stories from Reuters allows NMG to signal its engagement with the world. Symbolically, this reminds its readers that NMG is part of the global media discourse. This explanation is cognizant of NMG's agency in choosing

to lift stories even when it sends its journalist to events. Additionally, unlike prior scholarship on global media that emerged in the 1970s, this explanation eschews arguments by dependency theory scholars who would interpret Table 9 as illustrating a dependency relationship between the global south and the global north. Thus, although there is still an uneven flow of information, this chapter has pointed out that some media organizations are active participants in creating this unequal flow through not only lifting stories but also through whom they quote as sources.

The large presence of American and English voices to the detriment of Kenyan voices also pushes back against discourse on the lack of resources experienced by African media organizations. The lack of Kenyan voices in Kenya cannot be linked to issues of lack of capacity primarily because one might assume that it is exponentially cheaper for Kenyan journalists to quote Kenyan sources than it would be to quote sources from the global north. This again, like the lifting of stories, is due to the symbolic capital gained by quoting sources from these two countries compared to local voices. Kenyan journalists' use of sources from the U.S. and U.K. signals to the audience that they (and by extension their media organizations) are connected to global actors central to the construction of a global narrative.

This chapter has also reinforced findings with regards to framing discussed in chapter five. Table 26 points to the fact that the national media subfield gave salience to different frames in comparison to those given salience to by its cosmopolitan counterpart. Thus, even though at the field level one may argue that the frames about Darfur provide strength to arguments on the primacy of global scripts (as demonstrated by Table 19), Table 26 suggests that nation-specific milieus also play a crucial role in which scripts are

given salience by actors within the different subfields. This particular finding is in line with recent work by Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm (2015: 597) who find that the framing of Darfur was affected by national factors.

The two frames that best illustrate this intersection of global scripts and nation-specific realities are the crime and ethnic conflict frames. The salience of the crime frame, which Savelsberg and Siguru (2017) show peaked in 2007 and 2008, not only reflected the intervention of the ICC through application for an issuance of arrest warrants (Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm 2015 find this in their examination of new organizations in the global north), it also coincided with national debates in Kenya about sending those suspected of fanning Kenya's 2007/2008 post-electoral violence to The Hague. Thus, this frame is at the intersection of both national and global scripts about crime and punishment at play in different contexts.

The ethnic conflict frame in articles by Kenyan journalists epitomizes the role of "nation-specific institutional and cultural sensitivities" that Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm (2015:566) suggest will at times affect how knowledge is constructed. Reading Table 25 in conjunction with Table 26, shows that this frame is not solely prominent due to newspapers lifting their coverage from the cosmopolitan media subfield. Indeed, as Table 9 illustrates, *The Standard* hardly ever lifted stories, and yet it used this frame in a quarter of its articles on Darfur. To understand the use of this frame by journalists in Kenya, one has to be cognizant of arguments by Nyamnjoh (2005) and Wasserman and Maweu (2014a, 2014b) who both argue for the centrality of ethnicity when studying media fields in Africa. They argue that ethnicity is critical in explaining what influences journalists and media organization in their day-to-day reporting of both national and international

events. Thus, the ethnic conflict frame *domesticates* Darfur by relying on already present cultural repertoires about identity.

At the organizational level, the relationship between NMG and SGL is best summed up by Ott (1989) who suggests that an organization's culture will be affected by, among others, the dominant leaders and the organization's operating environment. Subsequently, with NMG being the dominant player in the field going back to the field's formative years, SGL has had to adapt. With regards to Darfur, the large number of articles on Darfur published by *The Nation* make it the *incumbent* with regards to knowledge production on Darfur within the national media subfield. *The Standard* finds itself playing second fiddle and, both *coercively* and *normatively*, needing to mimic *The Nation's* organizational logic. However, when analyzing the complete body of news articles published in Kenya about Darfur, Kenyan journalists (in both organizations) occupy a peripheral role.

Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted the benefits of analyzing media fields in the global south and how they construct knowledge for the case of Darfur reporting in Kenyan newspapers. It has also pointed out that despite critiques of how media organizations from the global north represent events in Africa, I did not identify much difference between how they represent Africa and how African news organizations represent Africa. Indeed, the national media subfield resembled news organizations in the global north in their choice of primary frame (see Savelsberg 2015) more than its counterpart did. Additionally, despite remonstrations about narrative loss, Kenyan journalists are more likely to quote American and English sources than they are to quote Kenyan sources. Kenyan voices

were treated as extraneous in the process of constructing knowledge by Kenyan journalists.

From a neo-institutional theory lens, this chapter has highlighted *The Nation's* position of strength, causing subsequent *isomorphism* for the other two newspapers. However, it is important to note here that using bylines to disaggregate the stories, the national media subfield plays second-fiddle to the cosmopolitan media subfield. The effect of this is twofold: 1) From a postcolonial theory perspective, the national media subfield in Kenya is an active participant in the silencing of African voices when selecting whom to anoint as a credible *knower* and 2) From a field theory perspective, in the coverage of continental events, African media fields are bifurcated and thus speaking of African media can be a misnomer when this bifurcation is not acknowledged.

The fact that the national subfield in Kenya is credited with only 26.16% of the articles on Darfur, should act as a caution to arguments such as those by Hamilton and Jenner (2004) that national media subfields have stepped in to supplement, and have even replaced, “work of traditionally employed foreign correspondents posted abroad” (Bunce 2011:4). However, although the national media subfield plays a peripheral role, results in Table 9 point to the fact that labor to construct knowledge is not shared equally within the cosmopolitan media subfield either. Reuters has a near monopoly within the subfield.

Chapter 7: Learning to Construct Knowledge: Journalistic *Habitus* in the Postcolony

People always say that Africa is always portrayed as you know a poor black woman with a baby on her back; the journalists I've come across are people who are actively trying to work against that, and that's very good (journalist interview, South Africa 2012).

Introduction

Okigbo and Pratt (1997) have stated that that the media field in Kenya “evolved from a ‘settler culture’ within which both print and electronic media” were acquiescent to the needs of “settler Britons and Asians” (1997:9). Chapter three highlights this point in its exposition of the emergence of media fields in African countries and the extent to which colonization influenced how the media field in Kenya developed. Another effect of colonization on the media field was in the training of journalists, which was not a concern of the colonial administration. This training is the main focus of this chapter in its exposition of how individuals ‘become’ journalists. Previous studies have focused on the production of news within a news organization (see, Gans 2005; Schlesinger 1978; Tuchman 1973, 1978) with the primary focus being the "political economy," "social organization of news" or "cultural practices" of news production (Schudson 1989). This chapter deviates from this approach. It traces, and captures, experiences of both the journalists immersed in the field and the next generation of journalists preparing to enter the field. It puts into dialogue not only the media field and the agents within it, but also the media field with its future agents. Thus, this chapter focuses on an institutional site from through which the field's *logic* is reinforced through curricula. Through this, I

explicate how journalists understand their roles as knowledge constructors in juxtaposition to how future journalists assume this role.

How does one 'become' a journalist? In Bourdieusean terms, how do individuals come to inhabit a social universe that produces knowledge about an atrocity for an African audience? Field theory calls our attention to agents who occupy a professional field and the "habitus that guides their actions" (Savelsberg 2015:211). After interviewing twenty-five journalists and spending six-months observing how future journalists were trained, it would be imprudent to not devote a chapter to these questions. For one thing, being a journalist in any African country is a difficult, not highly respected and often thankless job fraught with risks towards one's freedom and safety. These men and women wake up every morning with the sole purpose of telling a story. I rely primarily on field theory to interpret the data presented here. Field theory alerts us to the fact that actors in a professional field are imbued with a particular *habitus*, which regulates their interaction with the field (MacLeod 2009:15). They are bound by the field's rules of the game and have become skilled in managing these rules by dealing with their "cognitive, perceptual and evaluative structures" (Bourdieu 1999:36). They acquire this skill through not only experience but also training, both of which transform the students I observed into what Fligstein (2001:106) calls "skilled strategic actors" in constructing knowledge about atrocity.

The first half of this chapter focuses on experiences of students at my field site, relying largely on participant observation data. As discussed in chapter two, participant observation allows scholars to study individuals in their everyday setting and highlight how individuals are socialized into the *norms* and *rules of the game* of the fields they

work in or prepare to enter. Nonetheless, there is also the fact that participant observation alone may at times be inadequate into shedding light on this socialization process and there is a need for scholars to use this method in conjunction with other methodologies (see chapter two). Thus, for this chapter, I make use of field notes, interviews, and on the record conversations with students. These interviews are meant to highlight how journalism students not only make sense of the socialization process but also how they verbalize the extent to which they have internalized the process.

The second half of this chapter illuminates the convergence and divergence in motivations to enter the field explicated by both students and seasoned journalists. In this way, I situate the aspirations and discussions by students within the context of fields rooted in particular histories and trajectories. Of the twenty-five journalists I interviewed, twenty-three have traveled to Darfur and other places of mass atrocities in various African countries. Of the twenty-three, only three were female, two from South Africa and one from Kenya but working for a South African news organization with an office in Nairobi. Of the two who had not traveled to Darfur, both of whom were Kenyan and female, one was a sub-editor at *The East African*, and the other worked on the RMS news floor. Out of the five journalists who declined to be interviewed, only one was female and also worked for a South African news organization in Nairobi.

