


CENTRUM



WORKING PAPERS OF THE MINNESOTA CENTER FOR ADVANCED STUDIES IN LANGUAGE, STYLE, & LITERARY THEORY

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
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PREFATORY NOTE

The essays by William Keach, Peter Hughes and Norman Fruman were originally presented to a special session of the 1976 MLA Convention, titled "The Concepts of Imitation, Originality, and Plagiarism in English Literary History."

Future issues of Centrum will include the following:

BRENDA DANET / "Speaking of Watergate"

BRUCE JOHNSON / "Communicative Competence in American Trial Courtrooms"

ROBIN LAKOFF / Review article on Edwin Newman's Strictly Speaking

MARJORIE PERLOFF / "Symbolism/Anti-Symbolism"

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STEPHEN BEHRENDT / review of Ronald Paulson, Emblem and Expression: Meaning in English Art of the Eighteenth Century

EARL MINER

Assaying the Golden World of English Renaissance Poetics

*To returne from sorrow to rejoycing
it is a very good hap and no unwise
part for him that can do it.*

*Puttenham, Arte of English Poesie
(1.25)*

Even a person of the most settled literary convictions must be aware of the heady atmosphere of critical activity today. Not only does critical theory flourish in a way that was not thought possible a decade or so ago, but also we all feel the excitement and the optimism of an age that congratulates itself in having ventured "beyond formalism." From Paris and Geneva, from Toronto and Konstanz, news comes to tell us of fresh ways of considering literature. Criticism has been anatomized, structures and systems have been developed, literary phenomenology has been recounted, reader response has been examined, and "texts" have been "deconstructed." At the heart of these activities lies a formidable paradox: we are led to understand that such ways of understanding literature are at once new and timelessly true. In all this rise of new critical faiths, is there not something akin to the religious situation following the Reformation? Is there not, that is, a widespread belief that a true literary faith exists along with disputes as to which that true faith may be? If so, discovering the true faith is important, and the hazards are great. We may recall Donne's third satire:

. . . doubt wisely; in strange way
To stand inquiring right, is not to stray;
To sleepe, or runne wrong, is. On a huge hill,
Cragged, and steep, Truth stands, and he that will
Reach her, about must, and about must goe;
And what th'hills suddenness resists, winne so: . . .
To will, implyes delay, therefore now doe:
Hard deeds, the bodies paines; hard knowledge too
The mindes indeavours reach, and mysteries
Are like the Sunne, dazling, yet plaine to'all eyes.

(77-88)

In his dedication of *Volpone*, Jonson involved poetry in religion, saying that the poet is "a teacher of things divine no less than human." And he was kind enough to bad poets to declare that to think "that all are embarked in this bold adventure for hell is a most uncharitable thought."¹

As we contemplate the rival literary faiths today, we may agree with Donne that we must doubt wisely, and even that we have a duty to struggle for Truth. But I doubt that many think the supposed truths of criticism involve a religious obligation to save one's soul in the single true faith, or that we agree with Jonson that poets are teachers of divine and human things, or even that they are teachers. The old analogy between the poet as maker and God as creator, or between the poem of the one and the created world of the other, now seems as dead as Pan. If we do not agree with such things, do we mean that they never seemed true? Or do we mean that Renaissance ideas about poetry seemed true to them but have been shown to be untrue? If time has revealed their falsity, is criticism progressively if erratically rising toward a higher level of truth, or does each age invent a criticism useful to itself but not to others? Or do progressive and relativistic considerations both apply? Have we perfected criticism? Or is critical assurance a chimerical hope?

It very much seems that such questions as these, which are by no means comprehensive, require both historical and critical answers. More than that, they illustrate a very considerable gulf of time and idea between us and the Renaissance. The "vast abrupt" of Milton's *Chaos* confronts the foolhardy and the brave venturer alike. If that sounds rather melodramatic, let us consider a pair of Renaissance and a pair of contemporary critical ideas. Two recurrent literary questions involve method of interpretation and the purpose of literature. In his last book, Don Cameron Allen showed in bristling detail what we have long known, that the Renaissance continued the medieval practice of regarding literature as something polysemous.² The mere reader might think that Virgil only chose to tell how Aeneas fled Troy, dallied with Dido, and after great effort defeated Turnus. But the true understander knew that Virgil offered a far more significant allegory of the life of man from perilous birth to hazardous and passionate youth to virtuous wise age proved in struggle. That crazy Scot, Alexander Ross, even went so far as to evangelize Virgil, and by extracting lines from here and there out of various works retell the life of Christ.³ Surely no student of Virgil today moralizes him in such fashion. Allegorical hermeneutics of such kind simply do not seem anything other than quaint. We study them to learn how some people once thought. We learn about such ideas rather than use them ourselves.

The ideas we use are many, and among them is a "formalist" premise. We have all been brought up believing in the necessity of interpreting what is called the literary object. The concept of the objective status of literature is implicit in Aristotle, who seems to have had in mind representative Greek sculpture and decoration. We have been taught to think of structure, form, texture, cadence, movement, rhythm, and other attributes that are susceptible to verification by the senses. The fact that we all speak of such things, myself included, does not make them anything other than Critical Fictions, just like polysemousness. No one has ever seen, felt, or heard a novel, in any literal sense. A book or the sound waves of actors' voices have physical properties and can be objectively measured, as a coffee-table book on Etruscan art may weigh about two pounds, and the sounds from the stage may register so many decibels at a given moment. But literature exists only as perceptive and cognitive experience, for without perceivers and knowers there may be books and sounds but there will be no literature, just as in another intellectual realm there may be a physical world, but there is no chemistry and there is no physics without a chemist or a physicist to express

his understanding. For that what claim does a critic have to deconstruct a text except inferiority to, and dependence on, the poet who creates?

Another prevalent Renaissance doctrine holds that the end, or a chief end, of literature is, in Ben Jonson's words, "to inform men in the best reason of living."⁴ Defenders of humanistic studies today commonly insist that literature and the arts treat human values, but few of us feel much comfort with Renaissance formulations of the idea. Thomas Rymer let the paper tiger out of the bag when he asked if the moral of Othello was that young women should not run away with blackamoors and wives should watch to their linen.⁵ Who among us can assent to Jonson's idea of "the impossibility of any man's being a good poet, without first being a good man"?⁶ Surely he did not have in mind the likes of Dostoyevsky, Proust, and Hemingway. And yet these are good poets. The moral poet and the didactic poem seem singularly out of place in a world of dangerous liaisons such as are available for delectation at the local cinema or bookshop.

Finally, there are probably more people who assent to a similar idea than we acknowledge. In eastern Europe, in China, in many new societies, and in some other places, there is a strong emphasis on the social end of literature. Once a little respected vehicle of entertainment, the Peking opera now depicts the recurrent trials and triumphs of the Maoist state in defeating adventurous imperialism. Anyone who fails to think such a view genuine and appreciated knows little of contemporary reality or of such other things as the general telos of the Oresteia and the Augustan myth of the Aeneid. And yet each of us will insist that works with such a purpose alone are tendentious, as also that the Oresteia and Aeneid rise far above such limited considerations.

These four interpretations of literature involve Critical Fictions such as I have accused one of being. And each in its way carries some weight of conviction. The allegorical reading of the classics may seem quaint or crude, but from Pöschl, Putnam, and Otis, we have been taught to read Virgil in terms of what they call symbolism.⁷ The Anglo-American New Criticism has convinced us all that the temporal experience of literature involves actions of the mind that counter purely temporal concerns. Similarly, we do employ normative standards to dismiss some things we deem literary as trivial or even ugly. And we do regard literature as something deeply involved in the social milieu in which poets write.

For such reason, it is difficult to dismiss with Bacon dominant literary systems as idols and false notions. They may be Critical Fictions, but the make-believe serves real needs. It is in such spirit that we must approach Renaissance criticism, asking ourselves plainly what its main ideas are, what logic they may have, and considering what alternatives we can supply.

One of the first things we observe about Renaissance English criticism is its extraordinarily derivative character. Along with that we observe a considerable time-lag between England and the continent, not just in the acquisition of ideas but even in method. As a Protestant country, England was committed to that scholarship of the biblical text that, in continental centers of learning, led to classical and then vernacular scholarship. Not till Thomas Creech published his edition of Lucretius in 1695, however, did England get a classical text that classicists today take seriously. In 1905 Spingarn showed that nearly half of Jonson's Discoveries came from a single source, Daniel Hensius.⁸ A similarly long shadow falls from the two Scaligers, notably from Julius Caesar Scaliger and his Poetices Libri Septem. Another feature of Renaissance English criticism worth notice is its almost complete lack of historical outlook. The

concept of a literary age or period does not come into full being until Dryden, and without that concept such others as historical development or such methods as comparison are very unlikely to appear.

What we do find is a varying mix of rhetoric, Neoaristoteleanism, Neohoratianism, and Neoplatonism.⁹ The amount or importance of one element over another varies with the critic. Often it is not possible to be sure just what weight to give a remark such as Jonson's that to be a good poet one must first be a good man. That idea was already old when Quintilian applied it to the orator. From his other writings, it is plain that Jonson believed what he said, and the problem is therefore not that he said what he did not believe but that we have difficulty in believing what he said.

Of all the constituents of Renaissance literary theory and method, however, the least attractive to the modern mind have surely been rhetoric and her severer sister, logic. Until the studies by W. S. Howell and Father Ong appeared, most of us did not even have an idea of what the issues were in the fuss over Ramism, and even today most of us enjoy Puttenham more when he is being general than what he gets to "Ornament" in the second half of his book.¹⁰ Rosemond Tuve long since argued the importance of rhetorical study, claiming that there was a rhetorical culture shared in by poets of all kinds. That led William Empson to imply that if one could not perceive the major literary differences between Spenser and Donne one might as well waste time studying rhetoric.¹¹

As one who perpetually has to relearn the meanings of terms such as anadiplosis, homozeuxis, and even, I confess, enthymeme, I am hardly the proper trumpeter to lead our age to study of Renaissance "scholasticism." And yet it is in rhetoric and logic that we find a functioning Renaissance criticism. In an unpublished work, Ronald Runyan has examined Milton in terms of a few of the schemes (as opposed to tropes) set forth by the Ramists as figures of repetition. His approach makes evident sense to anyone who recalls that winding, recurrent style of Milton's. What he discovered is that the figures of repetition tend to cluster in the speeches of certain characters and on certain occasions. In particular, they burgeon in the speech of God the Father in Paradise Lost, Book III, and in the replies of Jesus to Satan in Paradise Regained. It will no longer do to say that God the Father speaks plainly, unfiguratively. We must simply be prepared to discover figures whose existence has been forgot. In this respect, then, there is much to discover in Renaissance rhetoric that may tell us how to read Renaissance literature. We shall have some difficulty persuading our Shakespearean colleagues of this, as the example of Leon Howard shows. Years ago he proved that Hamlet's "To be, or not to be" and other soliloquies followed a fairly simple Ramist outline of the usual hierarchy and subsidiary dualities.¹² I think that the essay could be published now, but formerly Shakespearean scholars abominated such trivia, even if their Bard did not.

If Renaissance writers believed in and used certain moral and rhetorical assumptions, they also had a larger and cloudier horizon in forms of Neoplatonism. The sense of something far more deeply interfused, the idea of the few fit and initiate readers, the dark conceit, the furor poeticus, the celestial Venus, and the perennial wisdom all derive from fairly standard kinds of Neoplatonism, and they will be found here and there in one version or another. But we must be aware of certain popular emphases if we are to follow changes. Lack of awareness of change

has led to some strange assumptions about the presence and timing of Neoplatonism. In general, sixteenth-century writers emphasize the idea of the scale of love more than writers from the next century, who are more concerned with what they termed "the intelligible world." Jonson and Henry More liked the figure of the world as garment of the soul, whereas Milton and Dryden were more interested in the doctrine of Middle Spirits.¹³ Of course it is well known that the best understanding of Plato available to the Renaissance was in Cicero's Hortensius, as Thomas Stanley seems to have sensed in preparing his material on Plato for The History of Philosophy, beginning with Cicero and gradually working in subsequent material from less reliable writers such as Pico della Mirandola.¹⁴ As distinct from Neoplatonism, Platonism was not recovered until the German classicists got to work in the last century and this. Unfortunately, we cannot read Friedlaender with any security that the Renaissance possessed so sure a grip of what Plato wrote. Recently Stanley Fish published a very interesting account of Plato's Phaedrus, which he read basically as rejection of rhetoric in favor of philosophical dialectic, and the point was useful to him for his general thesis.¹⁵ Although the Phaedrus is accounted by classicists as one of the difficult dialogues, most would think that such a strand was to be found in it. Such was, however, not at all the version delivered to the Renaissance by the interpreter who monopolized the subject, Ficino. To him, the Phaedrus was about beauty, De Pulchro being his subtitle and the basis of his Renaissance explication.¹⁶ Neoplatonism involves, then, very little Plato. It depends chiefly upon either Ficino, when Plato is ultimate inspiration; or upon that other hodge-podge of philosophy, symbolism, and the occult that flourished in England in the 1580s and again between 1640 and 1660.

There is point to details of the Renaissance use of dialectic and Neoplatonism because those two elements were of importance, dialectic to style and Neoplatonism to certain ideas. Neither, however, really constitutes what French critics today would term a construction, or the basic systematic poetics of the Renaissance. If it is only a hypothesis that a systematic poetics exists, then I must confess that I accept the hypothesis. My evidence derives in part from the recurrence of central ideas in Renaissance writing and in part from the completely different assumptions made in the three principal Asian cultures of China, Japan, and Korea. As I have already suggested, the systematic poetics of the Renaissance seems to me to be Neoplatonist and Neohoratian. Put another way, it entails a dominant theory of mimesis supplemented by a subordinate affectivism. Mimetic theory does indeed join the Renaissance with Aristotle and even with certain critics of our time, notably Erich Auerbach and Northrop Frye, different as they are. The affective theory was of importance because mimesis itself suffers from the crippling limitation that it fails to consider the reader. Of course Aristotle spoke of katharsis, but if Gerald F. Else is right, not even that is affective in meaning, whatever the Renaissance thought.¹⁷ It did not matter, because Horatianism was there to remedy the omission, and in fact effected such a reading of the Poetics.

It is seldom asked how a systematic poetic emerges, but I think the question an important one for what it tells of the literary assumptions of a culture and of the limitations of a given system. My explanation runs that a systematic poetics emerges in the encounter of a superior critical practice with the then dominant genre. Aristotle of course considered tragedy and comedy, although we do not have his remarks on the latter. It seems to me no accident that consideration of represented genres should lead to a theory of imitative representation. In the Asian countries I mentioned, mimetic theory did not exist until it was brought in as an

exotic Western product. Instead, the systematic poetics emerged from the encounter with lyric poetry as the most distinguished genre, and out of that came a reciprocal or polar theory of affectivism-expressionism. When we consider that, in Japan, such a systematics had to absorb at an unprecedentedly early moment prose fiction and its canons of time and daily reality, we can see that the entire nature of literary assumptions may depend on the sequence of generic occurrence in a culture. By the time prose fiction emerged as a principal genre in the West, Japanese poetics also had had to absorb three major forms of drama and theatre.

Returning to our Renaissance critics, we discover the entirely different but familiar situation of mimetic and affectivist dominance. Some of us might think, or all of us in some moods, that these canons so tirelessly repeated by the critics have little to offer for an understanding of Shakespeare's plays. Certainly, the strict Neoaristoteleans who quarrelled over II Pastor Fido earlier and over Le Cid later could hardly have thought Shakespeare a proper dramatist at all. For all that, it is Shakespeare that matters more, and his own support of mimesis and affectivism emerges revealingly when he takes his art to a second level of presentation, as in dumb shows, plays within plays, and masques. It will help to consider three such theatrical moments. In Richard III we have a version of the dumb show at Baynard's Castle, when Richard, Duke of Gloucester, appears "aloft, between two Bishops." His partner in the scheme to get the throne, Buckingham, then acts as the Presenter after the Mayor observes: "See, where his Grace stands 'tween two clergyman!" Buckingham interprets the emblematic moment:

Two props of virtue for a Christian prince,
To stay him from the fall of vanity;
And, see, a book of prayer in his hand,
True ornaments to know a holy man.¹⁸

By the end of the scene Gloucester has had Buckingham maneuver him into acceptance of the crown. Now after all we have seen of Richard's actions, we know that he is not "a holy man." His mimesis is false imitation, and our knowledge of that therefore leads to affective results directly opposite to those of stage characters like the Mayor who see Buckingham without our knowledge of his character. In the Pyramus and Thisbe episode of A Midsummer Night's Dream we have a different and clearer example of Shakespeare's devotion to mimesis and affectivism. Everyone knows how ridiculous is the play performed by Bottom and his friends with its "Thanks, courteous wall," "I see a voice!" and all the rest. The point here is less that the representation is falsified by the motives of the representers as that the imitation itself is so woefully – and comically – unbelievable. Such being the case, it fails completely in its aim of moving or affecting its immediate audience as the actors intend. Theseus does his best to rebuke his snickering courtiers but at last he cannot contain himself and says of the crazy playlet they are watching something that well illustrates failed affectivism and that surely is Shakespeare's wittiest line: "This passion, and the death of a dear friend, would go near to make a man look sad" (5.1.293-94). When mimesis fails in tragedy, a real death is required to arouse the emotions. Of course we also have a second, genuine representation of those mechanicals making fools of themselves. Again, in Hamlet we have both a dumb show and a play. Claudius endures the former but not the actual spoken representation of his murder of the elder Hamlet. The fuller the mimesis, the more affective it is. We see this over and over in Shakespeare, and not only in

terms of dumb shows and plays within plays. Seeing Juliet's body in its imitation of death, Romeo is so distraught that he takes his life. When she awakens, the sight of Romeo dead leads her to die too. The role-playing by King Lear's two evil daughters and Gloucester's two sons leads to a constant flow of reaction and affect in which we sometimes find ourselves responding like, and sometimes unlike, the characters represented on the stage.

"True imitation" may be thought true in descriptive, affective, and normative senses. Description is true if it represents what is true – unlike Richard at Baynard's Castle. Affectively it is true if it is done well enough to succeed in moving an audience, in Sidney's wonderful phrase, if it "holdeth children from play, and old men from the chimney corner."¹⁹ Normatively it is true when it is real, when it satisfies our sense of reality. But it is just here where serious problems begin to emerge with mimetic theory. The major assumption of mimesis is the reality of the world and of art. Reality can be truthfully perceived, truthfully known, and truthfully imitated or recreated. The meaningfulness of reality and the meaningfulness of the imitation of it derive in considerable measure from the presumed knowability of reality. To philosophers today such beliefs bristle with difficulties and are perhaps neither provable nor disprovable. I happen to think the assumptions make useful daily sense, but clearly anyone taking the so-called literature of the absurd seriously cannot also support mimesis. Such fundamental and truly basic assumptions about the nature of things underlie the violent resistance by many to abstract painting and serial music. Something similar was involved in Erich Auerbach's well known antipathy to writers like Joyce: such manipulation of style must have seemed to Auerbach to belie a veritable, representable reality.

