

## ◆ 10

### What Lorca Knew: Teaching Receptivity

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*Receptivity*, which I define as the capacity to receive and experience the most accomplished products of the human intelligence, should be the single most important principle guiding research and teaching in the humanities. Receptivity entails the fullest possible response— affective, intellectual, and aesthetic—to a wide range of visual art, music, literature, and systems of thought from any and all human cultures. *Intelligence*, as I employ the word here, encompasses all the possible ways in which human beings can make sense of their own experience of reality and develop forms of cultural expression. Some of these forms might not appear to be *intellectual* in the narrower sense of “cerebral,” but they all involve the human intelligence in this larger sense.

We need, then, a shift in focus—away from a sterile academic formalism and toward a more finely tuned receptivity to the “raw materials” of the humanities. The work of Federico García Lorca puts this argument to the test. Lorca is, in my view, an example of a highly receptive artist—in some sense a theorist of receptivity—and one whose own critical reception exposes the inadequacies of contemporary academic criticism. My experience writing about Lorca and using him as a pedagogical model for courses at the graduate and undergraduate level confirms my commitment to an expanded view of receptivity.

#### Arguing Receptivity

Many of us have experienced periods of time when the channels of reception were open to the experience of seemingly endless aesthetic possibilities. When I was in graduate school, another student told me of an experience she had had with certain poems of Robert Creeley: during a certain period of her life she felt that his poetry was speaking to her personally, reaching her at an intensely physical level. Such states might be exceptional, located at one end

of the spectrum of responsiveness. At the other extreme is the experience of those who, in an academic setting, appear to be approaching the task of literary analysis in a perfunctory mode, with utter indifference toward the value of the text. In my own case, receptivity appears in several guises: as a heightened susceptibility to artistic stimuli; as a craving at an almost physical level for the work of certain poets or musicians; as an intense desire to read everything a new favorite author has written; as a feeling of acute insight and understanding. When receptivity is absent, conversely, I feel shut down: familiar works acquire an “already read” quality while unfamiliar ones seem impenetrably alien.

Well-meaning academics and educational bureaucrats often justify the reading of literature by listing its potential side benefits: literature will foster critical thinking skills, promote the understanding of other cultures, or make the student well-rounded. These sound like worthwhile, if somewhat nebulous, goals, but by placing receptivity at the fore, I am assuming that the study of the most accomplished products of the human intelligence is an inherently valuable activity that does not require justification through such appeals. Mozart might make your baby smarter, but staking the value of Mozart on the capacity of his music to stimulate infantile intelligence provokes the question of what intelligence is *for* in the first place. Why do we want our babies to be smarter, if not to be able to exercise their intelligence in meaningful ways, such as being able to listen intelligently to Mozart? Training in the humanities may or may not always foster a sort of intelligence that is directly useful for other areas of life, but it trivializes such training to justify it by appealing to an aspirational shopping list of tangential benefits.

The blogger Ray Davis points out an interesting paradox: “I’m reluctant to call anything a ‘cultural universal,’ [ . . . ] but art-making is certainly more universal than the justifications offered for art-making” (“Good Enough”). I interpret this remark to mean that any particular justification we might develop for the making of art (or its study) will inevitably be more tenuous and transitory than the thing being justified, especially if the ultimate “payoff” of the humanities is defined in vague terms. Needless to say, the pressure to justify the humanities in terms of something else, seemingly more valuable than the humanities themselves, has been acute during recent decades. Yet almost everyone already working in the humanities tacitly agrees that the products of the human intelligence are worth studying, that human culture is inherently valuable and rewarding of our most dedicated attentions. This consensus is shared, arguably, by defenders of established canons but equally by most of those who want to open the canon to previously excluded forms of cultural expression.

In my view, then, receptivity, defined as the capacity to respond to the inherently valuable “raw material” of the humanities, is a prerequisite to meaningful scholarship and teaching in these fields. I also believe that

fostering such receptivity should be the ultimate goal of both teaching and research. This position might be somewhat more controversial than it sounds. By placing the principle of receptivity at the fore, I take issue with some conventional thinking. What many academics want to do, after all, is to produce arguments that are acceptable according to the norms of academia, instructing their students, likewise, on how to replicate the characteristic structure of such arguments. Works of music, art, literature, and philosophy become a mere pretext for exercises in a sterile academic formalism.

