

THE REGULATORY SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF CLASSIFYING MUNICIPAL
BONDS AS HIGH-QUALITY LIQUID ASSETS

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Dedication

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Abstract

Basel III introduced one of the first global banking liquidity requirements: the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR). This paper examines if changing the regulatory accounting for the LCR by including certain municipal bonds in its computation has a spillover effect on the municipal bond market. In contrast to statements made by regulators, I find that the rule decreases the affected bonds' yield spread, relative to unaffected bonds, due to an increase in bank demand for the affected bonds. Importantly, I am unable to find evidence that this change in the yield spread is due to a change in risk. Consistent with a decrease in yields, I document that municipalities that have the ability to issue either affected or unaffected bonds change their behavior by issuing relatively more of the affected bonds in the aftermath of the rule change. These results provide evidence that regulatory change in one sector of the economy can have a significant spillover effect on another sector of the economy which is not the intended target of the rule.

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1. Introduction

This paper examines the spillover effects of changing the measurement of banks' liquidity ratio on the municipal bond market. In the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) strengthened banks' liquidity regulation by requiring banks to maintain a minimum liquidity coverage ratio (LCR). This ratio is defined as *high-quality liquid assets* (HQLA) divided by estimated total net cash outflows during a 30-day stress period.¹ Whether municipal bonds should be classified as HQLA in computing this ratio and the resulting economic consequences are subject to intense debate. Issuers of municipal bonds contend that municipal bonds should be classified as HQLA based upon their safety and liquidity profiles and that excluding municipal bonds from the ratio would have a detrimental impact on municipalities and “*hurt the real engines of the U.S. economy*”, because banks would be less willing to hold municipal bonds (Arrieta-Candelaria et al., 2014). In contrast, the U.S. banking regulators questioned both the liquidity of these bonds and the claim that municipalities would be affected and excluded municipal bonds from HQLA in the final rule issued in 2014. However, less than a year later, in an abrupt reversal, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) unilaterally decided to make certain general obligation municipal bonds eligible for the HQLA classification while continuing to exclude all revenue municipal bonds.² Exploiting this policy reversal, I examine two potential spillover effects of the classification of certain

¹ The key characteristics of HQLA are that they can be rapidly monetized without significant impairment in their value during a stress period.

² There are two broad types of municipal bonds: general obligations and revenue bonds. General obligation municipal bonds are backed by the full faith and credit of an issuer whereas revenue bonds are backed by a specific revenue stream (e.g., a toll road, stadium, hydroelectric dam, etc.). The FRB included certain general obligation bonds in the calculation of HQLA, because they reasoned that they typically hold their value and have better liquidity than a revenue bond during a period of stress.

general obligation municipal bonds as HQLA. First, I examine if there is a change in the yield spread of general obligation bonds relative to revenue bonds. Second, I examine if municipalities change their pattern of issuance of general obligation bonds relative to revenue bonds.

In standard asset pricing theory, the fundamental price of an asset is determined by its expected risk discounted cash flows, whereas the asset's market price is determined by market supply and demand. In an efficient market these two prices should be equivalent. If a change in supply or demand arises exogenously without a concurrent change in the underlying fundamentals, then any potential price effects should be quickly arbitrated away. Under this theory, since reclassifying municipal bonds for banks' regulatory reporting does not affect bond fundamentals, there should be no pricing affects. On the other hand, more recent theories have augmented the standard asset pricing models to account for the specific demand for assets that are financially liquid (e.g., Holmström and Tirole, 2001; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012).³ These *safe assets* are in limited supply, and therefore command a nonpecuniary premium generally referred to as the *convenience yield*.⁴ Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) empirically show that U.S. treasury bonds are priced at a premium in the long run due to their high demand. Highly rated municipal bonds are also an example of safe assets due to their safety and moneyness (Gorton, Lewellan, and Metrick, 2012; Gorton, 2017). As a result, since safe

³ Financial liquidity refers to the capability of storing wealth through time. It is distinct from secondary market liquidity.

⁴ Safe assets are money or money-like assets that do not have adverse selection concerns; the convenience yield is defined in Gorton (2017) as, "the difference between the instrument's yield and the return that that bond would pay if these nonpecuniary returns did not exist but everything else was constant."

assets are scarce, and banks own a sizeable proportion of all municipal bonds, an exogenous increase in banks' demand for municipal bonds could impact their yield spreads unrelated to fundamental risk.⁵ Given these countervailing theories, it is not clear if a demand change will have an effect on the yield spreads of general obligation municipal bonds.

In order to answer this question, I implement an entropy balanced difference-in-differences research design centered on the relevant events to identify changes in the yield spreads of general obligation vis-à-vis revenue bonds. The Wall Street Journal reported on April 17th, 2015 that the FRB would be switching the classification of some municipal bonds to HQLA (Ackerman and McGrane, 2015). Then, on May 21st, the FRB issued a press release proposing to include general obligation bonds that meet certain safety and liquidity requirements as Level 2B HQLA.⁶ These two events represent the first credible news to the market that a change would be made. On April 1st, 2016 the FRB issued their press release for the final rule, which was largely unchanged from the proposed rule. The first two events have overlapping windows, so I combine them into one event. Since the safety and liquidity requirements are somewhat ambiguous, I first examine the average effect on all general obligation bonds. I find a decrease of about 5 basis points in the yield spreads of general obligation bonds relative to revenue bonds around the time when the news broke that there would be changes to the rule. Although this may appear to be a small effect, considering that the average yield spread in my sample is about 25 basis points, it

⁵ As of 2015, banking institutions owned around 13% of all U.S. municipal bonds (<https://www.sifma.org/resources/research/us-municipal-securities-holders/>).

⁶ HQLA are split between three categories: Level 1, Level 2A, and Level 2B with haircuts of 0%, 15%, and 50%, respectively.

is economically meaningful.⁷ I do not find evidence of an additional effect around the final rule adoption, which is not surprising if the market was not expecting the FRB to deviate from its initial proposal.

I perform several tests to further strengthen my inferences. First, I find evidence that the effect around the announcement dates is magnified in the cross section of highly rated general obligation municipal bonds that are most likely to qualify for HQLA status. Second, I find there is not a statistically significant treatment effect for the securities which may not be liquid during a crisis period, because their issuer has had previous extreme market price declines. Next, I address the concern that the decrease in yields is driven by a reduction in risk that is not yet reflected in credit ratings by testing if credit ratings are differentially changing for general obligation bonds subsequent to the event window. I find no evidence of an economically meaningful change in the credit quality of general obligation bonds relative to that of revenue bonds in the months after the event window. Finally, rather than using an entropy-balanced sample, I employ an alternate matching strategy where I match general obligation bonds with revenue bonds *within issuer*. Although this greatly reduces the sample, the main results are robust to this specification. Thus, the combination of the above results suggests that changing the banking rule has a spillover effect on the yield spreads of general obligation municipal bonds.

I next explore whether the rule change has a spillover effect on the issuance behavior of municipalities. Since I show that there is a decline in the yield spread of general obligation bonds relative to revenue bonds, I examine if conditional on issuing debt,

⁷ For a magnitude comparison, Butler, Fauver, and Mortal (2009) find that uninsured bonds in high corruption states have a higher yield of about 5.9 basis points relative to those in low corruption states.

municipalities issue relatively more general obligations in the post-period (i.e., I examine if there is movement along the supply curve). Although a 5 basis point change in the spread is unlikely to spur municipalities to issue new unplanned debt, it is still important to document if these municipalities shift the *type* of debt they are issuing. Increasing general obligation issuances relative to revenue issuances would have two important consequences for municipalities. First, general obligation bonds are usually issued at lower yields than revenue bonds. To the extent that municipalities reduce their financing costs (an activity that is excluded from GDP), they may have more room for other investments. Second, issuing general obligation bonds increases the amount of debt that a municipality will have to repay with certainty. On the other hand, if a project financed through a revenue bond does not produce a sufficient income stream, a municipality has no legal obligation to pay the bond back through other means. As a result, issuing general obligation bonds in lieu of revenue bonds will likely reduce taxpayers' short-term financing burden, but it puts the taxpayers at a greater risk of a tax raise in the long-term. However, it is not given that municipalities will change their issuance behavior. If it is sufficiently costly to switch between revenue bonds and general obligation bonds to fund a project, if the spread does not widen sufficiently to affect decision makers, or if the change in spread is short-lived, then I would not expect a change in issuance behavior. Since there are many types of municipalities who issue either revenue or general obligation bonds, but not both, I restrict my sample to only the municipalities that issued both types of bonds in the lead up to the rule change. I find that these municipalities issue relatively more general obligation bonds in the period following the rule change. Specifically, I document that relative to the change in revenue bond issuance, general obligation bond issuance increases by about 30%.

Since I show a magnified effect in the pricing analyses on highly rated general obligation bonds, I examine if municipalities who can issue highly rated general obligations take advantage of this magnified price change. Indeed, I find an incremental effect in the cross section of issuers with highly rated general obligation bonds. Next, I find a magnified impact in the cross section of issuers with the most flexibility to switch between general obligation and revenue bonds.

The mechanism underlying the two spillover effects that I document is that banks increase their holdings of general obligation bonds. Specifically, they increase their holdings of high-quality general obligation bonds. If there is an exogenous increase in the demand for these bonds, then the equilibrium price and quantity should go up. Unfortunately, I am not able to directly provide evidence of an increase in demand for two reasons. First, I cannot examine bank municipal holdings at the instrument level in order to distinguish between high- and low-quality bonds. Second, the holdings of general obligation and revenue bonds are aggregated on banks' FR-Y9C report, so I cannot examine the on average effect. However, to provide some evidence on the issue, I test how affected banks' total holdings of municipal bonds change around the implementation date relative to unaffected banks. In a related study, Roberts, Sarkar, and Shachar (2018) find an increase in municipal bond holdings (along with other HQLA) after the first quarter of 2013 for banks subject to the LCR. This is consistent with the LCR being a binding constraint (Killian, 2016). I reexamine this result in my setting using a difference-in-differences design around the effective date of the rule change using a two-quarter pre-

period and a two-quarter post-period.⁸ I find evidence that banks subject to the rule change increase their aggregate holdings of municipal bonds. This result is consistent with the argument that municipal bonds face higher demand from banks after the rule change, providing some indirect authentication of the proposed channel.

This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, I contribute to the literature on the economic consequences of bank liquidity regulation. A number of studies have examined the impact of liquidity regulation on banks' willingness to lend, changes to their balance sheet, and pricing of their stock (e.g., Bannerjee and Mio, 2015; Bruno, Onali, and Schaek, 2018; Curfman and Kandrac, 2018; Roberts et al., 2018). Different from the studies that focus on changes in bank behavior or stock price, I examine if changing the measurement of the LCR can have a spillover effect on an entirely different sector of the economy. This is important because there is a lack of evidence on the spillover of regulation (Leuz and Wysocki, 2016). According to Harberger's (1971) seminal work on welfare economics, an analysis of the impact of a regulation is incomplete without considering indirect effects, regardless of who it is that is ultimately affected. My research directly informs the debate concerning the decision to include/exclude municipal bonds from HQLA by showing that the rule change did affect the municipal market.

Second, this paper contributes to the literature on the pricing of fixed income securities and more specifically to the literature on municipal bonds. There are a variety of

⁸ The main purpose of the Roberts et al. (2018) study is to show how the LCR affected the liquidity creation of banks. However, in one of their tables, they use a DiD framework to study changes in a number of HQLA over the period 2009-2017. The event date used in their analysis is the 2nd quarter of 2013. Unlike the rest of the assets they study, general obligation municipal bonds were not actually included in HQLA in the U.S. until the FRB's rule change.

papers that examine the determinants of municipal yields or yield spreads. In most papers, the determinants can directly be traced to risk (e.g., Butler, Fauver, and Mortal, 2009; Gao, Lee, and Murphy, 2020). Conversely, this paper studies the effect of an event that is arguably unrelated to risk and perceived risk. Specifically, I show that the inclusion of municipal bonds in the liquidity coverage ratio of banks spills over to the municipal market as evidenced by a reduction in yield spreads. This empirical setting provides relatively clean tests for recent theories that propose an equilibrium role for demand in the pricing of assets (e.g., Koijen and Yogo, 2019; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012). In particular, this paper has distinct advantages over papers that infer a downward sloping demand curve from the price reaction to quasi-exogenous credit ratings changes. Although prior research documents positive price reactions to quasi-exogenous credit rating improvements, disentangling the non-fundamental based demand effects on asset price from the information or contracting effects of credit rating changes is extremely challenging. For example, credit ratings are frequently used in corporate debt covenants, directly resulting in an association between rating changes and cost of debt (Bernstein, 2017). Even when credit ratings are not commonly used in covenants, such as in the municipal bond market, research has still shown that an exogenous change to credit ratings affects the yield spreads of municipal bonds even after ruling out regulatory effects, due to a change in perceived risk (Cornaggia, Cornaggia, and Israelsen, 2018). In contrast, the HQLA designation is *only* meaningful for the computation of the LCR, and assets are *privately* classified by banks as HQLA on a case-by-case basis, potentially allowing one to isolate the effect of a non-fundamental based demand change.

