TOWARDS A THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OWNERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS' 

,JON L. PIERCE 
Univers ity of Minnesota-Duluth 

Department of Management Studies 
School of Business and Economics 

IO University Drive 
Duluth, Minnesota 55812 

KURT T. DIRKS 
University of Ill inois at Urbana-Champaign 

Department of Business Administration 
College of Commerce and Business Administration 

1206 South Sixth Street 
Champaign, IL 61820 

TATIANA KOSTOVA 
University of South Carolina 

International Business Program Area 
College of Business Administration 

Columbia, SC 29208 

K. Dirks and T. Kostova contributed equally to this paper and their names appear io 
alphabetical order. 

Major portions of th is paper were written while Jon L. Pierce was visiting in the Department 
of Psychology, and the School of Strategic Management and Leadership at The University of Waikato, 
in Hamilton, New Zealand. I appreciate the time and support that l received from both academic units 
and The University of Waikato. 

\Ve would also like to acknowledge the contributions made to our thinking and understanding 
of the meaning associated with psychological ownership that stems from numerous scholars who have 
struggled with this issue before us. In particular, we have been strongly influenced and aided in our 
endeavors by the scholarly works of Lita Furby, Helga Dittmar, Floyd W. Rudmin, and our 
conversations with Stuart Albert. 

Finally, we would like to dedicate this paper to the late Larry L. Cummings --mentor, 
colleague, and friend-- for the contributions that he made to our work on psychological ownership, its 
genesis, and eme,·gent processes. 



2 

Towards a Theory of Psycbologiclll Ownership in Organizations 

Abstract 

Building upon the widespread observation that individuals develop feelings of ownership for a 

variety of objects (material as wel l as immaterial), the construct of psychological ownership is 

conceptually defined and examined in the context of the organization. In addition, the "roots" of 

psychological ownership and the primary "routes" associated with its development are identified. 

Finally, a set of research propositions are provided to guide inquiry into the development of 

psychological ownership in organizations. 



3 

Organization scholars have recently focused their attention on ownership as a psychological 

phenomenon as it occurs in organizations. Pierce, Rubenfeld, and Morgan (I 991 ), for example, in 

their review of the ernployee ownership literature, theorized that formal ownership may produce its 

positive social-psychological and behavioral effects by working through psychologically experienced 

ownership. Subsequently, Kubzausky and Druskat (1995), discussing the strength of the ind ividual-

organization relationship, suggested that the creation of a psychological sense of ownership in the 

organization may be one means by which major changes in the employee's relationship with the 

organization can be created. In the development of their psychological theory of change, Dirks, 

Cummings, and Pierce (1996) employed psychological ownersh ip to explain why individuals both 

promote and resist change effo1ts in organizations. Most recently, Pratt and Dutton (1998) noted that 

ownership, as an attitudinal state, attaches itself to issues which organizational members "feel worthy 

of attentiona.1 i.ovestmcnt" (p. 4). 

lo addition, management practitioners and consultants (cf., Stayer, 1990; Peters, l988; Byham, 

1989) have argued that psychological ownership promotes improved quality, productivity, and 

satisfaction. T. L. Brown (1989), in lndustrv Week, for example, wrote that "It's psychological 

ownership that makes the competitive difference" for organizations operating in highly unce1tain and 

turbulent environments. For Pat Carrigan, plant manager of a General Motors components plant, it 

was the creation of a work environment in which people had a sense of ownership for their jobs that 

lead to dramatic productivity improvements (Peters, 1988). 

'vVhile the extant literature does not prov ide us with an empirical verification for such claims, 

we are inclined to speculate that there are a number of organizational effects --some positive in nature 

and some negative that may stem from strong states of experienced ownership. On the positive side of 

the ledger we envision an organizational member who is wi ll ing to make personal sacrifices, assume 



4 

of high levels of responsibility, and engage in developmental (nurturing) acts for the organ izational 

target of owr.iership. There may, however, be a negative side to psychological ownership. A manager, 

for example, who bas stroog feelings of ownership for the organization may be unwill ing to share her 

ideas, information and decision making authority --much li ke the "overly possessive" child who won 't 

share h.is toys with a youoger sister . 

. Whi le r·elatively new for the organizational sciences, the examination of ownership as a 

psychological pheno1J1enon is not new for other disciplines such as sociology and psychology. 

Acknowledging that as individuals we are ab le to make introspective observations of things that are in 

the self and non-self region (cf., James, 1890; Prelinger, 1959) and that some objects are perceived as 

a part of the self(cf., James, 1890), Etzioni (1991) notes that ownership should be seen as part real 

and part in the mind, and Heider (1958) notes that it is common for people to have attitudes()/ 

ownership that they attach to objects that are within the selt~region. Scholars interested in advaocing 

our understandiog of the formation, development, expression, and mainteoance of self-identity, for 

example, provide us with a rich insight into the psychology of mine. Developmental psychologists 

suggest that the development of feeli ngs of "mine" and the close connection between "me" and "mine" 

emerges in conjunction with the toddler's innate effectance motive and ol~ject control (cf., Furby, 

1991). A continuation of this process unfolds during the adolescent years as strnng feelings of 

ownership develop for those objects through which one expresses his/her identity to others (cf., 

Csikszentmihalyi & Rochberg-Halton, 198 1). Finally, geronto logical studies (cf., Cram & Paton, 

1993) reveal the debilitating effects that are associated with the separation of the elderly from ce,tain 

possessions for which individuals have a strong sense of psychological connectedness. Even though 

scholars working in these fields have provided us with valuable insight into the psychological 

phenomenon of ownership, thern r·emains a great deal of work yet to be done. As Dittmar ( 1992) 

noted, the psychological functions served by experiences of ownership (possession') are on ly partially 



5 

understood, as are the dynamics and processes associated with its formation. 

Among the central research questions concern ing ownersh ip as a psychological phenomenon 

that need to be addressed are the questions of the meaning of psychological ownership, the genesis of 

this state, and the condit ions under which psychological ownersh ip manifests itself. It is the purpose 

of tJ1is paper to explore these issues in order to advance our understand ing of psychological ownership 

in the organizational context. In order to gain an understanding of this phenomenon, we need to draw 

upon the writings of scholars working outs ide of the organizational sciences and to carry the 

implications of their work into the field of organizational behavior. It is our intention to propose that 

the psychology of owne,~~hip unfolds in the organizational context, much as it operates in other realms 

of the human condition. 

In this paper, we expand past research on the psychology of ownership in two major ways, 

oeither of which have been addressed before. First~ atler presenting the theoretical foundations for our 

work, we articulate the "roots of' (i .e., the motivation for and/or ind ividual functions served by) 

psychological ownership. Thus, we address the question why organizational members come to feel 

ownership. Second, we explicate the "rou1es 10" psychological ownership, especially as this state 

emerge.: within tbe organizational context. Thus, the questions, what factors cause organizational 

members lo experience these feel ings, and how th is psychological state is achieved are explored. 

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 

Before we begin the examination of the "roots of' and the "routes to" psychological ownership 

in organizations, we briefly review some of the exumt research on the psychology of ownership which 

demonstrates that people tend to experience feelings of ownership for a variety of objects material and 

immaterial in nature. We then provide a conceptual defin ition of psychological ownership and suggest 

that psychological ownership manifests itself in the organizational context, as well as in many others. 



6 

Psychological Experie11ces of Ow1Jership 

Empirical and clinical evidence unequivocally confirms that the psychology of possession (i.e., 

the psychology of me and mine) is well rooted in people, at least, in the Western culture'. 

Possession, Etzioni ( I 99 I) notes, is a "dual creation, part attitude, part object. part in the mind, part 

'real"' (p. 466). It is common, according to Dittmar ( I 992), for people to psychologically experience 

the cotinection between self and various targets of possession (e.g., homes, automobiles, space, and 

other people). Possessions come to play such a dominant role in the owner's identity, that they 

become a part of the extended self (ct:, Belk, 1988; Dittmar, 1992). Jean-Paul Sartre ( I 943/1960) in 

his treatise on "bei1\g and nothingness" noted that "to have" (along with "to do" and "to be") is on.e of 

the three categories of human existence. According to Sartre, "the totality of my possessions reflects 

the totality of my being ... I am what 1. have .. . What is mine is myself' (p. 591-592). Likewise, James 

(1890) commented that there is a very fine line between what a person calls "me" and "mine." ln this 

context he commented that: 

a man's Self is the sum total of al l that he CAN call his, not only his body and his 

psychic powers, but his cloths and his house, his wife and children, his ancestors and 

friends, his reputation and works, his land, and yacht and bank account. All these 

things give the same emotions. If they wax and prosper, he feels triumphant; if they 

dwindle and die, he feels cast down --not necessari ly in the same degree for each 

thing, but in much the same way for all (p. 291-292)." 