The fieldsite

Post-independence (1964-1968), media training was carried out by the International Press Institute, which ran several six-month training programs. It was not until the late 1960s that a local institution of higher education, the University of Nairobi (hereinafter, UoN), began training journalists. The program was as a "[United Nations Educational,

Scientific, and Cultural Organization] project financed largely by funds from Denmark, Norway, and Austria" (University of Nairobi n.d.). By the mid-1990s, the UoN's journalism program had "six lecturers on the faculty and 26 students in the program" (Okigbo and Pratt 1997:10). By 2015, the student population had grown to 1600 with a faculty body of 26 (University of Nairobi n.d.). The other large degree-granting institution of media and communication studies is Daystar, founded in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, before relocating to Nairobi Kenya in 1974 (Daystar University 2016). Unlike UoN, Daystar is a private institution, identifies as a Christian university¹⁰⁶ and is affiliated with Wheaton College in Illinois for its studies in communication and with Messiah College in Pennsylvania for its theology program (Oketch 2004:127; Okigbo and Pratt 1997:11). Daystar was accredited in the 1994 and was part of the private university boom of the 1990s (Daystar University 2016; Oketch 2004).

It is at Daystar that I spent six months observing and interacting with students and faculty. All classes observed were on the Nairobi campus which is located two kilometers from the city center. Daystar sees its mission as instilling Christian values in its students although it does not specifically define itself as a religious institution, i.e., it does not exclusively cater to students of the Christian faith (www.daystar.ac.ke). It views its founding principle of nurturing students to be "servant leaders for the transformation of the Church and Society" as central to its goal to train students to gain ethical and moral maturity needed to ensure a just society. The Nairobi campus is where the Daystar was initially housed in 1974 when it relocated to Kenya from Bulawayo Zimbabwe. Daystar

¹⁰⁶ Being Christian does not imply that they do not admit students of other faiths. As stated by Oketch the Commission for Higher Education requires that denominational institutions "must admit students of other faiths" (2004:125).

Nairobi houses a population of just under 3000 with Daystar Athi River (the second campus) housing 2000. There are six colleges in Daystar Nairobi across which 30 Bachelors programs, six Masters programs, two Ph.D. program and two postgraduate diplomas are offered. The only Ph.D. programs are in Communication and Clinical Psychology.

The classes I attended were in The School of Communication, Languages and Performing Arts. The school as a faculty body of 17, nine of whom had PhDs, eight had Masters degrees, and only three were male. All but one of the PhD degrees had been granted by institutions in the global north and the sole Ph.D. not from the global north was issued in South Africa. Four of the MA degrees were from Kenyan Universities (one from UoN, and three from Daystar) and the other four were from American Universities. The classes I attended were mostly taught by Ph.D. holders, though this was not an active choice as these were the only ones that fit my schedule while allowing me time to collect other data. Only one class was taught by an adjunct professor who had been a journalist before becoming the head of public relations for a State-owned enterprise. The courses always discussed the class concepts within the framework of a moral and just society. In this regard, the courses largely worked to dovetail the stated mission of Daystar with course topics.

I attended both undergraduate and graduate courses often attending two classes a day (Monday through Saturday) from the 24th of February 2015 to the 30th of July 2015; this amounted to spending approximately 17 hours a week in classes. The undergraduate classes had an average of 35 students while the MA class had nine students and both Ph.D. seminars had eleven students. The Ph.D. seminars were taught back-to-back on

Saturday, and the eleven students in the first session were in the second session. Male students were in the minority in all the classes that I sat in except at the Ph.D. level where there were more male than female students. Students in the MA and Ph.D. classes also had fulltime jobs; I refer to this group as ‘student-professionals.’ Some worked in the field as journalists while others were communication/public relations specialists for several organizations in Kenya. The MA courses were evening classes, and the Ph.D. courses I attended were on Saturday from 9 AM to 3 PM. Below is a table highlighting the classes I sat in on, the level (i.e., BA, MA, and Ph.D.), students’ gender breakdown in each course, and the degree attainment of the primary instructors:

Table 27:Classes Attended from May to July 2015.

Class Titles	Level	Gender Breakdown	Instructor Qualifications
Communication Theory	Undergraduate BA	21 F and 8 M	PhD
Writing for Newspapers	Undergraduate BA	26 F and 5 M	Public Relations professional
Communication Ethics and Law	Undergraduate BA	36 F and 8 M	PhD
Media Production and Ethics	Graduate MA	7 F and 2 M	PhD
Seminar on Media Studies	Graduate PhD	5 F and 6 M	PhD
Seminar on Applied Organizational Communication	Graduate PhD	5 F and 6 M	PhD

Instructors introduced me to the class as a visitor who would be sitting in on classes during the semester. As time went by students approached me to ask why it was precisely I was sitting in on classes to which my response was that I had an interest in how journalism classes were taught. Having gone through college education in Kenya,

students viewed me as being able to relate to their own experiences. I was reflexive of the intersecting nature of my identity which allowed me to assume the different identities (student/Kenyan/Kenyan studying in the United States) at various intervals throughout the semester. Students were open to talking to me about issues such as student/college life in Kenya. During one-on-one conversations, and during interviews, students talked freely about their feelings concerning the field they were either immersed in (this applied to graduate students) or preparing to enter (in this case undergraduate students). I judiciously recorded those conversations and interviews, after gaining consent, and they are interspersed in this chapter alongside notes from the participant observations.

Training Future Journalists

Reese and Cohen (2000:214) suggest that the goal of journalism education is to improve the practice of journalism, which should improve democratic norms in the society within which the profession is rooted. However, as I discuss in chapter three, the relationship between the political and media fields in post-colonial Africa was such that the latter was often co-opted by the former in the pursuit of ‘nation-building’ (see also, Mboya 1970; Ng’weno 1968; Nkrumah 1965; Odhiambo 1991). One factor that made this possible was how actors in the field viewed their role in relation to the state (see, Ng’weno 1968) and how the field trained its agents (Fair 2013; Nyamnjoh 2005).

In the years following independence, Kenya's approach to journalism education was one that favored on-the-job training, what Okigbo and Pratt (1997) call the ‘fleet street model’ of journalism education. Only recently has this model of education began to be replaced by more formal training programs in journalism schools. Despite this shift, journalism education in Kenya has still been described as “an afterthought among the

professions” (Ochieng’ 1996:17). This particular description of journalism education is even more acerbic when one considers that the speaker, Philip Ochieng’, is one of Kenya’s most revered journalists. Students whom I spoke to echoed Ochieng’s (1996) sentiment when talking about the field they were about to enter. They often mentioned the need to acknowledge that many in the field “are not formally trained as journalists but rather stumbled upon the profession” (field notes 2015). Nonetheless, this should not be construed as implying that journalists in the field had not actively thought about wanting to be journalists before their entry into the field. In fact, the prevailing sentiment among journalists was that their interest in journalism was piqued in high school and most had worked, and written, for their school papers.

However, despite this interest by journalists in the field, Ochieng’ states that for a long time, journalism was not seen as an academic discipline by any of the country’s public universities. UoN (the nation’s premier public university) only began offering BA degrees in journalism in 2006. This shift in education model did not see a concomitant change in curriculum content to make it reflective of lived experiences of journalism students in Kenya. Journalism schools continue to use canonical work from the global north with little to no contextualization to the realities in African countries (Synovate 2010). Kasoma (1996:95) and Rodny-Gumede (2013) have both argued that journalism curricula have tended to focus on imitating professional norms from the global north with little to no regard for local contexts and realities. Thus journalism education finds itself unable to adequately capture and give voice to notions of democracy and democratic governance in “transitional and postcolonial countries in the global South” (Rodny-Gumede 2013:129). Despite students being located in the postcolony, with all its

attendant realities, they find themselves located within fields, whether professional or academic that view the global north as the norm. Ideals such as *freedom of the press* were, and continue to be, seen as predefined, assumed to be universal and fixed regardless of social or even historical contexts (see Nyamnjoh 2015; Voltmer and Wasserman 2014).

Hence, despite journalism schools starting in the late 1950s in Anglophone Africa and the late 1960s in Francophone Africa, this should not be conflated with a presence of contextualization of journalistic canons (Nyamnjoh 2005:89). As a result curricula content, pedagogical approaches, and operational standards mimicked – wholesale - those from global north. Historically, this lack of curricula contextualization was partly a result of the presence of foundations and nonprofit organizations¹⁰⁷ that sought to educate African journalists in journalistic foundations and ideals.¹⁰⁸ Okigbo and Pratt (1997), state that this reliance on scholarship from the global north is not new and trace it to 1935 when American University in Cairo started its journalism training program. This would later be followed by programs initiated through the UNESCO's support that made the extension of US-style journalism training pervasive in countries like Kenya, Algeria, Nigeria, and Ghana (Okigbo and Pratt 1997:12).¹⁰⁹ The focus was, and still is, more on theoretical approaches rather than practical lesson plans (Rodny-Gumede 2013). This has led to what Jimada (1992) refers to as an education that “is not only too foreign but too

¹⁰⁷ Examples of these organizations included the International Press Institute and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation.