Third, in addition to the pricing effects, I document that municipalities alter their issuance behavior after the reclassification of general obligation bonds. This is important because the infrastructure of the United States is in dire need of repair (ASCE, 2017) and understanding municipal bond issuance behavior sheds light on the funding of infrastructure projects. To my knowledge, this paper represents a first attempt at identifying a factor that affects the type of municipal bonds that are issued. This is also important, because to the extent that municipalities are substituting general obligation bond issuances for revenue bond issuances, they are trading off cheaper financing in the short term for an increased likelihood of tax hikes in the long term.

Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on the economic consequences of accounting classifications and measurements. For example, Chircop and Novotny-Farkas (2016) provide evidence that a Basel III change to the measurement of regulatory capital affects the pricing and behavior of affected banks. I add to this stream of research by documenting that regulatory accounting changes can affect the economic behavior of entities that are not even subject to the regulatory accounting ratio itself.

The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the institutional background. Section 3 discusses the theoretical implications of a demand change. Section 4 describes the research design and sample construction. Section 5 and 6 present descriptive statistics and empirical results. Section 7 concludes.

2. Institutional Background

2.1 Basel III

In response to the 2008-2009 financial crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision met and developed Basel III, which was introduced in December of 2010 (BCBS, 2010). This accord strengthened some of the capital requirements introduced in Basel II. For example, the requirement for Common Equity Tier 1 Capital was increased from 2% of risk weighted assets to 4.5% of risk weighted assets. Additionally, Tier 1 Capital was increased from 4% of risk weighted assets to 6% of risk weighted assets. The accord also introduced a new requirement for a leverage ratio and two new liquidity standards. The minimum liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) was established to ensure that banks can withstand a 30-day period of significant stress whereas the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) was established with a longer perspective of one year. The LCR is considered to be the most consequential bank regulation since the financial crisis (Gorton and Muir, 2016). This study focuses on a measurement change to the LCR in the United States.

The revised LCR standards were issued by the BCBS in January of 2013. The LCR ratio is calculated as follows:

$$LCR = \frac{\textit{Stock of High Quality Liquid Assets}}{\textit{Total net cash outflows over the next 30 calendar days}} \quad (1)$$

The numerator is equal to the amount of HQLA that a bank holds. In order for an asset to be counted as a HQLA it must be unencumbered and have a number of other characteristics: low risk, ease and certainty of valuation, low correlation with risky assets, listed on a developed and recognized exchange, active and sizeable market, low volatility, and flight to quality (BCBS, 2013).⁹ Within the Basel III guidelines, HQLA were to be divided into Level 1, Level 2A, and Level 2B assets. Level 1 assets are the most liquid

⁹ A flight to quality is when demand for a particular asset increases during crises.

assets, such as cash and central bank reserves, and are not subject to a haircut. Level 2A assets are subject to a 15% haircut, while Level 2B assets (if permitted by the regulator) are subject to between a 25% and 50% haircut. The denominator is equal to the estimated stressed net cash outflow over the next 30 calendar days. In order to compute this value, the bank projects cash outflows and inflows for each day. The net cash inflows used in the calculation are capped at 75% of the net outflows.

2.2 United States Proposal and Implementation of Basel III

In November of 2013, the FRB, OCC, and the FDIC proposed a rule to implement the LCR requirement imposed in the Basel III accord (Proposal, 2013). In general, the LCR would only apply to banking organizations with \$250 billion or more in total assets. Additionally, the FRB proposed a Modified LCR (MLCR) that would apply to banking organizations with between \$50 billion and \$250 billion in total assets that are regulated by the FRB. The rule proposed by the U.S. regulators contained several departures from the international standards that were included in Basel III. For example, in the international standards, corporate debt and corporate securities could be classified as Level 2A or 2B depending upon their individual characteristics whereas in the U.S. proposal they could only be counted as Level 2B. Another departure was the exclusion of municipal bonds from the HQLA category altogether by the U.S. regulators although the international standards allowed municipal bonds to be treated as Level 2A HQLA.

The proposal was open for comments until January of 2014. Many of the hundreds of comments received by the agencies pertained to the exclusion of municipal securities from HQLA. Most of these comments recommended that municipal bonds be granted

Level 2A status to be consistent with international standards. For example, a joint letter by the CFO's of 18 of the largest U.S. cities recommended Level 2A treatment and warned that failure to include municipal bonds as HQLA would increase borrowing costs and “*hurt the real engines of the U.S. economy*” (Arrieta-Candelaria et al., 2014).¹⁰ Similar comments were submitted by trade groups (e.g., American Bankers Association, SIFMA, and the Financial Services Roundtable), municipal organizations (e.g., National Governors Association, National Association of Counties, and National League of Cities), banks, and politicians.

The final rule was issued in October of 2014 with an effective date of January 1, 2015 (Final Rule, 2014). The regulators did not move from their original position on the exclusion of municipal bonds. They stated that they did not believe the rule would have a significant impact on the demand for municipal securities.

2.3 Federal Reserve Board Proposal and Implementation

The Wall Street Journal reported in April of 2015 that the Federal Reserve Board was going to propose a rule allowing some municipal bonds to be counted as HQLA (Ackerman and McGrane, 2015). A little over one month later, the FRB issued a press release regarding its proposal (Proposal, 2015). The FRB proposed to include certain general obligation municipal bonds as Level 2B HQLA, while revenue municipal bonds were proposed to be excluded altogether. This was a unilateral move by the FRB and as

¹⁰ The 18 U.S. cities are Albuquerque, Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, El Paso, Fort Worth, Houston, Indianapolis, Jacksonville, Los Angeles, Louisville, Milwaukee, Oklahoma City, Philadelphia, Phoenix, San Diego, Seattle, and Washington, D.C.

such would only affect banking organizations that were regulated by the FRB. General obligations bonds are backed by the full faith and credit of an issuer whereas revenue bonds are backed by a specific revenue stream (e.g., a toll road, stadium, hydroelectric dam, etc.). In most cases, for a given issuer, general obligations are considered safer and trade at lower yields than a revenue bond. In their decision to exclude revenue bonds, the FRB suggested that they would be less likely to hold their value and would be less liquid in a crisis period, relative to general obligation bonds.

A general obligation bond would be eligible to be classified as a HQLA if it is investment grade, readily marketable, and meets other criteria that also apply to level 2B corporate debt. Under the proposal, there is no explicit ratings-based threshold for a general obligation bond to be classified as investment grade. Instead, a bank holding company should be able to demonstrate to its regulator on a security-by-security basis that the general obligation's issuer has "adequate capacity to meet its financial commitments under the security for the projected life of the security, which is met by showing a low risk of default and an expectation of the timely repayment of principal and interest" (Proposal, 2015). In order to meet the readily marketable standard, a given general obligation should have (1) more than two committed market makers, (2) many non-market maker participants on both the buying and selling side of transactions, (3) timely and observable market prices, and (4) high trading volume. Additional criteria are that a bank holding company should be able to demonstrate that across the general obligation bonds of an issuer, there has not been a price decline of over 20% in a 30-day calendar period of significant stress or that the haircut demanded by counterparties in secured lending/funding transactions has not

increased by 20 percentage points in a 30-day calendar period of significant stress (Proposal, 2015).

The FRB also proposed a few ways of limiting the amount of general obligations bonds that a bank can include in its LCR. First, they proposed that a bank could only include up to 25% of the total amount of securities outstanding with the same CUSIP number. Second, a bank could only include an amount at the issuer-level that is up to two times the average daily trading volume of all general obligation bonds at the issuer-level. Third, a bank's total HQLA amount can be made up of no more than 5% of general obligation bonds.

The proposal was open for comments until July of 2015. Again, a number of commenters expressed that municipal bonds should be included as Level 2A HQLA, while one commenter advocated for the continued exclusion of municipal bonds from HQLA. In addition, commenters disagreed with the three proposed limitations on the amount of general obligation bonds that a bank would be allowed to include. The press release for the final rule was issued in April of 2016 with an effective date of July 1, 2016 (Final Rule, 2016). It contained few substantive changes from the proposal. However, the 25% CUSIP limit was removed.

2.4 Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act

The U.S. Senate passed legislation in March of 2018 that rolled-back different aspects of the Dodd Frank Act. In one section of the legislation, financial regulators are required to amend the definition of HQLA to include all liquid and investment grade municipal bonds as level 2B. The legislation swiftly passed the U.S. House of

Representatives in May of 2018. Previously, only the FRB counted any municipal bonds as HQLA after they elected to include general obligation bonds whereas this legislation required the FRB, OCC, and FDIC to count both general obligation bonds and revenue bonds as HQLA. The agencies issued an interim final rule in August of 2018 to implement the changes, and issued, without change, the final rule in June of 2019. The events described above are summarized in Appendix A.

2.5 Choice of the Empirical Setting

The initial exclusion of municipal bonds by the agencies in their 2013 proposal is not an ideal scenario to examine the effects of the LCR's measurement change on municipal bonds for a few reasons. First, since both revenue and general obligations bonds were excluded, there is not a clear treatment and control group. Second, the exclusion of municipal bonds was only one minor part of the overall announcement on the proposed adoption of the LCR, so there are potential confounding effects. Finally, the announcement was made in the aftermath of the Federal Reserve's statement that they were considering tapering their purchases of assets. This provoked a market wide sell-off of many fixed income assets, including municipal bonds, and has come to be known as the Taper Tantrum. The passage of the legislation in 2018 is subject to similar concerns. For example, updating the definition of HQLA to include both general obligations and revenue bonds is referred to in just one section (out of over 50) of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act. It had other far-reaching consequences and is considered to be the "biggest rollback of bank rules since the financial crisis" (Pramuk, 2018). Further, this legislation was passed in the aftermath of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act which eliminated

the tax-exemption for advance refundings and also reduced personal and corporate tax rates thereby reducing the value of tax-exemption. Unlike the two events described above, the FRB's 2015 proposal to include certain general obligation bonds in its calculation of HQLA provides an ideal scenario to identify the effects of the LCR change on the municipal bond market. The reversal was unexpected and provides a natural treatment (general obligation bonds) and control group (revenue bonds). Further, the sole purpose was to reclassify certain general obligations as HQLA, and I am unaware of any other events in the general time-period that would differentially affect general obligation and revenue bonds. For the above reasons, the FRB's reclassification of general obligation bonds is the event that I focus on for the remainder of this paper.

3. Theoretical Implications of a Demand Change

3.1 Pricing of Municipal Bonds

Under classical asset pricing theory, a shift in demand for a bond that arises exogenously should not affect the fundamental value of an asset. Only changes in the fundamentals of a bond should affect its yield spread. The fundamentals include expected cash flows and risk. For municipal bonds, there are three relevant categories of risk: default risk, liquidity, and taxes (Gao et al., 2020). Relative to corporate bonds, the municipal bond default rate is remarkably low, yet it still accounts for the majority of a bond's yield (Schwert, 2017). Most of the research on municipal pricing examines factors that directly relate to these risks. For example, Butler et al. (2009) find a positive relationship between corruption and bond yields. Baber, Gore, Rich, and Zhang (2013) find that the true interest cost of municipal bonds increases after a financial restatement. There is evidence in the

municipal market that factors unrelated to a bond's fundamentals may also affect the yield spread at which it trades. For example, Cornaggia et al. (2018) find that when Moody's recalibrated their ratings system, yield spreads went down as a result of the upgrades. Although the recalibration was unrelated to changes in issuer fundamentals, it appears that retail investors' perception of risk changed due to the change in ratings. Similar to an exogenous credit rating change, the HQLA classification created by bank regulators should have no impact on the underlying fundamentals of the bond's issuer. However, in contrast to a change in credit ratings, the HQLA label unlikely affects retail investors' perception of an issuer's risk because this classification is new and only used in the computation of the LCR whereas credit ratings have long been used to convey credit risk and are highly salient. Thus, under standard bond pricing models, general obligation bonds should be unaffected by their reclassification as HQLA.

Highly rated municipal bonds are an example of safe assets (Gorton et al., 2012; Gorton, 2017). Since safe assets are in limited supply and investors demand them for their safety and moneyness benefits, they are priced at a premium (Gorton, 2017). Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) model this relationship analytically and show that non-fundamental demand can be priced. Safety and moneyness are also the key features determining whether an asset is classified as a HQLA or not. If an asset receives the HQLA label, then it provides the regulatory benefit of being included in the measurement of the LCR, which has the potential to influence the demand for that asset. To the extent that the banking industries' participation in the municipal bond market is large enough, then under these more recent theories, it is possible that an increase in demand would lead to a reduction in the equilibrium spreads of general obligation bonds.

However, it is not self-evident whether the FRB's rule change will affect the pricing of municipal bonds. Although financial institutions collectively hold nearly 15% of the entire municipal bond market, the label change did not go as far as commenters wanted. Therefore, it may not generate a demand change significant enough to move the market. Given these possibilities, I write my first hypothesis in null form:

H1: Relative to revenue bonds, the yield spread of general obligation bonds does not change as a result of the FRB's rule change.