While ownership is generally experienced as involving person-object relations, it can also be 

felt toward non-physical entities such as ideas, words, artistic creations, and other people, as well . 

Isaacs (1933), for example, obse1ved feeli ngs of ownership among young children through their 

expression that the nursery rhymes and songs were "theirs" if they heard them first, and no one else 

had a right to sing or hear them without their permission. Drawing on the work ofisaacs (1933). 

Heider (I 958) suggests that one only needs to witness the plagiarism of one's work, or other 



7 

"controversies among scientific men as to the parentage of ideas, discoveries or inventions" (Isaacs, 

I 933, p. 222) in order to find evidence for the power and emotion associated with this state. 

Similarly, James (1890) not.es that people feel personally annihilated when the construct ions of their 

hands or brains are suddenly swept away. The loss of possession leads to " .. shrinkage of our 

personality, a partial conversion of ourselves to nothingness" (p. 178). The loss of possessions are 

linked (o depressed feelings, while their growth produces a positive and uplifting effect (Formanek, 

1991 ). 

The psychological aspects of ownership have been explored, and evidence has been presented 

for their existence, by anthropologists, psychologists, social psychologists, geographers, ph ilosophers, 

animal behaviorists, and students of life-span development. Belk (1988), Cram and Paton (1993), and 

Dittmar (1992), for example, in their discuss ion of possessions as part of the extended self, note that it 

is common to witness the debilitating effects associated w ith the movement of elderly people from 

their homes to nursing facilities. Among young chi ldren at play, there is the frequent observation of 

strong reactions --"My car, Me!"-- when a child picks up the toy of another child (cf., Isaacs, 1933; 

Levine, .1983). In his study of the ownersh ip effect, Beggan ( I 992) demonstrated that ownership 

produces a psychological relationsh ip between the individual and the object wh ich is owned. Possibly 

as a result of self-enhancing biases, invested effo,t, exposure, controllabi I ity, and socia.1 approval, 

owned objects appear to be more attractive and rated more favornbly than objects which are not owned 

-- people appear to be more attracted and attached to their belongings, eveo letters of the alphabet 

(Nuttin, 1987), than to other objects similar in nature (Beggan, 1992). fina lly, Porteous (1976) notes 

that the individuals' emotional investment in, and thus their psychological attachment to the "home" 

(my home) is oflen expressed by the individual's preoccupation with interior decoration, the display of 

personal objects, and tbe external appearance of the house and lawn. As has frequently been noted, 

feelings of attachment to the home are oJlen extolled .in song, poetry, and proverb (Porteous, 1976). 



8 

Jn summary, past research and social p,·actice provide sutltcieot arguments and evidence for 

the existence of feelings of ownership (cf., Allport, 1937; Belk, 1988; Csiksze11tmi.l1alyi & Rochberg-

Halton, 1981: Dittmar, 1992; Furby, 1976, 1978; Heider, 1958; Isaacs, 1933; James, 1890; Kl ine & 

France, 1899; Litwinski, 1947; Prelinger, 1959; Weil, 1952). As a result, the issue of the existence of 

this psychological state will not be examined in greater detail here. Instead we will focus 011 questions 

pertaining to the "roots of'' (i.e., What condition within the individual gets served by this state?) and 

the "routes io" psychologically experienced ownership (i.e., What are the experiences that give rise to 

this state?) first, however, we will conceptually define the state of psychological ownership. 

Psychological Ownership Conceptually Defined 

Psychological ownership can be defined as that state where an individual feels as though the 

target of ownership (or a piece of that target) is "theirs" -- (i.e .. it is MINE!}'. Psychological 

ownership reflects a relationship between an individual and objects (material or immateria.1 in nature) 

where the object is expel'ieoced as having a close connection with the self(Furby, 1978a, l978b; 

Litwinski, 1942; Wilpe,1, 1991), becoming according to Belk {1988) and Dittmar (199 1) pa,1 of the 

"extended self." Psychological ownership is based on feel ings of possessiveness and being 

psychologically tied to an object. One's possessions, according to James (I 890), "are felt to be 

extensions of the self ... what is mine becomes (in my foeli.ogs) a part of ME" (cf., Isaacs, 1933, p. 

225) and thus the experienced state of psychological ownership. Kline and France (I 899) in their 

exploration of the psychology of ownership note that when property becomes grounded 

psychologically it becomes for the individual mine, as the individual finds him/herself present in it. 

"The recognition of things owned by me as mine is the material that makes up much of my 

persoJ1ality; aod the concept: mine is the cement to the entire mosaic mass constituting the ego" (p. 

466-467). 

The Organizational Context 



9 

Although most of the work on psychology of ownership has been in fields other than the 

organizatiooal sciences, there is some work that suggests that feelings of possessiveness and ownership 

extend into the organizational context, as well. As previously suggested, individuals express feelings 

of ownership for their work (Beaglehole, 1932, p. 300-301), their organization (Dirks, Cummings, & 

Pierce, l 996; Pierce, Rubenfeld , & Morgan, 1991 ), their products (Das, 1993), their jobs (Peters & 

Austin, 1985), and specific issues within organizations (Pratt & Dutton, 1998). For further evidence 

of the existence of feelings of ownership at the workplace we need only reflect on our social 

experiences and/or just look around ourselves. It is not uncommon to hear comments suggesting that 

various objects within the work environment are experienced as belonging to a pa1ticular individual or 

group, such as, a boss ' discussion how she will treat "her" direct repo1ts (and acting accord ingly), and 

defensive assertions stating that "those i.deas were mine!" In addition, observations reveal possessive 

and ownership behaviors, such as, an individua.l personalizing her workspace with pictures and 

mementos. 

Building upon the work of those scholars inte.restcd in feelings of ownership and the 

psychology of mine, as well as on our own experiences, we propose thal much .like the development 

and manifestation of psychological ownership in other domains of the human condition, psychological 

ownership manifests itself within the organizational context. Under ce11ain condit.ions organizational 

members are capable of coming to experience psychological ownership for a variety of organizational 

factors. There are a myriad of potential targets within the organizational context to which 

organizational members can become psychologically tied by developing feelings of ownership. 

Through processes yet to be explored, organizational members can come to experience, for example, 

space, material ol>jects, people/relationships (e.g., subordinates, team members), respoosibilit.ies (e.g., 

work), work outcomes (e.g., programs implemented), mental processes (e.g., ideas), social systems 

(e.g., organization, depmtment, team), as part of their extended selves. Specifically, we propose: 



Proposition J: ft is possible for organizalional members to experience psychological 

ownership toward 1he organization and various wrgets in 1he organization. 

THE "ROOTS" OF PSYCHOLOGICAL O\VNERSHIP 

10 

While the concept "self," according to James (1890), "envelops everything that a man can call 

his" (p. 228), the motivation (i.e., the "reason-for-being") for the experienced state of ownership 

remains to be articulated. In this section, we will explore the roots of ownership and its psychological 

condition. The primary question that is to be explored here is -- What is the motivation and/or 

function that gets served for the individual by this psychological state? 

No comprehensive taxonomy or empirica l ev idence currently exists that resolves this question. 

Several scholars have, however, speculat.ed on the mot ivation for possessions and have suggested that 

there may be several different loci for the motivation for ownership al\d its accompanying 

psychological state. Dittmar (1992) pointing to the complexity of the relationship between people and 

"their things," noted that thiogs play several important roles. In addition to serving a classical 

economics utilitarian value, possessions also "shape our consciousoess, our selt~awareness and our 

perception of the world" (p. 65). Porteous (1976) observed that the,·e are tlu·ee territorial satisfactions 

which derive from ownership: control over space per se; personalization of space as an assertion of 

identity; and, stimulation (the later might be achieved, for example, by thinking about, using, 

improving, observing, and defending one's possessions/territory). In addition, several scholars (e.g., 

Ardrey, 1966; Duncan, 1981; Porteous, 1976; Weil, 1952) have suggested tJiat possessions provide the 

individual with "a place," that symbolically can be c.aptui·e<I by the concept of "home" and its capacity 

to provide the i.odiv.idual with a context in which to dwell, a sense of psychic comfort, pleasure and 

security ( cf., Dreyfus, l 991; Heidegger, I 967). 

