

THE CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY

AND THE AMERICAN POLICY

A THESIS

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I. PRELIMINARY:

The United States has been somewhat unfortunate in having no settled and traditional diplomatic policy. This is due largely to our popular form of government, the administrative officers being changed so frequently that the successors in office do not inherit the knowledge and experience of their predecessors, but must frequently begin things anew. Great Britain, on the contrary, has a traditional diplomatic policy, which results naturally from the long terms usually held by her ministers of foreign affairs. Consequently that nation is always ready to take advantage of every foreign complication and to act quickly and understandingly at the crucial moment. This diplomatic excellence helps to explain her rapid progress, during the last two centuries, in the acquisition of territory in the East and the West.

This same trait also accounts for Great Britain's adroit handling of the Isthmian canal question. The lack of this diplomatic quality explains the United States' clumsiness in manipulating the Nicaraguan canal question and her change in policy under different conditions and administrations. One of the objects of the writer will be to show what the major trend of this policy has been.

As yet no canal across the Central American Isthmus has been built, due partly to international wrangling, our dread of entangling alliances and our Monroe Doctrine. By our ad-

hering strictly to Washington's warning against foreign alliances, we have neglected building the canal under proposed treaties with the Central American States. By insisting upon the Monroe Doctrine we have hindered European nations in the building of an interoceanic canal.

The Clayton-Bulwer treaty has to do with such an Isthmian canal and to understand the treaty fully and the modern Hay-Pauncefote convention, it is necessary to sketch briefly the early history of the attempts to gain possession of the canal routes.

II. HISTORICAL:

The Nicaraguan route, with its natural waterways, Lake Nicaragua and the San Juan River, has received the most consideration as a possible interoceanic canal route. Discovered early in the fifteenth century by the Spaniards, it was pointed out by Galvao, the Portuguese, in 1550 as one of the possible waterways across the isthmus. The discovery of the Pacific caused the western coast of Nicaragua to be rapidly filled up, and the Spaniards soon conquered the Aztec inhabitants. They also secured control of the San Juan River but did not molest the Indians on the eastern coast. Here among the lagoons of the Mosquito Shore, on the Bay Islands and in Belize, freebooters, the majority of whom were Englishmen, established themselves, became the friends of the Indians and fought the Spaniards.

England, at first, disavowed their acts but Cromwell later used them in obtaining a foothold in the West Indies. Spain became alarmed and by the treaty of 1670 agreed that England should ^{have} sovereignty over such lands, islands and colonies, situated in the West Indies or any part of America, which the King of Great Britain or his subjects at present possess. These buccaneers were told by England to cease their depredations and settle down on their territory as log-cutters. The English governor of Jamaica accepted the services of the Mosquito Indian Chief and his followers, thus establishing a British protectorate over Mosquitoland.

The war of 1739 between Spain and England witnessed a further extension of the latter's sovereignty by the formal acquisition of the Bay Islands. England formally announced her protectorate and continued her sway from Belize to the Bluefields Lagoon.

Spain sided with France in the "French and Indian War." As a consequence, in the Treaty of Paris, 1763, Spain lost Florida to England and gave English subjects the right to cut wood all along the eastern coast of Central America; England agreed to remove her fortifications and troops from that same territory.

The war of England with her colonies again found France

and Spain opposed to England. This time Great Britain met with defeat and by the Treaty of Versailles, 1763, was compelled to give up all claim to the Mosquito Shore and the Bay Islands, retaining merely usufructuary rights in Belize. It required another treaty in 1763 to compel the reluctant English settlers to retreat into Yucatan.

Spain was again at war with England in 1763 and the Spaniards in Central America attempted to drive out the English colonists from Belize. The latter took up the war in earnest and under the protection of the British guns forced the Spaniards far into the interior and proclaimed their ownership over Belize by the right of conquest. The treaties of 1763 and 1766 were revived but the English settlers nevertheless held Belize.

One by one the Spanish American States freed themselves from European control and established republics. Liberal ideas were rapidly spreading in Europe and to crush them, France, Spain, Russia, Prussia and Austria formed the Holy Alliance. It was rumored that this Alliance intended to restore to Spain, her former American colonies.