3.2 Issuance of Municipal Bonds

There are issuers who issue either exclusively revenue, exclusively general obligation, or both types of bonds.¹¹ For those municipalities that can issue both, they make the decision on which type to issue based on a variety of factors including the specific project they are undertaking, debt limitations, credit ratings, political considerations, and the spread between general obligation and revenue bonds at that time. In most cases, a municipality can issue general obligation bonds at a lower yield spread than it can issue revenue bonds. However, there are a couple drawbacks to issuing general obligations. First, issuing a general obligation bond puts the municipality's tax base at risk of having to be drawn upon. This particular risk can also be a factor in determining the credit rating of a

¹¹ In some cases, issuers have no choice but to issue only one type of bond. For example, several states ban or limit the issuance of general obligation bonds. In other cases, issuers may have a choice on what type of bond to issue. For issuers with taxing authority (e.g., states, cities, etc.), they may be able to pledge their taxing authority as security to fund a project (i.e., issue a general obligation bond). If the project has a related revenue stream, the issuer may instead pledge that revenue as security for a municipal bond issuance (i.e., issue a revenue bond). For issuers without taxing authority (e.g., special purpose districts, hospitals, etc.), they will typically issue revenue bonds. However, depending on state laws, they may be able to issue a general obligation bond as well.

municipality. In addition, some municipalities have statutory or constitutional limits on the amount of general obligation debt that can be outstanding. If the spread between general obligation and revenue bonds widens sufficiently as a result of the rule change, but the relative costs of issuing general obligations are unaffected, then I expect municipalities will shift their issuances towards general obligations. On the other hand, if municipalities are not able to choose freely between revenue bonds or a general obligation bonds to fund a project, if the spread does not widen sufficiently, or if the change in spread is not permanent, then I would not expect a change in issuance behavior. Given these possibilities, I write my second hypothesis in null form:

H2: As a result of the FRB's rule change, municipalities do not shift their issuances towards general obligation bonds.

4. Research Design and Sample Construction

4.1 Pricing of Municipal Bonds

Unlike the stocks of public companies, municipal bonds do not trade on centralized exchanges. They are traded over-the-counter (OTC) by a large network of dealers and are relatively illiquid. This makes performing a typical event study analysis untenable. As a result, I perform a series of difference-in-differences around the relevant events to identify the effect of the LCR on municipal bond pricing. However, I still face the classic reliability versus long term effect tradeoff. A shorter event window is likely to produce more reliable estimates, because the parallel trend assumption is more credible in the short run. However, I am interested in the long-term effect on general obligation municipal bonds. As a result, I follow previous literature that has examined the impact of an event on municipal yield

spreads. Specifically, I use a research design similar to the one employed by Cornaggia et al. (2018) (subscripts omitted for brevity):

$$Spread = \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 GO + \alpha_3 Post + \alpha_4 Post * GO + \alpha_5 Maturity + \alpha_6 Coupon + \alpha_7 Call + \alpha_8 \ln(Par) + \alpha_8 Negotiated + \alpha_9 Volume + FIXED\ EFFECTS + \varepsilon \quad (2)$$

I average variables across a 30-day time period before and after each event.¹² The controls I use are similar to those employed in prior studies (e.g., Cornaggia et al., 2018; Gao et al., 2020). *Spread* is the average trade weighted yield of a bond minus the maturity matched treasury yield. *GO* is an indicator variable that equals one for general obligation bonds, *Post* is an indicator variable that equals one during the period after an event, and the interaction term *Post*GO* is the difference-in-differences coefficient of interest. The remainder of the control variables are defined in Appendix B. In order to reduce covariate imbalance, I use an entropy balanced sample (Hainmuller, 2012). Specifically, I balance the covariates in the pre-periods, then I assign the weights to the post-periods.¹³ In addition to controls, I use three separate fixed effect structures. The first fixed effects structure includes state, issuer type, and credit rating fixed effects. Next, I use issuer and credit rating fixed effects. Finally, I use bond and credit rating fixed effects. I cluster standard errors at the issuer level.

I obtain data on bond yields, volume, coupon rates, dated dates, and maturity dates from the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) database within WRDS. I obtain a time-series of bond level credit ratings data from the Center for Municipal Finance, I obtain treasury yields from the U.S. Department of Treasury (USDT), and I obtain the

¹² The primary results are similar if I average variables over a 60- or 90-day period before and after the events.

¹³ Since there are two events, there are two separate pre-periods and post-periods.

other bond characteristics from SDC Platinum's Global Public Finance database. In constructing the sample, I require that a bond has at least two transactions in both the period before and after the event.¹⁴ I also include a couple of rule-based filters following Green, Li, and Schurhoff (2010): I exclude bond trades that report a coupon rate greater than 20% and bonds within 180 days of issuance. Since I use the treasury matched yield spread, I remove bonds that have a rounded time to maturity of over 30 years. Following Cornaggia, Hund, and Nguyen (2019), I exclude bonds within one year of their maturity. I also exclude taxable bonds, insured bonds, non-rated bonds, variable-rate bonds, and bonds without the requisite controls. Table 1 Panels A and B provide more detail on the sample selection process for the pricing tests. As mentioned in Section 2.3, there are several requirements that a general obligation bond must satisfy in order to be counted as a HQLA. However, these requirements tend to be ambiguous in nature. As a result, I first examine the average effect on all general obligation bonds that meet my sample's data requirements. Then, I provide cross-sectional evidence concerning the requirements.

The specific events that I study are the Wall Street Journal article (WSJ), proposal press release (PPR), and final rule press release (FRPR). The first two events have overlapping event windows. As a result, I combine them into one event with the pre-period starting 30 days prior to the WSJ article and the post-period extending to 30 days after the proposal press release (WSJ-PPR). Since the details of the proposal were not known until the proposal press release, I exclude the intermediate period between the WSJ article and

¹⁴ Alternatively, the primary results are similar when requiring either 1 or 3 transactions in both the pre- and post-period.

the PPR.¹⁵ This combined event represents the first news to the market that there would be a change to the LCR. As a result, if the rule change does affect pricing, then I would expect to find evidence for that around this event. The other event (FRPR) has a balanced 30-day pre- and post-period. There were not substantial changes from the proposal to the final rule, so it is unclear if there would be any effects around this event.

4.2 Issuance of Municipal Bonds

In order to test whether (conditional on issuance) municipalities shift their issuances towards general obligation bonds after the rule change, I use the following difference-in-differences specification (subscripts omitted for brevity):

$$\begin{aligned} \ln(\text{Amount}) = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Post} + \beta_2 \text{GO} + \beta_3 \text{Post} * \text{GO} + \beta_4 \ln(\text{Population}) + \\ & \beta_5 \text{Population Growth} + \beta_6 \ln(\text{per capita Income}) + \beta_7 \text{Unemployment Rate} + \\ & \text{FIXED EFFECTS} + \varepsilon \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

In this analysis, I aggregate variables up to the issuer-bond type-year level. For each year a municipality is included in the analysis, there are two observations: one for revenue bond issuance and one for general obligation bond issuance. If *GO* equals zero, then $\ln(\text{Amount})$ is the log of one plus the amount (in millions) of revenue bonds issued. If *GO* equals one, then $\ln(\text{Amount})$ is the log of one plus the amount (in millions) of general obligation bonds issued. *Post* is equal to one during the years of 2016 and 2017, and it is set to zero for 2013 and 2014. I exclude 2015 from the analysis, because the proposed LCR change was announced during mid-2015, and it takes time for municipalities to adjust their issuance

¹⁵ The main results are robust to including trades in the intermediate period between the WSJ article and the FRB's announcement. However, the magnitude is weaker.

behavior. Following Gao et al. (2020), I include county-level control variables to control for the local economic conditions of municipalities.¹⁶ I also include a variety of fixed effect structures. In the first specification, I include issuer fixed effects to remove any issuer level heterogeneity. I also include credit rating fixed effects. In the second specification, I include state-year fixed effects. I replace issuer and state-year fixed effects with issuer-year fixed effects in the third specification. The only variation within an issuer-year is in *Ln(Amount)*, *GO*, *Post*GO*, and *Credit Rating*. I cluster standard errors at the issuer level. These controls are defined in more detail in Appendix B.

I obtain data on bond characteristics from SDC Platinum's Global Public Finance database, and I obtain county-level control variables from The Bureau of Economic Analysis and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Similar to the secondary market analysis, I exclude taxable bonds, insured bonds, issuances with maturities of less than one year, issuances with maturities greater than thirty years, and issuer-years where I am unable to assign a credit rating. Importantly, not all issuers have the capacity to issue both revenue and general obligation bonds. As a result, I restrict the sample to issuers who issued *both* general obligation and revenue bonds in the pre-period.¹⁷ I assume that these issuers are able to switch between general obligation and revenue funding for a specific project, because they have issued both types of bonds in the pre-period. Table 1 Panel C provides more detail on the sample selection process for the issuance tests

¹⁶ If the issuer is a state, then I use control variables measured at the state-level. If the issuer spans multiple counties, then I use the sum of the counties' populations and the average of the other county characteristics.

¹⁷ Since I am interested in how behavior changes (conditional on issuance) as a result of the rule change, I also require each municipality to have either a general obligation or revenue bond issuance in the post-period.

5. Descriptive Statistics and Empirical Results

5.1 Pricing

5.1.1 Pricing Descriptives

Table 2 Panels A and B report pre-event covariate balance before and after entropy balancing. Most of the covariate means are significantly different between general obligation and revenue bonds prior to reweighting. For example, the unweighted treasury matched yields prior to the first event are about 44 basis points and 26 basis points for revenue bonds and general obligation bonds, respectively. The unweighted rates are generally falling in this time period as they are about 18 basis points and 10 basis points for revenue bonds and general obligation bonds, respectively, prior to the second event. By construction, after entropy balancing, there are no significant differences between the means of any of the reported variables in the pre-event periods.

Table 3 Panels A and B present the entropy weighted descriptive statistics around each event, split on treatment status. In general, these descriptives are close to those reported by other studies. Table 3 Panels C and D presents the univariate results of the impact of the rule change on treasury matched yield spreads. For both events, by construction, there is no significant difference between general obligation yield spreads and revenue yield spreads prior to the event. In the WSJ-PPR event, the spread for general obligation is significantly lower in the post-period. In the FRPR event, neither the general obligation spread, nor the revenue spread is significantly different in the post-period. Importantly, the difference in differences is significant for both events and points to an effect of about 3.6 basis points around WSJ-PPR and about 1 basis point around FRPR.

5.1.2 Pricing Results

In order to draw stronger inferences, I use regression equation (2) to test the effect of the rule change on municipal spreads. The results are reported in Table 4. The difference-in-differences coefficient of interest is $Post*GO$. Panel A reports the results of the regression around WSJ-PPR. Across three separate fixed effect structures, the coefficient is highly significant and translates to a differential effect of about 4.5 to 5 basis points. The economic magnitude of this yield reduction is also significant.¹⁸ For example, an average issuance of GO bonds would yield about \$730,000 less in risk premium payments.¹⁹ Further, this effect is comparable to other studies in the literature. Gao et al. (2020) find that borrowing costs increase by 5 to 11 basis points over a period of one to three years following a newspaper closure in the issuer's county. Butler et al. (2009) find that corruption is positively associated with yields. In their sample that most closely resembles mine (i.e., uninsured bonds), they find an effect of 5.9 basis points. However, it is smaller than the effects documented in other papers. For example, Cornaggia et al. (2018) document between a 19 to 33 basis point reduction in the treasury matched yield spread as the result of a plausibly exogenous upgrade in credit ratings of between 1 and 3 notches.

Panel B reports the results of the regression around the final rule's press release. Across three separate fixed effect structures, the coefficient is negative, but is not

¹⁸ In a discussion with a professional that works for a major issuer, I was informed that they would be aware of a change in the yield spread of this magnitude.

¹⁹ In the municipal setting, a typical issuance is composed of dozens of separate bonds. To calculate \$730,000, I multiply the average par of an *issue* (\$180 million) by the average maturity of a bond within the issue (9 years) and by my estimated effect (4.5 basis points). This requires making the assumption that par values are equally spread out across maturities.

significant. Since the final rule was very similar to the proposal, the insignificant market response to its announcement is within the expectation.²⁰

The results around the announcement date provide evidence to reject *H1* in favor of the alternative. Consistent with the commenters' arguments, it appears that the HQLA label change does affect the pricing of bonds.