Some scholars interested in the genesis of the experienced state of ownership have attempted 

to fix its origin in the individual's innate genetic structure, while others have focused on the 



lJ 

socialization practices traditionally carried out in certain societies. There are tbosc who believe that 

the human condition can be characterized by an innate need that is related to possession -- having a 

home (cf., Weil, 1952), having space/territory (cf , Ardrey, 1966; Darling, l937; Porteous, 1976), and 

the gathering and holding of various objects as personal possessions (c.f., Burk, 1900; Hall & Wiltse, 

J 891 ; Kline & France, 1899; McDougall, 1923/1908). Baldwin (cited by Litv,inski, 1942), like many 

others, .suggests that possessive and prope11y-related behavior is an instinct. He wrote: " Even with 

animals one foids the recognition of me11111 and luum and that not only with regard to other individuals 

like the young of the family, but equally with regard to th ings. The bird claims the nest and the 

whole tree as its own ... " (see Litwinski, 1942, p. 36). "The impulse to collect and hoard vari.ous 

objects," McDougall (1923/1908) wrote, "is displayed in one way or another by almost all human 

beings, and seems to be due to a true instinct ... " (p. 75). 

Beaglehole (1932), on the other hand, in his review of the literature dealing with property, 

concludes by suggesting that there is very little if any evidence that wou ld support the notion that 

there is an innate ownership instinct •· possessions appear to serve a variety of functions such as 

providing security and serving to satistY such needs as for food, safety, and reproduction, but 

possession is oot an end in and of itself. Rudmin ( 1990) suggested that private property became an 

institution with the emergence of agricultural-based socio-economic systems, and Dittmar (1992) based 

upon her review of the literature suggests that bio logy may play a role, but not a.o overriding one. 

"Social and cultural factors" (i .e., acquired factors) "significantly influence how people relate to their 

material possessions" (Dittmar, 1992, p. 36). People, Rudmin (1990) concludes, seek to secure their 

futures through the utility provided by their possessions. 

The nurture side of tbc argument is well articulated by the human development scholars ( cf, 

Furby, 1978b; Lewis & Brook, 1974; Seligman, 1975) who suggest that ownership and its 

psychological state is experienced early in the development process. As noted by Litwinski (1942), 



12 

"The motbe,· carefully inspects the objects that the child brings back. 'Go and look for your ball, 

bring back your bucket which the little boy has stolen from you ' " (p. 34). According to Litwi11ski 

(1942), it is through mother's education that U1e little child comes to consider objects as their own (cf., 

Furby, 1991). With maturation and an awareness of social relationships the child builds upon his/her 

experiences involving self and non-self, with new lessons and experiences of ownership involving 

more complex three-way relationships (i.e., self-object-other). For the child the differeotiation 

benveen self and not-self correlates with control (cf., Furby, I 978b; Lewis & Brook, 1974; Seligman, 

l975). Objects that can be controlled become considered as pmt of the self; and those which cannot 

fall within the domain of not-self. U11derstanding of three way relationships briJigs the ind ividual to 

understand possessions in tenns of mewn et 11111111 (this is mine and not yours; that is yours and not 

mine). 

Either as a result of e/1ectance motivation and developmental processes, innate possession 

tendencies, or a combination of the two, there emerges a fine line between what is considered me and 

that which is considere<I mine (Furby, l 99 l; .James, 1890). "We feel and act about certain things that 

are ours very much as we feel and act about ourselves" (James, 1890, p. 29). Having aod being, 

according to Sartre (1943), while distinct aJ'e essentially inseparable. People come to know and 

express themselves thl'Ough that which they own. 

Drawing upo11 Dittmar ( 1992), Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Hal!.oo (1981), Porteous 

(1976), and the above discussion, we suggest that the roots for ownership and its accompanying 

psychological feelings can be found, in pa11, in each of the following arenas: (a) efficacy and 

effectance motivation, (b) self-identity, and (c) "having a place," one or more of which may also serve 

as a source of stimulation, serve to fulfill some instrumental function, and/or provide security, psychic 

comfort and pleasure. Thus, from a humanistic perspective, psychological ownership serves a very 

important funct ion -- it allows individuals to fulfi ll bas.ic human needs through their work. 



13 

Each of the three sources of motivation for psychological ownership (efficacy and effoctance, 

self-identity, and "having a place") wi ll be explored in g,rcaier detail below. While each motivational 

concept will be treated separately, it is not our intention to sugge.st that they arc not interwoven with 

one another. Exploration of the interrelationships among tbese motives is, however, beyond the scope 

of this paper. We will conclude this section by proposing that each of these three motivational states 

provid<:;s the foundation for the emergence of psychological ownership within the organizational 

context. 

Efficacy and Effectancc Motivation 

Isaacs (1933) states that the desire to own "can on ly be thought of in terms of power -- or 

rather, of powerlessness" (p. 225). The motive for possession, according to Isaacs (1933), is in large 

part, being in con(TOI -- having the means to satisfy "my need as mine" (p. 225). She goes on to note 

that possessions enable the person to feel safe when these possessions are "mine to have and to hold" 

(p. 225). Having, therefore, becomes an end in itself, it becomes an issue of "power or powerlessness" 

and the psychological consequences of those two experienced states. The ultimate meaning of 

ownership is the fosi11g of the target of ownership with oneself -- as to have is to take into oneself, 

this being the literal and ultimate form of control and possession (ct:, Dittmar, 1992). 

In her review of individua.1-centered explanations for the process by which material possessions 

become a pa,t of the extende<I self, Dittmar (1992) refers to developmental theory and the work of 

Furby (1978a, 1978b, 1980) who postulates that the motivation for possession stems from effectance 

motivation (cf., White, 1959) and the individual's desire to produce desired outcomes in the 

environment. "Possessions," she notes, "have an instrumental function -- they make possible certain 

activities and pleasures. In other words, they enable one to effect desired outcomes in one's 

environment ... The importance of this instrumenta.1 factor at all ages ... is provocative .. . The results 

here suggest possession may be one manifestation of eJfoctance motivation in that a central feature of 



possession is the ability to affect and control the object in whatever way ooc wishes" (Furby, 1978b, 

p. 60). 

14 

White (I 959) argued that a part of the human condition is revealed by the individual 's 

exploratioo of its environment. This explorato,y behavior is d1·iven by tl1e effcctance motive, the 

individual's motivation to interact effectively with its environment The effectance motive is aroused 

by diff~rences in the environment and is sustained when one's action.s produce further differences. 

The motive subsides when a situation has been explored to the point that it .no longer presents new 

possibilities. Feelings of efficacy and pleasure (i.e., the affective side of cffcctance) stems from "being 

the cause," having altered the environment through one's control/actions. Exploration of and the 

abil ity to control one's environment gives rise to feelings of efficacy and pleasures associated with 

being the cause. In addition to producing intrinsic pleasure, control ove,· the environment may be 

instrumental in producing extrinsic satisfaction as certain desirable objects are acquired. Along the 

same lines is Beggan's (I 991) research which provides evidence in suppo,t of the notion tJ1at 

possessions serve to satisfy the individual's control motivation. 

Furby's (1978) writings suggest tliat ll1ere is both an intrinsic and instrumental function served 

by possessiou. She notes that "the motivation for and the meaning of ownership" is embedded in 

effectance or competence motivation. The desire to experience ca\lsal efficacy leads to attempts to 

take possession of objects in one's environment. Building upon White's (I 959) work, s.he proposes 

that tbe control of objects that accompanies ownership is pleasure producing per se, and .leads to 

experie1\ces of personal efficacy. Furby also suggests that possessions come to be a part of the 

exteJJded self because "they express a person's ability to exert direct control over the social and 

physical environment" (Dittmar, 1992, p. 58), and Furby ( 1978a) concludes tJ1at possessions are 

im1101tant to the individual because they are instrumental in the exercise of control over the physical 

env ironment aod over people. Control over the physical environment stems from control of the object, 



15 

control over the use of the object, and use of the object a.s a mechanism to exert control over other 

parts of the environment. Social contro l stems from being able to regu late others' access to or use of 

one's possessions. 

In sum, it is being suggested that the motivation for ownership and the experienced state of 

ownership is, in part, grounded in the motivatio11 to be efficacious in relation to one's environment. 

Arising out of the effectance motive (i.e., the motivation for feelings of efficacy and competence), the 

iodividual is propelled to explore and manipulate the environment. ln some situations these person-

envi.ronment interactions result in the exercise of control and subsequent feelings of personal efficacy 

(competeoce). Th.rough this process, Furby (199 I) notes that "possessions and self become intimately 

related" (p. 460). 