Great Britain, possessing American territory, became alarmed and asked the United States to join with her in a protest against any interference of Europe in the affairs of the American Continent. Monroe was President of the United States

and on the advice of John Quincy Adams, refused any English cooperation, but proclaimed the so-called "Monroe Doctrine" warning Europe to keep her hands off from America. This protection was particularly meant for the Spanish American States and England was deprived of no vested rights, for the United States expressly declined to interfere "with existing colonies or dependencies of any European power."

In the all absorbing work of internal development, the major portion of the American people neglected the Monroe Doctrine, but the idea was kept alive by the Central American States and certain canal advocates. During this early period the building of a canal was only agitated by individuals as a private enterprise.

III. EARLY AMERICAN POLICY:

Even at this time the American policy was outlined. In speaking of the Panama canal project in 1825, Mr. Clay said, "If the work should ever be executed, the benefits of it ought not to be exclusively appropriated to any one nation, but should be extended to all parts of the globe upon the payment of just compensation or reasonable tolls." This same principle was reiterated in 1835 when the United States Senate passed a resolution requesting the President, "to consider the expediency of opening negotiations with the Governments of other

and so Lord Palmerston gave Nicaragua to understand that the Mosquito territory extended to the mouth of the San Juan. The port of San Juan was forcibly possessed by an English naval force and the name changed to Greytown.

In the meantime, the discovery of gold in California caused a great flood of immigration to her fields of wealth. There were then no great trans-continental railways and so the American people naturally became interested in the Isthmian routes to the West. The United States in 1898 arranged a treaty with New Granada whereby the latter state granted to the United States or her citizens the right to construct a railway or canal across the isthmus and New Granada was promised complete sovereignty over the territory, and the United States was to guarantee the perfect neutrality of the route. This was in accordance with America's previous liberal policy as is still more clearly evidenced by the sentiments expressed in President Polk's special message to the Senate urging that body to ratify, a portion of which message is as follows: "There does not appear to be any other effectual means of securing to all nations the advantages of this important passage but the guaranty of great commercial powers that the Isthmus shall be neutral territory. The interests of the world at stake are so important that the security of this passage between the two oceans cannot be suffered to depend upon the wars

and revolutions which may arise among different nations."(1)

The capitalists of the United States saw the advantages of the route by way of Nicaragua and secured concessions from that state. They could make but little progress while England held the important port of Greytown and so they asked President Polk for help. He, unaware of the true situation, sent a special commissioner, Elijah Hise, to investigate the matter and who was to enter into no treaty until he had first communicated with Washington. Upon his arrival in Nicaragua he was carried away by his enthusiasm for American interests, and, ignoring his instructions, entered into a treaty with Nicaragua, whereby the latter state conferred the exclusive right upon the United States or citizens of the United States to build and control a canal through Nicaragua and to own all land needed for the purpose. This treaty was in direct contravention of the former policy of the United States, providing that the United States should fortify the canal, control it, and prohibit vessels of war belonging to countries at war with either the United States or Nicaragua from passing through it. In return for the favor the United States was to protect and defend Nicaragua, with military force if necessary.

This treaty, although very popular with the American people, Polk did not dare to push through the Senate since it might involve us in a war with England. General Taylor suc-

(1) M. & P. of the Presidents, IV, 513.

ceeded Polk in the presidential chair and he refused to submit the Wise treaty to the Senate and so it was never ratified. General Taylor recalled Mr. Wise and sent in his place as diplomatic agent Mr. E. G. Squier, who was given full power to enter into treaty stipulations with that state, but was commanded not to involve the United States "in any entangling alliances."

Commodore Vanderbilt had organized a canal company and had obtained a concession from Nicaragua under the Wise convention. Mr Squier attempted to smooth matters over and permit Vanderbilt's company to proceed with its work by inserting a clause in the contract and treaty to the effect that the canal should be neutral and free upon the same terms to all nations. This did not satisfy England. She put forth still greater efforts to secure the advantage. Mr. Chatfield was the British agent in Central America and he insisted upon the payment of an old claim by Honduras. In the Bay of Fonseca where the canal was supposed to terminate lay Tigre Island, the property of Honduras. Mr. Squier, by treaty with Honduras secured this island for the United States. Upon learning this, England's agent, seized Tigre Island by force and held it as indemnity for the debt of Honduras and refused to leave.