There is more to it than that, however, because most forms of mimesis we know have ethical corollaries. In brief, the question is not only whether something is true but also whether it ought to be true, or, in some minds, even if it is true should it be said? We may recall that Sidney's argument on behalf of poesy held that it was a better teacher than either philosophy or history.²⁰ By which Sidney meant, I think, two things. He meant that it was a more efficient way of conveying truth, and also that its affective powers were far greater. On the other hand, Sidney clearly expects that tragedy has a certain set of characters and characteristics; the epic similar characters but different characteristics; and comedy different characters but similar characteristics. It is difficult not to accept in some fashion the doctrine of decorum implicit here, once it is mentioned: but it is all too easy for critics to be carried away with the idea. Kings must be kingly, soliders military, lovers amatory, etc., and the characteristics are precisely those from a pre-existing stock. Reality not only ought to be true, but in order for it to be truly true it must be true in certain ways. Kings may do evil, but they are great men and not to be shown under comic circumstances, as *The Knight of Burning Pestle* shows, when the actors protest that Ralph the grocer's apprentice should not be seen with the daughter of the King of Moldavia.²¹ Soliders may be drunkards, but not kings or lovers. The very weaknesses of Shakespeare's Richard II are regal, and the vices of his Richard III are princely.

Such decorum is so important that it must be included in any description of Renaissance poetics. Decorum has profound rhetorical, ethical, social, and even religious sanctions in the Renaissance. A major reason why that is so derives from the status of that which is not decorously real, what is not natural and which is therefore also inartificial. Here is Sidney:

Delight hath a joy in it, either permanent or present. Laughter hath onely a

scornful tickling. For example, we are ravished with delight to see a faire woman, and yet are far from being moved to laughter. We laugh at deformed creatures, wherein certainly we cannot delight.²²

Deformed creatures have something artistically and morally wrong with them. A lusus naturae – a sport or “monster” – is laughable, and according to the proverb, Africa produced a new monster daily. Is there any bastard, cripple, or Jew in Shakespeare who satisfies a bastard, cripple, or Jew as reader? We recall that the funny people in A Midsummer Night's Dream are mere mechanicals. Or, to consider Ben Jonson, there are those readers of The Alchemist who profess to be upset because no poetic justice is done. I confess that I am troubled precisely because poetic justice is done. When Lovewit returns home, Subtle resumes his role as Jeremy the servant, and the master gets the person and fortune of a woman he had never seen before. The point is that after chaos of a kind the desirable social order is re-established.²³ Masters marry women with fortunes; servants do not.

It is easy to forget that the nature imitated by Renaissance art was, in social terms, an unjust hierarchical order in which those who ruled were few in number and did their best to make sure that others lacked power. Most Englishmen and even more Englishwomen could expect early death from disease or childbirth, and most were hungry more or less always. To bolster the unjust social hierarchy, intellectuals devised such things as the Scale of Nature, or the Great Chain of Being. The divinity that hedged a king, the High Court of Parliament, and “our laws and liberties” were all the possession of a few. The right of that few was to rule. The duty of the rest was to obey. Anglican Convocation went so far as to put into fathers' hands the power of life and death over their children. One of Burton's images of anarchy is children telling their parents what to do; another is women wearing breeches. Such anomalies are like towers building masons or fish in the trees. In his First Anniversary Donne worries less about the New Philosophy than each man thinking himself a Phoenix and forgetting his obligations as son and subject.²⁴

Of course there is more to be said of the Renaissance than that, and it is also true that mimesis does not require a Renaissance social order to exist. It existed in the so-called democracy of Greece, in republican and imperial Rome, and it exists still today. Auerbach fled Nazi persecution and very well knew what oppression was. Yet he has his decorum, which admits into the category “literature” almost only those works that possess high seriousness of some kind. Northrop Frye ends the Anatomy of Criticism with the vision of an increasingly liberal and rational society. All of us feel far more comfortable in the presence of such social implications than we do in the presence of Renaissance tyranny and autocracy. But is it not of something more than passing interest that the two principal advocates of mimesis in our time should also discover ethical or social as well as aesthetic implications in it? When a value is set on reality, as with anything else, it changes from neutrality to a part in a system of values. There is no reason whatever, to my mind, why a systematic poetics should not involve a systematic theory of values; and I simply do not see how any of us can detach one's self sufficiently from one's culture and one's age to create something wholly new. But that fact does not require us to accept the values of the Renaissance any more than the fact that Socialist criticism has values necessarily means that they are those one shares.

The chief glory of mimesis is also the matter on which many would wish to dissent from

it: its assumption that a proper reality can be presented in proper art. The idea of what is proper changes from the complex decorums of the Renaissance to the seriousness of Auerbach or the concepts of high and low mimesis of Frye. Only this much more need be said about it. Mimetic theory is not required for an aesthetic theory entailing a belief in the reality of the world and man's access to it. To recur to an earlier example, the affective-expressive theory of Japanese poetics has an equally strong faith. It would be unjust to assume that what Auerbach called "the Representation of Reality" belongs solely to mimesis or solely to Western literature.

The subordination of affectivism to mimesis in Renaissance theory has been shown, I believe, from the examples taken from Shakespeare's plays and from Sidney's remark about the nature of our responses to a beautiful woman or deformed creature. In the Renaissance itself, no such subordination appears to have been intended. The affective theory was commonly extolled in terms of the "ends" of poesy, to teach and delight. Again and again we observe critics either trying to join mimesis and affectivism into a whole or unaware that they are espousing two different critical propositions that have no necessary connection with each other — as the example of Asian poetics shows once again. Often a sanction obtained from religion, Neoplatonism, or analogy with God the Creator justifies the affectivism of art. As Chapman put it in his dedicatory matter prefaced to his *Iliad*: "since the excellence [of Poesy] cannot be obtained by the labour and art of man . . . it must needs be acknowledged a divine infusion." And yet he shortly speaks quite differently: "no Artist [is] so strictly and inextricably confined to all the laws of learning, wisdom, and truth as a Poet."²⁵ And here is Puttenham at length from the opening of his *Arte of English Poesie*:

A Poet is as much as to say as a maker. And our English name well conformes with the Greeke: for of [*ποιεῖν*] to make, they call a maker a Poeta. Such as (by way of resemblance and reverently) we may say of God: who without any travell to his divine imagination, made all the world of nought, nor also by any paterne or mould as the Platonicks with their Ideas do phantastically suppose. Even so the very Poet makes and contrives out of his owne braine both the verse and matter of his poeme . . . And nevertheless . . . a Poet may in some sort be said a follower or imitator, because he can express the true and lively of every thing is set before him, and which he taketh in hand to describe: and so in that respect is both a maker and a counterfaior: and Poesie an art not only of making, but also of imitation. And this science in [its] perfection, can not grow, but by some divine instinct, the Platonicks call it furor. . . .

Puttenham goes on to consider how poesy praised and honored gods, and how vice was reprobated by satire but "better reformed" by comedy and tragedy.²⁶ That is the right Elizabethan copia, getting at the effects of poesy by a lengthy preamble involving God and making before getting even to mimesis. The ideas last on. Davenant is sure that poesy is the "hyreless Science! and of all alone / The Liberal." And that by the poets' singing of love and just war, "the loving Love, and valiant, fight" (*Gondibert*, 2. 5. 67-68). For that matter, Hobbes begins his Introduction to the *Leviathan* with the very analogy between divine and human creation that Puttenham had used.

The most concise advocacy of affectivism with mimesis of which I am aware, and the strongest effort to relate the two logically, also comes from a time later than some would include in the Renaissance. In his Parallel Betwixt Painting and Poetry, Dryden wrote:

The imitation of nature is therefore justly constituted as the general, and indeed the only, rule —

and what follows is the stroke of a master critic who understood Shakespeare —

the general, and indeed the only, rule of pleasing [my stress] both in poetry and painting. Aristotle tells us [in Poetics, ch. 4] that imitation pleases, because it affords matter for a reasoner to inquire into the truth or falsehood of imitation, by comparing its likeness, or unlikeness with the original. But by this rule, every speculation in nature whose truth falls under the inquiry of a philosopher, must produce the same delight, which is not true. I should rather assign another reason. Truth is the object of our understanding, as good is of our will; and the understanding can no more be delighted with a lie than the will can choose [a glaring] evil. As truth is the end of all our speculations, so the discovery of it is the pleasure of them; and since a true knowledge of nature gives us most pleasure, a living imitation of it, either in poetry or painting, must of necessity produce a much greater. For both these arts, as I said before, are not only true imitations of nature, but of the best nature, of that which is wrought up to a nobler pitch.²⁷

Unlike Puttenham, who adds one idea to another in a series, Dryden has sought to make a whole, as had Sidney and Ben Jonson before him. Here is Jonson in the Dedication of Volpone: “it being the office of a comic poet to imitate justice, and instruct to life, as well as purity of language, or stir up gentle affections.”²⁸

The idea that poetry instructs and delights seems either wrong or crude to an age concerned with phenomenology, games theory, and deconstruction. The praise lavished by Sidney and Puttenham on Gorbudoc makes painful reading today, when it gives no delight at all and teaches us little but to appreciate better plays. Or, at the other end of our main dramatic tradition, we find Dryden writing that his tragedy Don Sebastian has a general moral besides specific ones couched in each character; and Congreve prefixing a Latin tag to The Way of the World implying that would-be adulterers will learn to avoid the sin by attending to the play.²⁹ And as for Sidney himself, the wag was not far wrong who said that Addison’s Cato best fits his requirements for tragedy.

One problem of particular difficulty is accepting an explicit moral. Dryden said that the general moral of Don Sebastian is set forth in the last three lines:

This dreadful sentence to the world relate, —
That unrepented crimes, of parents dead,
Are justly punished on their children’s head.

Such an explicit moral was obviously of great importance to Dryden. So was it to Beaumont and Fletcher, who conclude Philaster with a similar sentiment:

Let princes learn
 By this to rule the passions of their blood;
 For what Heaven wills can never be withstood.

Webster had his say at the end of The Duchess of Malfi:

Integrity of life is fame's best friend,
 Which nobly, beyond death, shall crown the end.

And Jonson also at the end of Volpone:

Let all that see these vices thus rewarded,
 Take heart, and love to study 'em. Mischiefs feed
 Like beasts, till they be fat, and then they bleed.

Marlowe goes on at greater length at the end of Dr. Faustus and is brief at the end of The Jew of Malta. Shakespeare is usually somewhat more indirect, but in addition to a sense of an ending, he gives morals at the end of a tragedy as early as Titus Andronicus and as late as King Lear. One need hardly stress the moral cast of A Mirrour for Magistrates, The Fairie Queene, and other lengthier Renaissance poems. Whether we find such concerns naive or not, they are patently there. Whether we find the morals too simple or not, they meant a great deal to their authors. Nor need one stress the cast of joyousness and sorrow in Renaissance songs and lyrics. On June 4, 1599, various satires, erotic verses, and other compositions were burnt by order of Archbishop Whitgift. The Renaissance acted on its convictions: if poetry could teach men virtue, it could also teach them evil.

The problem with Renaissance affectivism for me differs from that of my problem with its mimesis. Some version of affectivism seems to me necessary to account for the reader's experience, for my experience as I read. My feelings and ideas are engaged when I read. That is, we can never consider a literary theory complete that fails to account for what goes on in the reader. But the Renaissance version seems at times too sweeping and at times too simple. It seems no accident that affectivism was termed a fallacy by those American New Critics who were absorbed in that Critical Fiction, the literary object, which supposedly existed independently of its author or its reader. And it seems no accident either that, as we have come to be more concerned with psychological approaches to literature, phenomenology, and reader response, Renaissance affectivism should seem a very proper concern, even to a critic like Stanley Fish who has no belief in, or sympathy with, mimesis. I agree with Fish on those two heads at least but disagree on others and shall get at something of the difference between us by asking a question. We all know that the heyday of mimesis and affectivism in England ran from about 1550 to the end of the eighteenth century, and that even later Coleridge sought to adapt it to expressive theory. Now does not the combination of mimesis and affectivism account for a major portion of the greatest literature in English, including poetic and prose genres? I have said precisely what I think about the limitations of Renaissance literary and other views, but it does seem to me that its uneasily combined mimetic and affective theory managed to account, however crudely we may think it did, for the four main considerations of criticism: the poet, the

world, the expression, and the reader. Fish is so far from believing (in theory) that a literary theory could account for a qualitative difference that he is unwilling to admit (in theory) to normative standards of any kind.³⁰

It seems to me a peculiar advantage of living in our age that we can investigate literature in terms unrelated to reality or to morality. I assent to Fish's thesis that we may admit as literature (or science, religion, etc.) anything that someone chooses to think literary, which may include random jottings as well as sonnets and the most deeply pondered novel. Such permissiveness or broadmindedness has enabled us to understand the bases for our unself-consciously considering, all this while, such writers as Pico, Montaigne, and Hobbes to be literary. Such an approach has helped us understand that a scientific treatise such as Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy or Browne's Hydriotaphia may justly be thought literary, along with such autobiographical writings as Bunyan's Grace Abounding and Pepys's Diary. Such permissiveness, which is so antithetical to the rigorous, exclusive inferences drawn in practice from mimesis, seems to me to have done a world of good in extending the boundaries of literature to limits such as we have often recognized in practice if not in theory.

By the same token, however, I firmly believe that our contemporaries will impoverish their sense of literature if they do not recognize the claims made by Renaissance poetics. If I had not mentioned it already so often, I would enter some claims as well for Asian poetics. Anything that can get us out of our small parish and chapter of time can only do us good. But more than that, Renaissance poetics seems to have certain values for us that we cannot find in contemporary theory, which like any theory is often at variance with what people actually do and think. In his brilliant book, with its insufferable title, Self-Consuming Artifacts, Stanley Fish belies his own purely descriptive theory and entertains certain normative considerations. How else could he prefer one thing over another? How else decide Burton is superior to Browne and Bunyan to other Restoration prose writers? Fish's real talent has been to know when to depart from description for evaluation, and when to engage these contraries in fruitful dialectic. I wholly believe that such inconsistency represents the results of encounter with Renaissance literature, in which values and normative schemes are real and not just theoretic. Stanley Fish can speak about such things as advertising commercials and make a brilliant case for a purely descriptive approach to literature. But he cannot do so in accounting for his experience of Bacon and Browne, Donne and Bunyan. Nor can I or, I think, anyone responsive to Renaissance literature. The values may come to us with a naive theory of poetic teaching, and they may be buttressed by a detestable social system. But they are real. That is, we experience them in reading. And even across three or four centuries, in spite of certain profound changes in society, religion, and science, we still respond as the authors responded to their world. We do not respond exactly as they did by any means. Nor do we respond exactly as do all our contemporaries, as the present and all past states of criticism testify. But we do respond in ways that we are asked, as it were, to respond. When reading Renaissance literature, then, we respond with a strong conviction of reality derived from a well-practiced mimetic theory; and we respond in emotional and ethical ways to a well-embodied affective theory.

In a time like ours when action painting, serial music, and the literature of the absurd have had a desirable effect in extending the boundaries of literature, Renaissance poetics and

literature seem to me particularly valuable for insisting on literary integrity in various guises. One of them is the valued identity of what may be termed literary expressions: Hamlet or Macbeth, Paradise Lost or Paradise Regained. For no matter how far we go toward a purely descriptive, relativistic, or permissive view of literature, there will never come a time when sane readers will confuse Shakespeare's two tragedies or Milton's two epics. There will be no universal agreement about countless details of our response to these achievements; but each is an affective embodiment of reality such as we shall not confuse with another. That evident truth leads to others less obvious. The terms on which it is possible to create literary expressions are like those of other kinds of expression in that they set the terms by which they may be understood. Or to put it differently, we readers and the poet share for the moment the terms and assumptions of the predications of a literary creation. Such a bond between the poet and the reader has as its counterpart the bonds between different readers, whatever our differences of response in detail. One of the loneliest acts of our lives, reading, is yet an act that joins us with contemporaries whom we do not know, with those who have gone before us, and with those who will follow us. And it joins us in the same partial but essential degree with writers eliciting our consent, even when the terms of that consent differ so much as those provided by Shakespeare and Jonson, Donne and Milton.

We cannot claim that Renaissance literature is unique in this respect. Montherlant, Beckett, and Ionesco can also elicit recognition and consent. But Renaissance literature elicits stronger recognition and consent by virtue of that bond between poet and reader being insisted upon as a basis of recognizing reality and its effects on us.

If we take the term literally, such a bond is a Critical Fiction. And at best it may be thought that I am advancing a hypothesis, although I put full faith in it. I have recently completed a three-part study of seventeenth-century poetry in which I argue for and try to demonstrate a modal conception of literature. What I mean by that is that a poet consciously or unconsciously assumes some perceptive, cognitive, and expressive relation between himself, other human creatures, and their world. It seems to me that the radical of characteristic poems usually termed "Metaphysical" is a private mode. That term comes to us from privatus, meaning that belonging to oneself, not public or of the state. Donne's speakers are separated in their own valued uniqueness, and individuality, to one little room. Privare, to separate or deprive, is not amiss; nor is privus, meaning separate, peculiar. The poems by Jonson and others thought characteristic of that other period style termed "Cavalier" are social, valuing what small groups share, what esteemed people have in common against a larger crowd of the foolish or ignorant or corrupt. The social mode very much seems to me to develop out of sixteenth-century lyric poetry, in which a fractious and uncertain court society found means in convention, tradition, and shared values to assert its common bonds and aristocratic values exclusive of other social groups. The lover or friend and certain socii represent the norm. The seventeenth century brought a last adjustment in the public poetry of Butler, Milton, and Dryden, in which characteristically what is valued is what people share, not what separates them. These three seventeenth-century modes are merely relations on points of a graded scale, and we should have to place The Fairie Queene somewhere in the spectrum between the social and the public, although nearer the public. And we should have to place Japanese Court poetry between the private and the social.

My point of course does not rest on names or labels but on the human necessity to draw

a perceptive, cognitive, and expressive relation between the self, other people, and the world. And also on the fact that as readers we immediately recognize the relation and adjust our perceptive and cognitive faculties accordingly. It is in such spirit that I interpret Sidney's remark that the poet ranges the zodiac of wit, creating things in or out of nature, and delivering a golden world.³¹ I take it that poets may legitimately choose to deliver an iron or silver world as well, or even one of fool's gold and that we give consent as to the kind of world, ranging in likewise on our own zodiacs, and coming to do so from our chimney-corners or our games.