WitJ1 regard to the organizational conte.w, past research (e.g., Greenberger, Strasser, 

Cum mings, & Dun.ham, 1989; Heis ler, 1974; Sanders & Malki.s, 1982) has documented the im po,tance 

of efficacy, cffectance motivation and the related control motive in a variety of dimensions of the 

indiv idual-organization relationship. For example, Greenberger et al., (1989), in addition to observing 

a significant relationship of personal control in the pred iction of j ob satisfaction and performance, 

indicate that contro l (i.e., the need for and/or the amount possessed) plays a role in participative 

decision making, reactions to feedback, goal se,tting, empowerment, and self-management. Karasek 

(I 979) hypothesized that a congruence between the individual's need fo,· control and the amount of 

control experienced affects the likelihood that job demands (e.g., high work load) produce 

cardiovascular disea.5e. Providing partial suppo1t for this hypothesis, Dwyer and Ganster (1991) report 

finding a relationship between levels of employee control over their work and work environment, and 

days lost due to sickness under high psychological demand conditions. In addition, theo,y and 

empirical evidence attests to the power an.d importance of feelings of efficacy in relation to work 

motivation and task performance (e.g., Bandura, 1977, 1989, Cervone & \Vood, 1995). As a 



16 

consequence, organizational scholars might propose that the need for efficacy and effectance thar 

serves as an underpinning for the feelings of ownership will operate withi n the organizational context, 

as in other realms of human functioning. 

Proposilion 2: It is possible for orga11iza1ional members to experience psychological 

ownership for 1he organizc11ion and various /arge1s in the organization because 

. differenl aspects of organizations can sa1isfy 1heir efficacylejfec1ance motives for this 

psychological stare. Thu.v, individuals for whom the efficacyleffecta"ce motive is 

operative will be more likely 10 experience psychological ownership towards the 

organization and various orga,,izalional targels than 1hose for whom this motive is no/ 

opera1ive. 

Self-identity 

Numerous scholars have suggested that, in addition to serving an instrumental function 

(efficacy/effectance motive), possessions also serve as symbolic expressions of the self and that there 

is a close connection between possessions, self-identity, and individuality (e.g., Abelson & Prentice, 

1989; Dittmar, 1992; Mead, 1934; Po,1eous, 1976). Drawing on this research, we propose that 

ownership helps people come to define themselves, express their self-identity to others, and serve the 

con ti nu ity of the self across time. 

Coming to Kuow Thyself. Identity, according to some, is located al the interface between tbe 

individual a.nd society. Each individual 's identity arises out of a socio-cultural context. According to 

Mead's (1934) symbolic interaction ism, an individual develops a sense of self-identity as a result of 

viewing oneself from the perspective of how others see us -- self awareness is said to be the outcome 

of retlection. Yet the individual is not to be seen as a passive player in the process. Instead, the 

ind ividual is an active agent, exploring, experiencing, and constructing meaning around the 

relationship between self and society. 



17 

Social constructionism pl'ovides additional insight into this developmental process associated 

with self-identity and its connection with possession. Possessions serve as a vehicle of self 

underscanding (i.e., coming to know thyself) via the shal'ed meaning that people come to give objects 

(Mead, 1934). Thus, through the socialization process, the individual comes to learn the meaning and 

importance of certain possessions. Through an interactive, cyclic, and reinforcing process the 

individual comes to find pleasure and comfort in their relationship with cert:ain objects, and the 

mean ing ascri.bcd by others to them. Accompanying th is process, the individual comes to eventually 

internalize the meaning ascribed to these objects by others as a part of their self:identity. "Personal 

possessions," according to Dittmar (I 992), "come to objectify aspects of self-definition" (p. 85). This 

is especia.lly true for those objects which can be contl'olled. It is, in part, the act of controlling the 

environment that brings objects into the realm of the extended self Thus, there is an interconnection 

between the efficacy and effectance, and the self-identity functions of possession. 

Addressing the role of efficacy and effectance, the Meadian perspective comments on the 

importance of psychological nearness. The ch.ild according to this perspective (cf., McCarthy, I 984) 

begins to discover the self through exploration of the environment. Through the exploration process, 

the environment is experienced and lessons about the self get transmitted. Thus, through the process 

of experiencing an object 'we learn someth ing about it as well as about the self as they are closely 

linked. The owning of objects creates greater "psychological nearness" than merely having contact 

with them. This nearness suggests that the person and object are one (Dittmar, 1992), and individuals 

tend to like that which is with or a part of them more than those objects that are not (Beggan 1992; 

Nuttin, 1987). Therefore, possessions play a major role in the development of self-identity. 

In sum, it is being suggested that people appropriate the meaning given to objects to the self 

(McCracken, 1990). It is th.rough our interaction with our possessions, coupled with our reflection 

upon their meaning that " ... our sense of identify, our self-definitions, are established, maintained, 



reproduced and transfonned in our relations with our possessions" (Dittmar, 1992, p. 86). It is 

through the interactive process with one's possessions that they provide a space, comfort, an 

autonomy, pleasure, and opportunity that faci litates the development and cultivation of one's identity 

(Saunders, 1990; Kron, 1983) as they are symbols of the self (Cooper, 1976). 

18 

Expression of Self-Identity to Otbcl's. In addition to objects of ow11ership (material and 

immaterial) serving as symbols of identity to the self, they also serve to communicate one's identity to 

others. Possessions play a significant role in the realm of social interaction, as suggested by 

researchers in many different fields including anthropology, consumer behavior, and psycliology 

(Dittmar, 1992). In addition to affording power over others, possessions communicate the individual 's 

identity to others, hence achieving recognition and social prestige. 

People co.llect and publicly display a myriad of different objects as symbolic expressions of 

their self- identity (Dittma,·, l992). Among the objects and actions that reflect this public expression of 

the self include: purchase-5 of clothing and automobiles; location and type of home pu,·cbased, along 

with its interior and exterior decoration; and the pictures, awards, and degrees and certificates that are 

publicly displayed on office walls and table tops. These possessions are employed to express, for 

example, ou,· gender, social class, recreational interests, group memberships, education, and 

accomplishments. 

Jn the realm of consumer goods, the self expression appe.ars to be the most revealing. 

According to Levy (I 959) items that we purchase and display serve as symbols expressing personal 

va.lues, qualities, attitudes, and social affi liations. Grubb and Hupp (1968) looking into product-user 

sternotypes have demonstrated that consumers frequently work to match their image with the image of 

the typical user of that product, and Munson and Spivey (1980) suggest that people will frequently 

express concern with how others will view them in relation to ce,tain possessions . 

. Maintain tl1e Continuity of Self-Identity. Several scholars (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi & 



19 

Rochberg-Haltoo, 1981; Kamprner, 1989, 1991) have suggested that possessions are psycbologically 

meaningful for yet another self-identity perspective. People commonly employ objects of owoership 

as a way of achieving a continuity of the self. As people sta.rt to get older their history becomes an 

increasingly impmtant part of their self-identity. Associated with tl1is process mementos, photographs, 

diaries, letters, and gifts from others take on an increasingly important role (Crnm & Paton, 1993; 

Rochb~rg-Halton, 1984). One of tl1eir many roles is the maintenance of self-continuity, in that they 

are concrete reminders of themselves and their life in the past. 

Possessions in this domain provide people with feel ings of comfort~ an emotional connection 

between themselves and that pa,t of their lives that they have already experienced. There is, according 

to Dittmar (1992) and Kamptner's ( 1989) a sense of security afforded by certain possession. 

Kamptner ( 1989) goes beyond this, suggesting that there is often an erosion in the sense of self; tliat 

accompanies the movement of elderly people, for example, from their home, their connection to 

themselves and their past through their possessions. Th is is because the individual is being removed 

from those "things" that through psychological ownership have become symbolic extensions of !be 

self. "Possessions," according to Cram and Paton's (1993) study, "are repositories of memories of 

one's self identity in the past, especially when opportunities for the external validation of the self are 

limited" (p. 19). In similar fashion, Rochberg-l-lalton ( 1989) observes that "Objects can objectify the 

self. In objectively tell ing us who we are, what we do, and who or what we might become, things can 

act as signs of the self, and r·olc models for its continued cultivation" (p. 339). 

ln sum, it is being suggested that the motivation for ownership and the experienced state of 

owoership is, in large part, grounded in selt:identity. Arising out of the dynamics associated with 

corning to know thyself, expressing that identity to others, and continuing the maintenance of that 

identity across time people become psychologica lly attached to objects and integrate them into the self. 

ln light of the fact that it has been argued that the need for self~identity gives rise to feelings 



20 

of ownership in the larger re.aim of the human condition, organization scholars might propose that this 

need operates witJ1io the organizCttional context as well. l n fact, research in the organizational sciences 

(e.g., Dutton, Du.kerich, & HarquaiL 1994) has demonstrated that there is a relationship between the 

organization and the self-identity of some of its members. O'Reilly and Chapman ( 1986), for 

example, found a positive relationshiJ> between organizational identification (i.e., feeling proud to be a 

pmt of a group), and extra-role behavior and intent to remain with the organization. Pratt and Dutton 

(1998) indicate that the organizational identities repo,ted by organizational members influenced the 

extent to which they manifested ownership issues. Thus, it might be proposed that self-identity serves 

as an underpinning for the emergence of psychological ownership within the organi7,.ational coo.text as 

well. 