Thus matters were gradually going from bad to worse. A part of the American people were clamoring for war and England

insisted upon holding her territory in Central America. Mr. Clayton, Taylor's Secretary of State, endeavoring to arrange matters peaceably, laid the whole matter before Lord Palmerston and suggested that the difficulty be solved by both nations constructing and controlling the canal together. Mr. Clayton declared that his Government desired no exclusive advantages and that Great Britain ought to withdraw all claims to the territory of Nicaragua and Costa Rica. It will be noticed that the United States had a strong case against Great Britain and that the latter by a long series of encroachments had infringed upon the Monroe Doctrine. Nevertheless, Great Britain, by virtue of her skill and art in diplomacy got the better of the United States in the resulting treaty.

Lord Palmerston dispatched Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer as British envoy, to Washington, specially authorized to settle the Nicaraguan difficulty with Mr. Clayton. Sir Henry Bulwer first demanded that Mr. Squier be recalled and his acts disavowed, that the United States and England should treat directly upon these canal matters and that the British claim to Greytown should be recognized, to all of which Mr. Clayton agreed.

The treaty was then drawn up and a draft of it submitted to Lord Palmerston who was informed that its provisions would debar Great Britain from colonizing any part of Central America. On the 8th. of March, 1850 he authorized Sir Henry Bul-

wer to sign the convention.

THE CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY:

The Clayton-Bulwer treaty opens with a preamble stating the purpose of the convention and naming the persons authorized to draw it up.

In Article I of the Treaty the governments of Great Britain and the United States declare, "that neither the one nor the other, will ever obtain, or maintain, for itself any exclusive control over the said ship-canal; agreeing that neither will ever erect or maintain any fortifications commanding the same, or in the vicinity thereof; or occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any part of Central America," and further that neither of the contracting nations will make use of any alliance or protectorate which either has or may acquire over such central American States, in securing any special privilege to itself or its citizens or subjects. This article defines the territorial relations of the canal and at least prevents England from changing her Mosquito protectorate into actual dominion.

The Second Article provides that in case of war between the United States and Great Britain their respective vessels shall be exempt from detention or capture, while passing through the canal.

Articles III and IV simply provide means for the construc-

tion of the canal.

Article V guaranteeing the neutrality and protection of the canal is very important. A part of it is as follows: "the Contracting Parties further engage that, when the said canal shall have been completed, they will protect it from interruption, seizure, or unjust confiscation, and that they will guarantee the neutrality thereof, so that the said canal may forever be open and free, and the capital invested therein secure." The remainder of this article states that either party by giving a six months' notice to the other, can withdraw its guarantee of neutrality and security in case of unfair regulations and oppressive exactions by the managing company.

In Article VI the contracting parties invite other nations to enter into similar stipulations.

Article VII urges the speedy construction of the canal and promises priority of claim to the construction company already in the field.

The provisions of the convention are made to extend beyond Nicaragua by Article VIII, in the following language, "The Governments of Great Britain and the United States, having not only desired in entering into this convention to accomplish a particular object, but also to establish a general principle, they hereby agree to extend their protection by

treaty stipulations to any other practicable communications, whether by canal or railway, across the Isthmus which connects North and South America, and especially to the interoceanic communications, should the same prove to be practicable, whether by canal or railway, which are now proposed to be established by the way of Tehuantepec or Panama." The latter part of the article provides that the contracting governments shall determine what charges or conditions of traffic are reasonable, and that the same canals and railways, open to British and American subjects upon equal terms, shall be open on like terms to the "citizens of every other State which is willing to grant thereto such protection as Great Britain and United States engage to afford."

The last Article provides that "the ratifications of this convention shall be exchanged at Washington within six months from this day, or sooner if possible," and gives the date as April 19, 1850. (1)

This treaty in a way made England an exception to the Monroe Doctrine, admitting her right of participation and control in American affairs. The provision as to a neutral canal was perfectly in accordance with the previously declared American canal policy. The treaty seemed also to settle the Central American territorial controversy. President Taylor in his message of April 22, 1850, transmitting the draft of the treaty

(1) Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, Sen. Doc. No. 291, 55th. Cong., 2nd. Sess. P. 17.

to the Senate stated that it had been his "object in negotiating this treaty not only to secure the passage across the Isthmus to the Government and citizens of the United States by the construction of a great highway dedicated to the use of all nations on equal terms, but to maintain the independence and sovereignty of all the Central American Republics." (1) Taylor was evidently justified in thinking that he ^{had} secured his desired object, for by the first article each contracting party had promised not to "assume or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any part of Central America."