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NOTES

¹ Volpone, ed. Alvin B. Kernan (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1962), pp. 28-29.

² Mysteriously Meant (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1970).

³ Virgilius Evangelisans (London, 1634). His Mystagogus Poeticus (London, 1647 and much reprinted) provides a mythography using pagan gods allegorically and typologically.

⁴ Volpone, p. 30.

⁵ The Critical Works, ed. Curt A. Zimansky (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1956), p. 132.

⁶ Volpone, p. 28.

⁷ Classicists have long believed that Virgil developed an Augustan myth. The "symbolism" recently discussed involves something not totally different. See Viktor Pöschl, The Art of Virgil: Image and Symbolism in the Aeneid (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1962); Michael C. I. Putnam, The Poetry of the Aeneid (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1965); and Brooks Otis, Virgil: A Study in Civilized Poetry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963).

⁸ See Paul R. Sellin, Daniel Heinsius and Stuart England (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1968), especially pp. 123ff.; Spingarn's essay, "The Sources of Jonson's 'Discoveries' " [*Modern Philology*, 1 (1905), 450-60] is cited on p. 147.

⁹ The first two are admirably treated by Bernard Weinberg, A History of Literary Criticism in the Italian Renaissance (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1961). No such study exists for Neoplatonism, a fact which is of more significance than many Renaissance scholars would care to admit.

¹⁰ Wilbur Samuel Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700 (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1956), who cites Ong and other students of the subject. For

Puttenham, see The Arte of English Poesie (1589) (Menston: Scolar Press facsimile, 1968). The first book treats "Of Poets and Poesie," the second "Of Proportion Poetical."

¹¹ Tuve, Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1947); Empson, "Donne and the Rhetorical Tradition," Kenyon Review, 11 (1949), 571-87. The skirmishes between these two make up the only literary quarrel I have witnessed that provides instruction as well as diversion to the onlookers.

¹² Howard had to publish it separately as a booklet, "The Logic of Hamlet's Soliloquies" (Lone Pine, Calif.; The Lone Pine Press, 1964) Amongst the rejection notes he received, my favorite had this comment: Howard "can make a Ramist out of Polonius, but he cannot do this to Hamlet!" (p. 22). Actually Polonius's logic is scholastic, as Howard shows.

¹³ See Jonson's poems on Venetia Digby (Eupheme): "3. The Picture of the Body" and "4. The Mind." For Henry More, see Psychozoïa, 1.18ff. For Milton, see what the Attendant Spirit says in his opening speech in Comus. Dryden proposed the middle spirits as credible epic "machines" and so a way out of that theoretical dilemma: Of Dramatic Poets and Other Critical Essays, ed. George Watson, 2 vols. (London: J. M. Dent, 1962), 2, 88-92, later adding that a poet must be "deeply conversant in the Platonic philosophy to deal with them" (2, 178), a typical confusion of Platonism and Neoplatonism.

¹⁴ On the importance of the Hortensius and Cicero generally, see Pierre Paul Courcelle, Late Latin Writers and Their Greek Sources, trans. Harry E. Wedeck (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1969). For Stanley's translation of Pico's "Platonick Discourse on Love," see more conveniently, The Poems and Translations of Thomas Stanley, ed. Galbraith Miller Crump (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), pp. 197-229, one of the few concise treatments of Neoplatonic lore.

¹⁵ Self-Consuming Artifacts (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1972), pp. 5-21.

¹⁶ My edition, which is not atypical, altogether lacks the Greek: Divini Platonis Operum Omnium Quae Extant, 2 vols. ("Apud Iacobum Stoer," 1592), 2, 414ff.

¹⁷ Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1967), pp. 224-32, 423-50.

¹⁸ Richard III, 3. 7. 15ff. in the text of William Allan Neilson and Charles Jarvis Hill (Cambridge, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1942), the text also used subsequently.

¹⁹ The Apologie for Poesie in Elizabethan Critical Essays, ed. G. G. Smith, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1904), 1, 172.

²⁰ Apologie in Smith, 1, 162-71.

²¹ Sir Francis Beaumont, The Knight of the Burning Pestle, 4. 1. 69-71, as in English

Drama 1580-1642, ed. C. F. Tucker Brooke and Nathaniel Burton Paradise (Boston: D. C. Heath, 1933), also the source of other quotations from non-Shakespearean and pre-Restoration drama in what follows. In another explicit passage, the "Boy" actor protests the Wife's desire to have Ralph die on stage, telling her husband: "'T will be very unfit he should die, Sir, upon no occasion, and in a comedy too"' (5. 3. 131-32).

²² Apologie in Smith, 1, 199-200.

²³ The general point is very well made by Ian Donaldson throughout The World Upside-Down: Comedy from Jonson to Fielding (Oxford: Clarendon, 1970), especially Ch. 1.

²⁴ Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, ed. A. R. Shilleto (London: Bellard Sons, 1896), 1, 73. Donne, The First Anniversarie, 11. 214-18.

²⁵ The Works of George Chapman: Homer's Iliad and Odyssey, ed. Richard Herne Shepherd (London: Chatto & Windus, 1892), p. 3.

²⁶ Arte of English Poesie, pp. 1-2, 25.

²⁷ Dryden in Watson, 2, 194. Dryden's "philosopher" is a scientist, against whom Dryden like Sidney and most later critics has some prejudice, it would seem. I do not see why scientists cannot take the liveliest pleasure in the discovery of truth. But in taking like Aristotle – 4. 4864 – the view that our pleasure derives from knowing, Dryden takes a more satisfying view than does Horace or the Roman rhetoricians who approached matters somewhat didactically = docere.

²⁸ Volpone, p. 32.

²⁹ For Dryden, see The Works, ed. Walter Scott, 18 vols. (London: William Miller, 1808), 7, 300, the edition from which I later quote. Congreve's motto is taken from Horace, Satires, 1. 2. 37-38 and 131.

³⁰ This is part of a running critical discussion between us, and I acknowledge with thanks his careful scrutiny of unpublished work of mine. I have stressed his disagreements in theory, because his practice (for reasons mentioned below) shows other concerns.

³¹ Apologie in Smith, 1, 156.

A version of this essay was given as the 1974 Erasmus Lecture at the University of Toronto.

WILLIAM KEACH

Verbal Borrowing in Elizabethan Poetry: Plagiarism or Parody?

The usual approach to verbal borrowing in Elizabethan poetry, represented most fully by Harold Ogden White's Plagiarism and Imitation During the English Renaissance,¹ has been grounded on a suspiciously sharp distinction between proper and improper imitation. (I will be using "imitation" throughout in the rhetorical sense of one writer's detailed following of another writer, rather than in the Platonic or Aristotelian senses of mimesis, of art's copying nature.²) The Elizabethans, we are told, had a much higher regard than we do for proper imitation of other writers' work – for the serious, undisguised, emulative³ appropriation of what is best in one's predecessors. Such imitation is celebrated by virtually every Elizabethan theorist as one of the ways to genuine literary achievement. It had been sanctioned and practiced by the greatest writers of late Greek and Roman antiquity,⁴ and even Sidney, with his championing of the poet's capacity to range "only within the zodiac of his own wit,"⁵ urges "imitation" along with "exercise" and "invention" as one of the cardinal rules for the poet, and complains that his English contemporaries follow "neither artificial rules nor imitative patterns."⁶ At the same time, the Elizabethans were apparently outspoken in their disdain for improper imitation, characterized in White's words by "secrecy, perversity, servility, superficiality."⁷ White argues that the Elizabethan idea of such improper imitation was more restricted than our modern idea of plagiarism, as one might expect among writers who placed such a high value on proper imitation. The first recorded instance of the word "plagiary" does not appear until Joseph Hall's Virgidemiae of 1598, and Hall seems to mean by it mere servile copying with no element of transforming imitation or emulation.⁸ When Ben Jonson uses the word again in Poetaster (1601), he does so in the strict sense in which Martial first applied the Latin term plagiarius in his epigrams to outright literary theft.⁹ Still, according to White and subsequent literary historians, the Elizabethans consistently distinguished the servile, furtive borrowing of hack writers – which, incidentally, they seemed to be always complaining about – from the genuine forms of serious imitation they admired.

In conceptual terms alone this dichotomized view of what the Elizabethans thought and practiced leaves out a good deal of potentially interesting writing. Among other things it does not allow adequately, at least not explicitly, for verbal parody, understood either in the usual comic or satirical sense as "imitation which, through distortion and exaggeration, evokes amusement, derision, and . . . scorn." or in the specialized neutral and entirely formal sense extracted so delicately by Rosemond Tuve from musicological usage in her discussion of Herbert's poem entitled "A Parodie."¹⁰ Whether the Elizabethans had a developed theoretical

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concept of parody or not is questionable. The word is not recorded until 1607. The OED tells us incorrectly that Ben Jonson uses “parody” in the 1598 version of Every Man in His Humour, an error which unfortunately suits my case perfectly, since it suggests that “plagiarism” and “parody” first appear in the same year. But in fact the passage cited by the OED does not appear until the revised version of Jonson’s play printed in the 1616 folio.¹¹ In any case “parody” is not taken up in Elizabethan theoretical treatments of imitation, a fact which may account for its absence from most modern discussion of Elizabethan literary imitation. Yet we all know that the Elizabethans were exuberant and accomplished masters of verbal parody, particularly in drama. When one thinks about it, in fact, no other form of imitation seems quite so well suited to the Elizabethan taste for verbal ingenuity.

The range of examples I want to focus on may be located, tentatively, somewhere within a conceptual triangle formed, at its apex, by the high-minded imitation traditionally celebrated by Elizabethan theorists, and, at its two other extremes, by servile plagiarism on the one side and by satiric parody on the other.¹² As I have indicated, my examples seem to me neither plagiaristic nor parodic, though they have been held to be either one or the other by various commentators. I have drawn my examples from the Ovidian narrative poems which gained a special prominence during the 1590s. Highly self-conscious verbal borrowing was a feature of this Elizabethan genre from the beginning, and it may be that the conclusions I draw will have only a more or less localized relevance to this particular kind of poem. I suspect, however, that the attitude towards verbal borrowing demonstrated by Ovidian poets has a wider applicability. Robert Greene catches something of the imitative spirit I am interested in when, in the dedication to his prose narrative The Mirror of Modesty (1584), he responds to charges of improper borrowing: “I excuse my selfe with the answere that Varro made, when he offered Ennius workes to the Emperour: I give [quoth he] another mans picture, but freshlie flourished with mine owne colours.”¹³ Sir John Harington is more to the point, however, when he explains in his Epigram 112 that he doesn’t mind other writers’ “stealing” from him at all, as long as they do it well:

I would esteeme it (trust me) grace, not shame,
If Davis, or if Daniel did the same
I, when I list, could doe to them the like.¹⁴
(11. 5-8)

Whether there is any real significance to the fact that the words “plagiarism” and “parody” come into the language at the very end of the Elizabethan period, when the Ovidian narrative was completing its brief “vogue” and when the self-ironic bravura conveyed by Harington’s epigram was a familiar attitude, is at least an entertaining point for conjecture.

In 1594, the year after the publication of Shakespeare’s Venus and Adonis and the appearance in manuscript of Marlowe’s Hero and Leander, the young Thomas Heywood, who had come down to London from Cambridge at age nineteen or twenty to make his career as a professional writer, published a poem called Oenone and Paris.¹⁵ Heywood takes his narrative primarily from Ovid and Lucian, but the verbal surface is filled with echoes of Shakespeare’s epyllion. In his edition of Oenone and Paris, J.Q. Adams noted some fifty close parallels with Venus and Adonis and described Heywood’s poem as “a close imitation” in which “verbal plagiarism . . . is everywhere conspicuous.”¹⁶ If we look closely at Heywood’s borrowings,

however, some of them turn out to be more interesting and distinctive in their effect than any mere characterization of "plagiarism" would suggest. Consider Heywood's echoing, in his prefatory address "To the Courteous Reader," of Shakespeare's language in his dedication to Southampton. Shakespeare had apologized conventionally to Southampton by means of an extended procreative image: "But if the first heir of my invention prove deformed, I shall be sorry it had so noble a god-father: and never after ear so barren a land, for fear it yield me still so bad a harvest."¹⁷ Heywood alters Shakespeare's decorous image and tone to a more jaunty joke and swagger: "Gentlemen: to make a long Preamble to a short sute were follie, & therefore (in briefe) thus: Heare you have the first fruits of my indevours and the Maiden head of my Pen. . . ." The idea of flawed poetic offspring has been transformed into the willing surrender of one's literary virginity.

The spirit of this prefatory borrowing is evident elsewhere in Oenone and Paris. The stanza from Venus and Adonis so admired by Coleridge,¹⁸ in which Adonis finally breaks loose from Venus's embrace, begins with four lines resonant with the fluctuating tone of the Shakespeare poem as a whole:

With this, he breaketh from the sweet embrace
Of those fair arms which bound him to her breast.
And homeward through the dark laund runs apace:
Leaves Love upon her back deeply distress'd.
(11. 811-14)

Heywood rounds off an analogous moment in his narrative with a couplet which borrows from and cleverly displaces Shakespeare's language:

Hee breaketh holde, and from her armes hee skippes,
Yet first hee kist her on her rose-redde lippes.
(11. 713-14)

One can see in a passage like this why the author of a Notes and Queries article published a few years before Adams' edition of Oenone and Paris argued that Heywood's appropriations from Shakespeare amounted not just to "close imitation" or "plagiarism," but to deliberate travesty.¹⁹ Yet as Louis Zocca has suggested, "travesty," "parody," or "burlesque" seem the wrong words in this case.²⁰ In the two borrowings we have looked at Heywood does take Shakespeare's language in a more obviously comic direction, but the overall effect in his narrative of a vulnerable woman's humiliation by her arrogant, obtuse former lover is not simply comic. In fact Heywood's entire conception of the insolent, foppish Paris' rejection of Oenone works as a resourceful, and at times rather subtle, variation on the rejection of Venus by Shakespeare's Adonis. Furthermore, there are moments in Shakespeare's poem which are much more broadly comic than anything in Heywood's – Venus's plucking Adonis from his horse, for example. Heywood's borrowings are clearly meant to be recognized, and there is an equally clear delight in his reworking Shakespeare's language. But there is nothing genuinely parodic or travesty in what Heywood does with Venus and Adonis. He is not mocking Shakespeare. nor is he exactly supplanting the text of a shared formal configuration with another text, in Miss Tuve's serious

neutral sense of “parody.” He rather appears to be demonstrating his literary virtuosity and sophistication by playing inventive variations on the most urbanely stylish poem of his day and by asserting his independence from a model he quite obviously admires.

As an instructive aside on Heywood’s borrowings from Shakespeare and on the charges of plagiarism leveled at him by modern commentators, it is worth noting that some years after his literary debut in Oenone and Paris it was Heywood who was in a position to complain about inappropriate borrowings by Shakespeare. Among the poems attributed to Shakespeare in the 1612 edition of The Passionate Pilgrim are translations by Heywood of two epistles from Ovid’s Heroides: “Paris to Helen” and “Helen to Paris.”²¹ It is likely that Heywood produced these translations in the 1590s when he was working on the closely related subject of Oenone and Paris, but he did not publish them until 1609, in the first edition of Troia Britannica. Heywood’s response to the reappearance of his translations under Shakespeare’s name is curious. In a letter to his printer, Nicholas Okes, appended to An Apology for Actors of 1612, he refers to The Passionate Pilgrim as a “lesse volume,” but he is openly deferential and protective towards Shakespeare. He is troubled less by the fact of the piracy itself than by the possibility that the appearance of his translations “under the name of another . . . may put the world in opinion I might steale them from him; and hee to doe himselfe right, hath since published them in his owne name. . . .”²² Heywood’s worry is that readers will assume that he sole manuscript versions of the translations from Shakespeare, not that Shakespeare stole from Heywood’s printed work. A cynical observer might interpret Heywood’s deference to an almost fulsome admiration for his contemporary – he goes on to “acknowledge my lines not worthy his patronage” – as a nervous disguise lest his own earlier borrowings from Venus and Adonis in Oenone and Paris be discovered. I think it much more likely, though, that the case is just the reverse: that Heywood could run the risk of publicly discussing the suspicion that he might steal from Shakespeare because in his own mind there was no question of his borrowings in Oenone and Paris being taken as the kind of covert literary thievery we call “plagiarism.”²³

A year after the publication of Oenone and Paris, in 1595, two epyllia called Cephalus and Procris and Narcissus were published under the authorship of one Thomas Edwards, otherwise unknown. Edwards’ two poems borrow as extensively from Marlowe’s Hero and Leander as Heywood borrowed from Shakespeare, and they have been similarly dismissed as plagiarism. Edwards, says Zocca, “set out consciously to imitate Marlowe, and his pilferings are constant evidence of his efforts to bolster a weak poem.”²⁴ Yet Edwards’ less obvious indebtedness to George Chapman’s Shadow of Night (1594) may suggest what is in fact borne out in many of his borrowings from Marlowe: that he regarded the wit and eroticism of Hero and Leander as effects not just to be copied, but to be challenged and reinterpreted.²⁵ Here is Marlowe’s evocation of the coming of night as Hero and Leander stand looking dazedly at one another after their first meeting:

Thus while dumb signs their yielding hearts entangled,
The air with sparks of living fire was spangled,
And Night, deep drench’d in misty Acheron,
Heav’d up her head, and half the world upon
Breath’d darkness forth (dark night is Cupid’s day).

(I. 187-91)

Edwards reworks this language with a critical self-awareness at the moment in his poem when Cephalus, in disguise, succeeds in a mock-adulterous seduction of his own wife:

“The duskie vapours of the middle earth,
 “Drawne from contagious dewes, & noisome breathes,
 “Choakt the cleere day: and now from Acheron,
 “Blacke dismall night was come the world uppon,
 “Fitting true lovers, and their sweete repast. . . .”²⁶

(II. 453-57)

Where Marlowe had only hinted with paradoxical wit at the sinister and exploitative power of sexual love finally freed by the concealment of darkness, Edwards makes this the dominant idea of his passage. Recognizing not only the broader parallelism of image and idea but the specific phrases taken over almost directly from Hero and Leander (especially the inversion of “the world uppon”) is an important part of seeing how Edwards actually diverges quite purposively from his model.