Proposition 3: It i.v possible for organizational members 10 experience psychologicCtl 

ownership for the organization and various targets in the organization becCtuse 

different aspects of the organization ccm sati.tfe their se(f-idemity motive for this 

psychological state. Thus, individuals for whom the self-identity motive is operative 

will be more likely to experience psychological ownership toward, the organization 

and various organizational targets rhcm those for whom this motive is not operative. 

Haviug a Place 

To have a place is, according to the French political philosopher Simone Weil (1952), an 

impo11ant "need of the lmman soul" (p. 4 l). It has been suggested (cf., Ardrey, 1966; Darling, 1937, 

1939; Duncan, 1981; Porteous, 1976; Wei l, 1952) that the feelings of ownership are linked to the 

individual's need to have a place. Weil (1952), for example, claims that property (i .e., private and 

collective) along with order, liberty, freedom of opinion, truth, obedience, and responsibi lity are "vi.ta! 

needs of the sou l, ... the soul feels isolated, lost, if it is not surrounded by objects which seem to it 

like an extensioo of the bodily members" (p. 33) 



21 

Ardrey (1966) and Porteous ( 1976) have argued that the need to possess a certain space (i.e., 

territoriality) is an innate need. People, according to Ardrey, have an inherent drive to gain and to 

defend an exclusive property. for Darling (1937, 1939) territory is in essence a psychological 

expression. It is from this need that people devote significant amounts of time, energy, and resources 

to acquire, protect, decorate, and display his/her home. Duncan (1981), in her discussion of home 

ownersJiip, speaks of it as a psychological phenomenon that may have roots in human needs. The 

home, as seen by Duncan, is an object of ownership (possession) that may serve the human need for 

having a place •· my place. Similarly, Po1teous (1976) suggests that "the home" is important in that it 

provides the individual with both physical and psychic security. Drawing upon the Jungian concept of 

the sanctity of the threshold as a universal phenomenon, Porteous (1976) claims that the 

personification of owoed objects (e.g., the home) serves to promote security, identity, a1\d 

individualism, each of which is important because it represents freedom of sel f-determination. 

Po1teous ( 1976) provides us with insight into the definition of the concept of home and to the 

three territorial satisfactions (i.e., control over space, personalization of space as an assertion of 

identity, and stimulation) that derive from the possession of territory. 'While initially talking about the 

home in terms of geographical space including four wa lls on a plot of land, Porteous acknowledges 

that such places as the village, compound 01· neighborhood (which he acknowledges as collectively 

owned) also serve as the home or the home base for some people, thereby helping to fu lfill their 

tenitorial need. Porteous also suggests that home can also be thought of from the perspective of a 

fixed point of reference around which tl1e individual structures a significant portion of his/her reality. 

Psychologically, possessions that come to be experienced as home are those in which the individual 

has, in all likel ihood, made a considerable emotional investment (Porteous, 1976). It might be 

suggested, therefore, it is those possessions in which an individual finds a strong sense of 

"identification" that come to be regarded as home -- my place. 



1.n sum, it is being suggested that the motivation for ownership and the experienced state of 

ownersh ip is, in 11art, grounded in having a place of one's own (a home). Interpreting the work of 

Heidegger and Polanyi, Dreyfus ( l 99 l) notes that when we inhabit something, a mode of being, that 

something is no longer an object for us, instead it becomes a pmt of us. For Heidegger and Polanyi 

22 

this is called "dwelling in" or "inhabiting." People, according to Pohmyi, dwell in, that is, come to 

feel at home in, their language. Arising out of the dynamics associated with developing one's "home 

base" people become psychologically attached (e.g. , come to feel at home in one's lm1guage, in one's 

country, in one's things) to objects (material or immaterial) and in many of these possessions they may 

find a special place, one that is their's, one that is fam il iar, one that provides some fom1 of personal 

security --in it they find a place 10 dwell. 

Orga1lizational scholars might consider the consequence and role played by organizational 

members who "come to dwell" within !heir work (organization). Contemporary society and pop 

culture has identified some of these people as "workaholics," and organizational scientists (e.g., Lodahl 

& Kejner, 1965; Rabinowitz & Hall, l 977) have focused on job involvement --it is possible that the 

work alcoholic and/or the high ly job il\volvcd person are among those individuals who have come to 

"find their place in their work" (i.e., "to dwell or to feel at ho,ne in their work"). Building upon the 

thinking of Heidegger, Polanyi, and others, it might be proposed that tbe active condition of the "need 

to have a place" (to dwell or inhabit) may operate within the organization context, as it is reasoned to 

operate within the realm of the total human co1\dition, and in the process come to serve as tl1e 

foundation for the emergence of psychological ownership for one's work. 

Proposition 4: It is possible for orga11izatio11al members to experience psychological 

ow11ership for the orga11izatio11 and various targets in the organization because 

different aspects of organizations can sati.rfj, their motive for having a place (10 dwell 

or to inhabit). Thus. individuals for whom the motive to have a place is operative will 

be more lila!ly to experience psycltologicol ownership towords the organization and 



various organiz(tlional targels than those for whom this motive is no/ operative. 

THE "ROUTES TO" PSYCHOLOGICAL OWNERSHIP 

In this section, we focus on the routes (paths) through which ownership develops. Before 

doing so, we present a preliminary conjecture about the process by which psychological ownership 

begins to emerge. Figure I is employed to highlight the ,muor features associated with this process. 

Tbe Emergence of Psychological Ownership 

23 

The individual as we have suggested is seen as possessing a set of latent needs (e.g., the need 

for effectance, the need for self- identity, and the need for havi"ng a place) that serve as the "roots" for 

psychological ownership. Each of these needs is seen as playing a role positioning (i.e., making 

ready) the individual to act upon, engage in a relationship wi.th, or to experience certain objects as part 

of tbe extended self and thus the emergence of psychological ownership for that object. 

Insert Figure I about here 

The person (with hjs/her latent needs) moving through time interacts with a myriad of 

potential targe1s of psychological ownership. Each of these targets possesses different attributes, of 

which attractiveness, malleability, and accessibility may play a particularly important role in tenns of 

making these targets a strong candidate as a potential target of owne,·ship. Each target attribute is seen 

as potentially serving to fulfill one or more of the individual's latent needs. First, the potential target 

must be visible and attractive to the individual. Unle.ss it is experienced and captures the 

interest/attention of the individual it cannot end up being a target of ownership. Malleability, 

suggesting that the target is capable of being shaped and reshaped, is seen as potentially serving the 

effectauce need. Finally, it is being suggested that the target needs to be accessable (open, available) 



24 

to tbe individual. The degree to which the target is open to exploration and knowing, will detennine 

whether the individua l will be able to come to weave their self-identity around and t.o find a "place 

within" the target. Psychological ownership is, therefore, seen as the natural result of an interaction 

with an environment that .is receptive to the needs, actions and activities of the sel f. 

We suggest that an eve11l occurs in the inte,·action between the self and the potential target of 

owners.hip that brings the latent needs to a manifest state. If through this interaction, the individual 

comes to control, intimately know, or invest him/herseff into the target, the state of psychological 

ownership for the target develops, as each of these conditions, accord ing to Sartrn ( l 943), enables an 

object to become a prut of the self. 

In the remainder of thi.s section we explore the three 1rntior routes (paths) to the emergence of 

psychological ownership (control of the target, coming to know the target intimately, and investment 

of the self into the target) and examine their manifestation within the context of organizatiooal 

experiences. We discuss the effects of various organizational factors on psychological ownership and 

present ideas which can subsequently be employed to guide empirical inqu i1y into the emergence of 

this state among organizational members. 