A recent argument developed by Gerald Graff exemplifies the undervaluation of the products of human intelligence in favor of modes of academic discourse whose value is entirely conventional. In “Why How We Read Trumps What We Read,” Graff contends that a convincing contribution to academic discourse can be developed about any text at all. Therefore, he argues, the inherent value of the text does not enter into play: we must read our texts as academics, employing the tools of the trade, and the value of our arguments does not depend on the value (or lack of value) of the primary texts.

Graff’s own example, however, leads me to the opposite conclusion. The fact that a clever academic can develop an academically plausible argument about a work that by his own admission is rather trivial—in this case the ghostwritten autobiography of a minor American celebrity—does not mean that “how we read trumps what we read,” but simply that the form and style of conventional academic arguments are frighteningly easy to replicate and to parody.<sup>1</sup> Interestingly enough, Graff does not claim that the products of mass culture are of any value at all *except* as fodder for a certain kind of scholarly discourse. He therefore deliberately chooses an example that he knows his readers will hold in low esteem. His predictable choice to contrast the memoirs of Vanna White with *Hamlet* shows the deep-rooted conservatism of his mentality, since these staged comparisons ultimately reinforce the rigid categories they are meant to question. Graff seems to realize that something is amiss, since he concludes his article by arguing that scholars can only *learn* to make sophisticated arguments by engaging with great works of literature:

I like to think my reading of *Vanna Speaks* is intellectually substantial, but I was taught to produce such a reading by texts of far higher quality and by a good deal of literary and cultural criticism, particularly the kind that offers against-the-grain readings or that views the text as symptomatic of cultural or psychological patterns—in this case contradictions—rather than aware and in control of them. (73)

In other words, it is difficult to train a new generation of scholars to make sophisticated arguments by relying *only* on texts of negligible value, since

“readers are unlikely to produce rewarding readings of these texts (or of any other texts) unless they have read other texts that are more rewarding” (Graff 73) Nevertheless, what makes a text “rewarding,” for Graff, is its capacity to engender academic argument of the type that makes the text “symptomatic” of something else—presumably more significant than the text itself. The metaphor of the *symptom* tends to take away power, agency, and self-awareness from the work of art itself while privileging the critic’s knowingness.

The obvious objection to Graff’s line of argument is that readers lacking a sophisticated critical vocabulary still respond to texts in a meaningful way; presumably they did so before the current forms of academic criticism (“how we read,” in Graff’s terms) came into existence. The existence of art even in cultures that lack formal systems of criticism implies that its *raison d’être* is distinct from the role it plays in legitimating academic discourse (or being legitimated by such discourse). We see powerful forms of *receptivity* in the way one writer influences another, in translations, and in other varieties of reception quite distinct from scholarly argumentation. Conventional academic criticism, in fact, often appears to be a comparatively *weak* form of response, especially when it takes a perfunctory, formulaic mode. The quality of receptivity does not logically depend on the ability to translate this response into acceptable forms of academic discourse. What is more, the translation of readerly receptivity into formulaic argument can actually have an *impoverishing* effect, reducing a powerfully transformative and complex event to a mere *symptom* or byproduct. Only cultural objects considered to be of negligible value in the first place could possibly come out ahead in this kind of exchange. Indeed, academic discourse of the type championed by Graff tends to reduce the value of complex texts even as it finds a spurious complexity in Vanna White.

A merely *appreciative* criticism, however, also fails to do justice to the power of receptivity. It is not enough to stand in awe before the great products of the human intelligence: scholarship in the humanities also requires the *translation* of receptivity into sophisticated academic discourses. The real problem, then, lies in the difficulty of constructing arguments that translate the transformative power of receptivity into critical metalanguages without sacrificing too much in the process. There can be no readymade translation between the way we experience art and the way we write about it. Literary theory does not provide a fixed *methodology* for producing insights into literature, or for translating insights into a critical metalanguage—despite those unfortunate textbooks that purport to instruct the student on how to perform a Marxist, a Freudian, or a Deconstructive reading of a text. The use of theory as *methodology* is particularly infelicitous when it filters out the most interesting features of the reader’s response. We’ve all had the experience of seemingly intelligent students who write papers barren of insight because they have found no way of

mediating between the richness of their own receptivity and the formulaic quality of the academic arguments they are attempting to reproduce. I myself have often felt frustrated that my published scholarship includes so low a percentage of my total knowledge and experience of literature, leaving out perhaps eighty percent of what I think I know. It is unrealistic, perhaps, to expect much more than this: the goal should be to find ways of writing about literature that minimize the damage.