¹⁰⁸ Fair (2013) alerts us to a similar situation in post-conflict Liberia where she notes that between 2003 and 2011 there were at times more “outside media experts on the ground in Liberia” than “Liberian media professionals of any kind,” (p. 153).

¹⁰⁹ This ‘westernization’ of journalism curricula by UNESCO has continued with the recent publication of its new curriculum model for journalism education in the global south. (see United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 2002; 2007)

removed from African society” (367). Another effect of this has been on the skills acquired by journalists in Kenya who, Breit (2018:9) state, gained these skills “in response to the perceived needs of aid agencies, rather than the demands of regional media organizations and journalists.”

All of this was evident in the classes I attended at Daystar where almost all of the content in the curriculum was defined by scholars from the global north. African media scholars such as Francis Nyamnjoh, Francis Kasoma, Winnie Mitullah, Levi Obonyo, Clayton Peele, etc. were hardly ever assigned or read in the classes I sat in. The latter two teach at Daystar and, except for Nyamnjoh and Kasoma, all are in Kenya. In an undergraduate class on communication ethics and the law, the following readings were listed as required:

- Christians, Clifford, Mark Fackler, Kathy Rotzoll, and Kathy McKee (2001). *Media ethics: Cases and moral reasoning*. 6th ed. New York: Longman.
- Pember, Don & Clay Calvert. (2006). *Mass Media Law*. New York: McGraw.
- Bujo, Benezet. (1997). *The ethical dimension of community: The African model and the dialogue between north and south*, Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa.
- Bok, Sissela. (1999). *Lying: Moral choice in public and private life*. New York: Random House.
- Holmes, Arthur. (1984) *Ethics: Approaching moral decisions*. Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity.
- Jackson, Tudor. (1986) *The Law of Kenya: An introduction, cases, and statutes*. Nairobi: Kenya Literature Bureau
- Kasoma, Francis, ed. (1994) *Journalism ethics in Africa*, Nairobi: African Council for Communication Education.
- Patterson, Philip, and Lee Wilkins. (2008) *Media Ethics: Issues and Cases*, New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Smedes, Lewis (1983) *Mere Morality: What God expects from ordinary people*. Grand Rapids Eerdmans.
- Upkapi, Chudi. (1987) *Handbook on Journalism Ethics: African Case Studies*, Windhoek: MISA

Moreover, there was little to no attempt to move away from lecture as the preferred mode of content delivery. This resulted in a clear imbalance between theory and practice, an issue that is also highlighted in the Synovate study (2010:10–12), and which Breit (2018) states as being a key issue in how journalism is taught not just in Kenya but East Africa as a whole. The result of this imbalance is a mismatch between how journalists are trained and their ability to fit into the organizations that hire them.

Training Student-Professionals

Students in this group were all already immersed in the field and often took classes after work or on Saturdays. As may be expected of this group, there was a different approach to understandings of journalism and the scholarship they relied on in class. Their approach to course material was steeped in their lived experience within the field and they frequently drew upon this experience to challenge the contextual relevance of some of the theoretical arguments espoused by the scholars they read. They pointed out that when media owners' commercial interest clashed with the interest of audiences in getting relevant information, audience interests were always more likely to be marginalized. In a contest between public interest and the interest of the owners, the public's interest would always play second fiddle. They argued that the field in Kenya was undergirded by the economic and political inclinations of owners of the various organizations rather than the pursuit of information. This sentiment was also echoed in surveys by both Mbeke, Ugangu, and Okello-Orlale (2010) and Kenya's Media Council (2012). As a student-professional in a graduate course recounted:

Most of the time you don't have much say. If [managing editors] say, and most of the time [managing editor will] say like, the way ours is a privately-owned organization, they just say the *owner said*. And if he said, he said, and there's nothing much you can do. So, it'll just come back, and you'll edit out that bit, change that bit and that's it [...] most of this it happens to things that they have interest in. Or even...its not necessarily even interest...you have friends, their friends may call and say *oh there's this this this I don't want you publishing this about me* it will come back. Even if he has to come himself, and then you know when he comes himself everybody panics (student interview, Kenya 2015).

Graduate classes had vigorous debates about scholarship on journalism that was produced in the global north. In a Ph.D. class, for example, students talked about the importance making sure that what they relied upon was relevant and adaptable to current social pressures. Within this conversation, they questioned whether there was anything quintessentially Kenyan in the way the media field operated. There was also, in multiple discussions, a realization that often, what media fields in the global north were critiqued for, such as the stereotypical representation of Africa, was not that different from how African news organizations represented Africa and Africans. Students were often aware of the "danger of wanting to apply standards to the West which [they did] not apply to [them]selves" (field notes 2015). This points to a high level of self-reflection by these students who were located in the dual roles of knowledge producers and consumers of the knowledge they produce. The perception of media fields in the global north as universal manifested itself in the frequency with which students mentioned (both in interviews and classroom discussions) either CNN or BBC as being ideal media organizations, having journalists they wanted to emulate, and the journalists working for them as paragons of objectivity.

In an MA class discussion about the degree to which the field should protect their sources, this group of students largely believed that the question of source protection was

best left to each journalist's ethical considerations. This was because students did not think that the media field (specifically media owners) was likely to pressure journalists to reveal their sources when the latter's protection threatened the organization's bottom line. However, since none of the students had been in situations where they had to protect their sources despite the pressure, this conversation was more on the hypothetical than based on experience. Nonetheless, this discussion on source protection was anchored on the fact that students believed, both as professionals and consumers, that the media field largely operated more as the state's lapdog rather than as a watchdog against the State's excesses. No singular event crystallizes this perception of the field in the minds of this group of students more than the events leading to, and during, the country's post-electoral violence in 2007/2008 (discussed in chapter three).

Journalistic Norms

Weaver and Willnat (2012) have argued that notions of press freedom and 'objectivity' are not universal and are largely anchored upon cultural, political and historical contexts. This understanding builds on a constructivist approach to knowledge, norms, and institutions espoused by Berger and Luckmann (1966) and discussed in chapter one. Discussions by students regarding how they understood 'objectivity' and professionalism as it pertains to the field they were preparing to enter often focused on what Voltmer and Wasserman (2014:180–81) refer to "exogenous interpretations" of objectivity. Voltmer and Wasserman (2014) define this as a process where actors "turn elsewhere, usually the established democracies of the West, for role models that can be adopted" (p. 180). Students spoke of news organizations from the global north as being more 'objective' and

'professional' in their coverage. A student explained the preference for these organizations in the following manner:

One thing I always ask myself is what is the difference between local news and international news? Especially let's say, for example, Citizen [owned by RMS] and something like CNN. And, how they cover the news and how these other people cover the news. And I try to make a comparison, and I was like I don't know if Kenyans don't take their full risks or [are not] brave and courageous [enough] to get the real facts. Or they don't have enough resources, or they don't have the right connections. Because if such a story is covered in Kenya and another story is covered in America by CNN or other stations, you find out that [they] have other details that Kenyans don't really have and you wonder how they got to such a point where they are given such information and we local ones - and it happens especially in our country - we never get the same information. [...] I don't know I have no idea how they do it but you'd actually want to watch CNN more than the local station (student interview, Kenya 2015).

This same student went on to add that:

It's all about having... because I actually noticed that guys that report from CNN are actually free like you'd see themselves in them like you'd see this is a person who talks like this way, a person who acts this way recording the news, because it's something they enjoy doing. I am not saying probably Kenyan ones are not passionate about what they do, but there is a comfort zone they need to burst out of (student interview, Kenya 2015).

In a course on newspaper writing, the instructor was often at pains to inform the students that their job as a journalist was to remain objective by letting the facts speak for themselves. This, and many other instructors repeated the mantra that for students to become good journalists, they had to:

focus on an individual to create a connection between the reader and the individual to capture the readers' attention [...] find where the emotional triggers in the story are and use them to capture the audience" (field notes 2015).

Students were taught to narrate the news as they would a story, often discussing the importance of narrative structures that had a colorful introductory section (lede) in attracting and mobilizing audiences around the story. This is in line with the turn the field in the United States has taken over the last three decades with a focus on “narrative journalism” (see, Hartsock 2007; Wahl-Jorgensen 2013a, 2013b). Wahl-Jorgensen finds that award-winning stories are often "pervaded by subjective language" (2013a:316), which rely on Tuchman's (1978) “strategic ritual of objectivity.”

One way this ritual of objectivity unfolds is through the use of sources, as discussed in chapter four. In a class on communication ethics, it was clear that students viewed State actors as the most credible sources during moments of uncertainty such as conflict. Even in instances where victims are present and can be used as sources, the students largely stuck to ‘official sources.’ Interviewing victims was seen as more appropriate for human interest pieces than actual news. Another interesting discussion in this same class revolved around the used of images. While students viewed it as unethical to show pictures of dead bodies in the news, this was limited to images of dead Kenyans. Half the class seemed not to have any ethical concerns if the dead bodies were of victims of atrocities from other countries.