This particular passage in Cephalus and Procris raises a question about borrowing and echoing peculiar to Edwards’ poems, at least among Ovidian narratives. The passage, like many others in Cephalus and Procris, is marked with quotation marks at the beginning, though not at the end, of each line. According to R. B. McKerrow, such initial punctuation was used in the Renaissance primarily to call attention to sententious passages. Inverted commas were not especially associated with direct quotation until the eighteenth century, he observes, “although, owing to their use for calling especial attention to a passage, they often appear in passages which are actually quoted.”²⁷ How does this punctuation function in Edwards’ poem, particularly in relation to his borrowing from Marlowe? Though it might be going too far to say that he uses inverted commas mainly to draw attention to the borrowing, we can at least assume that if the author himself, and not just the printer, were responsible for the punctuation, it is certain evidence that he was not trying to conceal what he took. Furthermore although initial inverted commas appear in many places in Cephalus and Procris which are to some degree sententious and conventional, as in the passage just examined, they also happen to appear at places which are not sententious or conventional but where the borrowing from Marlowe is extensive.²⁸ Such punctuation does seem to be associated with Edwards’ non-plagiaristic verbal borrowing and allusion.

In Narcissus, the companion piece to Cephalus and Procris, the quirky virtuosity of Edwards’ borrowings from Marlowe is even more emphatically present. Narcissus, who speaks retrospectively in the poem about his own life and identity after the manner of the tragic complaint, first welcomes the figure of Leander to share his sorrow, along with Adonis. But then, in an extension of the partly critical attitude towards Marlowe’s poem also displayed in Cephalus and Procris, he rudely sends Leander away:

No, no Leander, thou lasciviously
 Didst play with love, and with thy love hadst sport,
 Ne’er didst thou morn, but as thou lived’st didst die,
 Telling Musaeus he the world of what

Thy dandling tresses of fair Hero got: . . .
(II. 190-94)

This is an arch conflation of and variation on three passages in Marlowe. Two come from the opening portrait of Leander –

Amorous Leander, beautiful and young
(Whose tragedy divine Musaeus sung)
(I. 51-52)

and

His dandling tresses that were never shorn . . .
(I. 55)

The third comes from the climactic account of Hero's capitulation in Sestiad II:

. . .this strife of hers (like that
Which made the world) another world begat
Of unknown joy.
(II. 291-93)

The almost sarcastic colloquialism of Edwards' passage does bring him at this moment into something like a parodic relationship to Marlowe. Were Hero and Leander itself not so well insulated against parody by its own worldly irony, one might be inclined to call Edwards' passage "parodic." In any case, Edwards' borrowings are certainly closer to parody than to plagiarism. They partake of the virtuoso independence of Heywood's borrowings from Shakespeare, but with an additional bent towards the crabbed and the satirical peculiar to Edwards' writing in the Ovidian mode.

One could cite many other examples of verbal borrowing in the Ovidian narrative which have provoked and puzzled modern readers. John Weever's Faunus and Melliflora (1600) has been described by Hallett Smith as "the most slavish of all the imitations of Shakespeare and Marlowe,"²⁹ and by Helmut Castrop as a "highly conscious parody."³⁰ But one final instance from another poem will perhaps suffice to clarify the witty virtuosity which seems to me so important to the late Elizabethan attitude towards this practice. In 1602 the young Francis Beaumont published Salmacis and Hermaphroditus, a poem which in several respects culminates the development of the Elizabethan Ovidian narrative. Like all the Ovidian poets, Beaumont borrows from Shakespeare and Marlowe. The verbal echoes of Hero and Leander are especially striking: Douglas Bush describes one passage as "almost plain theft."³¹ The portraits of Beaumont's protagonists are filled with details taken from Marlowe's presentation of his two lovers. But at several points Beaumont executes an ingenious reversal in his borrowings, a reversal fully in keeping with his mythological subject. The portrait of Hermaphroditus recalls Marlowe's Hero almost as strongly as it does Leander: the line "His legge was straighter then the thigh of Jove" (l. 77)³² reminds us that Leander's "body was as straight as Circe's wand" (l. 61), but the fact that "For his white hand each goddess did him woo" (l. 75) reminds us even more precisely that the wind and sun

took great delight "To play upon [Hero's] hands, they were so white" (I. 30). Conversely, the nymph Salmacis is praised for her "straight . . . body" and "soft . . . belly" (II. 106-7), details which echo Marlowe's Leander portrait:

His body was as straight as Circe's wand . . .
(I. 61)

How smooth his breast was, and how white his belly . . .
(I. 66)

These details, along with Salmacis' "sweet . . . face," recall quite pointedly what Marlowe's narrator says about Leander's face:

Some swore he was a maid in man's attire,
For in his looks were all that men desire . . .
(I. 83-84)

Beaumont's protagonists are not only descriptively like each other, they are also like their corresponding sexual opposites in *Hero and Leander*. His imitative technique is playful and self-dramatizing, but there is no suggestion at all that he is parodying Marlowe in a critical or satirical sense. Most importantly of all, Beaumont's borrowings are integral to his pervasively ironic recasting of Ovid's strange and haunting episode.

Judging from the practice of Ovidian poets, late Elizabethan writers had an open and spirited attitude towards the clever appropriation of phrases, lines, and even larger verbal patterns from their predecessors and contemporaries. The modern tendency to regard their appropriations either as "plagiarism" or as "parody" may actually have begun at the very end of the Elizabethan period, when a new generation of writers was beginning to grow impatient with many forms of Elizabethan verbal extravagance, and when the words "plagiary" and "parody" come into the English language. There is plenty of genuine plagiarism in Elizabethan literature, and plenty of genuine parody. But the verbal borrowing which is neither and which stands in a relationship of witty or challenging rather than grave emulation to its source seems to me the really interesting phenomenon to recognize as something especially characteristic of Elizabethan poetic virtuosity.

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NOTES

¹ Volume XII in *Harvard Studies in English* (Cambridge, Mass., 1935). White's interests are anticipated to some extent by Phoebe Sheavyn, *The Literary Profession in the Elizabethan Age* (Manchester, 1909), esp. pp. 134-35, and by H. M. Paull, *Literary Ethics: A Study in the Growth of the Literary Conscience* (London, 1928), Ch. IX, X, and the appendix on "Plagiarism." For reviews of White's Book, see D. C. Allen, *JEGP* 34 (1935), 597-99; Geoffrey Bullough, *MLR* 31 (1936), 211-13; Douglas Bush, *MLN* 31 (1936), 198-99; Austin Warren, *Sewanee Review* 44

(1936), 244-46; and especially Alice Walker, RES 13 (1937), 88-90. For later literary historians who have essentially followed White, see Edwin Haviland Miller, The Professional Writer in Elizabethan England (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), esp. pp. 231-41, and J. W. Saunders, The Profession of English Letters (London, 1964), Ch. III and IV. The best survey of Continental, particularly Italian, writing about "imitation" in the Renaissance is Walter J. Bullock's "The Precept of Plagiarism in the Cinquecento," MP 25 (1928), 293-312.

² According to Gerald F. Else's article on "imitation" in The Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, ed. Alex Preminger (Princeton, 1965), p. 379, "the Renaissance inherited three ideas of imitation from antiquity: (1) the Platonic: a copying of sensuous reality, (2) the Aristotelian: a representation of the universal patterns of human behavior, and of an action embodying these, and (3) the Hellenistic and rhetorical: imitation of canonized literary models." The OED, curiously, does not distinguish a special literary meaning of this third sense until the seventeenth century, although the words "imitate" and "imitation" were often applied to literary copying or emulation throughout the sixteenth century. The finest discussion of Elizabethan "imitation" as expressing the relation of art to reality is that of Rosemond Tuve, Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery (Chicago, 1947): see esp. p. 24, n. 15 — "I speak here . . . of Elizabethan notions of the relation of art to reality. The actual word 'imitation' was, of course, frequently used to signify one of the processes by which students supposedly learned to maintain that relation justly — i.e., the imitation of Latin authors . . ." White observes (p. 61, n. 1): "Elizabethan literary theorists, like their Continental teachers, continually employ the word 'imitation,' without distinction, for following nature [mimesis] and for following other writers."

One would like to know when "imitation" was first applied not to the following of "canonized literary models," but to the use of material from one's immediate predecessors or contemporaries. White does not discuss this distinction. Elizabethan writers like Webbe (A Discourse of English Poesy, in Elizabethan Critical Essays, ed. Smith, I, 232) and Nashe (Strange News of the Interception of Certain Letters . . . in Works, ed. McKerrow, I, 317) use "imitate" and "imitation" to talk about unscrupulous literary borrowing among contemporary writers.

³ "Emulate" and "emulation" come from Latin aemulatio — "an assiduous striving to equal or excel another in anything . . ." (Lewis and Short, A Latin Dictionary). The OED shows "emulation" common enough in the latter half of the sixteenth century in reference to behavior or action, but the first example which suggests its literary meaning is from Brinsley's Ludus Literarius of 1612.

⁴ See Ch. I of White's book: J. W. K. Atkins, English Literary Criticism: The Renaissance (London, 1947), pp. 86-91; and Else's article in the Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics cited in note 2 above. In his review of White's book (see note 1 above), Allen adds the important observation that it was from the grammar-school methods of teaching ancient language and literature "that the Englishmen of this period learned the canons of imitation."

⁵ Quoted from An Apology for Poetry, ed. Geoffrey Shepherd (London, 1965), p. 100.

⁶ Ibid., p. 133.

⁷ Plagiarism and Imitation, p. 119.

⁸ See OED B.2, which cites Virgideviae IV. ii.83-4; "Or an, Hos ego, from old Petrarchs spright / Unto a Plagiariic sonnet-wright." (Quoted from Collected Poems, ed. A. Davenport, Liverpool, 1949). The first use of "plagiar-ism" recorded in the QED is 1621.

⁹ See Poetaster IV.iii.95-6: "TIBU. Why? the ditti's all borrowed; 'tis HORACES: hang him plagiary" (Works, ed. C. H. Herford and Percy Simpson, Oxford, 1932, VI, 268). On Martial's use of plagium and plagiarius, see White, Plagiarism and Imitation, p. 16 and Paull, Literary Ethics, p. 102. Martial first uses "plagiarius" for "plagiarist" in Epigrams I. 52: ". . . dicas esse meos manaque missos. / hoc si terque quaterque clamitaris, / impones plagiario pudorem" (" . . . say that they are mine, sent forth from my hand. If thrice or four times you shout this, you will shame the plagiarist" – trans. Walter C. A. Ker in the Loeb Library edition).

¹⁰ Gilbert Highet, The Anatomy of Satire (Princeton, 1962), p. 69; Rosemond Tuve, "Sacred 'Parody' of Love Poetry and Herbert," in Essays by Rosemond Tuve, ed. Thomas P. Roche, Jr. (Princeton, 1970), esp. pp. 208-16.

¹¹ See OED 1 and Every Man in His Humour (1616) V.v. 25-7: "CLEM. . . . How? this is stolne! E.Kn. A Parodie! a parodie! with a kind of miraculous gift, to make it absurder then it was" (ed. Herford and Simpson, III, 400). Compare V.iii.284 ff. in the 1601 Quarto of the play (ed. Herford and Simpson, III, 284), which is presumably the version first acted in 1598. The 1607 citation of "parody" in the OED is from Thomas Walkington's The Optic Glasse of Humors.

¹² Michael Hancher has suggested to me that this scheme presupposes a vertical axis designating levels of imitative seriousness, and a pair of horizontal axes designating levels (a) of referentiality and (b) of approval or hostility. Parody is normally hostile and depends upon reference, either implicit or explicit, to the writing being imitated, while plagiarism approves, however cynically, of the imitated work and depends upon a total absence or suppression of reference, on a mendacious presentation of verbal borrowing for verbal originality.

¹³ Quoted from Life and Complete Works, ed. Alexander B. Grosart (London, 1881-1886), III, 7-8.

¹⁴ Quoted from The Epigrams of Sir John Harington, ed. Norman McClure (Philadelphia, 1926). Verbal borrowing among Elizabethan sonnet-writers has, of course, been widely acknowledged, although the focus is usually on what English poets took from Continental writers. See Sir Sidney Lee, "The Elizabethan Sonnet," The Cambridge History of English Literature (Cambridge, 1918), III, 248: "The full story of the Elizabethan sonnet is, for the most part, a suggestive chapter in the literary records of plagiarism."

¹⁵ See J. Q. Adams, ed., Oenone and Paris (Washington, D.C., 1943), pp. xxvi-xlv. Quotations are from this edition. For additional commentary on Heywood's authorship and early career, see Arthur Melville Clark, Thomas Heywood, Playwright and Dramatist (Oxford, 1931), p. 8 and n., and Frederick S. Boas, Thomas Heywood (London, 1950), pp. 12-13.

Heywood's authorship is also accepted by Hallett Smith, Elizabethan Poetry: A Study in Conventions, Meaning, and Expression (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), p. 92, and by Elizabeth Story Donno, ed., Elizabethan Minor Epics (New York, 1963), p. 11 and n. 2.

¹⁶ Oenone and Paris, pp. ix, xi. See also Hyder Rollins, ed., Shakespeare: The Poems: Variorum (Philadelphia, 1938), p. 449, and Boas, Heywood, p. 12.

¹⁷ Quotations are from the New Arden edition of the Poems, ed. F. T. Prince (London, 1960).

¹⁸ See Coleridge's Writings on Shakespeare, ed. Terence Hawkes (New York, 1959), pp. 56-61.

¹⁹ J. D. Parsons, "Earliest Critical Notice of Shakespeare," N. & Q., 157 (November 9, 1929), 325.

²⁰ See Louis Zocca, Elizabethan Narrative Poetry (New Brunswick, 1950), p. 256: "The poem has been termed a 'travesty of Shakespeare.' Actually it is merely a frank imitation . . . there is no evidence of any such treatment of Venus and Adonis as might be implied by the word 'travesty.' "

²¹ See the Arden edition of Shakespeare's Poems, ed. C. Knox Pooler (London, 1911), p. lxxi.

²² An Apology for Actors (London, 1612), p. G4r-G4v.

²³ Cf. Zocca, Elizabethan Narrative Poetry, p. 74, on Harington's acknowledged borrowings from Sidney's Defence in his own "Preface" to his translation of the Orlando Furioso: "A literary thief would not so invite comparison between his booty and the source he had plundered."

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 260-61.

²⁵ Apart from C. S. Lewis's dismissive comment that Edwards' writing is "like a bad imitation of Chapman at his worst" (English Literature in the Sixteenth Century, Excluding Drama, Oxford, 1956, p. 510), Chapman's influence on Edwards has not been studied. But evidence of such influence is very strong. The dedicatory stanzas to Thomas Argall conclude with the lines "What were it then for me to praise the light?/When none, but one, commends dark shady night," almost certainly an allusion to Chapman's exhortation to the aspiring poet to "serve the night" in The Shadow of Night (l. 328). And at the end of Cephalus and Procris Edwards announces even more directly "Henceforth I'll serve the night" (Quotations are from Donno's Elizabethan Minor Epics). If, as most scholars believe, Cephalus and Procris was written as early as October 1593, when a poem entitled Procris and Cephalus was entered anonymously in the Stationers' Register, then Edwards probably saw Chapman's The Shadow of Night in manuscript before it was published in 1594. See Cephalus and Procris. Narcissus, ed. W. E. Buckley (London, 1882), pp. v-vii, and Charlotte Carmichael Stopes, "Thomas Edwards, Author of 'Cephalus and Procris, Narcissus,'" MLR 16 (1921), 209.

²⁶ This passage belongs to the larger complex of night imagery in Cephalus and Procris, the overall meaning of which is difficult to determine. It is worth pointing out that a marginal note to the opening lines of the poem describes that passage as "A paraphrasis of the Night" (see Buckley's ed., p. 6). Virtually the same marginal note, apparently by Chapman, appears three years later in the 1598 edition of Hero and Leander, next to the Marlowe passage imitated by Edwards in lines 453-57.

²⁷ An Introduction to Bibliography for Literary Students (Oxford, 1927; rpr. 1967), pp. 316-18.

²⁸ See, for example, ll. 175-98 of Cephalus and Procris, which echo I.165 ff, I.471 ff., and II.331 of Hero and Leander, or ll. 289-92, which echo Hero and Leander I.361-62.

²⁹ Elizabethan Poetry, p. 99.

³⁰ Shakespeares Verserzählungen: Eine Untersuchung der ovidischen Epik im Elizabethanischen England (Marburg, 1964), p. 169. Castrop's words are "ein höchst gekonnte Parodie."

³¹ Mythology and the Renaissance Tradition in English Poetry, rev. ed. (New York, 1963), p. 186.

³² Quotations are from Donno's Elizabethan Minor Epics.

PETER HUGHES

Originality and Allusion in the Writings of Edmund Burke

When Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France first appeared in 1790, Horace Walpole praised it for reasons I should like to reflect on in this paper. "The wit and satire are equally brilliant," said Walpole, "and the whole is wise, though in some points he goes too far – yet in general there is far less want of judgement than could be expected of him. If it could be translated, which from the wit and metaphors and allusions is almost impossible, I should think it would be a classic book in all countries, except in present France. To their tribunes it speaks daggers, though, unlike them, it uses none."¹ In praising the Reflections as both a literary text and a propagandist act, as both discourse and event, Walpole recognizes that Burke's vehemence and originality, far from being at odds with his figurative and allusive style, seem to be characterised by that style. What I propose here is a discussion of the implications for literary history of Burke's rhetorical style. As these implications become clearer through a reading of three texts from Burke's writings, we shall see that Burke's originality, which is so caught up with obsessive notions of ancestry, generation, and origins, requires – by an understandable paradox – an allusive literary, even histrionic style, a style that serves as its and his own genealogy. I shall then point out some of the relations that Burke's style has with what I consider the great transformation in English (and indeed in European) literary history: the change through which literary discourse became less and less a way of representing, a way of saying something else, and more and more an enactment of itself, a way of saying that becomes a mode of existence. The notion of imitation itself is transformed, because the idea that literature is mimetic changes increasingly into the expectation that it will be expressive and even self-reflexive. In this transformation, which Burke prefigures and Romanticism continues, discourse turns into event, rhetorical statement turns into perlocutionary act, an event that happens in and through discourse. This is what Walpole hints at in his comment about Burke's attack on the French revolutionaries. "To their tribunes it speaks daggers, though, unlike them, it uses none."