Living up to England's proverbial reputation for cunning, Sir Henry Bulwer waited until he felt certain of the treaty's acceptance and then before exchanging the final ratifications, filed a declaration at the State Department, a part of which is as follows, "Her Majesty's ratification is exchanged under the explicit declaration that Her Majesty does not understand the engagements of the convention to apply to Her Majesty's settlement at Honduras, or its dependencies." Mr. Clayton consulted Mr. King, the chairman of the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Senate, and replied that he so understood the treaty, that it did not "include the British settlement in Honduras, nor the small islands in the neighborhood of that

(1) M. & P. of the Presidents, V, 42.

settlement, which may be known as its dependencies." Thinking that the Senate understood it in the same way and that it was a trivial matter, he failed to inform the Senate of England's reservation. The treaty was proclaimed July 5, 1850.

VI. MISUNDERSTANDING AND DIPLOMATIC WRANGLING:

England's next step was to proclaim the Bay Islands her colony and a dependency of Honduras. This immediately aroused a storm of indignation in America. Sir Henry Bulwer's reservation was discovered, and Senators claimed that they had been duped, having known nothing of its existence at the time of the ratification. The Senate accused England of bad faith, declared the seizure of the Bay Islands, a violation of the terms of the treaty, and demanded that the treaty be abrogated. Taylor's death brought Fillmore into the Presidential chair, but he could not settle the difficulty. Both nations sent war vessels to the seat of trouble, and hostilities seemed imminent. An American warship bombarded Greytown in supporting a quarrel of some American settlers. Civil war broke out in Nicaragua, and the American filibuster, General Walker took possession of the government. Upon his attempting to re-establish slavery his acts were disavowed by the United States Government, and he was deported.

A long course of diplomatic wrangling upon the meaning

of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty followed. A settlement was attempted by means of the Clarendon-Dallas treaty in 1856 but England refused to ratify because it provided for a recognition of the sovereign rights of Honduras to the Bay Islands. Great Britain then offered to submit the controverted points to the arbitration of any European Power as might be chosen by the United States. The United States refused the offer, Cass, Secretary of State, stating that the dispute involved simply the interpretation of the English language, and that the United States and Great Britain would be more competent to decide in such a case than any foreign nation.

President Pierce in his special message to the Senate of May 15, 1856 speaks with great bitterness of England's conduct and says, "The convention of April 19, 1850, . . . would never have been signed nor ratified but for the conviction that in virtue of its provisions neither Great Britain nor the United States was thereafter to exercise any territorial sovereignty in fact or in name in any part of Central America" and further on he states that "The essential object of the convention--- the neutralization of the Isthmus--- would become a nullity if either Great Britain or the United States were to continue to hold exclusively islands or mainland of the Isthmus." (1)

(1) M. & P. of the Presidents, V, 370.

The same sentiments are expressed by President Buchanan in his first annual message, December 8, 1857. He adds the suggestion that when two friendly powers "have unfortunately concluded a treaty which they understand in senses directly opposite, the wisest course is to abrogate such a treaty by mutual consent, and to commence anew." (1) Buchanan informed England of his intention to propose the abrogation of the treaty and wished to know the latter's opinion. England replied that she was willing to consider abrogation upon two conditions, first, that the proposal come from the United States, second, that the two nations return to the status quo existing before 1850. This did not satisfy President Buchanan and he still insisted upon his determination to secure the treaty's abrogation.