Why Journalism?

Due to the veneration of organizations from the global north by students, one may wonder why students still register an interest in entering an African media field. For the students, it was the feeling that they were on the cusp of changing the field. It was wanting to practice journalism in a manner that was as fearless as the journalists they admired. Consequently, organizations such as CNN, though viewed as problematic by

seasoned journalists, were seen by students as providing a standard that local organizations could emulate. Students saw them as providing a roadmap of which they, as future journalists, could make use in their pursuit of strengthening the field. This motivated students to want to join the field despite its attendant flaws. Journalism provided them with tools to tell stories about events they felt needed to be spotlighted. For some the story was about all the positive things that were happening on the continent that they felt were being ignored; for others, it was a way to hold governments accountable by giving voice to those they viewed as downtrodden:

I went back home for holidays one day and I realized that politicians, community leaders, and other elders are manipulating people to achieve their own goals. Not national goal, not community goal, not even family goal, just their own goal. [...] The most important thing, the best weapon you can have on this world is to know your rights, and I realized that the only thing that I can make these people know their rights is to be a journalist. Once I'm a journalist I'll do civic education, I will expose the bad and good of the government and when the people know their rights, they will be able to withstand manipulation from the leaders. That's why I chose journalism (student interview, Kenya 2015).

Regardless of the motivations for becoming a journalist, the underlying theme was often an interest in telling stories and a love of writing:

It started with my writing; I used to love writing [...] I'm not saying I'm pretty good but yes, I'm comfortable with my writing and, you see, everybody wants to make a difference. You feel like your writing is what is going to make a difference [...] I always say I want to make a difference. At the end of the day, I want to make a difference in somebody's life [...] But, I can't say that was the driving force, it was the writing. I just love writing (student interview, Kenya 2015).

Students' interest in telling a story was also discussed as an art form:

I think I was led to that form of art. I enjoyed seeing people go cover something, just any ordinary stories; I am a person who loves stories. And a person who gives out stories as well. So much, I realize that so much of the time that I spend time with people that I know, that I hang out with they enjoy my stories so much [...] You know how you were asked when you were young what do you want to become when you grow up? Of course, I said a doctor. At some point, later on in life I was like 'I really think journalism was my area.' Because I think my art is more to that side. I think my love for journalism started mainly because of how people covered stories (student interview, Kenya 2015).

Though motivations to join the field may appear, at first blush, idealistic, seasoned journalists also invariably mentioned their love for writing and journalism as an art form motivating them to join the field. Savelsberg finds that journalists he interviewed had a “joy in writing” (2015:213) and this was echoed in interviews with journalists:

I became a journalist to tell stories. I think I started doing this while I was in school and I found that it was the only thing that I was any good at. Which means I was terrible at many other things. And then I've just gone on doing that. Africa has a rich story telling history, there's a rich tradition of storytelling, so we are a very oral society and I think journalism becomes a form, a platform of expression, of storytelling (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

Both students and journalists also wanted to regain the power to narrate African experiences; both felt that western journalists had usurped this power. Students thought that because the field was maturing, it was ready for their fresh and different approach; one such new approach was attending a degree-granting journalism school. Speaking to the current state of journalism in Kenya, a student suggested:

I don't think [journalists] are fully prepared; that's why I was saying they are like in their comfort zone. They need to burst out and do something more for people to see that these guys are working well -and not just having a nice voice on T.V. and having good English you know? (student interview, Kenya 2015).

This student's motivation for wanting to join the field in 2015 was not different from a seasoned journalist's motivation for entering the field 13 years before:

Locally, I felt that journalists were perhaps either cowed or just not doing a proper job in telling people what was going on in our country. I remember the period under Moi [former Kenyan President] was a very difficult time for journalists to operate in but journalism is, good journalism, or rather democracy, is a by-product of good journalism. So, that's why I decided to step into the profession [in 2002] (journalist interview, Kenya 2012).

In both instances, the motivation to tell stories about Africa was central to respondents wanting to become journalists. Discussions about the role of journalists were entrenched within discourse of politics in Kenya. Hence, discourse on narrating African experiences was circumscribed by the representation of African political realities by fields from the global north. Good journalism was discussed in relation to how they interacted with and covered, the political field. This centrality of politics was also present amongst journalists already in the field when they talked about how they ended up covering the atrocity in Darfur.

The Mass Atrocity Beat

Journalists self-identified not as journalists whose beat was conflicted but rather as political analysts. In this elucidation of identity, atrocities such as Darfur were understood as being an extension of politics in African countries.

I'm gonna quote our former President. I'm an African, you know. I'm a journalist that covers politics; I cover Africa which means I cover many, many areas of conflict and many areas, disturbing areas. And so, when I came upon Darfur, reading about it all those years back, [I] could see the roots, the genesis of this kind of problem so [I] followed it from then (journalist interview, South Africa 2012).

Basically, the nature of my paper, I am a political analyst. *The East African* was very central in covering CPA [Comprehensive Peace Agreement]. I started covering the CPA process in 2004 up to the signing. From there I followed up during the interim period, six years, and was really following the, you know within the six years there were issues, post CPA the issues that were supposed to be solved, issues like the boundary, like citizenship, issues like Abyei issues like security arrangement, wealth sharing, those issues were quite very difficult because Khartoum as forced into, this divorce [CPA and eventual split] was quite a bitter divorce, one thing somebody once told me, that *you are always writing about South Sudan every day, what about if there's peace, what will you write about?* (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

Darfur was seen as not being that much different from the various other atrocities unfolding around the continent. Figure 5 captures this seeming ambivalence journalists felt about the extent of attention Darfur had received in the international community. A Kenyan journalist stated:

Conflict is almost a daily occurrence, frequent not daily, but a frequent occurrence. Right now [in 2012], I think Africa is having something close to 47 conflicts that are going on and there is no apparent end to many of them; you can talk of Somalia, South Sudan, you can talk of [Northern] Uganda, DRC, Sierra Leone, Liberia, name them, Nigeria and even in Kenya here. So, to prevent a reoccurrence of the same is actually providing information about the situation that is going on (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

The self-identification of journalists as political analysts is in contrast to an Africa correspondent of a prominent western newspaper interviewed by Savelsberg (2015). This particular correspondent states that his paper's editor-in-chief thinks that "one does not need a great political analyst for Africa," rather, to be an Africa correspondent one had to be able to travel to African countries and be "capable of writing reports" (ibid 205). This attitude points to a "marginality of Africa," (Savelsberg 2015: 205) and complex events in Africa, in the consciousness of the global north's media field (Savelsberg 2015). In deciding on whom to send to cover conflict in African countries, some editors appear to

value correspondents who can construct narratives rather than an understanding of Africa's political intricacies (see, Said 2006).

Personal experiences were also key push factors concerning how journalists ended up on the mass atrocity beat. In both Nigeria and Kenya, these factors included each country's respective experiences with violence:

For instance, when democracy just returned to the country and there were crises (particularly ethnic crises) in the Southwest, we had a militant people's congress. It is an ethnic organization, which according to the group aims at liberating the Yoruba from the Southwest from the oppression they were experiencing then especially under the military rule. It was called OPC; it was formed at that time. But when democracy came that military hangover was still part of the challenges that the country had to face. So, there were interethnic conflicts, very violent ones, and I covered quite a number of such if that's the kind of conflict you're looking at (journalist interview, Nigeria 2015).

When you talk about conflict, in terms of the local scene, you know you start with ethnic clashes and things like that. So, that's in a very small, small scale. Perhaps the one major, major conflict I covered was probably 2007-2008 post-election violence because I remember at that particular time we had a lot of reporters who were at *The Daily Nation* who been scattered all over the country who basically were covering the election when the violence flared up (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

In South Africa, the history of the apartheid was central in journalists' explanations as to why they were motivated to cover Darfur and other mass atrocities around the continent.

I mean I think obviously as a black South African I grew up during the apartheid that has shaped who I am. So, for me, any injustice towards people, where people are not protected or basic rights are taken away from them is a serious issue and so obviously, that led me to become a journalist. I was fortunate that at some time in my career was as the West Africa correspondent it afforded me the opportunity to go and see and tell a different story, and so reporting to a South African audience not being able to go there, but understanding due to being socialized in a system of oppression, you know, have some understanding of why it's important, why we should care, you know, and we should make our

government or at least it shouldn't disappear from our agenda (journalist interview, South Africa 2012).