Burke's opponents, and even some sympathetic observers who were disturbed by his violence, noticed this strangeness in his stylistic originality. His speeches and writings were in their eyes at once too literary and too directed toward actual results. What Walpole praised others criticized: the characteristics of Burke's style that made it seem at once too theatrical and too actual. Tom Paine was one of many who noticed the immense impact of Burke's Reflections, which he sought to counteract in The Rights of Man. There Paine attacks Burke, for clear polemical reasons, as a theatrical falsifier: "I cannot consider Mr. Burke's book in scarcely any other light than a dramatic performance; and he must, I think, have considered it in the same

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light himself, by the poetical liberties he has taken. . . .”² But there was more to Paine’s criticism than the charge that the *Reflections* were too literary – “a pathless wilderness of rhapsodies.”³ He noticed that Burke substitutes an order of discourse for an order of events, and that this substitution involves a triumph of imagination, a Pyrrhic victory through which Burke seems to be divided against himself, blind to any suffering that does not rise (or sink) to a theatrical kind of aesthetic experience. This is the full significance of Paine’s most often quoted comments:

It is painful to behold a man employing his talents to corrupt himself. Nature has been kinder to Mr. Burke than he is to her. He is not affected by the reality of distress touching his heart, but by the showy resemblance of it striking his imagination. He pities the plumage, but forgets the dying bird.⁴

And yet the converse of Burke’s allusive and literary style is its power to influence, even to bring about, historical events. Every reader of Burke’s *Reflections* is reminded that its descriptions, written in 1790, of revolutionary bloodshed and outrage anticipate events. The Terror was still nearly three years off, and as we shall see, even Burke’s account of the women’s march on Versailles of October 1789 intensifies and overdoes his own sources in ways that transform the meaning of those events, turning them into sacrilege and horror. Another American opponent of Burke, Joel Barlow, points this out in language that throws back at Burke some of his own Miltonic allusions:

Giving himself up to the frenzy of an unbridled imagination, he conceives himself writing tragedy, without being confined to the obvious laws of fiction . . . he paints ideal murders, that they may be avenged by the reality of a wide extended slaughter; he transforms the mildest and most generous people in Europe into a nation of monsters and atheists; “heaping mountains upon mountains, and waging war with heaven” . . . the war of Mr. Burke was let loose, with all the horrors he intended to excite. And what is the language proper to be used in describing the character of a man, who, in his situation, at his time of life, and for a pension of only fifteen hundred pounds a year, could sit down deliberately in his closet and call upon the powers of earth and hell to inflict such a weight of misery on the human race?⁵

We should notice too that Barlow recognizes something original, even monstrous, about a kind of writing that offers all the freedoms of fiction and none of its restraints. The monstrous element in Burke’s achievement, at least according to Barlow, is that his *Reflections on the French Revolution* helped to provoke and bring about the wars that convulsed Europe for a generation; and that the provocation was precisely through that excessively allusive and literary style that turned complex historical events into scenes from a demonic revenge tragedy.

Coleridge was among the first to notice that Burke’s line of argument combined eloquence with unlimited moral severity. As he observed in *The Friend* of 1809, Burke’s disagreements are always total: “If his opponents are theorists, then everything is to be founded on prudence, on mere calculations of expediency; and every man is represented as acting according to the state of his own immediate self-interest. Are his opponents calculators? Then calculation itself is

represented as a sort of crime."⁶ The allusions by which Burke darkens and vilifies his opponents often clearly refer to literary texts that support such a plan or impulse. Burke's Reflections probably includes more allusions to Paradise Lost than any other work except Frankenstein. To take one example among many, consider this description of the policies of the National Assembly toward the estates of the church and the nobility: "Flushed with the insolence of their first inglorious victories, and pressed by the distresses caused by their lust of unhallowed lucre, disappointed, but not discouraged, they have at length ventured completely to subvert all property of all descriptions throughout the extent of a great kingdom."⁷ This seems to me not only an allusion to Milton's "sons of Belial," but also to the lascivious corruption that both Milton and Burke associate with angelic revolt and demonic revolution:

In courts and palaces he also reigns
 And in luxurious cities, where the noise
 Of riot ascends above their loftiest tow'rs,
 And injury and outrage; and when night
 Darkens the streets, then wander forth the sons
 Of Belial, flown with insolence and wine.
 (PL. I, 497-502)

Between Milton and Burke, as a possible intermediary refuge, stands Dryden's allusion to these same lines in Absalom and Achitophel, where spiritual revolt merges into political rebellion: "During his office, treason was no crime; / The sons of Belial had a glorious time" (597-98). And finally, since even before Milton's use of the phrase, "the sons of Belial" had been a Puritan insult aimed at any group they thought to be wicked,⁸ such a glancing allusion gives overtones of sensual depravity to Burke's description of revolutionary economics.

This allusive association between revolution, blasphemy, and sexual excess, so frequent in Burke as to seem compulsive, may at times be quite oblique, even learned, e.g., "These Theban and Thracian Orgies, acted in France, and applauded only in the Old Jewry, I assure you, kindle prophetic enthusiasm in the minds but of very few people in this kingdom. . . ." At other times they can be brutally direct. One example of this, and one that helps to explain why Burke shocked some of his contemporaries, appears in a figurative and allusive comparison provoked by the extremist claims of unlimited freedom and rebellion made by both English and French revolutionaries: "I confess to you, Sir, I never liked this continual talk of resistance and revolution, or the practice of making the extreme medicine of the constitution its daily bread. It renders the habit of society dangerously valetudinary: it is taking periodical doses of mercury sublimate, and swallowing down repeated provocatives of cantharides to our love of liberty."¹⁰ The venereal allusions here may no longer be so clear to us (catharides is, for example, the pharmaceutical name for Spanish Fly) but they would have been both plain and startling to their first reader. What Burke produces through his unrestrained use of allusion is a form of originality we have since come to recognize as a demagogic tradition; it is the freedom of the imagination to create out of shifting structures and events an esthetic effect that then becomes an actual cause of future events. This can easily come about when the imagination is applied to politics. "For in the imagination," as one of Burke's contemporaries put it, "everything loses its natural shape, and everything is altered, and within it we create liberties as our eyes create shapes in the clouds"¹¹ – words addressed by Saint-Just to the Convention in 1793.

When we examine Burke's writings more closely, his allusions cluster around a central and obsessive question – how can ancestry and tradition be preserved? His originality lies in his concern with origins. The most persistent reference in these allusions is texts that offer the figure of the father, and Burke defends the paternal figure against parricidal attacks. Even in parliamentary discourse, as in a Commons speech of 1782, he presents the English constitution through this figure: "I look with filial reverence on the constitution of my country, and never will cut it in pieces, and put it into the kettle of my magician, in order to boil it, with the puddle of their compounds, into youth and vigor. On the contrary, I will drive away such pretenders; I will nurse its venerable age, and with lenient arts extend a parent's breath."¹² Apart from the gruesome reference here to the cooking of the father in a magician's kettle, which seems to be a blurred allusion to several folk tales, we also find a literary allusion to an identifiable text, to some pious and famous couplets from Pope's Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot:

Me, let the tender Office long engage
To rock the Cradle of reposing Age,
With lenient Arts extend a Mother's breath,
Make Languor smile, and smooth the Bed of Death (408-11)

We shall soon see how persistent this allusion is in Burke's writings. It runs through his writings from the beginning to the end of his career. We find it varied and twisted, but the bridge by which he crosses over from the private to the public meanings of this allusion is the extended importance of legacy and inheritance as at once the proof and the perpetuation of origins.

Inheritance, as many others have noticed, was one of the central issues raised by the French Revolution. Michelet recognized that guilt and injustice are transmitted through inheritance from one generation to the next, and he recognized in addition that in its origins and continuity the link is carnal and genital:

[The Revolution] did not ground fraternity on a common relationship – a filiation which transmits, with our blood, the participation of crime from father to son.

This carnal, material principle, which introduces justice and injustice into the blood, and transmits them, with the tide of life, from one generation to another, violently contradicts the spiritual notion of Justice which is implanted in the depths of the human soul. No: Justice is not a fluid, to be transmitted with generation.¹³

Burke sees the same elements in the principle of inheritance that underlay the ancien régime, but to him it is the vital principle of society precisely because it gives a genital and creative force to all social institutions. His development of this idea in the Reflections is stylistically an echo of the sublimity praised and created in his Inquiry of thirty years before. The workings of inheritance, like the acts of darkness in which human life begins, are secret and mysterious: "by the disposition of a stupendous wisdom, moulding together the great mysterious: incorporation of the human race, the whole, at one time, is never old, or middle-aged, or young, but in a condition of unchangeable constancy, moves on through the varied tenour of

perpetual decay, fall, renovation, and progression.”¹⁴ The majestic prose rhythms of this passage are fully justified. What we hear celebrated is the resolution of generational conflict through an organic analogy that unites history, politics, and the human body. Even this passage’s legal phrasing is tinged by metaphorical colour; “incorporation” is meant to be understood, at least partly, through its etymology.

By clothing origins in such genital mystery, Burke turns any rebellion against them into a blasphemous violation. He also turns filial piety into both a response to the sublime and a political doctrine. This emerges most clearly in his Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs of 1791, an essay that sought to justify his condemnation of the French Revolution: “Dark and inscrutable are the ways by which we come into the world. The instincts which give rise to this mysterious process of Nature are not of our making. But out of physical causes, unknown to us, perhaps unknowable, arise moral duties, which, as we are able perfectly to comprehend, we are bound indispensably to perform.”¹⁵ And the stripping away of the awe and reverence due to origins is repeatedly compared to the tearing off of clothing, to the indecent exposure of what should remain hidden and covered. This comes out in a passage from the Reflections that follows Burke’s description of the assault on the Queen of Versailles: “All the decent drapery of life is to be rudely torn off.”¹⁶ And since woman is the origin of the origins prized by Burke, since the mother is always a more certain parent than the father, since this patriarchal order can only be continued and confirmed by the mother, the inviolable chastity of women becomes the most valued (because the most certain) symbol of the purity and presence of origins. Revolutionary ideas violate that symbol at every turn:

On this scheme of things, a king is but a man; a queen is but a woman; a woman is but an animal; and an animal not of the highest order. All homage paid to the sex in general as such and without distinct views, is to be regarded as romance and folly. Regicide, and parricide, and sacrilege, are but fictions of superstition, corrupting jurisprudence by destroying its simplicity.¹⁷

One consequence of this fear of violation is the veil of allusions that Burke casts over both private and public mysteries. Another consequence is the insistent pairing of rape and rebellion in his writings, not only in the Reflections, but throughout his career. And a third result is the ambiguity that surrounds creative power in his thinking. Although it may confirm patriarchal origins, the patria potestas of traditional authority, creative power may also be the disruptive and violating force that overthrows that authority. The very notion of originality, in other words, both inspires and disturbs Burke. Originality is what continues from the past to give meaning and value to the present. And to express the power to make a start that is the meaning of originality, Burke loads his work with allusions to the literary past. But as innovation, originality can also mean the power to deny the past, the attempt to overthrow it.

This double meaning of originality underlies Burke’s attempt to distinguish between the sublime and the beautiful in his Treatise, which even now seems original to the point of freakishness. In aesthetic terms, its originality lies in the view that the sublime (and hence its converse the beautiful) often inheres in objects and events rather than in perceivers. The sublime is always filled with dynamic and male power – a charging bull, a mountain cataract, a storm at sea – and it is filled too with intimations of danger and fear. The beautiful is by contrast

always smooth and small – a polished marble, a garden flower – and it is described as female and graceful, characterized by beauty and serenity. The sublime could even be said to violate the most basic principles of eighteenth-century aesthetics, because it is associated with ugly rather than with the pleasing quod visum placet,¹⁸ with pain rather than pleasure. The sublime involves the dynamic manifestation of origins, of the primordial, of what in itself seems capable of creation and destruction: “Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain and danger . . . whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime. . . .”¹⁹

The connections made by Burke between origins, the sublime, and the patriarchal can be seen in our first passage for comment:

Wolves have not more strength than several species of dogs; but, on account of their unmanageable fierceness, the idea of a wolf is not despicable; it is not excluded from grand descriptions and similitudes. Thus we are affected by strength, which is natural power. The power which arises from institution in kings and commanders, has the same connexion with terror. Sovereigns are frequently addressed with the title of dread majesty. And it may be observed, that young persons, little acquainted with the world, and who have not been used to approach men in power, are commonly struck with an awe which takes away the free use of their faculties. When I prepared my seat in the street, (says Job), The young men saw me, and hid themselves.

[The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke, 12 vols. (London and Toronto, 1901), I. 141-42.]

“The power which arises from institution in kings and commanders,” says Burke, “Has the same connexion with terror. Sovereigns are frequently addressed with the title of dread sovereign.”²⁰ Taking this citation a little further, we notice that the awe and terror evoked by such figures of majesty are meant to be felt with particular force by the young (and possibly rebellious?). And it is in this context that Burke introduces his explicit allusion to the Book of Job. Now this may at first glance seem quite commonplace, but when we consider this allusion it takes on quite a different meaning. Burke here refers to Ch. 29 of Job, but his allusion would surely remind his first readers of the utter shame and rage that Job expresses after he is seen to be humiliated before these same young men: “And now? Now I am a laughing-stock, even to younger men; a flock of such base breed as theirs sheep-dog of mine never tended!”²¹ In a pattern that recurs frequently in Burke’s writing, patriarchal authority or majesty is no sooner mentioned than threatened; and the sublimity that he evokes lies as much in the threat as in the majesty. This reading of Burke’s allusion is strengthened by the light thrown back on the first text by the reference to the sheep-dog in Ch. 30. This makes sense of Burke’s extended comparison between dogs and wolves, gives added weight to the element of menace in the sublime, and puts even more edge to his howl of rage, the savage contempt, that Job feels for them: “A senseless and a nameless breed, earth is well rid of them. O that I should be a song and a by-word on such lips as these! That they loathe and shun me, and make bold to spit in my face, being what they are!” (Ch. 30, 8-11). Considered in this way, Burke’s allusion to Job is both original and disturbing: it suggests in the end the opposite of what at first he seems

to say. And this reversal of meaning appears to result from Burke's compulsive and complex response to sublime figures of authority – and to revolts against those figures of origin and rule.

The pervasive relations between Burke's early Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (to give its full and significant title) and his later political writings have already been pointed out. In a valuable article, Neal Wood has shown that Burke's theory of the sublime both precedes and proposes his later political positions; above all it stakes out the later claims he makes for the primacy of the concrete, dynamic, and visceral over their opposites, the abstract, static, and rational.²² This is not only the primacy of the authentic over its opposites, over whatever is not part of the living experience or Erlebnis of the writer or speaker. It is also, if I may continue to use the language of the Romantics and their successors, a forerunner of Nietzsche's declaration, "Only as an aesthetic product can the world be justified to all eternity. . . ."²³ And the aesthetic basis of Burke's political thinking is the renewal of the sublime as a force within society, as a force of reverential awe that will strike through society, to repeat Nietzsche's apt comparison, like a bolt of lightning. And although the sublime must always be tempered by beauty, justice by love, the violation of love through the levelling rancor of rebellion is bound to accompany any attack on the sublime, on the patriarchal figure of justice. And what Burke proposed was not only a merging of Hobbesian coercion and Lockean compassion, but also an attack on the free-thinking and hostility that prevented this merger. The revolutionary spirit combined, in an unholy reversal of this merger, everything that Burke detested, an "unfashioned, indelicate, sour, gloomy, ferocious medley of pedantry and lewdness, – of metaphysical speculations blended with the coarsest sensuality."²⁴ The erotic aspects of Burke's political aesthetics, and the highly original way he uses allusion, emerge in our second passage, which describes the assault on the royal apartments at Versailles.

History will record, that on the morning of the 6th of October 1789, the king and queen of France, after a day of confusion, alarm, dismay, and slaughter, lay down, under the pledged security of public faith, to indulge nature in a few hours of respite, and troubled melancholy repose. From this sleep the queen was first startled by the voice of the centinel at her door, who cried out to her, to save herself by flight – that this was the last proof of fidelity he could give – that they were upon him, and he was dead. Instantly he was cut down. A band of cruel ruffians and assassins, reeking with his blood, rushed into the chamber of the queen, and pierced with an hundred strokes of bayonets and poniards the bed, from whence this persecuted woman had but just time to fly almost naked, and through ways unknown to the murderers had escaped to seek refuge at the feet of a king and husband, not secure of his own life for a moment. . . . After they had been made to taste, drop by drop, more than the bitterness of death, in the slow torture of a journey of twelve miles, protracted to six hours, they were, under a guard, composed of those very soliders who had thus conducted them through this famous triumph, lodged in one of the old palaces of Paris, now converted into a Bastile for kings.

[Writings, III, 325]

Although Burke clearly got many of the details of his account from the basic source in the Moniteur,²⁵ he so transforms this account that a new event comes into being and takes on genuine political life. In a phrase full of implications, Burke opens by saying "History will record. . . ." How the story will be told, how it will follow his vivid telling, how the narrative of events that is about to follow will take the place of the events themselves – all of these implications unfold from this phrase. In the dramatic vignettes that Burke provides we should notice that his most brilliant and theatrical touches, the phallic thrusts into the queen's bed and her near-naked and hair's breadth escape, appear nowhere in the Moniteur account, to which this is a prolonged allusion. By a remarkable twist, Burke transfers the stab wounds inflicted by the assailants on the bodyguard to "pierced with an hundred strokes of bayonets and poniards the bed, from whence this persecuted woman had but just time to fly almost naked. . . ." The Moniteur account, which was clearly hostile to the actions and motives of the Paris intruders at Versailles, nonetheless makes it plain that the Queen was quite decently dressed and that her escape was much less dramatic than Burke makes it seem.²⁶

Even more striking, and something that seems to have gone generally unnoticed, is the way Burke transforms his contextual allusion to the Moniteur account. His narrative, and much of the Reflections, is cast in rhetorical terms that portray the revolutionaries as defilers of the temple, as orgiastic fanatics. The king and queen are forced by them "to abandon the sanctuary of the most splendid palace in the world, which they left swimming in blood, polluted by massacre, and strewn with scattered limbs and mutilated carcasses." Setting aside the sheer overstatement of this, I should like to point out that the Moniteur account creates such a picture not of the revolutionaries, but rather of the royalists, especially in referring to their provocative behaviour at a banquet held on the evening of the first of October. The Moniteur uses the term "orgie" to describe this feast, and goes on to observe "L'ivresse et la folie produisaient au château milles autres extravagances."²⁷ What this reversal, this anti-plagiarism, implies is much more than a simple turnaround of an opponent's argument. It implies in addition an attempt to transform the incidents at Versailles and during the return to Paris into a parodied allusion, but a sacred parody, of Christ's via dolorosa, of the Way of the Cross. The parody runs deep: it includes not only the transferred use of the scriptural narrative but also the substitution of the Father for the Son. The parodied recurrence of the cheering (now jeering) crowds on Palm Sunday, of the gall offered to the dying Christ ("After they had been made to taste, drop by drop, more than the bitterness of death"), taken with the other features of this passage, points to the way in which allusion may be not only reference to a specific or knowable text, but also, as it is here, a mode of repetition, even when that involves reversal, through which the originality of the writer is manifested by his ability to embody in rhetoric the psychic impulse toward repetition.