My impatience with the perpetuation of academic argumentation for its own sake is shared by many others in the humanities. In the same issue of *Profession* in which Graff's article appears, David Steiner is less than enthusiastic about Graff's "invitation to master the metadiscourse of academic argument" (51). (Graff, in turn, complains that Steiner "caricatures and trivializes this argument" [73], but he does not explain why this view is a caricature.) Amanda Anderson also examines Graff's "argument for argument," contrasting it with "the emphasis on *Bildung* and ethos" (19). Although she does find some value in Graff's approach, she makes it sound soullessly mechanical in its application: "Like a certain form of political proceduralism, Graff's pedagogical program relies on minimal and easily transmissible forms, which he offers as clear templates to be presented to students" (20). Mark Edmundson is also opposed to such readymade templates, suggesting a moratorium on "readings": "By a reading, I mean the application of an analytical vocabulary—Marx's, Freud's, Foucault's, Derrida's, or whoever's—to describe and (usually) judge a work of literary art" ("Reading" 56).

All of these essays from this issue of *Profession* are engaged in a debate between two views of literary studies, one that is *procedural* and another that is *transformative*. Is the point to master the metadiscourse of academic criticism in order to satisfy certain institutional demands, or to open ourselves up to the transformational power of literature itself? Steiner agrees begrudgingly with Terry Eagleton in finding that liberal humanists "grossly overestimate its transformational power" (51), but we could also point out that writers like Eagleton and Graff have done their best to neutralize this power. Academic proceduralism, in other words, has the effect of keeping literature enclosed within safely predictable borders so that it can remain subordinated to the needs of literary critics in the university, with their notorious suspicion of their object of study. We can turn this question around and ask what could possibly be more transformative than literature, since it is difficult to think of anything that has *more* impact in the formation of subjectivities, both individually and at the level of cultures and subcultures. It is only a slight exaggeration to call subjectivity itself a literary invention. Since I see no need to draw a line around literature in order to separate it from other products of the human intelligence, I would also include other forms of cultural expression traditionally in the domain of the arts and humanities, including film, music, dance, painting, sculpture,

and architecture, along with written texts that are not “literary” in the narrow sense. It is fairly obvious that such expressions lend whole cultures their distinctive identities, so it seems rather odd to think that it is an exaggeration to emphasize their power to mold individual subjectivities.

Literary theory, when understood as a mechanistic methodological proceduralism, is often the nemesis of receptivity. Rita Felski has argued that “the hermeneutics of suspicion” has led to a devaluing of many forms of readerly response:

Art is the quintessentially mood-altering substance. Broaching questions of aesthetic emotion virtually guarantees surges of animation and spirited engagement in the classroom, as I’ve also found in discussions of the sublime, perhaps the only affective response to have gained a dose of critical respect. Yet a wide spectrum of responses remains unexamined and unaccounted for: trance-like states of immersion or absorption in literature’s virtual worlds; surges of sympathy or mistrust, affinity or alienation, triggered by particular formal devices; the suddenness with which we can fall in love with, or feel ourselves addressed by, an author’s style; less auspicious, but all too frequent, feelings of fretfulness, irritation, or boredom. (“After Suspicion” 31)

Felski’s book, *Uses of Literature*, develops a “neo-phenomenological” approach that explores some of these responses in more detail, devoting separate chapters to four categories: “Recognition,” “Enchantment,” “Knowledge,” and “Shock.” Felski tries to avoid both “ideological” and “theological” readings: in other words, arguments deriving from the hermeneutics of suspicion as well as those that sacralize literature.

Superficially, at least, my argument for the value of receptivity resembles other recent attempts to champion a primordial “love of literature,” against the overintellectualizing demands of theory, or to restore beauty and aesthetic response to their proper place in literary criticism. These tendencies are understandable responses to the type of sterile academic argufying embraced with such enthusiasm by Graff and others of his ilk, but I reject the anti-intellectual overtones I hear in them. The notion of a primordial “love of literature” seems unobjectionable, but receptivity entails an openness to things that we don’t necessarily love, a willingness to allow ourselves to be influenced by things we find alien, off-putting, or even repulsive. Students, like their professors, will not love or even like every text they read or study. I also reject the idea that love is the opposite of theory. If anything, the study of literature should be more theoretical rather than less so, since literary theory is itself a valuable product of human intelligence and, at its best, provides examples of how other highly developed receptors have experienced literature. The literary criticism of Barthes, Derrida, and Foucault is instructive in this respect: typically, these theorists do not apply

their own theories mechanistically to the literary text, but use the text as a heuristic in order to develop new ideas. In *Death and the Labyrinth*, for example, Foucault does not offer a “Foucauldian reading” of Raymond Roussel, but attempts to understand Roussel on Roussel’s own terms.