5.1.3 Pricing Additional Tests

In order to strengthen the inferences provided by Table 4, I perform several additional tests. First, I delineate the types of general obligation bonds that are most likely to be affected by the rule change. In order to count as HQLA, a bond must be investment grade²¹. In my main analysis, I have included all bonds that are rated by Fitch, Moody's, or Standard & Poor's. Conditional on a municipal bond being rated, most of them are highly rated. In fact, nearly 99% of my sample is investment grade when using the traditional definition (i.e., above BB+/Ba1). As a result, I use AA-/Aa3 as the cutoff for investment grade municipal bonds which is a definition proposed by the Basel Committee to define other investment grade securities (BCBS, 2013). These results are presented in Table 5. Panel A presents results around the announcement window. The triple difference term $Post*GO*AA-$ is the coefficient of interest. It is significant across all three specifications at the 5% level with a coefficient that translates to a differential effect of about 15 basis points. This provides further evidence in favor of the alternate hypothesis.

²⁰ In some of the untabulated analyses described in Section 4.1, the coefficient on $Post*GO$ is marginally significant with a magnitude of 1 to 2 basis points. If anything, this provides further evidence of an effect due to the rule change.

²¹ See Section 2.3 for the FRB's definition of investment grade.

Although I did not find multivariate evidence for an effect around the final rule date, I explore the cross-sectional results for completeness. Panel B presents the results relating to the rule announcement. Again, since the final rule provided a limited amount of new information, it is not clear that there would be a market response. Consistent with this reasoning, the coefficient of interest is insignificant.²²

In order to count as a HQLA, a general obligation bond must also be readily marketable. All bonds that appear in my sample have *at least 2* trades in the pre- and post-periods. On average, the bonds in my sample trade between six and seven times in both the pre- and post-periods. By municipal bond standards, these are extremely liquid bonds. In fact, in a report on the secondary market trading behavior of municipal bonds between 2003 and 2010 published by the MSRB, the 90th percentile of trades per calendar year for their data set was 16.6, while the 95th percentile was 30.6. My sampling procedure requires *at least 2* trades in consecutive months. If this is scaled up to the yearly level, then the number of trades would be between the 90th and 95th percentile (MSRB, 2014). As a more direct comparison, I examine how many times each of my sample bonds traded in the year prior to the WSJ announcement. During that time, on average, a bond in my sample was involved in about 54 trades. In fact, the 10th percentile of my sample (7 trades) is greater than the 75th percentile of the MSRB sample (6.4 trades). A related concern is that although these are certainly readily marketable bonds by municipal standards, my results might be driven by bonds that are traded relatively infrequently when considering the amount of

²² For brevity, in subsequent tests I no longer report the results around the final rule announcement. The results up to this point suggest there is no incremental impact around the final rule announcement (or a very slight impact, depending upon the specification). There is no evidence in the subsequent tests that changes this inference.

principal outstanding. In an attempt to rule this out, I define a variable, *Turnover*, which is equal to a bond's total volume over the event period divided by the estimated total par value of that bond. In order to ease interpretation, I standardize *Turnover* to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. These results are presented in Table 6 Panel A. The triple difference term *Post*GO*Turnover* is the coefficient of interest. Across specifications, the interaction term is never significant at conventional levels. This provides evidence that my results are not driven by thinly traded bonds.

The final characteristic which a general obligation bond needs to have in order to be eligible for classification as a HQLA is a proven record as a reliable source of liquidity during a period of significant stress. This can be shown by demonstrating that across the general obligation bonds of an issuer, there has not been a price decline of over 20% in a 30-day calendar period of significant stress or that the haircut demanded by counterparties in secured lending/funding transactions has not increased by 20 percentage points in a 30-day calendar period of significant stress (Proposal, 2013). To my knowledge, there is not data available on the bilateral secured lending/funding transaction behavior of banks. However, aggregated data on tri-party repurchase agreements is available through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.²³ They report the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of municipal bond haircuts for each month from mid-2010 until present. During this time, the greatest monthly increase in the median haircut is 2 percentage points. Even if the 10th percentile of a month is compared to the 90th percentile in the following month the greatest increase is about 14 percentage points. To the extent that this is representative of the overall

²³ Available at: <https://www.newyorkfed.org/data-and-statistics/data-visualization/tri-party-repo/index.html>

repurchase market for municipal bonds, it suggests that this restriction may not be a binding constraint for the vast majority general obligation bonds. Next, I define a variable, *Large Decline*, which is equal to one if the market price of an issuer's securities has had a monthly decline of at least 20%. I construct this measure by aggregating individual bond prices up to the monthly level, computing monthly returns, and then aggregating these monthly security returns up to the issuer level. In order to capture a period of significant stress (the financial crisis), I calculate monthly issuer returns from 2007 until the start of my sample period. *Large Decline* is only equal to one for 21 separate general obligation bonds in my sample representing 13 unique issuers. This suggests that, again, this restriction may not be a binding constraint for the vast majority of general obligation bonds. I examine the impact of the rule change on these bonds by appending the triple difference term *Post*GO*Large Decline* to my baseline regression. This is a noisy measure because an issuer can have had a large decline in price, but if their securities have not had a large haircut increase in the secured lending/funding market, then the issuer's securities would still be eligible for classification as HQLA. The results from this analysis are presented in Table 6 Panel B. Across specifications the coefficient on *Post*GO*Large Decline* is positive and varies between about 9 and 20 basis points. The coefficient is marginally significant when using the least rigorous fixed effects (column 1) and is marginally insignificant in the remaining specifications. It is worth noting that in all cases the overall treatment effect for these bonds (*Post*GO* + *Post*GO*Large Decline*) is positive, although not significantly different from zero. This suggests these bonds did not receive a HQLA premium.

Although the yield spreads are weighted to be identical in the pre-periods that are examined, it is not necessarily the case that, absent treatment, they would have moved in a parallel fashion over time. The parallel trend assumption is fundamentally untestable, but in order to provide some evidence, I perform two separate pseudo analyses. Specifically, I move the treatment date back from the WSJ-PPR date by one and then two months. The results are presented in Table 7 Panels A and B. There are no statistically significant coefficients for the interaction term $Post*GO$ or $Post*GO*AA-$. This provides some evidence that the yield spreads of general obligation and revenue bonds tend to move in a parallel manner.

It could be the case that the underlying quality of the general obligation bonds may be differentially changing as compared to the revenue bonds over the time periods examined. To control for this possibility, I include fixed effects for the credit rating assigned to the bond. However, it may be the case that market participants recognize a change in credit quality before credit ratings are updated. To alleviate this concern, I examine if credit ratings are changing in the couple of months after the post period. Specifically, I compare the credit rating in the post-period to the credit rating 90 days after the event date. The results are presented in Table 8 Panel A. The univariate difference-in-differences is positive and significant. However, the magnitude is not economically meaningful as it represents a differential change of about one one-hundredth of a notch. This provides evidence that general obligation credit quality is not differentially changing relative to revenue bond credit quality.²⁴ Since I have shown that the effect of the rule

²⁴ If anything, there is a very slight decline in the credit quality of general obligation bonds relative to revenue bonds. This would bias against my results.

change is concentrated in the cross section of highly rated general obligation bonds, I perform the preceding analysis for highly rated bonds as well. Panel B presents these results, they are very similar to the results of Panel A.

Finally, I employ an alternate matching strategy to test the effect of the rule change on bond spreads. For a given general obligation bond, if possible, I match it with a revenue bond from the *same issuer*, same rounded years to maturity, same credit rating, with the smallest difference in pre-period yield spread. These untabulated results are similar to those reported in Table 4.

5.2 Issuance

5.2.1 Issuance Descriptives

Table 9 presents the descriptive statistics. In this sample, when split by bond type, the average amount of issuances is around \$87 million. Since each issuer-year accounts for two observations, the average total amount issued by a municipality during a year is \$174 million. By construction, the average of *GO* is .5, because again, for each issuer-year there is an observation for general obligation issuance and a separate observation for revenue issuance. In order to be included in the sample, a municipality must have issued at least one revenue bond *and* one general obligation bond in the pre-period as well as an issuance of any type in the post-period. The average of *Post* is .49 which shows there are slightly more observations in the pre-period.²⁵ The sample credit rating average is around 3 which

²⁵ The analysis spans four years (2013, 2014, 2016, and 2017). If an issuer is present in the sample, it must be included for at least 2 years (one in the pre- and one in the post-period). However, depending on issuance behavior it can be included in either 2, 3, or all 4 years of the sample.

corresponds to a credit rating of AA. The average unemployment rate is 4.95%, which is slightly below the average national unemployment rate over the sample period of 5.28%. The average population growth is around 1.05%, which is above the national population growth over the sample period of .69%. To the extent that these municipalities are growing faster than the national average, it makes sense that they are the ones issuing debt to fund infrastructure improvements.

5.2.2 Issuance Results

The results of estimating regression equation (3) are presented in Table 10. *GO* is positive in all specifications, but it is never statistically significant. This provides some evidence that general obligation issuances tend to be similar in size to the revenue issuances in the pre-period. The difference-in-differences coefficient of interest is on the term *Post*GO*. Across the separate fixed effect structures, the magnitude is consistently around .33 and is statistically significant. Since the dependent variable is logged, this implies that general obligation issuances increase by about 33% around the rule change, relative to the change in revenue bonds. This provides evidence that municipalities shift their issuances towards general obligation bonds in the aftermath of the rule change. Stated in a different way, I provide evidence that the way in which a bank is required to measure a regulatory accounting ratio has a spillover effect on the issuance behavior of municipalities.

5.2.3 Issuance Additional Tests

In order to both corroborate the inferences provided by Table 10 and tighten the link between the issuance results and pricing results, I perform a few other tests. First, I

delineate the types of issuers who would be most likely able to issue general obligation bonds at lower yield spreads as a result of the rule change. In the pricing analyses, I show that general obligation bonds rated at or above AA-/Aa3 experience an incremental decrease in their yield spreads. As a result, I use the same cutoff to see if those who are most able to benefit from the inclusion of general obligation bonds in the LCR change their issuance behavior incrementally more than other issuers. Since analysis is at the issuer-bond type-year level, I also define *AA-* at the issuer-bond type-year level. Specifically, *AA-* is a binary variable equal to one when the municipality's average rating on general obligation bonds issued in a year are rated at AA- or above (if $GO = 1$) or equal to one if the municipality's average rating on revenue bonds issued in a year are rated at AA- or above (if $GO = 0$), otherwise it is equal to zero. These results are presented in Table 11. The triple difference term $Post*GO*AA-$ is the coefficient of interest. It is positive and statistically significant across all specifications. This provides evidence that issuers who are most likely to benefit from issuing more general obligation bonds take advantage of the change to the LCR.

Although my sample is composed of municipalities who have issued both general obligation and revenue bonds, it is not the case that they all have a similar capacity to switch between the two types of bonds. As a result, I explore the cross-sectional variation in the ease with which a municipality may switch between issuing general obligation and revenue bonds. The authority to issue municipal bonds and the process by which they are issued varies with the type of issuer and with local laws. For example, in general, states, cities, and counties have the authority to issue general obligation bonds, and depending on the type of project, revenue bonds. Other issuer types, such as state and local authorities

(e.g., sewer districts, port authorities, transportation authorities, etc.) may issue revenue bonds, but may have trouble issuing general obligation bonds if they do not have the power to levy taxes (Monacell, 2007). This would make it more difficult to switch between the two types of bonds. For example, a port authority may be able to issue revenue bonds on its own, but in order to issue a general obligation bond it may need the backing of the city it is domiciled in. Given these nuances of the municipal market, I define a variable *Flexible* which is equal to one for states, cities, counties, and equal to zero for all others. To the extent that *Flexible* captures the relative ease of switching between the two types of bonds, I expect a magnified effect amongst *Flexible* municipalities. The results of this test are presented in Table 12. The triple difference term $Post*GO*Flexible$ is the coefficient of interest. It is positive and statistically significant across all specifications. This provides evidence that issuers who are able to, do change their behavior as a result of the change to the LCR. These tests provide further evidence in favor of the alternate hypothesis that issuers do change their behavior as a result of the change to the LCR.

Much like the concern in the pricing analyses, it is not necessarily the case that, absent treatment, the issuances of revenue and general obligation bonds would have moved in a parallel fashion over time. In order to provide some evidence on the parallel trend assumption, I replace *Post* and $Post*GO$ in third column of Table 10 with separate variables for each year in the analysis. I exclude the year prior to treatment, so the coefficients on the remaining terms are in reference to 2014. Figure 1 displays the point estimates of the *interaction terms* by year (i.e., $2013*GO$, $2016*GO$, and $2017*GO$). There is not a clear trend over time. In fact, the interaction term in 2013 is slightly higher relative to 2014, although it is nowhere near statistical significance. There is a sizeable jump in

both 2016 and 2017, relative to 2014. This provides some evidence in favor of the parallel trend assumption.

Up to this point, I have provided evidence that conditional on issuing debt, a municipality shifts its issuances towards general obligation bonds if it is able, because there are greater cost savings after the rule change. However, it could be the case that by chance municipalities have a large increase in their investment opportunity set in 2016 and 2017 (relative to 2013 and 2014), especially as it relates to projects that are traditionally funded by general obligation bonds. To rule out this possibility, I re-estimate equation (3) using a sample of municipalities that issue only revenue or general obligation bonds in the pre-period. The idea is that a 5 basis point change in the yield spread of bonds should not be enough to spur municipalities to issue additional debt. So, in the absence of an increase in the opportunity set for projects funded by general obligation bonds, there should be an insignificant coefficient on $Post*GO$. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 13.²⁶ Across specifications, the coefficient on $Post*GO$ is positive, but insignificant. This provides further evidence that municipalities are substituting general obligation issuances for revenue issuances because of the LCR rule change, rather than as a result of their opportunity set changing.