Controlling the Target 

Saitre (1943), McClelland (1951), Furby (1978a), Csikszentmihalyi and Rocbberg-Halton 

(198 1), and others have suggested that control exercised over an object eventually gives rise to 

feelings of ownership for that object. Based upon her studies of ownership and possessions, Furby 

( I 978a), proposed that tire greater the amount of control a person can exercise over these objects the 

more they will be psychologically experienced as a part of the self'. Furby's control model of 

ownership, in part derives from the wo,·k of White (1959) and McClelland ( 1951). While Whit.e's 

(I 959) work focused on the motive for environmental exploration, control, and subsequent feelings of 

efficacy, it was McClelland (195 1) who proposed that much like parts of the body and control over 



25 

them, material objects tbat can be controlled come to be regarded as a part of the self. 

Even though there are individual differences in terms of importance of possessions for 

persooal identity (e.g., Sampson, 1978), Prelinger (1959) provided a partial test and support for the 

proposition that i.n general, there is a relationship betweeo self and control exercised over objects. 

Specifically, he found that objects over which the respondent had control (or could manipulate), and 

those objects that she/he can be affected by, were more likely to be perceived as pa,ts of the self thao 

items for which neither was the case. Similar, findings have been provided by Dixon and Street 

(1957). 

J.n their studies focused on the semantics of ownership, Rudmin and Berry (I 987) found that 

control appeared to be a key feature. Ownership means the ability to use and to control the use of 

objects. While Rud min and Berry's ( I 987) work did not address the direction of the causal arrow, ooe 

interpretation stemming from their work, which is consistent with the thinking of Prelinger (1959), 

Furby (1978), and Tuan (1984), is that those things over which the individual exercises the most 

control are those items that are most likely to be experienced as mine as in the sense of ownership. 

The earl ier work of Lewis and Brook (1974) and Seligman (1975) provides support for this notion as 

well. Based upon their work in the realm of human development, Lewis and Brook (1974) and 

Seligman {[975) have argued that through the exercise of control objects become associated with the 

self and those object:s which are co1\trolled by others or those wh ich cannot be controlled are not a 

part of tbe ind ividual's sense of self. 

lt was Ellwood ( 1927) who suggested that a key concept might be "use." Those objects which 

were habitually used by an individual became assimilated into domain of the self of the user. As 

noted by Fui·by (1978a) use of an object can be seen as the exercise of contro l over that object. She 

goes on to note that access to \ISe of an object (i.e., control) gives a person control over others and 

their access to the object --"That over which l exercise ... contro l becomes a part of my sense of self" 



26 

(Furby, 1978a, p. 322-323). 

Within the context of the organization there are several di fferent structures (e.g., social system 

structure, technology, work design, leader behaviors) and organ izational processes (e.g., coordination, 

planning, commnnication) through which organiuttional members are afforded the opportunity to 

exercise control (influence) over a num.ber of potential targets of ownership, each of which, over a 

suffici~nt period of time, is likely to result in the development of psychological ownership. We 

propose that there will be a positive relationsh ip between the amount of control (influence) exercised 

over a potential target of ownership (e.g., job, team, social system, project/program) and the level of 

psychological owne,~~hip that the .individual experiences for that particu lar target. 

One of the many ways in which individuals are allowed to exercise greater or lesser degrees of 

control in an organiz.ational context is lhrough job design. In the job, for example, tbe amount of 

auionomy is likely to effect how much contro l an individual is allowed to exercise. The greater the 

autonomy the greater the ability lo exercise control, and hence the greater amoum of psychological 

ownership that is likely to develop for that job. Participation in decision making is another means 

through wh.ich an individual can exercise control. Hence, allowing workers to participate in a decis ion 

mak ing process is likely to effect the feelings of ownership for tbe decision made, and may even effect 

the amount of psychological ownership for a larger social system (e.g., organization). Both 

participation and autonomy allow the individual to alter the nature of the target and shape it according 

to his or her own form. Other practices that operate similarly include self-management opportunities, 

delegation of authority, and empowerment. 

In contrast, organizations also involve numerous factors lhat tend to remove the possibility for 

an individual to exert control, and hence impede the development of psychological ownership. 

Hallmarks of bureaucrntic syslems, such as centralization and formalization, are particularly 

noteworthy examples. Centralization and formal ization tend to minimize the amount of control thal 



27 

any single individual can hold, as a result of the placement of power in the structure of the 

organization. The individual quickly learns that, in such a system, nothing is "hers," because she has 

n.o authority to direct or shape the organization, or any part of it 

We must also note one additional factor that allows control -- legal ownership. For example, 

legal ownership in a law firm (i.e., a paitnership) gives that individual a legal right of control. We 

suggest that the more an individual assumes those rights psychologically, and acts upo.n them, the 

more likely he is to develop feelings of ownership for an organization. As Pierce, Rubenfeld, and 

Morgan ( 1991) note, psychological ownership is one of the means by which legal ownership is 

translated into a variety of desirable attitudes and behaviors in employee-owned firms (cf, Vai1 Dyne 

& Pierce, I 993). 

The discussion of the "control of the target" route to psychological ownership leads us to the 

following proposition: 

Proposition 5: 11iere will be a positive relationship between psychological ownership 

and the amounl of control (influence) an individual has over a potemial 1arget of 

ownership (e.g., job, team. decision. system, project, organizationj. The extent to 

which an organization employs practices associated with high levels of individual 

control and influence over potential targets of ownership (e.g., autonomy, participation 

in decision making) will be positively related 10 1he degree of psychological ownership 

experienced by its organizational members for the corresponding target. 

Coming to Intimately Know the Target 

James (1980) suggested that through a li ving relationship with objects, individuals come to 

develop feel ings of ownership for those objects. He called this the law of mental association by 

comiguity. Supporting the notion that feelings of ownership eme,·ge from the dynamics associated 

with a lived relationship with objects, Beaglehole (1932), after looking for evidence to support the 

existence of an instinct for possession, argued that by knowing an object (person or place) passionately 

(intimately) it becomes a pa1t of the self. 



28 

Commenting on the processes through which feelings of ownership are likely to emerge, Weil 

( 1952) states that "All men have an invincible inclination to appropriate in their own minds, anything 

which over a long, uninterrupted period they have used for their work, pleasure, or the necessities of 

life. Thus, a gardener, after a ce1tain time, feels that the garden belongs to him" (p. 33). Weil is 

suggesting that people come to find themselves psychologically tied to things as a result of their active 

particiP,ation or association with things. The gardener. for example, "comes to be rooted in the 

garden," as a result of working the garden and becoming famil iar with its needs. Through this process 

of active association, knowledge develops and the gardener comes to feel that it is his [hers], thats/he 

is one with the garden -- grounded in and with it (Weil, I 952, p. 33-35). Sartre (1943) and Furby 

(1978b) have also suggested that there is an associational aspect to ownership. Something can be 

min.e, in my feelings, by virtue of my being associated and familiar with it. 

Building upon this notion. Beggan and Brown (1994) and Rudmio and Berry (1987) suggested 

that through the process of associalion we come to know objects. The more information possessed 

about the target of ownership the more intimate becomes the connection between the individual and 

the object. According to James (1890), a part of our feelings about what is ours stems from living 

close to, gelling to know, and experiencing things around us. Thus, the more information possessed 

about the target of ownership, the more things are felt thoroughly and deeply and in the process the 

self becomes attache<I to (one with) the object. Along the same line-s was Beggao and Brown's (1994) 

research which focused directly on association as a psychological justification for ownership. They 

found that an individual tends to frame issues of ownership as a function of ao association between a 

person and an object. 

Rudmin and BeHy's (1987) work focused on the meaning associated with ownership. They 

noted that "ownership is linguistically an opaque concept," its meaning is difficult to grasp outside of 

looking intra-individually -- "After all, a stolen apple doesn't look any different from any other" 



29 

(Snare, 1972, p. 200). As a part of their work they came to see that aflachment served to provide pa,t 

of the meaning of owr\ership. They suggest that attachment breeds familiarity and knowledge. Thus, 

psychological ownership reflects an intimate relationship or a psychological proximity of the owner to 

the owned. Citing Horwicz (1878), they noted that we tend to prefer our own possessions to others, 

even otliers of a similar kind (cf., Beggan, 1992; Nuttin, 1987) because "we know them better, realize 

them more intimately, feel them more deeply" (translated by James, I 890, p. 326). 

Within the context of organizations, there are several different dynamics (processes) tJ\at afford 

the individual with the opportunity to develop a deep and thorough understandiog of a number of 

potential targets of ownership. It is through a close. lengthy, and intimate association that the 

individual comes to know the potential target of ownership and it gets brought into the citadel of the 

self. We propose that there will be a positive relationship between the level of knowing (i.e., degree of 

intimacy) of the potential target of ownership (e.g., work, job, team, social system, project/program) 

and the level of psychological ownership that the individual experiences for that particular target. 