Challenges to Covering an Atrocity

Despite the motivations mentioned by journalists and students, it is also a reality that the field is influenced by the social context within which they operate and are immersed. Journalists are ensconced in media fields affected by the political and economic fields. Most journalists talked about how expensive it was to travel to Darfur to cover stories. As preceding chapters have shown, some had resorted to relying on INGOs as funders for trips to Darfur and refugee camps despite worrying that these types of junkets would influence their framing. Journalists were aggrieved about instances when media organizations failed to pool their resources to allow them to travel. Even when they did find funds to travel, journalists complained about the lack of adequate resources for ensuring that they would be safely:

The media in Africa is a bit irresponsible. Irresponsible in the sense that they don't want to spend resources to gather information and I believe that the more resources you spend to gather authentic information that is irrefutable the more credibility you gain and therefore the more profits you are likely to make in the long run. I will give you an example, of when I went to Somalia the other day, I asked for out of pocket money for me \$500, it had to be slashed by \$100, I had \$400 when I left here. I was going to a conflict zone (journalist interview, Kenya 2012).

This lack of resources was put in sharp relief when a journalist discussed how funds ultimately affect travel to a conflict, but also the journalist's safety:

In any conflict, everybody provides very key sources of information to your work, including even the drivers. They provide you with key information that 1) will help you tell the story 2) will keep you safe or 3) will get you killed (journalist interview, Kenya 2015).

The dangers highlighted above may go some way in explaining the gendered nature of the coverage of mass atrocity, especially in light of the fact that in the classes I attended female students outnumbered male students. A Kenyan sub-editor explained this gender disparity concerning the coverage of conflicts in the following way:

Like in my office, the editors are about 80 percent female. I think they are, we are, prone to staying in the office, on the safe side [laughter] and we cover soft stuff. So, we'll do lifestyle; we'll do anything that's not dangerous. I think it's a bit of [a personal choice and structural issue]. It's really hard for a woman to be sent into a conflict situation. So, you'll see them on TV [...] They'll be news anchors, they'll cover tourism or even politics but not atrocities. It could probably be very difficult for the editor to assign conflict stories to a female journalist unless she specifically asks for it (sub-editor interview, Kenya 2015).

Thus although the number of female journalists in many countries around the world has increased over the last four decades (Chambers, Steiner, and Fleming 2004; Gallagher 2001; Van Zoonen 1994), there are very few female correspondents covering Darfur. This is not unique to the countries studied here as is evidenced in Savelsberg's (2015) work on journalists from the global north.

Discussion

To the question why and how one becomes a journalist, this chapter has sketched out this process for both students and journalists. One reason both students and seasoned journalists mentioned was an attraction to the profession due to their love of writing. This was not unique to the journalists and students, I interviewed as highlighted by Savelsberg's (2015) interviews with Africa correspondents and interviews by Smith (1987) and Coleman et al. (2016) with American journalism students. From conversations with students, it is also evident that most, if not all, wanted to join the field

to fulfill both their desires for self-realization and altruistic motivations. They wanted to enter the field to accomplish their aspirations to be good writers and good storytellers just as much as they wanted to tell stories that highlighted problems faced by Africans so they could be solved. Part of pointing out problems, for both students and journalists was countering what they perceived as stereotypical representations of Africa and Africans. This is also in line with work by Coleman et al. (2016:13) who find that students who may have experienced or know those that had experienced some form of prejudice were more likely to view journalism as an altruistic act. Students viewed stereotypical representations of Africa and Africans as prejudicial.

For practicing journalists, entry into the field occurred when the field's position was firmly ensconced within the non-market logics discussed in chapter three. For students, they enter a field still trying to form a cogent identity as a free and competitive field closer towards the market logic now than in the previous century. Furthermore, they graduated from institutions that rely on notions of objectivity as defined by western scholars and practiced/valorized by western media fields. Students are more likely to read and discuss western scholarship on western media rather than scholars from Kenya (or Africa) on Kenyan (and African) media in undergraduate classes. The effect of this approach to journalism education is that students understood journalism as an institution detached from their lived experience. Journalism was discussed as a liberal institution within a social context where “liberal democracy and notions of press freedom are nascent and fragile” (Kupe 2013: 144). This is particularly jarring when recalling debates in the 1960s by political leaders such as Tom Mboya (1970) and Kwame Nkrumah (1965) about the role of journalists and journalism in the postcolony. Kwame Nkrumah,

as discussed in chapter three, was especially concerned by the fact that the principals espoused by journalists in Africa were informed by “western epistemological assumptions about truth and practice, even if the reality on the ground” called for “contextually appropriate systems of meanings” (Nyamnjoh 2005:87). Nyamnjoh (2005) has argued that notions of press freedom should be embedded in understandings of belonging and group identity that are familiar to African journalists. Voltmer and Wasserman (2014), for example, highlight that within Southern Africa, understandings of press freedom and objectivity could center around the philosophy of *Ubuntu*. *Ubuntu* views “social belonging [...] as the basis of individual identity, thereby creating bonds of loyalty and protection” (ibid:182). Freedom, in this understanding, is circumscribed by one's connection and responsibilities to their social group.

Additionally this chapter has shown that upon entering the field the students do not discard their motivations for wanting to become journalists since, as suggested by Hass (2017:5), “actors do not abandon knowledge, dispositions, and interests (*habitus*) upon entering a field, but they do adjust according to position and relations”. As highlighted by both students and journalists, the motivation for entering the field is the same now as it was when the older generation of journalist entered the field. The two groups want to tell well-informed stories about Africa, and its conflicts, and by and large acknowledge that the field has made some progress. It is also inescapable that despite this wish for a different kind of journalism, the preceding chapters point to the fact that the narrative constructed on atrocity and the voices given a platform by the media field does not differ greatly from fields analyzed by Savelsberg (2015) and Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm (2015). One way to explain the frustration voiced by students about the current

state of the field is that as they prepare to enter the field, they are fueled by the immediacy of the now, with little first-hand understanding of the tension between structure and agency within the field.

Another seeming contradiction shown up in this chapter based on the use of State actors as sources. Students-professionals expressed an ambivalence in using State actors as sources when the field was viewed as the State's lapdog rather than its watchdog. Meanwhile undergraduate students viewed State actors as the best sources, which echoed the normative approaches on which sources are viewed as credible. It is important to remember here that the compromising nature of using State actors as sources is largely limited to the use of Kenyan State actors. Thus, as discussed in chapters four and six, this hesitance to use Kenyan State actors is linked to the relationship between the State and the media field that chapter three discusses. Viewed this way, the seemingly contradictory stances that this chapter highlights are actually more in line with findings in prior chapters.

Chapter 8: Conclusion: What we now Know

Introduction

At its heart, this dissertation project was interested in understanding how media fields in Africa construct knowledge about atrocities in Africa. It sought to answer its central question, *how is knowledge about genocide and mass atrocity in Africa constructed in the media?* I gathered data through content analysis of newspaper stories on Darfur from 2003 to 2008 from Kenya, South Africa, and Rwanda. I supplemented those archival data with journalist interviews from Kenya, South Africa, South Sudan, Uganda, and Nigeria. Additionally, I engaged in a six-month participant observation of a journalism school in Nairobi Kenya. As stated in chapter two, difficulties with access to newspaper archives, coupled with challenges of getting Rwandan journalists to agree to conduct interviews meant that there is neither a newspaper database nor interview material from Nigeria and Rwanda respectively to be analyzed. Nonetheless, as shown in the preceding chapters, this does not mean that the results discussed here cannot be extended to either country. To answer the overarching research question, I divided the project into three different parts:

- r.1) Does the representation of mass atrocity vary by region/nation?
- r.2) How does the representation of mass atrocity change over time?
- r.3) Who gets to narrate and be heard when journalists cover Darfur?

This chapter highlights how the preceding chapters answered each of the questions. This is followed by a summary of what this dissertation contributes to the multiple fields of scholarship it engages with.

Findings

R 1: Does the representation of mass atrocity vary by region/nation?

I found little variation in how Darfur was represented in Kenya, Rwanda and South Africa. As Table 18 shows, the frames employed in these three countries, at the national level at least, were quite similar; with most stories framing Darfur as either a civil war, an ongoing criminal enterprise, a humanitarian emergency or an ethnic conflict. This points to the constricting nature of journalistic genres, which Savelsberg (2015:255) points out as influencing the types of frames available to journalists. The paucity in journalistic genres also led to a similarity in the top three frames employed by the fields analyzed here and those examined by Savelsberg (2015:236): civil war frame, crime frame, and humanitarian emergency frame. It would be correct to surmise that audiences from these countries came to understand Darfur through similar frames as those from the global north (see Savelsberg 2015:236). However, there is some variance in which frames each country made salient in their coverage. This variation is a result of the type and level of each country's engagement in Darfur, as discussed in chapter four. Thus, for Kenya and South Africa, the overall focus on the civil war frame is attributable to both countries' involvement in the peace negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan, and Khartoum and Darfur respectively. While for Rwanda the primacy of the criminal frame was due to constant attacks against its troops stationed in Darfur.