6. Additional Analysis - Bank Demand

²⁶ Since this sample is composed of municipalities that issue *either* general obligation bonds *or* revenue bonds, it is at the issuer-year level. This differs from Table 10 which is at the issuer-bond type-year level in order to examine shifts in issuance behavior within a municipality.

The proposed mechanism underlying the two spillover effects that I document is an increase in demand for high-quality general obligation municipal bonds on the part of banks around the classification change. Under more recent modifications to the standard asset pricing model (e.g., Holmström and Tirole, 2001; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012), this shift in demand could lead to an increase in equilibrium price and quantity. In this section, my aim is to provide evidence for this mechanism.

The financial crisis exposed the tenuous liquidity positions of some banks. One of the principal reasons for the adoption of Basel III was to change banks' liquidity management behavior to require a stock of HQLA to cover a bank's expected cash outflow for one month during a crisis scenario. After this initial month, governments or central banks would be able to inject liquidity into the financial system. Specifically, banks that are subject to the LCR (MLCR) are required to hold at least 100% (70%) of their monthly expected net cash outflows in HQLA. As a result, banks are incentivized to hold assets which are labeled as HQLA in order to avoid running afoul of the regulation.

If banks already found it optimal to hold a certain HQLA before the LCR was implemented, then I expect that they would further increase their positions under two circumstances. First, if they are not in compliance with the regulation, then they would clearly be incentivized to increase their HQLA pool. Also, even if a bank is in compliance with the LCR, they may want to build a buffer in order to avoid violating the LCR under most conditions. However, if a bank has a sufficient amount of HQLA to where it is unlikely that the ratio would ever bind, then I would not expect it to impact their investment behavior. Given the point of the regulation was to change their behavior, the latter scenario is unlikely to be the case. Further, large banks have stated that the liquidity rules imposed

by Basel III are more of a challenge to them than the capital rules (Killian, 2016). The preliminary evidence shows that the LCR initially was binding and changed the pool of assets that banks held. For example, Roberts et al. (2018) show that U.S. banks affected by the LCR increase (decrease) their amount of liquid (illiquid) assets relative to unaffected banks over an 8-year window. In fact, they also show that the rate of change of municipal bond ownership increases over this time period, although municipal bonds were not included as HQLA for part of the event window used in their study. As a result, I reexamine Roberts et al.'s (2018) result using a short window analysis around the actual inclusion of general obligation municipal bonds as HQLA in order to provide evidence for the mechanism in my study. While banks said the rule change would affect their demand (Ackerman, 2014), regulators explicitly said that they did not expect the rule to have a significant effect on banks' demand for municipal bonds.

6.1 Research Design

Bank holding companies report municipal bond holdings in their FR-Y9C filings, but they do not report holdings at the security level nor do they report separate amounts for total amount of general obligation bonds versus revenue bonds. Ideally, I would like to test whether banks increase their holdings of general obligation bonds relative to revenue bonds, and more specifically, if there is a magnified effect for high-quality general obligation bonds. Unfortunately, given the data limitations I outlined, I can only examine aggregated holdings of municipal bonds. In order to test whether the rule affects banks' aggregate municipal investment behavior, I use the following specification (subscripts omitted for brevity):

$$\begin{aligned}
Munis = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 LCR Firm + \beta_2 Effective Date + \beta_3 LCR * Effective Date + \\
& \beta_4 Size + \beta_5 ROA + \beta_6 Debt + \beta_7 Deposits + FIXED EFFECTS + \varepsilon
\end{aligned}
\tag{4}$$

I run this regression at the bank-quarter level and include controls similar to those employed by Chircop and Novotny-Farkas (2016). *LCR Firm* is an indicator variable for firms that are subject to either the LCR or MLCR. It is equal to 1 if a bank has total assets greater than or equal to \$50 billion. *Effective Date* is an indicator variable that is equal to one when the rule is effective (i.e., on and after July 1, 2016). The interaction term *LCR*Effective Date* is the difference-in-differences coefficient of interest. The remaining control variables are defined in Appendix B. In order to tighten potential inferences, I use a short window setting and focus only on municipal holdings during 2016. This provides a two quarter pre- and post-period. In order to reduce pre-treatment covariate imbalance, I use entropy balancing in the quarter prior to treatment and assign the weights to the other quarters. Since *Size* is the variable that determines treatment, it cannot be balanced. As a result, I use the largest threshold of *Size* where the other variables are still able to be balanced. This process keeps all banks above \$9 billion in total assets. Standard errors are clustered by bank. I obtain banking data from the Bank Holding Companies database within WRDS.

If the rule affects banks' investment decisions, they may increase their holdings of general obligation bonds and keep their level of revenue bonds constant. On the other hand, they may keep the total amount of municipal bonds that they hold constant and rebalance the portfolio to increase the share of general obligation bonds at the expense of revenue bonds. As a result, I will interpret a positive and significant coefficient on *LCR*Effective*

Date as evidence in support of my proposed mechanism. However, due to the aggregation of municipal bonds, an insignificantly positive (or even negative) coefficient does not necessarily provide evidence against the mechanism.

6.2 Descriptive Statistics and Results

In untabulated descriptives, the means of *Size*, *Debt*, *Deposits*, and *Munis* are significantly different between treatment and control prior to entropy balancing. By construction, after entropy balancing, there are no significant differences in the pre-period between the means of any of the variables that were balanced. However, *Size* is still significantly different across treatment and control. Table 14 presents descriptive statistics for the investment sample after entropy balancing. Approximately 32% of the bank holding companies in the final sample are subject to either the LCR or MCLR. Municipal bonds make up 1% of the average bank's assets. The average control bank in my sample has total assets of around \$19.3 billion, while the average treatment firm has total assets around \$417 billion. They tend to be slightly profitable with a quarterly ROA of .2%. Although my sample is purposefully tilted towards larger banks, the descriptive statistics are reasonably similar to other studies.

6.3 Results

The results of estimating regression equation (4) are presented in Table 15 Panel A. The coefficient of interest is $LCR * Effective$. The first and third specifications are based off the sample where *Munis* are also balanced whereas the second and fourth specifications are based off the sample where *Munis* is not balanced. I include quarter fixed effects, and

separately, quarter and bank fixed effects. Across the separate specifications the point estimate for $LCR*Effective$ is positive and significant. Further, the economic magnitude of the DiD coefficient is significant. On average, the coefficient is slightly higher than .001. Since $Munis$ is scaled by assets, this coefficient represents an increase in municipal bond holdings by about .1% of assets because of the rule change. The average bank subject to the rule has total assets of about \$415 billion implying an increase in total municipal bond holdings of \$415 million for the average bank. Again, since I am unable to decompose holdings separately into revenue and general obligation bonds, this likely understates the amount that banks are increasing their general obligation holdings by.

As my final analysis, I explore the bank holdings of other securities which do not count as HQLA. In addition to municipal bonds, commenters requested that asset-backed securities (ABS) and private label mortgage-backed securities ($PLMBS$) be counted as HQLA (Final Rule, 2014). However, out of these three securities, only the classification of municipal bonds eventually changed. In order to provide some suggestive evidence on whether the affected banks are substituting municipal bonds for those securities whose classifications did not change, I re-estimate equation (4) and replace $Munis$ with ABS and $PLMBS$. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 15 Panel B. Across specifications, the coefficient on $Post*GO$ is negative. However, it is only significant for the specifications which employ $PLMBS$ as a dependent variable. I interpret these results as providing some limited evidence that at the same time banks were increasing their holdings of municipal bonds, they were decreasing their holdings of these other securities which remained non-HQLA.

7. *Conclusion*

This study documents that changing the measurements used in bank liquidity management can have spillover effects. Specifically, I find that classifying a general obligation municipal bond as a *high-quality liquid asset* in the regulatory accounting for the liquidity coverage ratio has a spillover effect by influencing municipal market pricing and behavior. First, I find that assigning the HQLA label to a municipal bond has an effect of between 4.5 and 5 basis points on the yield spread, an economically significant change in this market. This effect is closer to 15 basis points in the cross section of highly rated general obligation municipal bonds, which are most likely to be affected. Next, the reduction in financing costs of general obligation bonds appears to influence municipalities' issuance decisions. Relative to revenue bond issuance, municipalities increase their issuance of general obligation bonds by about 30%. This effect is magnified in the cross section of highly rated municipalities and in the cross section of municipalities with the most flexibility to switch between general obligation and revenue bonds. Finally, I find some indirect evidence for the proposed mechanism: a change in banks' investment behavior.

This paper contributes to several veins of literature, but also has important policy implications. The effects that I document are the result of changing municipal bonds to Level 2B assets. Many different entities (e.g., banks, politicians, trade groups, etc.) have requested Level 2A treatment. It may be the case that the results of this paper would be strengthened in magnitude if this change was made. For example, municipalities could potentially be able to borrow at even lower rates under Level 2A treatment. The lack of Level 2A treatment may put U.S. domiciled municipalities at a disadvantage in maintaining

and improving infrastructure relative to municipalities in other countries who do treat municipal bonds as Level 2A in their liquidity management regulations. However, it is important to note that this study does not examine if classifying general obligation bonds as *high-quality liquid assets* is an optimal decision for the purposes of liquidity management.

Figure 1: Trend of Bond Issuance around the LCR change

This figure shows point estimates and their 90% confidence intervals for an OLS regression estimating the effect of the LCR change on municipalities' bond issuance behavior, except for the benchmark year (2014). I estimate the model from Column (3) of Table 10. However, I replace *Post*GO* with separate time dummies.




Table 1: Sample Construction

This table reports the data filtering steps undertaken to arrive at the final sample. Panel A presents the sample construction for the pricing tests around the Wall Street Journal - Proposal Press Release (WSJ-PPR) event. Panel B presents the sample construction for the pricing tests around the Final Rule. Panel C presents the sample construction for the issuance tests.

Panel A: Pricing Analysis - WSJ-PPR

	Trades	Securities
MSRB secondary market trades [3/18/15 - 4/17/15] [5/21/15 - 6/20/15]	1,607,496	185,805
Coupon, yield, and maturity date are present	1,567,990	183,316
Maturity is between 1 and 30 years	1,485,526	169,621
Trades are at least 180 days after issuance	1,086,000	136,874
In the SDC tax exempt dataset	848,925	111,956
Traded at least twice in each period	478,868	27,697
Uninsured, rated, fixed rate	253,548	15,242
Has all controls in both periods	225,713	14,547
		*2
Final Sample Observations - Security-Month Level		29,094

Panel B: Pricing Analysis - FRPR

	Trades	Securities
MSRB secondary market trades [3/2/16 - 5/1/16]	1,489,321	167,158
Coupon, yield, and maturity date are not missing	1,452,309	164,393
Maturity is between 1 and 30 years	1,360,484	151,226
Not within 180 days of issuance	976,824	125,059
In the SDC tax exempt dataset	767,611	103,355
Traded at least twice in each period	451,230	28,145
Uninsured, rated, fixed rate	266,031	17,216
Has all controls in both periods	240,399	16,469
		*2
Final Sample Observations - Security-Month Level		32,938

Panel C: Issuance Analysis

	Issues	Issuer-Years	Issuers
SDC data 2013-2017, excluding 2015.	58,233	36,159	19,515
Maturity is between 1 and 30 years	48,082	32,449	18,576
Tax Exempt	43,201	31,337	18,076
Uninsured	32,399	23,321	13,767
At least one ratable issuance in the pre- and post-periods	12,756	7,165	2,438
Issued revenue and general obligation bonds in the pre-period	2,646	961	273
		<u>*2</u>	
Final Sample Observations - Issuer-Bond Type-Year Level		1,922	

Table 2: Entropy Balancing

This table reports the mean of pre-period variables before and after entropy balancing for revenue and general obligation bonds. Panel A presents means prior to the Wall Street Journal - Proposal Press Release (WSJ-PPR) event. Panel B presents means prior to the Final Rule Press Release (FRPR) event. *T*-tests are conducted to test the difference in means between the sample of revenue and general obligation bonds. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. See Appendix B for variable definitions.