I have dealt with this aspect of allusion elsewhere,²⁸ but one part of my argument needs to be repeated here. Allusion often creates a context for itself through the reader's sense of a recurrence rather than through any sense that a particular reference to a second text has taken place. We throw a dart at the wall, then draw a target around it. Burke's insistent presentation of reality as reverential fear of our origins (and innovating revolts against it) creates an echo-chamber of allusions that go far beyond the allusions of reference. And creates is the term to insist on. Burke is deeply original in his creation of an order of experience that changes discourse into events, that abolishes any clear distinction between art and life, between words and acts.

Such distinctions were central to eighteenth-century aesthetic theory, and Kant later used them to develop the notion that there is a separate order of aesthetic experience. But in the *Inquiry* we find that Burke is not at all interested in Schiller's (and others') attempt "to transform actual suffering into sublime emotion." What he values is a total confusion of realms, and he finds this at times in tragedy: "The nearer it approaches the reality, and the farther it removes us from all idea of fiction, the more perfect is its power."²⁹ And what that implies is precisely what our second passage offers: the power of the rhetorician, who should also be the leader, to displace events into discourse, to replace even what his audience may have seen happen by what they hear said. This is of course also a fair short definition of propaganda: or, in semiotic terms, a stage in the process by which the sign transforms its object.

This transformation of the object through allusive signs occurs in our third and last passage.

My Lords, he looked over that immense waste of his own creating, not as Satan viewed the kingdoms of the world and saw the power and glory of them, – but he looked over the waste of Oude with a diabolical malice which one could hardly suppose existed in the prototype himself. . . . the residence of the females of the family, a guard, as your Lordships know, rendered doubly and trebly secure by the manners of the country, which make everything that is in the hands of women sacred. It is said that nothing is proof against gold, – that the strongest tower will not be impregnable, if Jupiter makes love in a golden shower. This Jupiter commences making love; but he does not come to the ladies with gold for their persons, he comes to their persons for their gold. This impetuous lover, Mr. Hastings, who is not to be stayed from the objects of his passion, would annihilate space and time between him and his beloved object, the jaghires of these ladies, had now, first, their treasure's affection.

[Writings XII. 31]

Just before this extract from one of Burke's speeches in the impeachment proceedings against Warren Hastings, he compares Hastings negatively to the Devil in a Biblical and Miltonic allusion: "My Lords, he looked over that immense waste of his own creating, not as Satan viewed the world and saw the power and glory of them. – but he looked over the waste of Oude with a diabolical malice which one could hardly suppose existed in the prototype himself." Notice that the allusion is doubly negative. Hastings does not evoke the Devil, he exceeds him, and this tone of hyperbole runs through his attack. Burke's prolonged attempt to disgrace and destroy the former governor-general of the East India Company baffled many of his contemporaries, who could not understand why he devoted himself to such a cause with such unrelenting zeal. But at least part of the reason should be clear. Once we grasp the rhetorical and inward significance of origins and authority to Burke, we can see in the rapacious attacks Hastings made on the wealth and culture of India a horrible parallel to the assaults of the Jacobins. Burke significantly repeats his earlier analogy to erotic advances, but this time the classical allusion is twisted and reversed until it creates a bizarre picture of Hastings as a rapist. And this passage is not merely one example of a classical allusion gone out of control. Later

in the speeches of the same day Burke fantasizes the exchanges between two of Hastings' associates, implicating them as well, and with increasingly sarcastic force, in the same bizarre quasi-accusation. The histrionic style and imaginative involvement is astonishing: "You would imagine that they were making love, and that you heard the voice of the turtle in the land. You hear the soft cooing, the gentle addresses, – 'Oh, my hopes!' to-day, 'My fears!' tomorrow, – all the language of friendship, almost heightened into love; and it comes at last to 'I have got at the secret hoards of these ladies.'"³⁰ The homoerotic overtones complete the process of transformation. What began as an accusation of theft ends as the flagrant discovery of seduction and perverse complicity. The signs of Burke's allusions end by transforming the object, the question before the high court of Parliament, the actual legal case against Warren Hastings.

This semiotic change is something new in English literary history. In times past, especially in the more excited allegories devised during the Reformation and the Civil War, scriptural allusions could crowd out or transform the meaning of ideas and events in present time. Perhaps the last examples of this appeared in the apocalyptic speeches of Gerard Winstanley and, much more ironically, in Dryden's *Absalom and Achitophel*. But throughout Burke's writings we find the secularizing of this allegorical practice, and we also find, as we have seen, something even more unusual: the creation in and through the text of an act, a substitute event, a legal fact that is meant to have legal and historical consequences. We might object that Burke offers only inflammatory fantasies, not demonstrable truths. Our last passage in particular may seem little more than a libellous conceit, a demagogic joke. But since in its intentions and context it was meant, like so much of Burke's discourse, to be a cause of events, we cannot limit or dismiss it in this way. A Petrarchan or metaphysical conceit may end (or even begin) by boring us, but it will not be likely to force us or any one else into action. Burke does intend to force action upon his audience, and in that sense he is not only a propagandist with a kinetic mode of rhetoric. He is also the embodiment of his own notion of the sublime, a dynamic performer we are meant to respond to with fear and wonder. He becomes the chief actor in a drama that he has also staged and written.

And yet that dramatic script, which is meant to be the cause of so much, is itself also a complex effect. It is first, as we have seen, its own proof of a concern for tradition and the grand continuity of human culture. Its allusive style, its endless reference to texts and literary events, may make it at first glance seem deeply derivative, even affectedly literary. And yet it is profoundly original, even on the level of allusion, because so many of the references we uncover turn out to be meant in contrary or perverted senses. And it is original in the future sense that, as in all three of the passages we have considered, every allusive reference seems to be succeeded by a recurrence, a Kierkegaardian repetition within Burke's expressive self, a compulsive attempt to discover and perpetuate origins that well up in Burke's psyche, fill his work with recurrent patterns of expression, and finally overflow into the order of events. Even in this brief paper we have seen how complicated and circuitous Burke's treatment of earlier texts can be. He proves the truth, and the difficulty, of Valery's observation in his "Letter about Mallarme":

We say that an author is original when we cannot trace the hidden transformation that others underwent in his mind; we mean to say that the dependence of what he does on what others have done is excessively complex and irregular. There are works in the likeness of others, and works that are the reverse of others, but there are also works of which the relation with

earlier productions is so intricate that we become confused and attribute them to the direct intervention of the gods.³²

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NOTES

¹ Quoted in Isaac Kramnick, ed., Edmund Burke (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 110. Henceforth referred to as Kramnick.

² Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France and Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man (Garden City N.Y.: Doubleday, 1973), p. 296. Henceforth referred to as Anchor.

³ Anchor, p. 302.

⁴ Anchor, p. 288.

⁵ Kramnick, pp. 127-28.

⁶ Kramnick, p. 133.

⁷ Anchor, p. 167.

⁸ See Douglas Bush, ed., The Complete Poetical Works of John Milton (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 224n.

⁹ Anchor, p. 85.

¹⁰ Anchor, pp. 75-76.

¹¹ Discours et Rapports (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1957), p. 105. My translation.

¹² Kramnick, p. 37.

¹³ History of the French Revolution, trans. Charles Cocks (Chicago and London: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 22-23.

¹⁴ Anchor, p. 46.

¹⁵ Kramnic, p. 79.

¹⁶ Anchor, p. 90.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ See the important article by Herbert Dieckmann, "Das Abscheuliche und Schreckliche in der Kunsttheorie des 18. Jahrhunderts," in Die Nicht mehr schönen Künste: Grenzphänomene des Aesthetischen, ed. Hans Robert Jauss (Munich: Fink Verlag, 1968), pp. 271-317.

¹⁹ The Works of . . . Edmund Burke (London: Bohn, 1854), I, 74. Henceforth referred to as Inquiry.

²⁰ Inquiry, p. 96.

²¹ Vv. 1-2. I am quoting from the Knox translation.

²² "The Aesthetic Dimension of Burke's Political Thought," Journal of British Studies, 4 (1964), 41-46.

²³ The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals, tr. Francis Golfing (Garden City, N. Y.: 1956), p. 42.

²⁴ Anchor, p. 69.

²⁵ Gazette Nationale ou Le Moniteur Universel, (12 Oct. 1789), esp. pp. 293-95.

²⁶ Moniteur, p. 293.

²⁷ Moniteur, pp. 69, 281.

²⁸ In an essay "Allusion and Expression in Eighteenth-Century Literature," forthcoming in The Poet in his Work, to be published by the Yale University Press.

²⁹ Inquiry, p. 81.

³⁰ Writings, XII. 52.

³¹ Quoted in Edward Said, Beginnings (New York: Basic Books, 1975), p. 15.

NORMAN FRUMAN

Originality, Plagiarism, Forgery and Romanticism

Some years ago, in the course of a furious assault on Chatterton's literary reputation, an anonymous reviewer in the Times Literary Supplement delivered himself of the following generalizations:

Romanticism seems to have depended in part on a certain gullibility in readers, a willingness to be duped. . . . There is an analogy for the forgeries of Chatterton and Macpherson in the 18th century cult of ruins, for the ruin-enthusiasts were also prepared to accept modern or fake ruins; truth and authenticity were in both cases irrelevant – only the emotional associations mattered. . . . The credulity of antiquarians and ruin-lovers had some counterpart in the readers of Romantic poetry . . . to take Coleridge at his word that he had had the vision the person from Porlock interrupted. Romantics and forgers are necessarily on amicable terms because both demand that we submit to an illusion, that we concur in waking and finding a dream to be truth.¹

Christopher Ricks has cited this passage approvingly to argue that it is a mistake to focus attention narrowly upon individual psychology in trying to understand plagiarism or other literary misrepresentations during the Romantic period. Professor Ricks urges us rather to emphasize the “special constraints” under which such men as Coleridge and De Quincey labored, these constraints supposedly deriving from the “peculiar” attitude of Romanticism toward the past, toward forgery, and deception of various kinds.² Geoffrey Hartman accepts this position in declaring that “Coleridge is not a special case . . . his charlatanism is hardly of a perplexing or freaky kind . . . unhistorical isolation of Coleridge creates a mystery where there is none. Coleridge should not be taken out of his cultural context. He is best understood in the company of equally strange figures: Collins, MacPherson, Chatterton, and Blake.”³

Before such peremptory assertions, as Dr. Johnson said in another connection, “skepticism itself is dared into silence and the mind sinks in unresisting credulity.”⁴

Nevertheless, I shall boldly assert that these arresting conceptions, so elegantly and confidently expressed, are mostly false, and where not wholly false are misleading as to the particular claims made for the Romantic period. First, there has never been a time in history, so far as I know, where an intense interest in the past has existed, where there has not been available an abundance of imitators, copyists, or outright forgers to supply enthusiasts with a

[*Centrum*, 4:1 (Spring 1976), 44-49.]

steady supply of artifacts from the admired past. These may include an Egyptian amulet, a Greek manuscript, a Chippendale chair, a Van Gogh landscape, or, as the New York Metropolitan Museum some years ago learned to its great cost and still greater embarrassment, world-famous statues of Etruscan warriors.

In his Introduction to J. A. Farrar's Literary Forgeries (1907), Andrew Lang crisply observes that the topic is not exhaustively treated in the single volume ahead: "several volumes would be required by the theme." Literary forgery was rampant in the Roman world. Martial tells us that antiquity added so much to the value of art objects that fictitious pedigrees dignified many a fake (viii, 6, 34; xii, 59). According to H. M. Paull, in his both fascinating and distressing Literary Ethics (London, 1929):

The epoch between Plato and Cicero saw the forgers multiply, induced by the formation of big libraries, and the generous prices paid for ancient MMS. Any gap in a collection could be filled up by the obliging forger, to whose industry we owe the Letters of Plato and Socrates, the Life of Homer, etc. . . . Some modern German critics would suppress half of Plato as non-authentic . . . (p. 19)

One eminent seventeenth-century scholar, "the learned Jesuit, Father Hardouin," possibly in a moment of despair, went so far as to suggest that with the exception of "Homer, Herodotus, and some half-dozen others," our entire literary heritage from Greece and Rome are thirteenth-century forgeries. Hardouin was not entirely wrong. Cicero's De Consolatione "was accepted as his for two hundred years, though it is now known to have been the work of Sigonio, a scholar who died in 1584" (Paull, p. 20).

One of history's more influential forgeries, now mostly forgotten, has bequeathed us the famous tale of Troilus and Cressida. A composition by an unknown Roman of about the fifth century A.D., purporting to be a diary by a soldier in the Trojan War, one Dares Phrygius, was for over a thousand years widely accepted as more "authentic" than Homer's account.

The forgery of documents of all sorts, for reasons pious and otherwise, is one of the more lamentable features of medieval church history. And the Renaissance produced such a frenzy of acquisitive lust for the art and manuscripts of antiquity (the young Michaelangelo contributed a Greek statue to the flood of fakes) that historians have been trying to sort out the mess ever since. The Romantic cult of Gothic ruins had its counterpart in the Renaissance passion for Attic marbles and ancient parchments. Let us remember that Browning's dying bishop in St. Praxed's tried to bribe his sons with offers not only of "mistresses with great smooth marbly limbs," but also with "brown Greek manuscripts." Suppliers have always been abundantly available to satisfy carnal cravings; the same is perhaps almost as true of immoderate aesthetic desires.

What was special about the literary scandals produced in the eighteenth century was not their number, but the fact that two of them touched off enduring legend and controversy. The Rowley fraud was perpetrated by a boy tinct with genius. And with respect to MacPherson's Highland epic, that bitter controversy involved, among other things, the honor of Scotland, at least as many Scotsmen saw it. Ossian has suffered the usual fate of artworks that pretend to be

what they are not: they are dismissed by subsequent generations as of no aesthetic value. But Ossian was admired by practically everybody. Goethe thought it rivaled Homer. Practically every poet during the second half of the eighteenth century admired it, and imitated it (a sincerer form of admiration), as has been often said.

It is necessary to distinguish absolutely between a revival of interest in the past, a desire to revive certain of its artistic forms, and some alleged willingness to be duped. Horace Walpole spent enormous sums to build a Gothic palace for himself, but he took care to provide modern comforts within, and certainly was never confused by the distinction between an imitation and the real thing. And Walpole, after all, reacted with decided hostility when he learned of Chatterton's forgeries. Coleridge never attempted to defend Chatterton on the ground that the poor youth was a genius, or that his literary peccadilloes were merely moral bagatelles. On the contrary, he passionately affirmed that Chatterton's Rowley poems were genuine, as did Blake, who also accepted Ossian as authentic.

Neither the prevalence of forgery nor attitudes toward it were unique during the Romantic period. The forger is busily at work today, and moral attitudes have remained, on the whole, remarkably constant. It has been said of Corot that "according to the enlarged edition of his oeuvre catalogue, Corot painted over 2,000 pictures. Of these, more than 5,000 are in the United States."⁵ Compare this remark with the old Chinese saying quoted by Soame Jenyns in A Background to Chinese Painting (New York, 1966). "Out of every ten Sung paintings, eleven are spurious" (p. 12). There you have the range of the problem. The great art forgers of our time (so far as they are known), men like Van Meegeren and Elmyr de Hory, were at once plunged into disgrace when it was proved that it was from their worthless living fingers that sprang certain immortal canvasses previously attributed to Vermeer or Franz Hals or Matisse or Modigliani, works, incidentally, which in some instances had been certified by authorities of exalted reputation as among the chief glories of the deceased artist's genius.

Every period has its own special character, of course. But the love affair of Romanticism with Medievalism has been much exaggerated, especially as a literary phenomenon. Romanticism, after all, looked far more to the future than to the past. Poems like "Christabel" and "The Eve of St. Agnes," great as they are, are nevertheless countercurrents in what was otherwise a headlong romantic thrust forward.

Chatterton's forgeries and Coleridge's Preface to "Kubla Khan" have nothing whatever to do with the public's willingness to be duped, nor are the forger and the Romantic on amicable terms, let alone "necessarily." How can we believe in any special willingness of the Romantics to accept the Preface to "Kubla Khan," when that same Preface was accepted throughout the nineteenth century, and is believed by the overwhelming majority of readers, and most scholars, to this very day? When Elisabeth Schneider, in Coleridge, Opium, and Kubla Khan (Chicago, 1953), first provided a long and cogent argument for doubting that Preface, the learned world was dismayed. An eminent scholar wrote that to say that Coleridge was lying was to bring against him a charge far more serious than that of plagiarism.⁶ Are we to suppose that down all these generations there has been a willingness to be duped? If so, there was nothing special about the Romantic attitude.

It is true enough that Romanticism – at certain times, in certain places – made a cult of the past. But the deliberate fabrication of fake ruins has in itself no more to do with genuine forgery than a taste for eighteenth-century gardens today, or a penchant for Louis Quatorze furniture, albeit manufactured in Grand Rapids. I recently saw an ad which read, “Buy your antiques direct from the factory and save.” Walpole would have understood this perfectly. What is quite true of Romanticism, however, and which runs strongly counter to Professor Ricks’s central argument, and the passage from TLS on which it leans, is that it was during the Romantic period that a genuine sense of authorial rights and literary property took hold, though it would be some time yet before anything resembling binding copyright was to be legislated. Contrary to widespread and misinformed opinion, the attitude of the Romantic Age toward unacknowledged borrowing was in fact extremely harsh, and Coleridge himself was nothing less than savage in condemning others who failed scrupulously to “confess their authorities.”

The Romans, the Renaissance Italians, the Elizabethans, all took a view of literary property which by the late eighteenth century had come to seem shockingly casual, if not downright immoral. Wholesale plundering by Western poets from the Greek Anthology was commonplace for centuries. It was, more or less, acceptable to borrow whatever one needed from foreign authors, especially if they were dead – without acknowledgment, of course. The matter at issue here is not merely the lifting of plots, but also of speeches, images, metaphors, and so forth.

Some considerable study of this subject, however, has convinced me that at no time did living writers ever take kindly to other living writers borrowing from them, which is, after all, precisely what one would expect from human nature. “Hang the plagiary!” was a cry heard in Elizabethan times, directed by one bard at a poaching contemporary. Both writers, however, would have certainly agreed, without discussion, that foreigners and all the mouldering Greeks and Romans were open quarries to be mined by all. This is precisely the position embraced by Fielding in Tom Jones. The first chapter of Book XII begins: “The learned reader must have observed that in the course of this mighty work I have often translated passages out of the best ancient authors without quoting the original, or without taking the least notice of the book from whence they were borrowed.” The ensuing discussion is intended to show “what is to be deemed plagiarism in a modern author, and what is to be considered as lawful prize.” Despite the ironic tone, what follows reflects accurately both public and authorial views on the subject. I shall quote only a small part of this wonderfully entertaining and instructive chapter. “The ancients, such as Homer, Virgil, Horace, Cicero and the rest,” writes Fielding, are “to be esteemed among us poor writers as so many wealthy squires, from whom we, the poor of Parnassus, claim an immemorial custom of taking whatever we can come at. This liberty I demand . . . and all I require of my brethren is to maintain strict honesty among ourselves . . . To steal from one another is indeed highly criminal and indecent [but I shall never] scruple to take any passage which I shall find in an ancient author to my purpose. . . .”