Knowing of this type and depth comes about, in a general sense, till'ough various acts and processes of 

association. 

We predict that this route could begin to operate by providing the individual with information 

about the target; for example, about its mission, its goals, its activ ities, and its performance outcomes. 

l.n job design, information may come in the form of feedback. Through the infonnation, the 

individual may come to feel that s/he intimately knows the target (e.g., project, job, team, 

organization). As psychological ownersh ip begins to develop, access to information reinforces these 

feelings, as the individual feels the "right" to have that infonnation. 

This route may also operate through the number of (psychological a,1d physical) interac1ions 

the individual has with the target. For example, we predict that through a long association with a 

target (e.g., a long tenure in the job or as a product manager), an individual may feel that he knows 



30 

the target intimately --better than anyone else-- and hence, owns it. The same outcome may also 

occur more rapidly through frequent and extensive encounters. 

ln contrast, in organizations where infonnation is withheld or guarded, individuals will be less 

likely to develop psychological ownership. Ironically, as individuals come to feel ownership over a 

target, they may protect. it from others through these means -- limiting access to information about the 

target ijnd removing opporninitic-s for others to interact with it. Thus we propose: 

Proposition 6: There will be a positive relationship between psychological ownership 

and the 011101111/ of information that an individual has about a polenlial target of 

ownership (e.g. . kept i11for111ed i11 a timely ma1111er, provided with informalion 

frequently, being physicafly proximal to the target). The extent to which an 

organizational members is informed about various potential targets of psychological 

ownership will be positively related to the degree to which organizational members 

e.xperie11ce psychological ownership for the corresponding target. 

Investing the Self into the Targel 

The work of Locke (1690), Sartre (1943), Csikszent111ihalyi at\d Rochberg-Halton (1981), 

among others, provide us with insight into the relationship between work and psychological ownership. 

They inform us of the importance of it "flowing from the self" as a route to the sense of it. being mine. 

As part of his political philosophy, Locke (1690) argued that we own ourselves, we own our labor, 

and therefore, we are likely to feel that we own that which we create, shape, and/or produce. Sartre 

(1943) went so far as to suggest that buying an object was simply another for111 of creating an object, 

as might be reasoned by Locke (1690), as it too stems fro111 the fruits of our labor or that which is 

ours. 

The writings of Karl Marx ( 1976) can)' essentially the same 111essage. He reasoned that 

through our labor we invest our psychic energy into the product of that labor. Thus, that which stems 

from our labor, be it our work or the widget that we 111akc, much like our words, thoughts and 

emotions are representations of the self (cf., Rochberg-Halton, 1984, p. 364). Similarly Durkheim 



(1957) tends to see "things" as the crystallization of human activity. They are attached to the person 

who created them because they are the product of the individual, they derive their being imd form 

31 

from his/her efforts. Durkheim goes on to reason that the individual who has created them owns them 

in much the same way as he/she owns him/herself --one (i .e., the object) is an aspect of the other 

(i.e., the person). Kline and France (1899) note that the chi ld considers his/her collection of worthless 

stones .as more valuable than the bright and expensive toys, because the collection stems from the 

child's labor. lt "represents his own sell" (p. 453). 

Csikszentmihalyi and Rochbcrg-Halton (1981), based upon their investigations into the 

meaning of things, note that the it\vestmcnt of an individual's energy, time, effort, and attention into 

objects causes the self to become one with the object -- this union betweeJl self and object emerges 

because the object has emerged from the self. This "sense of ownership" and link of object with the 

self can develop between workers and their machines, their work, and the products of their labor --"he 

catls it his own" (Beaglehole, 1932, p. 300-301}. In addition, Beaglehole notes that employees react 

negatively to criticisms of their work (i.e. , the products of 1beir labor) because "They are so linked to 

his own feelings of self-respect and self~esteem that a negative judgment passed on the product is 

taken as a direct reflection upon the worker's personal ity" (p. 30 I). 

Within the context of one's relationship with the organization there are a variety of 

opportunities for an organizational member to invest him/herself into different facet of the organization 

(e.g., job/work, products, customers, programs/1>rojects, work team, committee assignments). This 

investment of the self may come in many fonns (e.g., the investment of one's time, ideas, skills, 

decisions and their physical, psychological, an.cl creative energies), resulting iu tJ\e target of ownership 

(or a po,tion of that target) flowing from the self -- creating the conditions where the person comes to 

see themselves in the target. 1t is proposed that the more an organizational facets (i.e., potential 

targets of owoership) absorbs or consumes the individual, the greater will be the strength of the 



32 

individual's psychological ownership for that target. We propose that there will be a positive 

relationship between the degree to which the target of ownership flows from the investmcot of the self 

into the target and the level of psychological ownership that t:he individual experiences for that 

particular target. 

The most obvious, and pel'l1aps the most powerfu l, means by which an individual invests 

herself, into an entity is to create it. Creation involves investing ti me, ene,·gy, and sometimes even 

one's values and identity, into the entity. For example, as academics we i.nvest all of these into our 

research, and hence, feel ownership for our ideas. In other vocations, individuals may come to feel 

ownership for products they create (scientists, product development teams), organizations they found 

(entrepreneurs), or bills they draft (politicians). The psychological and physical investments allow an 

individual to see their reflection in the target and/or feel their own sweat in its existence. Like an 

aitist, we leave our personal signature on the things we create. 

We can, however, invest ourselves into targets without actually creating them. Some practices 

allow, or necessitate, individuals to invest themselves more than others. For example, jobs that are 

more complex allow one to exercise more discretion and therefore, invest more of one's own ideas, 

unique, knowledge, and personal style into the job. Non-routine intensive technologies produce a 

similar outcome as they provide a greater oppo,tunity for individual discretion. In contrast, jobs with 

low complexity and routine technologies are associated with standardization, and hence, remove the 

oppo1tunity for investing oneself into the target. 

Lastly, we expect that respons;bi/i1y for a target, either perceived or rea l, leads to feelings of 

ownership. As the person is hel.d (or feels) responsible for a target he begins to invest himself into 

that target through the energy, care, and concern expended. A mentor --protege relationship is one 

exai11ple of this phenomenon. The mentor feels responsible for the protege's development, and hence 

invests his energy, time, emotion, and even his own values, in the protege. For better or worse, this is 



33 

likely to result in the mentor coming to think of the other person in terms of "his" protege. Social 

recognition of this relatiooship tends to further reinforce the fact that people see themselves in the 

target. The effects of social recognition of responsibility can be witnessed in the use and after-effects 

of terms such as "Reaganomics" and "the Brady Bill." 

To summarize, we offer the following proposition: 

.Proposition 7: There will be a posilive relationship between psychological ownership 

and lhe degree to which an individual organizational member invests him/her-self into 

the potential target of ownership. The ex/ent lo which an organization employs 

practices associated wilh ifs orga11i:zational members' inveslment of themselves into the 

potential largets of ownership (e.g .. non-rowine, intensive lechnologies, job 

comple,,ily, participation in the creation of /he targe1, responsibility for the target) will 

be positively related to the degree ofpsychological ownership experienced by 

organizational members for the corresponding target. 

DISCUSSION 

"Mine," writes Rudmin (1994), "is a small word ... It is deceptive in its power and importance 

... It controls our bebavior, but we rarely notice, as we move about our world restricting ourselves to 

narrow walkways and to those places for which we have keys" (p. 55). 

In this paper we have started the development of a theory of psychological ownership, that 

state where al\ individual feels as though the target of ownership (or a piece of that target) is "theirs" -

-(i.e., it is MINE!). In addition to defining the construct conceptually, we articulated the genesis of 

this state, explicated the intra-individual functions served, identified properties of targets to which 

these feeli.ngs attach, and detailed the processes that are associated with the development of this 

psychologically experienced condition. Evidence suggesting the robustness of the phenomenon stems 

from the large number of literatures (e.g., psychology, philosophy, sociology, anthropology, child 

development, geography, and organizational behavior) that have acknowledged the presence of this 

powerful psychological state and from which we were able to draw for the development of our 



34 

theoretical perspectives on psychological ownership. 

For more than a centu1y scholars have studied the role played by possessions and feelings 

associated with ownership in a variety of contexts. There appears to be widespread agreement that it 

is common for people, especially those under the influence of Western culture, to develop feelings of 

ownership for objects that are material and immaterial in nature. Possessions, secured in a box labeled 

mine, emerges in children at a very young age (Kline & !'ranee, 1899; Isaacs, 1933). When anchored 

psychologically the concept "mine" comes to play a major role in the self- identity and relationships 

among people. In addition, there is widespread agreement that the emotion associated with feelings of 

ownership can at times be extremely powerful. [t has, for example, been associated with insecurity, 

jealousy, squabbles among young children, lawsuits among people over patent rights, and it has even 

been c.laimed that people have gone to war over land that they felt rightfully belonged to them. 