It is at the organizational level, where we find that the national subfields made different frames salient compared to the cosmopolitan subfields in the respective countries. This suggests that a more meaningful unit of analysis would be the use of by-line attribution rather than an assumption that a story in an African newspaper represents

some kind of ‘African understanding’ of events as prior studies have tended to do (See Alozie 2005, 2007; Mody 2010; Ray 2009). One benefit of this approach is highlighted in the presence of the ethnic conflict frame in stories by both subfields operating in the countries analyzed. The presence of this frame is one of the more notable findings of this project. Scholars have often been critical of the global north’s use of this frame as an explanatory factor when they cover atrocities in African countries (see McNulty 1999:283; Wall 2007). African journalists have also voiced their frustration at the ethnicization of conflicts by western journalists as shown here and by Wahutu (2017b, 2017c) and Wahutu and Savelsberg (2013). Tables 19 and 21 show, however, that both African and non-African journalists employed this frame with relative frequency.

We are thus faced with a puzzle: despite African journalists being critical of ethnicized or racialized portrayals of African conflicts, national subfields do not appear to be profoundly different from their global north counter-parts “despite the disdain with which [African] journalists speak about northern media” (Savelsberg 2015:255). While there may be several explanations for this finding, I posit three: 1) the need for *domesticating* the news and creating a *conceptual order*; 2) a nuanced understanding of ethnic identity by African audiences and; 3) the simultaneous manifest and latent goal of highlighting *affinity* with victims while *Othering* the perpetrators of the atrocities.

1) *Domesticating the news*: The ethnic conflict frame operates as a filter through which the audience evaluates and understands the actors in the atrocity. This frame points to habituated understandings of social identity within the continent. Gurevitch, Levy, and Roeh (1991) argue that for an event to be judged to be newsworthy it has to be anchored "in a narrative framework that is already familiar to and recognizable by newsmen as

well as by audiences” (p. 207). This is in line with Entman's (2004:6) discussion of journalists needing to employ frames that are "highly salient" within society's knowledge structure. This would suggest that because Africans largely identify as belonging to ethnic communities (see Albaugh 2016; Mamdani 1996), the framing of events will seek to construct an image of events that is in line with the perceived mental schemas of the audience. This frame, therefore, acts as a mechanism through which journalists can filter the events in Darfur through narratives that rely on recognizable discourse on, and understandings of, identity. In South Africa, journalists spoke about a shared *affinity* between South Africans and those they identified as “black African” (see chapter four). This worked to tap into the memory of racial discrimination endured by black South Africans, creating a *parasocial* relationship based on a sense of shared trauma of racial and political persecution.

To explain how this frame is used to domesticate the conflict in Rwanda, I rely on Ingelaere's (2010) use of the notion of ‘hidden transcript.’ I argue that ethnicity and ethnic identification are alive within the Rwandan population but remain "invisible because [ethnic identification is] banned from public life and, therefore, difficult to capture" (p. 282). This, then, is what makes ethnicity part of the ‘hidden transcript’ since it is tacitly acknowledged as existing and affecting individuals while being kept away from the State's ever-watchful gaze. As shown by Mgbako (2005:219), some Rwandans who argue that ethnic identities in Rwanda are just as salient as national identities and thus “to say that a Hutu should not identify as a Hutu, that her Rwandanness obliterates her Hutu identity is wrong” (journalist interview, Mgbako 2005:219). This understanding of ethnicity in Rwanda is useful in shedding light on why this frame would be used as a

domesticating tool by Rwandan journalists, and its frequency in Rwanda's coverage of Darfur. Therefore, to suggest that this frame acts as a *domesticating* frame does not run counter to current understandings of ethnicity in Rwanda.

2) *Nuanced Understanding of Ethnicity*: It is clear that journalists have a nuanced understanding of ethnicity and ethnic identities. This should not be surprising since, as mentioned in chapter five, ethnic identities in African societies are a social reality and an accepted social fact. Indeed, as a Kenyan journalist quipped, "look we have been ethnic for ages" (journalist interview, Kenya 2015) and as such do not primarily view ethnic identities as being inimical to peace. The same can be said of South African journalists who posited that ethnicity and ethnic belonging played a role in the atrocities in Darfur: one journalist went on to state that it would be "naïve" to assume that ethnicity played no role in the atrocity. Though I have no interviews with journalists from Rwanda, work by Mgbako (2005) shows a similar sophistication in understanding and talking about, ethnic identities by not only Rwandan journalists but non-journalists as well.

In this sense, therefore, it would be imprudent to assume that the use of ethnicity in the three countries functions in the same way as it does for a western audience or journalist. Thus although Ray (2009) finds that within the African press "the fault lines of [Darfur] are often the same as those used by western media" (p. 172), I suggest that presence of this frame in both African and western framing is not necessarily analogous. I argue that African journalists, influenced by their socio-cultural contexts, have a much more nuanced understanding of this frame than perhaps their western counterparts who may employ it. Subsequently, this frame is not necessarily the result of *mimicry* of discourse about conflict in Africa. Its use is meant, instead, to capture the disparate

identities often present in African identities (religion, language, race, etc.); ethnicity in this formulation works as a placeholder for all the other identities that Darfuris may espouse.

3) *Affinity* and *Othering*: In spite of the aforementioned functions of the ethnic conflict frame, I propose that the use of this frame is primarily meant to *Other* those defined as perpetrators of the conflict while, simultaneously, highlighting a shared *affinity* between the audience and the victims. By highlighting the fact that the victims were ‘black African’ journalists point to a shared identity between the audience and the victims. One that rests on a shared ‘Africanness’ and shared history of trauma. In South Africa, this was based on the memory of Apartheid while in both Rwanda and Kenya this shared trauma was one of the manipulation of ethnic identity for the benefit of the political elite. In all three countries, this trauma was one of colonization and subjugation by real and perceived outsiders. Therefore, although postcolonial scholars argue that the use of ethnic conflict as a frame depoliticizes conflicts in Africa, I argue that the use of this frame to talk about Darfur in Africa is in itself a conscious political project, a project rooted in who is considered African and who is not. Hence, ‘black African’ in this formulation is a subaltern identity that is exclusive in its very nature. This frame works to highlight the shared trauma of being under subjugation in Africa and a sense of shared victimhood (Alexander 2004b).

Understood in this way, the ethnic conflict frame highlights the perpetrators as being “radically *Other*” (Mbembe 2001:11). This process relies on not only the global discourse surrounding Islam and Muslims in a post-9/11 world but also the perception of North Africa as being not ‘real Africa.’ It highlights how effectively Darfur had been

integrated into the War on Terror discourse, which Mamdani (2007) sees as central to how Darfur was framed in American media. This frame portrays the Janjawiid as entwined with the global War on Terror discourse and the phrase ‘Arab militia’ tapped into already present misgivings/prejudices against Arabs/Muslims within and outside the continent. A South African journalist pointed to this in explaining the presence of this frame by saying “you know whether you want to call the Janjawiid Arabs or Africans or Muslims or Christians, there is prejudice against Muslims by other Africans as well, but also between Arabs and Africans” (Journalist interview, South Africa 2012).

Hence, the perpetrators, by being called ‘Arab militias’ were categorized as *outsiders* and non-African who, as stated by a Kenyan journalist, are “brown colonizers” who migrated into Sudan, displacing black Africans. So, even though this frame is seen as working to avoid the “contributions of colonial powers in planting the seeds of conflict” (Savelsberg 2015:255) when used by western media, it works to illuminate perceived colonial and historical injustices when used to frame actors in Darfur by the fields and journalists analyzed here. The difference being that these injustices are brought upon black Africans by “brown colonizers” that settled in Darfur from the Middle East.¹¹⁰ This frame defines an African ‘*Other*’ who is then linked, through intertextual references, to a global ‘*Other*.’

R 2: How does the representation of mass atrocity vary over time?

This research question can only be answered in relation to the frames used in Kenya between 2003 and 2008. As Figure 4 illustrates, the civil war frame was consistently used

¹¹⁰ Gérard Prunier talks about the *Bahhara* (“those of the river”), who identified as “Arabs” and moved into Darfur in 1874 and conquered “rather than settled” Darfur and settled as a “nativized external élite” (2008:4–8).

more than any other frame in the years before 2007 and 2008. Starting in 2007, the crime frame plays a more prominent role, and this can be attributed to judicial interventions by the ICC. In 2007, the prosecutor at the ICC applied for and was granted warrants of arrest issued against Ahmed Haroun, the minister of state for humanitarian affairs between 2006 and 2009, and Ali Kushayb, a senior commander in the Janjawid. In 2008, the crime frame dominated the news reports about Darfur and here too the fact that the prosecutor's office applied for an arrest warrant against President el-Bashir was a factor. In the first story, following the application for an arrest warrant for President El-Bashir, and lifted from Reuters (2008:16–17), all other frames were dropped with the crime frame being the sole frame employed. The contextual factors such as the initial civil war were missing, and instead, the story focused on not only the criminality of El-Bashir but also the effects of the application on the upcoming elections in 2009. Unlike the newspapers analyzed by Savelsberg (2015:236) where this frame was consistently used more than other frames, and following its heights in 2004, we see that the crime frame only ever becomes the key frame once the ICC intervened. This is in line with arguments by Savelsberg and Nyseth-Brehm (2015) who find that interventions by the ICC did affect how Darfur was represented.

R 3: Who gets to narrate and be heard when journalists cover Darfur?