Panel A: WSJ-PPR

	Before entropy balancing			After entropy balancing		
	N= 8,674		N = 5,873	N= 8,674		N = 5,873
	REV	GO	Difference	REV	GO	Difference
<i>Call</i> _{<i>t-1</i>}	0.9263	0.8817	-0.0447***	0.8817	0.8817	0.0000
<i>Negotiated</i> _{<i>t-1</i>}	0.8555	0.5866	-0.2690***	0.5866	0.5866	0.0000
<i>Rating</i> _{<i>t-1</i>}	4.0474	2.8708	-1.1766***	2.8711	2.8708	-0.0003
<i>Spread</i> _{<i>t-1</i>}	0.4384	0.2570	-0.1814***	0.2571	0.2570	-0.0001
<i>Coupon</i> _{<i>t-1</i>}	4.6706	4.3581	-0.3125***	4.3581	4.3581	0.0000
<i>Ln(Par)</i> _{<i>t-1</i>}	2.1308	1.7658	-0.3650***	1.7658	1.7658	0.0000
<i>Maturity</i> _{<i>t-1</i>}	11.490	9.1688	-2.3213***	9.1690	9.1688	-0.0002
<i>Volume</i> _{<i>t-1</i>}	10.263	10.275	0.0115	10.275	10.275	0.0000

Panel B: FRPR

	Before entropy balancing			After entropy balancing		
	N= 9,481		N = 6,988	N= 9,481		N = 6,988
	REV	GO	Difference	REV	GO	Difference
<i>Call</i> _{<i>t-1</i>}	0.9348	0.8888	-0.0460***	0.8888	0.8888	0.0000
<i>Negotiated</i> _{<i>t-1</i>}	0.8432	0.5897	-0.2534***	0.5897	0.5897	0.0000
<i>Rating</i> _{<i>t-1</i>}	4.0184	3.0173	-1.0010***	3.0175	3.0173	-0.0002
<i>Spread</i> _{<i>t-1</i>}	0.1817	0.0975	-0.0842***	0.0976	0.0975	-0.0001
<i>Coupon</i> _{<i>t-1</i>}	4.6431	4.2800	-0.3631***	4.2800	4.2800	0.0000
<i>Ln(Par)</i> _{<i>t-1</i>}	2.0754	1.6569	-0.4185***	1.6569	1.6569	0.0000
<i>Maturity</i> _{<i>t-1</i>}	10.932	8.7207	-2.2110***	8.7209	8.7207	-0.0002
<i>Volume</i> _{<i>t-1</i>}	9.6201	9.3488	-0.2713***	9.3488	9.3488	0.0000

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics – Bond Trades

This table presents the entropy balanced summary statistics for the municipal bond pricing tests. Panel A presents statistics related to the Wall Street Journal - Proposal Press Release (WSJ-PPR) event. Panel B presents statistics related to the Final Rule Press Release (FRPR) event. Panel C reports changes in the spread around the WSJ-PPR event. Panel D reports changes in the spread around the FRPR event. *T*-tests are conducted to test the difference in means. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix B for variable definitions.

Panel A: WSJ-PPR

VARIABLES	REV				GO			
	N	Mean	SD	Median	N	Mean	SD	Median
<i>Call</i>	17,348	0.882	0.323	1.000	11,746	0.882	0.323	1.000
<i>Negotiated</i>	17,348	0.587	0.492	1.000	11,746	0.587	0.492	1.000
<i>Rating</i>	17,348	2.879	1.982	3.000	11,746	2.902	2.058	3.000
<i>Spread</i>	17,348	0.255	0.916	0.229	11,746	0.237	0.921	0.207
<i>Coupon</i>	17,348	4.358	0.994	5.000	11,746	4.358	0.993	5.000
<i>Ln(Par)</i>	17,348	1.766	0.860	1.705	11,746	1.766	0.860	1.677
<i>Maturity</i>	17,348	9.081	6.524	7.201	11,746	9.080	6.524	7.255
<i>Volume</i>	17,348	10.32	3.208	10.87	11,746	10.38	3.178	10.90

Panel B: FRPR

VARIABLES	REV				GO			
	N	Mean	SD	Median	N	Mean	SD	Median
<i>Call</i>	18,962	0.889	0.314	1.000	13,976	0.889	0.314	1.000
<i>Negotiated</i>	18,962	0.590	0.492	1.000	13,976	0.590	0.492	1.000
<i>Rating</i>	18,962	3.017	2.094	3.000	13,976	3.016	2.089	3.000
<i>Spread</i>	18,962	0.094	0.805	0.041	13,976	0.088	0.800	0.031
<i>Coupon</i>	18,962	4.280	1.051	5.000	13,976	4.280	1.051	5.000
<i>Ln(Par)</i>	18,962	1.657	0.877	1.536	13,976	1.657	0.877	1.536
<i>Maturity</i>	18,962	8.682	6.126	7.158	13,976	8.682	6.126	7.170
<i>Volume</i>	18,962	9.807	3.796	10.74	13,976	9.875	3.824	10.79

Panel C: WSJ-PPR

		Pre-period	Post-period	Change (Post – Pre)
<i>Spread</i>	<i>General Obligation</i>	.2570	.2171	-.0399**
	<i>Revenue</i>	.2571	.2529	-.0042
	<i>Difference (GO-REV)</i>			-.0357***

Panel D: FRPR

		Pre-period	Post-period	Change (Post – Pre)
<i>Spread</i>	<i>General Obligation</i>	.0975	.0791	-.0184
	<i>Revenue</i>	.0976	.0899	-.0076
	<i>Difference (GO-REV)</i>			-.0108**

Table 4: Changes in Bond Yield Spreads around Events

This table presents the results from entropy balanced OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the maturity matched treasury yield spread (Spread). The independent variable of interest is the difference-in-differences term *Post*GO*. Panel A reports the results around the Wall Street Journal - Proposal Press Release (WSJ-PPR) event. Panel B reports the results around the Final Rule Press Release (FRPR) event. See Appendix B for variable definitions. *, **, and *** Indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels. P-values are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by issuer.

Panel A: WSJ-PPR

VARIABLES	(1) Spread	(2) Spread	(3) Spread
<i>Post</i>	-0.002 (0.884)	-0.004 (0.809)	-0.034 (0.222)
<i>GO</i>	0.009 (0.668)	0.045 (0.179)	
<i>Post*GO</i>	-0.049*** (0.003)	-0.045*** (0.006)	-0.045*** (0.006)
<i>Maturity</i>	0.002 (0.179)	-0.004** (0.018)	-0.181 (0.237)
<i>Volume</i>	-0.025*** (0.000)	-0.023*** (0.000)	-0.023*** (0.000)
<i>Negotiated</i>	0.042** (0.048)	0.021 (0.529)	
<i>Coupon</i>	-0.226*** (0.000)	-0.234*** (0.000)	
<i>Ln(Par)</i>	-0.020* (0.093)	-0.033** (0.030)	
<i>Call</i>	-0.141*** (0.000)	-0.170*** (0.000)	
Observations	29,094	29,094	29,094
R-squared	0.656	0.775	0.954
Ratings FE	YES	YES	YES
State FE	YES	NO	NO
Issuer Type FE	YES	NO	NO
Issuer FE	NO	YES	NO
Bond FE	NO	NO	YES

Panel B: FRPR

VARIABLES	(1) Spread	(2) Spread	(3) Spread
<i>Post</i>	0.008 (0.149)	0.007 (0.235)	0.012 (0.295)
<i>GO</i>	0.008 (0.623)	0.034 (0.133)	
<i>Post*GO</i>	-0.008 (0.274)	-0.008 (0.273)	-0.008 (0.283)
<i>Maturity</i>	0.001 (0.468)	-0.005*** (0.000)	0.023 (0.848)
<i>Volume</i>	-0.017*** (0.000)	-0.017*** (0.000)	-0.020*** (0.000)
<i>Negotiated</i>	0.003 (0.851)	-0.012 (0.572)	
<i>Coupon</i>	-0.192*** (0.000)	-0.204*** (0.000)	
<i>Ln(Par)</i>	-0.009 (0.357)	0.001 (0.909)	
<i>Call</i>	-0.114*** (0.000)	-0.136*** (0.000)	
Observations	32,938	32,938	32,938
R-squared	0.674	0.800	0.961
Ratings FE	YES	YES	YES
State FE	YES	NO	NO
Issuer Type FE	YES	NO	NO
Issuer FE	NO	YES	NO
Bond FE	NO	NO	YES

Table 5: Changes in Bond Yield Spreads around Events - High Quality Bonds

This table presents the results from entropy balanced OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the maturity matched treasury yield spread (Spread). *AA-* is a binary variable equal to one when the bond is rated at *AA-* or above, otherwise it is equal to zero. The independent variable of interest is the triple difference term *Post*GO*AA-*. Panel A reports the results around the Wall Street Journal - Proposal Press Release (WSJ-PPR) event. Panel B reports the results around the Final Rule Press Release (FRPR) event. See Appendix B for variable definitions. *, **, and *** Indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels. P-values are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by issuer.

Panel A: WSJ-PPR

VARIABLES	(1) Spread	(2) Spread	(3) Spread
<i>AA-</i>	-0.375*** (0.000)	-0.292*** (0.000)	-0.015 (0.671)
<i>Post</i>	-0.013 (0.316)	-0.014 (0.261)	-0.027 (0.402)
<i>AA- *Post</i>	0.014 (0.496)	0.014 (0.503)	0.014 (0.487)
<i>GO</i>	-0.053 (0.450)	-0.139 (0.425)	
<i>AA- *GO</i>	0.064 (0.365)	0.178 (0.301)	0.104 (0.274)
<i>POST*GO</i>	0.096 (0.177)	0.096 (0.181)	0.098 (0.172)
<i>Post*GO*AA-</i>	-0.148** (0.043)	-0.148** (0.045)	-0.150** (0.043)
<i>Maturity</i>	0.004** (0.011)	-0.004** (0.027)	-0.073 (0.654)
<i>Volume</i>	-0.026*** (0.000)	-0.024*** (0.000)	-0.023*** (0.000)
<i>Negotiated</i>	0.071*** (0.001)	0.035 (0.295)	
<i>Coupon</i>	-0.223*** (0.000)	-0.230*** (0.000)	
<i>Ln(Par)</i>	-0.021 (0.140)	-0.037** (0.019)	
<i>Call</i>	-0.126*** (0.000)	-0.166*** (0.000)	
Observations	29,094	29,094	29,094
R-squared	0.619	0.770	0.952
State FE	YES	NO	NO
Issuer Type FE	YES	NO	NO
Issuer FE	NO	YES	NO
Bond FE	NO	NO	YES

Panel B: FRPR

VARIABLES	(1) Spread	(2) Spread	(3) Spread
<i>AA-</i>	-0.383*** (0.000)	-0.326*** (0.000)	-0.203*** (0.000)
<i>Post</i>	-0.015 (0.118)	-0.016* (0.096)	-0.010 (0.472)
<i>AA- *Post</i>	0.027** (0.021)	0.028** (0.020)	0.027** (0.021)
<i>GO</i>	0.030 (0.712)	0.021 (0.912)	
<i>AA- *GO</i>	-0.020 (0.812)	0.010 (0.958)	0.468** (0.046)
<i>POST*GO</i>	-0.028* (0.083)	-0.026 (0.112)	-0.027* (0.085)
<i>Post*GO*AA-</i>	0.022 (0.222)	0.019 (0.285)	0.021 (0.242)
<i>Maturity</i>	0.003** (0.011)	-0.005*** (0.001)	0.037 (0.755)
<i>Volume</i>	-0.017*** (0.000)	-0.016*** (0.000)	-0.020*** (0.000)
<i>Negotiated</i>	0.025 (0.151)	-0.006 (0.781)	
<i>Coupon</i>	-0.190*** (0.000)	-0.201*** (0.000)	
<i>Ln(Par)</i>	0.002 (0.918)	-0.005 (0.686)	
<i>Call</i>	-0.101*** (0.000)	-0.132*** (0.000)	
Observations	32,938	32,938	32,938
R-squared	0.596	0.795	0.961
State FE	YES	NO	NO
Issuer Type FE	YES	NO	NO
Issuer FE	NO	YES	NO
Bond FE	NO	NO	YES

Table 6: Changes in Bond Yield Spreads around WSJ-PPR - Additional Cross Sections

This table presents more entropy balanced cross-sectional results around the Wall Street Journal - Proposal Press Release (WSJ-PPR) event. Panel A includes *Turnover* which is the standardized value of (*Total Volume / Par*). The independent variable of interest in Panel A is the triple difference term *Post*GO*Turnover*. Panel B includes *Large Decline* which is a binary variable equal to one if the issuer has previously had a monthly decline in their security prices of 20% or more, otherwise it is equal to zero. The independent variable of interest in Panel B is the triple difference term *Post*GO*Large Decline*. See Appendix B for variable definitions. *, **, and *** Indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels. P-values are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by issuer.