This genial attitude, however, was soon to be overwhelmed by a radically new aesthetic, and to disappear almost entirely until our own century, when many manifestations of silent borrowing, even on an extensive scale, are protected by the doctrine of allusiveness. The Romantics, however, partly because of the rise of the idea, or cult, of original genius, one of the most revolutionary conceptions in the history of the arts, took the line that silent borrowing was not

only immoral, it was something much worse, proof of the artist's limited originality, hence of his genius, hence of his value. Blake's "I must forge my own system or be enslaved by another man's" is characteristic. Also characteristic was to attack artists you didn't like, for whatever reason, by calling them imitators. Blake himself provides a delicious example of this in his "Descriptive Catalogue": "Talk no more then of Correggio, or Rembrandt, or any of those plagiaries of Venice or Flanders," he thunders. "They were but the lame imitators of lines drawn by their predecessors, and their works prove themselves contemptible, disarranged imitations, and blundering, misapplied copies."

It is natural enough that literary scholars should look to causes in literary history to explain literary phenomena. But the individual is not a helpless victim of circumstances. The reasons why so great a genius as Coleridge was almost incapable of acknowledging his sources with any candor are not to be found in vague generalities about Romanticism, which in any case operated on everyone, but in his own desperately driven and insecure nature.

It will be sad indeed if the explanation for the forgeries of Chatterton and MacPherson, or for such extensive plagiarisms and related intellectual misrepresentations as were perpetrated by Coleridge or De Quincey come to be seen within a specifically Romantic or "literary" context. The central problem in trying to understand such acts surely involves the arduous task of trying to understand the men individually. After all, though every creative thinker or artist takes far more from the past than he can possibly give to the future, the overwhelming number of artists and thinkers at all times and in all places do not confront posterity with the problems surrounding a career like Coleridge's.

But if one does want to push the inquiry further, if one does want to see what general pressures weighed so heavily on certain writers who happened to live during the Romantic era, then we will find, I am confident, that these pressures do not derive uniquely from Romanticism, but rather from the ideal of the universally-learned man which was proven one of the most psychologically oppressive and insecurity-inducing legacies of the Renaissance. The scholar lives in a world of learning that expands infinitely, and the burdens thereof weigh most heavily on the most gifted. But this is a subject for another time and place, and one whose results, I am afraid, might prove far more disheartening than anything we are likely to learn about the vagaries of literary history.

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NOTES

¹ "Why Bother With Chatterton?" TLS, 23 July 1971, p. 859.

² Rev. of Coleridge, The Damaged Archangel, by Norman Fruman, Saturday Review 15 January 1972, p. 32.

³ Rev. of Coleridge, The Damaged Archangel, by Norman Fruman, New York Times Book Review, 12 March 1972, p. 36.

⁴ Journey to the Western Islands (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 38.

⁵ Frank Arnau, The Art of the Faker (London, 1961), p. v.

⁶ M. H. Abrams, rev. of Coleridge, Opium and Kubla Kahn by Elisabeth Schneider, Modern Language Notes, 70 (1955), 219.

KENT BALES

Generic Expectations and the (In-) Competent Reader

Richard H. Brodhead. Hawthorne, Melville, and the Novel. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1976. Pp. viii + 216.

Ruth Bernard Yeazell. Language and Knowledge in the Late Novels of Henry James. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1976. Pp. viii + 143.

The difficulties of genre theory are well known. One seems condemned to playing Ring Around the Hermeneutic Circle or to trying to square it by means of the mysteries of linguistics and logic – thus forsaking the literary problem that initiated the effort. Although certain broad distinctions can be made with some confidence, the ones that make fine discriminations of meaning possible are constructed of conventions, attitudes, and assumptions so changeable and unexamined as to imperil even the wariest reader's enterprise. Writers of practical criticism, consequently, usually ignore the generic problems their work necessarily raises.

These books in some ways are exceptions to this general rule. Although neither Yeazell nor Brodhead has intended to write a piece of literary theory, they raise questions about the concept of genre and of the generic "contract," and about the meaning of literary competence. Yeazell does so by implication; Brodhead uses genre distinctions throughout in trying to make possible a more responsible criticism of the novel. His book can be sampled, the most immediately profitable chapters being his first and last and the introductory chapters to the sections on Hawthorne and Melville. The other chapters are readings of individual novels, often quite good and the testing sites for his thesis, but not essential to understanding. Readers wanting Yeazell's ideas must read her entire book. They need not be anxious on this account, however, for it is beautifully written throughout, in every sense. It is also short.

Part of Yeazell's thesis is that:

the peculiar excitement of reading the late James derives not only from the melodramatic facts so gradually disclosed but from the imaginative needs

with which they are continually at war – the needs of consciousness to ‘handle, criticise, play with, deride,’ the need to escape from and even to transform ‘so grossly finite a world.’ It is from the tension between those needs and the hidden limits the world imposes that the deepest emotional energies of James’s late fiction come. Only by acknowledging the power of each can we be true to the strange pleasures which reading the late James provides. (p. 15)

The other part to her thesis is that James’s language, his famous “late style,” represents in its intricacy and elusiveness the efforts of consciousness to escape from or transform the hard facts of the “world.” In other words, The Ambassadors, The Wings of the Dove, and The Golden Bowl provide a double mimesis: like other novels they represent a “consistent referential universe to which [their] words finally point” (p. 2), though James’s pointing is often indirect indeed; and they represent great imaginations, even consciousness itself, walking the tightrope suspended between fascination with facts and fear of them, between reductive moral judgment and self-deception. Each represented world makes its legitimate claims on us, Yeazell argues, although the second depends for its existence on the pressures exerted by the first. But to conclude that as a consequence it is illusory, that it and its representing language are a “beautiful and mysterious screen placed between us and the . . . facts” (pp. 13-14), moral and otherwise, is to do what Yeazell calls “translating . . . into safer and less exciting fictions” (p. 3). And of course, traduttore, traditóre: the translator is a traitor.

Yeazell establishes her thesis largely by examining James’s language in situ. Lacking as she does a method for analyzing syntax, she begins with observations and impressions: that James’s characters do not sleep, that their language – like his in its careful syntactical control, its coordination or subordination of element to element – expresses “the world of the waking intellect” (p. 17) rather than an unconscious or dream world. Yet sentences strain under pressure from repressed knowledge, so that pronouns are broad or vague in reference, and phrases and clauses register in their relations the characteristic hesitation and delay of the Jamesian character’s dance towards and away from the emerging fact. Yeazell examines at length two features of James’s language that lend particularly strong support to this impressionistic beginning: James’s characters often complete each other’s sentences, as though they are collaboratively pressing towards the as yet unutterable; and James’s metaphors, almost embarrassingly Metaphysical in their arbitrariness and in the extravagance with which they are developed (or buried and resurrected), urge the imagination to yoke apparent contraries so as to discover the lurking truth uniting them. But while these methods disclose truth, they also delay its discovery, in the process readying the mind for it. Both conversation and meditation, then, simultaneously provide occasions for learning the truth and for creating the sustaining fictions that will make the truth bearable, or that portion of it so far admissible. And those fictions are themselves a kind of truth, true if for no other reason than that humans indeed protect themselves with them, but true as well because they restore subtlety to distinctions, to judgments worn smooth by use and thus simply and unquestioningly accepted as “truth” in most circumstances. What, for example, is the truth of adultery? The intimate caress of epidermises bound by law to others? The dynamics of the liason and of the causes leading to it? James’s characters reluctantly look beyond – one might say talk themselves beyond – the law and Flaubert to a future in which imagination must continue to give shape to the “truth” of adultery by means of the strategies for survival, the

“fictions” it must generate.

It in no way reduces the worth or originality of Yeazell’s argument to point out that it is less a bouleversement than a development of tendencies within Jamesian criticism and of post-Modernist ways of reading. Nor does this make it suspect as a latter-day phenomenon, a Borgesation, say, of material in fact quite different. William James, as early as 1878, was thinking along similar lines: “The knower is an actor, and co-efficient of the truth on one side, whilst on the other he registers the truth which he helps to create” (“Remarks on Spencer’s Definition of Mind as Correspondence”). But William was a very unsympathetic reader of his brother’s late work, as Yeazell reminds us. Henry in fact declared him to be incompetent, to be a man, “‘condemned to look at [my book] from a point of view remotely alien to mine in writing it’ ” (p. 94). As the brothers agreed at least roughly on epistemology, William’s failure to understand probably can be traced to his assumptions about what novels are for and how they are to be read – to his sense of the genre and its conventions. His case thus reminds us how difficult it is to define literary competence, for he was a contemporary with a lively and informed mind, a fine intelligence, experience reading novels, and sympathy for the “idea” informing his brother’s novels – yet he could not understand or like them. Yeazell is competent because she can respond to signals that William could not detect. It is as simple as that.

But “that” can be very complex. Consider the many signals Yeazell’s reading requires us to see. We must first assume a “real” world being pointed at – the basic convention, surely, of novels. We must also recognize another set of signals directing us to take the narrator’s habitation of several consciousnesses as serious and mimetic: we are to get from that strategy the “real” experience of their thought. This too is common enough. But when we recognize a disparity between world and consciousness matters get more difficult. An old convention is to see this disparity as ironic, perhaps even satirical, with the deluded consciousness that has mistaken “appearance” for “reality” as the comic or satirical butt. Or the mode may be tragic, the mistake at once eliciting our sympathy and striking terror or whatever. There are several kinds of irony, then, though comic or satiric uses are probably most common in novels. But if Yeazell is right, we would be mistaken to keep to this well-worn path. Other signals, notably features of James’s style, indicate that the claims of consciousness cancel in part the otherwise ironic nature of the disparity, making it harder to draw distinctions between appearances and reality, between lies or delusions and truth. The method of narration likewise signals caution about assuming any simply ironic response: in a useful Russian Formalist distinction, James diminishes the importance of the fabula (the reconstitutable sequence of events and causes that give rise to a story) by withholding “facts” about it, thereby concentrating attention upon the sujet (the work as presented). And the sujet is more a matter of unfolding consciousness, complete with its uncertainties, than it is a disclosure of the “real” world – although that proceeds intermittently as well. Yeazell’s reader would receive all these signals and respond to all by creating a reading that accomodates them: an incompetent reader would receive only some (probably only the basic ones) or would complain about not receiving even these, complain that he can “make nothing” out of late James.

Yeazell can make so much, is the competent reader she shows herself to be, at least partly because some of the signals have become conventional. Dislocations in narration and extreme styles have since been used with greater frequency to signal psychological matters, so

that renderings of the "stream of consciousness" enable us to read back into James an analogous rendering of seemingly more ordered thought. If literary competence requires recognition of conventions, however, as it must if it is to mean anything, then an original writer (a creator of conventions or an innovative exploiter of them) is unlikely to find many competent readers among contemporaries. But that familiar truth poses other problems, particularly those of when and how genres are formed. The historicity of genres (and of genre expectations) is often acknowledged, but less often acknowledged is how hard it is to define generic types as we look back towards their apparent origins, for it usually takes a crowd of instances to make known the presence of a new convention or sub-genre, or perhaps even of a new genre. Yet the idea of literary competence turns on our knowing such definitions, as does the idea of generic contract. To William's eyes, it is fair to say, Henry did not live up to a generic contract: Henry thought the failure William's. Clearly the terms of that contract were in dispute and seem to have remained in dispute. There seems to be agreement on one, perhaps essential, convention: reference to an extra-textual reality. But there are others, not essential to all novels but necessary if we are to read competently the genre or sub-genre of which The Golden Bowl is an instance. How do optional conventions, new or special clauses, get written into the generic contract? "Few novels demand more persistently that we translate them." Yeazell writes, "yet few novels feel so relentlessly verbal, even so untranslatable" (pp. 129-30). Put another way, few novels insist so that we honor the basic terms of the generic contract, yet few resist compliance so much and make our recognition of that resistance another term of the contract. A competent reader, it would seem, must in some cases be a Philadelphia lawyer.

Like Yeazell's thesis, Brodhead's is double. On the one hand he wants to show that "Hawthorne's and Melville's novel form is insistently a mixed medium" (p. 20) made of "distinctly different representational modes" (p. 18) that in their mixture are intended to to "justice both to the texture and to the meaning of experience" (p. 14). On the other he argues that Hawthorne and Melville helped domesticate the novel in America and created new formal possibilities for it by modifying and reconstructing "the constitutive conventions of their genre in such a way as to make it a more fit vehicle for their peculiar visions" (p. 4). The newly combinative form of their novels, then, enlarged the genre of the novel: their attempts at creating uniquely expressive forms have enriched the type of literature we loosely call the novel.

This is an old story, the chief burden of any history of literary forms, but still well worth the telling in its details. In this case it also challenges the familiar assumption that American prose fiction is essentially oriented towards romance forms, or even located "within" the genre of romance. Although Brodhead acknowledges that Hawthorne and Melville rely on the literary conventions of the romance of their day, have deep affinities with Renaissance romancers, and indeed "are bent on discovering romance in its rawest and most primary forms, romance as romance" (p. 22), he emphasizes their attempts to accommodate techniques of the realistic novel. These conventions represent a more modern apprehension of reality, whereas romance conventions, whether raw or refined, represent an essentially medieval reality (pp. 63-64). Thus Hawthorne and Melville are successful insofar as they make romance and other usually extraneous genres useful to the novel. While this argument is not developed, it is basic, as indicated by the final item of the title: Hawthorne, Melville, and the Novel.

Brodhead seems aware that his way is mined with dangers. A simple and melodramatic

opposition of novel to romance, for example, would commit him to an overly static and constitutive view of their generic natures. He objects, for example, that Hawthorne impoverishes the novel when in his prefaces he differentiates its "imaginative recording of ordinary life" from "the romance's actualization of fantasies" (p. 41): the novel can also actualize fantasy or render the intricacies of psychology. Furthermore, to set romance against novel would require a definition of both, heap difficulty upon difficulty. Brodhead therefore cites with approval Northrop Frye's view that all fiction except myth combines "romance elements and realistic displacements," for this frees the terms to "stand for not stable and mutually exclusive categories but rather tendencies each individual work combines in its own way" (p. 21). But while this permits us to think in terms of mixture and combination, hence of the development of a genre (say the novel), it doesn't explain how certain kinds of displacement can or cannot mix or combine successfully with other kinds of displacement. In fact it seems to place no limit on their combinative power. The idea of such limits is necessary, however, to Brodhead's thesis that there are "distinctly different representational modes" that can be mixed with varying success. One can see the effects of this dilemma in the way Brodhead fleshes out his thesis.

The representative mode of the novel requires temporal, sequential narration concerning incarnated characters involved in dramas of "personal self-fulfillment and self-destruction" (p. 14). Into this "realistic" mode Hawthorne and Melville mixed epiphanic moments, attempted "to circumvent temporal communication," "to lead us abruptly from narrative to theme" — where theme is understood in Frye's sense as " 'narrative seen as simultaneous unity' " when the reader's mind's eye shifts "from a temporal to an atemporal vision" (p. 11). Hawthorne's and Melville's attempts at transcending the representation of unfolding experience, at seeing all under a single, usually symbolic aspect, are in part affected by their use of "thematic and conceptual designs" (p. 11). These are fertile mixtures in The Scarlet Letter and Moby-Dick we are told, principally because the drama or represented experience is kept foremost, but the mixtures work less well in The Blithedale Romance or Pierre. These works, which are in fact usually characterized as failures of some order and kind, finally represent "their authors' confusion and uneasiness" (p. 191) over what the psychological dramas of their characters mean. Our confusion and uneasiness as readers result from the writers' use of "conceptual schemata" and other non-representational materials "to resuscitate ideals that their own psychological analyses have undermined" (p. 190). The books are failures of good faith, on one hand, and of genre on the other — for we are given generic signals impossible to accommodate to each other. A novel fails, then, when the other "representational modes" mixed with it deny or in some way obscure or invalidate the basically realistic mode of the novel. Failure does not inevitably result from mixture, however: the "conflict of fictions" that follows from Hawthorne's and Melville's unwillingness "to delegate to any one style of vision or organization the exclusive right to represent their world" can generate an imagined world that "comes into existence in their interaction" (p. 20). When conflict is transmuted into interaction, success results.

The limit on combination, then, is the coherence of the imagined world that is created. To use E. D. Hirsch's concept, or perhaps to misuse it, a work successfully mixes media or representational modes when it creates for itself an intrinsic genre: a work fails when it does not, when no combination of conventions defines a unity that seems its own.

But as the discovery (or recovery) of such a combination is the work of interpretation, Blithedale may yet be seen to have an intrinsic genre instead of intrinsic confusion. At least

some of us await the competent reader, perhaps, like William James, rendered incompetent ourselves by our very generic expectations. Blithedale seems so “novelistic” with its many details drawn from contemporary life, its dramatized narrator and experiments in representing sous-conversation (Brodhead’s readings of these are very acute), that the interpolated tales and other “romance” conventions seem an intrusion – hence the usual lament, joined by Brodhead, that it is an almost pretty novel, marred by its author’s inveterate tendency towards allegory. Readers who value highly novelistic incarnation reach this conclusion easily – Henry James was one himself and complained how Hawthorne’s talk of “Sibylline attributes” and of “spheres and sympathies” leads us so far “out of reality” that we “cease to feel beneath our feet the firm ground of an appeal to our own vision of the world – our observation” (Hawthorne, 1879). Within a calculus of retributive justice, William’s literal misreading of Henry’s novels may well repay Henry’s relatively incompetent reading of Blithedale.

As Brodhead and James roughly agree, where have they gone “wrong”? By overvaluing novelistic incarnation of character and of social reality, to be sure, but Brodhead makes at least one other damaging assumption – that unity of the mixed generic elements should result, that conflicts of meaning should be resolved. To be fair, he does not talk about resolution but about the difficult “balancing act” (p. 203) required to maintain an opposition of “transcendent” and “experiential” (p. 202) modes of vision. But while the image of a performing aerialist is finally more tentative than that of an exotic mixture of ingredients formerly thought incompatible but now a demonstrably palatable concoction, still the basic assumption is resolution of a kind.

