A Class of Solution to Bargaining Problems

Thomson, William
1978-10
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A Class of Solution to Bargaining Problems

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1978-10

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Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota

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Working Paper

Abstract

In his classic paper on the bargaining problem, Nash characterized the unique solution to satisfy a list of four axioms. A generalization of one of them, his independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom, is proposed. In conjunction to the other three, it is shown to yield a whole class of new solutions. Examples are provided. The most general reformulation of the axiom is incompatible with single-valuedness of solutions; solution correspondences are then defined and an existence result is provided.

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Center for Economic Research Discussion Papers

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Discussion Paper
103

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Thomson, W., (1978), "A Class of Solution to Bargaining Problems", Discussion Paper No. 103, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota.

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Thomson, William. (1978). A Class of Solution to Bargaining Problems. Retrieved from the University Digital Conservancy, https://hdl.handle.net/11299/54962.

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