University of Minnesota, Center for Austrian Studies
We test for substitutability of wage differentials and accident insurance benefits in late imperial Austria, where a new and extensive social insurance system produced good quality statistics. We establish that workers earned compensating wage differentials and that accident insurance benefits acted as substitutes for those market based differentials. The movement from negligence liability to compulsory accident insurance in 1887 induced both gains to workers in the form of income certainty, and losses in the form of smaller risk differentials.
Murray, J. E. and Nilsson, L. 2006. Risk Compensation for Workers in Late Imperial Austria. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, Center for Austrian Studies. Working Paper 06-2.
Murray, John E.; Nilsson, Lars.
Risk Compensation for Workers in Late Imperial Austria.
University of Minnesota, Center for Austrian Studies.
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