The aerialist is the happier image, for it places the audience in relation to a performance and admits other shows in other rings yet in the same tent. Brodhead approaches making such an admission when he discusses the “emotion of multitude” created by Hawthorne’s and Melville’s novels, which he shrewdly locates “not in the novel’s created world but between the reader and that world” (p. 17), for we participate in calling that world into being by shifting from one kind of generic expectation to others in an “intergenericity” akin to intertextuality. The multitude is not of characters (as in Dickens) but of ways of seeing, of constituting fictive worlds. For Brodhead, however, these are connected by a Jamesian web. Disjunction is only apparent – or a sign of artistic failure.

Yet disjunction of fictive worlds occurs frequently when we read Romantic and recent works. E. T. A. Hoffmann’s, for example, defiantly resist unitary interpretations, even ones built on “tensions.” A knowledge of genre conventions is necessary if we are to recognize disjunction, of course, but we ought not let the idea of genre itself keep us from accepting the differences and conflicts that contradictory signals engender. It may be a paradox to think of a genre comprised of disjunctive generic “worlds,” of contradictory conventional signals, but literature has often thrived on paradox. Such a conception will doubtless seem obscurantist to some, and it will certainly make it harder to judge whether a work succeeds or fails, but why should we always play at Solomon or shave with some literary Occam’s razor? Simplicity in the performance of certain tasks signals incompetence. So may it in reading – at least in some readings.

Yeazell’s final chapter provides an example of how a disjunctive reading works, as well as how difficult it is to achieve. Entitled “The Difficulty of Ending,” the chapter describes yet another turn of the screw that James’s strategy enforces, one that threatens to crush the entire

fragile enterprise. For after finding our way to the peculiar relationship that exists between reality and the fictions that at once shape, reveal, and evade it, we face an ending. This conventional necessity shakes the entire structure, for it must be “open” (as this is a “realistic” work and extra-textual life does go on), yet its openness poses a threat to any conclusion based on a fiction – as is The Golden Bowl’s. Maggie’s triumph seems a victory for the imagination. But the willed fiction of this conclusion awakens “our painful if suppressed awareness” of the “necessary price” (p. 127) of such a triumph: in particular, there is the probability that future, unrepresented fictions will be less innocent, as well as the certainty that this fiction will have painful consequences at least for Charlotte and Prince Amerigo. Our awakening leaves us with two kinds of book. After we have learned to read it by a complex relationship of generic signals that defuses irony and makes a comic resolution desirable, we are then urged by the disparity between that ending and our sense of the real to shift perspective, to alter the mood to tragic and to release the power of irony.

This reading does not displace the hard-won comic reading but exists simultaneously. The two are overlaid, not mixed, the overlays more contradictory than complementary. The intrinsic genre, then, is not unitary, except that it does define a “single” text. But it defines as competent that reading that not only recognizes the component generic conventions but that responds to them and uses them without attempting to mix them or to reduce one or the other. It involves, too, an awareness of how we are responding and why, a sense of changing affect – for we, after all, “have” the generic expectations. Such responsiveness to difference, such openness to ambivalence, should be encouraged by the growing attention given to intertextuality, and it should call genre theory as well to greater flexibility and subtlety.

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ELIZABETH BRUSS

REVIEW

Arthur H. Robinson and Barbara Bartz Petchenik. The Nature of Maps: Essays toward Understanding Maps and Mapping. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1976. Pp. 138. \$8.95.

Why should "the nature of maps" concern anyone who is neither a cartographer nor a stranded traveller? Because, as the opening pages of this study point out, "scholars tend to use the map as the fundamental analogy" – a kind of universal conceptual instrument, more familiar and above all simpler than the other terms that enter into the comparison. The thrust of the analogy is generally a suggestion of "some coherence, some total relation" which combines, places, and organizes isolated instances and mediates our intellectual relationship to them. But if we do use maps so automatically to clarify certain dimensions of (among other things) language, perception, and cognition, then we ought to know a great deal about the nature of our instrument, and especially any distortions that it might introduce. Yet few of those who speak so confidently of "cognitive" or "linguistic maps" are actually conversant with cartography; and the obviousness of maps and mapping – like so many other subjects – vanishes as one gets closer and tries to explain what exactly maps convey and how.

For all these reasons, then, the nature of maps is a promising and necessary topic, and authors Robinson and Petchenik would seem to possess exactly the right combination of expertise and speculative reach to fulfil that promise. Trained cartographers, they have gone beyond their specializations to explore:

. . . some of the human cognitive characteristics that lead to an understanding of mapping as one of man's basic forms of knowing and communicating. None are peculiarly cartographic, but we feel that such things as the nature of meaning, the mimetic-arbitrary continuum in symbology, the mechanisms of seeing and visual processing, the part-whole phenomenon, logical and infralogical operations, and topological, projective, and Euclidean referencings are basic to man as a mapper and hence to understanding the nature of cartography. (p. 109)

And yet the book does not quite accomplish all that it portends. It remains (as the subtitle puts it) a collection of "essays toward understanding maps and mapping" – slightly disjointed

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and repetitive, with its final suggestions about the nature of maps rather tentative.

The limitations of the book are no doubt a reflex of its ambitions. And one must praise both the power to recognize the potential scope of the subject and the many useful distinctions to which this recognition gives rise. Because Robinson and Petchenik pursue the implications of mapping beyond the techniques of professional cartography, they are able to pose questions about the perceptual and logical capacities that lie behind these techniques and must also be shared by those who are to use the maps.

The conception of things in spatial relationship is the critical operation, and he who does it is a mapper. An engineer may measure the positions of objects with respect to one reference system, and a cartographer may assign diminutive graphic surrogates to those objects and position them in some other reference system to produce the tangible thing we call a map; but the mapper is the one who develops the mental construct. (pp. 17-18)

This distinction between map-making, map-perceiving, and "mapping" itself – the underlying cognitive capacity for spatial representation – promises to be as fruitful (and as problematic) for the study of maps as the related distinction between "competence" and "performance" has proved to be for the study of language. The asymmetry of map-maker and map-percipient, which is (ideally, at least) absent in language, could vitiate Robinson and Petchenik's case if they were less careful than they are. Instead, the unequal competencies become a topic of speculation about when and how spatial representations are acquired, what map-makers take for granted in the way of projective and Euclidean systems for organizing space beyond the level of immediate experience, and why some potential map-percipients might not have the same presuppositions:

Among the cartographer's most basic assumptions is the notion of the universal utility of coordinate systems of reference. It is sobering to note, however, that the ability to think in terms of coordinates appears to be the ultimate in the development of the conception of space. (p. 97)

. . . every person does not go completely through all the possible developmental stages. (p. 103)

The central feature in Robinson and Petchenik's analysis of what is peculiar to mapping competence is Piaget's distinction between "logical" and "infra-logical" operations. Piaget and Inhelder's studies of stages in the intellectual development of children suggest that knowledge of the environment involves two different kinds of cognitive abilities. In one case, aspects of the world are isolated and classified without regard for relations of proximity, continuity, enclosure, and so forth. But these "logical operations," based on discrete judgments of identity and similarity, cannot lead to the construction of figures and space; this is the business of "infra-logical" operations.

The function of infra-logical operations is to produce an object rather than a collection of objects. Infralogical operations deal not with class inclusion, but with part-whole inclusion for single objects. (p. 100)

Piaget holds that both logical and infra-logical capacities unfold first in direct manipulation of the body and the surrounding environment, and only then in derived, indirect representations – whether these are “concepts,” verbal descriptions, or graphic images. Those who have not learned to coordinate perceptual and motor skills will not be able to reconstruct objects and spatial relationships. Perspective drawings and the global organization characteristic of mapping require an even more complex integration of logical and infra-logical capacities.

The assemblage of objects in the display . . . may be considered to consist of either a logico-mathematical set (classes or numerical collections of objects) or of a spatial set (objects within a single configuration); to be successful at replicating the model, a child would have to envisage both of these aspects at the same time. (p. 99)

Piaget’s work, then, suggests several ways in which map communication might break down. A percipient might have a logical mastery of his environment while still having trouble with the infra-logical operations necessary to “see” a map correctly. Then, too, to have mastered some infra-logical operations is not to have mastered them all. One’s ability to judge proximity and separation may be highly developed and yet leave one without the “comprehensive coordination of viewpoints” necessary to move from topological representations to projective representations of space. The capacity to construct a “systematized outsidersness,” needed for Euclidean and post-Euclidean representations, is even more sophisticated.

Robinson and Petchenik are not entirely clear about whether they believe that the spatial representations found in maps are natural or conventional. Piaget, of course, holds that there is an innate hierarchy of development that issues finally in Euclidean geometry and three-dimensional space. But Robinson and Petchenik also cite other sources, and particularly Blanshard’s The Nature of Thought, which treat spatial constructs as arbitrary, “by themselves neither sensible nor imaginable.”

Of course most minds never come near such a conception, as indeed for all ordinary purposes it is unnecessary that they should. (p. 103)

Hence it is possible that the practice of cartography itself may increase the distance between the spatial competence of those who make the maps and the competence of the average map-percipient.

The nature of maps, as Robinson and Petchenik treat it, is two-fold: mapping as a way of conceiving and mapping as a way of communicating information about space. Their discussion of the former, cognitive dimension of maps is far more compelling, although they do make several useful points about the semiology of maps. Their comparison of maps to other kinds of “presentational symbolism” (a term they derive from Langer for those symbolic systems which “do not present their constituents successively but simultaneously” and which lack discrete meaningful parts) in terms of the degree of arbitrariness and articulation one finds in them is plausible, if not pressed too far. Their brief discussion of the difference between maps and photographs, for example, is suggestive:

Maps are far more stylized than most pictorial representations. Unlike the

photograph, where elements of light and dark cannot be said to correspond exactly to verbalized elements of the object pictured, most ordinary maps are made to retain a systematic correspondence of the graphic element with the verbal category of element represented . . . maps usually have legends that serve to translate from verbal presentation to graphic presentation or vice-versa; moreover, representation techniques are carried from one map to another far more often than is the case in other forms of presentational symbolism. (p. 52)

There are also canny remarks about how the context of use influences perception and, hence, the legibility of graphic configurations on maps.

All figure-ground and part-whole relations appear to be reciprocal and reversible, because they are based on alterations in attention. There may, of course, be high probabilities associated with certain situations – X may more often been seen as figure than Y, but a shift in awareness or a shift in the purpose for which a map is approached may cause X to become part of a larger figure, or even to become ground. (pp. 84-85)

The book firmly establishes the inadequacy of information theory – with its emphasis on finite codes and the capacities of a transmission channel – for analyzing the structure of map communication.

. . . for information theory to be employed in any perceptual investigation, among the requirements that have to be met are: (1) an agreed-upon alphabet of signs with known and constant probabilities of occurrence, and (2) objectivity of the probabilities. . . . information theory is concerned with components (and the probabilities of their occurrence) which are to be perceived in linear sequences. . . . (p. 39)

As in their treatment of mapping competence, the arguments Robinson and Petchenik are using here closely parallel those put forward by Chomsky in defense of a generative-transformational theory of grammar. They even cite figural research by Green and Curtis to the effect that “the essential property of language is not to be found in Markov chains but in syntactic constituents” (p. 40). Yet once again the parallel goes unrecognized. This failure is not as trivial as it might at first seem, since Robinson and Petchenik give over most of their chapter on the semiotics of mapping to shattering facile analogies between mapping and language:

To be sure, we use the term “language” loosely to denote any method of communication; but to believe that the language systems of maps and words are somehow equivalent and therefore convertible is as wrong as asserting that the “language” of algebra could be used to communicate the meaning of a Rembrandt. The nonconformity of mapping with the language of words also suggests that there may well be insurmountable obstacles to the employment in cartographic theory of such word-language concepts as grammar and syntax. (p. 43)

The goal itself (discriminating between the structural and semantic properties of language and those of other semiotic systems) is unobjectionable, even crucial. But paradoxically – given their own animadversions against the ill-informed accounts of mapping found in work by scholars in other fields – the description of language one encounters in The Nature of Maps is not one that would please most linguists and philosophers of language. Consider, for example, such statements as the following:

. . . the graphic form with which the existence of a phenomenon in space is depicted on a map will generally convey one or more attributes of the phenomenon other than its sheer existence. . . . In language, such attributes or character are conveyed by additional modifying words, that is, not just “chair,” but “red chair” or “large chair.” (p. 60)

“Syntax” is perhaps the most thoughtlessly used word one encounters in writing where an attempt is made to compare maps with verbal language. With respect to language it refers to the temporal relations of words as they are spoken (or linear as they are written), where the sequence of emission and apprehension is prescribed and fixed. (p. 52)

These are both gaffs, although one is subtler than the other. A noun like “chair” is obviously susceptible to further analysis – e.g., “raised implement for sitting,” – and there are no words that confer “existence” without at the very least presupposing some grammatical-classificatory information about the character of that existence. (A few pages earlier, in fact, Robinson and Petchenik make almost the opposite point about the relative value of map-marks and words – “The general nature of words that makes them so useful and adaptable for description, definition, and classification, is not at all well suited for communication of such a unique spatial complex [as those associated with maps.]”)

The second assertion is also a reversal of something Robinson and Petchenik have implied earlier. To say that the principle of verbal syntax is linear enchainment is to contradict their own citation from Green and Curtis stating that the constituent structure of language cannot be reduced to a Markov chain. The distinction between surface and deep structure, between the sequential pattern of verbal signals as they unfold in time or across the plane of a page and the grammatical relations (e.g., dominance and subordination) which these patterns represent, is a fundamental principle of most contemporary studies of syntax. Whether or not the linear arrangement of language has some additional value of its own – either reflecting perceptual strategies or judgments of emphasis and focus within individual sentences or expressing logical and chronological relationships between sentences in larger units of discourse such as paragraphs, narratives, and expositions – it is important that one not confuse surface arrangement with syntactic relations. Perhaps the confusion comes about because the distinction between surface pattern and constituent structure is less absolute in mapping – “a map itself is a space in which marks that have been assigned meanings are placed in positions relative to one another in such a way that not only the marks, but also the positions and the spatial relationships among the elements, have meaning” (p. 16). Another contributing factor is the way different levels of language are collapsed into one in Robinson and Petchenik’s treatment, with the properties of morphophonemic structure (especially discrete elements and finite combinations) attributed to language as a whole. Above all, the problem seems to arise from the sources which Robinson and Petchenik have used. Cassirer and

Langer figure heavily, while many extremely important writers in linguistics and philosophy – Saussure, Peirce, Wittgenstein, Goodman, Chomsky, et al., – are never mentioned at all.

Because their sources mislead them about the nature of language, Robinson and Petchenik do not achieve the discrimination between mapping and verbal communication that they so ardently and legitimately desire. Moreover, because they identify syntax with surface sequence and find no such sequencing in maps, they abandon the search for deeper structural categories that mediate one's interpretation of maps. I should say "apparently abandon," because their assertions on this matter are not entirely consistent:

Map learning involves visual discriminations of a very much wider variety, for the graphic dimensions within which any particular spatial referent may be coded are nearly infinite. There is no limited "alphabet" of map marks.
(p. 60)

. . . most ordinary maps are made to retain a systematic correspondence of the graphic element with the verbal category . . . representation techniques are carried from one map to another. . . . (p. 52)

How do conventionalized "representation techniques" accord with perceptual anarchy and how can there be "systematic correspondence of graphic elements with verbal categories" if no such elements are said to exist? The most serious inconsistencies of all appear in the scattered allusions to the semantics of mapping.

In mapping, the "order" of the elemental units of meaning is prescribed by their arrangement in space. (p. 56)

In mapping, one objective is to discover (by seeing) meaningful physical or intellectual shape organizations in the milieu, structures that are likely to remain hidden until they have been mapped. (p. 74; their italics)

Either the milieu determines the map and meaning precedes mapping, or the map creates our notions of the milieu and mapping articulates a new meaning. The authors probably intend to suggest that we have ways of applying and verifying the "shape organizations" a map offers us in our physical environment, but even this presupposes that we are guided by the meaning of the map, rather than finding that meaning in the environment itself. Again, a better command of certain issues in the philosophy of language (and particularly Frege's distinction between "sense" and "reference") might have prevented contradictory assertions.

Seeing such problems, one turns back to the preliminary distinction Robinson and Petchenik draw between conceptual and communicative aspects of mapping. Semiotics (or "symbolic form") is associated almost exclusively with the latter, with the result that talk about concepts and meaning becomes disembodied and vague. One hears about conceptual operations and images but not about how they manifest themselves or what regulates their use. But this separation comes less from Robinson and Petchenik themselves than from the disparate and competing intellectual traditions upon which they must draw. To be sure, direct

quotation dominates the book, with too little consideration for how the various voices differ in their fundamental assumptions. (One is tempted, in fact, to recall that Robinson and Petchenik are students of cartography after all – and see the isolated chapters on information theory, semiology, perception, cognitive psychology and so forth as treatments of the same subject from different and not necessarily commensurable points of view, much as a series of maps with different coordinate systems or – better – different “themes” might treat the same milieu, now rendering its rivers and now its highways.) A more thorough digestion of their sources prior to writing and a greater concern for integrating or at least confronting incompatibilities would have been of immeasurable help to the readers of this book.

As for who those readers are – apparently The Nature of Maps is primarily aimed at professional cartographers and students of cartography. The many caveats concerning spatial constructs that are too sophisticated for the average map-percipient indicate as much, as do their ultimate proposals for more legitimate taxonomies of mapping based on the logical/infra-logical dichotomy. But even here, their remarks about the subtle interplay between scale and the spatial and logical discriminations a map allows are interesting to the layman. And there is little doubt that The Nature of Maps does help to advance the study of the subject and that any further advances must take into account the scope of mapping as Robinson and Petchenik have articulated it.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

Bloom Harold. Wallace Stevens: The Poems of Our Climate. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1977. \$17.50.

Heiserman, Arthur. The Novel Before the Novel: Essays and Discussions about the Beginnings of Prose Fiction in the West. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1977. \$15.00.

Mac Adam, Alfred J. Modern Latin American Narratives: The Dreams of Reason. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1977. \$10.95.

Richardson, James. Thomas Hardy: The Poetry of Necessity. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1977. \$12.00.

Shaw, W. David. Tennyson's Style. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1976. \$12.50.

Whitman, Robert F. Shaw and the Play of Ideas. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1977. \$14.50.

KENT BALES has published articles on Hawthorne, Brautigan, and the reception of American fiction in Hungary.

Autobiographical Acts: The Changing Situation of a Literary Genre, by ELIZABETH BRUSS, has recently been published by the Johns Hopkins University Press.

NORMAN FRUMAN, author of Coleridge: The Damaged Archangel, is preparing a book-length study of the problem of plagiarism in English literary history.

PETER HUGHES recently completed an edition of the works of Fanny Birney for Clarendon Press.

Rutgers University Press will soon publish a study of the epyllion in the English Renaissance, by WILLIAM KEACH.

EARL MINER has written extensively on the literature of the English Renaissance, and also on ancient and modern Japanese literature.