England did not want to lose the benefit of the general principle enunciated in Article VIII of the treaty and so Lord Napier, the British Minister, informed Buchanan that his Government intended to give up the Bay Islands and the Mosquito protectorate and that a special envoy, Sir William Ouseley, was on his way to arrange the matter with Nicaragua and Honduras. President Buchanan awaited the outcome of this mission. Sir William Ouseley's work resulted in the ratification of three treaties; the first with Guatemala of April 30th., 1859, confirming Great Britain in the boundary she claimed; the sec-

(1) M. & P. of the Presidents, V, 444.

ond with Honduras of Nov. 23th., 1859, surrendering the Bay Islands and recognizing them as part of Honduras; the third with Nicaragua of Jan. 23th. 1860, making Greytown, a free port, withdrawing England's protectorate from the Mosquito Indians and granting the latter a separate territory, but reserving to England the right to interfere in case Nicaragua troubled the Indians or failed to pay her indemnity.

This last provision caused some trouble three decades later when Nicaragua broke her conditions and England re-assumed control over the Mosquito territory. But this was quickly settled by the firm protest of the United States causing Great Britain to withdraw her troops from that territory.

The immediate results of the above three treaties were quite satisfactory to President Buchanan, which results were the freedom of the Central American States, and open ports at each end of the proposed canal free from English domination. In his fourth annual message of Dec. 3rd., 1860, Buchanan thus speaks of the settlement, "The discordant constructions of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty between the two governments, which at different periods of the discussion bore a threatening aspect, have resulted in a final settlement entirely satisfactory to this government." (1)

(1) M. & P. of the Presidents, V, 639.

Thus was England's violation of the treaty cured and it again became valid and binding between the two contracting nations.

VII. CHANGE IN AMERICAN POLICY:

The matter was left for some years in this situation until De Lesseps and his French Company, under valuable concessions from Panama, began to build the Panama Canal in 1879. This event caused great alarm in the United States and wrought a change of policy in the government, which had formerly declared in connection with the Isthmian affairs, that it had no views of exclusive advantage to itself. Congress passed resolutions reaffirming the principles of the Monroe Doctrine and asserting that the United States must exercise control over such interoceanic canal. The change in policy is clearly indicated in the following quotation from President Hayes' special message to the Senate of March 8th., 1880, "The policy of this country is a canal under American control. The United States cannot consent to the surrender of this control to any European power or to any combination of European powers. If existing treaties between the United States and other nations stand in the way of this policy suitable steps should be taken by just and liberal negotiations to promote and establish the American policy on this subject consistently with the rights of the nations to be affected by it."

(1) M. & P. of the Presidents, VII, 585.

Congress approved of this policy and by resolution requested the President to take immediate steps for the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Mr. Blaine, Secretary of State, issued a circular letter to the European governments to the effect that a joint guarantee of the neutrality of the canal, on their part would be considered, "an uncalled-for intrusion" since by the convention of 1848 with Columbia, the United States sufficiently guaranteed the perfect neutrality of the Isthmus. Lord Granville replied for England, Nov. 10, 1881, by pointing out the provisions of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and stating that "Her Majesty's Government rely with confidence upon the observance of all the engagements of that treaty." Blaine begins a correspondence with Lord Granville and tries to prove that England had at different times proposed the abrogation of the treaty and had violated its terms. Granville answers by citing President Buchanan's message showing the latter's satisfaction with the treaty and the happy settlement of the dispute.

Secretary Prelinghuysen, who succeeded Mr. Blaine continued the argument. He contended that the treaty was voidable at the option of the United States because the treaty related to a particular canal which has never been built and because England violated it. Lord Granville repeated his former reply

and showed by Article VIII that the convention was not only to accomplish a particular purpose but also to establish a "general principle" and to extend the protection of the two nations to any other practical communications across the isthmus.

Having failed utterly in obtaining his object by diplomacy, Frelinghuysen now adopts different tactics. Ignoring completely the Clayton-Bulwer convention he negotiates the so-called Frelinghuysen-Zavala treaty with Nicaragua, by which that state was to cede to the United States a strip of territory for the building of the canal and the United States was to build, own and fortify and control the canal. The United States engaged to defend the integrity of Nicaragua's territory. President Arthur transmitted this treaty to the Senate for ratification on December 10, 1884.