Panel A: Turnover

VARIABLES	(1) Spread	(2) Spread	(3) Spread
<i>Turnover</i>	-0.026*** (0.005)	-0.007 (0.417)	-0.009 (0.269)
<i>Post</i>	-0.005 (0.733)	-0.005 (0.773)	-0.041 (0.146)
<i>Turnover *Post</i>	0.011 (0.237)	0.001 (0.868)	-0.013 (0.187)
<i>GO</i>	0.006 (0.769)	0.044 (0.182)	
<i>Turnover*GO</i>	0.013 (0.255)	0.003 (0.797)	0.005 (0.535)
<i>Post*GO</i>	-0.047*** (0.006)	-0.045*** (0.008)	-0.044*** (0.009)
<i>Post*GO*Turnover</i>	-0.010 (0.428)	0.003 (0.769)	0.007 (0.507)
<i>Maturity</i>	0.002 (0.144)	-0.004** (0.021)	-0.213 (0.163)
<i>Volume</i>	-0.024*** (0.000)	-0.023*** (0.000)	-0.022*** (0.000)
<i>Negotiated</i>	0.042** (0.046)	0.020 (0.536)	
<i>Coupon</i>	-0.226*** (0.000)	-0.234*** (0.000)	
<i>Ln(Par)</i>	-0.026** (0.029)	-0.035** (0.022)	
<i>Call</i>	-0.143*** (0.000)	-0.171*** (0.000)	
Observations	29,094	29,094	29,094
R-squared	0.657	0.775	0.954
Ratings FE	YES	YES	YES
State FE	YES	NO	NO
Issuer Type FE	YES	NO	NO
Issuer FE	NO	YES	NO
Bond FE	NO	NO	YES

Panel B: Large Decline

VARIABLES	(1) Spread	(2) Spread	(3) Spread
<i>Large Decline</i>	-0.083 (0.514)	-0.079 (0.689)	
<i>Post</i>	-0.002 (0.920)	-0.003 (0.827)	-0.034 (0.228)
<i>Large Decline*Post</i>	-0.232** (0.027)	-0.113*** (0.000)	-0.118*** (0.000)
<i>GO</i>	0.009 (0.679)	0.044 (0.190)	
<i>Large Decline*GO</i>	0.191 (0.293)	0.551*** (0.006)	
<i>Post*GO</i>	-0.050*** (0.003)	-0.045*** (0.006)	-0.045*** (0.006)
<i>Post*GO*Large Decline</i>	0.220* (0.069)	0.096 (0.126)	0.093 (0.146)
<i>Maturity</i>	0.002 (0.181)	-0.004** (0.018)	-0.181 (0.238)
<i>Volume</i>	-0.025*** (0.000)	-0.024*** (0.000)	-0.023*** (0.000)
<i>Negotiated</i>	0.042** (0.047)	0.021 (0.531)	
<i>Coupon</i>	-0.226*** (0.000)	-0.234*** (0.000)	
<i>Ln(Par)</i>	-0.020* (0.099)	-0.033** (0.031)	
<i>Call</i>	-0.140*** (0.000)	-0.170*** (0.000)	
Observations	29,094	29,094	29,094
R-squared	0.656	0.775	0.954
Ratings FE	YES	YES	YES
State FE	YES	NO	NO
Issuer Type FE	YES	NO	NO
Issuer FE	NO	YES	NO
Bond FE	NO	NO	YES

Table 7: Pseudo Events

This table presents the results from entropy balanced OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the maturity matched treasury yield spread (Spread). The independent variables of interest are the difference-in-differences term $Post*GO$ and the triple difference term $Post*GO*AA-$. Panel A reports the results around the first pseudo-event. Panel B reports the results around the second pseudo-event. See Appendix B for variable definitions. *, **, and *** Indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels. P-values are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by issuer.

Panel A: March 17th, 2015

VARIABLES	(1) Spread	(2) Spread	(3) Spread	(4) Spread	(5) Spread	(6) Spread
<i>Post</i>	0.153*** (0)	0.152*** (0)	-0.0121 (0.174)	0.149*** (0)	0.148*** (0)	-0.0166 (0.240)
<i>GO</i>	0.012 (0.577)	0.068** (0.025)		-0.057 (0.352)	-0.094 (0.609)	
<i>Post*GO</i>	-0.005 (0.466)	-0.005 (0.443)	-0.001 (0.924)	-0.000 (0.986)	0.000 (0.990)	0.005 (0.828)
<i>AA-</i>				-0.350*** (0)	-0.298*** (0.000)	0.021** (0.015)
<i>AA-*Post</i>				0.004 (0.741)	0.004 (0.771)	0.004 (0.768)
<i>AA-*GO</i>				0.079 (0.203)	0.140 (0.444)	0.068 (0.193)
<i>Post*GO*AA-</i>				-0.004 (0.860)	-0.005 (0.835)	-0.006 (0.816)
Observations	30,966	30,966	30,966	30,966	30,966	30,966
R-squared	0.663	0.787	0.973	0.628	0.783	0.973
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Ratings FE	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO
State FE	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO
Issuer Type FE	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO
Issuer FE	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO
Bond FE	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES

Panel B: February 17th, 2015

VARIABLES	(1) Spread	(2) Spread	(3) Spread	(4) Spread	(5) Spread	(6) Spread
<i>Post</i>	-0.047*** (0.000)	-0.046*** (0.000)	-0.165*** (0.000)	-0.072*** (0.000)	-0.072*** (0.000)	-0.192*** (0.000)
<i>GO</i>	0.007 (0.713)	0.048 (0.154)		-0.016 (0.801)	-0.074 (0.553)	
<i>Post*GO</i>	-0.009 (0.374)	-0.008 (0.428)	-0.005 (0.556)	0.003 (0.889)	0.006 (0.736)	0.011 (0.530)
<i>AA-</i>				-0.333*** (0.000)	-0.284*** (0.000)	-0.182* (0.069)
<i>AA-*Post</i>				0.031** (0.021)	0.030** (0.022)	0.030** (0.020)
<i>AA-*GO</i>				0.042 (0.502)	0.108 (0.390)	0.224 (0.103)
<i>Post*GO*AA-</i>				-0.011 (0.603)	-0.015 (0.483)	-0.017 (0.401)
Observations	30,402	30,402	30,402	30,402	30,402	30,402
R-squared	0.640	0.772	0.969	0.602	0.769	0.969
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Ratings FE	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO
State FE	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO
Issuer Type FE	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO
Issuer FE	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO
Bond FE	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES

Table 8: Credit Ratings after the Events

This table presents univariate changes in the credit rating of bonds subsequent to the *post-period* for each event window. A rating of “1” corresponds to “AAA”. Panel A reports the results following the Wall Street Journal - Proposal Press Release (WSJ-PPR) event. Panel B also reports the results following the Wall Street Journal - Proposal Press Release (WSJ-PPR) event. However, it is restricted to high-quality bonds (*AA- = 1*). See Appendix B for variable definitions. *, **, and *** Indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels.

Panel A: WSJ-PPR

		Post-period	90 Days after Event	Change (90 Days - Post)
<i>Rating</i>	<i>General Obligation</i>	2.940	2.960	.020
	<i>Revenue</i>	2.891	2.900	.008
	<i>Difference (GO-REV)</i>			.011**

Panel B: WSJ-PPR (AA- = 1)

		Post-period	90 Days after Event	Change (90 Days - Post)
<i>Rating</i>	<i>General Obligation</i>	2.361	2.369	.008
	<i>Revenue</i>	2.352	2.352	.000
	<i>Difference (GO-REV)</i>			.008**

Table 9: Descriptive Statistics – Issuances

This table presents the summary statistics for the issuance analysis. See Appendix B for variable definitions.

VARIABLES	N	Mean	SD	25 th pct.	p50	75 th pct.
<i>Ln(Amount)</i>	1,922	2.567	2.045	0.000	2.614	4.127
<i>Post</i>	1,922	0.490	0.500	0.000	0.000	1.000
<i>GO</i>	1,922	0.500	0.500	0.000	0.500	1.000
<i>Rating</i>	1,922	3.075	1.644	2.000	3.000	4.000
<i>Ln(Pop)</i>	1,922	13.238	1.519	12.206	13.205	14.218
<i>Ln(PC Income)</i>	1,922	10.778	0.195	10.643	10.759	10.905
<i>Unemployment</i>	1,922	4.951	1.521	3.700	4.700	5.900
<i>Pop Growth</i>	1,922	1.051	0.951	0.337	0.993	1.657

Table 10: Issuance Behavior

This table presents the results from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is either the log of one plus the amount of general obligation municipal bonds issued (if $GO = 1$) or the log of one plus the amount of revenue municipal bonds issued (if $GO = 0$). The independent variable of interest is the difference-in-differences term $Post*GO$. See Appendix B for all variable definitions. *, **, and *** Indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels. P-values are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by issuer.

VARIABLES	(1) Ln(Amount)	(2) Ln(Amount)	(3) Ln(Amount)
<i>Post</i>	-0.115 (0.484)		
<i>GO</i>	0.155 (0.206)	0.163 (0.207)	0.127 (0.315)
<i>Post*GO</i>	0.331** (0.040)	0.334** (0.049)	0.332** (0.041)
<i>Ln(Pop)</i>	3.474* (0.071)	4.731* (0.097)	
<i>Ln(PC Income)</i>	-2.082 (0.103)	-1.392 (0.402)	
<i>Unemployment</i>	0.044 (0.507)	0.148 (0.310)	
<i>Pop Growth</i>	-0.006 (0.946)	-0.049 (0.663)	
Observations	1,922	1,922	1,922
R-squared	0.394	0.422	0.537
Ratings FE	YES	YES	YES
Issuer FE	YES	YES	NO
State-Year FE	NO	YES	NO
Issuer-Year FE	NO	NO	YES

Table 11: Issuance Behavior - High Quality Issuers

This table presents the results from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is either the log of one plus the amount of general obligation municipal bonds issued (if $GO = 1$) or the log of one plus the amount of revenue municipal bonds issued (if $GO = 0$). $AA-$ is a binary variable equal to one when the municipality's average rating on general obligation bonds issued in a year are $AA-$ or above (if $GO = 1$) or equal to one if the municipality's average rating on revenue bonds issued in a year are $AA-$ or above (if $GO = 0$), otherwise it is equal to zero. The independent variable of interest is the triple difference term $Post*GO*AA-$. See Appendix B for all variable definitions. *, **, and *** Indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels. P-values are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by issuer.

VARIABLES	(1) Ln(Amount)	(2) Ln(Amount)	(3) Ln(Amount)
<i>Post</i>	0.174 (0.509)		
<i>AA-</i>	0.368 (0.115)	0.413* (0.085)	0.553* (0.051)
<i>AA- *Post</i>	-0.320 (0.254)	-0.380 (0.219)	-0.122 (0.817)
<i>GO</i>	-0.568* (0.067)	-0.635** (0.049)	-0.746** (0.014)
<i>AA- *GO</i>	0.878** (0.011)	0.949*** (0.008)	1.058*** (0.002)
<i>Post*GO</i>	-0.801* (0.084)	-0.731 (0.125)	-0.732 (0.140)
<i>Post*GO*AA-</i>	1.273** (0.011)	1.201** (0.020)	1.171** (0.029)
<i>Ln(Pop)</i>	3.217 (0.130)	4.892 (0.115)	
<i>Ln(PC Income)</i>	-2.845* (0.074)	-2.808 (0.147)	
<i>Unemployment</i>	0.015 (0.837)	0.073 (0.622)	
<i>Pop Growth</i>	-0.018 (0.844)	-0.076 (0.508)	
Observations	1,922	1,922	1,922
R-squared	0.408	0.435	0.550
Issuer FE	YES	YES	NO
State-Year FE	NO	YES	NO
Issuer-Year FE	NO	NO	YES

Table 12: Issuance Behavior - Flexible Issuers

This table presents the results from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is either the log of one plus the amount of general obligation municipal bonds issued (if $GO = 1$) or the log of one plus the amount of revenue municipal bonds issued (if $GO = 0$). *Flexible* is a binary variable equal to one when the issuer is either a state, city, or county, otherwise it is equal to zero. The independent variable of interest is the triple difference term $Post*GO*Flexible$. See Appendix B for all variable definitions. *, **, and *** Indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels. P-values are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by issuer.

VARIABLES	(1) Ln(Amount)	(2) Ln(Amount)	(3) Ln(Amount)
<i>Post</i>	0.060 (0.863)		
<i>Flexible*Post</i>	-0.233 (0.492)	-0.247 (0.520)	
<i>GO</i>	-0.296 (0.339)	-0.288 (0.376)	-0.340 (0.269)
<i>Flexible*GO</i>	0.566* (0.088)	0.567 (0.103)	0.590* (0.069)
<i>Post*GO</i>	-0.632 (0.198)	-0.609 (0.236)	-0.597 (0.223)
<i>Post*GO*Flexible</i>	1.201** (0.020)	1.176** (0.030)	1.157** (0.025)
<i>Ln(Pop)</i>	3.254* (0.087)	4.820* (0.085)	
<i>Ln(PC Income)</i>	-2.313 (0.104)	-1.654 (0.382)	
<i>Unemployment</i>	0.023 (0.740)	0.126 (0.400)	
<i>Pop Growth</i>	-0.026 (0.771)	-0.066 (0.561)	
Observations	1,922	1,922	1,922
R-squared	0.411	0.438	0.552
Ratings FE	YES	YES	YES
Issuer FE	YES	YES	NO
State-Year FE	NO	YES	NO
Issuer-Year FE	NO	NO	YES

Table 13: Issuance Behavior -Falsification

This table presents the results from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is either the log of one plus the amount of general obligation municipal bonds issued (if $GO = 1$) or the log of one plus the amount of revenue municipal bonds issued (if $GO = 0$). This sample differs from the preceding tables by including issuers who are less likely to be able to switch between revenue and general obligation bonds, rather than those who are more likely to be able to switch between the bonds. Since these issuers either issue general obligations or revenue bonds, the analysis is the issuer-year level. The coefficient on GO is absorbed, because it does not vary within an issuer. The independent variable of interest is the difference-in-differences term $Post*GO$. See Appendix B for all variable definitions. *, **, and *** Indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels. P-values are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by issuer.