Like “love of literature,” appeals to “beauty” or “the aesthetic” can be problematic. Such appeals often work to limit rather than to expand receptivity by confusing beauty with what any particular audience will accept or find pleasing. *Beauty* can denote, simply, an adherence to conventional standards of prettiness or acceptability. A listener might choose to talk about his or her experience of the music of John Coltrane as *emotional, intellectual, spiritual, aesthetic, corporeal, rhythmic, or musical* (or some combination of these and probably other words as well). Different listeners might even attach differing meanings to these particular terms. It does not seem particularly useful, then, to define the limits of receptivity in advance or to accord any special privilege to the notion of the *aesthetic* or the *beautiful*, in their narrower definitions. The capacity to respond to beauty per se is only one part of receptiveness—unless we decide to use *beauty* to refer to the total impact of a work of art in all its dimensions. I happen to find Coltrane’s music beautiful both when it is conventionally pretty *and* when it pushes against aesthetic limits.

My suspicion of conventional ideas of love and beauty suggests that what is really at stake in receptivity are the *limits* of response. After all, most people find no problem being receptive to things they already admire and identify with. In practice, any particular reader will have strong limitations in receptivity. Personally, I have difficulty responding with generosity to Robert Duncan’s poetry, which I find needlessly grandiose and self-congratulatory. Yet surely it would be a mistake to see my resistance as anything more than a rather banal example of the limits of receptivity of a single, recalcitrant individual. The knowledge that other accomplished readers see great value in Duncan’s work holds my arrogance in check. Receptivity entails humility—the knowledge of one’s own limits—and a certain self-awareness in one’s effort to overcome these limits in an active way. Some of the best scholarly work, in fact, occurs at the border where receptivity meets resistance: I might someday write something more engaging on Robert Duncan than someone who has never felt any ambivalence.

This tension between receptivity and resistance leads me to conclude that there is no fixed way of distinguishing between those products of the human intelligence that are worthy of attention and those that are not. In principle, any claim—for any work of art—can be heard. The problem with many attempts to reaffirm the value of traditional literary canons is that they depend on unhelpful dichotomies between treasure and trash, much like the one Graff establishes between Hamlet and Vanna White. Not coincidentally, this is also the problem with approaches to cultural studies that

systematically undervalue their own materials, unwittingly reproducing the cultural hierarchy that cultural studies itself ought to be calling into question.

### What Lorca Knew

Federico García Lorca is a particularly elusive figure whose poetic achievement poses challenges to both “ideological” and “theological” approaches to literature. An approach rooted in the “hermeneutics of suspicion” might help to untangle his numerous ideological contradictions: his orientalism, his promotion of Spanish cultural exceptionalism, his internalized homophobia, and his sacralization of violence come to mind. In my recent book *Apocryphal Lorca*, I myself adopted a skeptical attitude toward Lorca’s North American reception, finding that poets in the United States were not nearly suspicious enough of their own romantic stereotypes of Spanish culture.

Surely nothing could be worse than a naïve “love of Lorca” that merely mimicked the most problematic dimensions of the poet’s own ideology. And yet ideological critique cannot really explain why Lorca is such a compelling figure in the first place. What I propose, then, is to explore what Lorca can teach us if we remain receptive to his work. I have often asked myself “what Lorca knew” (referring to the title of Henry James’s novel *What Maisie Knew*). In contrast to the “poet-professors” of his own generation, men like Jorge Guillén and Dámaso Alonso, Lorca did not seem particularly erudite. His essays on literature typically take the form of oral lectures rather than critical editions or academic essays. I would suggest, in the first place, that Lorca possessed considerable knowledge of the *performative* and the *pragmatic* dimensions of literature: oral traditions, dramaturgy, prosody, and the musical setting of poetic texts. He was also knowledgeable about music, dance, and painting.

