Three papers on collective bargaining reform and labor economics

Abstract

This dissertation focuses on identifying the microeconomic effects of state-level policies intendedto reduce labor union’s collective bargaining power. The first two chapters look at right-to-work (RTW) laws, which allow workers covered by union contracts to opt out of union membership. Chapter 1 focuses on the labor market effects of five recent RTW laws passed in the 2010s, finding that the laws suppressed wages in union-dense industries but did not have meaningful effects on employment or business activity. Chapter 2 delves into the mechanics behind this finding, looking at union organizing activity along state borders, where one side is RTW and the other is now. “Crossing into” an RTW state is associated with lower frequencies of NLRB elections and fewer workers joining unions, conditional on employment and establishment counts and other state policies. Chapter 3 focuses on the public sector and the relationship between collective bargaining and wage returns to job tenure. It exploits the exclusion of Wisconsin’s State Patrol from legislation that eliminated public sector collective bargaining rights and finds that compared to the State Patrol, other state law enforcement workers experienced a reduction in average wages. This effect was primarily borne by workers with mid-level seniority, reflecting the specific elimination of bargaining over seniority pay.