VIII REVERSION TO EARLY POLICY:

Grover Cleveland came into office shortly after this and before the Senate had passed upon the treaty withdrew it from their consideration. He refused to submit it to the Senate and in his first annual message of December 8, 1885, gave the following reasons for his action, "Maintaining, as I do, the tenets of a line of precedents from Washington's day, which proscribe entangling alliances with foreign states, I do not favor a policy of acquisition of new and distant territory, or the incorporation of remote interests with our own. • •

• • Whatever highway may be constructed across the barrier dividing the two greatest maritime areas of the world must be for the world's benefit--- a trust for mankind, to be removed from the chance of domination by any single power, nor become a point of invitation for hostilities or a prize for warlike ambition. An engagement combining the construction, ownership, and operation of such a work by this Government, with an offensive and defensive alliance for its protection, with the foreign state whose responsibilities and rights we would share, is in my judgment, inconsistent with such dedication to universal and neutral use, and would, moreover, entail measures for its realization beyond the scope of our national policy or present means." (1)

IX. HAY-PAUNCEFOTE CONVENTION:

President Cleveland by this attitude supported the older American policy of the international neutralization of the canal. The treaty was silently acquiesced in and no important diplomatic event occurred until the 5th. of February, 1900, when Lord Pauncefote and Mr. Hay drew up and signed a convention, modifying the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. The immediate occasion of this convention was the introduction of the Hepburn Bill into the House of Representatives on December 7th., 1899.

(1) M. & P. of the Presidents, VIII, 327.

This Bill completely ignored the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, providing for the construction of the Nicaragua Canal under the absolute and exclusive control of the United States. The President was alarmed lest the passage of that bill should involve the United States and England in a serious dispute and he authorized Mr. Hay, the Secretary of State, to obtain a modification of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. The thing desired seemed to be a canal under American control. Great Britain agreed to concede this, provided that the canal should be left free and open to all nations at all times on terms of entire equality, and that the United States should erect no fortifications commanding the canal or the adjacent waters. The Hay-Pauncefote Convention was drawn up along those lines and was amendatory of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty only to the extent that the United States was given the power to construct and own the canal through her Government or through her citizens, and that the United States was given the exclusive right of providing for the regulation, management and police of the canal. All the other provisions of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty were to remain in force.

The Hay-Pauncefote convention was opposed widely because it prevented the United States from fortifying the canal. When sent to the Senate for ratification it received several

amendments. The Davis amendment added the proviso that the foregoing stipulations of the treaty should not apply "to the measures which the United States may find it necessary to take for securing by its own forces the defence of the United States and the maintenance of public order." There were two further amendments in the name of Senator Foraker; the first, that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty should be superceded; the second, that Article III of the original treaty, providing for notice to be given to the other powers after the adoption of the treaty by the United States and England, be stricken out. With these amendments added the Senate on December 20, 1900 ratified the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. The amendments have been ^{jected} ~~refused~~ by Great Britain.

X. CONCLUSION:

The old Clayton-Bulwer treaty is thus left in force and will continue to govern the actions of the United States and Great Britain until properly abrogated. Its existence and validity have been repeatedly acknowledged by this Government, not only in by-gone days, but also in the present. The action of president McKinley in attempting to secure its modification by a new convention and the action of the Senate in amending the latter, admitted the binding force of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Senator Davis, the peerless authority on International

Law, in a letter to the writer, of February 28, 1900, asserted the existence of the treaty in the following language, "the Clayton-Bulwer treaty,-- in my judgment, is still binding upon this country. The main object of the pending Hay-Pauncefote treaty is to remove that right of joint control by Great Britain."

The popular clamor has been for a fortified canal under the exclusive and absolute control of the United States. The fortification of the canal, according to Admiral Dewey, would be a source of weakness rather than of strength since it would invite hostilities to its locality. The Hay-Pauncefote convention grants American ownership and control but refuses fortification. Considering her early acquired rights, England's concessions have been quite liberal. She first surrendered the disputed territory and Greytown. She now offers to surrender her right of ownership in the proposed canal, provided the canal is made neutral. This should certainly satisfy America. The Suez Canal, established and maintained neutral, has been a blessing to all the peoples and nations of the earth. Surely an Isthmian Canal, properly neutralized, would do much for the world.

As the history of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty indicates, the American policy, for the greater part, has been in favor

of the international neutralization of any interoceanic canal. And this is as it should be. It is the only just and equitable policy. The world was not made solely for the benefit of any single class, race or nation, but for the good of all. The United States, representative of the world's highest development and civilization, is in duty bound to secure the blessings of great public enterprises to the universal use of mankind.

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