Since many of these areas fall outside of conventional definitions of academic erudition (for scholars of literature at least), a large proportion of Lorca’s expertise becomes virtually invisible. A similar case is that of Claudio Rodríguez, a poet who, like Lorca, is often considered a sort of naïve genius who wrote in a fervor of “ebriedad” (drunkenness). Rodríguez’s master’s thesis “El elemento mágico en las canciones infantiles de corro castellanas” (The Magical Element in Castilian Children’s Songs “in the Round”) and Lorca’s lecture on Spanish lullabies (“Las nanas infantiles”) reveal poets who look for inspiration in popular culture (Rodríguez 29–76; García Lorca 113–31). There are several similarities between their approaches: both Lorca and Rodríguez are studying folkloric poems, ones that they themselves have collected from the oral tradition, in a *performative* context, with reference to the real-life uses of literature; both



lullabies and songs sung in the *corro* are associated with childhood and lack the prestige associated even with other forms of folklore, like the lyrics of the *cante jondo* (deep song). Yet neither poet-scholar shows disdain for his object of study.

It is worth remembering that Claudio Rodríguez made his living as a professor of literature. I myself was his student, and I am still trying to put into practice some of the lessons that I learned in his class many years ago. As I remember, he was interested in knowledge as it is embodied in human experience. He would talk, for example, about the way a person's body would bear the physical marks of his or her profession. He placed a high value on the kinetic knowledge of a skilled dancer, bullfighter, or athlete. One anecdote concerned a rural Spaniard who would sit with his hands on his knees without moving from this posture for many hours at a time. I do not recall the context of this discussion, but it was related to Rodríguez's close attention to our physical being-in-the-world. The knowledge that Miguel Delibes had of hunting, in both its human and natural dimensions, is an analogous form of literary "erudition" from the domain of prose fiction and nonfiction.

We have words like *intuition* to describe varieties of cognition that are not primarily intellectual. Nevertheless, the kind of embodied knowledge present in Lorca, Rodríguez, or Delibes is pragmatic and technical rather than mystically ineffable. Breaking down the delivery of a baseball pitcher or the complex prosody of Rodríguez's *Canto del caminar* requires a particular kind of attentiveness to detail. Curiously, I forgot much of what Claudio had taught me when I wrote about his own poetry, in my first book (Mayhew, *Claudio Rodríguez*). My aim at the time was "to interpret the hell out of it," so to speak, and I left to one side this crucial aspect of his work. I did argue at times that Rodríguez was a savvier, more self-conscious poet than other critics had allowed, but I was not as attentive as I should have been to his knowledge of the natural world or his sensitivity to the embodiment of knowledge.

Lorca, although he was not a professor of literature like Salinas or Guillén—or a member of the Real Academia like Rodríguez and Delibes—possessed extensive knowledge of literature in the more conventional, academic sense too. Older views of him as an unschooled creator have given way to more nuanced perspectives (Mayhew, *Apocryphal Lorca* 8–14). With the same knowledge and a different temperament, and perhaps a longer lifespan as well, he might have been another of the famed poet-scholars of his epoch. He also produced one of the most influential texts of twentieth-century poetics, the lecture "Juego y teoría del duende" (Play and Theory of the Duende; García Lorca 150–62). This lecture is often invoked to justify a variety of anti-intellectual poetics, since the *duende* is defined, following Goethe, as a "poder misterioso que todos sienten y ningún filósofo explica" (a mysterious power that everyone feels and no philosopher explains; 131).

Nevertheless, Lorca's own explanation of the *duende* is surprisingly complex. I once sat down a few hours before class to write a brief glossary of the musical, literary, and artistic references in Lorca's lecture and quickly realized that it would require several weeks of research just to track down his allusions to Italian Renaissance art and other, sometimes obscure references. It would take a great deal more time to understand how and why Lorca uses them. The *duende* is a moving target framed by a dizzying number of metaphors and allusions.