In chapter four, I show the bifurcation of the media field in Africa. One consequence of this split is the displacement of the African journalists in the pursuit of framing the narrative on Darfur (as shown in Table 9). Nonetheless, this bifurcation does not imply differences on which groups of social actors journalists in each sub-field viewed as credible sources of information. African journalists, like their global north counterparts,

sought out state actors as their primary sources of information. In all three countries, State actors were quoted with the greatest frequency. In this regard, both subfields in these countries resemble those from the global north in their preference in quoting State actors (Benson 2006b; Dimitrova and Strömbäck 2008; Sigal 1973) .

All three countries largely relied on State actors from African countries, with Kenya and South Africa relying on Sudanese State actors primarily while Rwanda relied mostly on Rwandan State actors. Journalists often pointed to the effectiveness/willingness of Sudanese embassies in providing media briefings. This particular finding highlights the fact that African voices were more present than non-African voices in the narration of the atrocities; one could, however, argue about the legitimacy of Sudanese State actors as sources since they were accused of committing the atrocities. While this is a legitimate concern, it should not detract from the fact that the presence Sudanese State actors in all three countries complicates assumptions about who narrates the pain and suffering of Africans.

The second group frequently quoted were actors working for transnational organizations. Journalists pointed out that transnational organizations were often one of the leading financiers of journalists' junkets into conflict areas or to refugee and IDP camps. In the age of financial hardships that have affected media houses, it is perhaps not surprising that journalists from the countries studied here relied on these organizations as sources of information. As Savelsberg (2015:220) shows, western journalists also view these organizations as perhaps even necessary in their attempt to cover atrocities and get to remote locations.

Differences in source selection are more apparent, in which sources were cited after the two categories discussed thus far. While Kenya and South Africa cited sources from INGOs third, Rwanda cited rebel group members with the third greatest frequency. While on the one hand, journalists in Kenya and South Africa voiced their concern at using INGOs as sources, there was also the realization that INGOs, just like transnational organizations, had resources to fund a trip. They fill the funding gap, resulting from financial cut-backs by media organizations, by flying journalists to conflict areas such as Darfur or refugee camps like *Kalma* and *Abu Shouk* in Darfur. Here too, there was an unconscious multilingualism displayed by journalists talking about INGOs. While INGOs were accused of 'oversimplifying' and 'criminalizing' events and actors, they were also seen as capable of providing "original research," and a means through which to "target [audiences'] heartstrings."

In Rwanda, INGO sources were the sixth quoted group out of the seven categories analyzed. This negligible use of INGO sources in Rwanda can be explained as a consequence of its memory of the genocide in 1994. During the genocide, media attention often focused on the humanitarian situation and the refugee crisis that was developing in neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo rather than the political machinations of the genocide (Hilsum 2007; Karnik 1998a, 1998b). As such, one might imagine that this particular nation-specific trait influenced Rwandan journalists not to use INGO sources. A look at Table 18 points to one possible effect of not using INGO sources with the humanitarian emergency being used in only 12.4 percent of the stories. It was the fourth cited frame in Rwanda compared to Kenya and South Africa where it was the third quoted frame.

Taking the groups of sources used by these three countries, I argue that there is not a multiplicity of voices narrating Darfur. Despite the organizational-level variance in source selection, Table 14 also shows that at the aggregate level, there is uniformity in the top two groups that provided sources. In this sense, therefore, we see that media fields in African countries rely on state actors as dependable sources of information in moments of uncertainty such as mass atrocity coverage. Moreover, as shown in chapter four, non-Sudanese African voices are pushed to the periphery by both the national and the cosmopolitan media subfields. Table 15 should act as a cautionary tale on the dangers of jumping into the 'western journalists silencing African voices' bandwagon. Furthermore, even though Rwanda cited primarily Rwandan State actors followed by Sudanese state actors, it is also important to highlight that Rwandan audiences rarely ever heard any other African voice. As shown in Table 15, Rwandan readers were much more likely to have heard American and English voices than voices from other African countries.

A stronger critique could be leveled against the national media sub-fields, and the choices journalists within them made in selecting sources that could act as an alternative to Sudanese State actors. As shown in Table 12, for example, Kenyan journalists quoted more sources from the United States, United Kingdom, and France more than they quoted Kenyans or even other non-Sudanese Africans. In Kenya and South Africa, being an African not from Sudan produces a condition of invisibility and erases these voices from the knowledge construction process. The results show that even when the subaltern is in charge of choosing voices to quote, there is propensity for the subaltern to select non-subaltern voices over subaltern voices. This is one of the main contributions to literature

this research makes and one that, suffice to say, pushes back on postcolonial critiques of the representation of Africa[ns] by the western media.

Contributions to the Field

The preceding chapters have sought to present empirical observations that speak to the theoretical themes highlighted in the literature review. These themes included the self-representation of Africa by the African media fields and its juxtaposition to Africa's representation by fields from the global north; questions anchored on the sociology of knowledge and the role of national contexts in affecting news framing; the voices that play a key role in narrating the experience of Africans caught in mass violence; the influence of a country's national-context on how the media field operates. Although several findings have been discussed in the preceding pages, it is crucial highlight some of the key findings. This project's immediate contribution is a creation of a database of newspapers covering an atrocity in Africa. No such dataset, as of this project's completion, is known to currently exist. It has added to the already present database of western newspapers used by Savelsberg (2015) in *Representing Mass Violence: Conflicting Responses to Human Rights Violations in Darfur*. Both datasets promise exciting approaches and findings for scholars interested in understanding how mass atrocity is represented by media fields both within and outside of Africa.

The representation of atrocities in Africa by western media organizations is a topic that has been theorized for decades (see for example Amoko 1999; Atkinson 1999a, 1999b; Ebo 1992, 1992; Mamdani 2007, 2010; Quist-Adade 2001; Savelsberg 2015). Few works have analyzed how African media represent atrocities in Africa, the exception being Alozie (2005, 2007), Mody (2010) and Ray (2009). This project has built on this

latter scholarship by positioning itself within this discourse while complicating some assumptions. By pointing to the proliferation of wire agencies in Tables 9 and 13, for example, it has pointed to the challenges in talking about an African media field and its representations of mass atrocity within the continent. These two Tables point to the fact that media fields in African have largely outsourced the knowledge construction project about mass atrocity in Africa. In this sense, Kenya and South Africa are very similar in their reliance the cosmopolitan subfield's representation of events around the continent.

In the case of Kenya this finding has to be tempered by the fact that once we take an organizational-level analysis, as chapter six does, we also see that two of Kenya's newspapers *The Standard* and *The East African* are much more aligned, in their coverage of Darfur, with the *The New Times* of Rwanda: all three newspapers had a majority or their stories about Darfur authored by African journalists. Nonetheless this does not change the aggregate proportion of stories lifted from the cosmopolitan subfield, largely due to the dominance of *The Nation*. This is paradoxical considering that NMG (*The Nation's* parent company) has for several years consistently been ranked as the largest "media firm in Africa outside of South Africa" (Maweu 2014:28). For the national subfield in Kenya, even though the subfield has gained some hard-fought freedoms and as more advertising revenue has come in (see Table 7.1 and chapter three), *The Daily Nation's* favored foreign coverage of Darfur while marginalizing its journalists. This silencing is even more troubling considering, as highlighted by chapter four and elsewhere (Wahutu 2017c, 2018), NMG did sometimes send journalists to cover news stories, only to end up selecting of wire agency stories to appear in print.

This outsourcing of labor, and differing sentiments by journalists and editors interviewed point to the importance of Reese's (2001) hierarchy of influence model discussed in chapters one and two. At the individual level of influence, journalist sentiments, described in chapter four, capture the frustrations about the path the field is on. As pointed out rather exasperatedly by several journalists in chapter four, outsourcing was seen as a failure of the field. It is the also at individual level that the presence of the ethnic conflict frame, in chapter five and six, was given nuance and context. Sociology of knowledge points to the path-dependent nature of knowledge, and the dependence by individuals on both cultural repertoires and sedimented knowledge to make sense of the world (Berger and Luckmann 1966). This project's disaggregation of journalists and media fields within the countries allows this project to highlight the strength of localized understandings of identity and the role it plays in conditioning journalists' understanding of violent conflict in Africa. No one finding captures the importance of this more than that of the use of the ethnic conflict frame by the national subfields in all three countries. The use of this frame points to the influence of sedimented knowledge about identity on how Darfur was framed. As illustrated in both chapters five and six, this finding requires us to rethink our assumptions about how African media/journalists represent Africa[ns]. Though both Mody (2010) and Ray (2009) point to this frame being used, at the time of writing this is the first project that disaggregates the use of this frame by African and non-African journalists whose work is published in African newspapers. This frame's use is explained both as an engagement with not only the memory and trauma of colonization, and as a politicization of who is African, in the exclusivist sense, and who is seen an outsider.