There are those scholars who have been inierested in the genesis of possessive tendencies, 

some claiming suppo1t for its genetic anchoring, while others have argued that it is the product of the 

socialization practices can-ied out in different societies. There have been those who are interested in 

the psychology of ownership and its role in child development (e.g., Isaacs, 1933; Kline & France, 

1899), io consumer behavior (Belk, 1988), among the elderly (Kamptner, 1989; Cram & Paton, 1993), 

within tJie customs and pmctices of different societies (Kline & France, 1899), from the perspective of 

the holding of land and the having of a house with its four walls (Duncan, 1981; Porteous, 1976), 

across different socio-economics strata of society (Csikszentmibalyi & Rochberg-Halton, 1981), within 

the philosophical discussions of "being" (Sai1re, 1943; Heidegger, 1967), as well as within the 

organizational context (Pratt & Dutton, 1998; Dirks, Cummings, & Pierce, 1996). 

Building upon tJ1is work, we have come to define psychological ownership as that condition 

where we come to feel as though an object (material or immaterial in nature) is "mine." This state is 

grounded in possession -- that co1Jditio1J where an individual feels psychologically tied to all object, 



35 

while outside of his/her physical self it has come to be experienced as a part of the extended self. We 

have proposed that as individuals enter organizations they bring with them the same human conditions 

that characterize their lives outside of the work envil'Onment, and thus under certain conditions come 

to feelings of ownership for different facets of the organ ization (e.g., work, tools, space, work teams). 

A significant part of our inquiry was centered on the question -- What are the roots of 

psychological ownership? Coming to understand the underlying motives (i .e., intra-individual 

functions) served by psychological ownership should aid in our understanding of the processes 

associated with its emergence within the organizational context. Building upon a diverse and rich 

literature in the realm of life-span development, philosophy, psychology, social psychology, 

anthropology, aod geography, we have come to propose that the roots for psychological ownership are, 

in part, grounded in three areas --efficacy and effectance-motivation, self-identity, and the need for 

having a place. The-se latent conditions become activated at different times and to varying degrees as 

people interact with a variety of potential targets of ownership within the work environment. The 

active state of these three needs can subsequently be employed as the conceptual foundation for 

empirical inqui1y into the development of psychological ownership among organizational members. 

While it is being suggested that the loci of the fonctioning of psychological ownership can, in 

part, be found in the need for efficacy and effectance motivation, the need for self-identity, and the 

need for the individual to find comfo11 in their having a place in which to dwell, it is impo1tant to 

consider that psychological ownersh ip needs nor be the result of a "need" of the self for anything, 

although it can be. It might occur simply because the boundaries of the self are intrinsically elastic. 

The individual possesses the natural ability to expand and contract its boundaries, treating aspects of 

the environment as if they were aspects of the self. Thus, according to Albert ( 1995), psychological 

ownership retlects the natural ability of the self to extend and contract its boundaries, to treat a non-

owned aspect of the environment as if it were an aspect of the self within the same feelings, burden of 



36 

responsibility, pleasure, rights, and obligations. 

We have also been interested in coming to understand the processes tlu·ough which 

psychological ownership emerges. lt is proposed that psychological ownership is the natural result of 

conrrol, intimate association, and/or the immersion of the self into the shaping or creation of the target 

of ownership. It is through each of these processes that the individual will come to feel that they are 

tied to .--one with-- the target. It becomes, accord ing to Dittmar (1992) and Belk ( 1988) a part of the 

extended self. 

\Ve commented on the emergence of this state with in the organizational context. Managers 

interested in fostering tlie development of tl1is state should look to their organization and answer the 

question --What experiences or organizational conditions can be employed to enhance the employee's 

control over the desired target of ownership, to promote their coming to intimately know that target, 

and/or to expand the employee's investment of the self into that targel. Over time, efforts directed to 

the development of one or more of these "routes" to psychological ownership should reinforce one or 

more of the employee's motivations fo,· psychological ownership --efficacy and effectance, self-

identity, or "having a place--- the "roots" of psychological ownership. 

What has not been addressed in this paper are the consequences of psychological ownership. 

It should not be interpreted as our intention to suggest that psychological ownership, whetlier it 

operates withi n or outside of the organizational context, is by definition a good or bad state. We 

believe that it can be both. Since what creates and maintains psychological ownership is, for example, 

contro l over things, one can easily envision that "too much control" can lead to organizational ly 

undesirable behaviors. One simply cannot psychological ly own everything and tlie 11eed to do so is 

one of the pathologies of psychological ownershi p. Whi le at other times psychological ownership may 

result in the assumption of responsibility for, as well as, givi ng care and ourturence to the target. 

Herein may lie some of the fonctional consequences associated w ith psychological ownership. 



37 

At this stage we note the need for additional theory const ruction and empirical inquiry. Th is 

paper has attempted to argue that psychological ownership can manifest itself within the organizational 

context and emerges through control, intimate knowing, and/or the investment of the self into the 

target of ownership. A number of propositions, anchored within the work and organizational context, 

were provided that when fully a1ticulated will contribute to the development of a theory of 

psychological ownership and provide us with a place to launch empirical inquiry into this potentially 

impo1tant individual-organization relat.ionship. 

Empirically, it is time for the development and construct validation of a measure of 

psychological ownersh ip. Subsequently, studies can be undertaken to ascertain the presence of this 

condition within the organi7.at.ion, the identification of the organizational targets to which 

psychological ownership affixes itself, and tests of the antecedent conditions and causal processes 

associated with the emergence of psychological owoership should be undertaken. Upon tbe 

development of the theory of the consequences of psychological ownership, organizational scholars can 

then turn. their empirical inquiry to its effects. 



38 

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47 



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44 



FIGURE 1. 
ROOTS AND ROUTES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OWNERSHIP 

Potential Target 

•Auractive 
•Malleable 
·,1ccessible 

13· 
> 

u.l 

Person 

• Efficacy/Efject=e" 
•Self-identiiy" 
•Place/Hom& 

Controlling Targetb ,__________ 
[ :;_ 

Know• Coming to 

Jnvestittg Self' c-------~ 

"Roots of Psychological Ownership 0Rouies to Psychological Ownership 

Potential Target 

Psychological 
Ownership 

Person 



ENDNOTES 

l. Consistent with the work of others (cf., Dittmar, 1992; Furby, 1976, 1978a, 1978b, 1980) we 

tend to equate feelings of possession with feelings of ownership. Accordingly, in this paper, we use 

the terms of ownership and possession interchange.ably. 

2. We acknowledge that the meaning attached to ownership, the linkage between objects and sell; 

46 

and the processes th.l'ough which ownership developed as discussed in this paper is very much a 

Western European interpretation. Many native Americans, for example, look upon possessions and 

ownership very differently and it is these different interpretations that will oot be addressed in this 

work. Scholars have on ly begun to consider cross-cultural differences in ownership (cf., Furby, 1976; 

Rudmin, 1994), which leaves us a long way from understanding the boundaiy conditions that apply to 

the psychology of ownership across cultures. 

3. We note the dated and sexist language in this and other quotations that will appear in th is paper. 

We have included them for their overall conceptual contribution to the theme of our work . 

4 . We draw a distinction between legal and experienced ownership. Legal ownership is recognized 

foremost by society, and hence the rights are recognized and protected through the legal system. In 

contrast, psychologically experienced ownership is recognized foremost by tbe individual who holds 

the feelings of ownership. Correspondingly, it is the individual who manifests the "felt rights" 

associated with psychological ownership (declaring "it is mine," while protecting it). Furby (1980), 

Isaacs (I 933), among others indicate that psychological ownership can exist in absence of legal 

ownership, as might be ev.ideni by children feeling and expressing ownership for toys and nursery 

rhymes at school. In addition, Vao Dyne and Pierce (I 993) observed differential effects for legal (i.e., 

equity ownership stake in an organization) and experiences of ownership on employee behavior and 

attitudes. 



S . 171e need for self-identity, for example, does not become engaged with each and every target 

that the individual comes into contact with. The same can be said for the "need for control and 

effectance motivation" and "having a place." Thus, we suggest that there is some "event" (a person-

target interaction that we do not yet understand) that activates one or more of the latent needs, such 

that through "time" we come to know, create, or have control over the target culminating in the 

emergence of psychological feelings of ownership. 

47