As Roberta Quance has pointed out, "[i]n Lorca's lecture *duende* is invoked in both the creation and transmission of a work of art, yet critics have paid little attention to the latter, concentrating instead on *duende* as a theory of inspiration which affects the author" (Quance). This is a crucial insight that confirms my own conviction that one of the things Lorca's lecture is about is the *performative transmission* of artistic creativity. In other words, this lecture provides a model for the teaching of receptivity rather than just another theory of poetic inspiration. Significantly, Lorca composed this text, as was his habit, as a lecture for oral performance rather than an essay to be read on the page.<sup>2</sup>

My undergraduate course on popular oral traditions in the Hispanic world, which I have given twice, attempts to put Lorquian theory into practice. This course deals with three major traditions: the *refranero*, the *romancero*, and the *cancionero* (collections of proverbs, ballads, songs) from medieval times to the present day. The last time I taught it, I also included a segment on the improvised "décima" in Cuba, using YouTube videos where appropriate. My students produced a variety of final projects. One composed song lyrics after the model of the fifteenth-century *cancionero*, set them to music, and performed them for the class. Another interviewed several native speakers of Spanish to elicit their knowledge of proverbs. One test of receptivity is the ability to convert one's reaction into something else: a translation, an imaginative critical essay, a song-setting. Some of the materials we looked at in class were remote from my students' experience, but they were able to make connections between the traditions we were studying and their own experience of music and proverbs. Although the "song and dance" component of the course had some entertainment value, its purpose was to demonstrate that poetry is a vibrantly performative art-form.

Some of this same material, taught at the graduate level, had a rather different effect. In the fall semester of 2009, I taught a graduate seminar on "Poetry and Performance" with my colleague Jill Kuhnheim, a specialist in Spanish American poetry and cultural studies.<sup>3</sup> Curiously, students in this course seminar had a more difficult time than my undergraduates in knowing what to *do* with this material. They were expected to write academically valid seminar papers according to the most stringent standards, but for better or for worse, our course materials did not always lend themselves to the

formulae of academic argumentation. The process of negotiation or *translation* among the students' own scholarly interests, the theoretical readings (Lorca's lectures and essays collected in Charles Bernstein's *Close Listening*, among others), and the performances of poetry that we listened to in class, turned out to be far from automatic. Some students told me that the course was extremely interesting, but that they found the course materials difficult to work with. A few of them, understandably enough, solved the problem by reverting to more conventional forms of literary analysis. Some of their final projects, although excellent in other respects, were not particularly attuned to the performative dimension of poetry and the particular challenges posed by the theoretical texts we had discussed in class, despite their extensive exposure to performance theory in several of their other courses.

When these students presented their own performances of poetry in groups, however, it became clear that they were capable of thinking about the pragmatic dimension of performance in highly creative ways. This activity (which was Jill Kuhnheim's idea, not mine) was perhaps the most successful component of the course. From the care and thought that had gone into these performances, I could see that these graduate students would go on to be gifted teachers of literature. The question, then, is how I could have better encouraged them to transfer some of that creative energy into their scholarly writing.

What I am still searching for, then, is a way of bringing this active engagement with poetry and performance into both my own writing and my graduate teaching. The problem, once again, is one of translation: scholarship at the highest level still has the requirement of putting forth intellectually valid arguments, but it also needs to embody the Lorquian spirit of receptivity. I feel strongly, however, that turning scholarship into a less serious enterprise is not the answer. Creative receptivity should make literary criticism more rather than less rigorous. The idea is not to make literature serve our own arguments, but to forge critical practices that do justice to literature itself.

The perpetual crisis of confidence in the humanities coincides (not so coincidentally, perhaps) with the dominance of the "hermeneutics of suspicion" and of the "argument for argument"—the idea that what we do in the humanities can be reduced to the abstract and formulaic proceduralism that can be exercised in any context whatsoever, with no regard to the value of our raw materials. The inevitable reaction against these two developments has brought renewed attention to the principle I have identified here as "receptivity." This is not a narrowing of the field or a return to a reactionary definition of the canon. In fact, receptivity entails an openness to every possible expression of human creativity and thus has the power to invigorate both our teaching and our scholarship.

## Notes

1. Graff's argument is that Vanna White (or her ghostwriter) presents her life as both banal and glamorous, creating both identification and distance from her audience. Needless to say, I find this apparent paradox less than overwhelming. The problem is that the argument ultimately collapses on itself: the only thing that puts Vanna's life beyond the reach of her fans is her contact with other minor celebrities like Pat Sajak, but if we assume that Sajak is as banal as Vanna, then this argument is circular.
2. My use of the "duende" lecture here does not pretend to account for the complexity of the text. I plan to write about Lorca's lecture in more detail in another article.
3. My reflections on this course are mine alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Professor Kuhnheim.

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