Table 14 illuminated the domination of State actors in the narrative construction process in both subfields in all three countries. Furthermore, Table 15 highlights the central role Sudanese voices played in this narrative construction process. Here too, this project highlights the extent to which national subfields in South Africa and Kenya have a penchant for voices from the global north when seeking alternative voices to act as counterweights to Sudanese State actors. By focusing on the routine level of Reese's (2001) hierarchical model, chapter four alerts us to the effects of journalists internalizing journalistic norms in relation to which voices were allowed to frame the narrative on Darfur. The field's normative approach towards favoring State actors as sources are encapsulated by Table 14 and journalist interviews. This has the effect of continually pushing to the periphery non-Sudanese African voices by journalists in the postcolony. The favoring of voices from the global north rather than non-Sudanese African voices points to an implicitly shared understanding of which voices are perceived as credible, and therefore crucial in imbuing journalists with sufficient cultural capital amongst their peers. In both Kenya and South Africa, the cultural capital brought by using state actors from the global north as the primary alternative voice fetishizes narratives and voices from the global north. Subsequently, even though Sudanese State actors' voices were central, it is instructive that non-Sudanese African voices are still marginalized in the process. Even in Rwanda's case, where Rwandan State actors were the main voices and acted as an alternative voice to Sudanese voices, non-Sudanese, and non-Rwandan voices were hardly ever heard. Simply put, African journalists are key players in the marginalization of African voices through their internalization of professional norms on who is a credible source.

Conclusion

In answer to the question that motivated this project, African audiences, by and large, receive knowledge about atrocities in Africa from non-African carrier groups. These carrier groups include not just the cosmopolitan subfields operating within the continent but also quoted sources who are non-African. While it is easy to point to the data presented here and say that, African sources have played a role in shaping the narrative on Darfur; this is not a holistic interpretation of the data. Combining the presence of wire agencies and sources from the global north, it is evident that non-African voices shaped African's knowledge about Darfur. This dissertation puts to task assumptions about how African journalists represent African atrocities by pointing to the dissonance between critiques of western media and the actual representation of Africa by African journalists. But perhaps the most exigent take-home message is that the marginalization of African voices is not the preserve of media fields from the global north as has hitherto been implied by scholarship on media representation. This project shows that the marginalization is a joint enterprise between media fields in Africa and those from the global north, and one distinctly rooted in the journalistic rules of the game.

Limitations

There are several limitations to this project. Perhaps the largest one is the fact that the data does not include newspapers and interviews with journalists from Francophone and Lusophone Africa. Consequently, there is a substantial portion of the continent that I do not analyze. Besides, without audience research it is difficult to talk about the extent of knowledge diffusion through these newspapers, especially when one considers that

80.6% of Kenyans fully trust the media (Mbeke et al. 2010), and while students in my field site are largely distrusting the field.

The second limitation is the absence of newspaper data from Nigeria despite having interview data from journalists from Nigeria and a lack of interviews from Rwanda. Some may view this as a weakness in the arguments I make about 'African' media fields; how representative and generalizable can my data be of 'Africa.' The reason for not having or analyzing news reports from Nigeria or journalist interviews from Rwanda is quite simply an issue of access. After combing through different databases and even requesting for microfilms of newspapers from Nigeria, nothing has been forthcoming. There is almost no online newspaper database before 2007 for Nigeria. Multiple requests for microfilms from the Centre for research libraries were met with "I'm sorry to inform you..." messages. Therefore, I have no Nigerian newspapers to analyze. In the case of interviews from Rwanda, access was also an issue. No journalist was willing to agree to an interview. Part of this is perhaps due to the political realities of Rwanda but also the fact that journalists in Rwanda have been living in fear of government reprisals (see, Sundaram 2016). The last limitation, which I will address in the future, is that project does not link specific quoted sources to specific frames. While I recognize the importance of this task, this will have to be addressed in future research.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Coding Scheme for content analysis

News Organization

DN = Daily Nation

EA = The East African

NT = The New Times

M&G = Mail & Guardian online

SOW = Sowetan

Al-Ah = Al-Ahram English

Title of document

Date published

Type report is it an article, editorial or Op-Ed

Frames

* The frames are divided into Diagnostic (D), Prognostic (P) and Motivational (M) frames.

Insurgency Frame

*This frame suggests that the state has a right to defend itself against insurgents/terrorists.

Insurgency D this frame explicitly refers to the actors as “terrorists” “insurgents” or “violent gangs” and calls their actions “terrorist acts”

Insurgency P this suggests that the actors should be killed or arrested, as they are “terrorists” or intimidating the populations that they seek refuge in as a solution

Insurgency M urges the maintenance of the integrity of the state as the ultimate goal

Civil War

*This frame describes Darfur as a war between groups that are organized within the nation-state with the aim of one being secession and over throw the government.

Civil War D events are referred to as civil or ‘tribal’ war

Ethnic War conflict is specifically referred to as an ethnic conflict (or use of Arab vs. African dichotomy)

Civil War P suggests negotiation between the opposing sides

Civil War M suggests the achieving of a negotiated peace is the ultimate goal

Crime D behavior reported can be referred to as criminal or specifically labelled criminal

*this frame includes variables on war crimes, genocide or genocidal intent, crimes against humanity.

** It also includes variables that measure whether or not blame is apportioned to the various actors in the conflict such as the government, militia or rebels

Crime P this suggests that the ICC should intervene

Crime M this proposes justice as the desired outcome

Humanitarian emergency frame

HumanEmer. D the article mentions hunger, encampment and/or illness of civilian as the main aspect of the conflict

HumanEmer. P suggests and or praises the delivery of aid to the civilian population

HumanEmer. M. Views cooperation with both sides of the conflict as paramount to the near-term survival of civilians

Aggressive State

* Here actions by the state are considered to have gone too far and disproportional but not necessarily criminal

* This frame will also analyze who is blamed as an aggressor.

Aggressive D. Sudanese state is seen as using disproportional levels of violence

Aggressive P. Sanctions and isolation are suggested as remedies that could be employed by the international community

* Humanitarian intervention by actors such as the UN are covered in this frame

Aggressive M. The reducing of aggression by the Sudanese State is suggested as the ultimate goal.

Ethnic Cleansing measures whether Darfur is explicitly referred to as “ethnic cleansing”

Human Rights Violation measures whether Darfur is explicitly referred to as a “Human Rights Violation”

Atrocity/Mass Murder measures whether Darfur is explicitly referred to as
“atrocity/mass murder”

Sources this variable is interested on the primary voice(s) quoted or paraphrased in the news article.

APPENDIX B

Interview Guideline

Life course

Seeks to explicate what has motivated the individual to become a journalist working on the Darfur conflict (education, socialization, career, position within the news organization)

Hierarchy and the Division of labor

Seeks to understand how the news is packaged within the organization and who has the final say on the final draft to be published. What is the process when individual journalists have a conflict in the way their story of framed and published

Individual perceptions of Darfur

Asks the journalists understand and explains Darfur in their own words and privately. This will seek to evaluate whether or not there is distantiation between the journalists and their published news reports. It also seeks to understand whether their understanding of Darfur has evolved over time.

Causes of the conflict in Darfur

This mirrors the options in the coding scheme but also allows the journalists to bring in something they feel is unique and missing in the way the cause of the conflict has been covered.

Framing.

This too mirrors those frames in the coding instrument while providing an opportunity to bring in a frame the journalist feels has not been used previously of enough.

Sources of Information

Seeks to understand the different sources of information the journalists rely on for getting information about Darfur. It also allows them to talk about some of the challenges and benefits of using some of these sources.

APPENDIX C

Figure 6: Methods to be employed for each Research Question




Table 28: Sector spends on advertising between 2009 and 2014 (in Billions of Kenya Shillings)

Year	Sector	Television	Radio	Newspaper	Total
2009	Communications	.681	3.936	1.804	6.435
	Financial services	.501	2.283	1.304	4.098
	Corporate	.574	1.593	1.228	3.403
	Pharmaceuticals	.73	1.522	.630	2.262
2010	Communications	.876	5.881	2.647	9.410
	Financial services	2.078	3.016	2.238	7.358
	Corporate	.738	3.300	1.540	5.585
	Pharmaceuticals	.68	2.305	1.030	3.448
2011	Communications	.596	6.437	3.795	10.829
	Financial services	3.891	3.565	2.356	9.815
	Corporate	.680	4.281	2.542	7.505
	Pharmaceuticals	.88	4.133	1.868	6.102
2012	Communications	.561	9.662	5.010	15.234
	Financial services	4.323	6.300	4.080	14.712
	Corporate	.749	5.870	3.083	9.702
	Pharmaceuticals	.141	3.774	1.978	5.901
2013	Communications	.538	10.199	8.644	19.382
	Financial services	4.353	5.613	4.367	14.338
	Corporate	.862	6.934	3.889	11.689
	Pharmaceuticals	.163	3.251	1.443	4.870
2014	Communications	.515	6.715	9.518	16.750
	Financial services	5.741	5.078	3.810	14.629
	Corporate	.986	7.289	4.608	12.885
	Pharmaceuticals	.74	3.186	2.340	5.608
	Total Spend	32.577	116.123	75.752	

Data from Ipsos-Synovate, Kenya