VARIABLES	(1) Ln(Amount)	(2) Ln(Amount)
<i>Post</i>	-0.006 (0.929)	
<i>Post*GO</i>	0.072 (0.241)	0.087 (0.226)
<i>Ln(Pop)</i>	1.130 (0.214)	1.092 (0.360)
<i>Ln(PC Income)</i>	-0.505 (0.226)	-0.520 (0.332)
<i>Unemployment</i>	-0.013 (0.553)	0.026 (0.520)
<i>Pop Growth</i>	0.028 (0.451)	0.032 (0.467)
Observations	5,545	5,537
R-squared	0.813	0.824
Ratings FE	YES	YES
Issuer FE	YES	YES
State-Year FE	NO	YES

Table 14: Descriptive Statistics – Bank Demand

This table presents the entropy weighted summary statistics for the bank demand analysis. See Appendix B for all variable definitions.

VARIABLES	Non-LCR				LCR			
	N	Mean	SD	Median	N	Mean	SD	Median
<i>Size</i>	312	16.608	0.482	16.403	148	19.090	0.807	18.830
<i>ROA</i>	312	0.003	0.002	0.003	148	0.002	0.002	0.002
<i>Debt</i>	312	0.298	0.210	0.288	148	0.310	0.201	0.267
<i>Deposits</i>	312	0.579	0.202	0.572	148	0.568	0.194	0.617
<i>Munis</i>	312	0.009	0.014	0.002	148	0.010	0.014	0.005

Table 15: Bank Demand

This table presents the results from entropy balanced OLS regressions where the dependent variable is different securities. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the fair value of HTM and AFS municipal holdings divided by total assets (Munis). Munis is (not) balanced in odd (even) columns. In Panel B, the dependent variable is either the fair value of HTM and AFS private label mortgage-backed securities divided by total assets (PLMBS), or the fair value of HTM and AFS asset-backed securities divided by total assets (ABS). The independent variable of interest is the difference-in-differences term *LCR*Effective*. See Appendix B for all variable definitions. *, **, and *** Indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels. P-values are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by bank.

Panel A: Municipal Bonds

VARIABLES	(1) Munis	(2) Munis	(3) Munis	(4) Munis
<i>LCR Firm</i>	-0.0031 (0.666)	-0.0108 (0.250)		
<i>LCR*Effective</i>	0.0016** (0.0402)	0.0020** (0.0246)	0.0008** (0.0336)	0.0010** (0.0152)
<i>Size</i>	0.0013 (0.618)	0.0031 (0.310)	-0.00097 (0.718)	-0.0024 (0.416)
<i>ROA</i>	0.673 (0.451)	0.671 (0.473)	0.0432 (0.694)	0.0905 (0.428)
<i>Debt</i>	-0.108 (0.335)	-0.179 (0.161)	-0.0221 (0.404)	-0.0224 (0.395)
<i>Deposits</i>	-0.0940 (0.417)	-0.157 (0.224)	-0.0232 (0.395)	-0.0230 (0.388)
Observations	460	460	460	460
R-squared	0.090	0.138	0.994	0.994
Quarter FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Firm FE	NO	NO	YES	YES
Munis Balanced	YES	NO	YES	NO

Panel B: Non-HQLA Securities

VARIABLES	(1) PLMBS	(2) PLMBS	(3) PLMBS	(4) PLMBS	(5) ABS	(6) ABS	(7) ABS	(8) ABS
<i>LCR Firm</i>	-0.0014 (0.737)	-0.0026 (0.536)			0.0006 (0.918)	-0.0001 (0.990)		
<i>LCR*Effective</i>	-0.0008* (0.0833)	-0.0008* (0.0895)	-0.0007** (0.0126)	-0.0007** (0.0108)	-0.0005 (0.473)	-0.0003 (0.556)	-0.0002 (0.299)	-0.0002 (0.392)
<i>Size</i>	0.0034* (0.0573)	0.0038** (0.0367)	-0.0010 (0.578)	-0.0009 (0.597)	0.0027 (0.311)	0.0030 (0.271)	-0.0042 (0.106)	-0.0035 (0.129)
<i>ROA</i>	-0.0124 (0.962)	-0.0200 (0.940)	-0.121*** (0.0018)	-0.131*** (0.0011)	-0.393 (0.319)	-0.331 (0.409)	0.0580 (0.416)	0.0446 (0.477)
<i>Debt</i>	0.0270 (0.515)	0.0212 (0.567)	-0.0691*** (0.0060)	-0.0730*** (0.0037)	0.117 (0.267)	0.0945 (0.296)	0.0173 (0.428)	0.0106 (0.591)
<i>Deposits</i>	0.0354 (0.385)	0.0309 (0.395)	-0.0519** (0.0302)	-0.0559** (0.0179)	0.129 (0.249)	0.106 (0.268)	0.0166 (0.448)	0.0103 (0.602)
Observations	460	460	460	460	460	460	460	460
R-squared	0.167	0.158	0.995	0.995	0.114	0.104	0.998	0.998
Quarter FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Firm FE	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES
Munis Balanced	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO

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Appendix A: Timeline

Event	Date	Description
Basel III Standards	12/1/2010	The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision releases their initial liquidity standards. Municipal bonds are eligible as Level 2A HQLA
Basel III Revised Standards	1/1/2013	The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision releases their revised liquidity standards. Municipal bonds are eligible as Level 2A HQLA
U.S. Proposal of Basel III	11/1/2013	U.S. regulators proposed a rule to adopt the components of Basel III. There were several modifications including the exclusion of municipal bonds from HQLA. The LCR applies to banks with more than \$250 billion in total assets. In addition, bank holding companies regulated by the FRB are subject to a modified LCR starting at \$50 billion in total assets.
U.S. Adoption of Basel III	10/10/2014	After pushback from many commenters, municipal bonds were still left off the HQLA list.
Wall Street Journal Article	4/17/2015	This represented the first report that the FRB was going to add certain municipal bonds to the HQLA list.
FRB Press Release	5/21/2015	The FRB released a statement saying general obligation bonds meeting certain conditions will be treated as Level 2B HQLA.
FRB Rule Proposal	5/28/2015	The FRB released their long form rule proposal
FRB Press Release	4/1/2016	The FRB finalizes the rule. There were minor changes from the proposal, but municipal bonds were kept as Level 2B.
FRB Final Rule	4/11/2016	The FRB released their long form final rule.
Rule Effective Date	7/1/2016	The new FRB rule takes effect.
Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protect Act (EGRRCPA) passes in the Senate	3/14/2018	The senate passes legislation which, in part, requires all the U.S. banking regulators to classify both general obligation and revenue bonds as Level 2B HQLA.
EGRRCPA passes in the House	5/22/2018	The house passes the EGRRCPA. Shortly thereafter, it is signed by the president.
Interim Final Rule	8/31/2018	U.S. regulators issue interim final rule classifying general obligation and revenue bonds as HQLA.
Final Rule	6/5/2019	U.S. regulators issue the final rule (which is unchanged from the interim final rule).

Appendix B: Variable Definitions

Variable	Source	Definition
Pricing		
Spread	MSRB	The bond's average trade weighted yield over an event period minus the average yield on a maturity matched treasury security. If necessary, the yield for the treasury security is linearly interpolated from the two closest available treasury yields.
Post	MSRB	An indicator variable that is equal to one in the period after (and including) the event and zero otherwise.
GO	SDC Platinum	An indicator variable that is equal to one if the bond is a general obligation bond and zero otherwise.
Call	MSRB	An indicator variable that is equal to one if the bond is callable and zero otherwise.
Negotiated	SDC Platinum	An indicator variable that is equal to one if the bond was issued through a negotiated offering and zero otherwise.
Rating	CMF	A numeric version of a bond's rating which ranges from 1 for the highest quality bonds to 21 for the lowest quality. Standard and Poor's ratings are used. If they are missing, Moody's ratings are used. If both Standard and Poor's and Moody's do not have information on the rating, then Fitch's ratings are used.
Volume	MSRB	The natural log of one plus the bond's buy volume over an event period.
Coupon	MSRB	The bond's average coupon rate over an event period.
Ln(Par)	SDC Platinum	The natural log of one plus the estimated par value of a bond. The estimated value is calculated as the par of the issue divided by the number of bonds in the issue.
Maturity	MSRB	The time to maturity of the bond (in years).

Appendix B: Variable Definitions - Continued

Variable	Source	Definition
AA-	CMF	An indicator variable that is equal to one if the bond has a credit rating at or above AA- (i.e., Rating \leq 4)
Turnover	MSRB	The bond's total volume over the event period divided by the estimated total par value of the bond. This variable standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.
Large Decline	MSRB	An indicator variable that is equal to one if the market price for an issuer's securities has had a monthly decline of at least 20%. This measure is constructed by aggregating individual bond prices up to the monthly level, computing monthly returns, and then aggregating these monthly security returns up to the issuer level. The monthly returns are calculated from 2007 until the start of the sample period.
Issuances		
Ln(Amount)	SDC Platinum	The natural log of one plus the amount of general obligation bonds (in million \$'s) issued (if $GO=1$) or the natural log of one plus the amount of revenue bonds issued (if $GO=0$).
Post	SDC Platinum	An indicator variable that is equal to one during 2016 and 2017 and zero otherwise.
GO	SDC Platinum	An indicator variable that is equal to one for general obligation bonds and equal to zero for revenue bonds.
Ln(Pop)	BEA	The natural log of the population of the municipality's home county. If the municipality spans multiple counties, then it is the sum of those counties. If the municipality is a state, then the state's population is used.
Pop Growth	BEA	The municipality's population growth (as a %), measured as $((\text{population}(t) - \text{population}(t-1)) / \text{population}(t-1)) * 100$.

Appendix B: Variable Definitions - Continued

Variable	Source	Definition
Ln(PC Income)	BEA	The natural log of the per capita income of the municipality's home county. If the municipality spans multiple counties, then it is the average per capita income of those counties. If the municipality is a state, then the state's per capita income is used.
Unemployment	USDA	The unemployment rate (as a %) of the municipality's home county. If the municipality spans multiple counties, then it is the average unemployment rate of those counties. If the municipality is a state, then the state's unemployment rate is used.
Rating	CMF	A numeric version of a bond's rating which ranges from 1 for the highest quality bonds to 21 for the lowest quality. This measure is aggregated up to the issuer-bond type-year level and rounded to the nearest whole number. Missing values are replaced with the previous year or two's data for the same bond type. If still missing, then it is replaced with the rating for the other bond type (i.e., GO or REV) from the same issuer. ²⁷
AA-	CMF	An indicator variable that is equal to one if the issuer-bond type-year has a credit rating at or above AA- (i.e., $Rating \leq 4$).
Flexible	SDC Platinum	An indicator variable that is equal to one if the issuer is a state, city, or county and zero otherwise.
Bank Demand		
Munis	Bank Regulatory (WRDS)	The fair value of HTM and AFS municipal bonds divided by total assets $((bhck8497 + bhck8499)/bhck2170)$
LCR Firm	Bank Regulatory (WRDS)	An indicator variable that is equal to one if the bank holding company's total assets are greater than or equal to \$50 billion and zero otherwise.
Size	Bank Regulatory (WRDS)	The natural log of total assets $(Ln(bhck2170))$

²⁷ Due to data availability, prior to replacement, nearly all observations in 2017 have missing ratings. After replacing missing values with past years' data or other bond ratings, nearly all have available ratings.

Appendix B: Variable Definitions - Continued

ROA	Bank Regulatory (WRDS)	Net income divided by total assets (bhck4340/bhck2170)
Debt	Bank Regulatory (WRDS)	Non deposit liabilities divided by total assets ((bhck2948-bhdm6631 - bhdm6636)/bhck2170)
Deposits	Bank Regulatory (WRDS)	Deposits divided by total assets ((bhdm6631 + bhdm6636)/bhck2170)
PLMBS	Bank Regulatory (WRDS)	Private label mortgage backed securities divided by total assets ((bhckg309 + bhckg311 + bhckg321 + bhckg323 + bhckk147 + bhckk149 + bhckk155 + bhckk157)/bhck2170)
ABS	Bank Regulatory (WRDS)	Asset backed securities divided by total assets ((bhckC988 + bhckC027)/bhck2170)